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Fiftieth session
Agenda item 20 (d)
STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND
DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE: EMERGENCY
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR PEACE, NORMALCY AND
RECONSTRUCTION OF WAR-STRICKEN AFGHANISTAN
Report of the Secretary-General
Addendum
The Special Mission and the political situation: developments
from mid-September to November 1995
1. At my instruction, the Head of the Special Mission to Afghanistan,
Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri, arrived in Islamabad on 16 September 1995 to
resume United Nations peacemaking efforts in Afghanistan. On the way
there, he represented me at the meeting/seminar convened at Tashkent by the
Government of Uzbekistan on the issues of security and cooperation in
Central Asia. At that event, the Head of the Special Mission was received
by the President of Uzbekistan, Mr. Islam Karimov, and met the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan and other officials to discuss the situation
in Afghanistan.
2. When the Head of the Special Mission arrived in the region, much of
Afghanistan was embroiled in fierce fighting, especially in and around
Kabul. The Taliban, who were at this time in control of more than half the
country, had moved close to Kabul in an apparent bid to remove President
Burhanuddin Rabbani from power by force, to take over the capital and to
establish an Islamic government. Mr. Rabbani and his commander, Ahmad Shah
Masood, who controlled Kabul and five other provinces in the north-eastern
part of the country, were evidently determined to defend Kabul at all cost.
3. The leader of the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (NIMA),
General Rashid Dostum, and his allies in the Supreme Coordination Council,
controlled the provinces in the north of Afghanistan, and were prepared to
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defend them against either the Rabbani or Taliban forces. Sporadic
fighting continued in and around the Salang highway between the Dostum and
Rabbani forces, following the collapse of an unannounced cease-fire between
them. Fighting also continued in Bamyan in the central region between the
rival factions of the Hezb-e-Wahdat. The three provinces of Nangarhar,
Laghman and Kunar in eastern Afghanistan, under the leadership of Governor
Hajji Abdul Qadir, remained relatively calm and neutral in these conflicts.
4. In short, the general atmosphere in Afghanistan was that of war and
preparation for war. The erstwhile rivalry, sometimes violent, that had
existed among the nine political parties formed during the struggle against
the Sovietbacked Government, appeared to have changed into a conflict among
three major armed groups: the Taliban, the forces controlled by General
Dostum and his allies in the Supreme Coordination Council, and the
government forces of President Rabbani. The country seemed to be heading
for a major and bloody contest among these forces for the control of Kabul.
The Head of the Special Mission was determined to do his utmost to prevent
such a contest, with all the bloodshed and misery it would entail.
5. This tense situation was exacerbated by a reported increase in external
interference in support of one or the other of the armed factions, through
the direct or indirect supply of weapons, ammunition and other forms of
military assistance. This manner of foreign intervention in Afghanistan
has persistently complicated efforts to restore peaceful conditions there
and the General Assembly and Security Council have rightly called upon all
States to desist from it.
6. In these unpromising circumstances, I instructed the Head of the
Special Mission to pursue the following objectives:
(a) To seek agreement between the major warring factions for a limited
cease-fire of about 10 days, with each party maintaining its position and
territory occupied at the cease-fire time. Agreement on this limited
cease-fire should be followed immediately by serious negotiations among the
concerned parties for the transfer of power by President Rabbani in Kabul;
(b) To negotiate the establishment of a forum or mechanism representing
the warring parties and others to which power would be transferred,
whereupon a long-term nationwide cease-fire would come into force, possibly
supervised by international monitors. The mechanism would then deal with
the issues of an interim Government, security and a neutral force for, and
demilitarization of, Kabul. These would be the first steps towards
political normalization.
7. In pursuit of these goals, the Head of the Special Mission shuttled
repeatedly between various cities in Afghanistan for meetings with
President Rabbani and his commander, Ahmad Shah Masood; General Rashid
Dostum; the Taliban Shura; the leader of the Hezb-e-Islami, Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar; Governor Hajji Qadir and members of his Eastern Zone Shura; the
leader of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), Pir Sayed Ahmed
Gailani; the representative of the Hezb-e-Wahdat, Mr. Taleb; the leader of
the Harakat-e-Islami, Ayatollah Assef Mohseini; and other prominent Afghan
personalities and organizations.
8. The Head of the Special Mission also travelled to Tehran on 27 and 28
September 1995, at the invitation of the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, and held a meeting with the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Allauddin Boroujerdi, and his advisors on the conflict in Afghanistan
and how the Islamic Republic of Iran could assist the United Nations peace
process. The Deputy Minister pledged his Government's full support for the
United Nations peace efforts; he hoped also that the necessary assistance
would be provided by the United Nations and the international community to
the Afghan refugees, especially those residing in the Islamic Republic of
Iran.
9. Several meetings were also held with the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Pakistan, Sardar Aseff Ahmad Ali, and other government officials; the
SecretaryGeneral of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Mr.
Al-Ghabid, and his senior colleagues; a visiting Saudi official, Mr. Ahmed
Badeeb; and the United States Assistant Secretary of State, Ms. Robin
Raphel. The Special Mission, supported by the Office of the Secretary-
General in Afghanistan, regularly briefed representatives of the permanent
members of the Security Council and other interested Member States in
Islamabad and Kabul.
10. Differences remain among the warring parties on the proposal for a
limited cease-fire. President Rabbani expressed his willingness to accept
an unconditional and nationwide cease-fire to permit talks on the transfer
of power. His opponents, General Dostum and especially the Taliban,
insisted that Mr. Rabbani should step down from power before they agreed to
the cease-fire and negotiations on the transfer of power. The compromise
proposal that negotiations on the cease-fire and the transfer of power
should be pursued concurrently was also not acceptable to all the parties.
11. The Taliban in particular seemed to believe that a military takeover
of Kabul was possible and was within their grasp and that a cease-fire
would simply provide a respite to Mr. Rabbani, enabling him to regain his
military strength. The representatives of the Taliban and the Supreme
Coordination Council were engaged in protracted negotiations on the
possible formation of political and military commissions for the final
assault on Kabul. Under these circumstances, the Head of the Special
Mission was unable to secure agreement among the parties to the proposal
for a limited cease-fire.
12. The general view of the Afghan people remains that, his mandate having
expired on 28 December 1994, Mr. Rabbani must transfer power to a broad-
based representative body. While the forces opposed to Rabbani wished to
see him removed by force, I was convinced that the transfer of power should
be achieved through peaceful negotiations in accordance with the principles
of the United Nations. To this end, the Head of the Special Mission
travelled several times to Kabul, often in dangerous circumstances, to
persuade Mr. Rabbani to relinquish power peacefully, if only to avoid the
risk of a major confrontation in Kabul and spare its population from
further destruction and bloodshed.
13. In two crucial meetings held in Kabul on 21 and 22 October, Mr.
Rabbani expressed to the Head of the Special Mission his willingness to
transfer power, not to his "enemies", but to a mechanism comprising
representatives of the warring parties, including his own, as soon as such
a body could be agreed upon and constituted. He insisted on the
declaration of a cease-fire, however limited, to allow for this arrangement
to take place, and on the need to curb foreign interference in Afghanistan,
especially by outside forces who were bent on removing him. The Head of
the Special Mission urged Mr. Rabbani to declare publicly his willingness
to relinquish power to an agreed mechanism, and to give assurances to his
opponents, who were sceptical of his real intentions to step down. He
agreed to make such a public declaration. He also said that he would
provide the Head of the Special Mission with a list of names of Afghan
personalities whom he recommended for membership of the transfer-of-power
mechanism. Some names emerged informally at this meeting. It was also
understood that the leader or head of the mechanism, who would be the
recipient of power from Mr. Rabbani, should be chosen at a later stage.
Mr. Rabbani also referred to his own peace initiatives, which he said would
be undertaken concurrently with those of the United Nations.
14. On 6 November, Mr. Rabbani announced publicly his willingness to
transfer power to an individual or commission and proposed that the warring
parties and other neutral personalities should sit together, under United
Nations mediation, to agree on a suitable mechanism and the date for the
transfer of power. As a precondition, however, Mr. Rabbani called for the
cessation of all hostilities and for an end to all forms of foreign
interference.
15. Two days later, on 8 November, the Head of the Special Mission
travelled to Kabul to discuss these points with Mr. Rabbani and to obtain
the list of names he recommended for membership of the mechanism. The
President reiterated the main elements of his declaration but, regarding
the names, said he was awaiting the outcome of a meeting that was currently
under way in Kandahar between the Taliban and representatives of the
leaders of the Hezb-e-Islami, Younis Khalis, and of the Harakat-e-Inqilabi-
Islami, Nabi Mohammadi. He said that these talks were going well and that
he expected that his representatives would shortly be invited to Kandahar
to join the talks, which were centred on the membership of the transfer-of-
power mechanism. He agreed with the Head of the Special Mission that there
should be a minimum time-lag between the declaration of a cease-fire and
the actual transfer of power, and that a suitable arrangement should be
agreed among the parties for the security of Kabul.
16. Following this meeting, the Head of the Special Mission met in Mazar-
i-Sharif on 11 November with General Dostum, who characterized Mr.
Rabbani's declaration of 6 November as yet another ruse to gain time and
cling to power. He too expressed great concern at the increasing pace of
outside interference in Afghanistan. He felt that no meaningful
reconciliation between Mr. Rabbani and the forces opposed to him was
feasible and feared that a major battle for the control of Kabul was
inevitable. He also wondered whether the formation of a parallel interim
Government, comprising the Taliban, the members of the Supreme Coordination
Council and others, and based in Jalalabad, might not be a way out of the
current impasse. He repeated his full support for the United Nations'
peace efforts, while maintaining his own contacts with the Taliban.
17. The members of the Taliban Shura who met with the Head of the Special
Mission also expressed serious doubts about Mr. Rabbani's intention to
relinquish power and expressed their conviction that the only way to effect
the transfer of power was by military means.
18. The Head of the Special Mission returned to Kabul on 14 November for
a further meeting with Mr. Rabbani. At this meeting, the latter submitted
names, representing all the provinces of Afghanistan, which had been
previously discussed with the Head of the Special Mission. In his view,
the names reflected a regional, ethnic, religious and political balance and
he asked that they be considered by the other parties. The Head of the
Special Mission accepted the names on the clear understanding that the list
was not a final one but would be subject to amendment by the other parties,
until an agreed and definitive list could be established.
19. The Head of the Special Mission immediately submitted these names to
General Dostum and, through him, to the other members of the Supreme
Coordination Council and, two days later, to the Taliban in Kandahar. The
Taliban assured the Head of the Special Mission that the list would be
considered by their full Shura, whose formal reaction would be made
available to him shortly. The list was also forwarded to Governor Hajji
Qadir for consideration by the members of the Eastern Zone Shura. The
Governor's initial response was positive and he said he would refer the
list to his area's Shura for a formal consideration and response.
20. On 19 November, the Head of the Special Mission travelled to Shebargan
for a meeting with General Dostum, who welcomed this list of names as a
reasonable basis for negotiations and encouraged the Head of the Special
Mission to continue with his consultations. The General himself submitted
10 names that he wished to see included. He said that he would personally
endorse a final list that was acceptable to the United Nations, whose peace
efforts in Afghanistan he supported fully.
21. In a meeting with the leader of the Harakat-e-Islami, Ayatollah Assef
Mohseini, the Head of the Special Mission was given several additional
names. Ayatollah Mohseini observed that the Afghan Shi'ite community,
which in his view constituted some 25 per cent of the country's population,
needed to be equitably represented in the mechanism. He recommended that
neutral and independent Afghans should form the majority of the mechanism.
This would reduce the often divisive role of the parties and provide a
needed stability to the peace process.
22. The Head of the Special Mission planned to travel to Kabul on 23
November for a meeting with Mr. Rabbani to consider the names given to him
by General Dostum and Ayatollah Mohseini. The formal response from the
Taliban was then expected. However, the visit could not take place because
of renewed hostilities in and around Kabul and consequent insecurity in the
area.
23. At my request, the Head of the Special Mission departed Islamabad on
26 November to report to me in New York on this latest phase of the peace
process. At the time of his departure, intense fighting, involving often
indiscriminate rocketing and aerial bombardment, was going on in and around
Kabul between the Taliban and government forces.
24. I have been asked to provide the Special Mission's good offices to
secure the release of seven Russian crew members of an aircraft forced down
by the Taliban, who have been detained in Kandahar since August 1995. I
accordingly instructed my Office in Afghanistan, in conjunction with OIC,
to undertake efforts, on humanitarian grounds, to facilitate negotiations
for the early release of these captives. To my regret, these negotiations
have yet to succeed. I appeal for the release of any and all non-
combatants who may be in detention.
25. Afghanistan is now at a critical crossroads: either to follow the
route to peace through dialogue and negotiations in a spirit of give-and-
take, and with the assistance of the United Nations and the cooperation of
the neighbouring and other interested countries; or to follow the route of
continued war and confrontation where today's victor may be tomorrow's
vanquished. Unfortunately, the current leaders of the principal factions
seem to favour the latter route, notwithstanding the evident longing of
their people for an end to almost two decades of strife.
26. I nevertheless continue to believe that peace and stability in
Afghanistan are attainable, and that the United Nations should not falter
at this juncture. The international community should not lose interest in
Afghanistan nor become accustomed to the country's plight. On the
contrary, it should be prepared to assist, in every way possible, this
founding member of the Organization to know peace again.
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