Introduction
 

29.  Sustainable peace and security for all countries and peoples remains a central objective of the United Nations at the dawn of the twenty-first century, as it was when the Organization was founded over half a century ago. No issue commands more of our attention and resources, as the intense pace of work in the Security Council over the past year has again shown. The international community has sought to respond to complex crises in situations as diverse as those in Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone.

30.  The demands made on the United Nations reflect a shift in the nature of the threats to peace and security since the end of the cold war: from inter-State conflict to intra-State conflict; from the violation of borders to a much greater emphasis on the violation of people. Where conflicts were once driven by the ideological divisions of a bipolar world, they are now fuelled by ethnic and religious intolerance, political ambition and greed, and are often exacerbated by the illicit traffic in arms, gems and drugs.

31.  The demands we face also reflect a growing consensus that collective security can no longer be narrowly defined as the absence of armed conflict, be it between or within States. Gross abuses of human rights, the large-scale displacement of civilian populations, international terrorism, the AIDS pandemic, drug and arms trafficking and environmental disasters present a direct threat to human security, forcing us to adopt a much more coordinated approach to a range of issues. Such an approach, as I made clear in my report to the Millennium Assembly, is one that compels us to think creatively. It requires us, above all, to understand that the various elements that contribute to human security must be addressed in a comprehensive way if we are to sustain durable peace in the future.

32.  That we are already embarked on this path is evidenced by changes in the way we manage our numerous and far-flung peace operations, where there is increasing readiness to work across administrative and institutional boundaries in pursuit of lasting solutions to complex problems.

33.  United Nations peacemakers, peacekeepers and peace-builders around the world have begun to cooperate more closely than ever with Governments and other actors within the United Nations system, with regional bodies, with non-governmental organizations and with the private sector to help create the basis for good governance and the peaceable resolution of differences between parties. The activities now pursued are far more extensive and complex than those of traditional peacekeeping. They include providing emergency relief; demobilizing and reintegrating former combatants; assistance in clearing and destroying mines; constitutional and legal reform; providing advice on the enhancement of human rights; and the creation and reform of state institutions and electoral assistance. Traditional activities, such as monitoring ceasefires, continue to play a critical role in peacekeeping operations.

34.  We have confronted major challenges during the past year and it is clear that there is no room for complacency. Both the United Nations and the Member States that determine its mandates and authorize the resources to accomplish them still have much to learn.

35.  Three major studies issued in the past year have sought to promote a better understanding of the needs and the potential of United Nations peace operations. By commissioning reports on the tragedies that happened in Srebrenica and Rwanda, I hoped to clarify what went wrong — including within the United Nations — in order to suggest what we might do differently in the future. Certain clear lessons emerged from those two reports, which have since been reinforced by experience, particularly that of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. Those lessons include the importance of joint action by Member States and the Secretariat to strengthen the instrument of peacekeeping; the need to understand clearly whether peacekeeping or enforcement is needed in a specific situation; the importance of providing adequate resources to meet mission needs and having, even within peacekeeping operations, a credible deterrent capacity; the importance of preparedness for “worst-case” scenarios; the requirement to improve information flows, both between Member States and the Secretariat and within the Secretariat; and the need for more effective and timely analysis of information from the field. Mutual respect by Member States and the Secretariat for each other’s roles and responsibilities, including arrangements of command and control in the field, is critical, as is the need for political commitment to initiate and sustain operations.

36.  Those two reports also helped us to reflect on the difficult questions surrounding what, in my millennium report, I termed “the dilemma of intervention”. It is, of course, relatively easy for the international community to assert that the tragedies of Rwanda and Srebrenica should never be allowed to happen again. But if the reaction to my address last year to the General Assembly is any guide, I fear we may still prove unable to give a credible answer to the question of what happens next time we are faced with a comparable crime against humanity.

37.  Recognition that many States have serious and legitimate concerns about intervention does not answer the question I posed in my report, namely, if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica — to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity? In essence the problem is one of responsibility: in circumstances in which universally accepted human rights are being violated on a massive scale we have a responsibility to act.

38.  In recognition of the increasingly complex task faced by the United Nations as it seeks to prevent and resolve conflict, and to keep and build the peace, I requested a panel of experts led by the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, Lakhdar Brahimi, to produce a report that would provide an overview of peace operations and suggest how they might be strengthened for the future. The report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations has just been issued. I am gratified that the Panel’s recommendations, some of which I discuss in the introduction to the present report, parallel many of my own proposals, outlined below.
39.  If we do not commit ourselves to these vital reforms, there is a real risk that we will continue to fail to meet the challenge of saving the innocent from the scourge of war. I urge Member States to join with me in acting upon the Panel’s key recommendations.

  Conflict prevention and peacemaking

40.  In recent years the international community has agreed that preventing armed conflict is critical to achieving lasting human security. Conflict prevention, as I put it in my millennium report, is where it all begins. Shifting from a culture of reaction to one of prevention is highly cost-effective both in human and in financial terms. In the early stages of a dispute, parties tend to be less polarized and more flexible and thus more inclined to settle their disputes peacefully than after violent conflict has become entrenched. Prevention also offers the best possible chance to address the root causes of a conflict, and not just its consequences, thus providing a real opportunity to sow the seeds of a durable peace.

41.  Confronting new outbreaks of violent conflict around the world and recognizing the importance of acting proactively, I have continued to strengthen our early warning and conflict prevention capacities. My primary objective has been to make early warning and conflict prevention a day-to-day concern for United Nations staff, both at Headquarters and in the field.

42.  In this context the Department of Political Affairs, serving as the focal point for conflict prevention within the United Nations system, has established a Prevention Team, which meets regularly to identify conflict situations that may offer potential for preventive action. Other departments and agencies have also strengthened their capacity in this area; once a developing crisis has been identified by a United Nations department or agency, consultations are held within the new interdepartmental Framework for Coordination. Meanwhile, the United Nations Staff College at Turin, Italy, in close cooperation with the Secretariat, has launched a conflict prevention training course, so far attended by more than 400 staff members from 22 departments, agencies, offices and programmes.

43. Experience shows that the success of the United Nations in helping to prevent conflicts will hinge upon close collaboration with Member States and a large number of other actors, including regional arrangements, non-governmental organizations and others. Following a high-level meeting held in New York in July 1998, we established a programme for coordination in conflict prevention with regional organizations, and have sought to improve our contacts with a variety of non-governmental actors. Such efforts should not obscure the fact that the primary responsibility for the prevention of conflict lies with Member States. Successful conflict prevention, under United Nations auspices, ultimately requires the political will to provide the necessary leadership and resources for action.

44.  I therefore welcome the growing attention Member States have paid to conflict prevention. This was most vividly demonstrated in the general debate during the fifty-fourth session of the General Assembly, as well as in the ground-breaking open debates on conflict prevention held by the Security Council in November 1999 and July 2000 and the comprehensive action plan adopted by the Group of Eight in July. The far-reaching presidential statements adopted by the Security Council indicated the broad commitment of Member States to improving the capacity of the United Nations for effective preventive action. It is important that this momentum is maintained and I look forward to engaging with Member States directly on this issue in the coming months.

45.  No region in the world illustrates the need to prevent conflict, and the costs of the failure to do so, more dramatically than Africa. The dreadful human cost inflicted by conflicts in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, the Sudan and elsewhere is self-evident. Tragically, despite the collective efforts of the international community to avert a resumption of hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia, including a visit to both countries by a delegation of the Security Council, fierce fighting resumed in May 2000, inflicting high levels of casualties and widespread destruction.

46.  Assisting Eritrea and Ethiopia to resolve their conflict through support for the mediation efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has been a major preoccupation during the past year. I urged the leaders of the parties to pursue a peaceful settlement and asked my Special Envoy on Africa, to assist OAU in this regard. On 18 June, an agreement on the cessation of hostilities was signed — a necessary first step towards the restoration of peace through a comprehensive peace settlement. The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea will soon be deployed on the border between the two countries, and we will assist in implementing the agreement and providing support for the mediation efforts of OAU.

47.  In Burundi, the designation of former President Nelson Mandela as the new facilitator of the peace process, after the death of former President Julius Nyerere in October 1999, brought new momentum to the Arusha process. United Nations assistance to the peace process increased with the provision of technical and conference service support, in addition to the assignment of a senior political adviser to the facilitator. I have also raised the profile of our involvement by designating a Special Representative for the Great Lakes region, with special emphasis on Burundi.

48.  In the quest for peace in Somalia there have been many false dawns. The Government of Djibouti’s peace initiative for Somalia is therefore something I have warmly welcomed. The Somali National Peace Conference, which opened at Arta, Djibouti, in May, has seen considerable success and secured the participation of a wide spectrum of Somalis. The extent of participation by a number of Somali groups and individuals remains mixed, however, “Somaliland”, in particular, remaining firmly outside the peace process. Success will continue to depend on the extent of unity that Somalis can achieve in reaching agreement on future political arrangements for their country.

49.  Meanwhile, the war in Angola, which resumed in October 1998, continues to cause terrible suffering. Almost 3.7 million people are internally displaced and hundreds of thousands more have been forced to flee their country. While the Government of Angola has weakened the military capabilities of UNITA, it is aware that military force alone will not bring peace to the country and has reiterated its commitment to the Lusaka Protocol. The United Nations is committed to working closely with the Government of Angola and all others concerned to help bring the war to an end and restore peace in the country. To this end, I have asked my Adviser for Special Assignments in Africa to pay particular attention to Angola.

50.  It is encouraging to note that African States themselves are increasingly determined to work together to avert the outbreak of new conflicts and to promote peace in the region. This was demonstrated when a sudden and unconstitutional change of government occurred in Côte d’Ivoire in December 1999 and States of the region took the lead, with support from the United Nations, in seeking to help Côte d’Ivoire to restore constitutional order.

51.  An area of renewed engagement of United Nations efforts in the last year — and one that has seen significant progress — is the Middle East. For 22 years, United Nations peacekeepers have served in southern Lebanon in one of our longest standing peacekeeping commitments anywhere in the world. Following several missions to the region by my Special Envoy, I reported to the Security Council on 16 June that Israeli forces had withdrawn from Lebanon in compliance with Council resolution 425 (1978). Soon afterwards, I visited the countries of the region to encourage the parties and other regional leaders to support the efforts to consolidate the restoration of peace and stability in Lebanon. Notwithstanding the reservations of the Governments of Lebanon and Israel about the withdrawal line, they both confirmed that they would respect the line as identified by the United Nations. After Israel withdrew its forces, the Government of Lebanon began to reassert law and order functions throughout the area.

52.  The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon is being reinforced so that it may carry out its responsibilities under the resolution. I trust that the international community will be quick to assist Lebanon with the task of reconstructing the economy in the south and rebuilding its links with the rest of the country. In August 2000, I appointed a Personal Representative for Southern Lebanon to coordinate United Nations efforts and assist in bringing peace and stability to the region.
53.  I have also been encouraged by the renewed bilateral and multilateral efforts in search of a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. At the Camp David summit hosted by President Clinton, the quest for a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians reached a crucial stage. I hope that the parties will persist in their efforts to bring the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the permanent status agreement to a successful conclusion.

54.  Iraq’s lack of compliance with various Security Council resolutions continues to be of grave concern. After lengthy negotiations, the Security Council adopted resolution 1284 (1999) on 17 December 1999, replacing the United Nations Special Commission with a new inspection agency for Iraq, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). I appointed an Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and a College of Commissioners to act as an advisory body. Iraq, however, has not accepted the resolution.

55. There has been no United Nations presence in Iraq since December 1998 to ensure Iraq’s compliance with Security Council resolutions concerning its programmes of weapons of mass destruction. In its resolution 1284 (1999) the Security Council also reiterated Iraq’s obligations to repatriate all Kuwaiti and third-country missing nationals and return all Kuwaiti property. Iraq has not agreed to cooperate with the high-level coordinator I appointed to deal with these issues, and the matter remains unresolved.

56.  The challenge of bringing peace to Afghanistan, another of the world’s intractable conflicts, remains daunting. The past year has seen scant progress, as the warring factions have evidenced little enthusiasm for a negotiated settlement. Meanwhile there has been a continuing influx of war materiel from outside powers, in clear violation of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and the Tashkent Declaration signed by the “six plus two” group of countries in July 1999. Since his appointment in February 2000 my Personal Representative and Head of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan has established an ongoing dialogue with Afghan leaders, including the Taliban and the United Front, as well as with other countries whose assistance will be essential if an overall settlement is to be achieved.

57.  The fragility of the region remains evident in the continuing tensions between India and Pakistan. It is regrettable that the two countries, both of which tested nuclear devices two years ago, have not been able to resume their bilateral dialogue. In Kashmir the situation along the line of control remains precarious and the level of violence and insecurity has increased. This is unacceptable. In this context, proposals currently under discussion aimed at resolving the conflict should be encouraged. Meanwhile, the worsening of the internal conflict in Sri Lanka has increased the concern of the international community, which has offered its backing to Norway’s facilitation efforts.

58.  I have paid close attention to positive developments on the Korean peninsula, where the follow-up to the recent historic inter-Korean summit offers an opportunity to establish trust between the two parties and resolve a bitter conflict that has persisted for half a century. I attach particular importance to enhancing the United Nations humanitarian and development effort in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

59.  On a very different scale are developments in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, where the work of the United Nations Political Office illustrates how effectively a small presence can help to maintain the integrity of a peace process. The Office was instrumental in assisting the Government of Papua New Guinea and the Bougainville parties to arrive at the Loloata Understanding in March 2000 and the Gateway communiqué in June 2000, which laid the basis for further talks on a political settlement of the crisis in Bougainville.

60.  In April 2000, I appointed a new Special Envoy for Myanmar. While I am not able to report substantive progress in our efforts, I am heartened to note that, with the agreement of the Government of Myanmar, the International Committee of the Red Cross began its humanitarian work in the country in 1999.

61.  In Fiji, in response to the crisis precipitated by the detention of Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry and others, I immediately dispatched my Personal Envoy, who conveyed to the leaders of the political parties my deep concern about the use of violence against a democratically elected government. While I welcome the release of the hostages, much more needs to be done to return the country to normalcy. Sustainable peace, stability and the prosperity of Fiji can be assured only if the aspirations of all communities within Fijian society are taken into account and when all its citizens can play a meaningful role in the political and economic life of the country. I stand ready to work with the Commonwealth and the international community to this end. Recent setbacks in the democratic process in another Pacific country, Solomon Islands, have also caused deep concern.

62.  In Europe, I have been encouraged by the continuing improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey. This evolution, bolstered by the Helsinki decision of the European Union regarding Turkey, should help to support efforts directed towards a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. A continuous process of proximity talks involving Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktash is under way under my auspices. With the assistance of my Special Adviser, attempts are being made to develop a conceptual framework for future progress.

63.  My Special Representative for Georgia has made a great effort to reinvigorate the Georgian/Abkhaz peace process, in particular by convening the Coordinating Council and by meeting regularly with the Russian Federation, in its capacity as facilitator, the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). He has shifted attention back to the core issue of the conflict, the political status of Abkhazia, Georgia, while continuing to negotiate, with both sides, issues such as the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and economic rehabilitation. While some progress has been achieved, the parties still lack the necessary political will to move towards a comprehensive political settlement.
64.  In Latin America, taking note of the growing international concern about the security and human rights situation in Colombia, I appointed a Special Adviser on International Assistance to Colombia in December 1999. He has established contact with a range of actors both within and outside the country and helped to heighten international awareness of the need for a settlement of the country’s conflict.

  Peacekeeping and peace-building

65.  The efforts to gain a better understanding of the needs of United Nations peace operations, outlined in the introduction to this chapter, have been made in the context of extraordinarily rapid developments on the ground. Over the past year, there has been a dramatic increase in peacekeeping activities, and recognition of the critically important links between peacekeeping and peace-building is increasingly reflected in practice in the field. As the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations noted in its recently released report, peacekeepers and peace-builders are “inseparable partners”, and the only ready exit for peacekeeping forces is sustainable peace.

66.  The operation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is now fully established; new operations were launched in East Timor and the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the year, and another is contemplated for Eritrea and Ethiopia; major changes have taken place or are envisaged for operations in Sierra Leone and southern Lebanon; and peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic and Tajikistan have been successfully concluded and succeeded by smaller peace-building offices.

67.  United Nations authorized deployment stands at approximately 45,000 uniformed personnel (troops, observers and civilian police) and a further 13,000 international and local civilian staff for peacekeeping operations mandated by the Security Council; the corresponding figures for this time last year were less than 17,000 uniformed personnel and less than 10,000 civilians. Operations broadly described as peace-building, and under the authority of the General Assembly, have 341 international personnel in the field, supported by 455 local staff, up from 203 and 244 respectively this time last year. However, these numbers in themselves do not indicate the extent of the challenges that increasingly confront peacekeeping operations. I have identified eight of these challenges below; many of them are echoed in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.

  New types of tasks

68.  Peacekeeping has become more complicated because peacekeepers must now undertake a greatly expanded range of tasks. Beyond interposition forces and multidisciplinary operations to assist the parties to implement agreements, peacekeepers over the past year have assumed responsibility for interim administrations in Kosovo and East Timor, balancing the competing and sometimes contradictory tasks of governing those territories, supporting the emergence of local institutions and maintaining law and order.

  New types of personnel

69.  The assumption of these new responsibilities has required that the United Nations expand and adapt the profile of peacekeepers in the field. Over a little more than a year, reflecting in particular the deployment of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor, the authorized deployment of police has jumped from approximately 2,500 to over 8,600, a more than threefold increase. In addition, these new missions have obliged the United Nations to recruit lawyers and judges; city administrators; and experts in customs, fiscal management, public utilities, health, education, sanitation and agriculture.

  Deterrent capacity

70.  This past year offered further evidence, in particular in Sierra Leone, of the precarious environments in which today’s operations are deployed, environments that can threaten the effectiveness of operations and the security of peacekeepers. As the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations notes, these operational experiences have underlined the importance of the United Nations deploying credible deterrent capacity with “robust rules of engagement”. There is also a clear need for further efforts in three areas: we need more and better equipped and trained troops; ongoing capacity-building efforts in developing countries, drawing upon bilateral and multilateral partnerships, to expand the pool of potential peacekeepers; and more effective use of United Nations standby capacities to provide equipment to peacekeeping troops in the field.

  Readiness/rapid deployment

71.  Events over the past year have demonstrated once again how important it is to be able to deploy forces rapidly, and have revealed the constraints in the critical areas of logistics, finance and human resources. Supplies of mission equipment at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, are now largely depleted. Yet, as a result of additional and more complex mandates, we face increased demands on the same or fewer resources. In this context I am gratified that the Panel on Peace Operations recommends that the Secretary-General be allowed funds to start planning a mission before the Security Council approves it.

  Timely and predictable financial support within peace processes

72.  The effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants can be crucial to the success of a peace process, without some degree of predictability of funding for such operations, the entire enterprise risks failure. To avoid such an outcome I have urged Member States to consider a more flexible approach to the use of assessed funding in this area.

  The role of economic incentives in perpetuating conflict

73.  The United Nations experiences in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and elsewhere have revealed what damage struggles for control over diamonds, timber, drugs, guns and other resources can do to a peace process. The importance of this issue was highlighted during the year by debates in the Security Council and by the report of the panel of experts on sanctions against UNITA in Angola. The report revealed the extent to which violations of sanctions, in the form of exports of illicitly mined diamonds, were sustaining the war in Angola.

  Cooperation with regional organizations

74.  Over the past year, cooperation with regional organizations and others in peace-building has proved fruitful on several occasions, but practical, political and organizational problems continue to make it a complicated undertaking. Those who will be responsible for implementing a peace agreement must be present during the negotiation phase to ensure that the operation is based on realistic assumptions. Furthermore, the lines of reporting and division of labour should be as unambiguous as possible; the Organization’s relationships with OSCE and the European Union in Kosovo represent an important step in the right direction. Efforts to improve working arrangements with respect to peacekeeping, will continue, and the forthcoming high-level meeting between the United Nations and regional organizations will be dedicated to cooperation in peace-building.

  Staffing at Headquarters

75.  The past year’s events have underlined the importance of adequate staffing at Headquarters, an issue which is dealt with in some depth by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. I am in complete agreement with the Panel’s view that Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be funded primarily through the regular United Nations budget rather than via the current Support Account, which has to be justified on a post-by-post basis every year.

76.  I welcomed the decision of the General Assembly in November 1999 to approve a number of posts within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. However, the significant loss of personnel and expertise previously incurred through the departure of gratis personnel severely constrained the Secretariat’s efforts to support new deployments, expansions and changes of mandate, as well as the liquidation of completed missions. The fact that so much was achieved with so few resources should be acknowledged as a major achievement of the Organization. Recognizing the extraordinary constraints under which the Secretariat has been required to operate and the impact those constraints have had on the planning and execution of missions, the Panel on Peace Operations has recommended an urgent increase in funding. In particular it urges the creation of a new information and analysis unit that will service all departments with peace and security responsibilities.

77.  No two operations have demonstrated the extent of the challenges outlined above more comprehensively than those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Africa’s third largest country, involves a number of regional States and continues to threaten the stability of the region as a whole. In accordance with my recommendations of 17 January 2000 for the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the Security Council authorized the deployment of a total of 5,537 officers and men. The task of that force was to provide secure logistics bases for the operations of up to 500 military observers charged with monitoring the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

78.  MONUC has experienced serious problems from the outset, including persistent restrictions on its freedom of movement by the Government and other parties; repeated outbreaks of fighting, including major military offensives, in violation of the ceasefire; and logistical challenges arising from the degraded state of the infrastructure in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the huge size of the country. MONUC operations are continually constrained by the deep suspicion that exists between the parties and, from time to time, by hostility towards the United Nations itself.

79.  The overall situation in Sierra Leone remains tense and critical. The successive and unprovoked attacks on, and detentions of, United Nations personnel by the Revolutionary United Front fighters, initiated in May 2000, have seriously undermined the prospects for peace in that country and continue to pose serious challenges to the operations of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone.

80.  Despite the difficulties in implementation, I share the view reaffirmed by both the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Security Council that the broad terms of the Lomé Peace Agreement reached in July 1999 remain important as a basis for moving towards durable peace. However, the determined and cohesive support of the neighbouring States and subregional organizations, particularly ECOWAS, and of troop contributors as well as the international community, remain vital if the Mission is to secure the credible military strength necessary to fulfil the broad objectives of the Peace Agreement.

81.  Meanwhile, in Western Sahara, nine years have passed since the plan for the settlement of the conflict between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO was agreed to, yet the settlement plan has still to be implemented and the situation remains delicate. In my recent report to the Security Council on the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), I have included suggestions that may assist in resolving the multiple problems relating to the implementation of the settlement plan. The presence of MINURSO remains critical to prevent any worsening of the conflict.

82.  Challenges of a different kind confront the United Nations in Kosovo and East Timor. In Kosovo, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has continued to work closely with the international security presence (KFOR) to create a safe and secure environment for all the residents of the province.

83.  A particular challenge has been the development and implementation of the rule of law in Kosovo. In cooperation with OSCE, the Mission is pursuing a comprehensive strategy to rebuild and reform the judicial, police and penal systems. UNMIK has also made progress in ensuring the direct involvement of the local population in the administration of the province. This involvement will be further enhanced following municipal elections later this year. With the assistance of the European Union, good progress has been made in establishing a macroeconomic framework in Kosovo. On the humanitarian front, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and her staff in Kosovo, together with key partners in the United Nations system, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and non-governmental organizations, successfully met the challenges of the emergency relief needs of Kosovo throughout the winter. As a result, the humanitarian “pillar” of UNMIK was terminated at the end of June, and the Mission is now focusing on reconstruction and development.

84.  The presence of the United Nations in Kosovo complements its long-standing engagement in the region, particularly through the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), which continues to assist in the establishment of the rule of law as part of the implementation of the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement. After lengthy efforts to overcome political obstruction, in June 2000, UNMIBH finally inaugurated the first unit of the new multi-ethnic State Border Service. This is the first and only executive law enforcement organ that is under the joint institutions of the State, rather than its ethnically based entities. Efforts to redress the ethnic imbalance in the police forces are, however, proceeding exceedingly slowly.

85.  The past year has seen extraordinary developments in East Timor. The popular consultation in the territory on 30 August 1999 resulted in 78.5 per cent of voters rejecting the autonomy option offered by Indonesia, thereby expressing their preference for a transition towards independence under United Nations auspices. Unfortunately, that success was marred by the subsequent violence, destruction and forcible displacement of hundreds of thousands of East Timorese, a direct result of the failure of the Indonesian authorities to fulfil their security responsibilities under the agreements of 5 May 1999.

86.  The speedy and resolute action of the Security Council in authorizing the deployment of the International Force, East Timor (INTERFET), led by Australia, and the subsequent establishment of UNTAET helped to bring to an end a long and sad chapter in East Timor’s history. The complex and difficult task of rebuilding East Timor and preparing it for full independence is proceeding but faces formidable challenges. Political skill, patience and a high level of international and local-level cooperation and coordination are the necessary conditions for success, and cooperation between UNTAET and the East Timorese has proceeded with vigour and goodwill. UNTAET intends gradually to expand the participation of the East Timorese in the administration so as to ensure a seamless transition to independence. The positive disposition of the President of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid, and the East Timorese leadership, particularly Xanana Gusmão, bodes well for good relations in the future.

87.  While we have confronted major difficulties and resource constraints in mounting these operations, I am gratified to report that the past year has also seen a considerable reduction in the level of United Nations engagement in the Central African Republic and Tajikistan.

88.  The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic, which completed its work in February 2000, played a crucial role in restoring peace and security to the country. It also helped to create conditions conducive to holding national elections, restructuring the security forces, training the national police and gendarmerie and launching major economic and social reforms. I have since established, with the concurrence of the Security Council, the United Nations Peace-building Support Office. The new office will assist the Government and people of the Central African Republic in the peace process, and help to nurture democratic institutions and build socio-economic recovery and respect for human rights and the rule of law, demonstrating how much can be done to promote peace and national reconciliation when missions are conducted with a clear mandate, appropriate resources, the commitment of the parties and the sustained support of the international community.

89.  As in the Central African Republic, our objective in Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, where United Nations peace-building offices are also in place, is not simply to deal with the immediate challenges of post-conflict stabilization, but also to promote sustainable peace in the longer term. Here and elsewhere the United Nations is working with local actors to address the root causes of conflict and thus minimize the chance that violence will reoccur.

90.  The United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Tajikistan, which was established in May 2000, will provide the political framework and leadership for the peace-building activities of the United Nations system in that country. It builds on the success of more than seven years of United Nations peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Tajikistan. The United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan, working closely with regional guarantor States and international organizations, assisted the Tajik parties in overcoming many obstacles to peace, national reconciliation and development. However, the conflict in neighbouring Afghanistan and the complexities of domestic politics mean that renewed instability cannot be ruled out. Consequently, the continuing support of the international community in the post-conflict phase will be important for Tajikistan’s ability to sustain and build on the achievements of the peace process.

91.  Haiti presents another example of a country in which the United Nations presence has recently changed. In this case the shift came about after a series of peacekeeping missions deployed since 1995 came to an end, including the joint United Nations/Organization of American States International Civilian Mission in Haiti. Those multidimensional missions were not mandated to re-establish or maintain peace in the wake of an armed conflict, but rather to solve a serious internal crisis by re-establishing democracy, improving respect for human rights and reforming state institutions, particularly the police.

92.  In order to consolidate the Mission’s achievements I recommended to the General Assembly that it establish the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH), which has taken over the task of assisting the ongoing transition to democratic constitutional rule. MICAH has three substantive pillars of activity: human rights, police and justice.

93.  The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala remains the largest of the United Nations peace-building missions. It continues to provide good offices and advisory and public information functions to support the implementation of the peace agreements. Many substantive reforms remain incomplete, however. Although 2000 is the final year in the official implementation calendar, the parties to the agreements have proposed that the implementation timetable be extended. Consequently, I am conducting consultations on means of consolidating the peace-building process in order to allow me to make an appropriate recommendation to the General Assembly.

94.  Peace-building in practice involves initiatives to help promote national reconciliation and justice, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and the organization of free and fair elections. It also includes measures to create propitious conditions for sustainable economic growth, a necessary condition for reconstruction. In pursuing these goals, our offices maintain regular contacts with relevant donor countries and with representatives of the international financial institutions.

95.  United Nations peace-building activities have been strengthened by a closer working relationship between peace operations and the field offices of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Such field offices are currently in place in Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

96.  Another far-reaching aspect of our peace-building work is that related to mine clearing. The Mine Action Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations works with its partners in missions all over the world to help locate and clear mines — a task that is growing as the number of mine-affected countries continues to rise and new mines are laid in countries previously cleared. These developments have further strained the limited resources that are available. Access to resources is only part of the problem, however, and once again I would like to stress the need to stigmatize the production, distribution and use of these indiscriminate weapons.

  Electoral assistance

97.  The United Nations provides assistance to electoral institutions for two reasons, namely, to enhance administrative capacity to hold credible, transparent and fair elections and to assist in the institutional consolidation required during the post-election period. Over the medium- and long-term such assistance aims to prevent the democratic breakdown and erosion that may sometimes occur after the first elections are held in societies in transition and to stabilize the electoral institutions themselves.

98.  The provision of electoral assistance is a vital component of the United Nations system’s overall peace-building and democratization strategies. Over the past eight years, the United Nations has experienced a significant increase in the number and complexity of requests for electoral assistance. Since its establishment in 1992, the Electoral Assistance Division has provided assistance in 150 electoral processes, ranging from the organization of elections to the provision of technical support. Particularly notable during the past year has been the United Nations participation in the electoral processes in Mexico and Nigeria.

  Sanctions

99.  Sanctions have had an uneven track record in encouraging compliance with Security Council resolutions and in recent years their efficacy has been increasingly questioned. In the case of comprehensive economic sanctions, concerns have been expressed about their negative effects on civilians and on neighbouring States, whose trading relations are harmed by sanctions but which receive no compensation for the harm suffered. The costs of sanctions have too often been borne by ordinary people, not by the authoritarian Governments against which they were directed. Paradoxically, the political élites that compose the regimes themselves have often benefited economically from the black markets that have sprung up to circumvent the sanctions intended to exert pressure upon them.

100.  I therefore share the view, emerging as a consensus among Member States, that the design and implementation of Security Council sanctions need to be improved, and their administration enhanced, to allow a more prompt and effective response to present and future threats to international peace and security. Future sanctions regimes should be designed so as to maximize the chance of inducing the target to comply with Security Council resolutions while minimizing the negative effects of the sanctions on the civilian population and neighbouring and other affected States.

101.  The debate on sanctions held in the Security Council in April and the subsequent establishment of an informal working group of the Council, with a mandate to draw up general recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of sanctions, demonstrated the Council’s readiness to consider practical steps to improve sanctions regimes. This is a welcome development that should help the Council to oversee the evolution of sanctions into a more potent instrument of deterrence and conflict prevention.

  Disarmament

102.  Disarmament is a critical element of the United Nations strategy for peace and security. Steps to reduce the level of arms and curb proliferation not only make the world a safer place by reducing the propensity for conflict but also lessen the temptation for States to embark on costly arms races. The latest figures indicate that global military expenditures increased in 1999 for the first time in the post-cold-war period, bringing total spending to approximately $780 billion, or 2.6 per cent of the world’s gross national product.

103.  Despite some progress in the reduction of nuclear weapons — in particular the Russian Federation’s ratification of the second Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Arms (START II) — there is deep concern within the international community at the continuing risk posed by such weapons. The results of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are therefore of considerable importance. The unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, a reinvigorated effort to halt the global spread of nuclear weapons and a strengthening of the standards governing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy — all issues crucial to the security of the peoples of the United Nations — provide grounds for encouragement. Much, however, remains to be done. The universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the speedy negotiation of a protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention are achievable goals; I strongly urge their pursuit.

104.  While the number of ratifications of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has increased during the past year, the challenges that confront its entry into force persist, especially after the United States Senate’s rejection of ratification in October 1999. It is essential that the Final Declaration of the Conference on facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty, held in October 1999, be implemented. I therefore reiterate my call to all States to ratify the Treaty, particularly those whose ratification is necessary for it to enter into force.

105.  Last year, I drew attention to the dangers posed by the development and testing of long-range missiles. While that danger remains, there is also danger from another quarter, namely, the growing pressure to deploy national missile defences. Within the scientific community there is widespread scepticism that such systems could ever work effectively, and real concern that their deployment could lead to a new arms race, set back nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policies, and create new incentives for missile proliferation. I trust that States will weigh these factors very carefully before embarking on a path that could jeopardize the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and that may reduce, rather than enhance, global security.
 
106.  With respect to conventional arms, preparations are being made for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, scheduled for 2001. Since these are the weapons that kill most people in most wars, the outcome of the Conference is of crucial importance. We must reduce the risks to the people most threatened by those weapons, including the children who are often recruited as soldiers to use them. Some progress is already being made as States tighten their arms export legislation and collect and destroy surplus weapons. Innovative approaches such as “weapons for development” and “weapons for food” programmes are yielding concrete results as practical disarmament measures at the community level. This progress is due to close cooperation between States, the business sector, groups in civil society and the international community.

107.  Although the United Nations is a global Organization, it recognizes that regional approaches to arms control and disarmament may also play a crucial role in enhancing security. The three United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament have been revitalized but a chronic lack of resources unfortunately continues to limit their effectiveness.

108.  During the 2000 Review Conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, non-governmental organizations working in the field of disarmament had an unprecedented opportunity to express their views to States parties at a meeting organized for that purpose. They also continued to play an unofficial but vital monitoring role under the Ottawa Convention, on anti-personnel mines. I trust that Member States will bear in mind the constructive contribution that civil society makes to disarmament when they decide how non-governmental organizations are to participate in the conference on small arms in 2001.