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From Africa Recovery, Vol.14#2 (July 2000), page 8

Sierra Leone: peacekeeping under fire

UN mission short on trained forces, equipment, global backing

By Michael Fleshman

The repudiation of the nearly year-old peace agreement in Sierra Leone by rebel forces reignited the country's long civil conflict and thrust the UN peacekeeping mission into a war for which it was neither mandated nor equipped. Some observers, particularly in developed countries, were highly critical of the operation, arguing that the UN was naive to trust the rebels' commitment to peace and negligent in deploying poorly trained and lightly armed troops.

The record, however, shows that senior UN officials and the Security Council were fully aware of the challenges awaiting the organization's peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and that Secretary-General Kofi Annan had repeatedly sought -- but did not obtain -- the resources required from member states to meet those challenges.

When rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked UN personnel on 1 May, the peace agreement collapsed. Within days, nearly 500 peacekeepers in the RUF-controlled north and east had themselves been disarmed and seized. The under-strength UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) retreated to defensive positions around the capital, Freetown.

As of early July, additional UNAMSIL troops have arrived. RUF leader Foday Sankoh is in government custody as the UN considers a government request for a tribunal to try him for war crimes. Fighting between rebels and government and UNAMSIL troops continues, while the international community is debating how -- and with whom -- to restart the peace process.

Early doubts

UN officials had expressed strong reservations about aspects of the Sierra Leone peace agreement from the outset. The agreement had been intended to end a brutal civil war that began in 1991 between the RUF and the Sierra Leone government, with the latter supported by a Nigerian-led regional force, the Economic Community of West African States' Military Observer Group (ECOMOG). A statement eventually led West African leaders to initiate a process of negotiations, resulting in the signing on 7 July 1999 of a peace accord in Lomé, Togo. It provided for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of rebel forces, the formation of a government of national unity and new elections under international supervision. Although the UN was not a direct party to the talks that produced the accord, the agreement called for a UN monitoring role alongside ECOMOG. In return, Mr. Sankoh was made vice-president, and, together with his soldiers, pardoned for human rights abuses committed during the war.

While the UN Secretary-General welcomed the end of the war, he explicitly expressed reservations about one aspect of the accord: a blanket pardon granted the rebels for human rights abuses committed during the war. These included chopping off the arms of some 100,000 people and the forced recruitment of child soldiers. Mr. Annan said that the UN would not be bound by that part of the accord, since the pardons "shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law."

Less than a month later, when the rebels detained the first UN observers, Mr. Annan reported to the Security Council that there had been "serious challenges" to the agreement. When ECOMOG announced that it would have to reduce its military presence in Sierra Leone, Mr. Annan then requested member states to provide for a fully fledged peacekeeping mission of some 6,000 military personnel. He cautioned that "in view of the volatility of the security situation in Sierra Leone and the fragility of the peace process, the United Nations force should be large and capable, and should operate on the basis of robust rules of engagement."

The military capability of UNAMSIL took on added importance in late December 1999 when ECOMOG announced that it would shortly withdraw its forces entirely. The absence of international financial and logistical support for ECOMOG, West African political leaders said, meant that the region could no longer afford to maintain its costly presence there.

"Credible" force sought

The withdrawal of all regional forces and increasing rebel violations of the peace agreement, Mr. Annan told the council in January 2000, made it vital that UNAMSIL, "through its military presence, military capabilities and posture be able to deter attempts to derail the peace process." To achieve that, he noted, "a sizable and militarily credible United Nations force would be required." He recommended that UNAMSIL's military component be increased to 11,100, with a broader mandate to ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN and humanitarian personnel, protect civilians at risk of attack and assume security functions previously performed by the departing West African peacekeepers.

Military capabilities again dominated the Security Council debate on 7 February. Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hedi Annabi informed the council that some battalions had arrived to join UNAMSIL without essential equipment. This lack of preparedness had compromised their effectiveness and led to instances in January in which large numbers of peacekeepers were disarmed by rebel forces. The RUF leader, Mr. Annabi also noted, had instructed his forces not to allow UNAMSIL troops into rebel-

controlled areas. Nevertheless, Mr. Annabi said ECOMOG's withdrawal meant that the UN needed to accelerate the deployment of additional peacekeeping units in rebel-held areas "despite the substantial risks in doing so."

It was a risk the Security Council chose to take, voting unanimously to expand the size and mandate of the mission. UK Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock told the council that because of the difficulties being encountered by UNAMSIL personnel, "troop contributors must ensure that their troops are of a high standard, ready and able to meet the challenges that they face."

It would be other countries' soldiers who would have to meet those challenges, however. None of the permanent Security Council members, including those with the world's largest and best-equipped armed forces, offered to contribute military contingents to UNAMSIL. Instead, the UN utilized troops made available by developing countries, including some of the world's poorest, which lack the training, equipment and logistical support of the armies of major powers.

When RUF forces started taking UN captives this May, UNAMSIL remained far short of its authorized troop strength and was still scrambling to find the necessary equipment and supplies for many of the troops it had.

UN officials have been calling attention to structural weaknesses inherent in the way peacekeeping operations currently are planned, staffed and implemented. In his 3 April 2000 "Millennium Report" on the UN's future, Mr. Annan noted these were problems "only member states can fix." The peacekeeping system was often likened to a volunteer fire brigade, he commented, "but that description is too generous. Every time there is a fire, we must first find fire engines and the funds to run them before we can start dousing any flames. The present system relies almost entirely on last minute, ad-hoc arrangements." In early June, Mr. Annan reminded reporters that he had called for the rapid reinforcement of UNAMSIL, but "those governments with the capacity did not respond. The UN can be as effective and strong as the governments want it to be." Recommendations by an expert panel on UN peacekeeping operations is expected to be presented at the 6-8 September Millennium Assembly.

"Peace on the cheap"

During the critical first 10 days of May, only the UK among the major powers responded to Mr. Annan's appeal for a "rapid reaction" force to reinforce hard-pressed UN units. The UK dispatched warships and a battalion of elite paratroops to secure Freetown and the strategic international airport. The UK action, taken to permit the evacuation of UK citizens from Sierra Leone, is widely credited with stabilizing the defence of Freetown and buying time for the deployment of more and better-equipped UNAMSIL contingents.

The world's leading military power, the US, also pledged support, offering to provide air transport for additional UNAMSIL contingents and "examine the possibilities" of providing needed military equipment. In the end, however, the US response was limited to flying in one load of ammunition to the Jordanian contingent. Washington offered to fly in a battalion of Bangladeshi reinforcements, but reportedly demanded $17-21 mn for the flights -- far above the cost of commercial transport. The Canadian government, by contrast, flew in UNAMSIL reinforcements on military aircraft at no cost to the UN.

Mr. J. Stephen Morrison, Africa director of the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, told a reporter that the deaths of US peacekeepers in Somalia in 1993, and the absence of major US interests led the Clinton government to try to get "peace on the cheap" in Africa without becoming directly involved. Without strong US leadership, he asserted, "robust peace enforcement is beyond the capacity of the United Nations. The Security Council does not have the stomach for it."

Backing mandates with resources

On the night of 11 May the Security Council met in special session at the request of African countries to consider their proposal to upgrade the UNAMSIL mandate from peacekeeping under Chapter 6 of the UN charter, in which the UN intervenes at the request of warring parties, to peace enforcement under Chapter 7, in which the consent of one or more parties is absent and an active combat role is authorized. The council declined to give UNAMSIL an enforcement mandate but subsequently authorized an expansion of the military component to 13,000, with further increases likely.

Mr. Annan told the 11 May meeting that while he was not necessarily opposed to an enforcement mission in Sierra Leone, "the first priority of the council must be to ensure that we have the capacity to carry out the tasks that its mandate implies."

Algerian Ambassador Abdallah Baali, speaking on behalf of the Organization of African Unity, also noted the gap between mission requirements and resources. "This test of UNAMSIL shows very clearly that the mandate and resources available to it are not and never were adequate to the situation." While the Security Council routinely urged developing countries in Africa to take responsibility for African peacekeeping operations, Mr. Baali noted, West Africa had maintained a military presence in Sierra Leone "without the strong material support they were entitled to expect" from industrialized countries.

Bangladesh Ambassador Anwarul Chowdhury addressed the reluctance of many developed countries to participate in peacekeeping operations. "The unfortunate reality," he said, "is that if developing countries stopped responding to the frantic calls of the UN today, there would be no peacekeeping tomorrow, barring a few of the choicest areas in the world which are of significant strategic interest to major powers. We should be grateful that developing countries continue to make contributions to UN peacekeeping," he continued. "Blaming failure on the peacekeeper is the easy way out of fulfilling our collective responsibility."

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