| United Nations | A/50/648 |
General Assembly
Distr. GENERAL
18 October 1995
ORIGINAL:
ENGLISH
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 92
THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF CROATIA
Report of the Secretary-General
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 11 of General
Assembly resolution 49/43 of 9 December 1994.
2. By that resolution, the General Assembly inter alia:
"1. Expresses its commitment to ensure respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia;
"2. Calls upon all parties, and in particular the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to comply fully with all Security
Council resolutions regarding the situation in Croatia, and to respect
strictly its territorial integrity, and in this regard concludes that their
activities aimed at achieving the integration of the occupied territories
of Croatia into the administrative, military, educational, transportation
and communication structure of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) are illegal, null and void and must cease immediately;
"3. Requests the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
to cease immediately any military and logistic support to the self-
proclaimed authorities in the Serbian-controlled parts of Croatia;
"4. Strongly condemns the Serbian self-proclaimed authorities in the
Serbian-controlled territories of Croatia for their military actions that
have resulted in ethnic cleansing of the United Nations Protected Areas,
and for their constant refusal to comply with the relevant Security Council
resolutions;
95-31481 (E) 191095/...
*9531481*
"5. Reaffirms its support for the principle that all statements of
commitments in the Serbian-controlled parts of Croatia made under duress,
particularly those regarding land and property, are wholly null and void;
"6. Reaffirms the right of all refugees and displaced persons from the
area of the former Yugoslavia to return voluntarily to their homes safely
and with dignity, with the assistance of the international community, and
in this regard, notes that the 1991 census is the basis for defining the
population structure of the Republic of Croatia;
"7. Urges the restoration of the authority of the Republic of Croatia in
its entire territory and urges also the utmost respect for human and
minority rights in the territory of Croatia, including the right to
autonomy in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and
established international standards, and for efforts to achieve a political
solution within the framework of the International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia;
"8. Calls for mutual recognition between the Republic of Croatia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) within their
existing internationally recognized borders;
"9. Commends the persistent efforts of the United Nations Protection
Force in performing its duties in the territory of the Republic of Croatia,
and in this regard emphasizes the importance of its role for the overall
peace process and for the success of the peaceful reintegration of
Serbiancontrolled territories of Croatia;
"10. Also calls for full respect of the cease-fire agreements in the
territory of Croatia, and urges the resumption of direct negotiations in
close cooperation with the International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia;
"11. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at
its fiftieth session a comprehensive report on the implementation of the
present resolution."
3. From its establishment in February 1992, the United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR) was deployed in four United Nations Protected Areas
(UNPAs) under the control of local Serb authorities. The UNPAs comprised
the Krajina (Sectors North and South), Western Slavonia (Sector West) and
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem (Sector East). This situation
continued for the first part of 1995, but several developments in the
summer of 1995 dramatically altered the context in which resolution 49/43
had been adopted in December 1994.
II. DEVELOPMENTS
4. Since the conclusion of the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994, the
Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia and International Conference negotiators, in close
consultation with the leadership in Zagreb, Knin and Belgrade, had sought
to encourage negotiations on practical issues of economic cooperation while
simultaneously promoting discussion of ideas for a political settlement to
the conflict in Croatia. These efforts culminated on 2 December 1994 with
the conclusion of the economic agreement (S/1994/1375, appendix I) and its
partial implementation through the reopening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway
through Sector West to Lipovac on 21 December 1994.
5. However, on 12 January 1995, the President of the Republic of Croatia,
Mr. Franjo Tudjman, announced the withdrawal of Croatian consent to the
extension of the mandate of UNPROFOR beyond its expiration on 31 March
1995. Informing me of this decision, President Tudjman stated that
"Croatia's overall experience during the past two years" had brought him to
the conclusion "that, although UNPROFOR has played an important role in
stopping violence and major conflicts in Croatia, it is an indisputable
fact that the present character of the UNPROFOR mission does not provide
conditions necessary for establishing lasting peace and order in the
Republic of Croatia, a sovereign State Member of the United Nations"
(A/50/64-S/1995/28, annex).
6. Mindful of the decisive role played by the United Nations in halting
the war on Croatian soil three years before, as well as of the part played
by UNPROFOR in preventing a full-scale resumption of hostilities, I
presented an interim report to the Security Council on 14 January in which
I expressed profound regret at this decision and grave concern "about the
risk of renewed hostilities should United Nations peace-keepers be
withdrawn from Croatia" (S/1995/38). On 17 January, while stating that "it
will not accept the status quo becoming an indefinite situation", the
Security Council expressed its belief that the continued presence of
UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia was of vital importance for regional
peace and security (S/PRST/1995/2).
7. The following two months were characterized by a significant escalation
in military activity and tension, as described in my report to the Security
Council of 22 March 1995 (S/1995/222), in which, inter alia, I recommended
the restructuring of UNPROFOR. By resolution 981 (1995), the Security
Council approved the establishment of the United Nations Confidence
Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO, and requested me
to continue consultations with all concerned on the detailed implementation
of its mandate. Meanwhile, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, acting as my Special
Envoy, had carried out consultations on a plan for the implementation of
the UNCRO mandate, which were finalized on 18 April 1995. It was not
without misgivings that I presented that plan to the Security Council, as I
noted that it did not have the formal acceptance and full support of either
the Government of Croatia or the local Serb authorities. The risk
therefore remained that either or both sides would fail to cooperate with
the United Nations in its implementation (S/1995/320). On the basis of that
report, the Security Council authorized the deployment of UNCRO on 28 April
1995 (resolution 990 (1995)).
8. Two days later, on 1 May 1995, the Croatian Army launched a military
offensive in the area of Western Slavonia known as Sector West. The
Security Council issued a statement urging an immediate end to the military
offensive, respect for the economic agreement of 2 December 1994 and
compliance with the existing cease-fire agreement (S/PRST/1995/23).
Continuing hostilities marked by attacks and reprisals led the Council to
issue a further statement on 4 May 1995, condemning, inter alia,
"incursions into the zones of separation by the forces of the Government of
Croatia in sectors North and South, and by both sides in Sector East". The
Council also condemned the "bombardment of Zagreb and other centres of
civilian population by the forces of the local Serb authorities" and
demanded their immediate cessation (S/PRST/1995/26). The Croatian Army's
takeover of Sector West was completed on 4 May 1995.
9. Over 10,000 civilians and military personnel living in areas
immediately affected by the fighting crossed the Sava bridge into Bosnia
and Herzegovina during the first days of the Croatian offensive. A further
2,139 Croatian Serbs decided to leave in the following weeks. About 5,000
refugees reached Sector East through Banja Luka and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and about 500 moved to Sector North.
The immediate repercussions also included an increase in harassment and
intimidation of Croat minorities in Sector South as well as in the Banja
Luka area of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
10. Further developments in former Sector West are described in my report
submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 994 (1995), in which I
observed that the Croatian military offensive in Sector West "... had
provided a bitter example of the consequences that occur when conflicting
parties forsake peaceful options and resort to war. The fact that the
attack took place despite the presence of United Nations peace-keepers in
the Sector also underlines the reality that, without the cooperation of the
parties, peace-keeping forces cannot keep the peace ..." (S/1994/467).
11. Notwithstanding assurances by the Croatian Government that it would
not pursue further military objectives, its military success in Sector West
appeared to motivate a similar campaign in Sector South, where in June the
Croatian Army and Bosnian Croat forces launched attacks in the Mount Dinara
area, 20 kilometres south-east of Knin. By mid-July, Krajina Serb forces
and Bosnian forces loyal to Mr. Fikret Abdic had launched a combined
offensive against the Bosnian Government Army in the Bihac pocket. A
declaration signed in Split on 22 July 1995 by Presidents Tudjman and
Izetbegovic and the President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
committed the Croatian Government to assisting the Bosnian Army in the
Bihac pocket and thus increased the risk of further escalation of
hostilities (A/50/306-S/1995/609). On 28 July, the combined forces of the
Croatian Army and the Croat Defence Council (HVO) succeeded in capturing
the towns of Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc in western Bosnia, severing the
main supply road linking Knin to Banja Luka. The Krajina Serbs and the
Bosnian Serbs responded by declaring a state of war and mobilizing their
respective forces.
12. Between 28 July and 4 August 1995, various concerted efforts were made
by me, my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and the Co-Chairmen
of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia in the hope of forestalling a full-scale outbreak of
hostilities. These efforts are extensively described in my report to the
Security Council of 3 August and my subsequent letter to the President of
the Council on 7 August (S/1995/650 and S/1995/666).
13. In the early hours of 4 August 1995, the Croatian Army launched a
major military offensive against the Krajina region and, in the course of
the following days, it established control of the whole of Sectors North
and South. Approximately 200,000 of the Krajina Serb inhabitants, or 95 per
cent of the population of the two sectors, fled into Bosnian Serb-held
areas in western Bosnia and most continued their flight to the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 49/43
14. The events of May and August occurred at least in part because the
local Serb authorities on the one hand, and the Croatian authorities on the
other, failed to extend the necessary cooperation to UNCRO to permit it to
implement the mandate authorized by the Security Council in its resolution
981 (1995), thus flouting Security Council resolutions and ignoring General
Assembly resolution 49/43. The deliberate attacks launched in May and
August with the aim of recovering Sectors West, North and South by force
constituted further defiance of those resolutions.
15. Major elements of General Assembly resolution 49/43 have been made
irrelevant by these events. Indeed, Croatia's reintegration of former
Sectors West, North and South by military force has changed the status of
the majority of what were referred to as "occupied territories". These
developments have, however, created a different form of crisis, involving
the flight of large numbers of ethnic Serbs from those territories into
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro). Protection of the human rights of those who fled and those
who remain, and the right of return of those who so wish, are important
issues that have arisen from the events in the former Sectors.
A. Sector East
16. The events described above, coupled with other political and military
developments within the Republic of Croatia and the contiguous territories
of the former Yugoslavia, as well as the frequently declared intention of
the Croatian authorities to recover lost territories by other means if
negotiations did not succeed, made it very difficult to resume meaningful
negotiations and bring them to a successful conclusion.
17. Croatia's offensive against Sectors North and South did not encounter
much resistance by Krajina Serb forces nor did it provoke a military
response by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). As
regards Sector East, however, the proximity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the reverses suffered by the Serbs
elsewhere could increase the risk of the conflict spreading beyond the
borders of Croatia should the Croatian authorities decide to try to recover
this Sector by force. Mindful of this possibility, I instructed my Special
Representative in August to discuss with the Croatian Government and the
local Serb leadership what tasks, if any, it would be useful for UNCRO to
continue to perform in Sector East and elsewhere in Croatia. The results
of these consultations are set out in my report to the Security Council of
29 September (S/1995/835).
18. An important, if tentative, step towards peace occurred at the
beginning of October when, after several weeks of shuttle diplomacy by the
United Nations Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Croatian and local Serb leaders in
Sector East agreed on 11 "guiding basic principles" on a settlement of
their dispute. The principles call for a transitional authority to be
established by the Security Council to administer the region during a
transition period. For the first time in Sector East, a high-level
representative of the Government of Croatia had met with local Serb
leaders. A second round of negotiations took place at the Embassy of the
United States of America in Zagreb, on 9 October, but with minor results.
19. Other aspects of resolution 49/43 relate in particular to the
cessation of any military and logistic support to the self-proclaimed
authorities in the Serbian-controlled parts of Croatia by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It has always been
extremely difficult to obtain accurate information about such support as
severe restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR, and more
recently UNCRO, have consistently impeded its collection. However, during
the months of June and July 1995, there were reports that an estimated
2,500 Serb refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) were being forcibly mobilized for military duties in the
Krajina. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
has protested these violations of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status
of Refugees. Reports on the mobilization of refugees from the Krajina
persisted during the month of August.
20. Only Sector East has a contiguous border with the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). There have been confirmed reports of
fuel entering the Baranja across the Batina bridge, and it can be presumed
that this happens elsewhere in the Sector. Goods can also enter the Sector
by ferry across the Danube, but this has not been directly confirmed by
UNCRO. Finally, many roads from Serbia enter the southern part of the
Sector, unmonitored by UNCRO, by which food, fuel and weapons can be
brought in.
21. Much of Sector East's infrastructure is provided by or linked with the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including
electricity, telephone lines, railway links and postal services. Only
limited tertiary education (an agricultural school) is available in the
Sector. The most important source of raw materials for use in the Sector's
industrial facilities and the prime market for its products has been the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Other markets have
been the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb
forces and, until the events of May and August, Sectors West, North and
South in Croatia. The significant economic cooperation between Sector East
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is thus
based both on historic trade patterns and on recent circumstances.
22. There has been no confirmation that local Serb forces form part of the
Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
Concern, however, persists over the activities of Serb paramilitary groups,
which have been operating in and from Sector East since fighting began in
1991. A training facility for the so-called "Tigers" commanded by Zeljko
Raznjatovic, for example, functions in Erdut, only a few hundred metres
from UNCRO Sector Headquarters, and these forces are reported to have been
responsible for recent atrocities in north-western Bosnia.
23. There are no reliable figures concerning the number of Croatian
Serbdisplaced persons residing in Sector East. In addition to those Serbs
who moved there after the hostilities of 1991-1992, local authorities have
informed UNHCR that 9,500 people from Sector West have resettled in the
Sector since the May offensive and that approximately 10,500 people
displaced from Sectors North and South have resettled there since the
Croatian offensive in August. The arrival of these displaced persons has
contributed to ethnic tensions in Sector East, leading a number of Croats
to leave either by choice or because of threats and intimidation.
B. Refugees and displaced persons
24. According to the nation-wide registration of refugees and displaced
persons carried out by the Croatian authorities in the summer of 1994, but
not verified by independent sources, the number of registered persons
displaced within Croatia was around 198,000. Of those, 94 per cent were
Croats, 2 per cent Serbs, 2 per cent Hungarians and the remaining 2 per
cent people of other ethnic origins. Out of this total, approximately
76,000 were displaced as a result of the fighting in and around Sector
East. About 6,000 people were displaced from areas outside the Sectors,
but in close proximity to the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. These
movements were largely the result of shelling by the Bosnian Serbs. The
balance of those displaced, about 116,000 people, came from the former
Sectors North, South and West.
25. In the past five months, some 900 to 1,000 Croat displaced persons
have returned to their homes in former Sector West. There are no reliable
estimates of the number of displaced Croats who have returned to their
homes in former Sectors North and South, but the number is believed to be
small. Ongoing "mopping-up operations" by the Croatian Army and police in
former Sectors North and South, the looting and burning of Serb houses, the
lack of economic prospects in the Krajina and the uncertain security
environment, including the presence of mines, account for the small number
of displaced Croats who have so far resettled in the three former Sectors.
Additionally, of the about 15,000 Bosnian Croats who fled the Banja Luka
area in the past two months, some 5,000 have been settled in Western
Slavonia, while others have been resettled in former Sectors North and
South as well as areas of western Bosnia recently captured from the Bosnian
Serbs. The resettlement of these people in the former Sectors is changing
the demographic characteristics of the areas and may inhibit the return of
the Croatian Serbs.
26. In the past five months, some of the biggest demographic displacements
since the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis have taken place. Since early
May, more than 480,000 people have been forced from their homes. The
movements directly involving Croatia include:
(a) Over 10,000 Croatian Serbs from Sector West into the Banja Luka
region and Sector East in May;
(b) Approximately 200,000 Croatian Serbs who fled from Sectors North
and South in August, 170,000 of whom found refuge in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the rest in the Banja Luka region
or Sector East;
(c) Some 25,000 Bosnian Muslim followers of Fikret Abdic who fled the
Bihac pocket into Croatia in August;
(d) More than 20,000 Croat and Muslim minorities from the Banja Luka
region expelled by the Bosnian Serbs into Croatia since August.
27. The exodus of 200,000 Krajina Serbs fleeing the Croatian offensive in
early August created a humanitarian crisis of major proportions. It is now
estimated that only about 3,000 Krajina Serbs remain in the former Sector
North and about 2,000 in the former Sector South. In the former Sector
West, about 1,200 Serbs remain in the area previously under Serb control,
with 4,000 to 5,000 Serbs remaining in the northern part of the Sector,
which has always been under Croatian control. In the former Sector West,
there have been signs of a small return of the Serb population, involving
perhaps about 50 individuals. According to Croatian officials, the Serb
population in the Republic of Croatia fell from 12 to less than 3 per cent
of the total population as a result of the "liberation of the occupied
territories".
28. The Croatian Government has consistently maintained that Serbs are
free to live in Croatia and that those who fled are welcome to return.
However, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNHCR and
UNCRO, as well as a number of Member States and independent human rights
organizations, have expressed their concerns over the fact that serious
violations of human rights have taken place and have continued to occur
after the military operations had been successfully concluded. These
violations, together with a number of recently adopted executive and
legislative measures, appear de facto to restrict the civil, political,
economic and social rights of the Croatian Serb population and the
refugees' right to return, in contravention of international conventions
(see sect. C below). The High Commissioner for Human Rights raised these
matters in two letters to President Tudjman on 18 August and 2 October
1995. In his letter of 2 October, he particularly urged that the Croatian
Government should not deter the return of the local Serb population in
safety and dignity.
29. Difficulties faced by those who wish to return were exemplified in
mid-September, when Croatian border authorities would not allow 257 Serbs
to enter Croatia at Davor in order to return to former Sector West, on the
grounds that the crossing-point was designated only for Croat and Muslim
refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
C. Human rights
30. On a number of occasions, the Security Council has expressed concern
at the grave situation of refugees and persons displaced during the
Croatian offensives. In particular, under Council resolutions 990 (1995)
and 1009 (1995), UNCRO is charged both with monitoring and protecting human
rights and with seeking corrective actions in the case of human rights
abuses. On 7 September, the Council reiterated its demand that Croatia
respect fully the rights of the local Serb population including the right
to remain or return in safety (S/PRST/1995/44).
31. On 3 October, the Security Council, inter alia, again reiterated that
demand and further demanded that the Government investigate all reports of
human rights violations and take appropriate measures to put an end to such
acts. It also called on Croatia to cooperate with international
humanitarian organizations in the creation of conditions conducive to the
repatriation of refugees in safety and dignity (S/PRST/1995/49).
32. Following the Croatian offensive in Sector West, a number of human
rights problems were signalled and the field officers of the Centre for
Human Rights conducted an immediate on-site investigation. The Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights published his findings on
these events in his periodic report of 5 July 1995 (E/CN.4/1996/6). The
investigation revealed evidence of members of the civilian population
having been killed during the offensive, and a number of cases of physical
and verbal abuse and of other forms of degrading treatment of detainees.
In his report, the Special Rapporteur concluded that serious violations of
human rights and humanitarian law had occurred during and after the
offensive in Sector West.
33. More than eight weeks after the Croatian offensive in Sectors North
and South, widespread violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law continue to be reported by a number of Member States,
international human rights organizations, regional organizations (including
the European Union), UNCRO and UNHCR. In this connection, United Nations
Peace Forces established human rights action teams under the leadership of
the field officers of the Centre for Human Rights to conduct immediate on-
site investigations. The teams found evidence of extrajudicial executions,
disappearances, ill treatment, harassment and the systematic and widespread
destruction of houses and entire villages carried out by members of the
Croatian Army and internal security forces in the Krajina against the
remaining civilian population, mostly elderly men and women. As of the end
of September, the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) documented
that 73 per cent of Serb houses were burned and looted in 243 villages
investigated. In early October, accounts of armed robberies and personal
threats were reported with increasing frequency, along with crimes against
property.
34. The Croatian authorities have maintained that these acts were
committed by uncontrolled elements. Yet international observers, including
members of the international press, have directly witnessed the presence of
the Croatian Army and special police units in several instances. It was
only recently, after significant international criticism, that President
Tudjman announced Croatian investigations into 611 cases of looting, 27
bombings and 7 murders. The authorities are also investigating 36 murder
cases, about which President Tudjman stated that it was not clear whether
they were committed in war situations and mopping-up operations or by
"unbalanced individuals".
35. Confirmed reports of continuing human rights abuses have created a
climate of deep apprehension that is not conducive to the return of those
who wish to do so. There are, as yet, no reliable guarantees by the
Croatian Government that returnees will enjoy safety and security. The
Croatian authorities have themselves warned against the return of Serbs to
their homes in the Krajina because of the uncertain security situation and
have said that mass returns must await a final political settlement.
36. Furthermore, a number of executive and legislative measures have been
adopted since August that appear to put in doubt the stated intention of
the Croatian Government to facilitate the return of refugees. These
include an executive order dated 31 August, which was subsequently slightly
modified by the Croatian parliament, on the temporary expropriation and
control by the Government of certain "abandoned" property in former Sectors
North, South and West. The law also applies to property situated in any
part of Croatia that is owned by individuals who have left the country
since 17 August 1990 or reside in Sector East, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under
the control of Bosnian Serb forces. In addition, the law applies to all
property owned by citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro). The deadline for claims of exemption was at first 30 days
from 4 September, but was subsequently extended to 90 days.
37. Under the law, property owners are required to claim their property
within 90 days "for possession and usage". Given that the return of
Croatian Serb refugees within that time-limit appears neither feasible nor,
under current circumstances, advisable, this requirement constitutes a
potentially insurmountable obstacle to such claims by Serbs who are
currently outside Croatia. This particular aspect was stressed by the High
Commissioner for Human Rights in his letter of 2 October to President
Tudjman. The Security Council, on 3 October, also called upon the
Government of Croatia to lift any time-limit on the return of refugees to
Croatia to reclaim their property (S/PRST/1995/49).
38. Other legislative measures adopted by the Croatian Parliament before
its dissolution in early September included modifications to the electoral
law that reduce the number of Croatian Serb representatives from 12 to 3
(elections are now expected to take place on 29 October); the suspension of
constitutional provisions regarding autonomy and the establishment of Serb
majority districts (Knin and Glina); and a law calling for a new population
census to be held in 1996.
IV. OBSERVATIONS
39. Croatia's "reintegration" of the former Sectors West, North and South
by military force has eliminated most of what was referred to as "occupied
territories" in General Assembly resolution 49/43. It has equally
eliminated the need for a substantial United Nations military presence in
those areas. I have communicated this view to the Security Council in my
reports of 23 August and 29 September (S/1995/730 and S/1995/835).
40. However, continuing human rights violations and security problems have
created an atmosphere that is hostile to any return of the refugees and
this may affect the ongoing negotiations in Sector East. The recently
adopted executive and legislative measures in Croatia, including the law on
property, appear to impede the participation of the Croatian Serbs in the
civil, political, economic and social life of the country. Indeed, they
seem incompatible with Croatia's stated intention to facilitate the return
of those who wish to do so.
41. The ongoing negotiations concerning the future of Sector East are of
great importance not only in themselves but also in the context of an
overall settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Given that no
precedent yet exists for the peaceful reintegration of Serb-controlled
territories in Croatia, it is important that all concerned should keep to
their undertakings and that the international community should continue to
pursue peaceful solutions that guarantee respect for the human rights of
all peoples throughout the former Yugoslavia.
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A S UNITED
NATIONS
General Assembly
Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL
A/50/665
S/1995/877
20 October 1995
GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth session Fiftieth year
Agenda item 72
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION
Letter dated 20 October 1995 from the Permanent Representatives
of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General
We have the honour to enclose herewith a statement issued jointly on 20
October 1995 by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America concerning
their intention to sign the relevant protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga
in the first half of 1996.
May we ask for your kind assistance in circulating the present letter and
its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 72, and
of the Security Council.
(Signed) Alain DEJAMMET(Signed) Sir John WESTON, KCMG
Permanent RepresentativePermanent Representative
of France to the Unitedof the United Kingdom of
NationsGreat Britain and Northern
Ireland to the United Nations
(Signed) Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT
Permanent Representative
of the United States of America
to the United Nations
95-31888 (E) 201095/...
*9531888*
ANNEX
Joint statement issued on 20 October 1995 by the Governments
of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the United States of America
The Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the United States of America believe that
internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of
arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned,
can contribute to international peace and security. The 1995 Review and
Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons recognized this fact and encouraged the creation of such
zones as a matter of priority. The Conference also recognized that the
cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support
for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of
such nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant protocols. In this regard,
we are jointly announcing today our intention to sign the relevant
protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga in the first half of 1996.
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