United Nations

A/51/131


General Assembly

Distr. GENERAL  

8 May 1996

ORIGINAL:
FRENCH AND RUSSIAN


                                             A/51/131

General Assembly
Fifty-first session
Items 14, 21, 33, 66, 71 and 98
  of the preliminary list*

*    A/51/50.


               REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

               STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND
               DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
                     INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

                       THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

          IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY

                       GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

                    ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

             Letter dated 7 May 1996 from the Permanent Representatives
             of France and the Russian Federation to the United Nations
                      addressed to the Secretary-General


     As representatives of the States that jointly chaired the Summit
on Nuclear Safety and Security, held in Moscow on 19 and 20 April
1996, we have the honour to transmit to you herewith the texts of the
Moscow Summit Declaration on Nuclear Safety and Security (see annex
I), the Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in
Nuclear Material (see annex II), a statement on the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (see annex III), a statement on Ukraine (see
annex IV) and a statement by participants in the Moscow Summit
concerning Lebanon and the peace process (see annex V).

     We should be grateful if you would have this letter and its
annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly under items
14, 21, 33, 66, 71 and 98 of the preliminary list.


(Signed)  Alain DEJAMMET                         (Signed)  Sergey LAVROV      
            Ambassador                                       Ambassador       
     Permanent Representative                        Permanent Representative 
 of France to the United Nations                     of the Russian Federation
                                                       to the United Nations  


                                    ANNEX I

                                                   [Original:  English, French
                                                               and Russian]   

           Moscow Summit Declaration on Nuclear Safety and Security


1.   The end of the cold war and the political economic reforms in
Russia have opened a new era in our relationship and have provided the
international community with real possibilities for cooperation in the
fields of nuclear safety and security.  The Moscow meeting is an
important step in the achievement of these objectives.  We are
determined, at this summit and beyond, to work together to ensure the
safety of nuclear power and to promote greater security for nuclear
materials.

2.   We are committed to giving absolute priority to safety in the use
of nuclear energy.  As we approach the tenth anniversary of the
Chernobyl accident, it is our shared objective that such a catastrophe
cannot recur.

     We are ready to cooperate among ourselves so that the use of
nuclear energy is conducted all over the world in accordance with
fundamental principles of nuclear safety.  Further, we are committed
to measures that will enable nuclear power, already a significant
contributor to electricity supply in those countries choosing to use
it, to continue in the next century to play an important role in
meeting future world energy demand in accordance with the goal of
sustainable development agreed at the Rio Conference in 1992.

     We recognize the importance of openness and transparency to obtain
public trust, which is a key factor for the use of nuclear energy.

3.   The security of all nuclear material is an essential part of the
responsible and peaceful use of nuclear energy.  In particular, the
safe management of fissile material, including material resulting from
the dismantling of nuclear weapons, is imperative, not least as a
safeguard against any risk of illicit trafficking in nuclear
materials.

4.   In the spirit of the decisions adopted during the New York
conference of May 1995 on review and extension of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including the decision on principles and
objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, we will
increase our cooperation in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament by promoting universal adherence to the NPT, working
vigorously to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards system and through effective and responsible export control
measures.  We are issuing a separate text on a Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).  We renew our commitment to the immediate
commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-
discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.

     Nuclear safety

5.   Recognizing that the prime responsibility for nuclear safety rests
with national Governments, it is of primary importance to continue to
enhance international collaborative efforts to promote a high level of
nuclear safety world wide.

     Safety of civilian nuclear reactors

6.   Nuclear safety has to prevail over all other considerations.  We
reaffirm our commitment to the highest internationally recognized
safety level for the siting, design, construction, operation and
regulation of nuclear power installations.

7.   The promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture in each
country with nuclear installations is essential to that end.

8.   Sustainable nuclear safety also requires a supportive economic and
legal environment in which both operators and national regulatory
bodies can fully assume their independent responsibilities.

9.   Nuclear safety can also be enhanced by greater international
transparency in nuclear power activities, in particular by means of
peer reviews, and this should lead to existing reactors that do not
meet current safety requirements being brought to an acceptable level
of safety or ceasing operation.

10.  The adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which reaffirms
these fundamental safety principles, is a major accomplishment in this
field.  We urge all countries to sign this Convention and to complete
internal procedures to join so that the Convention can be brought into
force expeditiously certainly before the end of 1996.

11.  National efforts have been made in the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe and the newly independent States to improve nuclear
safety levels, often in cooperation with multilateral and bilateral
programmes.  In this regard, we acknowledge these important efforts to
upgrade reactor safety and improve safety culture, but note that
further substantial progress is still required.  We reaffirm our
commitment to cooperate fully to achieve this.

     Nuclear liability

12.  An effective nuclear liability regime must assure adequate
compensation to victims of and for damage caused by nuclear accidents. 
In addition, to secure the degree of private sector involvement needed
to undertake vital safety improvements, the regime should at the same
time protect industrial suppliers from unwarranted legal action.

13.  The essential principles in this area are the exclusive and strict
liability of the operator of the nuclear installations and ensuring
needed financial security for adequate compensation.

14.  It is essential that countries with nuclear installations that
have not yet done so establish an effective regime for liability for
nuclear damage corresponding to these principles.

15.  It is important to work together to enhance the international
regime of liability for nuclear damage with a view to ensuring that it
will attract wide adherence and accommodate any State which may wish
to become a party.  We encourage the experts to make further progress
to this end.  In this connection, the reinforcement of regional
cooperation is welcomed.

     Energy sector strategies in countries in transition

16.  Efficient market-oriented strategies for energy sector reform are
essential to promote nuclear safety.  This will generate adequate
resources for investment in safety upgrades and maintenance, and
encourage energy conservation.  All countries in transition should
pursue such market-oriented reforms and investment strategies based
upon least-cost planning, giving due regard to nuclear safety and
environmental criteria, and to energy efficiency and conservation.

17.  The international financial institutions have played a leading
role in developing market-oriented energy sector reforms and
investment plans.  Their continued involvement and support is critical
to ensure further progress.

     Nuclear waste management

     International convention

18.  National authorities must ensure that radioactive waste is managed
safely and that provisions are made for its proper handling, storage
and ultimate disposal.  These are essential elements for any nuclear
energy programme.

19.  The development of the convention on the safety of radioactive
waste management, based on these principles, is of paramount
importance.  We call on all countries generating nuclear waste with
nuclear installations to participate actively in the preparation of
this convention under the auspices of the IAEA and to encourage its
effective finalization and prompt adoption.

     Ocean dumping

20.  We commit ourselves to ban dumping at sea of radioactive waste and
encourage all States to adhere at an earliest possible date to the
1993 amendment of the London Convention.

     Nuclear material security

     Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in
     Nuclear Material

21.  Illicit trafficking of nuclear material is a public safety and
non-proliferation concern.  We recognized the importance of this issue
at our meetings in Naples and Halifax.  As risks continue to exist, we
have agreed on, and released, a programme for preventing and combating
illicit trafficking in nuclear material to ensure increased
cooperation among our Governments in all aspects of prevention,
detection, exchange of information, investigation and prosecution in
cases of illicit nuclear trafficking.

     We call on other Governments to join us in implementing this
programme.

     Nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection

22.  We reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of nations to ensure
the security of all nuclear materials in their possession and the need
to ensure that they are subject to effective systems of nuclear
material accounting and control and physical protection.  These
systems should include regulations, licensing and inspections.  We
express our support for the IAEA safeguards regime, which plays a
critical role in providing assurance against the diversion of nuclear
material going undetected.  We underline the need for the urgent
strengthening of IAEA capabilities to detect undeclared nuclear
activities.  We note that these measures are also conducive to
preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear material.

23.  We recognize the importance of continually improving systems and
technologies for controlling and protecting nuclear materials.  We
urge nations to cooperate bilaterally, multilaterally and through the
IAEA to ensure that the national systems for controlling nuclear
materials remain effective.  We are encouraged by the wide array of
cooperative projects under way in this field under bilateral and
multilateral auspices and pledge to sustain and increase these
efforts.

24.  We urge ratification by all States of the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and encourage the application
of the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear
material.

25.  We pledge our support for efforts to ensure that all sensitive
nuclear material (separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium)
designated as not intended for use for meeting defence requirements is
safely stored, protected and placed under IAEA safeguards (in the
nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer IAEA
safeguards agreements) as soon as it is practicable to do so.

     Safe and effective management of weapons fissile material
     designated as no longer required for defence purposes

26.  Major steps have been taken in recent years towards nuclear
disarmament.  This has created substantial stocks of fissile material
designated as no longer required for defence purposes.  It is vital,
as mentioned above, that these stockpiles are safely managed and
eventually transformed into spent fuel or other forms equally unusable
for nuclear weapons and disposed of safely and permanently.

27.  The primary responsibility for the safe management of weapons
fissile material rests with the nuclear-weapon States themselves, but
other States and international organizations are welcome to assist
where desired.

28.  We welcome the steps that the United States and the Russian
Federation have taken to blend highly enriched uranium (HEU) from
dismantled nuclear weapons to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for peaceful
non-explosive purposes, and the cooperation programmes of Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States
of America and other States with the Russian Federation for the safe
storage, the peaceful uses of fissile material released by the
dismantling of nuclear weapons, and their safe and secure
transportation for that purpose; we encourage other efforts along
these lines.

29.  We are determined to identify appropriate strategies for the
management of fissile material designated as no longer required for
defence purposes.  Options include safe and secure long-term storage,
vitrification or other methods of permanent disposal, and conversion
into mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for use in nuclear reactors.  We have
agreed to share relevant experience and expertise to elaborate and
implement these strategies.  We welcome plans to conduct small-scale
technology demonstrations related to these options, including the
possibility of establishing pilot projects and plants.  We shall
convene an international meeting of experts in order to examine
available options and identify possible development of international
cooperation in the implementation of these national strategies,
bearing in mind technical, economic, non-proliferation, environmental
and other relevant considerations.  The meeting will take place in
France by the end of 1996.

30.  We recognize the importance of ensuring transparency in the
management of highly enriched uranium and plutonium designated as no
longer required for defence purposes.

                                    *  *  *

     Background documents on "Nuclear safety", "Nuclear material
accounting, control and physical protection" and "Safe and effective
management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer
required for defence purposes" are being released separately.



                                   ANNEX II

                                                   [Original:  English, French
                                                               and Russian]   

                Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit
                        Trafficking in Nuclear Material


     Illicit trafficking in nuclear material (as defined by article XX
of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency) continues to
pose a global proliferation risk and a potential danger to public
health and safety.  We have recognized the importance of this issue at
our meetings in Naples and Halifax.  The criminal diversion of nuclear
material could assist States or terrorist groups to bypass the
carefully crafted controls of the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime and permit them to construct or otherwise
acquire a nuclear or radiological weapon.  The majority of cases, so
far, have involved only small amounts of fissile material or material
of little use for weapons purposes, and many apprehended nuclear
traffickers have been swindlers or petty thieves.  Nevertheless, cases
of illicit nuclear trafficking continue to occur.  Accordingly, we
have concluded that increased cooperation among our Governments to
combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material will contribute to
increased international security and public safety, and to achievement
of global non-proliferation objectives.

     International efforts to suppress illicit trafficking in nuclear
material should address several fundamental aspects of the problem:

     -   Safe and secure storage of nuclear material and effective
         material protection, control and accounting to prevent its
         diversion;

     -   Cooperative intelligence, customs and law enforcement efforts
         to prevent the transportation and sale of diverted material;

     -   Joint efforts to identify and suppress illicit supply of, and
         demand for, nuclear material and to deter potential
         traffickers.

     In addition, nuclear material released by the dismantling of
nuclear weapons and no longer required for defence purposes must be
safely, affordably and effectively stored, protected and controlled,
until it can be used for non-explosive purposes or safely and
permanently disposed of.  This material must also be placed under
international safeguards as soon as it is practicable to do so.

     The international community's response to these challenges should
draw upon and further reinforce the existing instruments and
organizations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.  These include
universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the
Principles and Objectives agreed at the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review and Extension Conference, and to the Convention on
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as well as application of the
recommendations on physical protection made by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). 
Cooperation within the framework of the Zangger Committee and the
Nuclear Suppliers Group is important in the fight against illicit
trafficking.

     The storage and control of nuclear material is, first and
foremost, a national responsibility but the international community
should support national efforts by providing coordinated assistance,
where needed, to ensure that all nuclear material is safely and
securely stored and accurately and effectively controlled and
accounted for.  Cooperative assistance involving IAEA, the European
Union or other arrangements should be maintained and adequately
funded.

     In order to strengthen our collective response to illicit
trafficking in nuclear material we will:

     -   Regular share and promptly disseminate, in accordance with
         the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,
         information on nuclear theft and smuggling incidents;

     -   Exchange information on significant incidents in this area,
         especially if sensitive material is involved, and establish
         appropriate national points of contact for this purpose;

     -   Foster enhanced cooperation and coordination among our
         national intelligence, customs and law enforcement agencies
         and cooperation with those other concerned countries in order
         to ensure prompt investigation and successful prosecution in
         cases of illicit nuclear trafficking;

     -   Vigilantly discharge our national responsibility to ensure
         the effective storage, protection, control and accounting of
         nuclear material in our respective territories;

     -   Exchange experience and advice among ourselves and make it
         available to others and support efforts to provide
         appropriate assistance to ensure safe and effective nuclear
         material storage, protection, control and accounting;

     -   Maintain effective national systems of export licensing and
         control, which are important to deter and prevent illicit
         trafficking, and encourage and assist other States to do the
         same;

     -   Support efforts to define training requirements pertaining to
         detection of concealed nuclear material, radiation
         protection, safe handling and transportation of nuclear
         material and radiation protection, for law enforcement
         agencies (customs, police) in accordance with their
         respective tasks and closely coordinate relevant training
         activities in this area;

     -   Support the exchange of scientific information and data to
         permit the identification of the origin, history and route of
         seized illicit nuclear material;

     -   Support efforts to ensure that all sensitive nuclear material
         (separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium) not
         intended for use in meeting defence requirements is safely
         and effectively stored and protected and placed under IAEA
         safeguards (in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant
         "voluntary offer" IAEA safeguards agreements) as soon as it
         is practicable to do so;

     -   Work to strengthen the effective application of IAEA
         safeguards and encourage all States to provide adequate
         funding for them;

     -   Seek to identify strategies for the safe, effective and
         affordable peaceful use of nuclear material no longer
         required for defence purposes or for its safe permanent
         disposal;

     -   Encourage bilateral and other assistance and cooperation
         arrangements in the above areas and support their appropriate
         coordination to ensure that they are complementary and
         mutually reinforcing and to avoid needless duplication of
         efforts;

     -   Promote universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
         Treaty, which remains the fundamental basis for all
         international efforts to prevent the illicit spread of
         nuclear material, technology and expertise;

     -   Contribute to the enhanced treaty review process and
         implement the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-
         Proliferation and Disarmament agreed at the 1995 Nuclear Non-
         Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference;

     -   Work to promote the immediate commencement and early
         conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and
         universally applicable convention banning the production of
         fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
         explosive devices.


                                   ANNEX III

                                                   [Original:  English, French
                                                               and Russian]   

            Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty


     We affirmed our commitment to conclude and sign a Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by September 1996.  We agreed that a
CTBT will be a concrete step towards the achievement of one of the
highest priority objectives of the international community in the
field of disarmament and non-proliferation, and the fulfilment of the
obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  We also agreed that the CTBT must prohibit any
nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.  We
affirmed that this would constitute a truly comprehensive nuclear-test
ban.

     In this connection, we recalled the importance of the decision on
principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament adopted on 11 May 1995.


                                   ANNEX IV

                                                   [Original:  English, French
                                                               and Russian]   

                             Statement on Ukraine


     We met on 20 April 1996 with President Kuchma of Ukraine and
together examined a wide range of issues to improve nuclear safety and
security.  We agreed to continue our bilateral and multilateral
cooperation with Ukraine in this field.

     President Kuchma announced Ukraine's endorsement of the Programme
for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material
and expressed his willingness to support the objectives and actions
described in the Moscow Summit Declaration on Nuclear Safety and
Security.  President Kuchma also endorsed the statement on the CTBT. 

     The importance of President Kuchma's decision to close Chernobyl
by the year 2000 in accordance with the memorandum of understanding
signed on 20 December 1995 with all its provisions was recognized.

     The signatories to the memorandum reaffirmed their commitment to
its full implementation and will cooperate closely with Ukraine and
with international development banks on measures to support Ukraine's
decision.  For his part, President Kuchma confirmed Ukraine's
willingness to cooperate actively and efficiently within the framework
of the memorandum.

     We also discussed the study that is under way, funded by the
European Union, on a renewed sarcophagus for reactor 4 at Chernobyl. 
This study should be completed as soon as possible this year.  We
agreed that decisions would need to be taken in the light of the
conclusions of the study with the objective of finding a solution to
the problem.


                                    ANNEX V

                                                   [Original:  English, French
                                                               and Russian]   

                Statement by participants in the Moscow Summit


     We are seriously concerned over the course of events in the Middle
East.  We urge an immediate cease-fire.  Only a political solution can
ensure a long-term settlement of the current crisis and allow for a
renewed peace process.  We fully support efforts that are being made
in this direction.

     The peoples of Lebanon and Israel must have a chance to live in
peace and security.  Nobody must be allowed to put up obstacles on
this road or impede progress to peace in the entire region.


                                     ----- 

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