



**United Nations**

# **Report of the Disarmament Commission**

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**Official Records**  
**Fifty-sixth session**  
**Supplement No. 42 (A/56/42)**

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# **Report of the Disarmament Commission**



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*Note*

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

## Contents

<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Page</i>
I. Introduction .....	1–2	1
II. Organization and work of the 2001 substantive session .....	3–13	2
III. Documentation .....	14–23	3
A. Documents submitted by the Secretary-General .....	14	3
B. Other documents, including documents submitted by Member States .....	15–23	3
IV. Conclusions and recommendations .....	24–27	3
<i>Annexes</i>		
I. Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament: working paper presented by the Chairman .		6
II. Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms: non-paper presented by the Chairperson .....		15



## Chapter I Introduction

1. At its fifty-fifth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 55/35 C of 20 November 2000, entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission", which reads as follows:

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission,<sup>1</sup>*

*"Recalling its resolutions 47/54 A of 9 December 1992, 47/54 G of 8 April 1993, 48/77 A of 16 December 1993, 49/77 A of 15 December 1994, 50/72 D of 12 December 1995, 51/47 B of 10 December 1996, 52/40 B of 9 December 1997, 53/79 A of 4 December 1998 and 54/56 A of 1 December 1999,*

*"Considering the role that the Disarmament Commission has been called upon to play and the contribution that it should make in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session,*

*"Bearing in mind its decision 52/492 of 8 September 1998,*

*"1. Takes note of the report of the Disarmament Commission,<sup>1</sup>*

*"2. Reaffirms the importance of further enhancing dialogue and cooperation among the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament;*

*"3. Also reaffirms the role of the Disarmament Commission as the specialized, deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on those issues;*

*"4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,<sup>2</sup> and with paragraph 3*

*of Assembly resolution 37/78 H of 9 December 1982, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations on the items of its agenda, taking into account the adopted 'Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission';<sup>3</sup>*

*"5. Recommends that the Disarmament Commission, at its 2000 organizational session, adopt the following items for consideration at its 2001 substantive session:*

*"(a) Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament;*

*"(b) Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms;*

*"6. Requests the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding three weeks during 2001 and to submit a substantive report to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session;*

*"7. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament,<sup>4</sup> together with all the official records of the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;*

*"8. Also requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full provision to the Disarmament Commission and its subsidiary bodies of interpretation and translation facilities in the official languages and to assign, as a matter of priority, all the necessary resources and services, including verbatim records, to that end;*

*"9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled 'Report of the Disarmament Commission'."*

2. The Disarmament Commission held its organizational session at United Nations Headquarters in two meetings, on 1 December 2000 (A/CN.10/PV.240) and 9 April 2001 (A/CN.10/PV.241). During the session, the Commission considered questions related to the organization of work and substantive agenda items for its 2001 substantive session, in accordance with the adopted "Ways and means to enhance the functioning

of the Disarmament Commission” (A/CN.10/137) and in the light of General Assembly resolution 55/35 C. The Commission took up the question of the election of its officers, taking into account the principle of rotation of the chairmanship among the geographic regions. The Commission considered the provisional agenda for the 2001 substantive session and decided to establish a committee of the whole and two working groups to deal with two substantive items on the agenda. The Commission further decided that its next substantive session would be held from 9 to 27 April 2001.

## Chapter II

### Organization and work of the 2001 substantive session

3. The Disarmament Commission held its 2001 substantive session at United Nations Headquarters from 9 to 27 April 2001, during which the Commission held seven plenary meetings (see A/CN.10/PV.241-247) under the chairmanship of Diane Quarless (Jamaica). Timur Alasaniya, Political Affairs Officer of the Disarmament and Decolonization Organs Servicing Branch, Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services, served as Acting Secretary of the Commission.

4. During the 2001 session, the Bureau of the Commission was constituted as follows:

*Chairman:*

Ms. Diane Quarless (Jamaica)

*Vice-Chairmen:*

Representatives of the following States: Bolivia, Bulgaria, Egypt, Finland, Nepal, South Africa, Sweden and Ukraine

*Rapporteur:*

Mr. Ko Ko Shein (Myanmar)

5. At its 240th plenary meeting, on 1 December 2000, the Commission adopted its provisional agenda, contained in document A/CN.10/L.48, as follows:

1. Opening of the session.
2. Adoption of the agenda.
3. Organization of work.
4. Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament.

5. Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms.

6. Report of the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session.

7. Other business.

6. At the same meeting, the Commission approved its general programme of work for the session (A/CN.10/2001/CRP.1) and decided to allocate four meetings to a general exchange of views.

7. On 9 and 10 April, the Disarmament Commission held a general exchange of views on all agenda items (A/CN.10/PV.242-245). The representatives of the following countries made statements during the general exchange of views: Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden (on behalf of the European Union, with the associated countries aligning themselves), Ukraine, Uruguay and Viet Nam.

8. On 9 April, the Commission heard the statement of the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala.

9. On 19 April, the Commission held a meeting of the Committee of the Whole, during which the remaining organizational issues were finalized, namely, two Vice-Chairmen from the Group of African States were elected by acclamation.

10. In accordance with the decisions taken at its organizational session, the Disarmament Commission entrusted Working Group I with the mandate of dealing with agenda item 4, entitled “Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament”. Working Group I met under the chairmanship of Yaw Odei Osei (Ghana) and held 10 meetings between 11 and 26 April.

11. The Commission entrusted Working Group II with the mandate of dealing with agenda item 5, entitled “Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms”. Working Group II met under the chairmanship of Gabriela Martinic (Argentina) and held 11 meetings between 11 and 26 April.

12. At its 247th plenary meeting, on 27 April, the Disarmament Commission considered the reports of Working Groups I and II on agenda items 4 and 5, respectively. The reports of the subsidiary bodies of the Commission and the conclusions and recommendations contained therein are included in section IV of the present report.

13. In accordance with past practice of the Disarmament Commission, some non-governmental organizations attended the plenary meetings.

### **Chapter III Documentation**

#### **A. Documents submitted by the Secretary-General**

14. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 55/35 C, the Secretary-General, by a note dated 6 March 2001, transmitted to the Disarmament Commission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament,<sup>4</sup> together with all the official records of the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters (A/CN.10/199).

#### **B. Other documents, including documents submitted by Member States**

15. In the course of the Commission's work, the documents listed below, dealing with substantive questions, were submitted.

16. Two Chairman's papers, entitled "Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament", were submitted to Working Group I (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1 and A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.4).

17. A working paper was submitted by Viet Nam on behalf of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2).

18. A working paper was submitted by India, (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3).

19. A working paper, entitled "Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament: comments and proposals concerning Chairman's comments on proposed structure (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1)", was submitted by Sweden, on behalf of the European Union, with

the associated countries aligning themselves (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.5).

20. A working paper, entitled "Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament", was submitted by Nepal (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.6).

21. Two working papers entitled "Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms", were submitted by Sweden, on behalf of the European Union, with the associated countries aligning themselves (A/CN.10/2001/WG.II/WP.1) and A/CN.10/2001/WG.II/WP.2).

22. A working paper, entitled "Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms", was submitted by Nepal (A/CN.10/2001/WG.II/WP.3).

23. Three conference room papers were also submitted on item 4.

### **Chapter IV Conclusions and recommendations**

24. At its 247th plenary meeting, on 27 April, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus the reports of its subsidiary bodies and the conclusions and recommendations contained therein regarding agenda items 4 and 5. The Commission agreed to submit the texts of those reports, reproduced below, to the General Assembly.

25. At the same meeting, the Commission adopted, as a whole, its report to be presented to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session.

26. The report of Working Group I reads as follows:

#### **Report of Working Group I on agenda item 4**

1. At its organizational session on 1 December 2000 and its 241st meeting, on 9 April 2001, the Disarmament Commission adopted its agenda for the 2001 substantive session (A/CN.10/L.48) and decided to allocate to Working Group I agenda item 4, entitled "Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament".

2. In connection with its work, Working Group I had before it the following documents:

(a) The Chairman's paper (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

(b) Working paper submitted by Viet Nam on behalf of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2);

(c) Working paper submitted by India (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3);

(d) Chairman's paper (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.4);

(e) Working paper submitted by Sweden on behalf of the European Union, with the associated countries aligning themselves (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.5);

(f) Working paper submitted by Nepal (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.6).

3. The Working Group met under the Chairmanship of Yaw Odei Osei (Ghana) and held 10 meetings between 11 April and 26 April 2001. The Chairman also conducted a number of informal consultations. Timur Alasaniya, of the Disarmament and Decolonization Organs Servicing Branch, Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services, served as Secretary of the Working Group. Tatyana Shestakova, of the same Branch, assisted the Secretary. Mika Murakami and Valere Mantels, of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as advisers to the Working Group.

4. The first two meetings were devoted to deliberations on a possible structure of the outcome document. As a result of those deliberations, the Chairman, at the third meeting presented a document, entitled "Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament: draft structure of the outcome document", contained in document A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/CRP.1/Rev.1 which was agreed on as a basis for future work, subject to amendment, as required.

5. At the suggestion of the Chairman, the Working Group devoted four meetings to general discussions, during which comments, concrete ideas and proposals were presented by delegations. Based on those submissions, the Chairman prepared a compilation contained in document A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/CRP.2, without prejudice to the position of any delegation.

6. At the 7th meeting of the Working Group, on 20 April, the Chairman submitted his paper, entitled "Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament" (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.4), which was based on his earlier compilation, and took into consideration written and oral submissions. The Chairman's paper is his sole responsibility and does not represent a negotiated position, nor command any consensus whatsoever.

7. During the following three meetings, preliminary discussions were held on elements contained in the Chairman's paper and which enjoyed support as a contribution to the future work of the Working Group, and a number of comments, as well as written and oral proposals, were made by delegations. The Working Group noted that the Chairman's paper required further discussion, elaboration and refinement. The Chairman's paper is annexed to the present report without prejudice to the position of any delegation and on the understanding that it is non-binding.

8. At its 10th meeting, on 26 April, the Working Group considered and adopted by consensus its report on agenda item 4. On that occasion, the Working Group also requested the Chairman to conduct inter-sessional consultations based on the discussions, suggestions, oral and written proposals and materials submitted during the present session and to present a revised version of his paper some time before the 2002 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission.

27. The report of Working Group II reads as follows:

### **Draft report of Working Group II on agenda item 5**

1. At its organizational session on 1 December 2000 and its 241st meeting, on 9 April 2001, the Disarmament Commission adopted its agenda for the 2001 substantive session (A/CN.10/L.48), and decided to allocate to Working Group II agenda item 5, entitled "Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms".

2. The Working Group, under the chairmanship of Gabriela Martinic (Argentina), held 11 meetings between 11 and 26 April. Saijin

Zhang, assisted by Seigei Cherniavsky, of the Disarmament and Decolonization Organs Servicing Branch, Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services, served as Secretary of the Working Group, and Nazir Kamal, of the Department of Disarmament Affairs, served as an adviser to the Working Group.

3. During the inter-sessional period, the Chairperson conducted a number of informal consultations and, at the request of delegations, prepared a non-paper. The non-paper, which was presented to all delegations at an informal meeting previously announced in the *Journal*, and held on 16 March 2001, is the sole responsibility of the Chairperson and does not represent a negotiated position nor command any consensus.

4. The Working Group devoted the 1st and 2nd meetings to an exchange of general views on the item under consideration and, at the 3rd meeting, started the discussion of the non-paper. During the present session, a number of written and oral proposals were made by delegations. In this connection, working papers were also submitted by Sweden on behalf of the European Union, with the associated countries aligning themselves (A/CN.10/2001/WG.II/WP.1 and A/CN.10/2001/WG.II/WP.2), and by Nepal (A/CN.10/2001/WG.II/WP.3).

5. Once the reading of the non-paper was concluded, the Working Group devoted the 8th and 9th meetings to a preliminary exchange of views on "Recommendations" and on further comments and proposals on the structure of sections III and IV of the non-paper.

6. At the 10th meeting, the Working Group heard a presentation by Nazir Kamal, of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, regarding the activities carried out by that Department, including its regional centres, on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms and indications of possible future tasks that might be entrusted to them in that area. The Working Group also took stock of its work during the present substantive session.

7. At its 11th meeting, on 26 April, the Working Group took note of the Chairperson's non-paper, which enjoyed support as a

contribution to the future work of the Working Group. The Working Group noted at the same time that the Chairperson's non-paper required further discussion, elaboration and refinement. The Chairperson's non-paper is annexed to the present report, without any prejudice to the positions of any delegations and on the understanding that it is non-binding. The Working Group also considered and adopted by consensus its report on agenda item 5.

8. On that occasion, the Working Group also requested the Chairperson to conduct inter-sessional consultations based on the discussions, suggestions, oral and written proposals and materials submitted during the present session, to present a revised version of her non-paper some time before the 2002 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission and to gather information on documents and meetings on existing confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms, to be provided by delegations, preferably by 1 December 2001, on the understanding that they might submit further information at a later stage.

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/55/42).*

<sup>2</sup> Resolution S-10/2.

<sup>3</sup> A/CN.10/137.

<sup>4</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 27 (A/55/27).*

## Annex I

### **Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament: working paper presented by the Chairman**

#### **A. General overview: importance of nuclear disarmament in international peace and security**

1. The end of the cold war has set an auspicious environment for nuclear disarmament. Progress has been made by the international community through efforts at all levels, including unilateral measures, and bilateral, regional and multilateral actions, agreements and arrangements aimed at the reduction of nuclear weapons.

2. Despite the achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament, the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used, whether accidental, unintentional or unauthorized, remains of great concern. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world will remove forever the threat posed by these weapons.

3. Any use or threat of use of force would constitute a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The Commission recalls the advisory opinion of July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, which concluded that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

4. Collective efforts are under way to define and structure global and regional security arrangements. All States share a common interest to intensify the concerted efforts to promote the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. These objectives have been reaffirmed in various forums, including the tenth special session of the General Assembly, annual sessions of the General Assembly, and more recently, by the Millennium Summit. In their Declaration, the Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.

#### **B. Interrelationship between nuclear disarmament, international peace, security and stability**

5. In the post-cold-war environment, disarmament and security-related issues facing the international community cannot be solved separately and require a comprehensive approach, as well as the involvement of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, big and small.

6. The nuclear disarmament process is closely intertwined with the international security situation. A peaceful, secure, stable international environment based on mutual trust is essential for the advancement of the nuclear disarmament process.

7. Maintaining the global strategic balance and stability constitutes the basis and precondition for progress in the nuclear disarmament process; thus the enhancement of international peace and security and the promotion of nuclear disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

8. There is an interrelationship between nuclear disarmament and regional security. In this regard, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important contribution to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and to global efforts aimed at achieving the ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones should be regarded as a matter of priority for its interrelation with nuclear disarmament and international peace and security.

9. The positive outcome of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the final document of the Conference, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty, is recognized.

10. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been signed and ratified by an increasing number of countries, although 13 more ratifications are needed for its entry into force.

11. The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has contributed to ensuring strategic stability in the world as an important element for a stable and progressive development of the entire disarmament process.

### **C. Achievements and current developments in nuclear disarmament**

12. In the process of nuclear disarmament, whose pace has been accelerated in recent years, many tangible results have been achieved at various levels.

#### **1. Unilateral**

13. Significant progress has been made in reducing nuclear weapons through unilateral reduction measures taken by the nuclear-weapon States (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America), including the close-down and dismantling of nuclear-weapon-related facilities. The nuclear-weapon States have declared that none of their nuclear weapons are targeted at any State.

14. The declared moratoriums on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions continue to be observed pending entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

15. Efforts have been made to make nuclear disarmament measures irreversible, in particular, through the destruction of weapons and weapons systems, and the management and disposition of fissile material for their production.

16. Some States have taken an initiative to unconditionally forego the first-use of nuclear weapons and the use or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

17. A unilateral declaration of nuclear-weapon-free status, taking into consideration existing specific conditions, was supported and welcomed. In the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones in general, the nuclear-weapon States through unilateral and multilateral instruments stated their support for such

arrangements which are freely arrived at by the States of the regions concerned.

#### **2. Bilateral**

18. Significant reductions of missiles and their delivery systems have taken place within the framework of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I). All ballistic missile systems have been deactivated; both sides are in process of destroying missile launchers and bombers and the pace of reduction of deployed strategic nuclear warheads is well ahead of schedule.

19. Ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) by the Russian Federation is an important step in the efforts to reduce strategic offensive weapons and is welcomed. Completion of ratification of START II by the United States remains a priority. Under START II, deployed strategic nuclear warheads will be reduced by two thirds to 3,000-3,500. And once it enters into force, both sides will seek early deactivation of systems earmarked for elimination.

20. The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 26 May 1972 remains a cornerstone in maintaining global strategic stability and world peace and in promoting further strategic nuclear arms reductions. Continued efforts should be made to strengthen the Treaty and to preserve its integrity and validity.

21. Neither side is currently developing any new intercontinental ballistic missiles or submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

22. All strategic systems presently deployed by the sides are deployed in passive mode, that is non-threatening and consistent with the declared intentions. The sides have put in place a system for notification of missile launches.

23. A number of measures as well as declarations by the United States and the Russian Federation cover the area of non-proliferation. Both sides agreed to permanently close 24 production reactors in both countries; trilateral initiative between the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is addressing technical and legal measures for verifying that excess fissile material is never again used in nuclear weapons; the United States and the Russian

Federation are close to concluding an agreement that will codify the principles for disposition of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons earmarked for destruction.

24. In September 1994, China and the Russian Federation committed themselves to non-targeting nuclear weapons at each other. In June 1998, China and the United States issued a joint declaration announcing the same arrangement between them.

### 3. Regional

25. Nuclear-weapon-free zones have ceased to be exceptional in the global strategic environment. To date, numerous States have signed or become parties to treaties establishing existing nuclear-weapon-free zones. With the addition of Antarctica, which was demilitarized pursuant to the Antarctic Treaty, nuclear-weapon-free zones now cover more than 50 per cent of the Earth's land mass. The important contribution of nuclear-weapon-free zones to the strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime and to regional and world peace and security has been universally recognized.

26. The treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba continue to make contributions towards the achievement of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, particularly in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, and towards keeping the areas covered by those treaties free of nuclear weapons, in accordance with international law.

27. Several practical and urgent steps which are required to be taken by all parties directly concerned are called to be considered for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. These steps include the solemn declaration that all countries will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, the agreement to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and declaration of their support for the establishment of the zone and deposition of such declaration with the Security Council for consideration as appropriate.

28. The declared desire of all five States of the Central Asian region to finalize work on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and the concrete steps that they had taken to that

end to prepare the legal groundwork for the initiative and the progress that they had achieved in this regard are welcomed.

### 4. Multilateral

29. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was indefinitely extended at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This decision was taken together with decision 1 on "Strengthening the review process for the Treaty" and decision 2 on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament".

30. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 10 September 1996, was opened for signature in New York on 24 September 1996. The Treaty has been signed by 167 States and ratified by 76 States, including three nuclear-weapon States. Of the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty and required for entry into force, 31 States have deposited their instrument for ratification.

31. The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted by consensus a Final Document on 19 May 2000, in which the Member States agreed on the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty. An unequivocal undertaking was made by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty.

32. A panel of governmental experts on missiles will convene in 2001 and 2002 to prepare a report on the issue of missiles in all its aspects.

33. In 2000, the five nuclear-weapon States issued a joint declaration announcing the non-targeting policy of nuclear weapons at any State.

34. The United Nations Millennium Declaration is welcomed, in which Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving that aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

## **D. Mechanisms dealing with nuclear disarmament and role of the United Nations**

35. The United Nations, being the only universal forum where all Member States can contribute to the process of disarmament, supports and facilitates all efforts in that regard. In doing so, the United Nations has a central role in developing global principles of arms control and disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

36. The role and responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular are exercised through its institutional arrangements, which have been seized with the nuclear disarmament issues in accordance with their respective mandates.

### **1. Mechanisms dealing with nuclear disarmament within the United Nations system**

37. The General Assembly as a main deliberative organ has adopted many resolutions on the subject of nuclear disarmament and can promote and facilitate the achievement of concrete disarmament agreements in this field.

38. Special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament play an important role in promoting disarmament, peace, security, stability and non-proliferation. By seizing the opportunities of the present, preserving and building upon the achievements of the past and setting the future course of action in order to strengthen international peace and security, the special sessions devoted to disarmament play a unique role as a multilateral body in the field of disarmament.

39. The First Committee, as mandated by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, deals exclusively with disarmament and related international security questions. Annually it discusses and takes actions on numerous resolutions and decisions on issues related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

40. Since its establishment in 1952, the Disarmament Commission as the specialized universal deliberating disarmament forum, has been giving valuable and practical recommendations to facilitate negotiations among States to enter into bilateral and multilateral treaties for arms control. It is a measure of the effectiveness of the Disarmament Commission that in

the past decade it produced five sets of guidelines on important areas, including two on nuclear issues.

41. The Department for Disarmament Affairs advises the Secretary-General on disarmament-related security matters; monitors and analyses developments and trends in the field of disarmament; promotes the goal of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and supports the review and implementation of existing disarmament agreements; assists Member States in multilateral disarmament negotiation and deliberation activities towards the development of disarmament norms and the creation of agreements; promotes openness and transparency in military matters, verification, confidence-building measures, and regional approaches to disarmament.

42. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters advises the Secretary-General on matters within the area of arms limitation and disarmament. It has examined various aspects of studies and research on disarmament issues which have helped to facilitate the disarmament process, including nuclear disarmament.

43. The United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament provide technical servicing and substantive assistance on issues of nuclear disarmament amongst others, in order to promote transparency and confidence. They present a unique forum to the international community for discussion on regional aspects of security issues.

44. Studies conducted by the United Nations can be useful and instrumental to the more advanced consideration of various aspects of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament and to the achievement of a greater general awareness of the subject.

45. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research was established to undertake forward-looking, sustained research and study activity by the United Nations in the field of disarmament, thus to promote informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts. On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Institute, the General Assembly reiterated the international community's need for access to independent and in-depth research on disarmament, in particular emerging problems and the foreseeable consequences of disarmament, and encouraged the Institute to continue its independent research on these issues.

## 2. Mechanisms dealing with nuclear disarmament outside the United Nations system

46. To further the process of nuclear disarmament, aiming at the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it would be necessary to continue to have recourse to all possible approaches as well as to all existing mechanisms, especially outside of the United Nations system.

47. The Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has several nuclear disarmament related items on its agenda. During the past decade, it has negotiated the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, during the last few years the Conference has not been able to make any progress in its work.

48. In addition to other important objectives and functions, in particular the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy throughout the world, IAEA has a central role in the field of the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements signed by States in pursuit of their obligations under various legally binding instruments, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga), with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The importance of concluding the Model Additional Protocol is also emphasized.

49. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones constitutes an important contribution to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and to the global efforts aimed at achieving the ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control, and thus the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones should be regarded as a matter of priority for its interrelationship with nuclear disarmament and international peace and security.

50. The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, an intergovernmental agency created under the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been successful in ensuring that the obligations of the Treaty are met and that participants strictly adhere to the Control System. In doing so, it has promoted general and complete disarmament through the contribution to nuclear non-proliferation

and the creation of mechanisms against receipt, storage, installation, deployment or any form of possession, directly or indirectly of nuclear weapons or nuclear devices by the parties thereof.

51. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and as such it should be observed in full and good faith. The full and effective implementation of the Treaty in all its aspects has a vital role in promoting international peace and security.

52. The Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, established by the General Assembly in 1996, is mandated to establish a global verification regime envisaged in the Treaty, which consists of an International Monitoring System, a consultation and clarification process, on-site inspections and confidence-building measures. The Disarmament Commission takes note of an agreement to regulate the relationship between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission signed on 26 May 2000.

## E. Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament

53. In order to maintain and strengthen international peace and security, the international community needs to undertake practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament without delay and, in this regard, every effort should be made to ensure that all States are engaged in this process. Such steps include:

Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

New Agenda Coalition (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

General Assembly resolutions related to nuclear disarmament (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its review process (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.3 and 4 and A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament via START, the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and other steps, as described in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.4, A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties (of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) are committed under article VI (of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.4 and A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2 and 3 and A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be observed in full and in good faith. Those countries which have not yet acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should do so without delay and without conditions, so as to make the treaty truly universal (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2);

Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.3 and A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.3 and A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

The conclusion of the signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its early entry into force in accordance with constitutional processes (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3);

Early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Japan, A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2);

Strict observance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2);

States which have not yet signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should do so as soon as possible, so as to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty according to its provisions (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2);

Moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions and any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Immediate commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes or other nuclear explosive devices in the Conference on Disarmament, with a view to their conclusion within five years (Japan);

The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, with a view to their conclusion within five years (China, A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2);

The Conference on Disarmament should, without further delay, establish ad hoc committees with appropriate mandates to undertake substantive negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons and related issues, such as a fissile material cut-off treaty and negative security assurances (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3);

The Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2);

Establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Application of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

The nuclear-weapon States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special responsibility for nuclear disarmament. They should continue to reduce drastically their respective nuclear arsenals on the principle of irreversibility (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2);

Stressing the importance of applying the principle of irreversibility to the process of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2);

Early entry into force of START II and conclusion of START III, while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions (Russian Federation);

Consolidation of the cessation of the nuclear arms race through the preservation of its achievements and founding principles (START, Intermediate-range Nuclear Force and Anti-Ballistic Missile treaties) (France);

Completion and implementation of the trilateral initiative between the Russian Federation, the United States of America and IAEA (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States in unilateral reduction of their nuclear arsenals (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals have to assume the initial responsibility for moving forward the reduction of nuclear weapons. They should revitalize unilateral and bilateral nuclear reduction processes, which should be further complemented by reductions within a multilateral framework (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3);

The nuclear-weapon States to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2);

The nuclear-weapon States to undertake the step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and to

carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures, with a view to the total elimination of those weapons (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2);

The nuclear-weapon States to commence plurilateral negotiations among themselves at an appropriate stage on further deep reductions of nuclear weapons as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2);

Increased transparency by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear weapons capabilities (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons (tactical nuclear weapons) and steps to formalize and put into effect previously agreed measures in this regard (European Union);

Elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons as part of a step-by-step, progressive effort to eliminate all nuclear weapons (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3);

Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems (de-alerting) (proposal to delete “(de-alerting)”) (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.4 and A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

The nuclear-weapon States to de-alert and deactivate immediately their nuclear weapons and to take other concrete measures to further reduce the operational status of their nuclear weapons systems (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2);

Putting forward of an initiative to create a Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-Proliferation System (Russian Federation);

Missile Technology Control Regime (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Establishment of a panel of governmental experts on missiles to prepare a report on the issue of missiles in all its aspects (General Assembly resolution 55/33 A and A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

The role of nuclear weapons in security policies should be diminished so as to minimize the risk that those weapons will ever be used and

facilitate the process of their total elimination (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2);

Review of strategic postures and doctrines (no first use of nuclear weapons) (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

All the nuclear-weapon States should renounce the nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons, undertake unconditionally not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and conclude an international legal instrument to such effect (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2);

The nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to agree on an internationally and legally binding instrument on the joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to conclude an internationally and legally binding instrument on security assurances of non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2);

Reduction of the salience of existing nuclear weapons by removing the first-use posture from security doctrines. A global no-first-use agreement should be reached, which would include a non-use agreement against non-nuclear-weapon States (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3);

General Assembly resolution, entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*" (South Africa);

Engagement as soon as appropriate (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.3) of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Stressing the importance of the conclusion of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and also the conclusion of the model additional protocol with IAEA (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Further development of verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.3 and A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Reducing the risk of unauthorized, accidental or unintentional use of nuclear weapons (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Establishment of an ad hoc committee on security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament (multilateral legally binding instrument for negative security assurances) (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Establishment of an ad hoc group on prevention of an arms race in outer space in the Conference on Disarmament (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Consolidation (support for A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.4) of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and establishment of such new zones (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

All the nuclear-weapon States should support the efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect the status of those zones and assume the relevant obligations (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2);

The nuclear-weapon States to support, without conditions, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and accede to the protocol or protocols of all the current treaties of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, if they have not done so (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2);

Secretary-General's proposal on an international conference on eliminating nuclear dangers (General Assembly resolution 55/2, A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1 and A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3);

Proposal on an international conference on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation (General Assembly resolutions 54/54 G and 53/77 Y and A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

In accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and the guidelines laid down by the Disarmament Commission, encourage establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, by arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3);

Follow-up on the legal advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Proposal for the establishment of a Global Missile and Missile Technologies Non-Proliferation Control System (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Universal adherence to international norms and conventions in the area of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (European Union);

Unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons by altering operational aspects of the weapons should be prevented. This step would be in keeping with a no-first-use posture. For this purpose, convening of an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear danger proposed by the Secretary-General and endorsed by the Millennium Summit of the United Nations (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3);

Commitment by the nuclear-weapon States not to deploy their nuclear weapons outside their national territories (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Unconditional commitment by all the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones and conclusion of a relevant international legal instrument-security assurances (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2 and A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Nuclear-weapon States to undertake to withdraw all the nuclear weapons deployed outside their territories. The nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States concerned should forego the nuclear umbrella policy and the practice of nuclear-sharing (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2 and A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

Those who possess nuclear weapons should commit themselves to not deploying them outside their own national territories (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3);

A convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons should be negotiated and concluded (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2);

The commencement of multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2);

In order to move beyond political commitments into the realm of a binding legal convention, as was done in the case of biological and chemical weapons, it is necessary to negotiate, in the Conference on Disarmament, a convention on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3);

Initiative on energy supply for sustained development of mankind, radical solution of problems posed by proliferation of nuclear weapons, and global environmental improvement, envisioning, inter alia, international efforts under the aegis of IAEA to consider the issues of the nuclear fuel cycle, in particular by examining innovative and proliferation-resistant nuclear technology (Russian Federation).

## **F. Conclusions and recommendations**

To be issued at a later stage.

## Annex II

### Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms: non-paper submitted by the Chairperson, 16 March 2001

#### A. Introduction and scope

1. The Working Group was entrusted with the task of dealing with “Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms”. The references to confidence-building measures made by the Working Group are neither mandatory nor prescriptive.

2. The ultimate goal of confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms is to strengthen international peace and security and to contribute to the prevention of war. Their objectives are to reduce the dangers of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities, to help prevent military confrontation as well as covert preparations for the commencement of armed conflict, to reduce the risk of surprise attacks and of the outbreak of war by accident. By doing so, confidence-building measures adopted at different levels complement each other and contribute to strengthening peace, security and stability at all levels.

3. States need a peaceful and stable environment in which international relations are governed by clear and predictable norms of international law, so that optimal conditions are created for relations with other States, thereby promoting the social, economic and cultural well-being of their peoples. Shared security can bring about positive change in relations among States.

4. A better relationship between States in the political, institutional, cultural, social and other fields, with broad participation of the actors of the society generates confidence based on shared interests in a common future. In this context confidence-building measures play a key role, and their efficiency would be improved if they were part of a broader integrated approach which would encompass economic, social and other political aspects.

5. Confidence-building measures must be neither a substitute nor a precondition for disarmament measures, nor divert attention from them. Yet their potential for creating favourable conditions for progress in the disarmament field should be fully utilized in all regions of the world, insofar as they may

facilitate and do not impair in any way the adoption of disarmament measures.

6. By helping to create a climate in which the importance of the military element is gradually diminished, confidence-building measures could, in particular, facilitate and promote the process of arms limitation and disarmament. Given the enhanced awareness of the importance of compliance, confidence-building measures may also serve the additional objective of facilitating verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

7. Confidence-building measures can be adopted in various forms. They can be agreed upon with the intention of creating legally binding obligations, in which case, they represent international treaty law among parties. They can, however, also be agreed upon through politically binding commitments. Evolution of politically binding confidence-building measures into obligations under international law can also be envisaged.

8. The confidence-building process would be facilitated by good governance, particularly arms transparency, and by openness in military matters. Transparency and accountability can enhance confidence and contribute to reducing regional and international tensions, thereby promoting international peace and security. Openness in military matters would also reduce uncertainty and unpredictability, as well as reinforce the peaceful declarations and intentions of States.

9. Regional and global approaches are not contradictory, but rather complementary and interrelated. The relationship between the development of confidence-building measures and the international security environment can also be mutually reinforcing.

#### B. Principles

10. Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms should fully respect the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In particular, and as a prerequisite for

enhancing confidence among States, the following principles enshrined in the Charter must be strictly observed: refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States; peaceful settlement of disputes; and the sovereign equality of States.

11. Confidence-building measures must be applied on a voluntary and reciprocal basis and need to be developed at a pace with which all States participating in the process are comfortable.

12. The principles contained in guidelines previously adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission are also applicable, as under:

- Paragraph 8 of the “Guidelines on conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament, with particular emphasis on consolidation of peace in the context of General Assembly resolution 51/54 N”, adopted in 1999;
- Paragraph 14 of the “Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991”, adopted in 1996;
- Paragraphs 9 to 31 of the “Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security”, adopted in 1993;
- Paragraph 21 of the “Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level”, adopted in 1988.

### **C. Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms**

13. Measures to build confidence must be tailored to specific situations. The effectiveness of a concrete measure will increase the more it is adjusted to the specific perceptions of threat or the requirements of a given situation or a particular region.

14. The building of confidence is a dynamic process: experience and trust gained from the implementation of early largely voluntary and militarily less significant measures can facilitate agreement on further and more far-reaching measures. Whilst, in a specific situation,

the implementation of far-reaching arrangements at an early stage might be attainable, it would normally appear that a gradual step-by-step process is feasible.

15. Confidence-building requires a consensus among the States participating in the process. States must therefore decide freely and in the exercise of their sovereignty whether a confidence-building process is to be initiated and, if so, which measures are to be taken and how the process is to be pursued.

16. In considering the introduction of confidence-building measures in particular regions, the specific political, military and other conditions prevailing in the region should be fully taken into account. Confidence-building measures in a regional context should be adopted on the initiative and with the agreement of the States of the region concerned.

17. The implementation of confidence-building measures should take place in such a manner as to ensure the right of each State to undiminished security, guaranteeing that no individual State or group of States obtains advantages over others at any stage of the confidence-building process.

18. Obligations undertaken in agreements on confidence-building measures must be fulfilled in good faith.

19. Bearing in mind that the process of confidence-building at the different levels is in constant evolution, the following measures taken on voluntary basis are merely illustrative and not intended to be exhaustive:

#### **1. Measures and guidelines as adopted by the General Assembly**

(a) United Nations standardized system of reporting on military expenditures (1980),<sup>a</sup>

(b) United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (1991),<sup>b</sup>

(c) Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters (1992).<sup>c</sup>

## 2. Measures developed and implemented at the regional, subregional, bilateral and unilateral levels

(a) Confidence-building and security-building measures in the political, economic, social, environmental and cultural fields, such as:

(i) Information-sharing among law enforcement agencies in sensitive or disputed border areas, joint border and customs control activities;

(ii) Adherence to relevant United Nations resolutions and guidelines in the field of conventional arms;

(iii) National legislation and administrative regulations on arms export, import, transit, re-export and diversion;

(iv) Providing information to the United Nations Secretary-General regarding destruction programmes of surplus, confiscated or collected weapons;

(v) Joint actions of armed forces in civilian emergency situations, including cooperation programmes in the event of natural disasters or to prevent such disasters, based on the request and authorization of the affected States and joint activities for sea rescue and in sea mine clearance;

(vi) Consultations on limitation and control of conventional weapons;

(vii) Establishment of regional registers for small arms and light weapons;

(viii) Promotion of adherence to and universality of global legal instruments dealing with conventional arms, as well as regional, subregional and bilateral conventions and/or agreements that are already in place;

(ix) Identification and carrying out of activities and common economic projects to promote cooperation among neighbouring countries along their border regions;

(x) Establishment of demilitarized zones or of zones of peace;

(xi) Increased security and cooperation to face threats like narcotraffic, terrorism, illicit traffic of arms, international organized crime, etc.;

(xii) Measures against poverty in the context of addressing causes of conflict;

(xiii) Development and adoption of a standardized methodology for measuring defence expenditures;

(b) Exchange of information on armed forces and military activities such as:

(i) Organization structure, size and composition of armed forces;

(ii) Plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems;

(iii) Military disengagement to avoid conflict and ease tension;

(c) Dissemination of militarily relevant information, for example, on:

(i) Arms transfers;

(ii) Military budgets;

(iii) Defence policy papers, statements, defence white papers;

(iv) Defence doctrine, planning and expenditures;

(d) Inspections, prior notification/observations and visits to military facilities and activities, including overflight regimes, and:

(i) Gradual adoption of agreements regarding advance notification of military exercises;

(ii) Visits to military bases and/or installations;

(e) Regional seminars on security issues, involving the participation of civilians and military personnel such as:

- Military doctrines;
- Security policy;
- Regional security perceptions;
- Confidence-building and security-building measures;
- Illegal arms traffic;
- Transfer of conventional arms;

- Laws of armed conflict;
- Defence conversion;
- Defence language school;
- Military medicine;

(f) Establishment of effective communications between military and political authorities of different States; for example on:

- Mechanisms for consultation and joint efforts to deal with unusual military activities or hazardous incidents of military nature (including hot lines);
- Development and establishment of communications among civilians or military authorities of neighbouring countries in accordance with their border situation;

(g) Establishment of regional security institutions charged with a variety of tasks affecting the security of States in a region, such as:

- Conflict prevention;
- Arms control;
- Elimination of illegal arms traffic;
- Contacts and exchanges among military officials, including heads of defence universities, colleges and institutions;
- Education for Peace Programmes;
- Arrangements for observing routine operations and exchange of civilian and military personnel for regular and advanced training;
- Exchange of advisory and financial assistance in safeguarding and improving control of surplus or obsolete weapons stockpiles, in particular small arms and light weapons storage facilities;
- Joint training for peacekeeping operations.

#### **D. Role of the United Nations**

20. The primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security. The United Nations constitutes the only universal forum where all

Member States contribute to the process of disarmament.

21. Taking into account that the potential of confidence-building measures for creating favourable conditions for progress in the disarmament field should be fully utilized in all regions of the world, the United Nations can contribute to that objective by promoting complementarity between regional and global approaches as well as by establishing effective liaison and cooperation with relevant regional bodies.

22. In that regard, the collection and dissemination of information regarding confidence-building measures in place by the United Nations, through the Department for Disarmament Affairs, will serve as a valuable reference material as well as facilitate future progress in this field.

#### **E. Recommendations**

[To be discussed at a later stage]

#### *Notes*

<sup>a</sup> See resolution 35/142 B.

<sup>b</sup> See resolution 46/36 L.

<sup>c</sup> See document A/47/42.