From Africa Recovery, Vol.12#4 (April 1999), page 14

UN mission in CAR makes progress

Central African Republic parties take advantage of international presence to make peace

By John Nyamu

With renewed fighting in Angola and the termination of United Nations peacekeeping operations there, scant international attention has been paid to the success of another significant UN presence in Africa. The UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), which Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Bernard Miyet described as an example of the UN's continuing key role in maintaining international peace and security, has been a significant force for stability since the 1996 military crisis that plunged the country into political paralysis. MINURCA helped organize the legislative elections held on 22 November and 13 December 1998, and it continues to coordinate training for the national police and gendarmerie, among other tasks.

The elections seemed inconclusive -- the government and opposition won 54 and 55 seats, respectively, in the 109-seat legislature. However, says Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji of Nigeria, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, they gave the country an opportunity to realize the importance of "consensus, cohabitation and cooperation."

On 26 February, the Security Council accepted Secretary-General Kofi Annan's recommendation that MINURCA's mandate -- due to end on 28 February -- be extended until 15 November. The Council also authorized MINURCA to play a supportive role in the presidential elections scheduled for October. But that would mark the end of the mission's mandate, the Council added.

In his latest report on the situation in CAR, Mr. Annan had said that the mission should continue to facilitate the resolution of the country's political, economic and security problems. The mission also should help the government establish a "secure environment for the elections and should monitor and verify their conduct." Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hedi Annabi in turn said that the Council's response to the recommended extension of MINURCA's mandate depended on concrete actions by the government to address concerns that had led to the crisis in the country.

The crisis erupted in late 1996, when some members of the armed forces staged three successive mutinies, expressing widespread public discontent over social and economic issues, such as outstanding salary arrears. The crisis threw the country's security forces into chaos, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a proliferation of armed militias comprising political factions opposed to the government of President Ange-Félix Patassé. This, in turn, led to an influx of weapons, many of which got into the hands of civilians.

MINURCA steps in

In December 1996, leaders at the 19th France-Africa summit decided to mediate in the conflict. Their efforts led to the government and opposition groups signing the Bangui Agreement in January 1997. Subsequently, they established a six-nation Inter-African Mission (MISAB) to monitor the agreement. With logistical and financial support from France, MISAB created a military force of 800 African troops, under the command of Gabon. Together with CAR authorities, it initiated a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercise in which up to 93 per cent of heavy weapons and about 58 per cent of light weapons were retrieved from former mutineers, militias and other unlawfully armed people in the country.

The need for MINURCA's deployment arose in step with France's planned withdrawal of support for MISAB by mid-April 1998, which could have meant the collapse of the inter-African mission. One of MINURCA's key roles was to supervise and monitor the storage and final disposition of those weapons. It was also to help coordinate a police training programme, and to give advice and technical support to the national electoral bodies.

Established by the Security Council on 27 March 1998, MINURCA was deployed on 15 April 1998 for an initial period of three months. Since then, its mandate has been extended thrice. With headquarters in Bangui, the mission has a total of 1,369 military and police personnel, comprising 24 civilian police and 1,347 soldiers, under the command of Brigadier-General Barthélemy Ratanga of Gabon. Ambassador Adeniji told Africa Recovery in a telephone interview, "This is practically an all-African mission and I have been impressed by the determination of people to make it work, and to show that given the necessary support by the international community, these (African) conflicts can be managed by Africans." His duty is to promote reforms for national reconciliation, security and stability in the country, and to mediate between the government and opposing political parties. He is mandated to cooperate with other international organizations to establish the foundations for lasting peace, national reconstruction and development.

Ambassador Adeniji said MINURCA's civilian police officers have drawn up an extensive re-training programme, which has so far turned out 180 gendarmes and more than 150 policemen. He felt that the mission would be able to train up to a third of the police and gendarmerie by the end of this year. On capacity-building in other areas, he noted a great need to strengthen the electoral authorities. "The capacity of the National Assembly to do its work, the materials necessary for effective performance by the parliamentarians, in particular, the capacity of those who service the national legislature, all have to be built up," he said.

Limited mandate

MINURCA faced two types of difficulties, Ambassador Adeniji said. The first was linked to the mandate itself and the second concerned the situation within the country. The restricted nature of the mandate limited the mission's impact, making it necessary for the Secretary-General to recommend that it deploy in five locations in the country, in order to facilitate the work of international observers during the legislative elections. A related problem was the piecemeal expansion of the mandate. "All those areas of peace-building which really ought to have been integrated into the mission at the beginning were not. It is only piece by piece that in successive resolutions these were added," he remarked.

Geographical and infrastructural handicaps in the country aggravated the mission's difficulties, Ambassador Adeniji said. "Being a landlocked country, everything either had to be flown in or transported by road from the nearest port in neighbouring Cameroon. It takes ages. The roads are very bad so there is usually considerable delay in getting the materials we need to operate." Other problems stemming from local conditions, he said, included post-conflict distrust and suspicion, so great it has required constant mediation to get anything done.

Compared to the situation in Angola, Ambassador Adeniji stressed, however, that CAR leaders deserve credit for their political will to resolve their many problems peacefully. The opposition in Angola had managed to obtain the vast resources required to mount military operations, and had also enjoyed external assistance, he said, adding, "Fortunately, such resources are not available here, and so far, there is no evidence at all of an external dimension to this crisis." Because the CAR conflict has been internal, it has been easier to manage, in terms of convincing all sides that they have no choice but to make what they have work, Ambassador Adeniji noted. He said the CAR parties have also demonstrated the willingness to take advantage of the presence of the international community, unlike in Angola where the government was pressing the UN to leave.

Although the CAR, comprising several ethnic groups, is one of very few African countries with a national language (Sango), Ambassador Adeniji said ethnicity still emerged as a major factor in the crisis. The military rebellion, for example, was linked to the desire of the dominant group in the army to maintain that domination. Regionalism, pitting the northern savanna people against the southern riverine population, was another factor. He pointed out that the Security Council should note that a credible and large deterrent capacity was vital for the success of peacekeeping missions. In this regard, he stated that MINURCA's force level was not adequate. "It has been able to be effective because it has been given a limited mandate, but in a country of this size, and given the enormity of the initial threat to peace and security, a larger force would have been even more effective," he said.

Ambassador Adeniji emphasized the advantages of effective communication between the mission and the leaders and people of CAR, especially in averting a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the mission's role. "Shortly after we came here, Radio MINURCA was established. That has been a major influence in promoting nationwide awareness of the positive role of the UN. The people now prefer it to other radio stations because they believe they will get impartial and objective reporting of international and national events." He acknowledged the possibility of CAR being drawn into a regional conflagration, especially as the government had concluded a defence agreement with the strife-torn Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). On that basis, the country provided logistical support to the DRC, and allowed its territory to be used by DRC troops in their war against rebels opposed to President Laurent-Désiré Kabila's leadership. "We in MINURCA have always cautioned the government here that it can least afford to be embroiled in this conflict, and we have been assured that it is not the intention of the government to get involved deeply," he said.

Ambassador Adeniji noted that the problems of CAR had been exacerbated by conflicts in neighboring countries. He drew attention to a large number of refugees from Sudan, DRC and Republic of Congo, adding, "there are some from the old [1980s] Chadian crisis who have not gone back to Chad. In the first weeks of this year, the DRC conflict virtually moved next door, with an influx of some 8,000 refugees into CAR over a single weekend." He said this has been a major reason why CAR and its neighbours favour a continued UN presence in Bangui.

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