| United Nations | A/50/504 |
General Assembly
Distr. GENERAL
4 October 1995
ORIGINAL:
ENGLISH
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 18
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES
Question of Western Sahara
Report of the Secretary-General
1. On 9 December 1994, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote,
resolution 49/44, on the question of Western Sahara. The present report,
which covers the period from 18 September 1994 to 30 September 1995, is
submitted in pursuance of paragraph 8 of that resolution.
2. The Secretary-General, in close cooperation with the current Chairman
of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), has continued to exercise his
good offices with the parties concerned.
3. On 5 November 1994, the Secretary-General submitted a report 1/ to the
Security Council in which he provided an account of the further efforts
which he and his Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Erik Jensen (Malaysia),
who has since been confirmed as his Acting Special Representative, had made
during the preceding months in order to resolve the issues still standing
in the way of the implementation of the Settlement Plan for Western Sahara.
2/
4. In his report, the Secretary-General described the process of
identifying potential voters since its start on 28 August 1994, as well as
the logistic and other difficulties experienced by the United Nations
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in trying to
accelerate its pace. On 25 October, the deadline set for the submission of
applications, MINURSO received a flood of completed forms, which exceeded
the number previously submitted. By then, only about 50,000 (about 21 per
cent of the total) had been computerized and analysed. The Secretary-
General recalled his earlier intention to recommend to the Security Council
that the transitional period should start on 1 October 1994 and that the
referendum should take place on 14 February 1995. 3/ However, it
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was clear that many months would be required to make sufficient progress in
the identification process to be close to determining a date for the
referendum. The Secretary-General informed the Council that he would report
further on the organization and timing of the referendum after the
consultations he intended to hold during his visit to the area in November.
5. In a statement by its President on 15 November, 4/ the Security Council
welcomed the Secretary-General's decision to visit the region and expressed
the hope that, on that occasion, he would be able to report significant
progress towards implementing the Settlement Plan and holding the
referendum.
6. In his report dated 14 December, 5/ the Secretary-General informed the
Security Council about his consultations held during his visit to the
mission area from 25 to 29 November. He was accompanied throughout the
visit by his Acting Special Representative. At Algiers, he was received by
the State President, Mr. Liamine Zeroual. He also held meetings with Mr.
Abdelkader Bensalah, President of the National Transition Council; Mr.
Mokdad Sifi, Head of Government; Mr. Mohamed Salah Dembri, Minister for
Foreign Affairs; Mr. Ramtane Lamamra, Permanent Representative of Algeria
to the United Nations; and other senior officials of the Government of
Algeria.
7. At all those meetings, the Secretary-General stressed the urgency of
reaching an early settlement and sought Algeria's continued cooperation.
The authorities reassured him of their firm support for the activities of
the United Nations in Western Sahara and reaffirmed their preparedness to
provide all necessary assistance in his efforts. They stressed, in
particular, the need for the parties to adhere strictly to the provisions
of the Settlement Plan, which they considered essential for the credibility
of the referendum.
8. At Smara refugee camp near Tindouf, which he visited on 27 November,
the Secretary-General met with Mr. Mohamed Abdelaziz, Secretary-General of
the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro
(Frente POLISARIO); Mr. Bachir Mustafa Sayed, Deputy Secretary-General of
the Frente POLISARIO and its Coordinator with MINURSO; Mr. Bukhari Ahmed,
representative of the Frente POLISARIO in New York; and other senior
POLISARIO officials. Issues discussed included the process leading to the
referendum; the Security Council's position on the issue; increasing the
number of identification centres and personnel; various other aspects of
the Mission's work; and the cooperation of both parties with the Acting
Special Representative. The POLISARIO leaders expressed concern about
certain developments since the beginning of the identification and
registration process that they viewed as impediments to the smooth
implementation of the Settlement Plan and the conduct of a free, fair and
impartial referendum. They indicated that, while they continued to believe
that direct dialogue would be useful, they would not make it a prerequisite
for the continuation of the peace process in conformity with the Plan.
9. Addressing the main concern of the Frente POLISARIO - the large number
of application forms submitted at the last minute - the Secretary-General
pointed out that the Identification Commission was an independent body
whose members, he was confident, would carry out their mandate with
impartiality, fairness and integrity. He urged the Frente POLISARIO
leaders to continue to cooperate with the Acting Special Representative and
MINURSO so as to facilitate rapid progress in the implementation of the
Plan. He made it clear, however, that ultimately the continued involvement
of the United Nations would depend on the demonstrated political will of
the parties.
10. At Rabat, where he arrived after a visit to MINURSO headquarters at
Laayoune, the Secretary-General was received by His Majesty King Hassan II
of Morocco. He also held meetings with Mr. Abdelatif Filali, Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; Mr. Driss Basri,
Minister of the Interior and Information; Mr. Ahmed Snoussi, Permanent
Representative of Morocco to the United Nations; and other senior officials
of the Government of Morocco. A wide range of issues relating to the
implementation of the Settlement Plan were discussed. These included the
referendum; progress achieved so far in identification and registration,
and measures required to accelerate the pace of the process; the
cooperation of both parties with MINURSO and the Acting Special
Representative; and the position and expectations of the Security Council
regarding the process leading to the holding of the referendum.
11. The Secretary-General was reassured that Morocco remained fully
committed to the Settlement Plan and would continue to provide all
assistance required for his efforts to implement it. The Moroccan
authorities further pledged continued support for the activities of MINURSO
and the efforts of his Acting Special Representative.
12. The Security Council was further informed that the four identification
teams working at Laayoune and Tindouf (two at each centre) had achieved a
weekly output of 1,000 potential voters interviewed and identified. In
order to complete the work within a reasonable time-frame, an estimated 25
teams working simultaneously would be required. Consultations had started
with the parties regarding the location, equipping and opening of
additional centres. The preliminary cost estimates for the further
expansion of the Identification Commission were contained in an addendum to
the 14 December report. 6/
13. The Secretary-General concluded his report with the hope that, by 31
March 1995, progress achieved in the identification process would have
reached a level that would enable him to recommend 1 June 1995 as the date
(D-day) for the start of the transitional period, with a view to holding
the referendum in October 1995.
14. On 13 January, the Security Council adopted resolution 973 (1995) in
which the Council approved the expansion of MINURSO as proposed in the
SecretaryGeneral's report of 14 December. It also requested the Secretary-
General to report by 31 March on arrangements with regard to the logistic,
personnel and other resources required for the deployment of MINURSO at
full strength and on his final plan for implementing all elements of the
Settlement Plan. The mandate of MINURSO was extended until 31 May 1995,
with the possibility of a further extension on the basis of a further
report by the Secretary-General at that time.
15. In pursuance of that resolution, the Secretary-General submitted a
report to the Council on 30 March. 7/ The Council was informed that seven
identification centres were operating in the Territory and the Tindouf
area, and that arrangements had been completed to establish an eighth
centre (four on each side). The Government of Spain had forwarded
important archival documents to the Acting Special Representative, at his
request. Those documents had been classified by MINURSO and were proving
of considerable value as aids to identification, especially for doubtful
cases. The attention of the Council was drawn to the complexity of the
identification of potential voters. As had been agreed, it could only take
place when two tribal leaders (sheikhs), one from each side, were present
to testify. The representatives of the two parties and an observer of OAU
were also expected to attend. Problems arose when one of the parties had
difficulties in making its sheikh available on time. Moreover, both sides'
earlier insistence on strict reciprocity meant that whenever, for whatever
reason, identification could not take place at a centre on one side, work
was automatically suspended at a centre on the other.
16. The Secretary-General recalled that, from the start, the single
greatest obstacle to identification had been the issue of tribal leaders.
The Settlement Plan gave tribal leaders the responsibility for identifying
applicants as being the persons they claimed to be and as belonging to a
particular tribal group (subfraction); the sheikhs were also to provide
oral testimony relevant to the eligibility criteria. Most sheikhs, elected
as they were in 1973, were already of mature years at that time and many
had since died or become incapacitated. As a result, one third of the
tribal subfractions were without a recognized tribal leader on at least one
side.
17. In the summer of 1994, the two parties agreed to the proposal of the
Acting Special Representative that the process should start with those
subfractions where there was a surviving and competent sheikh on each side.
With regard to the other cases, the views of the two parties diverged
markedly. The Frente POLISARIO argued that to avoid any subsequent
manipulation of the selection of sheikhs, only those elected in the
Territory in 1973, or their eldest sons, should be eligible to testify.
Morocco opposed the view that the 1973 election of sheikhs under Spanish
rule was the only one ever held in the Territory, that sheikhs were
traditionally coopted and not elected, that not all Saharan sheikhs were
necessarily in the Territory in 1973 and that those elected in 1973 might
subsequently have been replaced by others, since their term of office was
to last only five years.
18. A measure of convergence then began to emerge. On 10 February, the
Acting Special Representative submitted a detailed proposal to the two
parties: a surviving sheikh from the 1973 election was to be preferred;
then his eldest surviving son; then a candidate from the election of 1973,
normally by descending number of votes received; and failing that, the
party would put forward three names from which the Chairman of the
Identification Commission would select one, after consultation with the
other party. The three names were to be of persons from the subfraction
concerned, of recognized standing in their community, of appropriate age,
without any official position and themselves included in the census lists
of 1974. Attached to the proposal was a list of all 88 tribal subfractions
included in the 1974 census and such information as was available to
MINURSO concerning the sheikhs, sons of sheikhs and non-elected candidates
from the 1973 election; in the 29 cases where no such person was known, a
blank space was left for the three names to be provided by the parties.
19. In their written response dated 13 February, the Moroccan authorities
maintained that there had been no prior commitment on their part to certain
of the limitations, but they took note of further clarification offered in
writing by the Acting Special Representative on 18 February. On 23
February, the Moroccan authorities provided detailed statistical
information concerning the whereabouts of all members of the subfractions
listed as residents in the Territory. They also undertook to make
available names of candidates to replace sheikhs as required. On 26
February, the Frente POLISARIO also submitted a written response,
reiterating certain concerns and returning the list of subfractions
completed with the names of persons to be considered as replacements in the
absence of sheikhs.
20. Recalling the other aspects of the Settlement Plan, the Secretary-
General reported that the Commander of the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces in
the southern zone, Major-General Abdelaziz Bennani, had assured the Acting
Special Representative of Morocco's preparedness to implement fully the
provisions of the Plan relating to the reduction of Moroccan troops in the
Territory, once D-Day and the start of the transitional period had been
determined. Preliminary consultations on the confinement of POLISARIO
troops had been initiated. Mr. Emmanuel Roucounas (Greece), a prominent
international jurist, had been appointed as the independent jurist, to
ensure the release of all Saharan political prisoners and detainees. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had stated that it was
ready to start working on the release of prisoners of war as soon as the
parties were ready to do so. With respect to the draft code of conduct,
which had been submitted to the parties on 13 December 1994, the
Secretariat received detailed comments and proposals from the Frente
POLISARIO on 31 January and from the Government of Morocco on 15 February.
The replies reflected major differences between the two sides, which the
Secretariat was attempting to reconcile. Regarding the repatriation of
refugees, other Western Saharans and members of the Frente POLISARIO
entitled to vote, a technical team of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) visited the mission area from 2 to 15
February in order to review the plans for the operation.
21. The Secretary-General indicated in paragraph 51 of his report that
progress achieved thus far did not enable him to recommend 1 June 1995 as
the date (D-Day) for the start of the transitional period. If, however,
the parties made it possible to raise the rate of identification to 25,000
per month, and if they cooperated in resolving expeditiously the remaining
issues in the Settlement Plan, it could be envisaged that the transitional
period could begin in August 1995 and the referendum be held in January
1996.
22. In pursuance of resolution 973 (1995) of the Security Council and a
statement by its President dated 12 April, 8/ the Secretary-General
submitted a report to the Council on 19 May. 9/ He recalled that despite
the increased operational capabilities, the rate of identification had been
uneven. The operation had been interrupted periodically by difficulties
relating to the timely availability of sheikhs and party representatives,
and to weather conditions and logistics. Although the Acting Special
Representative had proposed to the parties a formula for dealing with cases
where there was no sheikh available, difficulties had arisen in the
interpretation and implementation of certain points of the agreement. At
the end of April, identification had therefore been taking place at only
three centres.
23. In late April, the Acting Special Representative held a series of
consultations with the parties to address their concerns. Both sides
agreed to his proposals and, as a result, the identification operation was
resumed at all eight centres on 2 May. During the period since the
Secretary-General's previous report, 7/ the parties had not entirely
abandoned their insistence on reciprocity in the operation of the centres
on both sides, or their attachment to a maximum of 150 persons to be
identified daily at any given centre. After additional resources had been
made available since the adoption of Security Council resolution 973
(1995), MINURSO had been able on occasions to identify 800 to 900 persons
in one day, which confirmed that a rate of 1,000 a day was technically
feasible.
24. While noting the difficulties encountered as a result of the
complexity and sensitivity of the identification process, the Secretary-
General pointed out that during the 10 months since the start of the
identification, barriers that had seemed insurmountable had been overcome
and much had been achieved that now seemed irreversible. Reiterating that
the process could not be brought to a successful conclusion without the
full cooperation of the parties, he called upon them once again to work
with MINURSO in a spirit of genuine cooperation. He asked the Security
Council for an extension of the mandate of MINURSO for a period of four
months and set a number of benchmarks for the coming months that would
enable the Council to assess the parties' willingness to press ahead with
the implementation of the Plan. By the end of September, he would assess
all the progress achieved and, on that basis, would make recommendations to
the Council for the fulfilment of the United Nations mandate in Western
Sahara.
25. In its resolution 995 (1995) of 26 May, the Security Council decided
to send a mission of the Council to the region and to extend the mandate of
MINURSO until 30 June, pending the findings and recommendations of its
mission. The six-member Council delegation visited Rabat, Algiers,
Tindouf, Laayoune and Nouakchott from 3 to 9 June. Its objective was to
impress upon the parties the necessity of fully cooperating with MINURSO in
the implementation of all aspects of the Settlement Plan, to assess
progress and identify problems in the identification process, and to
identify problems in other areas relevant to the fulfilment of the Plan.
26. On 21 June, the Security Council received the report of its mission.
10/ On 23 June, the Frente POLISARIO informed the President of the Security
Council that it was suspending its participation in the identification and
withdrawing its observers. 11/ This was in protest against the sentencing
by a Moroccan military tribunal on 21 June of eight Saharans to prison
terms of 15 to 20 years for having participated in a demonstration in
Laayoune on 11 May, and the announcement by Morocco to the Council mission
of its intention to present for identification 100,000 applicants residing
outside the Territory. In response, Prime Minister Filali addressed a
letter to the President of the Security Council on 26 June, 12/ in which he
stated that Morocco could not accept an indefinite postponement of the
referendum and called upon the Council to take all necessary steps to
ensure the resumption of the process with a view to holding the referendum
on schedule.
27. Having considered the report of its mission, 10/ including
recommendations for moving forward on the identification process and other
aspects of the Settlement Plan, the Security Council adopted resolution
1002 (1995) on 30 June. The mandate of MINURSO was extended until 30
September 1995 as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 19
May, 9/ and the Council requested the Secretary-General to make every
effort to persuade the parties to resume their participation in the
implementation of the Plan.
28. The Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples considered the question of Western Sahara on
10 and 14 July. During its consideration of the question, the Special
Committee had before it a working paper containing information on
developments concerning the Territory. 13/ The Special Committee decided
to transmit the relevant documentation to the General Assembly.
29. On 12 July, Frente POLISARIO Secretary-General Abdelaziz addressed a
letter 14/ to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-
General in which he confirmed the Frente POLISARIO's agreement to resume
its participation, after a Moroccan royal edict of 9 July had reduced the
21 June prison sentence to one year. In the same letter, he reiterated the
view of the Frente POLISARIO that the 1974 Spanish census constituted the
only basis recognized in the Settlement Plan as accepted by the two parties
and endorsed by the United Nations and deemed unacceptable what he termed
the participation of a substitute population, sought by the occupying
Power, whose most recent manoeuvre was to attempt to include 100,000 of its
nationals in the voters list. The identification operation recommenced in
late July, after the details concerning its resumption had been clarified
and practical measures taken to reopen the centres.
30. In pursuance of Security Council resolution 1002 (1995), the
SecretaryGeneral submitted a report to the Council on 8 September. 15/ He
indicated that a total of 53,000 applicants had been identified since the
process began one year before. Since his previous report, 9/ the Moroccan
authorities had reiterated their wish to proceed as expeditiously as
possible in completing the process. They had agreed to conduct preliminary
vetting of the 100,000 applicants residing outside the Territory, as called
for by the Council mission in its report. 10/ In a letter dated 23 August
to the Secretary-General, Prime Minister Filali also reiterated Morocco's
conviction that all applicants should be treated equally, irrespective of
their place of residence and the criterion under which they applied.
31. The Council was informed that the Frente POLISARIO had decided not to
participate in the identification of the 100,000 applicants residing
outside the Territory, many of whom were members of the "Tribus del Norte",
"Costeras y del Sur" and "Chorfa" groupings. From among these, the Frente
POLISARIO rejected three groups as in no sense "belonging to the
Territory". With respect to other groups, while not contesting the right
of their members who were included in the 1974 census to be identified, the
Frente POLISARIO agreed to participate in their identification only on the
assumption that their number would be modest and the individuals would be
identified by one sheikh from each side.
32. The Secretary-General noted that, were the parties to cooperate
fully, identification in three of the four centres in the Territory (except
Laayoune) and all four refugee camps could be completed in five weeks.
There would then remain, in addition to Laayoune, those individuals
belonging to an assortment of tribal groups widely dispersed and thinly
represented in any one place in the Territory or in the camps. MINURSO had
an obligation to consider all applications that had been correctly
submitted. Bringing a person to be identified did not prejudge the
decision.
33. The Secretary-General also noted that, technically, there would be no
obstacle to organizing identification sessions in various places within or
outside the Territory, wherever the bulk of the applicants resided. The
practice could continue of calling on two sheikhs from the tribal subgroup
concerned, but these would not invariably be drawn one from each side, as
had been the practice hitherto. Were identification to take place without
the participation of sheikhs from the Frente POLISARIO side, it would be
necessary, for the process to have credibility, to insist on the submission
of documentary evidence to establish that the individual was indeed a child
of a Saharan father and some supporting evidence as to the father's birth
in the Territory. The Frente POLISARIO would, of course, be invited to
observe the proceedings and to submit its observations in accordance with
the agreed procedures. OAU should also be represented and the presence of
its observers would be an important element. If such a programme could be
implemented, the identification of persons living outside as well as those
from the camps and the Territory could be completed in approximately four
months.
34. The Security Council was further informed that as at 31 August the
military component of MINURSO, headed by the Force Commander, Brigadier-
General Andre Van Baelen (Belgium), totalled 285 personnel, comprising 237
military observers and 48 military support personnel. Pending the
fulfilment of the conditions necessary for the commencement of the
transitional period, the military mandate of MINURSO remained restricted to
monitoring and verifying the cease-fire, which came into effect on 6
September 1991. During the past year, only a few minor cease-fire
violations had been observed, most of which pertained to unauthorized
movements by both parties.
35. As at 31 August, the civilian police component of MINURSO totalled 92
officers. Colonel Wolf-Dieter Krampe (Germany) assumed his functions as
Civilian Police Commissioner on 13 March, to replace Colonel Jurgen
Friedrich Reimann (Germany) who had completed his tour of duty with
MINURSO. Colonel Krampe served until 20 August and, pending the
designation of his replacement, Lieutenant-Colonel Jan Walmann (Norway) was
designated Acting Civilian Police Commissioner. Pending the commencement
of the transitional period, the activities of the civilian police component
remained linked to those of the Identification Commission. It maintained a
24-hour security presence at the identification centres and provided
technical assistance to the Commission, as appropriate.
36. With respect to other aspects relevant to the fulfilment of the
Settlement Plan, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that
the benchmarks which in his last report 9/ he had proposed to meet had not
been achieved for the most part. Both parties had maintained their
respective positions concerning the confinement of the Frente POLISARIO
troops. Both had also objected to the terms of the proposed code of
conduct, despite the efforts made by the Secretariat to reconcile their
differences.
37. While reiterating the Security Council's warning that the process
could not continue indefinitely, the Secretary-General stressed that
premature withdrawal of MINURSO would have very grave and far-reaching
implications for the parties and the whole subregion and should be avoided,
if at all possible. He proposed an extension of the mandate of MINURSO
until 31 January 1996, adding that if, by then, the conditions necessary
for the start of the transitional period were not in place, he would
present the Council with alternative options for consideration, including
the possibility of withdrawal of MINURSO.
38. On 22 September, the Security Council adopted resolution 1017 (1995)
in which the Council extended the Mission's mandate until 31 January 1996
and noted the Secretary-General's above-stated intention. It also
requested the Secretary-General to produce specific and detailed proposals,
in close consultation with the parties, to resolve the problems hindering
the completion of the identification process, and to report on the outcome
of his efforts in that regard by 15 November 1995. He was also requested
to report by 15 January on progress achieved towards the implementation of
the Settlement Plan, and to state in that report whether or not the
transitional period could begin by 31 May 1996.
Notes
1/ S/1994/1257.
2/ S/21360 and S/22464 and Corr.1.
3/ S/1994/819.
4/ S/PRST/1994/67.
5/ S/1994/1420.
6/ S/1994/1420/Add.1.
7/ S/1995/240 and Add.1.
8/ S/PRST/1995/17.
9/ S/1995/404.
10/ S/1995/498.
11/ See S/1995/524, annex.
12/ S/1995/514, annex.
13/ A/AC.109/2029 and Add.1.
14/ S/1995/578, annex.
15/ S/1995/779.
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