United Nations

A/50/504


General Assembly

Distr. GENERAL  

4 October 1995

ORIGINAL:
ENGLISH


Fiftieth session
Agenda item 18


IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

Question of Western Sahara

Report of the Secretary-General


1.   On  9  December  1994, the  General Assembly  adopted, without  a vote,
resolution 49/44,  on the question of  Western Sahara.   The present report,
which covers the  period from 18  September 1994  to 30  September 1995,  is
submitted in pursuance of paragraph 8 of that resolution.

2.   The Secretary-General, in close  cooperation with  the current Chairman
of  the Organization of African  Unity (OAU), has  continued to exercise his
good offices with the parties concerned.

3.  On 5 November 1994, the Secretary-General  submitted a report 1/ to  the
Security Council  in which  he provided  an account of  the further  efforts
which he and his Deputy Special  Representative, Mr. Erik Jensen (Malaysia),
who has since been confirmed as  his Acting Special Representative, had made
during the preceding months  in order to resolve  the issues still  standing
in the way of the implementation of the  Settlement Plan for Western Sahara.
2/

4.    In  his  report,  the   Secretary-General  described  the  process  of
identifying potential voters since  its start on 28  August 1994, as well as
the  logistic  and other  difficulties  experienced  by  the United  Nations
Mission  for  the  Referendum  in  Western  Sahara  (MINURSO)  in  trying to
accelerate its pace.   On 25 October, the deadline set for the submission of
applications, MINURSO received  a flood  of completed forms, which  exceeded
the number previously submitted.  By then, only  about 50,000 (about 21  per
cent of  the total)  had been  computerized and  analysed.   The  Secretary-
General recalled his earlier intention to  recommend to the Security Council
that the  transitional period should  start on 1  October 1994  and that the
referendum should take place on 14 February 1995. 3/  However, it



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was clear that many  months would be required to make sufficient progress in
the  identification  process to  be  close  to  determining a  date  for the
referendum. The Secretary-General informed the  Council that he would report
further  on  the  organization  and  timing  of  the  referendum  after  the
consultations he intended to hold during his visit to the area in November.

5.  In a statement by  its President on 15 November, 4/ the Security Council
welcomed the Secretary-General's decision to visit  the region and expressed
the hope that,  on that occasion,  he would  be able  to report  significant
progress  towards   implementing  the  Settlement   Plan  and  holding   the
referendum.

6.  In his  report dated 14 December,  5/ the Secretary-General informed the
Security Council  about  his consultations  held  during  his visit  to  the
mission area from  25 to 29  November.   He was  accompanied throughout  the
visit by his Acting  Special Representative.  At Algiers, he was received by
the State President,  Mr. Liamine Zeroual.  He  also held meetings with  Mr.
Abdelkader  Bensalah, President  of  the National  Transition  Council;  Mr.
Mokdad Sifi,  Head of  Government; Mr.  Mohamed Salah  Dembri, Minister  for
Foreign Affairs;  Mr. Ramtane Lamamra,  Permanent Representative of  Algeria
to  the United  Nations; and  other senior  officials of  the Government  of
Algeria.

7.  At  all those meetings,  the Secretary-General  stressed the urgency  of
reaching an  early settlement  and sought  Algeria's continued  cooperation.
The authorities reassured  him of their firm  support for the activities  of
the United  Nations in Western Sahara  and reaffirmed  their preparedness to
provide  all  necessary  assistance  in  his  efforts.    They  stressed, in
particular,  the need for the  parties to adhere  strictly to the provisions
of the Settlement Plan, which they  considered essential for the credibility
of the referendum.

8.  At  Smara refugee camp near  Tindouf, which he  visited on  27 November,
the Secretary-General met  with Mr. Mohamed Abdelaziz, Secretary-General  of
the Frente Popular para  la Liberacion de  Saguia el-Hamra  y de Rio de  Oro
(Frente POLISARIO);  Mr. Bachir Mustafa  Sayed, Deputy Secretary-General  of
the Frente  POLISARIO and its Coordinator  with MINURSO;  Mr. Bukhari Ahmed,
representative  of  the Frente  POLISARIO  in  New  York;  and other  senior
POLISARIO officials.  Issues discussed included  the process leading to  the
referendum; the  Security Council's position  on the  issue; increasing  the
number of  identification centres  and personnel; various  other aspects  of
the Mission's  work; and the  cooperation of  both parties  with the  Acting
Special  Representative.   The  POLISARIO leaders  expressed  concern  about
certain  developments  since   the  beginning  of  the  identification   and
registration  process  that  they  viewed  as  impediments  to  the   smooth
implementation of the Settlement  Plan and the  conduct of a free, fair  and
impartial referendum.  They indicated that,  while they continued to believe
that direct dialogue would be useful, they would  not make it a prerequisite
for the continuation of the peace process in conformity with the Plan.

9.   Addressing the main concern of the Frente  POLISARIO - the large number
of application  forms submitted at the  last minute  - the Secretary-General
pointed out  that  the Identification  Commission  was  an independent  body
whose  members,  he  was  confident,  would  carry  out  their  mandate with
impartiality,  fairness  and  integrity.   He  urged  the  Frente  POLISARIO
leaders to continue to cooperate with  the Acting Special Representative and
MINURSO so  as to  facilitate rapid  progress in  the implementation  of the
Plan.  He made it clear, however, that  ultimately the continued involvement
of the  United Nations would  depend on the  demonstrated political will  of
the parties.

10.   At Rabat, where he  arrived after a visit  to MINURSO headquarters  at
Laayoune, the Secretary-General was received by  His Majesty King Hassan  II
of Morocco.    He  also held  meetings  with  Mr.  Abdelatif  Filali,  Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs  and Cooperation; Mr. Driss Basri,
Minister  of  the Interior  and  Information;  Mr. Ahmed  Snoussi, Permanent

Representative of Morocco to the United  Nations; and other senior officials
of  the Government  of  Morocco. A  wide range  of  issues relating  to  the
implementation of  the Settlement Plan were  discussed.   These included the
referendum; progress  achieved so  far in  identification and  registration,
and  measures  required  to  accelerate  the   pace  of  the  process;   the
cooperation  of   both  parties   with  MINURSO   and  the  Acting   Special
Representative;  and the position  and expectations  of the Security Council
regarding the process leading to the holding of the referendum.

11.    The  Secretary-General  was reassured  that  Morocco  remained  fully
committed  to  the  Settlement  Plan  and  would  continue  to  provide  all
assistance  required  for  his  efforts  to  implement  it.    The  Moroccan
authorities further pledged continued support for the  activities of MINURSO
and the efforts of his Acting Special Representative.

12.   The Security Council was further informed that the four identification
teams working at  Laayoune and Tindouf (two at  each centre) had achieved  a
weekly output  of 1,000  potential voters  interviewed and  identified.   In
order to complete the work within a  reasonable time-frame, an estimated  25
teams working simultaneously  would be required.   Consultations had started
with  the  parties  regarding  the   location,  equipping  and   opening  of
additional  centres.    The  preliminary  cost  estimates  for  the  further
expansion of the Identification Commission were  contained in an addendum to
the 14 December report. 6/

13.  The  Secretary-General concluded his report with  the hope that, by  31
March  1995, progress  achieved in  the  identification process  would  have
reached a level that would enable  him to recommend 1 June  1995 as the date
(D-day) for  the start of the  transitional period, with  a view to  holding
the referendum in October 1995.

14.  On  13 January, the Security Council  adopted resolution 973 (1995)  in
which the  Council  approved the  expansion of  MINURSO as  proposed in  the
SecretaryGeneral's report of 14 December.   It also requested the Secretary-
General to report by  31 March on arrangements with regard to the  logistic,
personnel and  other resources  required for  the deployment  of MINURSO  at
full  strength and on  his final  plan for implementing all  elements of the
Settlement Plan.   The mandate of  MINURSO was extended  until 31 May  1995,
with  the possibility  of a  further extension  on  the  basis of  a further
report by the Secretary-General at that time.

15.   In pursuance  of that  resolution, the  Secretary-General submitted  a
report  to the Council on 30 March. 7/  The  Council was informed that seven
identification centres  were  operating in  the  Territory  and the  Tindouf
area, and  that  arrangements had  been  completed  to establish  an  eighth
centre  (four  on  each  side).    The  Government  of  Spain had  forwarded
important archival documents  to the  Acting Special Representative, at  his
request.  Those  documents had been classified  by MINURSO and were  proving
of considerable  value as aids  to identification,  especially for  doubtful
cases.   The attention  of the  Council was drawn  to the complexity  of the
identification of potential voters.  As had been  agreed, it could only take
place when two  tribal leaders (sheikhs), one  from each side,  were present
to testify.  The representatives of  the two parties and an  observer of OAU
were  also expected to attend.   Problems arose when one of  the parties had
difficulties in  making its sheikh available on time.  Moreover, both sides'
earlier insistence on  strict reciprocity meant  that whenever, for whatever
reason, identification could not  take place at a  centre on one  side, work
was automatically suspended at a centre on the other.

16.    The Secretary-General  recalled  that,  from  the  start, the  single
greatest obstacle  to identification had been  the issue  of tribal leaders.
The Settlement Plan gave tribal leaders  the responsibility for  identifying
applicants  as being the  persons they  claimed to be and  as belonging to a
particular  tribal  group (subfraction);  the sheikhs  were also  to provide
oral testimony relevant to the eligibility  criteria.  Most sheikhs, elected
as they were in  1973, were  already of mature years  at that time and  many

had  since died  or  become  incapacitated. As  a result,  one third  of the
tribal subfractions were without a recognized  tribal leader on at least one
side.

17.  In the summer of  1994, the two  parties agreed to the proposal of  the
Acting  Special  Representative  that the  process should  start  with those
subfractions where there was a  surviving and competent sheikh on each side.
With  regard to  the other  cases, the  views of  the two  parties  diverged
markedly.    The  Frente  POLISARIO  argued  that  to  avoid  any subsequent
manipulation  of  the  selection  of  sheikhs,  only  those  elected  in the
Territory in  1973, or  their eldest  sons, should be  eligible to  testify.
Morocco  opposed the view  that the  1973 election of  sheikhs under Spanish
rule was  the  only  one  ever held  in  the  Territory, that  sheikhs  were
traditionally  coopted and not  elected, that  not all  Saharan sheikhs were
necessarily in the Territory  in 1973 and that  those elected in  1973 might
subsequently  have been replaced  by others, since their  term of office was
to last only five years.

18.  A measure  of convergence then began  to emerge.  On  10 February,  the
Acting Special  Representative  submitted  a detailed  proposal to  the  two
parties:   a surviving sheikh  from the 1973  election was  to be preferred;
then his eldest surviving  son; then a candidate  from the election of 1973,
normally  by descending  number of  votes  received;  and failing  that, the
party  would  put  forward  three  names  from  which  the  Chairman of  the
Identification  Commission would  select one,  after consultation  with  the
other  party.   The three names were  to be of persons  from the subfraction
concerned, of  recognized standing in their  community, of appropriate  age,
without any  official position and themselves  included in  the census lists
of 1974.  Attached to the proposal was a list  of all 88 tribal subfractions
included in  the  1974 census  and  such  information  as was  available  to
MINURSO  concerning the sheikhs, sons of sheikhs  and non-elected candidates
from the 1973  election; in the 29 cases  where no such  person was known, a
blank space was left for the three names to be provided by the parties.

 19.  In their written response  dated 13 February, the Moroccan authorities
maintained that there had been no prior commitment  on their part to certain
of the limitations, but  they took note of further clarification offered  in
writing  by  the  Acting Special  Representative  on  18 February.    On  23
February,   the   Moroccan   authorities   provided   detailed   statistical
information concerning the whereabouts  of all members  of the  subfractions
listed  as  residents  in  the  Territory.    They  also  undertook  to make
available  names  of candidates  to  replace sheikhs  as  required.    On 26
February,  the   Frente  POLISARIO  also   submitted  a  written   response,
reiterating  certain  concerns  and  returning  the  list  of   subfractions
completed with the names of persons to be  considered as replacements in the
absence of sheikhs.

20.   Recalling the  other aspects of  the Settlement  Plan, the  Secretary-
General  reported that the  Commander of the Royal  Moroccan Armed Forces in
the southern zone,  Major-General Abdelaziz Bennani, had assured the  Acting
Special  Representative of  Morocco's preparedness  to implement  fully  the
provisions of the Plan  relating to the reduction  of Moroccan troops in the
Territory, once  D-Day and the  start of  the transitional  period had  been
determined.   Preliminary  consultations  on the  confinement  of  POLISARIO
troops  had  been initiated.  Mr. Emmanuel  Roucounas (Greece),  a prominent
international jurist,  had  been  appointed as  the independent  jurist,  to
ensure the  release of all Saharan  political prisoners and  detainees.  The
International Committee  of the  Red Cross  (ICRC) had  stated  that it  was
ready to start working  on the  release of prisoners of  war as soon as  the
parties were ready to  do so.  With  respect to  the draft code of  conduct,
which  had  been   submitted  to  the  parties  on  13  December  1994,  the
Secretariat  received  detailed  comments  and  proposals  from  the  Frente
POLISARIO on 31 January and from the Government  of Morocco on 15  February.
The  replies reflected major  differences between  the two  sides, which the
Secretariat  was attempting  to  reconcile.   Regarding the  repatriation of
refugees,  other  Western  Saharans  and  members  of  the  Frente POLISARIO

entitled to vote, a technical team  of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for  Refugees (UNHCR)  visited the  mission area  from 2  to 15
February in order to review the plans for the operation.

21.   The  Secretary-General indicated  in paragraph 51  of his  report that
progress achieved thus far did  not enable him  to recommend 1 June 1995  as
the  date (D-Day) for  the start  of the transitional period.   If, however,
the parties made it  possible to raise the rate of identification to  25,000
per month, and if they cooperated  in resolving expeditiously the  remaining
issues in the Settlement  Plan, it could be envisaged that the  transitional
period could  begin in  August 1995 and  the referendum be  held in  January
1996.

22.  In  pursuance of resolution  973 (1995)  of the Security Council  and a
statement  by  its  President  dated  12  April,  8/  the  Secretary-General
submitted a report  to the Council on 19 May.  9/  He recalled that  despite
the increased operational capabilities, the rate  of identification had been
uneven.   The operation  had been interrupted  periodically by  difficulties
relating  to the  timely availability of sheikhs  and party representatives,
and to  weather  conditions and  logistics.    Although the  Acting  Special
Representative had proposed to the parties a formula for dealing with  cases
where  there  was  no  sheikh  available,  difficulties  had  arisen  in the
interpretation and  implementation of certain points  of the  agreement.  At
the end of  April, identification had  therefore been  taking place at  only
three centres.

23.   In late  April, the  Acting Special  Representative held  a series  of
consultations with  the  parties to  address  their  concerns.   Both  sides
agreed to his proposals and,  as a result, the  identification operation was
resumed  at  all eight  centres  on 2  May.    During the  period  since the
Secretary-General's  previous  report,  7/  the  parties  had  not  entirely
abandoned their  insistence on reciprocity in  the operation  of the centres
on both  sides, or  their  attachment to  a maximum  of  150  persons to  be
identified daily at any  given centre.  After  additional resources had been
made available  since  the  adoption  of  Security  Council  resolution  973
(1995), MINURSO had been  able on occasions to  identify 800 to  900 persons
in one  day, which  confirmed that  a rate  of 1,000  a day was  technically
feasible.

24.    While  noting  the  difficulties  encountered  as  a  result  of  the
complexity and  sensitivity of  the identification  process, the  Secretary-
General pointed  out that  during  the 10  months  since  the start  of  the
identification, barriers  that had seemed  insurmountable had been  overcome
and much  had been achieved that  now seemed irreversible.  Reiterating that
the process  could not  be brought  to a  successful conclusion without  the
full cooperation  of the  parties, he  called upon  them once again  to work
with MINURSO  in a  spirit of  genuine cooperation.  He  asked the  Security
Council for  an extension of  the mandate  of MINURSO  for a period  of four
months and  set a  number of  benchmarks for  the coming  months that  would
enable the Council  to assess the  parties' willingness to press  ahead with
the implementation of the  Plan.  By the end  of September, he  would assess
all the progress achieved and, on that  basis, would make recommendations to
the Council  for the fulfilment  of the  United Nations  mandate in  Western
Sahara.

25.  In  its resolution 995 (1995) of  26 May, the  Security Council decided
to send a mission of the Council to the region and  to extend the mandate of
MINURSO  until 30  June, pending  the  findings  and recommendations  of its
mission.    The  six-member  Council  delegation  visited  Rabat,   Algiers,
Tindouf, Laayoune  and Nouakchott  from 3 to 9  June.  Its objective  was to
impress upon the  parties the necessity of fully cooperating with MINURSO in
the  implementation  of  all  aspects  of  the  Settlement  Plan,  to assess
progress  and  identify  problems in  the  identification  process,  and  to
identify problems in other areas relevant to the fulfilment of the Plan.

26.   On 21 June, the  Security Council received  the report of its mission.

10/ On 23 June,  the Frente POLISARIO informed the President of the Security
Council that it was suspending its  participation in the identification  and
withdrawing  its observers. 11/  This was in  protest against the sentencing
by a  Moroccan military  tribunal on  21 June  of eight  Saharans to  prison
terms  of 15  to 20  years for  having participated  in a  demonstration  in
Laayoune on 11 May, and the announcement by  Morocco to the Council  mission
of its intention to  present for identification  100,000 applicants residing
outside  the Territory.   In  response,  Prime  Minister Filali  addressed a
letter to the President of the Security Council on 26 June, 12/ in which  he
stated  that Morocco  could not  accept  an  indefinite postponement  of the
referendum  and  called  upon the  Council to  take  all necessary  steps to
ensure the resumption of the process with a  view to holding the  referendum
on schedule.
  27.    Having  considered  the  report   of  its  mission,  10/  including
recommendations for  moving forward on  the identification process and other
aspects of  the Settlement  Plan,  the Security  Council adopted  resolution
1002  (1995) on  30  June. The  mandate of  MINURSO  was extended  until  30
September 1995 as recommended by  the Secretary-General in his  report of 19
May, 9/  and  the Council  requested  the  Secretary-General to  make  every
effort  to  persuade  the  parties  to  resume  their  participation  in the
implementation of the Plan.

28.    The  Special   Committee  on  the   Situation  with  Regard  to   the
Implementation  of  the  Declaration  on  the Granting  of  Independence  to
Colonial Countries and Peoples considered the  question of Western Sahara on
10 and  14 July.   During  its consideration  of the  question, the  Special
Committee  had  before   it  a  working  paper  containing  information   on
developments  concerning the  Territory. 13/  The  Special Committee decided
to transmit the relevant documentation to the General Assembly.

29.   On 12 July, Frente  POLISARIO Secretary-General  Abdelaziz addressed a
letter 14/ to  the President of the Security  Council and to the  Secretary-
General  in which he  confirmed the  Frente POLISARIO's  agreement to resume
its participation, after a  Moroccan royal edict  of 9 July had reduced  the
21 June prison sentence to one  year.  In the same letter, he reiterated the
view of the Frente  POLISARIO that the 1974  Spanish census constituted  the
only basis recognized in  the Settlement Plan as accepted by the two parties
and  endorsed by the  United Nations and deemed  unacceptable what he termed
the  participation of  a  substitute  population,  sought by  the  occupying
Power, whose most recent  manoeuvre was to attempt to include 100,000 of its
nationals in  the voters list. The  identification operation recommenced  in
late July,  after the details concerning  its resumption  had been clarified
and practical measures taken to reopen the centres.

30.    In  pursuance  of  Security   Council  resolution  1002  (1995),  the
SecretaryGeneral submitted a report  to the Council on  8 September. 15/  He
indicated that a total  of 53,000 applicants had  been identified since  the
process began one year before.  Since his  previous report, 9/ the  Moroccan
authorities  had reiterated  their  wish  to  proceed  as  expeditiously  as
possible in completing  the process.  They had agreed to conduct preliminary
vetting of the 100,000 applicants residing  outside the Territory, as called
for  by the Council mission in  its report. 10/  In a letter dated 23 August
to the  Secretary-General, Prime Minister  Filali also reiterated  Morocco's
conviction that  all applicants should be  treated equally, irrespective  of
their place of residence and the criterion under which they applied.

31.  The Council was  informed that the Frente POLISARIO had decided not  to
participate  in  the  identification  of  the  100,000  applicants  residing
outside the Territory, many of whom were members of the "Tribus del  Norte",
"Costeras y del Sur" and "Chorfa" groupings.   From among these, the  Frente
POLISARIO  rejected  three  groups  as  in   no  sense  "belonging  to   the
Territory".   With respect to  other groups, while  not contesting the right
of their members who  were included in the 1974 census to be identified, the
Frente POLISARIO agreed to participate in  their identification only on  the
assumption that their  number would be modest  and the individuals would  be
identified by one sheikh from each side.

 32.   The  Secretary-General noted  that,  were  the parties  to  cooperate
fully, identification in three of the  four centres in the Territory (except
Laayoune) and  all four  refugee camps  could be  completed  in five  weeks.
There  would  then  remain,  in  addition  to  Laayoune,  those  individuals
belonging to  an assortment  of tribal  groups widely  dispersed and  thinly
represented in  any one place in the Territory or in the camps.  MINURSO had
an  obligation  to  consider   all  applications  that  had  been  correctly
submitted.    Bringing a  person  to  be  identified  did  not prejudge  the
decision.

33.   The Secretary-General also noted  that, technically, there would be no
obstacle to organizing identification sessions  in various places  within or
outside the Territory,  wherever the bulk  of the  applicants resided.   The
practice  could continue of calling on two sheikhs  from the tribal subgroup
concerned, but these would  not invariably be drawn  one from each  side, as
had  been the practice hitherto.   Were identification to take place without
the participation of  sheikhs from  the Frente POLISARIO  side, it would  be
necessary, for the process to  have credibility, to insist on the submission
of documentary evidence to establish that the  individual was indeed a child
of a Saharan  father and some supporting evidence  as to the father's  birth
in the Territory.   The Frente  POLISARIO would,  of course,  be invited  to
observe the  proceedings and to submit  its observations  in accordance with
the agreed procedures.   OAU should also be represented and the presence  of
its observers would be  an important element.  If  such a programme could be
implemented, the identification of persons living  outside as well as  those
from the camps  and the Territory could  be completed in approximately  four
months.

34.   The  Security Council  was further informed  that as at  31 August the
military component of  MINURSO, headed  by the  Force Commander,  Brigadier-
General  Andre Van Baelen (Belgium), totalled 285  personnel, comprising 237
military  observers  and  48  military  support  personnel.    Pending   the
fulfilment  of   the  conditions  necessary  for  the  commencement  of  the
transitional period, the military  mandate of MINURSO remained restricted to
monitoring  and  verifying the  cease-fire,  which  came  into  effect on  6
September 1991.    During  the  past  year,  only  a  few  minor  cease-fire
violations  had  been observed,  most  of  which pertained  to  unauthorized
movements by both parties.

35.  As at 31 August,  the civilian police component of  MINURSO totalled 92
officers.   Colonel Wolf-Dieter  Krampe (Germany) assumed  his functions  as
Civilian  Police  Commissioner  on  13  March,  to  replace  Colonel  Jurgen
Friedrich  Reimann  (Germany)  who  had  completed  his  tour  of  duty with
MINURSO.    Colonel  Krampe  served  until   20  August  and,  pending   the
designation of his replacement, Lieutenant-Colonel Jan Walmann (Norway)  was
designated Acting  Civilian Police Commissioner.   Pending the  commencement
of the transitional period, the activities  of the civilian police component
remained linked to those of the Identification Commission.  It maintained  a
24-hour  security  presence  at  the  identification  centres  and  provided
technical assistance to the Commission, as appropriate.

36.   With  respect  to  other aspects  relevant  to the  fulfilment of  the
Settlement Plan,  the Secretary-General informed  the Security Council  that
the benchmarks which  in his last report 9/ he had proposed to  meet had not
been  achieved  for  the  most part.    Both  parties had  maintained  their
respective  positions concerning  the confinement  of the  Frente  POLISARIO
troops.   Both  had also  objected to  the  terms of  the proposed  code  of
conduct, despite  the efforts  made by  the Secretariat  to reconcile  their
differences.

37.   While  reiterating the  Security  Council's  warning that  the process
could  not   continue  indefinitely,  the  Secretary-General  stressed  that
premature  withdrawal of  MINURSO would  have  very grave  and  far-reaching
implications for the parties and the whole subregion and  should be avoided,
if  at all  possible.  He  proposed an extension  of the mandate  of MINURSO
until 31  January 1996,  adding that if,  by then, the  conditions necessary

for  the start  of  the  transitional period  were  not in  place, he  would
present the  Council with alternative  options for consideration,  including
the possibility of withdrawal of MINURSO.

38.   On 22  September, the Security Council  adopted resolution 1017 (1995)
in which the  Council extended the  Mission's mandate until 31  January 1996
and  noted  the   Secretary-General's  above-stated  intention.    It   also
requested the Secretary-General to produce specific and detailed  proposals,
in close  consultation with the parties,  to resolve  the problems hindering
the completion of the  identification process, and to report on the  outcome
of his efforts  in that regard by 15  November 1995.   He was also requested
to report by 15  January on progress achieved  towards the implementation of
the Settlement  Plan,  and  to  state in  that  report  whether or  not  the
transitional period could begin by 31 May 1996.


Notes

  1/  S/1994/1257.

  2/  S/21360 and S/22464 and Corr.1.

  3/  S/1994/819.

  4/  S/PRST/1994/67.

  5/  S/1994/1420.

  6/  S/1994/1420/Add.1.

  7/  S/1995/240 and Add.1.

  8/  S/PRST/1995/17.

  9/  S/1995/404.

  10/  S/1995/498.

  11/  See S/1995/524, annex.

  12/  S/1995/514, annex.

  13/  A/AC.109/2029 and Add.1.
    14/  S/1995/578, annex.

  15/  S/1995/779.


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