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Programme budget for the biennium 2002-2003

Estimates in respect of matters of which the Security Council is seized

Ninth report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

I. Introduction

1. In December 2001, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions considered three reports of the Secretary-General concerning estimates in respect of matters of which the Security Council is seized (A/C.5/56/25 and Add.1 and 2) containing proposed resource requirements for 17 special political missions. For the 15 missions dealt with in A/C.5/56/25, the Committee recommended approval of a charge of \$8 million against the provision for special political missions under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2002-2003 for the period from 1 January to 31 March 2002, pending a detailed review by the Committee in February 2002 and subsequent action by the General Assembly (see A/56/7/Add.5, paras. 5 and 7). For the United Nations Office in Burundi (A/C.5/56/25/Add.1), the Committee recommended approval of an amount of \$1,700,000 pending the above-mentioned review and action by the Assembly (see A/56/7/Add.6, para. 11). For the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus (A/C.5/56/25/Add.2), the Committee recommended approval of the estimate of \$1,413,400 for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2002 (see A/56/7/Add.7, para. 7). In its resolution 56/255 of 24 December 2001 the General Assembly approved the amounts recommended by the Committee.

2. In accordance with its recommendation in paragraph 5 of its report of 12 December 2001 (A/56/7/Add.5), the Advisory Committee has conducted a detailed review of the issue of charges, as submitted in the reports of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of matters of which the Security Council is seized (A/C.5/56/25 and Add.1 and 2), against the provision of \$98,338,700 for special political missions under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2002-2003. The Committee also had before it proposed resource requirements for two additional missions (A/C.5/56/25/Add.3). During its review,



the Committee met with the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs and other representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarifications. The statement made by the Under-Secretary-General during the meeting is contained in annex I to the present report.

3. The reports of the Secretary-General (A/C.5/56/25 and Add.1-3) contain estimates for 19 special political missions authorized by the Security Council totalling \$41,458,500. Upon request, the Advisory Committee was provided with updated estimated charges against the provision for special political missions in the biennium 2002-2003, including missions authorized by both the Security Council and the General Assembly, amounting to \$64,035,400 (see annex II).

II. General considerations

4. The Advisory Committee was informed that the proposed staffing of the missions amounted to 416 staff for missions authorized by the Security Council and 360 for those authorized by the General Assembly, for a total of 776. In view of the need to fill vacancies quickly in missions with mandates that are often short, the Committee enquired as to the recruitment procedures followed. It was informed that the streamlined procedures used for peacekeeping missions were also followed for special political missions.

5. The Advisory Committee discussed the issue of the timing of the submission of estimates for special political missions, which, as indicated in its report of 12 December 2001 (see A/56/7/Add.5, para. 4) had been a matter of concern to it when it considered the estimates in December. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that, of the missions for which estimates were submitted in December, three were established after the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2002-2003 was submitted to the Committee in April, namely, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan. **In the opinion of the Committee, closer cooperation is needed between the Departments of Political Affairs, Peacekeeping Operations and Management to facilitate the submission of estimates for special political missions early in the sessions of the Committee and the General Assembly.**

6. **The presentation of the report on revised estimates in respect of matters of which the Security Council is seized requires improvement. The introduction should provide a more comprehensive explanation of the nature of the missions, their mandates and, to the extent possible, programmes of activities. The Committee notes that details are provided to the Security Council; however, this does not obviate the need to fully justify resource requirements in documentation submitted to the General Assembly. Furthermore, the Committee requests that future reports contain adequate information on performance. The Committee stresses, however, that future reports should be succinct and certainly not larger than the document currently before the Committee.**

7. The Committee held a general discussion with the representatives of the Secretary-General on a number of issues relating to special political missions. The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs described the various aspects of these

missions, which range from good offices led by a senior representative of the Secretary-General without a permanent presence in the field, to field missions led by representatives of the Secretary-General or mission heads that carry out peacemaking, monitoring/observation and peace-building activities, to sanctions monitoring bodies based at Headquarters. The Under-Secretary-General gave some details of the concept of post-conflict peace-building support offices, of which there are currently four — in the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Tajikistan (see annex I).

8. The Advisory Committee enquired about the fact that the bulk of the resources requested for the missions pertained to administrative and logistic support. It was informed that the work of the peace-building support offices was not intended to be operational; rather, it was to focus on advocacy — providing political guidance; developing, in close cooperation with the United Nations country team and other partners of the United Nations system, a peace-building strategy; helping newly elected Governments to manage the political and security crises they face; facilitating dialogue between international financial institutions and the Government; and promoting good-neighbourliness in cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.

9. The Advisory Committee notes that, in some of the missions, the ratio of support/logistic personnel to substantive personnel is high. **The Committee recommends that consideration be given to outsourcing more of the support costs wherever this is feasible and cost-effective. Furthermore, cooperation between the United Nations and other actors in the field should be pursued in order to optimize support resources.**

10. **The Committee emphasizes that proposals by the Secretary-General for the establishment of new missions should be accompanied by an analysis of whether the establishment of the mission is the best option under the circumstances. It may be necessary to rely on the work of Headquarters or on work done by others in the United Nations system until the time is ripe for the establishment of the mission. The Committee cautions that there is a risk of establishing offices that are poorly funded, poorly staffed, stretched to the limit and therefore only minimally effective. Furthermore, before missions are established, it should be determined whether the functions required could be carried out by other offices or actors in the region. The role of special representatives of the Secretary-General and special political missions should be clearly identified in a manner that ensures that they are complementary and that there is no duplication of function.**

11. **The Advisory Committee has, in the past, expressed its concern that a number of special missions could appear to duplicate one another. Specifically, the Committee points to the multiplicity of advisers, envoys and offices dealing with African issues. The Committee is not questioning the need for any of the above or suggesting that they should be abolished. The Committee recognizes that the African continent is large, with complex, often intractable, problems that require multifaceted approaches. Efforts should therefore be made to ensure that the work and objectives of the various activities are, to the extent possible, complementary.**

12. The Advisory Committee welcomes the statement by the Under-Secretary-General that the Department of Political Affairs approaches the establishment and

maintenance of peace-building offices with caution. With regard to the criteria for establishing such offices, the Under-Secretary-General stated that “they should be established where there is a clear need for sustained international engagement in helping countries emerging from conflict to consolidate peace and they should cease to exist once a modicum of normalcy has been re-established” (see annex I). In this connection, the Committee was provided with the report of a joint review mission on the United Nations post-conflict peace-building support offices, which was undertaken by the Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme. The mission produced a number of lessons learned and recommendations, which included:

- (a) The imperative of a peace-building strategy;
- (b) The identification of minimum preconditions for the success of peace-building offices;
- (c) The need to have a clear understanding by all the stakeholders of the core functions of a peace-building mandate;
- (d) The importance of an explicit delineation of responsibilities and functions between the peace-building office and the rest of the country team;
- (e) The need for adequate staffing and financial resources from the regular budget;
- (f) The importance of rationalizing and adapting existing planning and programming instruments;
- (g) Enhancing relations between the Representative of the Secretary-General and the Resident Coordinator;
- (h) Elaborating benchmarks for the eventual withdrawal of a peace-building office.

13. The Advisory Committee recalls paragraph II.7 of its first report on the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2000-2001 (A/54/7), in which it requested a clarification of the role of the Departments of Political Affairs, Peacekeeping Operations and Management in the administration of funds for special political missions. The Committee considers that coordination between the departments could be improved.

III. Illustrative comments on four specific missions

A. United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau

14. The Advisory Committee notes from paragraph 5.30 of document A/C.5/56/25 that the authorities of Guinea-Bissau have commended the work of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau, which was established in 1999, and “have requested the extension of its mandate until the next legislative and presidential election”. The estimate for the one-year period from 1 January to 31 December 2002 amounts to \$2,893,300, as compared to the appropriation for the two-year period from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2001 of \$5,219,400. The information in section II.F and annex VI of the report, however, does not fully explain the mandate of the mission and the related costs, nor is there an indication of

the role of other partners in peace-building support. No explanation is given of the function of the 15 international and 13 local level staff. No programmes are indicated in annex VI.A, section IV, and the mission has only one civilian police adviser and two military advisers. Thus, the bulk of the resources relate to administrative support.

15. The Advisory Committee does not question the need for the mission; however, it stresses the need for greater clarity concerning what the mission is required to perform in the light of the proposed resources. The Committee considers that this is one of the missions that should consider the possibility of outsourcing support costs.

B. United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic

16. As indicated in paragraph 5.33 of document A/C.5/56/25, the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic was established by the Security Council on 15 February 2000. Annex VII.A of the report shows total estimated requirements for the Office for 2002 of \$4,628,500, as compared to the appropriation of \$6,196,200 for the period from 15 February 2000 to 31 December 2001. Proposed staffing consists of 24 international staff and 32 local staff, for a total of 56, which represents an increase of 14 over the previous mandate period.

17. In the opinion of the Advisory Committee, the report needs to contain a much clearer statement of the exact mandate of the mission as authorized by the Security Council. The Committee notes that, in the case of this mission also, the bulk of the requested resources relate to administrative and logistics support. Estimates for substantive programmes, as discussed in paragraphs 20 to 25 of annex VII.B of the report, total only \$463,300. The estimate for the human rights programme amounts to \$213,500 and includes activities related to institution-building, support to civil society and human rights education and promotion. The Committee points out that these programmes are also undertaken by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

18. The Advisory Committee notes that the estimates for the Office contain no clear statement of objectives, no work plan and no indication of the role of other partners operating in the area.

C. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa

19. An inter-agency multidisciplinary mission sent to 11 West African countries in March 2001 recommended the establishment of a subregional office (see S/2001/434). By his letters dated 25 June and 26 November 2001 (S/2001/1128), the Secretary-General indicated his intention to establish the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa. In a letter dated 29 November 2001 (S/2001/1129), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General. The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa was established in November 2001.

20. As shown in annex IV.A of document A/C.5/56/25, the estimates for the Office for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2003 total \$4,043,700, and include provision for 8 international staff, including a post of Under-Secretary-General for the Special Representative, and 11 local level staff. In addition, provision is made for the services of two experts to organize workshops and prepare reports on thematic issues. The Committee notes that operational costs amount to \$983,300 and that, of the 19 posts proposed, only 5 of the Professional posts (excluding that of the Under-Secretary-General) are substantive.

21. During the course of its meetings with the representatives of the Secretary-General, the Advisory Committee was briefed on the mandate and objectives of the Office (see annex I). The Committee notes that in the report only minimal information is given on the role and activities of the mission and little information is given, other than generic job titles, on the activities to be performed by the staff requested in annex IV.B. Future reports should contain such information.

D. United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building

22. The United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building was established in June 2000. By a letter dated 26 May 2000 (S/2000/518), the Secretary-General proposed the establishment of the mission for a limited time to pursue the objectives of post-conflict peace-building and consolidation. In a letter dated 1 June 2000 (S/2000/519), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council took note with appreciation of his letter. As indicated in paragraph 5.61 of document A/C.5/56/25, by a letter dated 7 May 2001 (S/2001/445), the Secretary-General apprised the Security Council of the positive role played by the Office and stated his intention to continue the activities of the Office for a further period of one year, until 1 June 2002. **However, no information is given concerning why the mission is being extended and what it would accomplish in one year, or, indeed, what would remain to be accomplished. This information should be provided in future reports.** Section II.L and annex XII of the report contain only minimal information on mandates, objectives, programmes and results.

IV. Conclusion and recommendation

23. The exchange between the Advisory Committee and the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs and other representatives was useful and informative. The Committee expresses its intention to keep the matter under review and, in that context, to hold similar meetings on a regular basis.

24. Bearing in mind its observations and recommendations in the paragraphs above, the Advisory Committee recommends approval of a charge of \$41,458,500, inclusive of the amount of \$11,113,400 approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 56/255, for the 19 special political missions dealt with in the reports of the Secretary-General (A/C.5/56/25 and Add.1-3) against the provision for special political missions requested under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2002-2003.

Annex I

Statement of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (25 February 2002)

General

Missions led by the Department of Political Affairs vary considerably in their mandate, size and duration. Their typology ranges from those which focus on good offices led by a senior representative of the Secretary-General without a permanent presence in the field, to field missions led by representatives of the Secretary-General/heads of mission that carry out peacemaking, monitoring/observation and peace-building activities, to sanctions monitoring bodies based at Headquarters.

Some of these missions are mandated by the General Assembly, others relate to matters of which the Security Council is seized. The focus of today's discussion is the latter category.

The following are a few examples of the various types of activity that come under the general rubric of Department of Political Affairs-led missions:

- The Special Adviser of the Secretary-General (in the Horn of Africa) is tasked with enhancing the United Nations involvement in the regional peacemaking effort in the Horn of Africa, but is not based in the region.
- The United Nations Political Office in Somalia is focused on the specific situation in Somalia. It monitors the situation in that country and assists Somalis in their effort to achieve national reconciliation.
- The four peace-building support offices (United Nations Peace-building Support Office in **Liberia**, United Nations Peace-building Support Office in **Guinea-Bissau**, United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the **Central African Republic** and United Nations **Tajikistan** Office of Peace-building) are field missions that work to foster the fragile peace that needs nurturing after the end of violent conflict.
- The Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA and the Counter-terrorism Committee belong to a different category. The former, made up of five experts, investigates violations and monitors compliance with a specific set of sanctions imposed against one party in the conflict in Angola. The latter is a committee of the whole of the Security Council established in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks in the United States by resolution 1373 (2001), which set out a comprehensive agenda of activities to counter and bring to justice terrorists and those who harbour, aid and support them. A secretariat has been established within the Security Council Affairs Division to service the Committee.

In the last year the following activities have been added: the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa, the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General (for the Horn of Africa), the Counter-terrorism Committee and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, which will become a part of the future United Nations mission in that country that will also absorb the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan.

Significant political developments on the ground have resulted in the expansion of the mandates of some missions, notably the United Nations Political Office in Bougainville and the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic.

Missions that have served their purpose have been closed (such as the United Nations Mission in Haiti).

Post-conflict peace-building

Post-conflict peace-building is a broad concept that deals with the transition from conflict to peace.

Post-conflict peace-building support offices are a relatively new experiment. The first was established in 1997 in Liberia as part of an exit strategy for the ECOWAS/United Nations peacekeeping operation. Since then, three additional offices have been established, in Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic and Tajikistan.

In general terms, there are four types of situation requiring United Nations peace-building assistance: (a) in situations where there is no peace operation, (b) during a multi-dimensional United Nations peace operation, (c) in places of armed conflict where there is no peace operation, and (d) in post-conflict situations, to which the four Department of Political Affairs-led missions belong.

These offices are not operational entities. They do not engage in development or reconstruction activities.

They are transitional arrangements whose primary purpose is to help safeguard and nurture the fragile, post-conflict democratic institutions, promote national reconciliation, strengthen the rule of law and the respect for human rights.

The concept of post-conflict peace-building is analogous to the need for patients to take the full dose of antibiotics even when the symptoms of the infection are no longer apparent.

These missions strive to help create an enabling political and security environment for the rest of the United Nations system and its national and international partners to do their job.

Peace-building support offices carry out this function in roughly the following manner:

First, they develop, in close cooperation with the United Nations country team and other partners of the United Nations system, an integrated peace-building strategy that ensures that political and development assistance objectives are mutually supportive.

Secondly, they lend, as necessary, their political support to the mobilization of resources for the actions and programmes outlined in the strategy.

Thirdly, they help, through their good offices, newly elected Governments to manage the political and security crises they invariably face in a post-electoral, post-peacekeeping phase. The aim is to sustain the peace, to help prevent these societies from sliding back into conflict.

Fourthly, they facilitate dialogue between international financial institutions and the Government.

Fifthly, because a post-conflict situation usually affects and is affected by developments in neighbouring countries, peace-building support offices are often called upon to help promote good-neighbourliness and dialogue, in close cooperation with the relevant regional or subregional organizations.

Finally, they take the lead or participate in planning and organizing activities aimed at promoting national reconciliation and promoting the respect for human rights, and, where the capacity exists, provide advice in security-sector-related reforms.

It must be emphasized, however, that the Department of Political Affairs approaches the establishment and maintenance of peace-building offices with considerable caution. They should be established where there is a clear need for sustained international engagement in helping countries emerging from conflict to consolidate peace and they should cease to exist once a reasonable degree of normalcy has been re-established.

With this in mind, in 2001 the Department, together with UNDP, undertook a review of the four offices, which produced a series of lessons learned and recommendations that are being put into practice. Indeed, some of the lessons have been incorporated in the new budget proposals before you.

Relationship between mandates and responsibilities of certain offices

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa

An inter-agency fact-finding mission to 11 West African countries in 2001 recommended the establishment of a subregional office. This responded to the wish of these countries for an integrated approach in the United Nations response to the multifaceted problems confronting West Africa.

Many of the national problems that affect specific country situations are transnational in origin and effect (for example, the illicit circulation of small arms, refugees, alliances among various armed dissident groups and former combatants, drug trafficking and infectious diseases). The added value of the Office is to ensure that these problems are dealt with from subregional perspectives that complement the national responses.

The mandate clearly stipulates that the Office will carry out its core functions with due regard to the specific mandates of the United Nations organizations as well as the peacekeeping operations and peace-building offices in the region.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General would have no line authority over such operations or offices, or over any of the regional presences of operational agencies. He or she will maintain, however, a close working relationship with all of them for the purposes of carrying the facilitative/catalytic mandate entrusted to the Office.

Therefore, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa would not be a new operational entity of the United Nations system.

Unless entrusted by the Secretary-General with specific good offices roles, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would not deal with country-specific issues.

Post of Assistant Secretary-General for the United Nations Office in Burundi

The mandates of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Great Lakes region and the United Nations Office in Burundi are different. The primary role of the latter is to help implement the peace process in Burundi, while the Office for the Great Lakes is charged with looking at the cross-cutting issues in the region — security, minority rights, refugees, etc. — and facilitating their resolution through the instrument of an international conference convened jointly by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. The conference is intended to address those issues whose resolution was not given priority consideration in the Lusaka or Arusha agreements.

In the absence of a political appointee (Assistant Secretary-General or Under-Secretary-General) for Burundi, the Secretary-General assigned his Special Representative for the Great Lakes region to head the United Nations effort in support of Mr. Mandela's facilitation in the Burundi peace process and to represent him at meetings on Burundi in Arusha and elsewhere.

Subsequently, in consultation with Mr. Mandela and the leaders of the region, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was appointed Chairman of the Implementation Monitoring Committee for the Arusha Agreement and of its Executive Committee.

With the repatriation of the Implementation Monitoring Committee to Burundi early in 2002 and the need for its Chairman to devote himself full time to its work and that of the Executive Committee, it became obvious that the Special Representative for the Great Lakes region could not continue to perform both functions.

Since the appointment of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as Chairman of the Implementation Monitoring Committee was done in consultation with Mr. Mandela and other leaders in the region and in view of the priority given to Burundi by the Security Council, it became necessary to request a post of Assistant Secretary-General for Burundi to accommodate the Chairman of the Implementation Monitoring Committee and head of the new United Nations Office in the country.

Annex II

Approved and anticipated charges against the provision for special political missions in the biennium 2002-2003

Missions	Additional charges anticipated to be approved during the first part of the resumed fifty-sixth session			
	Total estimated requirements	Charges approved during the fifty-sixth session	Total charges	Current mandate
	a	b	c	d (b+c)
A. Authorized by the General Assembly				
1. Central American peace process	188 500	188 500	-	188 500
				1 year (resolution 56/224)
2. United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala	14 755 100	14 755 100	-	14 755 100
				1 year (resolution 56/223)
3. United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan	7 355 400	7 355 400	-	7 355 400
				1 year (resolution 56/223)
4. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to Myanmar	277 900	277 900	-	277 900
				1 year (resolution 56/231)
Total, General Assembly mandates	22 576 900	22 576 900	-	22 576 900
B. Authorized by the Security Council				
5. United Nations Office in Burundi	6 925 800	1 700 000	5 225 800	6 925 800
				1 year (S/2001/1207)
6. Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon	950 400	237 600	712 800	950 400
				1 year (S/2001/1168)
7. United Nations Political Office in Somalia	1 892 600	237 000	1 655 600	1 892 600
				2 years (S/2001/1098)
8. United Nations Political Office in Bougainville	1 543 400	332 600	1 210 800	1 543 400
				1 year (S/2001/1028)
9. United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia	1 835 200	446 100	1 389 100	1 835 200
				1 year (S/2001/982)
10. Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Africa	101 900	101 900	-	101 900
				1 year (S/2001/1032)
11. Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region	1 654 500	359 100	1 295 400	1 654 500
				1 year (S/2001/1096)
12. United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau	2 722 700	676 300	2 046 400	2 722 700
				1 year (S/2001/961)
13. United Nations Office in Angola	2 327 000	1 939 700	387 300	2 327 000
				3.5 months, until 15 April 2002 (S/2001/973)
14. Special Adviser of the Secretary-General for Special Assignments in Africa	1 089 900	230 200	859 700	1 089 900
				1 year (S/2001/1179)

<i>Missions</i>	<i>Total estimated requirements</i>	<i>Charges approved during the fifty-sixth session</i>	<i>Additional charges anticipated to be approved during the first part of the resumed fifty-sixth session</i>		<i>Total charges</i>	<i>Current mandate</i>
			<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>		
15. United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic	4 628 500	661 500	3 967 000	4 628 500	1 year (S/PRST/2001/25)	
16. Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA	713 900	611 900	102 000	713 900	3.5 months, until 19 April 2002 (Security Council resolution 1347 (2001))	
17. Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus	1 413 400	1 413 400	-	1 413 400	1 year (S/2001/1183)	
18. United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building	772 900	463 700	309 200	772 900	5 months, until 1 June (S/2001/446)	
19. Counter-terrorism Committee	2 126 000	510 600	1 615 400	2 126 000	Open (Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and S/2001/986)	
20. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan	3 116 800	779 200	2 337 600	3 116 800	Open (S/2001/937)	
21. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo	1 323 100	-	1 323 100	1 323 100	6 months (1 February-31 July 2002) (S/2001/139)	
22. Monitoring Group established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1363 (2001)	2 276 800	-	2 276 800	2 276 800	1 year, until 19 January 2003 (Security Council resolutions 1363 (2001) and 1390 (2002))	
23. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa	4 043 700	412 600	3 631 100	4 043 700	2 years (S/2001/1129)	
Total, Security Council mandates	41 458 500	11 113 400	30 345 100	41 458 500		
Total, General Assembly and Security Council	64 035 400	33 690 300	30 345 100	64 035 400		

<i>Summary</i>	
Amount appropriated by the General Assembly for 2002-2003 for special political missions	98 338 700
Total charges approved by the General Assembly during its fifty-sixth session	33 690 300
Additional charges requested for approval during the first part of the resumed fifty-sixth session	30 345 100
Total (approved and to be approved)	64 035 400
Unallocated balance of the provision, after approval of all the charges reflected above	34 303 300

