| United Nations | A/50/439 |
General Assembly
Distr. GENERAL
18 September 1995
ORIGINAL:
ENGLISH
Fiftieth session
Item 97 (a) of the provisional agenda*
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION:
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
Economic measures as means of political and economic coercion
against developing countries
Report of the Secretary-General
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
INTRODUCTION ...............................................1 -52
I. SUMMARY OF RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS .......6 - 173
II. ACTIONS BY UNITED NATIONS BODIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ............................18 - 365
A. United Nations bodies ............................ 18 - 305
B. Other international instruments .................. 31 - 369
III. SUMMARY OF THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE EXPERT GROUP
MEETING ..............................................37 - 5211
A. Conceptual issues ................................ 39 - 4411
B. Legal issues ..................................... 45 - 4713
C. Impact assessment ................................ 48 - 5114
D. Institutional issues/follow-up ................... 5215
Annex. List of experts invited to an expert group meeting on coercive
economic measures ..............................................17
* A/50/150.
95-28157 (E) 131095/...
*9528157*
/... A/50/439
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A/50/439
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INTRODUCTION
1. The present report has been prepared in response to General Assembly
resolution 48/l68 of 21 December 1993. In that resolution, the General
Assembly, inter alia, expressed concern about the adverse effects of the
use of coercive economic measures on the economy and development efforts of
developing countries, and about the general negative impact on
international economic cooperation and on world-wide efforts to move
towards a non-discriminatory, open trading system. The Assembly reaffirmed
that no State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any
other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it
the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights.
2. The Assembly also called upon the international community to adopt
urgent effective measures to eliminate the use by some developed countries
of unilateral coercive economic measures against developing countries that
are not authorized by relevant organs of the United Nations or are
inconsistent with the principles contained in the Charter of the United
Nations, and requested the Secretary-General to assign to the Department
for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis of the United
Nations Secretariat, in cooperation with the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, the function of continuing to monitor the imposition
of measures of this nature, as well as to continue the preparation of
studies in this field, as mandated by the Assembly in its resolutions
44/2l5 and 46/2l0. Finally, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General
to report to it at its fiftieth session on the implementation of the
resolution.
3. Accordingly, the Secretary General, in a note verbale dated March 1995,
invited the Governments of all States to provide relevant information. At
the time of preparation of the present report, replies had been received
from the Governments of the following seven States: Colombia, Cuba,
Ecuador, Estonia, Iraq, Japan and Madagascar.
4. The Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis
convened an expert group meeting on the subject to solicit the views of
internationally recognized experts on the concept and implications of
coercive economic measures.
5. The present report contains a summary of the responses of the
abovementioned Governments, a review of relevant actions on the part of
United Nations bodies and other multilateral instruments, and a summary of
the deliberations of the above-mentioned meeting.
I. SUMMARY OF RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS
6. The Government of Colombia noted that it continues to support the
relevant provisions of General Assembly resolution 48/l68 relating to the
non-legitimacy of the imposition of coercive economic measures.
7. The Government of Cuba stressed that despite the end of the cold war,
certain Powers, based on their predominant position in the world economy,
have continued to use coercive economic measures against developing
countries. The imposition of coercive economic measures ignores such
principles as the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention and non-
interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States, and violates
international legal instruments with the intent of forcibly imposing the
political will of the sending State and subverting the political, economic
and social regime of the target State. Unilateral coercive economic
measures are inconsistent with the objectives and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations, and also contradict the principles and norms
established in the International Development Strategy, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the resolutions and decisions of the
United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development. The Government of Cuba indicated that unilateral coercive
economic measures include a variety of punitive actions against the
targeted State, such as closing off the domestic market of the country that
imposes the measure to the targeted country; eliminating mostfavoured-
nation treatment; preventing and limiting commercial and financial
transactions with third countries; obstructing the procurement of essential
goods by the target State; attempting to prevent access to appropriate
technology; attempting to obstruct commercial navigation; subjecting third
countries to extraterritorial provisions; limiting the implementation of
principles and provisions relating to intellectual property rights; and
applying political and discriminatory criteria in granting visas or
residence permits.
8. The Government of Cuba considers the economic blockade imposed by the
United States of America against Cuba for more than 35 years to be a
blatant example of the application of this type of unilateral coercive
economic measure. In addition to the social consequences that such measures
have caused, they are estimated to have cost the country over $40 billion.
9. According to the Government of Cuba, the imposition of the United
States blockade has imposed such costs as the loss of preferential prices
for sugar exports; a lack of financial resources; substantial increases in
transport costs, resulting from the geographical shift in its trading
pattern; immobilization of vast quantities of resources; excessive prices
for imported goods; idling of plants and equipment, owing to lack of spare
parts; the reduction of tourist activities; and the loss of related
earnings.
10. The Government of Cuba considers that these punitive measures applied
by the United States against Cuba are clearly incompatible with relevant
resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.
11. The Government of Cuba is concerned that, despite relevant resolutions
adopted in recent years by the General Assembly on the use of coercive
economic measures against developing countries, which provide a clear
mandate, the United Nations Secretariat has still not identified specific
activities within the medium-term plan and programme budget for the proper
implementation of those decisions. The Government of Cuba hopes that
appropriate measures will be taken to rectify this state of affairs.
12. The Government of Ecuador stressed its full agreement with the
provisions of General Assembly resolution 48/l68, which condemn the
imposition of coercive economic measures against developing countries.
Ecuador believes that the use of coercive economic measures to impose one
State's will on another is inconsistent with the basic principles of
international law. Such measures have no justification or legitimacy
unless they are authorized by the competent organs of the United Nations
and are consistent with the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations.
13. Attempts to coerce a State by means of economic pressure can have
serious consequences for the human rights of individuals living in that
State. Coercive economic measures have no international legitimacy and are
also incompatible with the provisions of a number of international
instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, and
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Such measures particularly
infringe upon the universal principles of the right of people to self-
determination and the right of individuals to well-being. The social
institutions and physical infrastructure of countries subjected to economic
coercion are usually seriously affected. Ecuador therefore believes that
economic pressure also infringes upon the right to development as set forth
in the Declaration on the Right to Development adopted by the General
Assembly in 1986.
14. The Government of Estonia noted that Estonia has never used political
or economic sanctions against any country, except when authorized by the
United Nations. Estonia reaffirms the basic position that all coercive
measures not in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations and without
the authorization of the United Nations Security Council are to be
condemned by the international community.
15. The Government of Iraq noted that, in believing firmly in the right of
States to the exercise of complete sovereignty and equality and respect for
human rights, it strongly opposes the use by some developed countries of
arbitrary economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion
against the peoples of the world with the aim of humiliating them and
depriving them of their basic right to development and economic well-being.
The Government of Iraq stresses that the coercive economic measures taken
by some developed countries against developing countries constitute a
flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of
international law, the principles of human rights and the divine
prescriptions of religious law. Iraq calls upon those countries to desist
from enacting any legislation or taking any measures that threaten the
economic security of the countries of the third world and prevent them from
enjoying their right to a free and decent life of wellbeing and economic,
social and scientific progress.
16. The Government of Japan stressed that it had voted against General
Assembly resolution 48/l68. Japan is therefore opposed to the inclusion of
the item on coercive economic measures in the agenda of the Second
Committee at the fiftieth session of the General Assembly. Japan is of the
view that it is inappropriate to discuss economic sanctions in general
because this distorts their meaning, making it appear that they are
unilateral measures taken by developed against developing countries.
17. The Government of Madagascar provided information about negotiating
with the International Monetary Fund concerning access to the Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility.
II. ACTION BY UNITED NATIONS BODIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
A. United Nations bodies
18. The relevant General Assembly resolutions and declarations are
described below.
1. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in
the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of
Their Independence and Sovereignty (General Assembly
resolution 2l3l (XX)) and Declaration on Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations (General Assembly
resolution 2625 (XXV))
19. Both declarations provide that no State has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or
external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and
all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the
personality of the State or against its political, economic or cultural
elements are condemned.
20. Both declarations also state that no State may use or encourage the
use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another
State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its
sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind, and that
every State has an undeniable right to choose its political, economic,
social and cultural system, without interference in any form by another
State.
2. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order (General Assembly resolution 320l (S-VI))
21. The Declaration provides, in part, that the new international economic
order should be founded on full respect for the full permanent sovereignty
of every State over its natural resources and all its economic activities.
In order to safeguard these resources, each State is entitled to exercise
effective control over them and their exploitation with means suitable to
its situation, including the right of nationalization or transfer of
ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full
permanent sovereignty of the State. The Declaration states the no State
may be subjected to economic, political or any other type of coercion to
prevent the free and full exercise of this inalienable right.
3. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
(General Assembly resolution 328l (XXIX))
22. Article 32 states that no State may use or encourage the use of
economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State
in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its
sovereign rights.
4. Commission on Human Rights
23. The Commission on Human Rights, in its resolution 1994/47, entitled
"Human rights and unilateral coercive economic measures", identified the
following instruments and resolutions as providing the legal framework for
the consideration of the issue:
(a) Charter of the United Nations;
(b) Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV));
(c) Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (General Assembly
resolution 328l (XXIX)), in particular article 32;
(d) The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World
Conference on Human Rights in June 1993; 1/
(e) Commission on Human Rights resolutions 199l/79, 1992/39, 1993/59.
24. The Commission on Human Rights identified unilateral coercive measures
against developing countries, such as blockades, embargoes, trade
restrictions and freezing of assets as being in clear contradiction with
international law. Such measures have the purpose of preventing target
States from exercising their rights to determine their political, economic
and social system, and are intended to exert political, economic and social
pressure. Unilateral coercive economic measures create obstacles to trade
relations among States, adversely affect the socio-humanitarian activities
of developing countries, and hinder the full realization of human rights by
the people subject to those measures. The human rights affected include
those set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in particular
the right of people to self-determination and the right to development.
Unilateral coercive economic measures thus also constitute violations of
peoples' rights.
25. The Working Group on the Right to Development identified the use of
unilateral coercive economic measures as an obstacle to the implementation
of the Declaration on the Right to Development.
26. The Commission on Human Rights, at both its fiftieth and fifty-first
sessions, requested the Secretary-General to submit, in consultation with
Governments, specialized agencies and intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations, a report on coercive measures unilaterally
implemented against developing countries that hinder the full realization
of all rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
other international human rights instruments, particularly the right of
people to a minimum standard of living and development.
27. In accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/47, the
Secretary-General submitted a report on the subject at its fifty-first
session, containing comments submitted by Governments, specialized agencies
and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations on coercive
measures unilaterally implemented against developing countries
(E/CN.4/1995/43). The report contains some salient points based on
replies, such as:
(a) The use of all forms of coercive measures violates the principle of
international cooperation, and constitutes a barrier to mutually
advantageous cooperation between countries;
(b) The use of unilateral coercive economic measures has severe
repercussions on the economies of targeted developing countries, and
creates numerous social problems;
(c) The use of unilateral coercive economic measures as a means of
exercising political and economic pressure against developing countries
constitutes a grave violation of the human rights of individuals, groups
and people recognized in the Charter of the United Nations and in all
international human rights instruments.
28. The Commission on Human Rights has called on the international
community to reject the use of such unilateral coercive measures. It has
requested all States to refrain from adopting them, and has condemned the
fact that certain countries, using their predominant position in the world
economy, continue to intensify the adoption of such measures. The
Commission has also stressed that the international community as a whole
should hold Governments responsible for the use of coercive measures and
their consequences, and should take firm action to thwart such attempts,
which are in flagrant violation of international law. The United Nations
should deal with the adverse effects of these coercive measures on human
rights, and should establish a mechanism to monitor the forms of such
measures, the purposes they are designed to achieve and their repercussions
on the economies of the developing countries affected. This would
also include identifying countries that impose such measures with a view to
determining the adequate manner in which the measures should be tackled and
finally eliminated.
5. International Law Commission
29. The International Law Commission has been considering a draft article
on prohibited countermeasures within the context of its codification and
progressive development of the law of State responsibility. At its forty-
sixth session (2 May-22 July 1994), the Commission provisionally adopted
draft article l4, entitled "Prohibited counter measures", for inclusion in
the draft articles concerning the content, forms and degrees of
international responsibility. The text of article l4, as provisionally
adopted by the Commission, reads as follows:
Article l4
Prohibited countermeasures
"An injured State shall not resort by way of countermeasures, to:
(a) The threat or use of force as prohibited by the Charter of the
United Nations;
(b) Extreme economic or political coercion designed to endanger the
territorial integrity or political independence of the State which has
committed an international wrongful act;
(c) Any conduct which derogates from basic human rights;
(d) Any other conduct in contravention of norms of general international
law."
30. However, the Commission decided not to formally submit articles on
countermeasures to the General Assembly, pending the adoption of other
articles on countermeasures and the submission of the relevant
commentaries. At its forty-seventh session (2 May-2l July 1995), the
Commission adopted a set of draft articles on the question of
countermeasures, which will be submitted to the General Assembly at its
fiftieth session.
B. Other international instruments
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
31. Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 2/ deals
with security exceptions. It states that nothing in the Agreement shall be
construed to prevent any contracting party from taking any action that it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests.
The interpretation and application of article XXI is still the subject of
dispute as illustrated, inter alia, by:
(a) The complaint of former Czechoslovakia against the United States of
America, in 1949, concerning restrictive trade measures. In this case, it
was stated that every country must be the judge in the last resort on
questions relating to its security. On the other hand, every contracting
party should be cautious not to take any step that might have the effects
of undermining the General Agreement;
(b) In 196l, on the occasion of the accession of Portugal, Ghana stated
that its boycott of Portuguese goods was justified under article XXI,
noting that under that article, each contracting party was the sole judge
of what was necessary in its essential security interest. The Government
of Ghana felt that the situation in Angola was a constant threat to the
peace of the African continent, and that any action which, by bringing
pressure to bear on the Portuguese Government, might lead to a lessening of
this danger, was therefore justified in the essential security interest of
Ghana;
(c) The United States embargo on trade with Cuba, imposed in 1962,
invoked article XXI as justification (national security reasons). Cuba
rejected that argument;
(d) In 1970, the Working Party report on the accession of the former
United Arab Republic stressed that, in response to concerns raised
regarding the Arab League boycott against Israel, the representative of the
former UAR noted that in view of the political character of this issue, the
United Arab Republic did not wish to discuss it within GATT. The
background of the boycott measures was political and not commercial;
(e) In November 1975, Sweden introduced a global import quota system for
certain footwear. The Government of Sweden considered that the measure was
taken in conformity with the spirit of article XXI, and stated, inter alia,
that the decrease in domestic production had become a critical threat to
the emergency planning of Sweden's economic defence as an integral part of
the country's security policy;
(f) In April 1982, the former European Economic Community and its member
States, Canada and Australia, suspended indefinitely imports into their
territories of products from Argentina. In notifying these measures, they
stated that they had taken certain measures in the light of the situation
addressed in Security Council resolution 502 (1982); that they had taken
those measures on the basis of their inherent rights, of which article XXI
of the General Agreement was a reflection. Argentina took the position
that, in addition to infringing the principles and objectives underlying
GATT, those measures violated specific GATT articles. Argentina sought an
interpretation of article XXI. These efforts led to the inclusion of
paragraph 7 (III) in the Ministerial Declaration of November 1982, which
provides that the contracting parties undertake, individually and jointly,
to abstain from taking restrictive trade measures for reasons of a non-
economic character, that are not consistent with the General Agreement;
(g) On 7 May 1985, the United States of America notified the contracting
parties of an executive order prohibiting all imports of goods and services
of Nicaraguan origin, and all exports from the United States to Nicaragua.
Nicaragua stated that those measures contravened GATT articles and that it
was a matter not of national security but of coercion. Nicaragua further
stated that article XXI could not be applied in an arbitrary fashion. The
United States stated that its action had been taken for national security
reasons, and that it was the prerogative of each country to judge which
action it considered necessary to protect its essential security interests;
(h) In November 199l, the European Community (EC) notified the
contracting parties that the EC and its member States had decided to adopt
trade measures against former Yugoslavia. The EC stated that those
measures were taken upon consideration of its essential security interests
and were based on article XXI. Former Yugoslavia stated that those measures
were inconsistent with the GATT agreement.
32. The above briefly described instances of the application of coercive
economic measures with reference to article XXI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade indicate the difficulties in the interpretation of
national security exceptions, and thus the difficulties in legitimizing
coercive economic measures for national security reasons.
2. Helsinki Final Act, 1975
33. Principle VI of the Declaration of the Principles guiding Relations
between Participating States adopted in the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe on 1 August 1975, 3/ entitled "Non-
intervention in internal affairs" provides, in part, that the participating
States, will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of
military, political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to
their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the
rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any
kind.
3. The Charter of the Organization of American States of
30 April 1948, as amended 27 February 1967
34. Article l8 of the Charter of Bogota establishing the Organization of
American States 4/ provides that no State or group of States has the right
to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle
prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or
attempted threat against the personality of the State, or against its
political, economic and cultural elements.
35. Article 19 of the Charter states that no State may use or encourage
the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order
to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages
of any kind.
36. Article 34 of the Charter provides that member States should refrain
from practising policies and adopting actions or measures that have serious
adverse effects for the development of other member States.
III. SUMMARY OF THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE EXPERT
GROUP MEETING
37. The Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis
convened an expert group meeting on coercive economic measures (see annex
for a list of experts invited). The meeting discussed conceptual and legal
issues, the problems of impact assessment and institutional arrangements.
38. The main findings of the meeting are summarized below.
A. Conceptual issues
1. Definition
39. The imposition of coercive economic measures must be seen in the
context of the use of tools of economic statecraft and as an element of
coercive diplomacy. The meeting agreed that the definition of coercive
economic measures must include the following essential elements:
(a) The motives of the sender State and the explicitly stated policy
objectives (i.e., identification of the objectionable policies in the
target State);
(b) The selection of specific types of economic instruments imposed on
the target State with the objective of enforcing changes in objectionable
policies in the target State;
(c) The implicit assumption that the imposition of coercive economic
measures causes economic damage and dislocation in the target State,
creating political, economic and social tensions in the target State, which
in turn create pressure for policy changes.
40. The meeting determined that coercive economic measures are negative
economic activities imposed by the sender on the target State for political
(non-economic) purposes. Coercive economic measures can be imposed by
individual States (unilateral economic sanctions) or regional organizations
(plurilateral economic sanctions). The specific, defining feature of
coercive economic measures is that of negative economic activities applied
for political purposes, forming part of discriminatory or punitive
interventionist policies. The meeting agreed that the existence of serious
material impact is a necessary condition for negative economic activities
to qualify as coercive economic measures. This definition distinguishes
coercive economic measures from:
(a) Multilateral economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council
after determining a threat to international peace and security. This type
of multilateral economic sanction is legitimized by the international
community as an instrument to enforce the collective security regime. This
bestows legal, political and moral authority;
(b) Unilateral or plurilateral economic sanctions imposed for economic
purposes. Specific types of unilateral or plurilateral sanctions,
especially when they relate to trade measures, are dealt with in the
context of the multilateral trade regime (norms, rules and dispute
settlement mechanisms);
(c) Positive economic sanctions (affirmative economic measures) that
involve adequate incentives and reward systems to induce policy changes.
41. The concept of coercive economic measures embraces the policy
objectives of the sender State, the selection of specific economic measures
by the sender State, the economic impact on the target State and enforced
policy changes in the target State. The assessment of the economic and
political effectiveness of coercive economic measures and the judgement of
their legitimacy are further relevant issues.
2. Policy objectives
42. The motives of the sender State and the derived policy objectives are
essential factors in the concept of coercive economic measures. The real
motives and the explicitly stated policy objectives (change of
objectionable policies) are related but not always identical. The stated
policy objectives are the result of political processes in the sender
State, and reflect the reconciliation of often divergent interests. They
range from alleged threats to the national security of the sender State and
the alleged violation of agreed international norms and instruments by the
target State, to expressions of dislike for specific domestic or foreign
policies of the target State or more generally for the political and socio-
economic system of the target State. The stated policy objectives in
specific cases of coercive economic measures reflect a broad range of
options based on unilateral judgements by the sender State, and express
specific interests. This approach forms part of coercive economic
diplomacy in inter-State relations.
43. The meeting agreed that a general classification of motives/objectives
should include the broad categories of deterrence, compliance, punishment
and retaliation. Efforts to establish a hierarchical order of motives are
relevant for the consideration of legitimacy. Any hierarchical ordering
must be devised in accordance with degrees of acceptability (acceptability
criteria). Some participants stressed the view that coercive economic
measures are to some extent an unavoidable part of the use of economic
tools of statecraft as coercive diplomacy. In this view, coercive economic
measures can constitute an alternative to the use of military force. It
was agreed, however, that without clearly defined criteria, unilateral
decisions on the use of coercive economic measures have the potential for
arbitrariness and abuse. It was also agreed that any hierarchical ordering
in terms of acceptability should place policy objectives related to the
violation of internationally agreed norms and instruments above those based
on the expression of objections to the specific political and socio-
economic system of the target State.
3. Type of coercive economic measures
44. The meeting agreed that sender States can potentially resort to a
large variety of economic instruments. The selection of specific economic
measures is linked to the basic objective, namely, to restrict the target
State's access to markets, capital, technology and investment. The
selection of specific trade, finance and investment-related measures is
intended to maximize the negative economic impact in order to enforce
changes in the alleged objectionable policies. The broad categories of
trade, finance and investment-related measures can be further subdivided in
a typology of individual measures. The selection of specific measures is
influenced by such factors as the policy objectives, the intended negative
economic impact, the economic size of the target State, and the
geographical proximity and strength of economic ties between the sender and
target States. The interplay of these factors has to be analysed in
specific cases in order to permit adequate generalizations.
B. Legal issues
45. An essential problem addressed by the meeting is that of the legal
base, such as international law, declarations and resolutions adopted by
international organizations, and provisions contained in international
regimes and conventions. The basic question is how to interpret such legal
instruments for applicable norms and criteria with which to judge the
legitimacy of coercive economic measures, both in general and in specific
cases. The relevant provisions of such instruments reflect a normative
consensus on the legality of coercive economic measures under certain
circumstances, but there is a lack of normative consensus in certain other
respects. The meeting agreed that the basic principle to be applied in the
judgement of the legality of coercive economic measures is that of non-
intervention and non-discrimination, based on such norms as the sovereignty
of nation States and the sovereign equality of States. This prohibits
intervention into the domestic affairs of sovereign States, either by
forcible (military) or non-forcible (economic) intervention, as a general
rule. The strict observation and application of these basic principles of
international law, backed by specific declarations adopted by international
organizations, prohibits the application of coercive economic measures as
instruments of intervention, including any attempts at an exterritorial
application of coercive economic measures. This establishes the generally
applicable rule.
46. Evolving norms in international law and specific enforcement
provisions in international regimes and conventions can contribute to the
specification of the applicable criteria to be used in the judgement of the
legitimacy of coercive economic measures (States' responsibilities,
response to wrongful acts etc.). This development, however, should not
detract from the applicability of the basic principles of non-intervention
and non-discrimination. It should also be taken into account, even in
applying exceptions, that the response must be proportional to the
seriousness of the violation (principle of proportionality).
47. While not disputing the general rule, some participants expressed the
view that the application of coercive economic measures cannot be
completely excluded in a realistic consideration of international
relations. Exceptions, according to this view, include the use of coercive
economic measures as part of an enforcement mechanism incorporated into
internationally agreed instruments and regimes. Under such circumstances,
coercive economic measures can be legitimately applied in the case of clear
violations of internationally agreed norms. Such judgements, however,
should be made on a multilateral and not a unilateral basis. The meeting
noted that despite the above-mentioned principles, there have been recent
attempts to justify unilateral coercive measures for explicitly
interventionist purposes (to bring about changes in a sovereign State's
economic and political system). The meeting viewed this development with
concern and wished to bring it to the attention of the international
community.
C. Impact assessment
48. The problem of impact assessment concerns the effectiveness of
coercive economic measures. Impact assessment has to differentiate
between:
(a) The costs for the imposing State and the distribution of such costs;
(b) The negative economic impact on the target State (economic
effectiveness);
(c) The enforced policy changes in the target State (political
effectiveness).
49. The costs for the sender State and the distribution of such costs form
part of the political process leading to the decision to impose coercive
economic measures. Different domestic interest groups (commercial interest
groups, non-governmental groups pursuing specific political objectives
etc.) try to influence the policy decision-making process. This offers
opportunities for mobilizing opposition to the application of illegitimate
coercive economic measures. It is also necessary to distinguish between
coercive economic measures that are imposed by an executive branch of
government and those measures that require approval by legislative bodies
in the sender State. The negative economic impact on the target State
depends on a variety of factors, such as the magnitude and scope of the
imposed coercive economic measures, the relative size of the target vis-a-
vis the sender State (i.e., the degree of economic autonomy of the target
State), and the availability of alternative economic options for the target
State in terms of access to markets, capital, technology and investments.
The meeting agreed that further analytical work will be required to
operationalize the concept of economic impact assessment. This will have to
include the elaboration of specific indicator systems, as well as the
analysis of the relationship between the magnitude and scope of imposed
measures, specific variables and their negative economic impact.
Differentiation will also be required between short, medium and long-term
impact, depending on the duration of imposed measures. Structural and
sectoral distortions will have to be identified. The degree of compliance
with government-imposed restrictions on the part of transnational
corporations will also be an important factor.
50. The meeting questioned some of the basic assumptions concerning
political impact, such as the assumption that coercive economic measures
have a negative economic impact. The negative economic impact is assumed
to cause tensions that translate directly into political pressure and
enforce changes in objectionable policies. In reality, the mechanism is
much more complex and ambiguous. The meeting stressed that the translation
of a negative economic impact into policy changes depends very much on the
nature of the political regime in the target State.
51. There can be either a unifying effect ("rallying around the flag") or
a strengthening of internal opposition, depending on the concrete
circumstances of individual cases. Another consideration is the effect of
coercive economic measures on vulnerable groups in target States and
whether there are options for specifically targeting coercive economic
measures on the policy makers in target States. These problems require
further case-studies and empirical analysis. The judgement of economic and
political impact involves both qualitative and quantitative assessments.
D. Institutional issues/follow-up
52. The meeting agreed that the problem of coercive economic measures
merits increased attention by multilateral bodies. Within the United
Nations, intergovernmental deliberations should be supported by analytical
and monitoring capacities in the United Nations Secretariat. The
analytical work should be focused on the refinement of applicable norms and
criteria, and on the methodology for impact assessment. The monitoring
function will require effective information-gathering and assessment
methods, as well as effective cooperation and coordination among various
United Nations intergovernmental bodies and units of the United Nations
Secretariat, based on clearly defined mandates.
Notes
1/ Report of the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14-25 June
1993 (A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), chap. III); see, in particular, para. 31.
2/ See The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: The Legal Texts (Geneva, GATT secretariat, 1994), p. 485.
3/ See International Legal Materials, vol. 14, No. 4 (July 1975), p.
1292; see also A/36/597.
4/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 119, No. 1609, p. 3.
ANNEX
List of experts invited to an expert group meeting on
coercive economic measures a/
Professor David CORTRIGHT (United States of America)
Dr. Alberto Franco MEJIA (Costa Rica)
Professor Deepak NAYYAR (India)
Professor Raymo VAYRYNEN (Finland)
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a/ Participants also included representatives of the Department for
Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, the Department of
Political Affairs, the Office of Legal Affairs and the Centre for Human
Rights, of the United Nations Secretariat; and representatives of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.