United Nations


General Assembly
Security Council

Distr. GENERAL  

3 January 1995


Fiftieth session                           Fiftieth year



                                                    Paragraphs  Page

 I.  INTRODUCTION .........................................1 - 72


III. INSTRUMENTS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY ...................23 - 807

     A. Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking .............      26 - 327

     B. Peace-keeping ....................................      33 - 468

     C. Post-conflict peace-building .....................      47 - 5612

     D. Disarmament ......................................      57 - 6514

     E. Sanctions ........................................      66 - 7616

     F. Enforcement action ...............................      77 - 8018

IV.  COORDINATION .........................................81 - 9619

 V.  FINANCIAL RESOURCES ..................................97 - 10123

VI.  CONCLUSION ...........................................102 - 10524
94-51621 (E)   040195                                                     /...

                               I.  INTRODUCTION

1.  On 31 January 1992, the Security Council met for the first time at the
level of heads of State or Government.  The cold war had ended.  It was a
time of hope and change and of rising expectations for - and of - the United
Nations.  The members of the Council asked me to prepare an "analysis and
recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the

framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations
for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping" (see
S/23500).  Five months later, in June 1992, I submitted my report entitled
"An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111).  It dealt with the three problems
the Council had requested me to consider, to which I added the related
concept of post-conflict peace-building.  It also touched on peace


2.  In submitting my recommendations on how to improve the Organization's
capacity to maintain peace and security, I said that the search for improved
mechanisms and techniques would be of little significance unless the new
spirit of commonality that had emerged, of which the Summit was such a clear

manifestation, was "propelled by the will to take the hard decisions demanded
by this time of opportunity" (ibid., para. 6).  

3.  Subsequent discussion of "An Agenda for Peace" in the General Assembly,
in the Security Council and in Member States' parliaments established that
there was general support for the recommendations I had put forward.  That

discussion, and the new process initiated in 1994 for the elaboration of "An
Agenda for Development" (see A/48/935), have also served to advance
international consensus on the crucial importance of economic and social
development as the most secure basis for lasting peace.

4.  Since the Security Council Summit the pace has accelerated.  There have

been dramatic changes in both the volume and the nature of the United Nations
activities in the field of peace and security.  New and more comprehensive
concepts to guide those activities, and their links with development work,
are emerging.  Old concepts are being modified.  There have been successes
and there have been failures.  The Organization has attracted intense media
interest, often laudatory, more often critical, and all too often focused on

only one or two of the many peace-keeping operations in which it is engaged,
overshadowing other major operations and its vast effort in the economic,
social and other fields.

5.  All this confirms that we are still in a time of transition.  The end of

the cold war was a major movement of tectonic plates and the after-shocks
continue to be felt.  But even if the ground beneath our feet has not yet
settled, we still live in a new age that holds great promise for both peace
and development.

6.  Our ability to fulfil that promise depends on how well we can learn the

lessons of the Organization's successes and failures in these first years of
the post-cold-war age.  Most of the ideas in "An Agenda for Peace" have
proved themselves.  A few have not been taken up.  The purpose of the present
position paper, however, is not to revise "An Agenda for Peace" nor to call
into question structures and procedures that have been tested by time.  Even
less is it intended to be a comprehensive treatise on the matters it
discusses.  Its purpose is, rather, to highlight selectively certain areas
where unforeseen, or only partly foreseen, difficulties have arisen and where
there is a need for the Member States to take the "hard decisions" I referred

to two and a half years ago.

7.  The Organization's half-century year will provide the international
community an opportunity to address these issues, and the related, major
challenge of elaborating "An Agenda for Development", and to indicate in a
comprehensive way the direction the Member States want the Organization to

take.  The present position paper is offered as a contribution to the many
debates I hope will take place during 1995 and perhaps beyond, inside and
outside the intergovernmental bodies, about the current performance and
future role of our Organization.


8.  It is indisputable that since the end of the cold war there has been a
dramatic increase in the United Nations activities related to the maintenance
of peace and security.  The figures speak for themselves.  The following
table gives them for three dates:  31 January 1988 (when the cold war was

already coming to an end); 31 January 1992 (the date of the first Security
Council Summit); and today, on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the
United Nations.  

9.  This increased volume of activity would have strained the Organization
even if the nature of the activity had remained unchanged.  It has not

remained unchanged, however:  there have been qualitative changes even more
significant than the quantitative ones.

10. One is the fact that so many of today's conflicts are within States
rather than between States.  The end of the cold war removed constraints that
had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere.  As a result

there has been a rash of wars within newly independent States, often of a
religious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence and
cruelty.  The end of the cold war seems also to have contributed to an
outbreak of such wars in Africa.  In addition, some of the proxy wars fuelled
by the cold war within States remain unresolved.  Inter-state wars, by
contrast, have become infrequent.  

11. Of the five peace-keeping operations that existed in early 1988, four
related to inter-state wars and only one (20 per cent of the total) to an
intra-state conflict.  Of the 21 operations established since then, only 8
have related to inter-state wars, whereas 13 (62 per cent) have related to

intra-state conflicts, though some of them, especially those in the former
Yugoslavia, have some inter-state dimensions also.  Of the 11 operations
established since January 1992 all but 2 (82 per cent) relate to intra-state
         Table.  Some statistics on United Nations activities related
                 to peace and security, 1988 to 1994                 

                          As at          As at         As at
                        31 January    31 January    16 December
                           1988          1992           1994

 Security Council
 resolutions adopted
 in the preceding 12

 months                     15            53              78
 Disputes and

 conflicts in which
 the United Nations
 was actively
 involved in
 preventive diplomacy
 or peacemaking in

 the preceding 12
 months                     11            13              28

 operations deployed
     Total                   5            11              17

     Classical               5             7               9

     Multifunctional         -             4               8

 Military personnel
 deployed                    9 570        11 495          73 393

 Civilian police
 deployed                   35           155               2 130

 civilian personnel
 deployed                    1 516         2 206           2 260

 military and police
 personnel                  26            56              76

 United Nations
 budget for peace-
 keeping operations

 (on an annual basis)
 (millions of United
 States dollars)           230.4       1 689.6         3 610.0 a/

 Countries in which
 the United Nations
 had undertaken
 electoral activities
 in the preceding 12
 months                      -             6
 Sanctions regimes
 imposed by the

 Security Council            1             2               7

    a/  Projected.
12. The new breed of intra-state conflicts have certain characteristics that
present United Nations peace-keepers with challenges not encountered since
the Congo operation of the early 1960s.  They are usually fought not only by
regular armies but also by militias and armed civilians with little
discipline and with ill-defined chains of command.  They are often guerrilla

wars without clear front lines.  Civilians are the main victims and often the
main targets.  Humanitarian emergencies are commonplace and the combatant
authorities, in so far as they can be called authorities, lack the capacity
to cope with them.  The number of refugees registered with the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has increased from
13 million at the end of 1987 to 26 million at the end of 1994.  The number

of internally displaced persons has increased even more dramatically.

13. Another feature of such conflicts is the collapse of state institutions,
especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance,
a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos.  Not only are
the functions of government suspended, its assets are destroyed or looted and

experienced officials are killed or flee the country.  This is rarely the
case in inter-state wars.  It means that international intervention must
extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks and must include the promotion
of national reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government. 

14. The latter are tasks that demand time and sensitivity.  The United
Nations is, for good reasons, reluctant to assume responsibility for
maintaining law and order, nor can it impose a new political structure or new
state institutions.  It can only help the hostile factions to help themselves
and begin to live together again.  All too often it turns out that they do
not yet want to be helped or to resolve their problems quickly.  

15. Peace-keeping in such contexts is far more complex and more expensive
than when its tasks were mainly to monitor cease-fires and control buffer
zones with the consent of the States involved in the conflict.  Peace-keeping
today can involve constant danger.  

16. I cannot praise too highly or adequately express my gratitude and
admiration for the courage and sacrifice of United Nations personnel,
military and civil, in this new era of challenge to peace and security.  The
conditions under which they serve are often extremely harsh.  Many have given
their lives.  Many must persevere despite the loss of family members and

17. It must also be recognized that the vast increase in field deployment has
to be supported by an overburdened Headquarters staff that resource
constraints have held at levels appropriate to an earlier, far less
demanding, time.

18. A second qualitative change is the use of United Nations forces to
protect humanitarian operations.  Humanitarian agencies endeavour to provide
succour to civilian victims of war wherever they may be.  Too often the
warring parties make it difficult or impossible for them to do so.  This is
sometimes because of the exigencies of war but more often because the relief

of a particular population is contrary to the war aims of one or other of the
parties.  There is also a growing tendency for the combatants to divert
relief supplies for their own purposes.  Because the wars are intra-state
conflicts, the humanitarian agencies often have to undertake their tasks in
the chaotic and lawless conditions described above.  In some, but not all,
such cases the resulting horrors explode on to the world's television screens
and create political pressure for the United Nations to deploy troops to
facilitate and protect the humanitarian operations.  While such images can
help build support for humanitarian action, such scenes also may create an

emotional environment in which effective decision-making can be far more

19. This has led, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Somalia, to a new kind of
United Nations operation.  Even though the use of force is authorized under
Chapter VII of the Charter, the United Nations remains neutral and impartial

between the warring parties, without a mandate to stop the aggressor (if one
can be identified) or impose a cessation of hostilities.  Nor is this peace-
keeping as practised hitherto, because the hostilities continue and there is
often no agreement between the warring parties on which a peace-keeping
mandate can be based.  The "safe areas" concept in Bosnia and Herzegovina is
a similar case.  It too gives the United Nations a humanitarian mandate under

which the use of force is authorized, but for limited and local purposes and
not to bring the war to an end. 

20. A third change has been in the nature of United Nations operations in the
field.  During the cold war United Nations peace-keeping operations were
largely military in character and were usually deployed after a cease-fire

but before a settlement of the conflict in question had been negotiated. 
Indeed one of their main purposes was to create conditions in which
negotiations for a settlement could take place.  In the late 1980s a new kind
of peace-keeping operation evolved.  It was established after negotiations
had succeeded, with the mandate of helping the parties implement the
comprehensive settlement they had negotiated.  Such operations have been

deployed in Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique.  In most
cases they have been conspicuously successful.

21. The negotiated settlements involved not only military arrangements but
also a wide range of civilian matters.  As a result, the United Nations found
itself asked to undertake an unprecedented variety of functions:  the

supervision of cease-fires, the regroupment and demobilization of forces,
their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons;
the design and implementation of de-mining programmes; the return of refugees
and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the
supervision of existing administrative structures; the establishment of new
police forces; the verification of respect for human rights; the design and

supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms; the
observation, supervision and even organization and conduct of elections; and
the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.  

22. Fourthly, these multifunctional peace-keeping operations have highlighted

the role the United Nations can play after a negotiated settlement has been
implemented.  It is now recognized that implementation of the settlement in
the time prescribed may not be enough to guarantee that the conflict will not
revive.  Coordinated programmes are required, over a number of years and in
various fields, to ensure that the original causes of war are eradicated. 
This involves the building up of national institutions, the promotion of

human rights, the creation of civilian police forces and other actions in the
political field.  As I pointed out in "An Agenda for Development" (A/48/935),
only sustained efforts to resolve underlying socio-economic, cultural and
humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation. 


23. The United Nations has developed a range of instruments for controlling
and resolving conflicts between and within States.  The most important of

them are preventive diplomacy and peacemaking; peace-keeping; peace-building;
disarmament; sanctions; and peace enforcement.  The first three can be
employed only with the consent of the parties to the conflict.  Sanctions and
enforcement, on the other hand, are coercive measures and thus, by
definition, do not require the consent of the party concerned.  Disarmament
can take place on an agreed basis or in the context of coercive action under

Chapter VII.

24. The United Nations does not have or claim a monopoly of any of these
instruments.  All can be, and most of them have been, employed by regional
organizations, by ad hoc groups of States or by individual States, but the
United Nations has unparalleled experience of them and it is to the United

Nations that the international community has turned increasingly since the
end of the cold war.  The United Nations system is also better equipped than
regional organizations or individual Member States to develop and apply the
comprehensive, long-term approach needed to ensure the lasting resolution of

25. Perceived shortcomings in the United Nations performance of the tasks
entrusted to it have recently, however, seemed to incline Member States to
look for other means, especially, but not exclusively, where the rapid
deployment of large forces is required.  It is thus necessary to find ways of
enabling the United Nations to perform better the roles envisaged for it in
the Charter.

                   A.  Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking

26. It is evidently better to prevent conflicts through early warning, quiet
diplomacy and, in some cases, preventive deployment than to have to undertake

major politico-military efforts to resolve them after they have broken out. 
The Security Council's declaration of 31 January 1992 (S/23500) mandated me
to give priority to preventive and peacemaking activities.  I accordingly
created a Department of Political Affairs to handle a range of political
functions that had previously been performed in various parts of the
Secretariat.  That Department has since passed through successive phases of

restructuring and is now organized to follow political developments
worldwide, so that it can provide early warning of impending conflicts and
analyse possibilities for preventive action by the United Nations, as well as
for action to help resolve existing conflicts.  

27. Experience has shown that the greatest obstacle to success in these
endeavours is not, as is widely supposed, lack of information, analytical
capacity or ideas for United Nations initiatives.  Success is often blocked
at the outset by the reluctance of one or other of the parties to accept
United Nations help.  This is as true of inter-state conflicts as it is of
internal ones, even though United Nations action on the former is fully

within the Charter, whereas in the latter case it must be reconciled with
Article 2, paragraph 7.  
28. Collectively Member States encourage the Secretary-General to play an
active role in this field; individually they are often reluctant that he
should do so when they are a party to the conflict.  It is difficult to know
how to overcome this reluctance.  Clearly the United Nations cannot impose
its preventive and peacemaking services on Member States who do not want

them.  Legally and politically their request for, or at least acquiescence
in, United Nations action is a sine qua non.  The solution can only be
long-term.  It may lie in creating a climate of opinion, or ethos, within the
international community in which the norm would be for Member States to
accept an offer of United Nations good offices.

29. There are also two practical problems that have emerged in this field. 
Given Member States' frequently expressed support for preventive diplomacy
and peacemaking, I take this opportunity to recommend that early action be
taken to resolve them.  

30. The first is the difficulty of finding senior persons who have the

diplomatic skills and who are willing to serve for a while as special
representative or special envoy of the Secretary-General.  As a result of the
streamlining of the senior levels of the Secretariat, the extra capacity that
was there in earlier years no longer exists.

31. The second problem relates to the establishment and financing of small

field missions for preventive diplomacy and peacemaking.  Accepted and
well-tried procedures exist for such action in the case of peace-keeping
operations.  The same is required in the preventive and peacemaking field. 
Although special envoys can achieve much on a visiting basis, their capacity
is greatly enhanced if continuity can be assured by the presence on the
ground of a small support mission on a full-time basis.  There is no clear

view amongst Member States about whether legislative authority for such
matters rests with the Security Council or the General Assembly, nor are
existing budgetary procedures well-geared to meet this need.  

32. Two solutions are possible.  The first is to include in the regular
budget a contingency provision, which might be in the range of $25 million

per biennium, for such activities.  The second would be to enlarge the
existing provision for unforeseen and extraordinary activities and to make it
available for all preventive and peacemaking activities, not just those
related to international peace and security strictly defined.

                              B.  Peace-keeping

33. The United Nations can be proud of the speed with which peace-keeping has
evolved in response to the new political environment resulting from the end
of the cold war, but the last few years have confirmed that respect for

certain basic principles of peace-keeping are essential to its success. 
Three particularly important principles are the consent of the parties,
impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence.  Analysis of
recent successes and failures shows that in all the successes those
principles were respected and in most of the less successful operations one
or other of them was not.  

34. There are three aspects of recent mandates that, in particular, have led
peace-keeping operations to forfeit the consent of the parties, to behave in
a way that was perceived to be partial and/or to use force other than in
self-defence.  These have been the tasks of protecting humanitarian
operations during continuing warfare, protecting civilian populations in
designated safe areas and pressing the parties to achieve national
reconciliation at a pace faster than they were ready to accept.  The cases of
Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are instructive in this respect.  

35. In both cases, existing peace-keeping operations were given additional
mandates that required the use of force and therefore could not be combined
with existing mandates requiring the consent of the parties, impartiality and
the non-use of force.  It was also not possible for them to be executed
without much stronger military capabilities than had been made available, as

is the case in the former Yugoslavia.  In reality, nothing is more dangerous
for a peace-keeping operation than to ask it to use force when its existing
composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny it the capacity
to do so.  The logic of peace-keeping flows from political and military
premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics
of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping

is intended to facilitate.  To blur the distinction between the two can
undermine the viability of the peace-keeping operation and endanger its
36. International problems cannot be solved quickly or within a limited time. 
Conflicts the United Nations is asked to resolve usually have deep roots and

have defied the peacemaking efforts of others.  Their resolution requires
patient diplomacy and the establishment of a political process that permits,
over a period of time, the building of confidence and negotiated solutions to
long-standing differences.  Such processes often encounter frustrations and
set-backs and almost invariably take longer than hoped.  It is necessary to
resist the temptation to use military power to speed them up.  Peace-keeping

and the use of force (other than in self-defence) should be seen as
alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting
easy transition from one to the other.

37. In peace-keeping, too, a number of practical difficulties have arisen
during the last three years, especially relating to command and control, to

the availability of troops and equipment, and to the information capacity of
peace-keeping operations.  

38. As regards command and control, it is useful to distinguish three levels
of authority:

    (a) Overall political direction, which belongs to the Security Council;

    (b) Executive direction and command, for which the Secretary-General is

    (c) Command in the field, which is entrusted by the Secretary-General to
the chief of mission (special representative or force commander/chief
military observer).

The distinctions between these three levels must be kept constantly in mind
in order to avoid any confusion of functions and responsibilities.  It is as

inappropriate for a chief of mission to take upon himself the formulation of
his/her mission's overall political objectives as it is for the Security
Council or the Secretary-General in New York to decide on matters that
require a detailed understanding of operational conditions in the field.  
39. There has been an increasing tendency in recent years for the Security
Council to micro-manage peace-keeping operations.  Given the importance of
the issues at stake and the volume of resources provided for peace-keeping
operations, it is right and proper that the Council should wish to be closely
consulted and informed.  Procedures for ensuring this have been greatly

improved.  To assist the Security Council in being informed about the latest
developments I have appointed one of my Special Advisers as my personal
representative to the Council.  As regards information, however, it has to be
recognized that, in the inevitable fog and confusion of the near-war
conditions in which peace-keepers often find themselves, as for example in
Angola, Cambodia, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, time is required to

verify the accuracy of initial reports.  Understandably, chiefs of mission
have to be more restrained than the media in broadcasting facts that have not
been fully substantiated.

40. Troop-contributing Governments, who are responsible to their parliaments
and electorates for the safety of their troops, are also understandably

anxious to be kept fully informed, especially when the operation concerned is
in difficulty.  I have endeavoured to meet their concerns by providing them
with regular briefings and by engaging them in dialogue about the conduct of
the operation in question.  Members of the Security Council have been
included in such meetings and the Council has recently decided to formalize
them.  It is important that this should not lead to any blurring of the

distinct levels of authority referred to above.

41. Another important principle is unity of command.  The experience in
Somalia has underlined again the necessity for a peace-keeping operation to
function as an integrated whole.  That necessity is all the more imperative
when the mission is operating in dangerous conditions.  There must be no

opening for the parties to undermine its cohesion by singling out some
contingents for favourable and others for unfavourable treatment.  Nor must
there be any attempt by troop-contributing Governments to provide guidance,
let alone give orders, to their contingents on operational matters.  To do so
creates division within the force, adds to the difficulties already inherent
in a multinational operation and increases the risk of casualties.  It can

also create the impression amongst the parties that the operation is serving
the policy objectives of the contributing Governments rather than the
collective will of the United Nations as formulated by the Security Council. 
Such impressions inevitably undermine an operation's legitimacy and

42. That said, commanders in the field are, as a matter of course, instructed
to consult the commanders of national contingents and make sure that they
understand the Security Council's overall approach, as well as the role
assigned to their contingents.  However, such consultations cannot be allowed
to develop into negotiations between the commander in the field and the

troop-contributing Governments, whose negotiating partner must always be the
Secretariat in New York.  

43. As regards the availability of troops and equipment, problems have become
steadily more serious.  Availability has palpably declined as measured
against the Organization's requirements.  A considerable effort has been made

to expand and refine stand-by arrangements, but these provide no guarantee
that troops will be provided for a specific operation.  For example, when in
May 1994 the Security Council decided to expand the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), not one of the 19 Governments that at that time
had undertaken to have troops on stand-by agreed to contribute.  

44. In these circumstances, I have come to the conclusion that the United
Nations does need to give serious thought to the idea of a rapid reaction

force.  Such a force would be the Security Council's strategic reserve for
deployment when there was an emergency need for peace-keeping troops.  It
might comprise battalion-sized units from a number of countries.  These units
would be trained to the same standards, use the same operating procedures, be
equipped with integrated communications equipment and take part in joint
exercises at regular intervals.  They would be stationed in their home

countries but maintained at a high state of readiness.  The value of this
arrangement would of course depend on how far the Security Council could be
sure that the force would actually be available in an emergency.  This will
be a complicated and expensive arrangement, but I believe that the time has
come to undertake it.

45. Equipment and adequate training is another area of growing concern.  The
principle is that contributing Governments are to ensure that their troops
arrive with all the equipment needed to be fully operational.  Increasingly,
however, Member States offer troops without the necessary equipment and
training.  In the absence of alternatives, the United Nations, under
pressure, has to procure equipment on the market or through voluntary

contributions from other Member States.  Further time is required for the
troops concerned to learn to operate the equipment, which they are often
encountering for the first time.  A number of measures can be envisaged to
address this problem, for example, the establishment by the United Nations of
a reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment, as has been frequently
proposed, and partnerships between Governments that need equipment and those

ready to provide it.  

46. An additional lesson from recent experience is that peace-keeping
operations, especially those operating in difficult circumstances, need an
effective information capacity.  This is to enable them to explain their
mandate to the population and, by providing a credible and impartial source

of information, to counter misinformation disseminated about them, even by
the parties themselves.  Radio is the most effective medium for this purpose. 
In all operations where an information capacity, including radio, has been
provided, even if late in the day, it has been recognized to have made an
invaluable contribution to the operation's success.  I have instructed that
in the planning of future operations the possible need for an information

capacity should be examined at an early stage and the necessary resources
included in the proposed budget.  

                       C.  Post-conflict peace-building

47. The validity of the concept of post-conflict peace-building has received
wide recognition.  The measures it can use - and they are many - can also
support preventive diplomacy.  Demilitarization, the control of small arms,
institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of
human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development can be as

valuable in preventing conflict as in healing the wounds after conflict has
48.  The implementation of post-conflict peace-building can, however, be
complicated.  It requires integrated action and delicate dealings between the
United Nations and the parties to the conflict in respect of which peace-
building activities are to be undertaken. 

49. Two kinds of situation deserve examination.  The first is when a
comprehensive settlement has been negotiated, with long-term political,
economic and social provisions to address the root causes of the conflict,
and verification of its implementation is entrusted to a multifunctional
peace-keeping operation.  The second is when peace-building, whether
preventive or post-conflict, is undertaken in relation to a potential or past

conflict without any peace-keeping operation being deployed.  In both
situations the essential goal is the creation of structures for the
institutionalization of peace.

50. The first situation is the easier to manage.  The United Nations already
has an entree.  The parties have accepted its peacemaking and peace-keeping

role.  The peace-keeping operation will already be mandated to launch various
peace-building activities, especially the all-important reintegration of
former combatants into productive civilian activities.

51. Even so, political elements who dislike the peace agreement concluded by
their Government (and the United Nations verification provided for therein)

may resent the United Nations presence and be waiting impatiently for it to
leave.  Their concerns may find an echo among Member States who fear that the
United Nations is in danger of slipping into a role prejudicial to the
sovereignty of the country in question and among others who may be uneasy
about the resource implications of a long-term peace-building commitment.  

52. The timing and modalities of the departure of the peace-keeping operation
and the transfer of its peace-building functions to others must therefore be
carefully managed in the fullest possible consultation with the Government
concerned.  The latter's wishes must be paramount; but the United Nations,
having invested much effort in helping to end the conflict, can legitimately
express views and offer advice about actions the Government could take to

reduce the danger of losing what has been achieved.  The timing and
modalities also need to take into account any residual verification for which
the United Nations remains responsible.

53. Most of the activities that together constitute peace-building fall
within the mandates of the various programmes, funds, offices and agencies of

the United Nations system with responsibilities in the economic, social,
humanitarian and human rights fields.  In a country ruined by war, resumption
of such activities may initially have to be entrusted to, or at least
coordinated by, a multifunctional peace-keeping operation, but as that
operation succeeds in restoring normal conditions, the programmes, funds,

offices and agencies can re-establish themselves and gradually take over
responsibility from the peace-keepers, with the resident coordinator in due
course assuming the coordination functions temporarily entrusted to the
special representative of the Secretary-General.

54. It may also be necessary in such cases to arrange the transfer of

decision-making responsibility from the Security Council, which will have
authorized the mandate and deployment of the peace-keeping operation, to the
General Assembly or other inter-governmental bodies with responsibility for
the civilian peace-building activities that will continue.  The timing of
this transfer will be of special interest to certain Member States because of
its financial implications.  Each case has to be decided on its merits, the
guiding principle being that institutional or budgetary considerations should
not be allowed to imperil the continuity of the United Nations efforts in the

55. The more difficult situation is when post-conflict (or preventive)
peace-building activities are seen to be necessary in a country where the
United Nations does not already have a peacemaking or peace-keeping mandate. 
Who then will identify the need for such measures and propose them to the
Government?  If the measures are exclusively in the economic, social and

humanitarian fields, they are likely to fall within the purview of the
resident coordinator.  He or she could recommend them to the Government. 
Even if the resident coordinator has the capacity to monitor and analyse all
the indicators of an impending political and security crisis, however, which
is rarely the case, can he or she act without inviting the charge of
exceeding his or her mandate by assuming political functions, especially if

the proposed measures relate to areas such as security, the police or human

56. In those circumstances, the early warning responsibility has to lie with
United Nations Headquarters, using all the information available to it,
including reports of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) resident

coordinator and other United Nations personnel in the country concerned. 
When analysis of that information gives warning of impending crisis, the
Secretary-General, acting on the basis of his general mandate for preventive
diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-building, can take the initiative of sending
a mission, with the Government's agreement, to discuss with it measures it
could usefully take.

                               D.  Disarmament

57. At their Summit on 31 January 1992, the members of the Security Council
underscored their interest in and concern for disarmament, arms control and

non-proliferation, with special reference to weapons of mass destruction. 
They committed themselves to taking concrete steps to enhance the
effectiveness of the United Nations in those areas.

58. Considerable progress has been made since January 1992.  The moratorium
on nuclear testing continues to be largely observed.  The Conference on

Disarmament has finally decided to begin negotiations on a comprehensive
test-ban treaty.  The General Assembly has recommended the negotiation of a
treaty to ban the production of fissile material.  Efforts are under way to
strengthen the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on

Their Destruction (resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex), ratified by 131 countries,
through development of verification mechanisms.  The Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1/ has been signed by 159 countries, but
has not yet entered into force, pending ratification by the required
65 signatories.  There have been some important accessions to the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex).  

59. I attach special importance to a successful conclusion of the forthcoming
conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  It is also of
great importance that the Chemical Weapons Convention enter into force as
soon as possible.  The momentum in all these areas needs to be maintained. 
Ways have to be found for reconciling transfer of technology with measures
necessary to prevent its misuse for military purposes.

60. These issues are of paramount importance both to the security of
humankind and to the release of economic, scientific and technological
resources for peace and human progress.  In the present paper, however,
devoted as it is to the Organization's recent experience in handling specific
conflicts, I wish to concentrate on what might be called "micro-disarmament". 
By this I mean practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the

United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them
light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands.

61. The contemporary significance of micro-disarmament is demonstrated by the
enormous proliferation of automatic assault weapons, anti-personnel mines and
the like.  Competent authorities have estimated that billions of dollars are

being spent yearly on light weapons, representing nearly one third of the
world's total arms trade.  Many of those weapons are being bought, from
developed countries, by developing countries that can least afford to
dissipate their precious and finite assets for such purposes, and the volume
of the trade in light weapons is far more alarming than the monetary cost
might lead one to suspect.

62. Micro-disarmament plays an important part in conjunction with all the
other techniques discussed in the present paper.  The assembly, control and
disposal of weapons has been a central feature of most of the comprehensive
peace settlements in which the United Nations has played a peace-keeping
role.  As a result, the Organization has an unrivalled experience in this

field.  Micro-disarmament is equally relevant to post-conflict
peace-building:  Nicaragua has shown what can be achieved through imaginative
programmes to mop up large numbers of small arms circulating in a country
emerging from a long civil war.  Disarmament can also follow enforcement
action, as has been demonstrated in Iraq, where the United Nations Special
Commission has played a pioneering role in practical disarmament, in this

case involving weapons of mass destruction.  All the sanctions regimes
include an arms embargo and experience has confirmed the difficulty of
monitoring cross-border arms flows into countries at war with their
neighbours or within their own borders.  

63. There are two categories of light weapons that merit special attention. 

The first is small arms, which are probably responsible for most of the
deaths in current conflicts.  The world is awash with them and traffic in
them is very difficult to monitor, let alone intercept.  The causes are many: 
the earlier supply of weapons to client States by the parties to the cold
war, internal conflicts, competition for commercial markets, criminal

activity and the collapse of governmental law and order functions (which both
gives free rein to the criminals and creates a legitimate reason for ordinary
citizens to acquire weapons for their own defence).  A pilot advisory mission
I dispatched to Mali in August 1994 at the request of that country's
Government has confirmed the exceptional difficulty of controlling the
illicit flow of small arms, a problem that can be effectively tackled only on

a regional basis.  It will take a long time to find effective solutions.  I
believe strongly that the search should begin now.
64. Secondly, there is the proliferation of anti-personnel mines.  One of the
positive developments in recent years has been the attention this problem has
attracted.  The international community has begun to address it.  Current
efforts in the context of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively

Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 2/ are giving priority to
anti-personnel mines and the General Assembly's call for a moratorium on
their export has won much support from manufacturing countries.  In addition,
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is developing new
protocols to the Convention.  Meanwhile work continues to try to deal with
the approximately 110 million land-mines that have already been laid.  This

is an issue that must continue to receive priority attention.  The Register
of Conventional Arms is important in these endeavours.  It is essential that
the Register be developed into a universal and non-discriminatory mechanism.

65. Progress since 1992 in the area of weapons of mass destruction and major
weapons systems must be followed by parallel progress in conventional arms,

particularly with respect to light weapons.  It will take a long time to find
effective solutions.  I believe strongly that the search should begin now,
and I intend to play my full part in this effort.

                                E.  Sanctions

66. Under Article 41 of the Charter, the Security Council may call upon
Member States to apply measures not involving the use of armed force in order
to maintain or restore international peace and security.  Such measures are
commonly referred to as sanctions.  This legal basis is recalled in order to
underline that the purpose of sanctions is to modify the behaviour of a party

that is threatening international peace and security and not to punish or
otherwise exact retribution.  

67. The Security Council's greatly increased use of this instrument has
brought to light a number of difficulties, relating especially to the
objectives of sanctions, the monitoring of their application and impact, and

their unintended effects.  

68. The objectives for which specific sanctions regimes were imposed have not
always been clearly defined.  Indeed they sometimes seem to change over time. 
This combination of imprecision and mutability makes it difficult for the
Security Council to agree on when the objectives can be considered to have

been achieved and sanctions can be lifted.  While recognizing that the
Council is a political body rather than a judicial organ, it is of great
importance that when it decides to impose sanctions it should at the same
time define objective criteria for determining that their purpose has been
achieved.  If general support for the use of sanctions as an effective

instrument is to be maintained, care should be taken to avoid giving the
impression that the purpose of imposing sanctions is punishment rather than
the modification of political behaviour or that criteria are being changed in
order to serve purposes other than those which motivated the original
decision to impose sanctions.

69. Experience has been gained by the United Nations of how to monitor the
application of sanctions and of the part regional organizations can in some
cases play in this respect.  However, the task is complicated by the
reluctance of Governments, for reasons of sovereignty or economic
self-interest, to accept the deployment of international monitors or the
international investigation of alleged violations by themselves or their
nationals.  Measuring the impact of sanctions is even more difficult because
of the inherent complexity of such measurement and because of restrictions on
access to the target country.  

70. Sanctions, as is generally recognized, are a blunt instrument.  They
raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable
groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on
political leaders whose behaviour is unlikely to be affected by the plight of
their subjects.  Sanctions also always have unintended or unwanted effects. 

They can complicate the work of humanitarian agencies by denying them certain
categories of supplies and by obliging them to go through arduous procedures
to obtain the necessary exemptions.  They can conflict with the development
objectives of the Organization and do long-term damage to the productive
capacity of the target country.  They can have a severe effect on other
countries that are neighbours or major economic partners of the target

country.  They can also defeat their own purpose by provoking a patriotic
response against the international community, symbolized by the United
Nations, and by rallying the population behind the leaders whose behaviour
the sanctions are intended to modify.  

71. To state these ethical and practical considerations is not to call in

question the need for sanctions in certain cases, but it illustrates the need
to consider ways of alleviating the effects described.  Two possibilities are
proposed for Member States' consideration.

72. The first is to ensure that, whenever sanctions are imposed, provision is
made to facilitate the work of humanitarian agencies, work that will be all

the more needed as a result of the impact of sanctions on vulnerable groups. 
It is necessary, for instance, to avoid banning imports that are required by
local health industries and to devise a fast track for the processing of
applications for exemptions for humanitarian activities.

73. Secondly, there is an urgent need for action to respond to the

expectations raised by Article 50 of the Charter.  Sanctions are a measure
taken collectively by the United Nations to maintain or restore international
peace and security.  The costs involved in their application, like other such
costs (e.g. for peacemaking and peace-keeping activities), should be borne
equitably by all Member States and not exclusively by the few who have the
misfortune to be neighbours or major economic partners of the target country.

74. In "An Agenda for Peace" I proposed that States suffering collateral
damage from the sanctions regimes should be entitled not only to consult the
Security Council but also to have a realistic possibility of having their
difficulties addressed.  For that purpose I recommended that the Security

Council devise a set of measures involving the international financial
institutions and other components of the United Nations system that could be
put in place to address the problem.  In response, the Council asked me to
seek the views of the heads of the international financial institutions.  In
their replies, the latter acknowledged the collateral effects of sanctions
and expressed the desire to help countries in such situations, but they

proposed that this should be done under existing mandates for the support of
countries facing negative external shocks and consequent balance-of-payment
difficulties.  They did not agree that special provisions should be made.
75. In order to address all the above problems, I should like to go beyond
the recommendation I made in 1992 and suggest the establishment of a
mechanism to carry out the following five functions:

    (a) To assess, at the request of the Security Council, and before

sanctions are imposed, their potential impact on the target country and on
third countries;

    (b) To monitor application of the sanctions;

    (c) To measure their effects in order to enable the Security Council to

fine tune them with a view to maximizing their political impact and
minimizing collateral damage;

    (d) To ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable

    (e) To explore ways of assisting Member States that are suffering
collateral damage and to evaluate claims submitted by such States under
Article 50.

76. Since the purpose of this mechanism would be to assist the Security
Council, it would have to be located in the United Nations Secretariat. 

However, it should be empowered to utilize the expertise available throughout
the United Nations system, in particular that of the Bretton Woods
institutions.  Member States will have to give the proposal their political
support both at the United Nations and in the intergovernmental bodies of the
agencies concerned if it is to be implemented effectively.

                            F.  Enforcement action

77. One of the achievements of the Charter of the United Nations was to
empower the Organization to take enforcement action against those responsible
for threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. 

However, neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present
has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this
purpose, except perhaps on a very limited scale.  I believe that it is
desirable in the long term that the United Nations develop such a capacity,
but it would be folly to attempt to do so at the present time when the
Organization is resource-starved and hard pressed to handle the less

demanding peacemaking and peace-keeping responsibilities entrusted to it.

78. In 1950, the Security Council authorized a group of willing Member States
to undertake enforcement action in the Korean peninsula.  It did so again in
1990 in response to aggression against Kuwait.  More recently, the Council

has authorized groups of Member States to undertake enforcement action, if
necessary, to create conditions for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia
and Rwanda and to facilitate the restoration of democracy in Haiti.  

79. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Security Council has authorized Member
States, acting nationally or through regional arrangements, to use force to

ensure compliance with its ban on military flights in that country's air
space, to support the United Nations forces in the former Yugoslavia in the
performance of their mandate, including defence of personnel who may be under
attack, and to deter attacks against the safe areas.  The Member States
concerned decided to entrust those tasks to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).  Much effort has been required between the Secretariat
and NATO to work out procedures for the coordination of this unprecedented
collaboration.  This is not surprising given the two organizations' very
different mandates and approaches to the maintenance of peace and security. 

Of greater concern, as already mentioned, are the consequences of using
force, other than for self-defence, in a peace-keeping context.  

80. The experience of the last few years has demonstrated both the value that
can be gained and the difficulties that can arise when the Security Council
entrusts enforcement tasks to groups of Member States.  On the positive side,

this arrangement provides the Organization with an enforcement capacity it
would not otherwise have and is greatly preferable to the unilateral use of
force by Member States without reference to the United Nations.  On the other
hand, the arrangement can have a negative impact on the Organization's
stature and credibility.  There is also the danger that the States concerned
may claim international legitimacy and approval for forceful actions that

were not in fact envisaged by the Security Council when it gave its
authorization to them.  Member States so authorized have in recent operations
reported more fully and more regularly to the Security Council about their

                              IV.  COORDINATION

81. Just as the United Nations does not claim a monopoly of the instruments
discussed above, neither can it alone apply them.  All the efforts of the
Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General to control
and resolve conflicts need the cooperation and support of other players on

the international stage:  the Governments that constitute the United Nations
membership, regional and non-governmental organizations, and the various
funds, programmes, offices and agencies of the United Nations system itself. 
If United Nations efforts are to succeed, the roles of the various players
need to be carefully coordinated in an integrated approach to human security.

82. Governments are central to all the activities discussed in the present
position paper.  It is they who authorize the activities and finance them. 
It is they who provide directly the vast majority of the personnel required,
as well as most of the equipment.  It is they who set the policies of the
specialized agencies of the United Nations system and of the regional
organizations.  It is they whose continuing support, and, as necessary,

intervention with the parties, is essential if the Secretary-General is to
succeed in carrying out the mandates entrusted to him.  It is they who are
parties, or at least one of the parties, to each conflict the United Nations
is trying to control and resolve.  

83. A new trend in recent years has been the establishment of informal groups
of Member States, created on an ad hoc basis to support the Secretary-General
in the discharge of peacemaking and peace-keeping mandates entrusted to him. 
They are normally referred to as "Friends of the Secretary-General for ...". 
They have no formal mandate from the General Assembly or the Security Council
and comprise States with a particular interest in the conflict in question. 

They have material and diplomatic resources that can be used to support the
Secretary-General's efforts.  Their value to him is as a sounding-board, as a
source of ideas and comment and as a diplomatic instrument for bringing
influence to bear on the parties.
84. This arrangement has been of value in a number of instances.  It is
nevertheless necessary to maintain a clear understanding of who is
responsible for what.  The Secretary-General has the mandate from the
relevant intergovernmental body and must remain in the lead.  The members of
the "Friends" group have agreed to support the Secretary-General at his

request.  If they take initiatives not requested by the Secretary-General,
there is a risk of duplication or overlapping of efforts, which can be
exploited by recalcitrant parties.  Such initiatives can also raise questions
in the intergovernmental body that expects the Secretary-General to retain
responsibility for the mandate entrusted to him and to report to that body on
his implementation of it.  

85. As for regional organizations, Chapter VIII of the Charter defines the
role they can play in the maintenance of peace and security.  They have much
to contribute.  Since the Security Council Summit, the United Nations has
extended considerably its experience of working with regional organizations
in this field.  On 1 August 1994, I convened a meeting in New York of the

heads of a number of such organizations with which the United Nations had
recently cooperated on the ground in peacemaking and peace-keeping.  The
meeting permitted a useful exchange of views and it is my intention to hold
further meetings of this kind.

86. Cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations takes a

number of forms.  At least five can be identified:

    (a) Consultation:  this has been well-established for some time.  In some
cases it is governed by formal agreements and reports are made to the General
Assembly; in other cases it is less formal.  The purpose is to exchange views
on conflicts that both the United Nations and the regional organization may

be trying to solve;

    (b) Diplomatic support:  the regional organization participates in the
peacemaking activities of the United Nations and supports them by diplomatic
initiatives (in a manner analogous to groups of "Friends" as described above)
and/or by providing technical input, as the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) does, for instance, on constitutional issues
relating to Abkhazia.  In the same way, the United Nations can support the
regional organization in its efforts (as it does for OSCE over
Nagorny Karabakh);

    (c) Operational support:  the most developed example is the provision by

NATO of air power to support the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
in the former Yugoslavia.  For its part, the United Nations can provide
technical advice to regional organizations that undertake peace-keeping
operations of their own;

    (d) Co-deployment:  United Nations field missions have been deployed in
conjunction with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in
Liberia and with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Georgia.  If
those experiments succeed, they may herald a new division of labour between
the United Nations and regional organizations, under which the regional
organization carries the main burden but a small United Nations operation

supports it and verifies that it is functioning in a manner consistent with
positions adopted by the Security Council.  The political, operational and
financial aspects of the arrangement give rise to questions of some delicacy. 
Member States may wish at some stage to make an assessment, in the light of
experience in Liberia and Georgia, of how this model might be followed in the

    (e) Joint operations:  the example is the United Nations Mission in
Haiti, the staffing, direction and financing of which are shared between the

United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS).  This
arrangement has worked, and it too is a possible model for the future that
will need careful assessment.

87. The capacity of regional organizations for peacemaking and peace-keeping
varies considerably.  None of them has yet developed a capacity which matches

that of the United Nations, though some have accumulated important experience
in the field and others are developing rapidly.  The United Nations is ready
to help them in this respect when requested to do so and when resources
permit.  Given their varied capacity, the differences in their structures,
mandates and decision-making processes and the variety of forms that
cooperation with the United Nations is already taking, it would not be

appropriate to try to establish a universal model for their relationship with
the United Nations.  Nevertheless it is possible to identify certain
principles on which it should be based.

88. Such principles include:

    (a) Agreed mechanisms for consultation should be established, but need
not be formal;

    (b) The primacy of the United Nations, as set out in the Charter, must be
respected.  In particular, regional organizations should not enter into
arrangements that assume a level of United Nations support not yet submitted

to or approved by its Member States.  This is an area where close and early
consultation is of great importance;

    (c) The division of labour must be clearly defined and agreed in order to
avoid overlap and institutional rivalry where the United Nations and a
regional organization are both working on the same conflict.  In such cases

it is also particularly important to avoid a multiplicity of mediators;

    (d) Consistency by members of regional organizations who are also Member
States of the United Nations is needed in dealing with a common problem of
interest to both organizations, for example, standards for peace-keeping

89. Non-governmental organizations also play an important role in all United
Nations activities discussed in the present paper.  To date, 1,003
non-governmental organizations have been granted consultative status with the
United Nations and many of them have accredited representatives at United

Nations Headquarters in New York and/or the United Nations Office at Geneva. 
The changed nature of United Nations operations in the field has brought
non-governmental organizations into a closer relationship with the United
Nations, especially in the provision of humanitarian relief in conflict
situations and in post-conflict peace-building.  It has been necessary to
devise procedures that do not compromise their non-governmental status but do

ensure that their efforts are properly coordinated with those of the United
Nations and its programmes, funds, offices and agencies.  Non-governmental
organizations have also had great success in mobilizing public support and
funds for humanitarian relief in countries affected by international or
domestic conflict.

90. Within the United Nations system there are three levels at which
coordination is required:  within the United Nations Secretariat; between

United Nations Headquarters and the head offices of other funds, programmes,
offices and agencies of the United Nations system; and in the field.

91. The multifunctional nature of both peace-keeping and peace-building has
made it necessary to improve coordination within the Secretariat, so that the
relevant departments function as an integrated whole under my authority and

control.  Proposals the Secretary-General makes to the General Assembly or
the Security Council on peace and security issues need to be based on
coordinated inputs from the Departments of Political Affairs, Peace-keeping
Operations, Humanitarian Affairs and Administration and Management and
others.  Guidance to the field must similarly be coordinated, in order to
ensure that chiefs of missions do not receive conflicting instructions from

different authorities within the Secretariat.

92. In an international bureaucracy interdepartmental cooperation and
coordination come even less naturally than they do in a national environment. 
It has required some effort to ensure that the above objectives are met.  I
have entrusted the main responsibility in this regard to my Task Force on

United Nations Operations and to interdepartmental groups at the working
level on each major conflict where the organization is playing a peacemaking
or peace-keeping role.

93. Improved coordination is equally necessary within the United Nations
system as a whole.  The responsibilities involved in multifunctional

peace-keeping operations and in peace-building transcend the competence and
expertise of any one department, programme, fund, office or agency of the
United Nations.  Short-term programmes are needed for cease-fires,
demobilization, humanitarian relief and refugee return; but it is the longer-
term programmes that help rebuild societies and put them back on the path of
development.  Short-term and long-term programmes need to be planned and

implemented in a coordinated way if they are to contribute to the
consolidation of peace and development.  The mechanism for ensuring a more
effective and equitable application of sanctions, which I have recommended
earlier in the present position paper, will equally require close
coordination between a large number of players on the United Nations stage.

94. Such coordination has to date proved difficult to achieve.  Each of the
agencies concerned has its own intergovernmental legislative body and its own
mandate.  In the past, there also has been insufficient interaction, in both
directions, between those responsible in the Secretariat for designing and
implementing peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building activities and the

international financial institutions, who often have an all-important say in
making sure that the necessary resources are available.

95. As regards coordination in the field, the current practice when a
peace-keeping operation is deployed is to entrust this task to a special
representative of the Secretary-General.  Cambodia, El Salvador and

Mozambique are successful examples, not least because of the cooperation
extended to my Special Representatives by the various other components of the
United Nations system.
96. For my part, I shall maintain my efforts in the Administrative Committee
on Coordination and in my bilateral relations with the executive heads of the
various funds, programmes, offices and agencies to achieve better
coordination within the United Nations system in the context of peace and
security.  Governments of Member States can support those efforts.  Many of

the problems of coordination arise from the mandates decreed for the agencies
by discrete intergovernmental bodies.  As such, they defy the capacity for
inter-Secretariat coordination.  I accordingly recommend that Governments
instruct their representatives in the various intergovernmental bodies to
ensure that proper coordination is recognized to be an essential condition
for the Organization's success and that it is not made hostage to

inter-institutional rivalry and competition.

                           V.  FINANCIAL RESOURCES

97. None of the instruments discussed in the present paper can be used unless

Governments provide the necessary financial resources.  There is no other
source of funds.  The failure of Member States to pay their assessed
contributions for activities they themselves have voted into being makes it
impossible to carry out those activities to the standard expected.  It also
calls in question the credibility of those who have willed the ends but not
the means - and who then criticize the United Nations for its failures.  On

12 October 1994, I put to the Member States a package of proposals, ideas and
questions on finance and budgetary procedures that I believe can contribute
to a solution (see A/49/PV.28).  

98. The financial crisis is particularly debilitating as regards peace-
keeping.  The shortage of funds, in particular for reconnaissance and

planning, for the start-up of operations and for the recruitment and training
of personnel imposes severe constraints on the Organization's ability to
deploy, with the desired speed, newly approved operations.  Peace-keeping is
also afflicted by Member States' difficulties in providing troops, police and
equipment on the scale required by the current volume of peace-keeping

99. Meanwhile, there is continuing damage to the credibility of the Security
Council and of the Organization as a whole when the Council adopts decisions
that cannot be carried out because the necessary troops are not forthcoming. 
The continuing problems with regard to the safe areas in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the expansion of UNAMIR in response to genocide in Rwanda are

cases in point.  In the future it would be advisable to establish the
availability of the necessary troops and equipment before it is decided to
create a new peace-keeping operation or assign a new task to an existing one.

100.    Peace-building is another activity that is critically dependent on

Member States' readiness to make the necessary resources available.  It can
be a long-term process and expensive - except in comparison with the cost of
peacemaking and peace-keeping if the conflict should recur.  One lesson
learned in recent years is that, in putting together the peace-building
elements in a comprehensive settlement plan, the United Nations should
consult the international financial institutions in good time to ensure that

the cost of implementing the plan is taken into account in the design of the
economic plans of the Government concerned.  The problems in this area are
aggravated by many donors' reluctance to finance crucial elements such as the
conversion of guerrilla movements into political parties, the creation of new
police forces or the provision of credit for the purchase of land in "arms
for land" programmes.  
101.    Compensation to Member States affected by sanctions on their
neighbours or economic partners will also be possible only if the richer
Member States recognize both the moral argument that such countries should

not be expected to bear alone costs resulting from action collectively
decided upon by the international community and the practical argument that
such compensation is necessary to encourage those States to cooperate in
applying decisions taken by the Security Council.  I recognize that the sums
involved will be large but I am convinced that they must be made available if
the Council is to continue to rely on sanctions.  

                               VI.  CONCLUSION

102.    The present position paper, submitted to the Member States at the
opening of the United Nations fiftieth anniversary year, is intended to serve

as a contribution to the continuing campaign to strengthen a common capacity
to deal with threats to peace and security.

103.    The times call for thinking afresh, for striving together and for
creating new ways to overcome crises.  This is because the different world
that emerged when the cold war ceased is still a world not fully understood. 

The changed face of conflict today requires us to be perceptive, adaptive,
creative and courageous, and to address simultaneously the immediate as well
as the root causes of conflict, which all too often lie in the absence of
economic opportunities and social inequities.  Perhaps above all it requires
a deeper commitment to cooperation and true multilateralism than humanity has
ever achieved before.

104.    This is why the pages of the present paper reiterate the need for
hard decisions.  As understanding grows of the challenges to peace and
security, hard decisions, if postponed, will appear in retrospect as having
been relatively easy when measured against the magnitude of tomorrow's

105.    There is no reason for frustration or pessimism.  More progress has
been made in the past few years towards using the United Nations as it was
designed to be used than many could ever have predicted.  The call to
decision should be a call to confidence and courage.


    1/  Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session,
Supplement No. 27 (A/47/27), appendix I.

    2/  See The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 5:  1980 (United
Nations publication, Sales No. G.81.IX.4), appendix VII.



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Date last posted: 18 December 1999 16:30:10
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