



# General Assembly

Distr.: General  
20 September 2001

Original: English

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## Fifty-sixth session

Agenda item 20 (a)

### **Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations**

## **Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel**

### **Report of the Secretary-General\***

#### **I. Introduction**

1. In its resolution 55/175 of December 2000, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to it at its fifty-sixth session a comprehensive, updated report of the safety and security situation of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to provide information on the implementation of the resolution, including an account of the measures taken by Governments and the United Nations to prevent and respond to all individual security incidents involving United Nations and associated personnel.

2. The present document is an interim report pending full implementation of all the measures foreseen for the enhancement of staff security. The report contains information regarding the threats against United Nations personnel, including data on those who have lost their lives since the preparation of

the last report and a description of the measures taken thus far to enhance the security of staff.

#### **II. Threats against United Nations and humanitarian personnel**

3. Since my last report, incidents of violence against United Nations and humanitarian personnel have continued unabated. As a result, in recent months, three civilian staff members have lost their lives in the service of the United Nations as a result of malicious acts, bringing to 201 the total number since 1 January 1992 (for details see the annex to the present report). This figure does not include those who lost their lives in accidents such as the tragic helicopter crash in Mongolia in 2000, which claimed the lives of four United Nations staff. During the same period there were four cases of hostage-taking involving 10 United Nations system personnel, bringing to 255 the total since 1 January 1994. Staff members of organizations of the United Nations system and non-governmental organizations have also continued to be targets of rape and sexual assault, ambushes, armed robbery, attacks on humanitarian convoys, carjackings, harassment, and

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\* The present report is being submitted after consultations with the operational organizations of the United Nations, taking into account the shortage of staff in the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator.



arrest and detention. Incidents of extortion and misappropriation of relief assistance, often aided by the ready availability of small arms, plague the efforts of the humanitarian community across the globe.

4. Non-governmental organization partners of United Nations humanitarian organizations operate in the same environment and are subject to the same risks in complex emergencies. In the past year, incidents of violence against humanitarian workers have had a greater impact upon the NGOs than upon the agencies of the United Nations. The recent attacks on humanitarian workers in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Indonesia, Burundi, the Russian Federation (Chechnya) and the Sudan are unacceptable and must be condemned in the strongest terms.

5. The independence and the diversity of mandates of the non-governmental organizations may give them greater flexibility than the United Nations in responding to crisis situations, but may in some circumstances leave them more vulnerable to insecurity. Given the complementary nature of the work of the United Nations and the humanitarian NGOs, my concern lies with the safety and security of all humanitarian workers, whose presence at a duty station can mean the difference between life and death for so many of those who depend on their help.

6. The alarming increase in the danger to the lives and security of humanitarian personnel over the past decade is largely attributable to the multiplication and enlargement of irregular armed groups. This is a relatively new feature in conflict situations in all regions of the world. These groups often do not respect the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian personnel and/or reject international agreements designed to provide such personnel.

7. Member States must take stronger action to ensure that the perpetrators of attacks upon humanitarian workers are brought to justice. It is untenable that the vast majority of perpetrators of such attacks have gone unpunished, while those few that have been apprehended receive only cursory penalties. The lenient sentences given to the perpetrators of the murderers of staff of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in west Timor recently are a case in point. There is no doubt in my mind that the strongest deterrent to attacks on humanitarian workers is the swift application of justice

by Member States and I must once again call upon those States to take this responsibility seriously.

8. In this regard, I wish to reiterate my appeal to those Member States who have not done so to sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and to become parties to the Convention on the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel. With regard to the latter, I also wish to invite Member States to consider favourably the recommendations I put forward in my report (A/55/637 paras. 27-33), in which I proposed the expansion of the scope of the Convention. We must signal a clear message that humanitarian workers cannot be attacked with impunity.

9. In these circumstances, humanitarian personnel cannot be expected to achieve their objectives if they are not protected themselves through the provision of adequate and professional security personnel and security awareness training. During the reporting period a number of United Nations staff who faced hostile situations, ranging from hostage incidents, fires, ambushes, carjackings and armed robbery, attributed their survival directly to skills obtained through the enhanced security training programme. Thus the "culture of security awareness" engendered by my efforts to reinforce and enhance the United Nations security management system has begun to have a tangible impact on staff safety.

### **III. Measures taken by the United Nations system to enhance the security arrangement for United Nations staff members**

10. In my last report I described in detail the steps required to improve the United Nations security management system. I have been greatly encouraged by the many expressions of concern and support by Member States, as evidenced by the approval by the General Assembly of a modest increase in the resources being made available to me for security. As outlined below, a number of steps have been taken to enhance the security arrangements in place for United Nations personnel. On the other hand, the continuing lack of financial and personnel resources have impeded much of the work that still needs to be undertaken. Proposals detailing the required financial and personnel resources will be submitted to the General Assembly

through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

### **A. Strengthening of the United Nations security management system**

11. In the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2002-2003, I will be making a number of proposals to the General Assembly to strengthen the overall security management system. Of particular concern to me is the appointment of a full-time Security Coordinator, an issue which I urge the Assembly to consider favourably as it is the very cornerstone of the United Nations security management system. Dynamic and committed leadership is required to sustain the initiatives aimed at increasing the efficacy of the United Nations security management system at an appropriate level to engage the executive heads of agencies and representatives of Member States and donors.

12. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, which oversees the United Nations security management system on my behalf, has traditionally been, and should continue to be, staffed by representatives of the United Nations agencies to ensure an integrated approach to security decisions, taking into account the various mandates and levels of security tolerance among the United Nations agencies and their operational partners. This inter-agency profile is replicated at every level of the United Nations security management system through the global network of designated officials, security management teams and field security officers. This effectively ensures that the standards and practices of the United Nations security management system are true United Nations standards to which the entire system both contributes and adheres. The integrated approach is essential to ensure broad consensus behind security initiatives such as the Minimum Operational Security Standards (MOSS).

13. Given the tremendous responsibility of maintaining the United Nations security management system, the headquarters of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator is now being strengthened by the recruitment of eight Professional level staff, approved by the General Assembly in section II of its resolution 55/238 of 23 December 2000. There is an obvious and direct correlation between the deployment of well-trained security staff,

at both the field and headquarters levels, and enhanced staff safety and security. These staff members at Headquarters, as well as the addition of eight field security officers (also approved by the General Assembly in section II of resolution 55/238), will enable the Office to respond more effectively to new crises as well as to develop and undertake more security training missions, initiate inspection and compliance missions, ensure better coordination and, on my behalf, exercise greater authority in the security management system.

14. While much remains to be done in this regard, a number of improvements emanating from my recommendations have been made. There has been a greater commitment by the United Nations agencies, programmes and funds to security management and training. Thus far during 2001, United Nations staff serving at 29 high-risk duty stations benefited from security training under the Office. By the end of 2002, an additional 44 duty stations will have benefited from training. As a result of this rigorous training schedule, the overall competency of the United Nations security management system as an inter-agency, integrated initiative has already been significantly reinforced. There is a greater awareness than ever before of security management as an integral aspect of the work of the Organization, requiring the vigilant participation of all agencies and staff.

15. Efforts to standardize and maximize the benefits of security training materials have also shown results. An Inter-Agency Working Group on Security Training made significant progress in this regard. All agencies with their own security training programmes agreed to adopt the curriculum developed by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator in order to provide a United Nations system-wide approach to training certification. Agencies also agreed to participate with the Office in inter-agency security training initiatives.

16. The focus on security has reinforced the coordinating role of the Office in overseeing the United Nations security management system. The trend towards the establishment of independent security initiatives has been reoriented to increased cooperation and coordination of staff security interventions. This includes the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, which is working closely with the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator to ensure uniformity in the application of a system-wide policy on common

security standards and procedures. While some organizations of the United Nations system will continue to require their own security services related to their specific mandates, the system as a whole has never worked so closely together on the critical issue of staff security.

17. At the field level, humanitarian staff understand that working in complex humanitarian environments will always entail risks, some of which can be beyond the control of humanitarian workers themselves; however, it is important to ensure that the risks taken by staff are mitigated through improved coordination that is both well reasoned and well informed. Thus one of the primary aims of my efforts is to strengthen the security management system at the field level through improved coordination and collaboration on security. Several initiatives at the field level have been undertaken to strengthen collaboration between the United Nations and its partners.

18. For example, in Somalia, one of the most difficult working environments for aid agencies, the United Nations country team has sought to strengthen United Nations security in line with global recommendations made by the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator in a report on a Somalia mission, which recommended that the United Nations agencies should establish seven inter-agency cost-shared field security officer posts as well as strengthen procedures and enhance equipment provision. Consequently, the security management team decided to strengthen the security system for Somalia based around two pillars: a cost-shared security system consisting of seven security officers provided with standard equipment; and the provision of essential supplies to staff, such as communications equipment, escape kits, and flakjackets, as well as logistical support for the United Nations agencies. Funds for the latter have been earmarked as part of the 2001 consolidated appeals.

19. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where front lines divide people in need over a wide area, the United Nations country team has made the point that security matters must be dealt with in a decentralized manner. In the light of the unacceptable number of tragic attacks on humanitarian staff in the country, the United Nations and its partners organized meetings to explore ways to reduce risk while attempting to recover the humanitarian space needed to carry out sustainable

relief operations. One initiative in this regard is the current effort by the humanitarian community to strengthen dialogue with local communities to help create a positive atmosphere, reduce tensions and build confidence.

20. In view of the fact that humanitarian actors operating in insecure environments cannot afford to be ignorant of the local political realities and the impact their operations may have on armed groups, it is incumbent upon them to gain an understanding of the interests and stakes of the different local actors in order to be able to provide effective assistance. To support such an analysis, the United Nations in Somalia has developed a database to enable the collection of data and analysis of historical trends.

21. In Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the majority of NGOs on the ground are able to take advantage of the United Nations agency radio network. In the Indonesian province of Maluku, the security management system has been enhanced through the installation of a United Nations radio system, available also to NGO operational partners.

22. Despite efforts made at the field level to improve staff security, there are some instances in which United Nations efforts to safeguard staff are frustrated. For example, in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, international agencies are not permitted to equip themselves with any form of communications equipment, despite the poor quality of local communications and the often difficult driving and road conditions. This remains a serious concern for the health and safety of staff members travelling on duty outside the capital, in case of accidents or medical emergencies. Similarly, the United Nations is not permitted to make use of any other form of wireless communication.

## **B. Security and stress management training**

23. As outlined in my previous report (A/55/494, para. 51), the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator continues to present its comprehensive security and stress management training programme to United Nations system staff around the world. The programme consists of three major components: security management and crisis management training for all officials responsible for security, including the

designated official, members of the security management team, area coordinators and wardens; specialized training for field security officers; and personal security awareness briefings for staff.

24. As at 1 August 2001, the Office's mobile training teams had visited 29 countries and had presented its "one-time" training to approximately 8,000 staff members. According to present planning, an additional 10 duty stations will be covered before the end of 2001. Beginning in 2002, the Office will begin the second stage of the "one-time" training, presenting a security and stress management programme in 111 countries where there is a United Nations presence.

25. When this "one-time" training has been completed, it will be necessary to put in place a three-year cycle for "sustainment training" to ensure that changes in staff and security managers and their replacement by untrained personnel do not weaken the security management system.

26. Discussions are ongoing within the inter-agency system to implement a process whereby staff members would need to be certified as "security proficient" before they could be deployed to the field. This certification process would also make it possible to keep track of all security-related training undertaken by the staff member.

27. In addition to this training, the Office has also established a technical training programme for security specialists such as field security officers and chief security officers at peacekeeping missions. Over the reporting period, in addition to single-topic training seminars, it has presented four regional security officer workshops, which were attended by the majority of security officers working for the United Nations system. On request, the Office has also provided customized security training to a number of United Nations organizations.

28. The entire security and stress management training programme undertaken by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator has been funded from the Trust Fund for the Security of United Nations Personnel. As at 1 July 2001, contributions had been received from the following Member States: Argentina (US\$ 50,000), Finland (\$102,000), Japan (\$2 million), Monaco (\$25,500), Netherlands (\$193,000), Norway (\$100,000), Poland (\$20,000) and Sweden (\$196,000). These funds will only be sufficient to support the

security and stress management training programme through the end of 2002.

29. A few organizations of the United Nations system complement the Office's security training programme by providing security awareness training for their staff. In order to ensure that all organizations of the United Nations system are presenting a consistent message to staff in the single-agency training programmes, an inter-agency Working Group met in May 2001 to standardize and harmonize all the security and stress management training packages within the United Nations system. The Working Group also considered the next steps to be taken to further develop and enhance security training for personnel. Efforts are also being undertaken to enhance the security training packages. A CD-ROM is under development by UNHCR in cooperation with all agencies and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator which will facilitate a self-tutorial learning approach to security training and serve as an important field reference.

30. In recent months and subsequent to the murders of UNHCR staff in west Timor, Indonesia and Guinea, UNHCR has embarked on an in-depth "action learning" security process at high-risk duty stations. The process is interactive, with UNHCR security personnel guiding staff members in developing their own security architecture. While it adheres to the standards of the United Nations security management system, its objective is to develop local ownership of security arrangements and to conclude agreements relating thereto between heads of office and employees.

31. The World Food Programme (WFP) has instituted mandatory security awareness training, in compliance with United Nations security management system standards, which has been given to over 8,400 personnel since 1999. Staff are provided with practical steps to take in the field to enhance their personal security and are educated regarding the United Nations field security system and the need to adhere to established standards.

### **C. Stress counselling**

32. The conditions under which staff members of the United Nations system have carried out their mandates have changed dramatically. Unlike military personnel, United Nations system staff members have not

traditionally been trained to deal with the traumatic events which they are with increasing frequency forced to experience. Nor have they developed the psychological immunity that is sometimes found in those who are required to work in traumatic situations. Untreated cumulative and critical incident stress has a negative impact on staff performance. Those who experience this type of stress are generally not fully productive, have difficulty in being objective and do not work as members of a team. A failure to properly manage cumulative and critical incident stress can lead to illness and sometimes to life-threatening situations. In addition, prolonged exposure to dangerous environments can make the staff member blasé about taking basic security precautions.

33. Stress counselling has been recognized by most organizations as an area which needs close inter-agency coordination and action. A full-time stress counsellor has now been assigned to the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator to coordinate the inter-agency response to critical incidents as well as to develop policy related to the matter. This individual works closely with the stress counsellors assigned to certain peacekeeping missions, UNHCR and WFP. Over the past year, the majority of staff who experienced critical incidents were provided with the opportunity to meet with a stress counsellor. The increase in the number of stress counsellors in the Office will permit it to respond more effectively to the needs of staff.

#### **D. Minimum operating security standards**

34. In response to the increased risk of murder, kidnapping and serious assault to United Nations staff working in many operational areas throughout the world, the organizations of the United Nations system have identified the need for an increase in basic security requirements at each duty station as well as the need to make field operations managers more security-conscious and accountable for their actions. At the same time it was regarded as necessary for mechanisms to be put in place in the field to permit a systematic assessment of threats facing United Nations system staff for each location so that the organizations could react appropriately.

35. To address this requirement, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, in close collaboration with the agencies and the field, has

developed an objective set of standards known as the baseline Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) which must be implemented at each duty station. MOSS is broadly divided into four sections — security planning, training, communications and security equipment — and spells out the standard, which must be met in order for the system to operate safely. These standards were provided to all designated officials and security management teams who were requested to identify their country-specific minimum requirements, based on the threat assessment and phase in effect at their location.

36. While many duty stations have indicated that they are in compliance with their particular MOSS, others are not. Resources will be required to bring these duty stations into compliance with their own set minimum standards. Non-compliance with MOSS will constitute one of the criteria which could lead to the suspension of United Nations operations; it could also affect insurance coverage.

#### **E. Minimum telecommunications standard for the security and safety of field personnel**

37. The ability to communicate on a 24-hour basis in the event of an emergency is a critical component of any field security mechanism. Field operations must also have the capacity to relay, in a timely manner, information on current events to enable a proactive security approach to the situation on the ground. The existence of effective field communications, independent of public infrastructure which may be disrupted during a crisis, is crucial.

38. It is essential to establish appropriate standardized emergency telecommunications systems for field operations which build upon the other initiatives that the United Nations has undertaken over the past few years to improve staff security and ongoing efforts to fill critical communication gaps at the field level. This will entail ensuring a minimum level of telecommunications capacity at all times in all offices and vehicles and among all United Nations personnel, with the capacity to build quickly upon the basic system when needed to address extraordinary security contingencies. This minimum level of telecommunications capability is scaled on the basis of the United Nations security phases.

39. Over the past three years an ad hoc task force, including the offices of UNHCR, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Food Programme and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator have worked with the Working Group on Emergency Telecommunications to review field emergency communications systems. On 10 October 2000, a draft proposal to establish a common minimum telecommunications standard for the security and safety of field personnel was approved by ACC. The standard, which will be an integral part of MOSS, establishes minimum requirements of resources, coordination, procedures and policy for effective field emergency telecommunications that ensure a 24-hour capability of communications and response.

#### **F. United Nations/NGO security collaboration**

40. In view of the close working relationship between United Nations humanitarian agencies and non-governmental/intergovernmental organizations, cooperation at the field level regarding security is considered essential. With a view to recommending ways of enhancing collaboration on the issue of security, at the request of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, WFP convened two workshops to discuss the matter further. The outcome of the workshops was a series of both strategic and operational recommendations, ranging from the promotion of a culture of security collaboration to more practical approaches such as sharing of security information. The results of the workshops were forwarded to the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security, which found the recommendations capable of implementation with minor amendments to meet legal considerations, and recommended their implementation at the field level, as appropriate.

41. While the United Nations security management system is prepared to collaborate with the NGO community to the maximum extent possible, there are steps which the NGO community must take to facilitate this relationship. These areas were clearly identified in the above-mentioned workshops and contained in their recommendations. Foremost, principally, the NGOs, like the United Nations agencies, must identify security focal points, on global and national levels, to interact

with the United Nations, share information and coordinate the security related actions of NGOs. Secondly, the humanitarian community, including the United Nations, must seek to adhere to common humanitarian ground rules, to ensure our mutual security concerns in the field.

42. Efforts to enhance security collaboration with non-United Nations entities will continue and increase at all levels: in the field through the designated officials for security, and at the Headquarters through continued consultations with the NGO consortia, international organizations, Member States and donors.

#### **G. Consolidated appeals and the Central Emergency Revolving Fund**

43. For the third year, project proposals aimed at improving staff security in complex emergencies have been included in the United Nations consolidated appeals. The 2001 appeals launched in November 2000 are requesting over \$13.7 million to cover urgent security costs in some 13 countries and regions where humanitarian staff are working to provide humanitarian assistance. The funds requested will be used to enhance staff security through such initiatives as the extension of the area field security officer network and to improve communications. As at August 2001, only about \$3.4 million had been contributed in this regard.

44. The General Assembly will also consider a note by the Secretary-General on enhancing the functioning and utilization of the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (A/55/649). Among other recommendations for enhancing the use of the Fund, the note requested the Assembly to endorse a recommendation to expand the use of the Fund to allow funds to be advanced to support immediate emergency security measures on behalf of United Nations and associated personnel.

#### **H. Accountability**

45. The development of a culture of accountability for security throughout the United Nations system is a matter of great concern to me. Discussions regarding the matter have been ongoing on an inter-agency basis, but much additional work still needs to be done. This accountability must start with Member States and extend through executive heads to security managers and staff, both at Headquarters and in the field.

46. Accountability and compliance must be equal parts of the security management system. However, accountability can only be effective if security managers and staff have the resources, capacity and authority to carry out clearly defined security responsibilities. In addition, coordination is essential to ensure that approved security policies are consistently applied. Proper security training is essential if managers are to discharge their responsibilities effectively and be held accountable for their actions. By the same token, similar training is essential for staff members.

47. In the United Nations system the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator will undertake the regulatory function of supervising regularly, providing guidance and support, evaluating, assessing and testing compliance with security standards and policies through regular inspection and compliance missions to the field. Every effort will be made to consult the respective agencies with security personnel involved in these exercises in order to coordinate such missions with them. Working closely with the agencies, the Office will identify security management core competencies and define standards of performance for designated officials, field security officers and members of the security management team. Training will be provided to ensure specific competency development.

48. Based on the findings of the Office's compliance programme, problems and best practices will be highlighted and security training programmes will be modified accordingly to prevent repetition of errors. Any deficiencies identified by the Office's inspection/compliance missions will be brought to the attention of senior managers for action. I will report more extensively on progress to be achieved in this area at a subsequent date.

### **I. The promotion of humanitarian principles and negotiated access**

49. In my previous report I emphasized the link between staff safety and security and the promotion of humanitarian principles and the concept of negotiated access. To obtain safe and unimpeded access to populations in need, humanitarian organizations are often obliged to negotiate with a myriad of armed groups. When doing so, they are guided by recognized humanitarian principles and the humanitarian

imperative to save lives. Humanitarian organizations also need to consult with and involve the beneficiaries and the traditionally accepted community leadership to ensure that the provision of assistance is based on assessed needs and to guarantee accountability.

50. Increased contact by humanitarian agencies with armed groups or with the community leadership in areas under their control, while essential, entails security risks. Armed groups who do not respect international humanitarian law may target relief workers and their assistance. Armed elements that seek to use all possible means to expand their power base may be threatened by the desire of humanitarian actors to provide aid to the vulnerable people or by the direct engagement by humanitarian actors with the community leadership.

51. It is therefore incumbent upon both United Nations security officials and humanitarian workers to first obtain a sound level of understanding of the political and security environment in which aid is being provided in order to plan and implement activities in ways that minimize security risks, both to the aid workers and to their beneficiaries. I urge Member States to support the efforts of the United Nations and its partners to promote transparent dialogue with all parties to a conflict and affected communities, in order to find ways to ensure that humanitarian staff and their programmes are protected from violence.

## **IV. Observations and recommendations**

52. The safety and security of humanitarian personnel must be viewed in their reality. Humanitarian personnel are at risk because they are present to assist the needy; because they enter into areas of tension or conflict where human rights abuses are the order of the day; where there is hunger, poverty and injustice. Humanitarian workers are targeted, often, because they are the only ones there and they represent the international community. They often are the vanguard of the Organization's quest for peace and stability and their safety and security is one of the highest priorities of the United Nations security management system.

53. Humanitarian personnel often work in hazardous or tense situations and are generally ill-equipped to deal with the threats they must confront on a daily basis. While the principles of neutrality and

impartiality, which once protected humanitarian workers, continue to be upheld, often the mere perception that humanitarian workers are assisting “the other side” in a conflict over another can put their lives at risk.

54. The parties, both official and irregular, to these conflicts must take responsibility for their actions. Greater efforts must be made to prevent such incidents and, in the event they occur, to bring the perpetrators to justice. It must be made clear that violence towards humanitarian workers undermines the legitimacy of any group seeking political recognition or entitlements.

55. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the environment in which United Nations and humanitarian personnel are required to operate will change in the near future. Such personnel must therefore be provided with the tools and the ability to minimize their exposure to risk. Security is a shared responsibility between the Member States, the organizations and personnel. Each must fulfil certain responsibilities: the Member States must ensure, when establishing mandates, that proper and adequate means are put at the disposal of the organizations to safely fulfil these mandates. Member States also must insist that there be a universally accepted and respected system of security coordination, with appropriate funding for personnel, training and equipment.

56. The organizations of the United Nations system have a responsibility for the safety of their staff. It is therefore critical that inter-agency collaboration be improved and strengthened through the harmonization of security management between actors in the humanitarian community. All organizations working at a particular duty station must observe and practice effective security management. Mistakes by one organization can seriously compromise the security of others. Personnel must ensure that they are well informed about security conditions in areas to which they are assigned. They must ensure high security awareness and also ensure that they do not become complacent about their working environment, which by definition entails risks.

57. It is therefore my intention to continue to advocate for a management approach which ensures that security is an intrinsic part of every operation. To this end, I will actively pursue a culture of compliance and accountability, with clear definitions of the key

roles and responsibilities of all those involved in the security management process.

58. I am instructing the senior officials involved that security training and security awareness must be provided to every staff member. This is the single most effective means of minimizing risk; I will pursue the implementation of preventive risk management by ensuring that risks are regularly analysed and planned for. Steps are already being taken to put in place a standardized methodology for data collection on security incidents.

59. Member States are encouraged to build the capacity of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator through the appointment of a full-time Security Coordinator at the Assistant Secretary-General level to provide the high-level attention that this matter requires.

60. Given the prevalence of complex emergencies, which entail unforeseen and often unpredictable security measures to ensure the safety of humanitarian workers, I call upon Member States to contribute generously to the security proposals contained in United Nations consolidated appeals.

61. To this end I wish to reiterate my appeal to all Member States to contribute to the Trust Fund for the Security of United Nations Personnel so that the means may exist to implement these decisions.

62. Member States are also urged to support the efforts of the United Nations and its partners to promote transparent dialogue with affected communities and parties to the conflict with a view to obtaining adherence to humanitarian principles in order to find ways by which humanitarian staff and their programmes can be protected from violence.

**Annex****Civilian personnel who have lost their lives since  
17 September 2000**

<i>Name</i>	<i>Nationality/agency</i>	<i>Date/place of incident</i>	<i>Cause</i>	<i>Legal action</i>
Djamba, Sankara Jose	Democratic Republic of the Congo/ UNHCR	27 March 2001 Kimpese, Democratic Republic of the Congo	Gunshot wounds	No
Rakotonan Ahary, José	Madagascar/UNDP	8 May 2001 Antananarivo, Madagascar	Gunshot wounds	No
Lhommée, Jean- Pierre	France/UNDP	5 July 2001 Bangui, Central African Republic	Gunshot	No