United Nations

A/50/377


General Assembly

Distr. GENERAL  

22 September 1995

ORIGINAL:
ENGLISH


Fiftieth session
Agenda item 59


                VERIFICATION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, INCLUDING THE ROLE
                OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIELD OF VERIFICATION

Report of the Secretary-General


1.   The General  Assembly, in  its resolution  48/68 of  16 December  1993,
requested the  Secretary-General, as a further follow-up to the study on the
role of  the United  Nations in  the field  of verification and  in view  of
significant developments  in international  relations since  that study,  to
undertake,  with  the  assistance  of  a  group  of  qualified  governmental
experts,  an in-depth study  on verification  in all  its aspects, including
the  role of the United Nations in the field  of verification, and to report
thereon to the Assembly at its fiftieth session.

2.   Pursuant to  that resolution, the  Secretary-General has  the honour to
submit to  the  General  Assembly the  study  on  verification  in  all  its
aspects,  including  the  role  of  the  United  Nations  in  the  field  of
verification (see annex).



















95-26408 (E)   131095/...
*9526408*
  ANNEX

              Study on verification in all its aspects, including the
              role of the United Nations in the field of verification


CONTENTS

  Paragraphs  Page

ABBREVIATIONS ..........................................................7

GLOSSARY ...............................................................9

FOREWORD BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ......................................10

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL ..................................................12

I.  INTRODUCTION ........................................  1 - 816  

II.  EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF VERIFICATION ............  9 - 2118

III.  REVIEW OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE 1990 STUDY GROUP ...  22 - 4920  

  A.  Background ......................................  22 - 2520  

  B.  Data-collection capability ......................  26 - 3421  

  C.  Exchanges between experts and diplomats;
    research activities .............................  35 - 3923  

  D.  Role of the Secretary-General in fact-finding and
    other activities ................................  40 - 4324  

  E.  Use of aircraft for verification purposes .......  44 - 4525  

  F.  Use of satellites ...............................  46 - 4726  

  G.  Towards an international verification system ....  48 - 4926  

IV.  RECENT UNITED NATIONS VERIFICATION EXPERIENCE AND
  OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS ...........  50 - 20127  

  A.  Introduction ....................................   50   27

  B.  Existing arms limitation and disarmament
    agreements and arrangements .....................  51 - 11027

    1.  Nuclear weapons-related agreements and
      arrangements ................................  51 - 8127

CONTENTS (continued)

  Paragraphs  Page

      (a)  Non-proliferation commitments and
        implementation of safeguards ...........  51 - 6427

      (b)  Treaty on the Elimination of
        Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
        Missiles ...............................  65 - 6731

      (c)  The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks .....  68 - 7131

      (d)  Other bilateral agreements and
        arrangements ...........................  72 - 8132

    2.  Chemical weapons-related agreements and

      arrangements ................................  82 - 9035

      (a)  The Chemical Weapons Convention ........  82 - 8535

      (b)  Other agreements and arrangements ......  86 - 9035

    3.  Biological weapons-related agreements and
      arrangements ................................  91 - 10036

      (a)  The Biological Weapons Convention ......  91 - 9836

      (b)  Other agreements and arrangements ......  99 - 10038

    4.  Conventional weapons-related agreements and
      arrangements ................................  101 - 11039

      (a)  The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
        in Europe ..............................  101 - 10739

      (b)  Convention on Certain Conventional
        Weapons (Inhumane Weapons Convention) ..  108 - 11040

  C.  The United Nations and preventive diplomacy .....  111 - 12541

    1.  Introduction ................................      11141

      (a)   Role of  the Secretary-General  in fact-            finding  and
related activities .........  112 - 11941

      (b)  Other relevant United Nations activities  120 - 12543

  D.  Other regional and bilateral agreements and
    developments ....................................  126 - 15645

    1.  Europe ..................................................45    
CONTENTS (continued)

  Paragraphs  Page

      (a)  Organization for Security and
        Cooperation in Europe ..................  126 - 13745

      (b)  The Treaty on Open Skies ...............  138 - 14046

      (c)  Other relevant European experience .....  141 - 14447

    2.  Latin America ...............................  145 - 14748

    3.  The Korean peninsula ........................      14849

    4.  The Middle East .............................      14949

    5.  South Asia ..................................  150 - 15249

    6.  South-East Asia .............................  153 - 15650

  E.  Verification under United Nations Security
    Council mandate .................................  157 - 20151

    1.  Peace and security operations ...............  157 - 17851

      (a)  Introduction ...........................      15751

      (b)  Verification objectives ................  158 - 17351

      (c)  New verification technologies ..........  174 - 17655

      (d)  The United Nations Situation Centre ....      17755

      (e)  Summary of experience ..................      17855

    2.  Sanctions ...................................  179 - 18656

    3.  The United Nations Special Commission and the
      International Atomic Energy Agency in Iraq ..  187 - 20158

V.  LESSONS FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE AND IDEAS FOR
  GUIDELINES AND PRINCIPLES FOR THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE
  UNITED NATIONS IN VERIFICATION ......................  202 - 26560

  A.  Lessons from recent experience ..................  202 - 23460

    1.  Concept .....................................  204 - 21661

    2.  Management ..................................  217 - 23463

CONTENTS (continued)

  Paragraphs  Page

  B.  Ideas for guidelines and principles .............  235 - 26566

    1.  Concept .....................................  242 - 24767

    2.  Management ..................................  248 - 26568

VI.  FUTURE ACTIVITIES BY THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIELD
  OF VERIFICATION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS ..................  266 - 31470

  A.  Introduction ....................................      26670

  B.  Verification in the context of arms limitation
    and disarmament agreements ......................  267 - 26970

  C.  Verification and confidence-building ............  270 - 27270

  D.  Verification and conflict management ............  273 - 28171

    1.  Preventive diplomacy ........................      27472

    2.  Peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building  275 - 28072

    3.  Disarmament measures within the framework of
      peace enforcement ...........................      28173

  E.  Linkages and synergies ..........................  282 - 31074

    1.  Cooperative monitoring ......................  285 - 31074

      (a)  Information gathering ..................  287 - 29675

      (b)  Cooperative verification technologies ..  297 - 30677

      (c)  Imagery analysis centre ................  307 - 30879

      (d)  United Nations studies on cooperative
        monitoring .............................  309 - 31079

  F.  Future activities by the Conference on
    Disarmament .....................................  311 - 31480

VII.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS .........  315 - 32881

  A.  Introduction ....................................  315 - 31681

  B.  Facilitation/coordination .......................  317 - 32081

CONTENTS (continued)

  Paragraphs  Page

    1.  Exchange of verification knowledge and
      expertise ...................................  317 - 31881

    2.  Encouragement of cooperative monitoring and
      verification experiments ....................  319 - 32082

  C.  Common services .................................  321 - 32583

    1.  Databases ...................................      32283

    2.  A United Nations Information, Training and
      Analysis Centre .............................      32384

    3.  Expansion of existing agreed verification
      principles and guidelines ...................  324 - 32585

  D.  Role of the United Nations in neutral third-party
    verification ....................................  326 - 32785

  E.  Concluding observations .........................      32887

Annexes

I.  Current applied verification experience .........................105

II.  Selected examples of cooperative verification technologies ......114

III.  List of written submissions and presentations ...................116

/...  A/50/377
  English
  Page

A/50/377
English
Page

ABBREVIATIONS


Acronyms and abbreviations used in the text
 
ABACCArgentinian-Brazilian  Agency for  Accounting  and Control  of  Nuclear
Materials

ACRSArms Control and Regional Security Working Group

ASEAN  Association of South-East Asian Nations

BDA  Bilateral Destruction and Non-production Agreement

CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States

CPC  Conflict Prevention Centre (OSCE)

CSCE  Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*

CTR  Cooperative Threat Reduction

EU  European Union

ECCAS  Economic Community of Central African States

IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM  Inter-continental ballistic missile

ISTC  International Science and Technology Centre

MFO  Multinational Forces and Observers

MIRV  Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle

NACC  North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NTM  National technical means

OAS  Organization of American States

OPCW  Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

_______________________

     *    As of  1 January 1995, known as  the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
PTS  Provisional Technical Secretariat (OPCW)

SITCEN  United Nations Situation Centre

UNIDIR  United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

UNSCOM  United Nations Special Commission

VEREXAd Hoc Group of Governmental Experts  to Identify and Examine Potential
Verification   Measures   from  a   Scientific   and   Technical  Standpoint
(Biological Weapons Convention)

VICS  Verification Implementation and Coordination Staff (NATO)

WEU  Western European Union
GLOSSARY

Full name of agreements mentioned in the text


Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty


Biological Weapons Convention



CF Treaty

Chemical Weapons Convention


Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Inhumane Weapons Convention)

ENMOD Convention


INF Treaty




Non-Proliferation Treaty

Partial Test Ban Treaty


Sea-Bed Treaty




START I



START II



Treaty of Rarotonga

Treaty of Tlatelolco
Treaty  between  the  United  States  of America  and  the  Union of  Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Convention  on   the  Prohibition   of  the   Development,  Production   and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological  (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on  Their
Destruction

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

Convention on  the Prohibition of  the Development, Production,  Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

Convention  on  Prohibitions  or   Restrictions  on  the   Use  of   Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to  be Excessively Injurious or  to
Have Indiscriminate Effects

Convention  on  the  Prohibition of  Military or  Any  Other Hostile  Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques

Treaty  between  the  United States  of  America  and  the  Union  of Soviet
Socialist  Republics on  the  Elimination of  Their  Intermediate-Range  and
ShorterRange Missiles

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Treaty  Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests  in the Atmosphere, in  Outer Space and
under Water

Treaty on the Prohibition  of the Emplacement  of Nuclear Weapons and  Other
Weapons of  Mass Destruction  on the  Sea-Bed and  the Ocean  Floor and  the
Subsoil Thereof

Treaty  between  the  United States  of  America  and the  Union  of  Soviet
Socialist Republics on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

Treaty between the  United States of America  and the Russian  Federation on
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty

Treaty for  the Prohibition  of Nuclear  Weapons in  Latin American and  the
Caribbean

/...  A/50/377
  English
  Page

A/50/377
English
Page

FOREWORD BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL


  Verification  provisions have  been  a necessary  element  of  substantive
agreements  from time immemorial, and  one of the most difficult elements to
negotiate.  This  requirement for verification was reflected in the first of
the 16 principles of verification  adopted by the General  Assembly in 1988,
which   reads  as  follows,  "Adequate  and  effective  verification  is  an
essential  element of  all arms  limitation and  disarmament agreements". 1/
In that  light I  very much welcome  this report of  the Group of  Qualified
Governmental Experts on  their recently completed, and unanimously  approved
study, "Verification in all  its aspects, including  the role of the  United
Nations in the field of verification".

  The   present  study  properly   builds  on   and  further   develops  the
recommendations of the 1990 study on  "The role of the United Nations in the
field  of  verification".    The  report on  that  study  was welcomed,  and
commended  to  Member   States,  when  the   General  Assembly  adopted,  by
consensus,  its resolution  45/65 of  4 December  1990.   However,  the 1990
study had  been conceived  in 1988  when the effects  of the  cold war  were
still  very  much  in  evidence.     Since  then,  conditions  have  changed
dramatically, and  the United Nations has  been entrusted with a wider range
of activities in the  fields of disarmament, confidencebuilding and conflict
management, all activities  where verification can  play a  key role.   This
situational  change is not only of a political  nature; new technologies are
contributing to more effective means of verification as well.

  Recognizing  these changed  circumstances, the  General Assembly,  by  its
resolution  48/68 of 16 December  1993, invited me  to undertake, again with
the  assistance of a  group of  qualified governmental  experts, an in-depth
study to review the  conclusions of the 1990  study, to examine  the lessons
of  recent  United  Nations  verification  experience  and  other   relevant
international  developments  and  to  explore  the  further  development  of
guidelines  and principles  for the  involvement  of  the United  Nations in
verification.    The  Group  adopted  a  definition  of  verification  which
broadened the "agreement-specific"  approach from the  1990 study to include
any commitment undertaken by a party or parties  which they would then  seek
to have verified.   This, in  fact, is  very much in  line with my  flexible
approach to  respond to the requirements  of Member States  in the field  of
international peace and security.

  The major  recommendations of the report, aside from those  related to the
further   development  of  guidelines  and   principles,  include  specific,
practical steps  that might  be undertaken by  the United Nations,  often in
concert  with Member States,  and where  appropriately authorized  to do so.
The recommendations on possible roles for  the United Nations are  organized
in three broad categories:

  -Facilitating  and   coordinating  roles   between  existing  verification
procedures and implementing bodies;

  -Common  services roles,  including  provision of  databases,  information
collection and analysis, and training;

   -Operational roles  where neutral, third-party  assistance might help  in

the implementation of global, regional, subregional and local agreements.

  I  fully agree with the concluding observation in  the report that "modest
steps,  within the budgetary and political constraints  currently facing the
Organization, to enhance its verification role  will have a positive  impact
on  efforts  by  the  international  community  to  successfully   implement
disarmament  treaties, to  develop  effective early-warning  mechanisms  for
impending  conflicts and to  respond with  appropriate strategies  to manage
and resolve  conflicts that have occurred".  This broadening  of the concept
of verification to include provision for  both conflict prevention and post-
conflict   peace-building,  while  preserving  its  application  to  treaty-
specific situations,  reflects what  I  believe to  be the  views of  Member
States as we stand on the threshold of the twenty-first century.

  I  wish to  express my  sincere appreciation  to the  Chairperson and  the
members of  the Group  of Experts  for their  work in preparing  the present
report. I commend it  to the General Assembly and urge that it be given full
consideration.


Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI
Secretary-General 
United Nations  


Notes

  1/   See  Official Records  of  the  General Assembly,  Fifteenth  Special
Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3), para. 60).

/...  A/50/377
  English
  Page

A/50/377
English
Page

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL


28 July 1995

Sir,

  I  have  the  honour  to  submit  herewith  the  report of  the  Group  of
Governmental Experts on Verification in All  its Aspects, including the Role
of the United Nations in the Field of  Verification, which was appointed  by
you in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 48/68 of 16 December 1993.

  The Governmental Experts appointed by you were the following:

Ms. Perla Carvalho (first, second and fourth sessions)
Minister
Permanent Mission of Mexico
  to International Organizations
  and the Conference on Disarmament
Geneva

Ms. Suchitra Durai (first session)
Under-Secretary
Disarmament and International
  Security Affairs Division
Ministry of External Affairs
New Delhi, India

Mr. Ferenc Gajda
Senior Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Hungary
  to the United Nations
New York

Brigadier-General (Ret.) Henny J. van der Graaf
Eindhoven University of Technology
Faculty of Technical Physics
Centre for Arms Control and Verification Technology
Eindhoven, The Netherlands

Mr. Alaa Issa (fourth session)
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations
New York




His Excellency
Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General of the United Nations
New York
Mrs. Flora I. Karugu (first and second sessions)
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of Kenya
  to the United Nations
New York

Dr. Tor A. Larsson
Director of Research
National Defence Research Institute (FOA)
Stockholm, Sweden

H.E. Ms. Peggy Mason
Ambassador
External Fellow, York University
Centre for International and Strategic
  Studies (YCISS)
Toronto, Ontario, Canada

Major-General Ekundayo B. Opaleye (first and second sessions)
Chief of Defence Research, Development and Planning
Ministry of Defence
Lagos, Nigeria

Mr. Philip R. O. Owade (third and fourth sessions)
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Kenya
  to the United Nations
New York

Colonel PARK Tong-Hyong (third and fourth sessions)
Chief of the Arms Control Verification Division
Arms Control Office
Ministry of National Defence
Seoul, Republic of Korea

Mr. Hector Raul Pelaez
Counsellor
Department of International Security,
  Nuclear and Spatial Matters
Ministry of Foreign Relations
Buenos Aires, Argentina

H.E. Mr. D. E. Nihal Rodrigo
Deputy Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka
  to the United Nations
New York

Mr. Sameh Shoukry (first, second and third sessions)
Minister Plenipotentiary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Cairo, Egypt

 Major-General T. M. Shelpidi (third and fourth sessions)
Office of the Chief of Defence Research,
  Development and Planning
Ministry of Defence
Lagos, Nigeria

Mr. Rakesh Sood (second, third and fourth sessions)
Director
Disarmament and International
  Security Affairs Division
Ministry of External Affairs
New Delhi, India

Commander SON Chang-keun (first and second sessions)
Division of Verification
Arms Control Office
Ministry of National Defence
Seoul, Republic of Korea

Dr. Thomas Stelzer
Minister Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Austria
  to the United Nations
New York

H.E. Mr. Adolfo R. Taylhardat
Ambassador
Caracas, Venezuela

Mr. WU Chengjiang
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of the People's Republic
  of China to the United Nations
New York

Mr. Dmitri G. Youdin
First Deputy Director
Department of International Organizations
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Moscow, Russian Federation

  The  present report  was prepared  between  February  1994 and  July 1995,
during  which period the Group held  four sessions in  New York:  the first,
from  22 to 25 February 1994; the second, from 11 July  to 22 July 1994; the
third, from  30 January to  10 February 1995; and the fourth,  from 17 to 28
July 1995.  In carrying out its work,  the Group had before it  publications
and  papers  on  various  issues  of  relevance  to  the  report  that  were
circulated  by members  of  the  Group.   In addition,  the Group  wishes to
express  its  appreciation  for   numerous  contributions,  including   oral
presentations,   which   it   received   from   different   United   Nations
institutions,  as well  as  from  organizations outside  the United  Nations
framework.   A complete list is  attached to the present  study.  The  Group
also wishes  to express  its gratitude  to the  International Atomic  Energy
Agency (IAEA),  particularly  to Mr.  Berhan  Andemicael,  who acted  as  an
expert observer to the Group.

  The members of the  Group of Experts  wish to express their gratitude  for
the assistance that  they received from  members of  the Secretariat of  the
United  Nations.  They  wish in  particular to  thank Mr.  Prvoslav Davinic,
Director, Centre  for Disarmament Affairs, Ms.  Olga Sukovic,  who served as
Secretary  of the Group, Mr.  Douglas Fraser, who served as Deputy Secretary
of the  Group, and  Ms.  Eiko Ikegaya  and  Ms.  Sarah Meek,  who  conducted
research  and  assisted  in  drafting.    The  Group  expresses  its special
gratitude to Dr.  Patricia McFate,  who served  in her  private capacity  as
consultant to the Secretariat.

  I  have  been  requested by  the  Group of  Governmental  Experts, as  its
Chairperson,  to  submit  to  you,  on  its behalf,  this  report  which was
unanimously approved.


(Signed)  Peggy MASON               
Chairperson of the            
Group of Governmental Experts      
on Verification in All Its       
Aspects, including the Role of the   
United Nations in the Field of Verification

/...  A/50/377
  English
  Page

A/50/377
English
Page

I.  INTRODUCTION


1.   The General  Assembly, in its  resolution 43/81 B  of 7 December  1988,
reiterated its view that disarmament and  arms limitation agreements  should
provide for  the participation  of parties  directly or  through the  United
Nations organs in the verification process and stated that it was  conscious
of the  fact that the United  Nations was already  playing a  useful role in
the  field of verification.  The Assembly endorsed a set of 16 principles of
verification developed by the  United Nations Disarmament  Commission.   The
16 principles  resulted partly  from the  three relevant  paragraphs of  the
Final Document of  the Tenth Special  Session of the  General Assembly,  the
first special  session devoted to  disarmament, which were  used as a  basis
for the work of the Commission. 1/ In the same resolution the Assembly  also
recognized  that  the United  Nations,  in  accordance  with  its roles  and
responsibilities  under the  Charter of  the  United  Nations, could  make a
significant  contribution in  the  field of  verification, in  particular of
multilateral agreements.   It requested the Secretary-General to  undertake,
with  the assistance  of a group  of qualified governmental  experts, an in-
depth study of the  role of the United Nations  in the field of verification
that  would:   (a) identify  and  review existing  activities of  the United
Nations  in the field  of verification  of arms  limitation and disarmament;
(b)  assess the  need for  improvements in  existing activities  as  well as
explore and  identify possible  additional activities,  taking into  account
organizational, technical,  operational,  legal and  financial aspects;  and
(c)  provide  specific  recommendations  for  future  action by  the  United
Nations  in that context.   The  Secretary-General was  further requested to
submit a comprehensive report  on the subject to the General Assembly at its
forty-fifth session.

2.  In accordance  with its mandate, on  13 July 1990 the  Group of  Experts
submitted its report to the  Secretary-General, who in turn  submitted it to
the General  Assembly on  28 August.  2/   The 1990  study suggested,  inter
alia, that an enhanced United Nations  capability to assist in verification,
with the consent of  all States parties to disarmament agreements, could  be
a significant contribution to international  security and cooperation and to

that end  made  three specific  recommendations  for  action by  the  United
Nations:  (a) the development by  the Department for Disarmament  Affairs of
a consolidated data bank on all aspects of  verification and compliance from
the  provision  of published  materials  and  data by  Member  States  on  a
voluntary  basis;  (b)  the  promotion  of  exchanges  between  experts  and
diplomats; and  (c) the possible strengthening  and broadening  of the scope
of the role of the Secretary-General in fact-finding and other activities.

3.    The  1990  study  also  considered  the  issue   of  an  international
verification system.  It concluded that the development of a United  Nations
verification  organization should  be  seen as  an evolutionary  process and
would  depend  in  large  measure  on   further  changes  in  the  political
environment and  on the  verification requirements  emerging from  continued
advances in  arms limitation and disarmament  agreements.   In the meantime,
the  United  Nations would  need  to  address  the  multilateral aspects  of
verification  with  increasing  attention,  in  the  light  of  the  growing
importance of multilateral negotiations.

 4.   At  its forty-fifth  session, in  1990,  the General  Assembly adopted
resolution 45/65  of  4  December in  which  it  welcomed  the  1990  study,
commended  it to  the attention  of  Member States  and requested  that  the
Secretary-General   take   appropriate   action   on   the  Expert   Group's
recommendations with appropriate assistance from Member States.

5.   By  way of  follow-up to  the  1990  study and  in view  of significant
developments  in  international relations  since  its  completion,  a  draft
resolution  was introduced  at  the  forty-seventh session  of  the  General
Assembly  seeking the  views of  Member States  on:  (a)  additional actions
that might  be  taken to  implement  the  recommendations contained  in  the
study;  (b)  how  the  verification   of  arms  limitation  and  disarmament
agreements  could  facilitate United  Nations  activities  with  respect  to
preventive diplomacy,  peacemaking, peace-keeping  and post-conflict  peace-
building; and  (c) additional  actions that might  be taken with  respect to
the role  of the  United  Nations in  the field  of verification,  including
further  studies by  the  United Nations  on the  subject.   The  draft  was
adopted by the Assembly as resolution 47/45 on 9 December 1992.

6.  At its forty-eighth session, the General Assembly  had before it a draft
resolution entitled "Verification in all its  aspects, including the role of
the  United Nations  in the  field  of verification",  which was  adopted as
resolution 48/68 on 16 December 1993. 3/

7.  In  the resolution the General  Assembly noted that recent  developments
in  international  relations  continued  to  underscore  the  importance  of
effective  verification  of  existing and  future  agreements  to  limit  or
eliminate arms and that some of  those developments had significant  effects
on  the role  of the  United Nations  in the  field of  verification,  which
required careful  and ongoing examination.   Recalling  its resolution 47/45
and  taking note of the  report of the Secretary-General (A/48/227 and Add.1
and 2 containing the  views of Member States on follow-up to the 1990 study,
the Assembly requested the SecretaryGeneral, as  a further follow-up to  the
study,  to  undertake,  with  the  assistance   of  a  group  of   qualified
governmental experts, an in-depth study that  would: (a) examine the lessons
from  recent United  Nations  verification  experiences, as  well  as  other
relevant international  developments, for  future activities  by the  United
Nations and by the  Conference on Disarmament  in the field of  verification
in all its aspects, taking into  consideration its specific experience,  and
with  particular attention to the ways verification  could facilitate United
Nations  activities  with  respect   to  confidence-building  and   conflict
management  and  disarmament;   (b)  explore  the  further  development   of
guidelines  and principles  for the  involvement  of  the United  Nations in
verification;  and (c) review the  conclusions of the  1990 study group with
particular attention  to the ways that  the United  Nations might facilitate
verification   through  relevant   procedures,  processes   and  bodies  for
acquiring,  integrating  and  analysing  verification  information  from   a
variety of sources.  The Secretary-General  was further requested to  submit

a report on the subject to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session.

8.   The  present report  has been  prepared  pursuant  to General  Assembly
resolution 48/68.


 II.  EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF VERIFICATION

9.   Since 1990, the international security environment has  undergone - and
continues to experience  - a series of  profound changes, including the  end
of the cold  war.  No longer stymied  by ideological divisions between  East
and West, the new international environment  provides the opportunity for  a
more dynamic multilateralism at both the global and regional levels.

10.   At the same time,  this period of rapid  transition has  seen a marked
augmentation in regional conflicts, especially conflicts within States,  and
increased  recourse  to  the  United  Nations  for  assistance.    There are
currently 16 United Nations peace-keeping operations  under way, 11 of which
were begun after 1990.   Not only  has the number of peace-keeping  missions
increased dramatically, but in relation to  such tasks as humanitarian  aid,
election  and  human rights  monitoring  and  the repatriation  of refugees,
their scope and complexity have broadened considerably.

11.  During this period international  awareness has reinforced the  need to
prevent proliferation,  in all its aspects,  of weapons  of mass destruction
and  their  delivery  systems  and  to  avoid  excessive  and  destabilizing
accumulations and transfers of conventional arms, including light weapons.

12.   The  number  and  scope  of  major multilateral  arms  limitation  and
confidencebuilding  agreements  which have  been  completed  in  the  period
between 1990 and 1995,  together with other  relevant compliance  monitoring
activities, have provided an unprecedented level of practical experience  in
the  implementation   of  verification  provisions   which,  in  turn,   has
influenced  how the  concept  as  well as  the process  of  verification are
understood in today's  world.  In  particular, verification  is now seen  to
apply in a broader range of contexts than was hitherto the case.

13.    In the  1990  study,  verification  is defined  as  a  process  which
establishes whether the States parties  are complying with their obligations
under an agreement (A/45/372, para.  12).  The process includes:  collection
of  information   relevant  to   obligations  under   arms  limitation   and
disarmament  agreements;  analysis  of  the  information;  and  reaching   a
judgement as to whether  the specific terms  of an agreement are being  met.
The context  in  which verification  takes place  is that  of the  sovereign
right of States to conclude arms  limitation and disarmament agreements  and
their  obligation to  implement such agreements.   Verification is conducted
by the  parties to  an agreement, or  by an organization  at their  request.
Although the mandate of the 1990 study  did not extend to an  examination of
verification per  se in contexts such  as the  implementation of confidence-
building measures  or monitoring activities in  relation to a  peace-keeping
operation,  it did  however  permit consideration  of  approaches,  methods,
procedures and  techniques relating  to other  arrangements in  the area  of
international peace and  security which might  be useful to  the process  of
verification  of arms  limitation and  disarmament  agreements.   Among  the
related  activities  identified  by  the  study  were  agreed   verification
procedures  in the context  of crisis  prevention and resolution  as well as
verification  provisions for  disengagement  agreements in  the  context  of
United Nations or other multilateral efforts.

 14.    In  1993,  the  broader  context  in  which  verification  currently
operated, as  well  as the  increasing  importance  of compliance,  was  the
subject of  General Assembly resolution 48/63  of 16  December 1993, adopted
by consensus,  in which the Assembly  welcomed the  universal recognition of
the  critical importance of  verification of arms limitation and disarmament
agreements  and other obligations.   It  is precisely  this broader context,
encompassing  both  the verification  of  arms  limitation  and  disarmament

agreements  and  other obligations,  which the  Assembly  in its  resolution
48/68 directed  the 1995  Group of  Governmental Experts  to explore  in the
light  of the new political environment and recent  United Nations and other
relevant international experiences.

15.  From  this new perspective, verification  can be generically defined as
a  process in which  data are  collected, collated and analysed  in order to
make an  informed judgement  as to  whether a  party is  complying with  its
obligations. Such obligations may derive from  many sources, among the  most
important of  which are multilateral  treaties and/or agreements  (including
the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  itself), bilateral  treaties  and/or
agreements,  decisions  of  competent  multilateral  organs  (including  the
General Assembly  and the  Security Council)  and/or unilateral  commitments
undertaken by a party or parties which they then seek to have verified.

16.   This  new definition  combines  both  traditional verification  in the
context of arms limitation and disarmament  agreements, which is carried out
by  the States  parties  or  international organizations,  composed  of,  or
requested  by, those parties,  and a  more recent  approach to verification,
which  expands  the  sources  of  obligations  beyond  arms  limitation  and
disarmament, inter alia, in the context  of United Nations activities. There
are differences and similarities, in nature and context.

17.  This new  definition not only embraces new sources of obligations to be
verified but  also  expands its  application  to  the types  of  obligations
beyond  limitations on armaments and military forces per se.  It is now well
accepted that the  verification of confidence-building measures may well  be
beneficial  in  appropriate  circumstances.    Similarly,  the  process   of
monitoring compliance  with measures  under Article  41 of  the Charter  not
involving  the  use of  armed forces,  commonly  known  as sanctions,  is an
increasingly  relevant type of verification activity.   This definition also
takes  account of  the  fact that  the subjects  of  the obligations  to  be
verified may include non-State actors involved in intra-State conflict.

18.    The  primary  aim  of  verification  is  to  increase  the  level  of
transparency  in  relation  to  relevant  activities  to  a  point  where  a
determination  regarding  compliance can  be  reliably  made.    Confidence-
building measures seek  to reduce misperceptions and misunderstandings, as a
first  step towards  replacing suspicion  with  confidence, by  enabling the
parties   to  be  more  transparent  about  their   intentions  in  specific
circumstances.   In  crisis situations  or  in post-conflict  contexts,  the
ability  of  all  parties  to  have  accurate,  timely  information  so that
threatening actions  can be avoided, or  early warning  of impending danger,
may be central to the successful resolution of the dispute in question.

 19.  The methods  by which data are  acquired for verification purposes can
be categorized  as  cooperative  or unilateral.   Cooperative  measures  are
those in which the party being verified, as  part of the agreed methodology,
assists  the  verifier  in order  to  facilitate  the  verification process.
Examples include  data  exchanges,  notifications and  on-site  inspections.
Unilateral methods, such as the  use of national technical means, require no
such assistance by the party being verified.

20.  The environment in which the verification  process is taking place  can
be  characterized  as   cooperative  or  non-cooperative.    A   cooperative
verification  environment may  facilitate  increased transparency  which  in
turn promotes  a harmonious  data-collection process,  and hence  compliance
will be  more easily  confirmed.   Clarification of  anomalous or  ambiguous
events may  be facilitated  by voluntary actions  to demonstrate  compliance
that  goes  beyond  the  strict  terms  of  a  party's  obligations.    Non-
compliance,  if  it  occurs,  may  be  the  result  of  honest  mistakes  or
misdirected  actions,  rather  than  a  deliberate   intention  to  be  non-
compliant.   In  a non-cooperative  verification environment  - for  example
where  the verification  is  taking place  in the  context  of  a cease-fire
agreement  after   a   protracted   period  of   hostilities  -   there   is
understandably less willingness to be transparent.   In addition, there  may

be resort to patterns  of behaviour which hamper collection of data or there
may be  deliberate efforts  to conceal  relevant events  or activities.   In
such contexts anomalies may  be, or may signal,  acts of non-compliance  and
more  extensive, and  intrusive,  investigative measures  may  be  needed to
determine  if a party is  engaged in non-compliant activities.  Whatever the
political  environment   in  which   the  verification   is  taking   place,
ambiguities need to be resolved to the satisfaction of all parties.

21.   Like  confidence-building, the  verification  process  is a  fluid one
which both  influences and is influenced  by the  broader political context.
As a culture  of transparency and  mutually beneficial interactions replaces
one of secrecy and suspicion, the  verification environment may change  from
one where  the inspected  party actively  seeks to  evade inspection  to one
where that party is "passive", seeking  neither to hinder nor to help, to an
atmosphere of  active cooperation between  inspected and inspecting  parties
because both see a shared interest in demonstrating compliance.


III.  REVIEW OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE 1990 STUDY GROUP

A.  Background

22.   In following up the  1990 study on  the role of the  United Nations in
the field of  verification, the new  Experts Group  was mandated to  "review
the conclusions  of the 1990  study group with  particular attention  to the
ways that the United Nations might  facilitate verification through relevant
procedures, processes  and bodies for  acquiring, integrating and  analysing
verification information from a variety of sources". 4/

23.   In its report,  the 1990 Group  of Experts  concluded (A/45/372, chap.
VI)  that a more  peaceful international  system should have, as  one of its
main  pillars, arms  limitation and  disarmament agreements  with  effective
verification measures  in which all States could have confidence.  The Group
noted that the unique  strengths of the  United Nations - its global  scope,
its membership, and its  Charter - made it well suited to undertake  certain
activities with respect to  verification.  In assessing  the need of  United
Nations  involvement in the  verification of arms limitation and disarmament
agreements,  the 1990  study took  as its point  of departure  the universal
recognition that States  had equal rights  to participate in the  process of
international verification  of agreements to which  they were  parties.  The
study  noted  the asymmetries  in capabilities  of  States  in the  field of
verification  and  the need  to  look for  multilateral  ways  and  means of
coordinating resources in order to ensure their most efficient use.

24.  The 1990  Group of Experts offered  its conclusions and recommendations
in six areas:

  (a)  Data-collection capability;

  (b)  Exchange between experts and diplomats;

  (c)  Role of the Secretary-General in fact-finding and other activities;

  (d)  Use of aircraft for verification purposes;

  (e)  Use of satellites;

  (f)  Towards an international verification system.

25.  In this chapter, the recommendations and  conclusions of the 1990 study
will be  briefly summarized and the  current status  of their implementation
reviewed. An  analysis of new developments  and future  possibilities may be
found in chapter VI of the present report.


B.  Data-collection capability

26.  The 1990  Experts Group agreed (ibid.,  paras. 262-266) that the United
Nations could  play a useful role  in making research  and data relating  to
verification available to  wider audiences.   Increasingly,  access to  data
and  its  availability  have  become  essential  building  blocks  for  arms
limitation  and disarmament  agreements and  for confidence-  and  security-
building measures between  States.  The United  Nations could take an active
role in facilitating the  operational international exchange  of these data.
Most of  the data would be provided  voluntarily by States and the data bank
would  be accessible by other  States; it would be  computer-based and would
have facilities for storage and retrieval,  on-line access and the  capacity
to interface  with other relevant data  banks to which Member States provide
access.

27.  In implementing the conclusions and recommendations  of the 1990 study,
the United  Nations Centre  for Disarmament  Affairs has gradually  acquired
the capacity  to store  and retrieve  electronic data.   A  small number  of
States have made  specific contributions to  the database in both  hard copy
and electronic form. 5/  The Centre also  assists in data collection through
its role  in consolidating  returns from  States parties  and Member  States
related  to   a  number  of   confidence-building  measures,  for   example,
information  submitted  on  laboratories  and  other  facilities  by  States
parties to  the Biological  Weapons Convention.  6/  Among  other data,  the
Centre  maintains  lists  of  experts  for   specific  tasks  such  as   the
investigation of  the alleged  use of  chemical and  biological weapons,  as
well as other fact-finding and advisory  missions mandated by the Secretary-
General in response to requests from Member States.

28.  The bulk  of the information  collected to date is bibliographical  and
needs  additional input  from Member  States.    The Centre  for Disarmament
Affairs  is developing  procedures for  inputting  more operational  data to
assist it  in  its day-to-day  work,  including  responses to  requests  for
information  from permanent missions  to the  United Nations.   Advances are
being made  in making data electronically  accessible and usable by staff of
the Centre  and other  parts of  the Secretariat.   Provision  of data  bank
access  for Member States - a  key objective of  the 1990 report - remains a
goal which  the United Nations will  be unable to meet  until it  is able to
address satisfactorily  issues of cost,  systems compatibility and  security
of confidential information  within the  various data management systems  of
the Organization.

29.    Other   data  collected  by  the   United  Nations  in   relation  to
confidencebuilding  include  the  collection  of  information  submitted  by
Member States in response  to General Assembly  resolutions establishing the
standardized  instrument  for   the  international  reporting  of   military
expenditures, and the Register of Conventional Arms. 7/   Data in respect of
both mechanisms is  provided to Member  States in  the form of  consolidated
annual reports of the  Secretary-General and, in the  case of the  Register,
much of it is also stored electronically.

30.   The  1990 study  identified  the  standardized reporting  of  military
budgets to  the United Nations as  potentially useful  in promoting openness
of  information  about  military  spending  and  comparability  of  budgets.
However, Member States continue to hold  differing views on the  appropriate
method of  reporting and the  participation rate is  limited.  In  contrast,
the Register  of  Conventional Arms,  established  on  1 January  1992,  has
attracted  greater  support.   Member  States  are  called  upon to  provide
annually to  the Secretary-General relevant data  on imports  and exports of
arms in seven categories of conventional weapons.   In addition, pending the
expansion  of the  Register, Member  States are  invited to  provide to  the
Secretary-General,  with  their  annual  report  on  exports  and   imports,
available  background   information  regarding   their  military   holdings,
procurement through national production and relevant policies.

31.   The  Register is  intended to  be global  in  nature and  voluntary in
character.  Its aim  is to  promote an  increased level  of transparency  in
armaments in order to enhance confidence,  promote stability, help States to

exercise restraint, ease tensions and strengthen regional and  international
peace  and  security.  While  there  are  no  verification  provisions,  the
reporting  by  Member  States  of  both  exports  and  imports  allows  some
comparisons to be made.

32.   The  Register became  fully operational  in 1993,  with a  total of 92
States submitting data on  international transfers of  conventional arms for
calendar  year  1992.     In  addition,   34  States   submitted  background
information,  including listings  of military  holdings from  22 States  and
data on  procurement through  national production from  14 States.   It  has
been estimated  that more  than 90 per  cent of actual  transfers were  thus
reported. 8/

33.  Pursuant  to General Assembly resolution 48/75  E of 16 December  1993,
the Secretary-General  appointed a  Group of Governmental Experts  to assist
him  in the  preparation  of  a report  on the  continuing operation  of the
Register  and its  further development.   The  Group held three  sessions in
1994  during which it considered  three dimensions:   (a) adjustments to the
definitions  for  the  seven  existing  categories  of  equipment;  (b)  the
addition of  new  categories of  conventional  weapons;  and (c)  the  early
expansion of  the scope of  the Register as  called for  in General Assembly
resolution 46/36 L of 9 December 1991.   The Group could not reach consensus
in respect  of these matters but  concluded that they  should be kept  under
review in future (see A/49/316).

34.   In his 1993 and 1994  annual reports on the work  of the Organization,
the Secretary-General reiterated that the Register was an important  element
in international  efforts to enhance trust  and confidence  among States and
that its value could be increased even further if, in addition to  providing
transparency  in the international  arms trade,  its scope  were expanded to
include  data  on   military  holdings  and  procurement  through   national
production. 10/   He also  strongly urged  Member States to make  use of the
Register,  together  with  other confidence-building  measures, particularly
within regional and subregional frameworks, with  a view to contributing  to
the  United  Nations efforts  in  the  fields  of  preventive diplomacy  and
peacemaking. 11/


C.  Exchanges between experts and diplomats; research activities

35.   The  1990 Group  of Experts  recognized that,  in the  short  term, in
anticipation  of   further  advances   in  the   field  of   treaty-specific
verification  and  new  agreements  increasing  confidence and  transparency
between  States,  the United  Nations  could  play  a  constructive role  in
promoting exchanges  between experts  and diplomats  to help  the latter  to
address negotiating problems and to help  experts focus on needed solutions.
The  exchanges   could  also  promote   international  cooperation  in   the
development of  verification procedures. Accordingly,  the Group recommended
that  the  United  Nations,   through  the  Department   (now  Centre)   for
Disarmament  Affairs,  should   promote  workshops,  seminars  and  training
programmes  on  verification  and compliance,  and that  the  United Nations
Institute for Disarmament  Research should increase its research  activities
on  verification topics.   The  Group  further  recommended that  the United
Nations explore ways to  provide expert advice to States, at their  request,
to  establish  and  implement  verification structures,  thereby  increasing
their effective participation in agreements (A/45/372, paras. 267-270).

36.   Since the  publication of  the 1990 study, the  Centre for Disarmament
Affairs has  organized a  number of seminars  and conferences  at which  the
question of  verification and monitoring in  the context  of disarmament has
been addressed. 12/   A number  of other seminars, symposia  and conferences
have  focused  on  confidence-building  measures  and  transparency.    Such
conferences and  workshops have been regularly  organized by  the Centre for
Disarmament  Affairs, often  in cooperation  with  one  of the  three United
Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament. 13/
  37.    Verification  has been  a regular  feature  of the  UNIDIR research

programme for  several  years.   With  a  particular focus  on  verification
procedures contained in agreements and treaties  currently in force or under
negotiation as well as on relevant  international organizations in the field
of  verification, monographs  have been  prepared, inter  alia,  on national
concepts of  verification, 14/  a systematic classification  of methods  and
practices  of  verification  and  an  analytical  study  of  the  procedures
envisaged by each treaty  and their implementation; 15/ and on the impact of
ongoing  and   foreseeable  technological   developments  for   verification
purposes. 16/

38.    Currently,  UNIDIR is  carrying out  two  projects in  monitoring and
verification, the  first related  to  the role  of high  technology and  the
second  to  that of  international  organizations.    The  project on  high-
technology ground-tospace  tracking will produce  a technical assessment  of
these systems as well as an examination of  their utility in the development
of  a confidence-building regime  for outer space.   The second will examine
prospects   and  proposals  for   the  enhancement   of  the   functions  of
international organizations in the field of  verification and monitoring.  A
project is also to  be implemented to evaluate  the experience of the United
Nations  Special  Commission (UNSCOM)  in  Iraq  and  in  order to  identify
potential benefits for verification processes.

39.  In his 1994 report to the General Assembly (A/49/329), the Director  of
UNIDIR explained the rationale behind a  major study currently under  way on
the utility  and modalities of  disarming warring parties  as an  element in
efforts to resolve intra-State conflict, the  type of conflict recognized as
likely to be the most prevalent  and destabilizing in the near  future.  The
study focuses  on a systematic examination  of the  disarmament dimension of
United  Nations  conflict  management  processes.    Because  parties  to  a
conflict, especially intra-State conflict, have  little or no  confidence in
each other, verification and transparency take  on special importance.   The
role  of  the United  Nations,  as  a  neutral "third  party"  17/  able  to
facilitate  the  twin  objectives  of  disarmament  and  peace-building,  is
central to the UNIDIR study.


                 D.  Role of the Secretary-General in fact-finding
                     and other activities

40.    The 1990  Group  of  Experts  believed  that the  Secretary-General's
factfinding  experience  could  be  helpful  with  respect  to  those   arms
limitation  and   disarmament  agreements   lacking  explicit   verification
provisions.  Building on his current mandate to investigate the alleged  use
of chemical  and bacteriological  methods of  warfare contrary  to the  1925
Geneva Protocol, the Group  agreed that, in  the short term, the  Secretary-
General's fact-finding capabilities could be strengthened by broadening  the
scope of his  mandate or by expanding the  means through which his  existing
mandate was  carried out. However,  the 1990 Group  noted that  care must be
taken  so as not to  hinder his flexibility to conduct fact-finding missions
in  a manner  most  appropriate to  the circumstances.   In  particular, the
Group  agreed that  the Secretary-General's  fact-finding mandate  could  be
extended to cover the Convention on Prohibitions  or Restrictions on the Use
of Certain  Conventional  Weapons Which  May  be  Deemed to  Be  Excessively
Injurious  or   to  Have  Indiscriminate   Effects  (the  Inhumane   Weapons
Convention).
  41.  In addition,  in order to  further strengthen the complementary  role
played  by  bilateral  and  multilateral  disarmament  and  arms  limitation
efforts,   the  1990  Group  recommended  that  States   parties  to  future
multilateral arms limitation and  disarmament agreements consider depositing
those  instruments  with  the  Secretary-General  of  the  United   Nations,
providing the United Nations with periodic reports regarding  implementation
of those  agreements for subsequent dissemination  to all  Member States and
seeking the assistance of the United Nations  in the organization of  review
conferences (A/45/372, paras. 271-272).

42.   Regarding the status of  implementation of  these recommendations, the

Secretary-General  has  been  made  the  sole  depositary  of  the  landmark
Chemical Weapons Convention, 18/ a multilateral  agreement now signed by 157
countries, and  which was opened  for signature on  13 January  1993.  Since
February 1993,  the Provisional  Technical Secretariat  of the  Organization
for  the  Prohibition  of  Chemical  Weapons  (OPCW)  has  been  engaged  in
preparations for the  entry into  force of the  Convention.  The  Convention
will enter  into force after  the deposit  of the sixty-fifth  instrument of
ratification. 19/   The  Executive Secretary  of  the Provisional  Technical
Secretariat  has made annual reports  to the First Committee  of the General
Assembly on its progress.   In his capacity as depositary, and in the  light
of  the concern  of the  international community  as to  the low  number  of
ratifications of  the Convention, 20/  the Secretary-General  has written to
the Governments of the  140 signatory States that  have not yet ratified and
urged  them to  do  so  in this  fiftieth  anniversary year  of  the  United
Nations.  When the Convention enters  into force, close cooperation  between
the United Nations and  OPCW is expected,  particularly in the light of  the
SecretaryGeneral's continuing responsibility in  relation to allegations  of
chemical weapons use by States non-party to the Convention.

43.  Since the 1990 study, considerable steps have been taken to  strengthen
the  Secretary-General's  fact-finding  capability  in  the  field  of   the
maintenance  of international peace  and security.   The  relevance of those
efforts  for   United  Nations  verification   activities  in  relation   to
confidence-building  and conflict  management  is discussed  in  chapter  IV
below.


E.  Use of aircraft for verification purposes

44.  While the 1990 Experts Group did  not make any specific  recommendation
with regard to the use of aircraft for verification  purposes, it recognized
its potential utility for both verification  purposes and for the monitoring
of confidence- and security-building measures.   The Group noted that, while
the use  of aircraft  by the  United Nations  for such  purposes would  have
significant organizational and financial implications, those costs could  be
reduced  by  donations  from  Member  States   for  United  Nations  use  of
specialized aircraft with appropriate sensors.

45.   Although  the use  of aircraft  for  observation  missions has  a long
history, the recent use of aerial  surveillance in United Nations operations
has  demonstrated  the   utility  of  such  methods  for  verification   and
monitoring purposes.   In the case  of UNSCOM,  high-altitude aerial imagery
was obtained from reconnaissance flights of a dedicated U-2 aircraft of  the
United States  of America.   The U-2 is reportedly  the first reconnaissance
system to be placed  under full-time United  Nations control.  In  addition,
helicopter  aerial imagery  was obtained  by UNSCOM using  CH-53 helicopters
provided  by  Germany.    In  the  former  Yugoslavia,  the  United  Nations
Protection  Force  (UNPROFOR),  under  Security Council  authorization,  has
requested a  regional organization, the  North Atlantic Treaty  Organization
(NATO), to carry out aerial surveillance on its behalf (ibid., para. 273).


F.  Use of satellites

46.  Although  no recommendations were made in  this area, the 1990 Group of
Experts recognized (ibid., para.  374) that satellites had played a key role
in verifying arms limitation and  disarmament agreements and  predicted that
they would  continue to  do so in  the future.   The Group  also noted  that
developing a United Nations satellite network for arms control  verification
would have major organizational and financial implications.

47.   In the absence  of an  international satellite monitoring  agency, the
1990 Group  suggested that  Member States  operating observation  satellites
could  undertake  to provide  their services,  including possible  access to
their  imagery.  The use,  since  1990,  in  multilateral  contexts of  both
commercial  and national  technical  means  as  part of  monitoring  efforts

underscores the  relevance of  an enhanced  role for  satellite imagery  for
verification and  monitoring  purposes. 21/    This  issue is  discussed  in
detail in subsequent chapters of the present report.


G.  Towards an international verification system

48.  While  the political  climate at the  time of  the 1990  study was  not
conducive  to  recommendations  concerning  the  development  of  a  "United
Nations  verification  system" and  the  1990  Experts  Group  did not  pass
definitive judgement on the  issue, it did note that such a development  was
dependent  on  further changes  in  the  political  environment  and on  the
verification requirements emerging  from continued advances in arms  control
agreements.   The Group affirmed that  such development must  be seen as  an
"evolutionary  process",  and  identified  several  ways in  which  such  an
"international verification system"  could come into existence including  as
an "umbrella" verification  organization resulting from the coordination  or
merging of two or  more future verification systems.   The Group  of Experts
concluded  that  the development  of a  United  Nations verification  system
should continue  to be  the subject  of consideration  as the  international
political environment changes (ibid., paras. 275-277).

49.  With the current proliferation of multilateral verification  mechanisms
as a result of agreements already  concluded or under discussion,  the issue
of an international  verification system is receiving increasing  attention.
Throughout the  remainder of the  present report, the  role that the  United
Nations  might play,  whether in  facilitating verification  under  discrete
mechanisms or  in moving  a modest  step closer  to an  umbrella system,  is
explored in detail.



 /...  A/50/377
  English
  Page

A/50/377
English
Page

IV.  RECENT UNITED NATIONS VERIFICATION EXPERIENCE AND
     OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS       

A.  Introduction

50.    Because  the  scope  and  nature  of  verification  tasks,  aims  and
technologies, as  well as the contexts  in which  verification operates have
continued to  evolve  and expand,  many  lessons  are emerging  from  recent
ground-breaking  United  Nations  verification  activities  and  from  other
international developments associated  with arms limitation  and disarmament
treaties,   confidence-building   measures   and  conflict   management  and
resolution  activities.  In  the present  chapter that  recent experience is
examined in an effort  to identify lessons, both old and new, of  particular
relevance to the role of the United Nations in verification.


B.  Existing arms limitation and disarmament
    agreements and arrangements 22/        

1.  Nuclear weapons-related agreements and arrangements

(a)  Non-proliferation commitments and implementation of safeguards

  (i)  Introduction

51.   The Treaty on the  Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered

into  force  in  1970,    has  179  States  parties  as  of 1  August  1995.
Verification of compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of  States
parties is through the use of  safeguards administered by the  International
Atomic Energy Agency, an  autonomous agency of the United Nations family  of
organizations,  with a membership of 122 States.  Safeguards are designed to
verify  statements  regarding  the  presence,  amounts and  use  of  nuclear
material or  other  items subject  to  safeguards  as recorded  by  facility
operators  and as reported  by the State  to IAEA. 23/   In  addition to the
Non-Proliferation  Treaty, two  other  multilateral agreements  require  the
acceptance  of IAEA safeguards  by the  States parties:  the  Treaty for the
Prohibition of  Nuclear Weapons in Latin  America (Treaty  of Tlateloco) and
the  South Pacific  Nuclear-Free Zone  Treaty  (Treaty  of Rarotonga).   The
legal obligation  to submit  to Agency  safeguards  is also  found in  other
legal instruments, including bilateral agreements between nuclear  suppliers
and recipients.  The application of safeguards in accordance with all  these
obligations is  conducted on  the  basis of  specific safeguards  agreements
negotiated between  the Agency and the  individual State  in accordance with
the framework for the conclusion  of such agreements between  the Agency and
Member States established by the Agency's  statute and other relevant  legal
instruments. Article III of the statute  authorizes the Agency, inter  alia,
"to  establish and  administer safeguards  designed  to ensure  that special
fissionable  and  other  materials,  services,  equipment,  facilities,  and
information made available ... are not used in such a way as to further  any
military purpose".

52.  IAEA  uses nuclear material accounting  to establish the quantities  of
nuclear material present in a State  and the changes that take place in that
inventory.  Containment and surveillance measures,  for example, the use  of
Agency seals,  cameras and videotape  recorders, are complementary  measures
which take advantage of physical barriers, such  as walls or containers,  to
restrict  or control  access to,  or the  movement of,  nuclear  material or
equipment and to reduce the probability of undetected movement.

53.  Under safeguards agreements pursuant  to the Treaty, Agency  inspectors
conduct ad  hoc and routine inspections  in the course  of which they  carry
out  a  number  of  functions,  including  examination  of  records,  taking
measurements, verification of  the functioning and calibration of  technical
instruments  and  application  of  containment  and  surveillance  measures.
Under these agreements,  the Agency  may also  conduct special  inspections,
inter alia,  if it considers  that information  made available by  the State
"is  not adequate for  the Agency to  fulfil the  responsibilities under the
agreement." 24/   As a  result of  revelations of  a covert  nuclear-weapons
programme by a State party to the Treaty,  in February 1992, the IAEA  Board
of Governors  affirmed the  Agency's right  to  conduct special  inspections
under  its   safeguards  agreements   with  States  parties   to  the   Non-
Proliferation Treaty. 25/

54.   Safeguards-strengthening measures  introduced by  IAEA in  the wake of
the Gulf war include  the early provision of information about the design of
new nuclear  plants and/or modifications to  existing ones; more  systematic
collection  and analysis  of information  available  in  the media  and from
other open-source  literature about nuclear activities  in a  State; and the
voluntary reporting by  States, over and  above the  reporting requirements,
of their imports  and exports of nuclear  material and of certain  equipment
and non-nuclear material used in the nuclear industry.

  (ii)  Safeguards  and verification of  nuclear-weapon dismantlement  -    
South Africa

55.  In  September 1991, IAEA  became engaged  in activities  to verify  the
completeness and to assess the correctness  of South Africa's initial report
on its nuclear material subject to  safeguards, following the conclusion  of
a   comprehensive  Non-Proliferation   Treaty-related  Safeguards  Agreement
between South  Africa and the Agency.   In March  1993, a  new dimension was
added when  the President  of South Africa  announced that  his country  had
previously developed a limited nuclear  deterrent capability which  had been

dismantled and destroyed before  South Africa had acceded to the Treaty.  At
the invitation of the South African  authorities, Agency experts visited the
facilities involved in the abandoned nuclear-weapons programme and  reviewed
the associated historical  data for the purpose  of assessing the status  of
the  programme  and verifying  that all  the  nuclear material  used in  the
programme had been fully accounted for and placed under Agency safeguards.

56.   That  was the  first occasion  on which  a State,  which had  covertly
developed nuclear  weapons and  then dismantled  them, subsequently  invited
IAEA to verify the  fact of the discontinuance  of its weapons programme and
the  dismantlement  of  the  weapons.   With  full  access to  all  relevant
facilities, IAEA was able sufficiently  to resolve initial  discrepancies to
enable it,  at the end  of 1993, to reach a conclusion  giving a "high level
of  assurance"  that  South  Africa's  inventory  of  nuclear  material  and
facilities was  complete, that its former nuclear-weapons programme had been
abandoned and  that nuclear  material involved  in that  programme had  been
placed under safeguards. 26/
    (iii)  Verification  of compliance with  safeguards obligations  -      
Democratic People's Republic of Korea

57.    Following  the  entry  into  force  of  the  comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement between the Agency and the  Democratic People's Republic of  Korea
in April 1992, the Agency began the task of verifying the initial report  of
the  Democratic People's Republic  of Korea  on nuclear  material subject to
safeguards  in  that  country.    The  Agency  concluded  that,  because  of
significant  inconsistencies between information provided  by the Democratic
People's  Republic  of  Korea  and  the  IAEA  secretariat's  findings,  the
secretariat  could  not confirm  the  correctness  and completeness  of  the
report.

58.   Following various efforts to  resolve those  inconsistencies, the IAEA
Director General requested access to additional  information and to sites in
accordance  with  the  special  inspection  provisions  of  the   Safeguards
Agreement of  the Democratic  People's Republic  of Korea  with the  Agency.
That action was  supported by the IAEA Board  of Governors in February  1993
and,  in  May  1993, by  the  United  Nations  Security  Council,  after the
Director General had reported to it on the non-compliance of the  Democratic
People's Republic of Korea with its  Safeguards Agreement, resulting in  the
Agency's inability to verify non-diversion.

59.   Inspection of the seven  declared facilities  was eventually completed
in mid-1994, although  the problem of  verifying the initial  report of  the
Democratic  People's  Republic  of  Korea  was  further  complicated by  its
discharge  of spent  fuel  from the  5-megawatt  experimental  nuclear-power
reactor  without  the  appropriate  safeguards  measures  requested  by  the
Agency. 27/  In carrying out  its verification activities in  the Democratic
People's  Republic  of  Korea,  IAEA  was   able  to  utilize  new  methods,
technologies   and   analytical   techniques,   particularly   environmental
monitoring,  28/ which the Agency employed during  inspections while seeking
to ascertain the possibility of undeclared activities.

60.   On 21  October 1994,  the United  States and  the Democratic  People's
Republic  of Korea signed an  "Agreed Framework", consisting of  a number of
actions  for  overall  resolution  of  the   nuclear  issue  on  the  Korean
peninsula.   In  the agreement  the  Democratic  People's Republic  of Korea
committed itself, inter alia, to remaining  a party to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, freezing its  graphite-moderated reactors programme, and allowing  a
gradual  process  leading  ultimately to  full  implementation  of  its IAEA
Safeguards Agreement.   The Agency maintains  that the Safeguards  Agreement
remaining in force should be fully implemented.

  (iv)  Verification of multipartite safeguards arrangements - ABACC

61.  In 1990,  the Presidents of  Argentina and Brazil signed a  Declaration
on Common  Nuclear Policy  at Foz do  Iguacu, Brazil.   In the  Declaration,
they established,  inter alia, a common  system of accounting and control of

nuclear material for the  purpose of verifying that  nuclear material in all
nuclear  activities  of  the  parties  was  used  exclusively  for  peaceful
purposes.  The 1991 Argentina-Brazil  Agreement on the  Exclusively Peaceful
Uses  of Nuclear  Energy established  the Argentinian-Brazilian  Agency  for
Accounting  and Control  of Nuclear  Materials  (ABACC),  which has  been in
operation  since  July  1992.    Negotiations  with  IAEA  on  a  safeguards
agreement  to cover all  nuclear materials  within the  territories or under
the jurisdiction  or  control of  the  two  countries  was completed  and  a
Safeguards Agreement was signed by the end of 1991.

62.  The  Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, IAEA
and ABACC entered into force on 4 March 1994,  and the implementation of its
provisions  is  under way.   One  of the  obligations of  the parties  is to
promote  a cost-effective  and complementary  application of  safeguards  in
accordance with a  balanced application of three  principles set out in  the
Agreement  and its  additional protocol:   empowerment of ABACC  and IAEA to
reach independent conclusions;  at the same  time, avoidance  of unnecessary
duplication  of safeguards;  and implementation  of safeguards  in a  manner
designed  to be  consistent with  prudent management practices  required for
the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities.

  (v)  The strengthening of safeguards

63.  In 1993 IAEA launched  a major effort towards  strengthening safeguards
in  order  to  enhance  their  ability  to  detect  any  undeclared  nuclear
activities  in  a  State.   In  this  context,  and  building  upon  earlier
safeguards-strengthening measures  endorsed by its  Board of Governors,  the
Agency's Programme 93 + 2, with the support of IAEA member  States, has been
developing and field-testing  further measures to strengthen safeguards.  In
general terms, such  measures can be grouped  into clusters related  to more
access  for  the  Agency,  both  to  information  about  a  State's  nuclear
activities and to sites  in order to verify the additional information  that
the Agency seeks to obtain.  Increased access,  whether to information or to
sites, would flow from  greater nuclear transparency on  the part of States.
The  Agency continues to  advocate the  value of  greater transparency about
all aspects  of  a State's  nuclear programme  and  to  encourage States  to
exhibit such transparency.

64.   At its  meeting in March 1995, the  Agency's Board of Governors, inter
alia, recognized  that States parties  to comprehensive  agreements and  the
Agency   have  an   obligation  to   cooperate  fully   to  facilitate   the
implementation of  the safeguards  provided for in the  relevant agreements.
The Board also  endorsed the general  direction of  Programme 93  + 2 for  a
strengthened  and cost-effective safeguards  system.   It noted  that such a
system  would benefit  from technological  developments and  would call  for
greater  access  to relevant  information  and  greater physical  access  to
relevant  sites for the  Agency, either  on the  basis of  authority already
provided  for in  comprehensive safeguards  agreements  or  on the  basis of
complementary  authority to  be conferred  by the States  involved.   At its
meeting in  June 1995,  the Board  of Governors  took note  of the  Director
General's  plan to  implement, at  an early  date, measures  for which legal
authority already existed.   These  relate to  the clusters  of measures  on
greater   access   to  information,   for  example,   through  environmental
monitoring, and  to sites, for example,  through some no-notice  inspections
at locations where the Agency currently  has access for routine  inspections
and  those measures to  optimize the  use of the  present safeguards system.
Measures  that would require  additional authority  are to  be considered by
the Board of Governors in December 1995.     

 (b)   Treaty  on the  Elimination of  Intermediate-Range and  Shorter-Range
Missiles

65.  The INF  Treaty, which entered into force  in 1988, required the United
States and the then Soviet Union  to eliminate all their  intermediate-range
ground-launched ballistic  and cruise  missiles and  their launchers  within
three years of the Treaty's entry into force.   Those obligations have  been

met.  Verification  of  the  Treaty  continues,  however,  with  a  focus on
ensuring that its provisions are being observed.

66.    From  the   mid-1950s  until  the  conclusion  of  the  INF   Treaty,
verification of bilateral  arms control agreements relied primarily on  NTM.
Building  on  the  provisions of  the Anti-Ballistic  Missile  Treaty, which
required  the  parties  to  facilitate  the   use  of  NTM  by   prohibiting
interference with, and deliberate concealment from,  its use, the INF Treaty
incorporates  a range  of  cooperative and  mutually  reinforcing  measures.
These include  extensive data  exchanges concerning  numbers, locations  and
technical characteristics of treaty-limited items; inspections at INF  sites
to confirm  the  data  exchanged  and to  help  monitor elimination  of  the
weapons; short-notice  on-site inspections at  INF-related sites during  the
3-year reduction period and the next  10 years; permanent on-site inspectors
at  a key  missile production  facility in  each country;  a prohibition  on
interference with verification by  NTM; and cooperative measures for opening
missile shelters.  "Mock" inspections (unilateral trial inspections)  played
an important role in the  implementation of the Treaty in a wide variety  of
areas,  including the testing  of plans, concepts, procedures and equipment,
and  the training  of inspection  and escort  personnel.   In  addition, the
Parties to the INF Treaty established  a Special Verification Commission  to
resolve,  inter alia, questions relating to compliance  with the obligations
assumed (article XIII of the INF Treaty).

67.   Many  decisions  on  the verification  regime  were made  late in  the
process and there was a shortened planning period for implementation of  the
regime.     Certain  provisions   required  completion   of  several   basic
obligations  within  a short  period after  entry into  force, necessitating
some initial  ad hoc arrangements.  The initial  INF data submitted  by both
sides  required  further review  in  order  to  ensure  that  they had  been
properly  derived  from   operational  systems  and  that  specific   agreed
measurement scales  had been  used.   INF missile  elimination planning  and
scheduling  also  required  post-negotiation  consideration  of  significant
factors outside  the disarmament  process per  se, including  federal, State
and  local environmental  standards -  factors not  sufficiently  considered
during the negotiating process.

(c)  The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

68.   The START treaties  - START  I, signed by  the United  States and  the
Soviet  Union  on  31  July 1991,  and  START  II,  signed  by  the  Russian
Federation and the  United States on  3 January 1993  - require  significant
reductions  in  deployed  strategic  offensive  arms,  create  a regime  for
counting, locating, basing and operating such  arms and regulate the testing
and modernization of those  weapons. On 23 May  1992, the United  States and
Belarus,  Kazakstan, the  Russian Federation  and Ukraine signed  the Lisbon
Protocol,  29/  on  the  basis  of  which  Belarus,  Kazakstan,  the Russian
Federation  and Ukraine, which  had strategic  offensive arms  of the former
Soviet  Union stationed on  their territories, became parties  to START I as
successors to the former  USSR.  On 5 December 1994, those countries and the
United States  exchanged instruments of  ratification at Budapest,  bringing
the Treaty into force.  START I  implementation activities began even before
entry into  force  (for  example, exchanges  of  data  on  flight  tests  of
missiles).    Baseline   inspections  of  the  parties'  strategic   nuclear
facilities began in March 1995.

69.  START II, based on a Joint Understanding between the Presidents of  the
Russian Federation  and  the United  States,  reduces  the total  number  of
strategic  nuclear weapons deployed  by both  countries by  two thirds below
pre-START  I levels and  provides for the elimination  of all ICBMs carrying
multiple  independently   targetable  re-entry   vehicles  (MIRVed   ICBMs).
Because  of the close relationship  between the two  treaties, it was agreed
that START  II should  not  enter into  force before  START I.   The  United
States Senate Foreign Relations Committee resumed  its hearings for START II
ratification  on  31 January  1995.  The  Foreign  Affairs  and the  Defence
Committees of  the Russian State Duma  presently have  START II ratification

as an item on their agendas.

70.   The START  treaties pose  verification challenges  which exceed  those
encountered  in the INF  verification experience.   The  INF Treaty required
the  permanent elimination  of treaty-limited  items -  a requirement  which
simplified  compliance  monitoring  - while  the START  agreements  call for
reductions and subsequent limitations  of treaty-limited items.  In addition
to  verifying  specific numbers  of  treaty-limited  items,  the  monitoring
process must also be able to  distinguish between deployed and  non-deployed
missiles,  converted  and accountable  bombers, new  and  existing types  of
missiles and the like. 

71.   The START I verification regime, which is based upon and expanded from
the INF regime, is designed to facilitate verification by NTM.  It  provides
for data  exchanges and  notifications on strategic systems  and facilities,
exchanges  of  telemetry  data from  missile  flight  tests, a  ban  on  the
encryption  of  telemetry  data,  12  types   of  on-site  inspections   and
exhibitions and continuous monitoring at ICBM  final assembly plants.   This
regime also applies to  START II.  In  addition, the latter contains certain
unique  verification provisions  which respond  to  the  need to  tailor the
provisions to the differing obligations of the respective parties.

(d)  Other bilateral agreements and arrangements

  (i)  Russian Federation - United States

72.  Since  July 1992, using  an approach  characterized by  the parties  as
"cooperative  denuclearization",  over 30  bilateral  agreements  have  been
signed  between  the  United  States and  the  Russian  Federation, Ukraine,
Belarus and Kazakstan, some of them related to  the Nunn-Lugar Act. 30/  The
current objectives  of the  ongoing Cooperative  Threat Reduction  programme
(CTR) include helping Belarus, Kazakstan and  Ukraine to meet the provisions
of  the  Lisbon  Protocol, assisting  the  Russian  Federation in  strategic
offensive  arms  reduction  to  START  I  goals by  2001  and  enhancing the
security of  all Russian  nuclear weapons.   CTR  programme activities  have
included  support   for  warhead  removal,   ICBM  deactivation,  and   silo
eliminations  in Ukraine  and  Kazakstan; emergency  response  equipment  in
Belarus and Kazakstan;  and installation of security and safety enhancements
to Russian nuclear-weapon transport railcars.

73.    The  recently  initiated Laboratory-to-Laboratory  Nuclear  Materials
Protection,  Control, and  Accounting  Program, provides  opportunities  for
United  States   national  laboratories  and   institutes  in  the   Russian
Federation  to develop model  control systems  at selected  facilities which
will  protect  weapons-usable fissile  material  from  theft  or  diversion.
Similar cooperative  programmes are being  developed in Ukraine,  Kazakstan,
and Belarus.   On 16 March 1994,  the United States Department of Energy and
the  Ministry of  Atomic Energy  of the  Russian Federation  signed a  joint
statement of intent to host reciprocal inspections  of facilities containing
plutonium removed  from nuclear  weapons. Such on-site  inspections will  be
taking place  in  highly sensitive  military  installations  as well  as  in
relation to equally vital commercial proprietary information.

74.   The United  States Nuclear  Regulatory Commission  is cooperating with
Gosatomnadzor of the Russian Federation on  the development of a  safeguards
infrastructure  for  the  latter  country.   The  International  Science and
Technology  Center (ISTC),  funded in  part  under  the Nunn-Lugar  Act, has
supported  over 90 projects  to redirect  the efforts  of defence scientists
and  engineers,  in  the  former  Soviet  Union.    ISTC  has  supported   a
Gosatomnadzor-led project  with the  cooperation of the Russian  Ministry of
Atomic Energy to develop safeguards for  plutonium processing at the Tomsk-7
plant.  More than  5,000 former Soviet defence scientists have been part  of
CTR-supported civilian research projects funded by ISTC.

75.   The  United States  and  the Russian  Federation have  also  exchanged
information concerning  unilateral measures which  each has  taken, and plan

to take, in regard  to reductions in  their nuclear forces and  improvements
in safety, security,  and control practices  related to  those forces.   The
United  States  has  unilaterally  declassified  information  regarding  its
plutonium production and storage.  The two countries have agreed to  conduct
a  joint  exercise on  early warning  of  missile launches  and to  exchange
details of nuclear warhead production since 1945.

76.   At the  May 1995 Moscow  Summit, the Presidents  of the two  countries
declared  that fissile  materials removed  from  United States  and  Russian
Federation nuclear  weapons which were being  eliminated and  were in excess
of national security requirements would not  be used to manufacture  nuclear
weapons; no  newly  produced fissile  materials  would  be used  in  nuclear
weapons;  and fissile  materials  from or  within  civil  nuclear programmes
would not  be used  to manufacture  nuclear weapons.   Additional  bilateral
agreements are  being planned,  including reciprocal  monitoring at  storage
facilities  of  fissile  materials  removed  from  nuclear  weapons to  help
confirm the  irreversibility of  the process  of  reducing those  countries'
nuclear weapons.

77.    The  increased  access  to  nuclear  production  and  nuclear warhead
dismantlement facilities  by the parties  offers considerable  opportunities
for reassurance concerning  the status of nuclear-weapons dismantlement,  as
well  as  the implementation  of  tightened  accountability  procedures  for
nuclear  weapons  and  fissile  materials.   Enhanced  transparency  31/  of
activities  provides  the  two  countries  with  reassurances  about   their
intentions,therebyreinforcingthecommitmentofeachpartytocontinuedcooperation.

  (ii)  Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Republic of Korea;
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea and United States of America

78.   In February  1992, the  Republic of Korea and  the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea  adopted the Agreement on Reconciliation,  Non-aggression,
and Exchanges  and Cooperation  (Basic Agreement) and the  Joint Declaration
of  Denuclearization of the  Korean Peninsula.   Following those Agreements,
the two  Governments began  to take  concrete steps  towards establishing  a
security dialogue.

79.   The Joint  Declaration prohibits  not only  the testing,  manufacture,
acceptance,  possession and  deployment  of  any  nuclear weapons,  but  the
possession of  any nuclear reprocessing  as well  as enrichment  facilities.
In  order  to establish  a  verification  system  for  the Declaration,  the
Republic of  Korea  and the  Democratic  People's  Republic of  Korea  began
negotiating  on  the  inspection  regime  through  a  Joint Nuclear  Control
Committee.  But both sides could not resolve their differences on the  scope
and  extent  of  the  inspection.    Thus  their  efforts  to  establish  an
inspection regime have been deadlocked since December 1992.

80.   The Basic  Agreement  is important  in  a  military sense  because  it
contains non-aggression clauses.  Specifically, both  sides agreed to set up
a  Joint  Military  Commission  and  to  discuss  steps  to  build  military
confidence and  to achieve arms reduction, including the mutual notification
of major movements of military units,  and military exercises, the  peaceful
utilization  of  the   demilitarized  zone  (DMZ),  exchanges  of   military
personnel and  information, and  phased reductions in  armaments.   Although
the  Republic  of  Korea  and  the  Democratic  People's  Republic  of Korea
established  the  Joint  Military  Commission in  May  1992  and tentatively
adopted  an auxiliary  agreement for  the  detailed formula  for South-North
non-aggression,  further  progress  has  not  been  achieved  owing  to  the
aggravated political environment.

81.  In  addition to commitments relevant to its IAEA safeguards obligations
discussed above, the Agreed Framework between  the United States of  America
and  the  Democratic People's  Republic of  Korea  consists  of a  number of
actions directed towards the overall resolution of the nuclear  issue on the
Korean  peninsula.   Mutual  commitments  have  been  made  to cooperate  in
replacing  the graphite-moderated  reactors and  related facilities  of  the

Democratic  People's  Republic  of  Korea  with  light-water  reactor  power
plants;  to  move  towards  full  normalization  of political  and  economic
relations; to work together for peace and security  on a nuclear-free Korean
peninsula;  and to  work together  to strengthen  the  international nuclear
non-proliferation regime.  Details on a number of these issues remain to  be
worked out and negotiations between the parties are continuing.

 2.  Chemical weapons-related agreements and arrangements

(a)  The Chemical Weapons Convention

82.   As of   21 July  1995, 32 States  had deposited  their instruments  of
ratification  with  the  Secretary-General of  the  United  Nations.   Since
February  1993, the  Provisional  Technical  Secretariat of  OPCW  has  been
engaged in preparations for the entry into force of the Convention. 32/

83.     The  Chemical   Weapons  Convention   creates  a   new  multilateral
verification body, the OPCW.  The  Treaty specifies an extensive,  intrusive
and  far-reaching  verification  system  including  reporting  requirements,
baseline  inspections,  regular  on-site  inspections of  declared  chemical
sites, verification of destruction and  challenge inspections.   It provides
for "managed access"  techniques designed to provide effective  verification
while protecting sensitive  installations or information, including that  of
a proprietary  nature, and  for "facility  agreements" specifying the  terms
and scope of a routine inspection.

84.    Experience thus  far has  underlined  the importance  of a  "start-up
process"  for a  complex verification  regime such  as that of  the Chemical
Weapons Convention in order to permit  sufficient time to operationalize the
verification body, refine  verification methods, properly train  inspectors,
provide for equipment and laboratories, develop health  and safety standards
and design and install a sophisticated  data-management system at the  level
of both the international and the national authorities.

85.   The  Provisional  Technical  Secretariat  has  suggested  that  proper
planning is  heavily  dependent on  its  receipt  of appropriate  data  from
signatory States in advance  of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons
Convention  particularly  with  respect  to defining  the  magnitude  of the
operational verification tasks.

(b)  Other agreements and arrangements

86.  In  September 1989, the  United States  and the  Soviet Union signed  a
Memorandum of Understanding at Jackson Hole,  Wyoming, United States, for  a
"Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to  Prohibition
of  Chemical Weapons"  (known as  the Wyoming Memorandum  of Understanding).
In phase  I of  the agreement, the  parties provided general  data on  their
chemical weapons capabilities and conducted  visits to relevant military and
civilian  facilities between December  1989 and February 1991.   In phase II
the parties  provided detailed data on  their chemical weapons  capabilities
and  permitted  intrusive  on-site inspections  to  verify  the accuracy  of
certain of the data declarations; that phase  was initiated in January  1994
and  completed in  December 1994.    Five  intrusive inspections  took place
during phase  II:   Russian  teams  inspected  five United  States  chemical
weapons  facilities  (two  former  production,  two  active  storage  and  a
development and  test  facility);  and United  States teams  inspected  five
Russian chemical weapons  facilities (one production, three active  storage,
and a development and test facility).

87.   Effective implementation  of the  Wyoming Memorandum of  Understanding
was achieved through comprehensive preparatory activity, such as  logistical
and operational  planning, inspector/escort  training and mock  inspections;
the  use of standardized  safety procedures,  including the  use of advanced
personal   protective  equipment   and   consistency  of   application;  the
availability  of the requisite  technical expertise  on site  to explain the
data declarations  and answer technical  questions; the  development of, and

securing  of  agreement  on,  procedures  for  accomplishing  sampling   and
analysis,  and  on the  verification  technologies  to  be  used during  the
analysis;  and  the  resolution  of  issues   during  the  conduct  of   the
inspections   in  information   exchange  sessions.     Phase   II   of  the
implementation  was  particularly challenging,  involving  a  complex regime
with  hundreds  of  thousands  of  items  associated  with  chemical-weapons
munitions and weapons systems.

88.  Implementation of the Wyoming  Memorandum of Understanding has provided
practical  experience in carrying  out several  types of  inspections and in
confirming, to  a limited extent, the accuracy of the baseline data provided
for the  facilities inspected.  Combined  with clear,  complete and accurate
data declarations and  clear, comprehensive pre-inspection briefings of  the
inspection team, the  procedures used during challenge inspections  produced
acceptable results.

89.  On 1 June 1990,  the Soviet Union  and the United States also signed  a
Bilateral Destruction  and Non-Production  Agreement.   While the  Agreement
has  not  yet entered  into force,  the  Russian  Federation and  the United
States have  worked cooperatively  since early  1992 to  reach agreement  on
implementing it and to facilitate the Russian Federation's  chemical-weapons
destruction programme.

90.   Several  concerns  regarding chemical-weapons  destruction  should  be
noted. The Russian Government  has encountered serious  public opposition to
the  proposed  construction of  chemical-weapons  destruction  facilities in
heavily  populated localities and  to the  transport of  toxic substances by
railroads  running  through  urban-industrial  centres.    This   experience
underlines  the need  to take  into  account  public concerns  regarding the
health  and ecological  consequences of  the operation  of  chemical-weapons
destruction facilities  and the transportation  of chemical toxic  munitions
to the sites of their dismantlement.


3.  Biological weapons-related agreements and arrangements

(a)  The Biological Weapons Convention

91.    As of  March 1995  there were  132 States  parties to  the Biological
Weapons Convention.  For the purpose  of resolving compliance concerns,  the
Convention relies upon consultation and cooperation between States  pursuant
to  article   XII,  national  means   of  verification  and  regular  review
conferences.

92.   As  a result  of agreements  worked out  among the  parties at several
periodic  review conferences,  a  set of  confidence-building  measures  was
adopted.   These  voluntary  measures provide  for agreed  declarations  and
reports  designed  to  improve  the   monitoring  of  compliance   with  the
provisions of the Convention.  The  declarations and reports are  circulated
by  the  Centre  for  Disarmament  Affairs  to the  States  parties  in  the
languages  in  which  they  were  submitted.  33/    Not  all  parties  have
participated in  these confidence-building  measures.   Some States  parties
have  emphasized  that  openness  in  research-and-development   programmes,
personnel and facilities  is an important element of alleviating  compliance
concerns.

93.   There  has been  steadily growing  interest  in  the development  of a
multilateral   verification  or   compliance  monitoring   regime  for   the
Biological Weapons  Convention.   At the  1991 Review  Conference of  States
parties,  an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts was established to examine
"potential"   verification  measures   from  a   scientific   and  technical
standpoint.  In the resulting  VEREX report, 21 measures were identified and
compiled under the broad areas of four  off-site and three on-site measures,
including:  information  monitoring; declarations; remote  sensing; off-site
inspections;   exchange   visits;  on-site   inspections;   and   continuous
monitoring. 34/   The definitions and  other basic concepts developed by the

VEREX Group may well have application in other verification contexts.

94.   The  mutually reinforcing  and  "multiplier"  effects created  by  the
combination of  verification  measures was  a  central  theme of  the  VEREX
report. The Ad Hoc Group concluded  that the potential verification measures
they  had identified  and evaluated  could be  useful to varying  degrees in
enhancing confidence,  through increased transparency,  that States  parties
were fulfilling their  obligations under the Biological Weapons  Convention.
They noted that, while  reliance could not be  placed on any  single measure
to differentiate  conclusively between  prohibited and  permitted activities
and  to  resolve ambiguities  about  compliance,  some  of  the measures  in
combination   could  provide   enhanced  capabilities   towards   that  end.
Different  combinations  of  methods  could  produce  differing  degrees  of
effectiveness.

95.  One theme of the VEREX report was the need to increase transparency  in
the peaceful side  of biological research as  a necessary foundation for the
eventual  development   of  a  strengthened   regime  for  the   Convention.
Cooperative activities  among biological  research centres  could assist  in
developing  an appropriate  climate for  progress on  verification.  Another
useful  mechanism might  be a  global epidemiological  surveillance  system.
There is potential for the additional application  of verification measures,
for  example,  existing  information  collection  undertaken  primarily  for
medical or  civilian research  purposes might be applicable  in verification
and vice versa.   In turn, such  added benefits might make participation  in
the regime more attractive, particularly for developing countries.

96.  The Special  Conference to consider the VEREX report completed its work
on 30  September 1994.  The  States parties agreed  to establish another  ad
hoc   group   "to  consider   appropriate   measures,   including   possible
verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen  the Convention, to
be included,  as appropriate,  in a legally  binding instrument".  35/   The
Special Conference  noted that any new measures should apply to all relevant
facilities and activities, be  reliable, cost-effective,  non-discriminatory
and  as  non-intrusive as  possible.    Measures  are to  be  formulated and
implemented  in   a  manner   designed  to   protect  sensitive   commercial
proprietary  information and legitimate national security needs and to avoid
any negative  impact on scientific  research, international cooperation  and
industrial  development.   The Group  will submit  its report to  the States
parties to  be considered  at the  Fourth Review  Conference or  later at  a
special conference.
  97.   Efficient and  reliable verification  measures involve, inter  alia,
availability   and  expertise   in  using   rapid  detection   methods   for
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons (BTW).   The detection of BTW
agents  could  be  achieved  through  an  analysis  of  their  physical  and
biological  properties.  Immunotechnology and  gene  probe technologies  are
valuable  components of  relevant biological  methods.   However, because of
the particular difficulties which limit  technical means of  verification in
biological activities,  they will likely need  to be  complemented by access
to  personnel  and  documents directly  relating  to  the  activities  being
investigated.    The  International  Centre  for  Genetic  Engineering   and
Biotechnology (ICGEB),  a unique  intergovernmental  centre in  the area  of
biotechnology and genetic  engineering, is engaged in research,  development
and training in these technologies and  aims to strengthen the  capabilities
of  developing  countries  in  the application  of  these  technologies  for
peaceful  purposes.    ICGEB  could have  a  role  to  play  in  support  of
verification  of  the  Biological  Weapons  Convention.    The  World Health
Organization could also contribute in this respect.

98.    The example  of the  Biological  Weapons Convention  suggests that  a
"building block" or  evolutionary process of strengthening verification  may
be possible  if  parties to  an  agreement  lacking verification  provisions
subsequently incorporate  voluntary transparency  measures and,  ultimately,
agreed verification obligations.

(b)  Other agreements and arrangements

  (i)  Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States

99.   In  the  absence of  a  verification  mechanism  under the  Biological
Weapons  Convention, the  Russian  Federation, the  United  Kingdom  and the
United States  have undertaken additional  reciprocal activities to  address
compliance concerns. In September 1992, a  Trilateral Statement of the three
Governments  provided for  measures,  including reciprocal  visits  to  non-
military and military  biological facilities; reciprocal,  confidential data
exchanges  on  biological  activities;  reviews  of  potential  measures  to
monitor  compliance with  the Biological  Weapons Convention and  to enhance
confidence  in that  compliance; and  exchanges of  scientists at biological
facilities  on a long-term  basis.   Since then,  joint United States/United
Kingdom teams  have conducted visits  to non-military biological  facilities
in the Russian Federation, following visits  by Russian Federation teams  to
United Kingdom  and United States  non-military biological facilities.  Also
during the period the parties exchanged  questions and answers on biological
weapons-related issues.

100.   Full and  complete implementation  of the  Trilateral Statement could
serve  as a  means of  gaining confidence  among the  parties  that relevant
international agreements are being implemented.


 4.  Conventional weapons-related agreements and arrangements

(a)  The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

101.   Because the  CFE Treaty  36/ calls  for conversion or  destruction of
many  thousands of  weapons, while  also  permitting  the retention  of many
thousands of  others, verification  presents challenging  requirements.   In
addition  to  limitations  on  five  categories  of  conventional   weapons,
ceilings  on  military  personnel have  been  added  under  the  politically
binding  CFE   1A  Agreement,   although  with   a  limited  provision   for
verification, and with the limits not  becoming mandatory until the  weapons
reductions have been completed. 37/

102.   The  CFE Treaty  requires  the exchange  of detailed  data  regarding
weapon inventories  and personnel  as well  as on-site  inspections of  both
operational  and storage military  sites, that  are far  more extensive than
for  any previous  arms limitation  agreement.    It provides  for challenge
inspections,  although  the  inspected  party  may  delay  or  refuse   such
inspections.     It  also  provides  for  both  national  and  multinational
technical  means  of  verification  and  provision  has  been  made  for the
eventual adoption  of an aerial inspection  regime.  The Treaty provides for
a  forum of the  parties (the  Joint Consultative  Group) where verification
and compliance issues can be discussed.

103.  To date no militarily significant violations  of the Treaty have  been
recorded.   Only  a  few  incidents in  which  mistakes  have been  made  in
carrying  out the  provisions of  the Treaty  have occurred, and  these have
been corrected.

104.  Time pressures during the final phase of negotiations resulted in  the
omission of several desirable provisions, in particular the finalization  of
an  aerial inspection  regime that would have  provided significant benefits
in  relation to  on-site  inspections.   Another troubling  issue associated
with CFE  verification has  been cost.   Several  parties have  been unable,
without being subsidized,  to purchase the necessary verification  equipment
or to  travel to meetings of  the Joint Consultative  Group.  One  practical
response has been to allow all parties access  to NATO's database, known  as
VERITY, which includes  all inspection  reports.  This  has not only  helped
reduce verification costs  but has also  given erstwhile  adversaries access
to  a  common   database  for  the  assessment  of  Treaty   implementation.
Assistance  and training provided  by certain  States parties  to help other
parties in the  development of  their national verification mechanisms  have
also  been  important.    As  concerns  over  cost  increasingly  become  an

impediment  to implementation,  there has  been a corresponding  increase in
the  willingness  to  explore  provision  of  "common  services"  and  other
approaches to reducing costs. 38/

105.   Implementation of  the CFE verification regime  to date offers rather
striking  evidence   of  the   beneficial  effects   of  cooperation   among
participating  countries in  scheduling  inspections and  in  combining  the
results of  monitoring activities.  The  Treaty's provision  for a permanent
system  of on-site  inspections  of  military units  throughout  Europe  has
institutionalized  a  climate  of  military openness  which  has  been  both
influenced by, and a contributing factor  in, the increased transparency  of
political relations in general.

 106.   From the  outset of  the negotiating  phase, trial  inspections were
conducted to  test various proposed  verification procedures.  This provided
essential  training and preparation  and allowed  many potential problems to
be  ironed  out  before  they were  written  into  the  final  text  of  the
agreement.   CFE experts  also credit trial  inspections, working  contacts,
joint training  courses and the deployment  of multinational  teams for both
trial and operational  inspections 39/ with  contributing to the development
of a professional corps of verification experts.  Trial inspections also:

  -Provided  an  indication   of  the  practical  feasibility  of   proposed
verification provisions;

  -Identified potential cost savings;

  -Facilitated  the   development  of  common   standards,  procedures   and
practices that helped  to reduce conflict  during implementation and thereby
helped  to ensure  a standard  interpretation  of the  Treaty's verification
procedures;

  -Sensitized  the  parties  to  distinct  political,  social  and  military
national cultures;

  -Assisted  each  party  in  assessing  its  own  verification  approaches,
requirements and organization.

107.   The requirement  for providing  common services  in a  cost-effective
manner  has led to the ad hoc  development of such services (in  the form of
NATO's  Verification  and  Implementation Coordination  Staff).   Originally
open only  to NATO  countries, these  common services  are now  increasingly
available to other States parties.  This evolution from a strictly  national
approach to  verification for the CFE  Treaty towards a multilateral one has
been driven by significant practical benefits and cost savings.

(b)Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Inhumane Weapons Convention)

108.  As  of 10 August  1995 there  were 51 States  parties to the  Inhumane
Weapons  Convention.   The  Convention,  which deals  with  prohibitions  or
restrictions  on the  use  of non-detectable  fragments,  land-mines,  booby
traps and  other  devices, and  incendiary  weapons,  does not  include  any
verification mechanism.

109.  In  1994, a Group  of Governmental Experts was mandated  by the States
parties  to  prepare  for  a  Review  Conference  of  the  Inhumane  Weapons
Convention. Developing  a verification system  for Protocol  II (land mines)
to the Convention has been  one of the  issues discussed at the meetings  of
the  Experts  Group.  While  no  consensus  has  yet  been  reached, several
proposals have  been tabled,  ranging from  a system involving  fact-finding
missions  to  reliance  upon  confidence-building  measures  to  assist   in
monitoring   compliance.    Judging   from  the   ideas  now   under  active
consideration,  it  is  possible  that  the  United  Nations,  already   the
depositary  under the Convention, could  be asked to play  an important role
in verification,  whether in the  area of fact-finding,  as the channel  for
exchange of  data related  to confidence-building  measures or  even as  the

verification secretariat itself. 40/
  110.   The Group of Governmental  Experts considered  various proposals to
amend Protocol II to  the Convention within the  framework of the  following
clusters of  issues:  scope  of application;  definitions; prohibitions  and
restrictions; and verification, fact-finding and compliance.  The report  of
the Group will be considered at the Review  Conference of the States Parties
at Vienna, to  be held from  25 September  to 13 October  1995. 41/   States
parties continue to be challenged to  balance the requirement for  effective
verification with concerns about intrusiveness.  Verification costs and  the
respective  verification roles  of  international  and national  authorities
will be among the important issues negotiated at the Review Conference.


C.  The United Nations and preventive diplomacy

1.  Introduction

111.  In identifying  components of, and a  United Nations capacity  for, an
integrated  international verification  system,  the 1990  study  noted  the
existing  capacity of  the Organization  to provide  impartial observers and
experts (for  example, in  areas of  fact-finding of  specific relevance  to
disarmament and in relation  to peace-keeping missions).  It then went on to
note  that  an  international verification  system,  in  addition  to  tasks
related  to  monitoring   compliance  with  specific  arms  limitation   and
disarmament   agreements,  could   be  tasked  with   facilitating  conflict
resolution efforts, early  warning regarding emerging crises or  identifying
confidence-building measures in  regions lacking them (A/45/472, paras.  244
and  245).    From  this perspective  it  is useful,  therefore,  to examine
improvements in  the capacity  of the United  Nations in the  area of  fact-
finding, in the promotion of confidence-building  measures in the context of
specific  situations  of  tension  and  in  relation   to  other  preventive
diplomacy  activities as  both components  of  a developing  United  Nations
verification capacity  and activities that will be themselves facilitated by
improved  monitoring  techniques.    (Verification  in  relation  to  United
Nations peace-keeping  and  related operations  is  discussed  in section  E
below).

(a)  Role of the Secretary-General in fact-finding and related activities

112.  In an effort to strengthen the role of the United  Nations and enhance
its  effectiveness in  maintaining  international peace  and  security,  the
General Assembly  in 1991  adopted the  Declaration on  Fact-finding by  the
United Nations in  the Field of the  Maintenance of International Peace  and
Security. 42/  The  sending of a United Nations fact-finding mission to  the
territory of any State  requires the consent of  that State, subject  to the
relevant provisions of  the Charter of the  United Nations. 43/   As  to the
role of the Secretary-General, the Declaration provided, inter alia, that:

  "The Secretary-General  should monitor  the state  of international  peace
and security regularly and systematically in  order to provide early warning
of  disputes  or  situations which  might threaten  international  peace and
security.   The  Secretary-General  may  bring relevant  information to  the
attention  of the Security  Council and,  where appropriate,  of the General
Assembly;

   "To  this  end,  the  Secretary-General  should  make  full  use  of  the
information-gathering capabilities of the Secretariat and keep under  review
the improvement of these capabilities." 44/

113.   Elaborating further the  main points made by the Secretary-General in
his  report entitled "An  Agenda for  Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111), the General
Assembly adopted  resolution 47/120  A on  18 December  1992 and  resolution
47/120  B  on  20  September  1993,  both  entitled  "An  Agenda  for Peace:
preventive diplomacy  and related matters".   In those  resolutions the role
of  the  Secretary-General  in  two  fields  was  further  elaborated:   the
capacity of the United Nations for  early warning, collection of information

and analysis; and fact-finding missions.

114.  In his  1994 annual  report on the work  of the Organization, 45/  the
Secretary-General  reported that  initial  steps  had  been  taken  to  move
gradually towards an  early-warning mechanism and to upgrade the  collection
and   processing  of   information   and  analysis   in   the   Secretariat.
Subsequently, in  his position paper entitled  "Supplement to  An Agenda for
Peace", issued  in January  1995, the  Secretary-General  reported that  the
Department of Political  Affairs, after successive phases of  restructuring,
was now organized  to follow political developments  world wide, so that  it
could   provide  early   warning   of  impending   conflicts   and   analyse
possibilities for preventive action  by the United  Nations, as well as  for
action to help resolve existing conflicts (A/50/60, para. 26).

115.   During the last several  years, the  fact-finding missions undertaken
by  the   Secretary-General  have  generally   immediately  preceded   peace
operations, constituted part  of the ongoing  operations or  been undertaken
after  a   conflict  has   been  resolved   as  part   of  efforts   towards
reconstruction and the consolidation of peaceful  conditions.  In the period
from  September  1992  to  September  1993,  the  Secretary-General  himself
travelled  to  27  countries and  there  were  more  than  100  missions  of
representation,  fact-finding  and  good  will  offices  undertaken  on  his
behalf. 46/   For the period  from September 1993  to September 1994,  there
were 34 high-level missions dispatched. 47/

116.   In  addition to  efforts  to mediate  negotiations among  parties  to
various disputes,  tasks also included the  investigation of allegations  of
serious  human  rights violations  occurring  after  fighting broke  out  in
Abkhazia,  Georgia; reporting  on  elections in  Moldova;  a  reconnaissance
mission  in Rwanda; and  a survey mission  for human  rights verification in
Guatemala.

117.    In  October 1993,  the President  of  Mali requested  the Secretary-
General  to provide  assistance in  the  collection  and control  of illicit
small arms said  to be proliferating in the  country.  The advisory  mission
established in response, in  visits to the Sahara  and Sahel in  August 1994
and March 1995 respectively, identified the  need for a subregional approach
to the problem and recommended, inter  alia, arrangements for United Nations
monitoring  of  a range  of  confidencebuilding  measures,  including  joint
customs patrols along  borders, increased communications among armed  forces
in response to incidents and increased  meetings of officials to  coordinate
relevant policy among the countries involved.

118.    The  Secretary-General  continues  to  attach  a  high  priority  to
preventive diplomacy and  peacemaking activities as the most  cost-effective
techniques for the maintenance of international  peace and security.  In the
above-mentioned  position  paper  entitled  "Supplement  to  an  Agenda  for
Peace", he identified  two practical problems that  had emerged:  the  first
relating  to the  difficulty of finding  senior persons able  and willing to
serve as his  special representative or envoy; and  the second, to the  lack
of  clear  legislative  authority,  and  financial  underpinning,  for   the
establishment of  small field missions to  provide a  continuing presence on
the ground in support of the role of  the special envoy (ibid, paras. 30 and
31).

119.   Since the  release of  the "Supplement"  paper, the Secretary-General
has received a list of qualified  eminent persons from certain Member States
that  has helped to  alleviate the  first-mentioned problem.   Regarding the
establishment and  financing of  field missions,  the Secretary-General  has
indicated  his intention to submit  a special report to the General Assembly
at  its  fiftieth  session,  suggesting  options  for  tackling  the  latter
problem.  The Security Council,  in its statement on the "Supplement" paper,
expressed its belief that adequate resources  must be made available  within
the United Nations system for such field missions. 48/

(b)  Other relevant United Nations activities

120.  The 1990  study discussed the  role of the Department for  Disarmament
Affairs,  the organizational  unit of  the Secretariat  then responsible for
disarmament  questions.   An  outline  was  presented of  the administrative
assistance  provided  to  ongoing negotiations  at  Geneva  that  included a
verification  dimension as well as  support for the verification work of the
United Nations  Disarmament  Commission.   The servicing  of expert  groups,
including those  directed  at  the  issue of  multilateral  verification  of
disarmament agreements, was  also reviewed (A/45/372,  paras. 161  and 162).
Since  then the  Centre for  Disarmament Affairs  has continued  to  play an
important role  in support of  various efforts in  both the negotiating  and
deliberative  bodies at  the global  level  to  identify and  explore common
ground between States in the area of verification.

121.   Of particular  relevance for  the present  study is  the work  of the
Disarmament Commission on agreed guidelines and recommendations in  relation
to  openness  in military  matters.   Building  on its  1988 guidelines  for
appropriate   types   of   confidence-building    measures   and   for   the
implementation  of such  measures on  a  global or  regional level,  49/ the
Disarmament Commission at its 1991 and 1992  substantive sessions had on its
agenda  an item entitled  "Objective information  on military  matters".  In
May  1992,   the  Commission  adopted   by  consensus   the  guidelines  and
recommendations   for  objective   information  on   military  matters.  50/
Described as an important confidence-building measure,  one of the goals  of
objective information  on military matters was  to serve  "to facilitate the
process of arms limitation, reduction and  elimination, as well as reduction
of forces,  and the verification of  compliance with  obligations assumed in
these areas".   It  was agreed  that the  information to  be provided  under
agreements  or  arrangements for  the exchange  of objective  information on
military matters should be consistent  in volume, range and quality with the
objectives  identified by  the parties.   The  data  should be  accurate and
comparable,  should be provided on  a reciprocal basis and  might, if deemed
necessary by the parties, be subject to verification.  The General  Assembly
by its  resolution 47/54 B  of 9 December  1992 endorsed  the guidelines and
recommendations for objective information  on military matters as adopted by
the  Disarmament  Commission  and  recommended  them   to  all  States   for
implementation. 51/

122.    In May  1993, the  Disarmament Commission  adopted by  consensus the
guidelines  and  recommendations  for  regional  approaches  to  disarmament
within  the context  of  global  security.   The  General  Assembly, by  its
resolution  48/75  G  of  16  December  1993,  endorsed  the  guidelines and
recommendations   and   recommended  them   to   all   Member   States   for
implementation.

123.    The  Centre  for  Disarmament  Affairs  augmented  its  capacity for
regional   outreach  through  its  three  regional  centres  for  peace  and
disarmament in  Africa, Asia  and the  Pacific, and  Latin  America and  the
Caribbean respectively.   The  Centre for  Disarmament Affairs  acts as  the
focal point  for coordinating  inputs to  the activities  of these  centres.
The mandates of  the centres, while differing  slightly in detail to reflect
the  specific characteristics  of the  region  in  question, charge  them to
provide, upon request, substantive  support for initiatives  and measures of
peace,  arms limitation and  disarmament in  the regions,  to cooperate with
regional organizations  and to coordinate  activities under the  Disarmament
Information  Programme.  The  centres promote awareness of regional security
and  disarmament issues  through newsletters,  seminars and  workshops  and,
increasingly, by creating networks for the  exchange of data and information
related  to disarmament  and security,  including broadening  contacts  with
research centres and academic institutions.

124.   The centres,  by  promoting, in  particular, confidence-building  and
transparency  in military  matters,  are gradually  becoming  more  directly
involved in the  broader sphere of preventive  diplomacy.  For  example, the
Centre in Africa has provided substantive  and organizational support to the
Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions  in Central Africa and  to
the   Secretary-General's   advisory   mission   to   Mali   concerning  the

proliferation there of illicit  small arms.  In  addition, the Centre hosted
the  second meeting  of  the  group of  experts  working on  the  treaty  to
establish an African nuclear-weaponfree zone.

125.  The General Assembly,  in its resolution 49/76 D of 15 December  1994,
"encourage[d] the  regional centres to  continue intensifying their  efforts
in promoting  cooperation with  subregional and  regional organizations  and
among the States in their respective  regions to facilitate the  development
of   effective  measures   of  confidence-building,   arms  limitation   and
disarmament, with  a view  to strengthening peace  and security".   It  also
encouraged   the  centres   to   take  into   account  the   guidelines  and
recommendations for  regional approaches to  disarmament within the  context
of global security, as discussed above.


 D.  Other regional and bilateral agreements and developments

1.  Europe

(a)  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

126.   The concept  of confidence-building  measures originated  to a  great
extent in Europe and, more particularly, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of  the
Conference  on   Security  and   Cooperation  in   Europe.  52/     In   the
confrontational  atmosphere  of cold-war  Europe,  where  progress  on  arms
control between the  two rival blocs was slow,  a series of simple  measures
was   agreed  upon  "to  reduce   the  dangers  of  armed  conflict  and  of
misunderstanding or miscalculation  of military activities which could  give
rise  to  apprehension".   Apart  from  reducing  fears  by making  military
exercises  more predictable,  those measures  were  intended to  promote the
growth  of confidence among  the participating  States with  respect to each
other's  military intentions  so  that  further measures  could  be  agreed,
including  arms  limitation  and disarmament  measures.   Almost  from their
outset, confidencebuilding measures were  seen as a preliminary step towards
arms limitation.

127.  Through a series of follow-up meetings among the participating  States
and,  most  importantly,  the  Stockholm  Conference  of 1984-1986,  a  more
elaborate set of militarily significant, binding and verifiable  confidence-
and security-building  measures (CSBMs) were  refined.  Active  verification
by  participating  States  involving  quotas  of  on-site  inspections   was
included.   The use  of aircraft  overflights was  also permitted,  although
none have been employed to date.

128.  In 1994,  CSCE - now increased from the original 35 to 53 participants
- changed  its name  to the  Organization  for Security  and Cooperation  in
Europe. Further elaborations  of the OSCE confidence- and  security-building
measures were  made at  Vienna  in 1990  and  1992  and, most  recently,  at
Budapest in 1994.

129.   OSCE  has also  had  a conflict  management dimension,  which emerged
subsequently, and  has been most prominently  represented by  the Charter of
Paris,  adopted  on  17  November  1990.     This  agreement  involved   the
establishment  of a  Conflict  Prevention  Centre albeit  initially  with  a
mandate   limited  only  to  the  further  elaboration  of  confidence-  and
security-building  measures.    In  addition,  a  number  of  processes  and
obligations relating to conflict management  were developed.   Also included
were a variety of  procedures for fact-finding in  the context of  security-
related matters and  human rights.  Provisions  with respect to OSCE  peace-
keeping were also incorporated into the Charter of Paris.

130.  This dimension of OSCE has continued to evolve with the  establishment
of  a  High  Commissioner  on  National  Minorities.    While  the conflict-
resolution  mechanisms have been  useful in some contexts, their rudimentary
nature  has rendered  them incapable  of  addressing  the complex  and deep-
seated problems that have arisen in the former Yugoslavia.

131.    OSCE has  also developed  a  unique computerized  data-communication
network that has managed to streamline  the exchange of data,  notifications
relating to  military matters and  reports among the  parties to  the Vienna
Documents and is  used by the CFE  Treaty parties for their  communications.
This  multilateral system  follows on  the bilateral  precedents  originally
developed between the  United States and the  former Soviet Union during the
cold war.

132.  Compliance with the follow-on Vienna Documents  of 1990, 1992 and 1994
has been  good and has  displayed an impressive  degree of transparency  and
openness. The  provisions for exchange of  military information  have been a
key  element in  the process.    This  unprecedented sharing  of information
about  military   structures  and  activities,  including  verification  and
evaluation,  has played an important role in helping  to ensure stability in
Europe as  States go through  the transition from  cold war  structures.  In
many  ways,  Europe  is  building  a  low-key,  practical  verification  and
confidence-building infrastructure which  should prove of enduring value  as
a  foundation  for  a  future  security   structure.  The  OSCE  regime   of
confidence-  and security-building measures  has created a "dense network of
verification all over Europe and even  beyond", and verification has  become
"a routine matter in European military security policy". 53/

133.  Information provided in the  annual declarations and notifications  of
the  Vienna   Declarations  form  the   basis  of  subsequent   verification
activities.   These data are checked  by inspections  and evaluation visits,
as well  as by national  means.  Discrepancies  are discussed and  resolved.
Honest  mistakes are  made  even with  the  best  of  intentions and,  in  a
cooperative verification environment, can be corrected.

134.  Another key element of OSCE,  the procedure established for  mandatory
acceptance  of inspections and  evaluation visits  from any  OSCE State, has
provided hands-on experience in verifying regional agreements.

135.    Implementation of  the  Stockholm  and  Vienna  documents, like  the
experience with  the CFE  Treaty and  the  preparations for  the entry  into
force  of  the  Open Skies  Treaty  (see  paras.  138-140  below),  have all
involved  training and trial  inspections or  overflights in  advance of the
entry  into force  of  the agreement,  helping to  smooth  out many  of  the
wrinkles in implementation in a  less confrontational atmosphere  than would
be the case once obligations had become binding.

136.  Some  efforts to share this experience with other regions of the world
have  been  made,  such  as  Canada/Republic  of  Korea Conventional  Forces
Inspection Training Workshops held in December 1992 and May 1995.  OSCE  has
also requested help from  the United Nations in  promoting linkages to other
verification bodies. 54/

137.  OSCE  has declared itself a  regional organization under Chapter  VIII
of the Charter of  the United Nations, thus  underscoring its intent to work
closely with the United  Nations.  OSCE and the United Nations have begun to
work out cooperative actions in  an effort to better  apply the capabilities
of both organizations and to avoid duplication.

(b)  The Treaty on Open Skies

138.   The  Treaty  on Open  Skies  55/  is  one of  the  most  wide-ranging
international  efforts to  date  to  promote  openness and  transparency  of
military forces.   It  establishes a  regime of  unarmed aerial  observation
flights over the  entire territory of its participants  - to date 27  States
in Europe and North America have signed the Treaty.

139.  The Treaty is  designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence
by giving  all participants, regardless of  size, the  possibility to obtain
information on  military or  other activities  of concern  to them.   It  is
based upon four basic principles:   general territorial openness and  access
for overflights; use of unarmed aircraft  for observation flights; an agreed

sensor  suite,  using sensors  commercially available  to  all parties;  and
annual quotas for reciprocal overflights.   The Treaty allows for  consensus
decisions in the Open Skies  Consultative Commission, its implementing body,
in order to upgrade sensors, adjust quotas and admit new participants.

140.  As with other examples in the  present chapter, trial overflights have
been used, both for refining Treaty  procedures and for training  personnel.
Another experience  along the  lines of that  of the CFE  Treaty was that  a
strictly national approach to verification operations has disadvantages  for
smaller States  with more  limited resources.   Among the  solutions in  the
case of the Open Skies Treaty is the pooling of aerial monitoring  resources
and quotas among some groups of the parties.   Moreover, it is possible that
NATO's VICS will undertake an important  coordinating function for some,  if
not most, of the parties, as  it has for  the CFE Treaty.  Since the  Treaty
on  Open  Skies explicitly  requires  that  the  sensor  technology used  on
aircraft  must  be of  a  standard that  is  available commercially  to  all
participants, an  effort has  been made  to  encourage equivalent  technical
capabilities among all  parties.  Finally,  it is  useful to  note that,  as
with the CFE Treaty, notifications and  other communications pursuant to the
Treaty can be exchanged over the OSCE automated communications network.

(c)  Other relevant European experience

141.   Parallel to the  development of OSCE,  talks on  arms control matters
took  place between NATO  and the  Warsaw Treaty  Organization.   Unlike the
case of  OSCE, this process did  not directly involve  the neutral and  non-
aligned  States of the European continent.   The CFE  Treaty of 1990 was the
most  significant result of  this process.   Currently,  efforts are ongoing
with respect to harmonizing the obligations of the CFE Treaty with those  of
OSCE,  with   particular  attention  to   their  information  exchange   and
verification requirements.  A  new thrust of current  thinking is a focus on
subregional  arms control  processes  in Europe,  taking  particularly  into
account,  the former Yugoslavia.   This  envisages a  role for peace-keeping
forces, confidence-building  measures  and arms  limitation and  disarmament
measures in the  post-conflict environment of that subregion.  Verification,
including  that  by  neutral third  parties,  figures  prominently  in  this
thinking.

142.   The role of   the North Atlantic Cooperation Council composed of NATO
members, former Warsaw Treaty Organization members and  the successor States
to  the former USSR, is still  evolving.  The provisions for  NACC and other
OSCE countries  to join  in United  Nations and  OSCE operations,  including
peace-keeping, search  and rescue,  and  humanitarian operations,  may be  a
precursor  for  future  cooperative  actions  with  the  United  Nations  by
regional organizations in the field of peace and security.

143.   The  Hungarian-Romanian Agreement  on  the  Establishment of  an Open
Skies  Regime, obliges  each  State  to  accept four  overflights  annually,
regardless of  additional commitments  assumed under  other multilateral  or
bilateral treaties. Several overflights have occurred under this  agreement.
At a meeting of the Hungarian-Romanian  Consultative Commission held in June
1994, the  parties  expressed  their  satisfaction that  the  Agreement  was
indeed  contributing to mutual confidence, transparency and good-neighbourly
relations  between  the  two  countries.    They  also  stressed  that their
bilateral Agreement  was regarded by other countries as an important step in
the implementation process of the multilateral Treaty on Open Skies.

144.  Confidence-building measures  have been important  precursors of  more
ambitious arms limitation and disarmament measures in Europe.   Verification
has played an indispensable  role in this process.   Recent years  have seen
the  emergence of OSCE  fact-finding, cooperation  among the United Nations,
OSCE, NATO, WEU, CIS and other  regional organizations on peace-keeping  and
other conflict management activities in Europe.


2.  Latin America

145.   In 1991,  Argentina, Brazil  and Chile signed a  Joint Declaration on
the Complete  Prohibition of Chemical and  Biological Weapons,  known as the
Mendoza Accord.  That agreement, as well as  ABACC (see paras. 61-62 above),
provides  practical experience  in  how  to  approach  verification  in  the
context of regional cooperation.

146.   In 1990,  the  Governments  of Costa  Rica, El  Salvador,  Guatemala,
Honduras and  Nicaragua resumed  their efforts  to reduce  their forces  and
weapons.   This  process, which  began in  1983  under  the auspices  of the
Contadora Group,  continued  in 1992  under  the  direction of  the  Central
American  States.    The  countries  reaffirmed  their  desire  to  open the
negotiations   on  security,   verification,  civilian   control   and  arms
reductions, as called for  in the Esquipulas  II agreements. 57/  A  regular
process now exists  to accomplish their goals operating through  discussions
in the Central American Security Commission.

147.  The General  Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS),  a
regional  organization which  focuses, inter  alia, on  arms limitation  and
non-proliferation,  has  adopted  four  resolutions  on  arms  control   and
security,  one   of  which  called  for  the  convening  of   a  meeting  of
governmental experts to  discuss the development of regional  confidence-and
security-building measures.  At a meeting  held at Buenos Aires,  from 15 to
18  March 1994, the  governmental experts  developed a list  of military and
non-military  confidence- and  securitybuilding  measures  for countries  to
consider in  their  bilateral,  subregional  and regional  relations.    The
military  measures   included:     notification  of   troop  movements   and
manoeuvres, exchange  of information, exchange of personnel, communications,
contacts, training and education.  The non-military confidenceand  security-
building measures were  measures of a political, diplomatic, educational and
cultural  nature.   A  further  OAS  meeting  on  confidence- and  security-
building measures is to be held at Santiago in the autumn of 1995.


3.  The Korean peninsula

148.   Relevant bilateral  developments regarding the  Korean peninsula  are
discussed in paragraphs 78 to 81 above.


4.  The Middle East

149.  Within the context of the Arms  Control and Regional Security  Working
Group of the Middle  East peace process,  a number of initiatives are  under
way.  The Working Group  is composed of two "baskets":  the operational  and
the  conceptual. The  operational  basket deals  with  concrete  confidence-
building  measures. 58/ The  regional delegations have approved the creation
of  a regional communications  network.   They have  agreed on  subjects and
formats  for  an exchange  of  military  information.    Finally, they  have
established  a  text  for  a  document  on  the  multilateral  prevention of
incidents at  sea  and for  enhanced  regional  cooperation for  search  and
rescue.   In  the conceptual  basket, regional  delegations are  considering
such  issues as:   the definition  of the region for  arms control purposes;
long-range views on security in the  region; and the verification  questions
associated with the  creation in the  region of a  zone free  of weapons  of
mass destruction.   The  conceptual basket has  discussed these issues  at a
number of meetings  and conferences, including a verification seminar hosted
by  Egypt in  1993.   The conceptual  basket has  also visited  a number  of
facilities  to review  verification  procedures, including  both  Swiss  and
Finnish chemical  facilities.  Finally, the  Working Group  has approved the
creation of three regional security centres to be based in the region. 59/


5.  South Asia

150.   India  and its  neighbours  have negotiated  a range  of  confidence-
building  measures  covering   three  broad  categories:    (a)   political,

including declarations of  intent, discussions on  security-related concepts
and doctrines,  and measures  aimed at  improving people-to-people  contacts
and  broadening  the  base  for  bilateral  relations;  (b)  communications-
related,  such  as  hot  lines,  dedicated  channel  links,   risk-reduction
mechanisms and periodic meetings of officials  to discuss issues and  defuse
tensions;  and  (c)   technical,  including  activities  relating  to   arms
limitation  and transparency,  such  as prior  notification  and  constraint
measures.

151.   India  and Pakistan  have signed  a number  of bilateral  confidence-
building agreements,  including those on  avoidance of airspace  violations,
prior notification of  troop movements  and exercises,  joint patrolling  of
border  areas, establishment of communications links at  the senior military
level,  an agreement not  to attack  each other's  nuclear facilities  and a
joint undertaking not to develop, produce, acquire or use chemical weapons.

 152.    India and  China  have  been  engaged in  a  process  of  enhancing
confidence  between the two countries  in border areas  since 1988, with the
establishment of a Joint Working Group on  the boundary question, which  has
focused on such measures as prior notification of military  exercises in the
area along  the line of  actual control.  An important  step forward was the
Agreement on Peace and  Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the
India-China Border Areas, signed in September  1993.  Under that  Agreement,
both  countries  agreed   to  negotiate  a  series  of   confidence-building
measures, including  possible reductions of  military forces deployed  along
the border, consistent with the principle of mutual and equal security.   An
expert  group  has  been formed  to  assist  in the  implementation  of  the
Agreement.   In  addition, exchanges between defence  colleges and security-
related institutes and  high-level defence visits  have provided for greater
contacts and exchange of views between the two countries.


6.  South-East Asia

153.  Following on a history  of bilateral and trilateral security contacts,
the  countries of  the  Association  of South-East  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN),
together  with their dialogue and consultative partners and ASEAN observers,
held  the first  meeting of  the newly established  ASEAN Regional  Forum at
Bangkok,  on 25  July 1994.   The  meeting was in  accordance with  the 1992
Singapore Declaration of the Fourth  ASEAN Summit, by which  the ASEAN Heads
of  State and Government  had proclaimed  their intent  to intensify ASEAN's
external dialogues in political and security matters as a  means of building
cooperative ties with States in the Asia-Pacific region.

154.   The  Bangkok   meeting  was   the   first  time   that   high-ranking
representatives from the majority of States  in the Asia-Pacific region  had
come together  specifically to  discuss political  and security  cooperation
issues and  was considered an  historic event for  the region, signifying  a
"new chapter of peace, stability and cooperation for South-East Asia". 60/

155.  The 1994 meeting participants agreed to  convene the Regional Forum on
an annual  basis, and  to hold  the second  meeting in Brunei  Darussalam in
1995; to endorse the principles and purposes of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity  and
Cooperation  in South-East Asia,  as a  code of  conduct governing relations
between  States and a  unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-
building, preventive diplomacy  and political and security cooperation;  and
to entrust the incoming chairman with  substantive preparations for the next
meeting,  including  the  collation  of  ideas  for  further  study  such as
confidence-  and  security-building, nuclear  non-proliferation, cooperation
in  regional  peace-keeping training,  exchanges of  non-classified military
information, maritime  security issues and  preventive diplomacy.   Finally,
recognizing the need to develop a  more predictable and constructive pattern
of relationships for  the Asia Pacific region, participants expressed  their
"firm conviction" to work towards the  strengthening and the enhancement  of
political  and  security  cooperation  within  the  region,  as  a  means of
ensuring lasting  peace, stability  and prosperity  for the  region and  its

peoples.

 156.   ASEAN signalled  its interest  in promoting  closer United  Nations-
ASEAN ties by its  introduction at the forty-seventh session of the  General
Assembly  of a resolution seeking general endorsement of the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation, which it obtained unanimously.  61/  In addition,  Thailand
has sponsored  three ASEAN-United  Nations workshops  on the  United Nations
and preventive diplomacy with participation on a pan-Pacific basis.


E.  Verification under United Nations Security Council mandate

1.  Peace and security operations

(a)  Introduction

157.   It  is  only in  recent  years  that  verification per  se  has  been
recognized  as  a  normal  part  of   peace  and  security  operations.  62/
Verification  objectives have  been pursued  using a number  of verification
methods which  can be described in  a functional manner.   Although many  of
the verification  methods have remained  the same, there  have been a  great
variety of verification objectives defined for  these recent operations.  It
is important  to note  that  all measures  of verification  depend upon  the
specific  mandate  given  by the  appropriate authority.    The verification
objectives and  methods are  outlined in  the following  paragraphs and  are
summarized in annex I to the present report.

(b)  Verification objectives

  (i)To confirm cease-fires/cessation of hostilities, troop withdrawals  and
redeployments

158.   In the  wake of  a cease-fire, peace-keeping  missions consisting  of
military   observers  are   often  mandated   to  monitor   an   established
demilitarized  zone,  to deter  violations  through  their  presence and  to
observe  any hostile action mounted from the territory  of one State against
the  other.   Standard  observation  techniques  are used,  supplemented  by
modern,  improved equipment,  such  as night  surveillance  devices,  ground
positioning systems, high-quality  communications, etc.  This equipment  has
greatly  improved the  capability of  ground patrols  and  observation posts
manned by  military  observers, as  has  the  increased  use of  aerial  and
maritime resources.   When tension increases  and it is  clear that  unarmed
military observers are not a sufficient deterrent to incursions in the  DMZ,
the mandate  can be expanded, under  appropriate authority,  and the mission
allocated armed peace-keeping forces.

159. Investigations of alleged violations (a  form of fact-finding), use  of
liaison  officers   to  maintain  contact   and  develop  relationships   (a
confidencebuilding measure) and freedom of movement  for patrols (a form  of
transparency)  demonstrate  the  close  linkage  between  peace-keeping  and
security   operations  and   traditional   arms  control   and   disarmament
verification procedures.  As with other types  of verification and with  all
other  verification  objectives  in  peace  and  security  operations,   the
"verifiers"  will  be   making  assessments   and  exercising   professional
judgement in the  context of the situation on the ground.  There will rarely
be any absolutes.

   (ii)To confirm  demilitarized zones, areas  of limitation, no-fly  zones,
protected and safe areas

160.  The  agreement by the parties  to particular restrictions lends itself
to specific verification  of adherence to  those restrictions,  for example,
to  the conduct of  inspections at  the time and place  chosen by the peace-
keeping  operation.   The definitive  agreement  of  the parties  to certain
limitations and  deployments also  facilitates the  development of  baseline
data from  which the mission can  verify the integrity of agreements entered

into and make adjustments  in relation to those agreements, as the situation
demands.   In addition to the  utilization of unarmed  military observers in
this situation, there is a role for the  deployment of armed military  units
in  order to provide  the parties  with a sense of  security.  Demilitarized
zones, demarcated  areas of  separation and areas  where designated  numbers
and  types  of  weapons  are  permissible  all  contribute  to  facilitating
verification against a standard, agreed by all parties to the conflict.

161.    Monitoring, as  mentioned  above, is  done  by  deployed  forces and
military  observers  occupying  static   positions  and  observation  posts,
through the  occupation  of temporary  observation  posts  and by  foot  and
vehicular  patrols. Regular  inspections are  carried  out  in the  areas of
limitation.   Investigations can be carried  out at any time when one of the
parties makes an allegation against the other.

162.   A  subset  of this  objective is  the monitoring  of  arms which,  by
agreement of  the party or parties,  have been sequestered  for a period  of
time or under a specific set of circumstances.

163.  In  one major peace-keeping  operation, 63/ the  Security Council  has
created a "no-fly" zone  and the mission has assigned specific resources  to
this  verification task.   In addition  to the use of  military observers as
monitors at airfields in  the mission area, the  operation relies on support
provided by a regional organization for  the provision of aerial  monitoring
and  airborne radar  coverage.   Liaison  officers  have been  exchanged and
communications exist  to allow immediate follow-up  of all  reports from the
peace-keeping operation to the supporting organization and vice versa.

164.  Certain  conflicts have given rise to  a new concept in  peace-keeping
operations, the designation of "protected" 64/ or  "safe" 65/ areas.   These
two  concepts are  still being  elaborated and  have led  to  many different
interpretations.  The development of a  generally recognized concept of safe
or protected areas with appropriate measures  for verification could play  a
useful  role  in  settling   conflicts,  provided  there  is  the  requisite
political will to do so.

165.  Protected areas were intended  to protect minority populations against
hostile majorities through such measures as demilitarization, provision  for
continuation  of  local   government  and  policing  under  United   Nations
monitoring.  The   safe  area  concept  was   devised  in   the  context  of
humanitarian operations  in order  to facilitate  delivery of  that form  of
assistance wherever  needed.  When fighting between factions interfered, the
Security Council designated certain towns and cities as safe areas in  order
to  attempt to  ensure that  there was  free and  unimpeded access  for  the
delivery of humanitarian assistance  and the safe  transfer of the sick  and
wounded.   In other  cases, missions  have been  asked to contribute  to the
security  and protection of  refugees and  civilians at  risk, including the
establishment of "secure humanitarian areas".  66/  The verification methods
for  protected and safe areas  include deployment of forces in the immediate
vicinity,  provision  of escorts,  aerial  surveillance  and  patrolling  by
military observers and police monitors.

166.   Another  type  of "restricted"  67/ area  was  created when,  at  the
request of  the Government  concerned, the Security  Council authorized  the
dispatch of  forces and observers to that country in a preventive deployment
meant to help contain the conflict.   The task was to monitor and report any
developments in the  border areas.   This verification  of "no activity"  is
carried out  by  patrolling and  the manning  of  observation  posts.   This
operation  can also  be seen  as  a confidencebuilding  measure in  its  own
right.

  (iii)To confirm  relocation, cantonment,  disarming and demobilization  of
forces in an internal (intra-State) conflict

167.  Strict  verification is an integral  part of the step-by-step  process
in each operation.   Using a  system of  patrols, escorts  and liaison,  the

military   observers  and,  in  some  cases,  deployed  forces  monitor  the
reduction  of the  numbers of  arms and  armed personnel.   In  a  number of
instances,  the  physical  destruction  of  weapons  has  been  carried  out
directly by  mission personnel or  under their supervision.   In most  cases
the  baseline data  on which  the verification was  based was  developed and
agreed in conjunction with the parties. In other  situations the data had to
be developed "from scratch" by  the missions, without the  assistance of the
parties.  In addition to the methods described above, in one instance  there
was,  inter  alia, the  first  use of  United  Nations  maritime  patrol and
surveillance forces.

  (iv)To validate sanctions

168.  While the  United Nations has long utilized the provisions of  Article
41 of the Charter (concerning measures not involving  the use of force),  it
is  only in recent years that peace and security operations have contributed
directly  to  monitoring or  enforcing  sanctions.    Verification has  been
required  in  order  to  determine  the  effectiveness  of  arms  and  other
embargoes.  It  has been  carried out  in some cases  by the United  Nations
personnel  and  in others,  under  a  United  Nations  mandate, by  regional
organizations  or  multinational coalitions  that  possessed  the  necessary
resources to verify the presence, or  absence, of compliance.   Verification
methods, ranging  from mobile  patrols and checkpoints  along frontiers  and
monitors at airports and seaports to intercepts at  sea, the use of maritime
and   aerial  assets,   including  satellite  surveillance,   provided  from
national,  multilateral and  regional  resources, contributed  in  no  small
measure to the effective implementation of  the sanctions/embargoes.  For  a
further discussion of sanctions see section E.2 below.

  (v)To validate the conduct of free and fair elections and referenda

169.  Many peace and security operations are designed to set the  conditions
for,  and  end  with, the  conduct  of  "free  and  fair"  elections as  the
culmination  of the  peace or  settlement  process.   This  process includes
observing both  the registration process and  the election itself.   In most
cases  the operations  only  had  responsibility, often  shared  with  other
organizations  including NG0s, for  the verification  aspect.   In one case,
however, the United Nations had the  responsibility actually to conduct  the
registration  and election.   The  verification  methods  used were  in most
cases no different than for any democratic election process.

  (vi)To monitor  functioning of the local police/record major violations of
human rights

170.   In a  number of  operations the  agreed settlement  provided for  the
continued functioning of police forces with  the proviso that their  conduct
be monitored  in order to verify  that justice was  being administered in  a
fair and equitable manner for all parties.   The presence of United  Nations
civilian  police monitors has now become almost routine as they are deployed
in  9 of  the  current 16  peace-keeping operations  and have  a monitoring,
i.e., verification,  function in 5  of the  9 operations.   The verification
methods  include  joint  patrolling   and  investigations  as  well  as  the
monitoring of procedures at police posts and headquarters.

171.   As the scope of peace  and security operations began to expand in the
early 1990s, one  of the innovative  verification objectives established was
the monitoring of human rights in  the context of settlements of intra-State
conflict, i.e.,  to investigate cases  and situations involving  allegations
of  human rights  violations and  to follow  up those  allegations with  the
competent  authorities  and  the  parties  to  the  conflict.    This active
verification  and compliance mandate  is directed  not only  at an objective
recording  of facts,  but also  at the  exercise of  good offices  aimed  at
assisting  efforts by  the parties  to find  a  remedy  to violations.   The
verification methods have included the establishment,  as part of the peace-
keeping mission, of a human rights  division, utilizing human rights experts
and  legal  staff to  investigate  complaints  and make  recommendations for

corrective action.

  (vii)  To monitor the provision of humanitarian relief

172.   Under conditions where an  individual State  has disintegrated and/or
the provision of basic services has broken down  owing to conflict or  other
causes, security  for aid  workers  is  often a  consideration; it  is  also
necessary to ensure  that the aid and assistance  is being delivered to  the
intended recipients.  Military observers and United Nations civilian  police
have been used to good effect, as have armed security elements.

173.   In some  cases, in addition  to a  cease-fire between  the parties in
conflict, the movement and/or  return of refugees  and internally  displaced
persons has  been  a feature  of agreements.    Again,  monitoring has  been
required  to ensure  no harassment  by other  parties and  the provision  of
minimum services to those involved.




 (c)  New verification technologies

174.   It  is  worth  reiterating that  verification  methods in  peace  and
security operations in recent years have  been assisted by the  introduction
of new  technologies and, in some  cases, the  employment of non-traditional
platforms  for the technology.  The new technology is mainly in the areas of
acoustic and  movement sensors  and communications and  gives the  verifiers
the  capacity to work with much  greater speed and efficiency as  well as an
ability for  round-the-clock  operations.   Fixed-and  rotary-wing  aircraft
have become the norm in operations,  whether they are providing  third-party
support to  United Nations  forces or  are an  integral part of  the mission
itself.    In  addition to  being  able  to  conduct  airborne  patrols  and
surveillance, to  move personnel rapidly to  inspection sites and so on, the
aircraft carry  sensors that  allow night  and poor  weather observation  as
well as  communication  monitoring.    Unmanned  aerial  vehicles,  such  as
drones, may also be  increasingly used, especially where  the use of  manned
platforms is  unduly risky.  As  technological developments  progress in the
miniaturization of  sensor  equipment,  the capacity  of these  vehicles  to
contribute to aerial surveillance will be greatly enhanced.

175.     Ships  provide  another  platform   for  the   conduct  of  certain
verification  activities, in  particular  the monitoring  of  sanctions  and
maritime demilitarized zones.

176.  Satellites are  very much in  use in peace-keeping operations,  mainly
as  an  aid  to  communication  via  third  parties;  they  are  being  used
increasingly for  the dissemination of  information.  Commercial  satellites
are now available  for this role and  provide a somewhat independent  source
for organizations such as the United Nations.

(d)  The United Nations Situation Centre

177.   The recently  established United  Nations  Situation Centre  (SITCEN)
provides information  to the  decision makers  in the  Department of  Peace-
keeping Operations  and  elsewhere.   Although  clearly  not in  the  direct
business of verification,  SITCEN provides  essential services to those  who
direct certain verification activities and assists  in the reporting of  the
results to decision makers.

(e)  Summary of experience

178.    Experience with  the  verification  aspects  of  peace and  security
operations indicates that problems have emerged because of the lack of:

  -Clear mandates concerning  arms limitations and other obligations so that
verification objectives can be better defined;

  -The requisite  resources  so that  appropriate  methods  can be  used  in
support of the verification objectives;

  -More systematic and better  collection and analysis  of information  from
ground  reconnaissance,  aerial  surveillance  and  information   processing
systems;

   -Independent sources of information and analysis;

-The  ability to exploit  more fully  advances in  technology, especially in
the areas of communications and surveillance;

-Recognition of the advantages of pursuing  informed consent of the  parties
to a conflict (in the sense  of providing as much detail  as is possible) in
order to build confidence, encourage transparency and ease verification;

-Better use  of  public  information  and  public  relations  techniques  to
explain the verification aspects  of the mission to  all parties (a  form of
transparency in reverse);

-Better training  in new  techniques of  arms control  and force  limitation
such as relocation, disarming, cantonment and demobilization.


2.  Sanctions

179.   Under Article 41 of  the Charter of  the United Nations, the Security
Council may call upon  Member States to apply measures not involving the use
of  armed force  in order  to  maintain or  restore international  peace and
security.  Such measures are commonly referred  to as sanctions.   Sanctions
commonly involve  the embargo  of arms  and/or other  trade to the  party in
question.  The implementation  of sanctions is a complex matter, during  the
course of which the following objectives must be  considered:  to modify the
behaviour of, not to  punish or exact retribution from, the country or party
under sanctions;  to minimize the impact  of sanctions  on vulnerable groups
and to ensure that appropriate measures  are taken for humanitarian supplies
to  reach  affected populations;  and  to  minimize collateral  damage  from
sanctions on neighbouring or other States. 68/

180.   To  date, the  Security Council  has established  eight committees to
oversee implementation of sanctions, in respect  of South Africa, Iraq,  the
former Yugoslavia,  the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Somalia, Haiti, the National
Union  for   the  Total   Independence   of  Angola   (UNITA)  and   Rwanda,
respectively, with the scope differing from case to case.  Some are  limited
to arms  embargoes (South  Africa, Somalia,  UNITA in  Angola, and  Rwanda),
while others are more comprehensive (Iraq  and the former Yugoslavia).   The
committee  on  the former  Yugoslavia,  established  in  1991,  was given  a
mandate  that  included the  power  to  recommend  measures  in response  to
violations  69/  and  to  approve  exceptions  to  the  embargo.  70/    The
committees established since  then (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Somalia,  Haiti,
UNITA in Angola, and Rwanda) have similar mandates.

181.   The sanctions  committees are usually  asked to perform  a series  of
tasks and  to report  on  their work  to  the  Security Council  with  their
observations  and recommendations.   There are  several types  of tasks that
the committees may be asked to perform:

  (a)  Development of guidelines for  the implementation of measures imposed
by the Council or  to study ways  and means by which such measures  could be
made more effective; 71/
    (b)   Collection and examination of  information submitted  by States on
actions  they  have  taken  for  implementation   with  a  view  to   making
recommendations  to  the Council.    They  are  also  asked  to examine  the
Secretary-General's   progress  reports   on  implementation   and  to  make
appropriate recommendations to the Council;

  (c)   Dealing with violations through consideration of information brought
to their attention  by States concerning violations, making periodic reports
of  such violations to  the Council  (identifying where  possible persons or
entities, including vessels, reported to be  engaged in the violations)  and
recommending appropriate measures in response; 72/

  (d)   Approval  of exceptions  on  application by  States to  the measures
imposed by  the Security  Council, for  example, on  grounds of  significant
humanitarian need. 73/

182.  The  sanctions committees themselves  have no operational verification
mechanisms.  They have to rely on the  efforts of individual Member  States,
acting singly  or with  others.   Such cooperation  can take  several forms:
unilateral,  multilateral  or the  utilization  of  regional  organizations.
Verification mechanisms/bodies  that  have been  relied upon  include:   the
European Union (EU)/(OSCE),  sanctions assistance missions in the  countries
bordering the former Yugoslavia; the joint operation by NATO and WEU in  the
Adriatic Sea; the WEU monitoring  mission on the Danube;  and a multilateral
naval patrol enforcing the United Nations embargo in respect of Haiti.

183.     Close  interaction  between   the  Sanctions   Committees  and  the
verification mechanisms/bodies  in the  field is  a critical  factor in  the
effective implementation of sanctions.  One  example of such interaction  is
the EU/OSCE sanctions assistance missions.   A Sanctions Coordinator acts in
liaison  with  the  sanctions   assistance  missions  and   reports  to  the
appropriate sanctions committee of the Security Council.

184.  Member  States may monitor and enforce the implementation of sanctions
in various  ways, for example,  surveillance, data collection,  inspections,
investigation of allegations of violations, etc.   Depending on the  mandate
from the Security Council, sanctions implementers may have the  right to use
force to  ensure compliance,  commensurate to the  circumstances.   Adequate
verification  mechanisms  can  contribute  to  focusing  the  sanctions   on
specific targets  within the subject country  rather than  the population in
general.  For example, a verification  mechanism involving the World  Health
Organization   and   an   internationally  recognized   commercial  supplier
facilitated  the examination by  the Committee  on the  former Yugoslavia of
the  proposal  by  the  Russian  Federation  to  supply  natural  gas  on  a
humanitarian basis to affected populations.

185.  Problems have resulted from an inability to supplement the efforts  of
individual States with  international or regional mechanisms for  monitoring
and/or enforcement  of sanctions.   Currently an  ad hoc  approach is  used,
lacking  systematic  procedures,  including  the  failure  to  delegate   to
personnel in  the  field the  authority  for  the routine  authorization  of
humanitarian  assistance. Confirmation,  through  effective  verification of
compliance,  could  help  to  avoid  some   of  the  unintended  impacts  of
sanctions, thus rendering it a more effective tool in critical situations.

186.  Verification  of the sanctions is costly  and to date no  satisfactory
means of  burden sharing  has been  devised.   Problems have  arisen in  the
assessment of the potential impact of sanctions  on both the target  country
and  third  countries,  in  the  monitoring  of  their  application,  in the
delivery  of humanitarian assistance  to vulnerable  groups and  in both the
measurement  of  collateral damage  and the  evaluation of  claims submitted
under  Article 50 of  the Charter.   The Secretary-General,  in his position
paper   entitled  "Supplement  to   an  Agenda   for  Peace",   has  made  a
recommendation  for   the  establishment  of   a  mechanism  for   sanctions
implementation (A/50/60-S/1995/1, paras. 74-76).


               3.  The United Nations Special Commission and the
                   International Atomic Energy Agency in Iraq

187.   Section C  of Security Council resolution 687  (1991) of 3 April 1991
requires  the  elimination,  under   international  supervision,  of  Iraq's

weapons of  mass destruction  and ballistic  missiles with  a range  greater
than  150 kilometres,  together with  the related  equipment and facilities.
It also calls for measures to ensure that  the acquisition and production of
such  weapons  are  not  resumed.    UNSCOM  was  set up  to  implement  the
provisions concerning  chemical and biological weapons  and missiles and  to
provide assistance  and  cooperation  to IAEA  in the  nuclear  areas.   The
Director General of IAEA was  entrusted with the task  of eliminating Iraq's
nuclear-weapons  programme.   This operation  is unique  in  that it  is the
first and only commission  which was set  up by  the United Nations for  the
implementation  of disarmament and  inspection procedures in a single Member
State,  pursuant to a  Security Council  resolution which  was adopted under
Chapter VII  of  the  Charter  and which  also  affirms that  such  measures
represent steps towards the  goal of establishing in  the Middle East a zone
free from weapons of  mass destruction and all  missiles for their  delivery
and the objective  of a  global ban on  chemical weapons.   It  is also  the
first time  that IAEA  was given  a mandate  by the  Security Council  going
beyond the Agency's safeguards agreements with Member States.

188.   UNSCOM was  mandated:   to carry out immediate  on-site inspection of
Iraq's biological, chemical  and missile capabilities;  to take possession -
for  the purpose  of their  destruction  or removal  or for  rendering  them
harmless - of all  chemical and biological weapons, all stocks of agents, or
all  related  subsystems  and  components  and  all  research,  development,
support and  manufacturing facilities; to  supervise the destruction by Iraq
of all its ballistic  missiles with a range  greater than 150 kilometres and
related major  parts, repair and production  facilities; and  to monitor and
verify  Iraq's  compliance  with  its  obligations  not  to  use,   develop,
construct  or  acquire  any  of the  items  specified above.    The Director
General of IAEA is  mandated to carry out similar activities in the  nuclear
field.

189.    Since September  1991,  when  the scope  of  the  clandestine  Iraqi
nuclearweapons  development  programme   was  ascertained,   74/  IAEA   has
supervised the  systematic destruction  of facilities,  equipment and  other
items proscribed under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). 75/
  190.  In  total, UNSCOM has  inspected over  200 undeclared  sites in  the
light  of  their  potential  for  the  storage  of  chemical  and biological
weapons.   In  the chemical field,  Iraq has acknowledged  the production or
import of over 212,000 filled and  unfilled chemical munitions, nearly 4,150
tons of agent  and nearly 18,000  tons of  precursor chemicals. 76/   In the
biological field, in  the face of mounting evidence  that it was engaged  in
an advanced  military biological programme,  Iraq was  due to  hand over  to
UNSCOM a full account of its programme in early August 1995.

191.   Pursuant to  Security  Council resolution  715 (1991)  of 11  October
1991,  UNSCOM  and  IAEA  are  also  mandated  to  engage  in the  long-term
monitoring  and verification  of Iraq's  compliance with  its  unconditional
obligations not to  use, retain,  possess, develop,  construct or  otherwise
acquire  any  weapons  or  related  items  prohibited  under  section  C  of
resolution 687 (1991).   In this connection, UNSCOM and IAEA have the  right
to carry out inspections,  at any time and  without hindrance, of  any site,
facility, activity, material or other items in Iraq. 77/

192.  There  are two common techniques utilized by UNSCOM and  IAEA in their
disarmament  and inspection  operations on-site:   ground-based  and  aerial
inspections.   Ground  teams  typically utilize  hand-held video  and  still
cameras in  their routines.   Personnel  carry gamma  detectors for  nuclear
inspections  and chemical agent monitors or "sniffers"  that detect chemical
warfare agents and some precursors in chemical weapons inspections;  samples
are taken  for analysis and relevant  documentation is  gathered for review.
78/  Interviews  and discussions with  personnel and the study  of documents
are also an important part of the overall process.

193.  The Security  Council in its resolution 707  (1991) of 15  August 1991
authorized the  Special Commission and IAEA  to conduct  both fixed-wing and
helicopter  flights throughout  Iraq for  all relevant  purposes,  including

inspection, surveillance,  aerial  surveys,  transportation  and  logistics,
without interference  of any  kind and  upon  such terms  and conditions  as
might be determined by the Special Commission.   UNSCOM has under its  full-
time control both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. 79/

194.   For  its long-term  monitoring in  Iraq, UNSCOM is  utilizing remote-
control, heat- or  motion-triggered cameras at various chemical,  biological
and  ballistic  missile sites.    These  cameras  are  linked  by radio  and
telephone land-line to the UNSCOM/IAEA Monitoring  Centre at Baghdad.  There
is also a series of tamper-proof tags and seals.  In addition, chemical  air
sampling devices are  deployed at chemical-weapons facilities to monitor the
atmosphere.

195.   With the approval of  the long-term monitoring  plan by the  Security
Council in  November 1991,  80/ IAEA  began phasing  in relevant  activities
such as  material accountancy  and containment  measures.   These, in  turn,
have necessitated the establishment of inventories  of nuclear material  and
other  nuclear-related items, the  application of  seals and  the tagging of
equipment subject to the plan.

196.   Despite the uniqueness  of the mandate,  particularly in relation  to
the unprecedented  levels of access granted to inspectors, for the most part
methods  and  procedures  in  general  use  in  disarmament  and  monitoring
activities have been used by UNSCOM  and IAEA.  However,  the implementation
of  Security  Council  resolution  687  (1991)  amounts  to a  "verification
laboratory" for the testing, particularly in  combination, of a wide variety
of old and some new verification methods, procedures and techniques.

197.    Baseline  data  from  accurate  and  complete  declarations  is  the
essential  foundation for  further verification  activities  and a  frame of
reference  for comparisons with information from other  sources.  Deliberate
withholding of some of the data by Iraq  was overcome, in large part, by the
extraordinary inspection  rights of UNSCOM and IAEA on a short- or no-notice
basis.    Detecting, locating  and  identifying  undeclared  facilities  and
activities proved to be a significantly  more difficult task than  verifying
the accuracy  of information regarding  declared facilities and  activities,
but both were important for effective verification.

198.   Access  to nationally  derived  information  from Member  States  was
important for  site designation  by  UNSCOM  and IAEA  and a  close  working
relationship between them and Member States  was beneficial in this  regard.
Photo  imagery  generated  by the  U-2  aircraft,  operating under  UNSCOM's
control  and   processed  by   UNSCOM  analysts,   provided  an   effective,
independent overhead imagery  capability. Commercial satellite imagery  also
proved useful, as did helicopters equipped with gyro-stabilized cameras  for
close-range  surveillance,  including direct  support of  on-site inspection
teams.  UNSCOM's  Information Assessment Unit, which collected, compiled and
analysed data from many sources, including  overhead imagery, has proved  to
be a key element in directing activities and providing factual assessments.

199.  UNSCOM and IAEA  have found no-notice or  short-notice, ground on-site
inspections  to be their  single most important  verification tool.   At the
same time,  ground  inspectors  alone  are  insufficient,  as  they  require
information provided by airborne platforms or  other sources to direct  them
where to inspect.

200.  Both  UNSCOM and the  Provisional Technical  Secretariat of OPCW  have
benefited from a close and ongoing dialogue on methods and approaches.

201.   With the requirement  for the organization and management of complex,
multinational  inspection  teams on  relatively  short  notice,  UNSCOM  has
provided unique training benefits for Member  States which rotate  personnel
through it. More than 60 Member States  have provided UNSCOM with  qualified
experts in  chemical and biological  fields.   They constitute  now a  first
corps of  professional verifiers with  work experience within  multinational
teams available to the United Nations and other international bodies.


            V.  LESSONS FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE AND IDEAS FOR GUIDELINES
                AND PRINCIPLES FOR THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
                IN VERIFICATION

A.  Lessons from recent experience

202.   In this opening  section of chapter V, the  Group of Experts attempts
to draw  out some  general lessons -  both old  and new -  from this  recent
verification experience.  References to particularly salient specific  cases
that support  these general lessons are  given end  notes where appropriate.
For  convenience,  these lessons  are  broken  into two  general categories:
first,   lessons  relating  to  the  concept  and   general  application  of
verification, and second, lessons about the management or practicalities  of
verification activities.  It should be  noted that these categories  overlap
and  are not intended to  be mutually exclusive.  Equally important, lessons
derived  in  particular  contexts  will  not   necessarily  apply  in  every
verification case.   An important  aspect of the  present study  has been to
identify  both the similarities and the differences among various categories
or contexts of verification activities.

203.  The survey  in chapter IV amply  demonstrates the wealth of experience
that  has accumulated and  continues to  grow with  respect to verification.
It  also  demonstrates that  a  growing  proportion  of  this experience  is
multilateral in nature, including that of the United  Nations.  These trends
seem likely to continue in the future.


1.  Concept

204.   Cross-fertilization  of lessons.    The  nature of  verification  has
evolved  both as  practical experience  increases  and as  the  verification
objectives become  increasingly diversified.   An important lesson  seems to
be that verification in  each context may benefit from the experience gained
and  methods used  in  the  others.  81/    Experience further  supports  an
underlying  theme  of  the  present  report:    that  global,  regional  and
bilateral  processes may  be  linked and  that  each can  benefit  from  the
verification lessons learned in the others. 82/

205.    Evolution  of verification  in  specific  agreements.   Verification
processes  within specific  agreements have  the  potential to  evolve.  83/
What might  have been too ambitious politically in terms  of verification at
one time  may become more  feasible as the  political context of  agreements
moves from  a more confrontational environment to a more cooperative one and
as new verification techniques become available. 

206.    Verification  and  confidence-building.    Verification  can,  where
appropriate,  play  a key  role  in  monitoring compliance  with confidence-
building measures, through enhancing the degree of  confidence achieved. 84/
It is also possible to conceive of an evolutionary process that begins  with
modest  confidence-building  measures,  followed at  a later  stage  by more
ambitious  ones, perhaps  including  verification measures,  which  in  turn
would be followed by more rigorous  arms limitation and disarmament measures
with full verification provisions. 85/

207.  Transparency.  The clear  lesson emerging from relevant  international
verification  experience  since  the  1990   study  is  the   centrality  of
transparency to effective (including cost-effective) verification. 86/   The
evolution of political will can facilitate increased transparency which,  in
turn, contributes in a positive manner  to the successful implementation  of
arms  limitation   obligations   and   reduced   requirements   for   formal
verification.   These observations  are mirrored  in both  bilateral and  in
multilateral experience. 87/

 208.   Verification  and  cooperation.   Full cooperation  in  verification
efforts, including  access to information  and sites  can prove instrumental

in providing  desired  assurances. 88/    Actions  or declarations  that  go
beyond the  verification requirements  can enhance  transparency and  reduce
the need for formal verification. 89/

209.   Military significance.   Military  significance has  been a  standard
test  of  effective  verification  in traditional,  particularly  bilateral,
verification  contexts.  The  test of  military significance  also has great
relevance  to  certain  peace  operations  where  the  military  risks  from
violations may  be of immediate concern.  In multilateral  agreements, it is
up to  each party  to develop its  own definition  of military  significance
based on the purposes  of the agreement and their impact on its own national
security needs.

210.   Early warning.  The 1990 verification  study identified early warning
as  one  of  the functions  of  the  verification  of  arms  limitation  and
disarmament agreements.    This assessment  has  been  borne out  by  recent
verification experience.   Since that time,  verification has  broadened its
aim  to  ensure  early  detection  of  even  preliminary  efforts  aimed  at
acquisition  of a  proscribed capability.    Early  warning appears  to have
equally important  application in  United Nations  activities in  preventive
diplomacy and conflict management.   It also applies  to confidence-building
contexts, especially  where the  aim of  the agreed measures  is to  provide
timely  assurance   of  the  absence  of   hostile  intent  or   provocative
activities.

211.   Undeclared activities  and facilities.   Recent  experience indicates
that focusing exclusively on verifying the accuracy of declared  information
about   activities  and   facilities  may  not  always   be  sufficient  for
determining compliance.  90/   Increased  attention  is  now being  paid  to
detecting  the existence of  undeclared activities  and facilities  - a much
more  difficult  verification  problem.  91/    Verifying   the  absence  of
undeclared activities and facilities implies a requirement to ensure  agreed
access to  information and  sites.  Enhanced  openness, while it  will help,
may not give an  absolute guarantee of the  absence of undeclared activities
and facilities. 92/

212.   Non-discrimination.  It remains  clear that  future multilateral arms
limitation and  disarmament agreements must  be non-discriminatory in  their
restrictions and their  verification regimes.  93/   Some recent  experience
suggests that,  in designing and  implementing verification obligations,  it
is  important to ensure  an equitable distribution  of the  burden among the
parties.  94/  The final  test of non-discrimination should  rest on whether
implementation provides fair and balanced treatment of all parties.

213.  Protection of national  and commercial secrets.  There  is a wealth of
experience  suggesting that  effective verification  can be  undertaken  and
agreed-upon  access  allowed without  necessarily  compromising  national or
commercial  secrets. 95/    Ensuring  the  protection of  confidential  data
observed during  verification operations remains  an important dimension  of
successful verification  operations, particularly for international  bodies.
96/

214.  Abuse of verification.  Care should  be taken to prevent the  abuse of
verification,  and measures  that could  reduce this  possibility should  be
carefully considered and deliberated during the negotiation of  verification
provisions,  while  recognizing   that  parties  to  an  agreement  have  an
obligation  to  demonstrate   compliance  in  the  course  of   implementing
effective  verification   and  to   refrain  from   impairing,  evading   or
interfering with that process.  Measures to limit the abuse of  verification
procedures are  found in  the "managed  access" provisions  of the  Chemical
Weapons Convention, which are  not yet in force  and therefore cannot yet be
evaluated.

215.   Non-disarmament considerations.   The need to take  into account non-
disarmament issues when  designing and implementing verification  provisions
is demonstrated  in the  experience reviewed. 97/   Such issues  may include

local  environmental  standards  and  public  concerns,  as  well  as  legal
protections regarding privacy.

216.  Neutral  "third party".  Recent  experience suggests that parties  may
request   neutral   "third-party"   verification   in   certain    contexts,
particularly  when the  level of  hostility among  the parties is  high. 98/
Verification assistance,  such as that offered  by the  United Nations, when
acceptable  to all parties,  can be essential  to the  full participation by
all parties in the verification process. 99/   Neutral third parties may  be
essential in  initiating confidence-building  efforts  and facilitating  the
implementation of concrete measures.


2.  Management

217.  Benefits and  costs.  Balancing verification  costs and benefits in an
effective manner will  be a continuing challenge  for the United Nations and
Member States  alike.   Verification benefits can  include determination  of
compliance, deterrence  of  non-compliance,  clarification  of  ambiguities,
transparency and timely  warning.  Verification  costs, defined broadly, can
include financial  outlays and  human resources  and equipment  expenditures
and,  more  broadly,  may   entail  the  risk   of  divulging   confidential
information that is outside the requirements  for verification.  One  lesson
of recent experience appears to be  that parties are demanding more strongly
that  verification benefits  be demonstrably commensurate  with verification
costs. 

218.    Cost-effectiveness.    Another  recurrent  theme  throughout  recent
experience  is  the  need  to  ensure  cost-effectiveness  in   verification
implementation.   In many cases,  a positive  political atmosphere, combined
with economic and other  developments, is contributing  to creative  efforts
at more cost-effective verification techniques and regimes. 100/

219.    Level  of   assurance.    In  many  circumstances  it  is  virtually
impossible, for technical  reasons, to guarantee  the absence  of undeclared
activities or objects. Care must therefore  be taken to distinguish  between
the high level of  assurance which can  generally be provided in respect  of
the verification of declared activities and  the necessarily lower level  of
assurance  which  verification   can  provide  in  relation  to   undeclared
activities.

220.  National versus multilateral verification.   There is little  evidence
in  recent experience  to  suggest that  multilateral  verification  regimes
based on  strictly national rights and obligations 101/ are cheaper in terms
of resources or financial costs.  In the  long run, having an  international
body do part or all of the verification  tasks on behalf of the  parties may
result in savings for all.  In other words, the sum of  each country's costs
for conducting verification under a  national verification approach  may not
be cheaper  than the  cost of  having an  international body acting  for the
countries  provide  common  verification  services.    While  the   ultimate
judgement  about compliance  questions  remains a  national  responsibility,
recent practical experience suggests that a  reappraisal of the benefits  of
such common services by international organizations  may well be  warranted.
102/  Even  without the involvement of  an international body, the  benefits
associated  with  cooperative  monitoring  or  other  types  of  pooling  of
verification resources is supported by recent experience. 103/

221.   Common services.   Sometimes  the practical  requirements for  common
services may  drive an evolutionary development  of ad  hoc procedures among
parties when  none is  explicitly provided  for in  formal agreements.  104/
The lesson here seems  to be that  some degree of centralized management  or
coordination, perhaps by an international body,  can provide common services
to parties, which they might not easily achieve when acting independently.

222.   Synergies.   The idea  of synergy -  the multiplier effects  of using
several  methods in  combination to  increase  their  individual as  well as

overall  effectiveness -  applies to  both traditional and  new verification
contexts.  In traditional contexts, the  combined use of data  declarations,
notifications, satellite  and overhead imagery  and on-site inspections  has
repeatedly   been  found  to  augment  significantly  the   utility  of  the
individual  measures, particularly on-site inspections.  105/  Opportunities
exist for  synergies among  verification methods,  because of the  potential
cost benefits  as well  as  enhanced  effectiveness. 106/   There  are  also
potentially  valuable  synergies  among  regional  and  global  implementing
organizations  that deserve  closer  examination.  107/   There  is  already
evidence  that  international  verification  organizations  are  in  contact
informally and  exchanging information and experience.  108/  In the case of
verifying United Nations sanctions, there is  a need to supplement  national
activities by appropriate international and regional efforts.

223.  Additional applications of verification data.  Another lesson is  that
there  may be benefits that result from sharing data collection resources or
simply  data   with  applications   in  non-disarmament   fields,  such   as
environmental   ones.   109/      Practical   experience   in   verification
implementation in  one  field may  also  contribute  to the  development  of
verification measures in another. 110/

224.   Cooperative data  sharing.  Recent  experience suggests the  need for
more cooperative  sharing, on a mutually  agreed basis,  of appropriate data
from national or multinational technical sources. 111/

225.  Data  management.  The need for  effective data management systems  to
handle the  increasingly complex  and detailed  information being  reported,
recorded,  disseminated and analysed is another lesson amply demonstrated by
recent experience. 112/  The  value of data communications  systems for arms
limitation  and  confidence-building purposes  as  well  as  for  exchanging
verification  data  is  also  indicated.  113/    Such  data  management and
communication   requirements  suggest   that  some  degree   of  centralized
management or coordination by an international body may be needed.

226.  Simplicity.  Verification to be effective does not always require  the
most technologically advanced  tools; commercially available  equipment that
is not necessarily at  the cutting edge of technology may be quite adequate.
114/

227.  Use of technology to  reduce the manpower burden.  Greater reliance on
equipment  may help  to reduce  human  resources requirements,  improve  the
efficiency of existing manpower and reduce  intrusiveness. 115/  Related  to
this lesson is another that data from instrumentation that is used  remotely
must be  protected  from tampering  and  authenticated  through the  use  of
encryption codes.

228.   Baseline  data.   The  importance  of having  comprehensive  baseline
information  as the  foundation for  subsequent verification  activities  is
reinforced  by  recent  experience,   as  is  the   importance  of   on-site
inspections, including short-notice ones. 116/

229.    Verification  preparations.    Experience  suggests  that,   because
verification is  often a  learning experience  for  implementers, there  may
need to be  a start-up period before an agreement comes into  force in order
to  allow   for  adequate  preparations  at   both  the   national  and  the
international level. 117/  A variety of diverse  cases to date point to  the
value of  joint verification  experiments, research  projects and  equipment
development,  118/ inspections  by invitation  and trial  inspections,  119/
even before  an agreement is  signed.    These mechanisms build  confidence,
assist in  training and planning,  encourage cooperative approaches and help
refine verification procedures.   Assistance in training  and even financial
assistance may  be critical for effective  participation by  some parties in
the verification process. 120/

230.  Ad  hoc verification in peace  and security operations.   Verification
in  most United  Nations peace  and  security  operations is,  by necessity,

established  rapidly  and  in  an  ad  hoc  manner.    This  contrasts  with
traditional verification  contexts where years may  be spent  in designing a
specific  verification   arrangement.     Peace  settlements   will  usually
delineate the verification  objectives, but the methodology of  verification
will  often be  worked  out on  the ground.    While collective  memory  and
precedents  have  traditionally  played  a  large role  in  determining  the
procedures to  be followed  in peace-keeping  operations, recent  experience
suggests that more systematic advance attention  to equipment, expertise and
training  may be warranted.   The review by the  Department of Peace-keeping
Operations  of  the verification  measures  used  to date  in  peace-keeping
operations   may   facilitate  the   development,   where  appropriate,   of
verification  "protocols".   Such systemization  could  also help  to ensure
that  parties  to  peace  settlements  are   fully  aware  of  the  relevant
verification requirements.  Care must be taken, however,  to ensure that the
development of  such general  guidelines does  not restrict  the ability  of
United Nations  peace-keepers to  adapt  their verification  methods to  the
specific context in which they are operating.

231.   Independence  and impartiality.   In  the  case of  some verification
activities by international bodies such as the United Nations,  the need for
an independent capacity to collect, reduce  and analyse data associated with
verification requirements can be demonstrated.   The advantages of a readily
available  multinational   cadre  of  highly   professional  verifiers   and
technical experts are also shown in some contexts. 122/

232.   Safety.   Experience  suggests  the need  to address  adequately  the
health  and  safety  of  verification  personnel  when  dealing  with  toxic
substances   or  dangerous   activities  or   when  working  in   a  hostile
environment.  122/  This idea  applies to both  traditional and new contexts
for verification.  As much as  possible, verification provisions should seek
to  minimize the risks to  the health and safety  of verification personnel.
Moreover, responsibility for the health and  safety of such personnel should
be clearly spelled out in agreements.

233.    Verification  and  implementation  mechanisms.     The  utility   of
establishing  a  forum   for  addressing  and  resolving  verification   and
compliance  issues   is  another  observation   that  emerges  from   recent
experience  in several cases.  123/   In order  to facilitate implementation
and  avoid disputes  that  must be  dealt  with  in  such a  forum,  advance
agreement on basic verification methods and  procedures is critical 124/ or,
in the  case  of peace-keeping  operations,  clarity  in those  portions  of
mandates dealing  with verification.  To achieve such agreement  and help to
ensure  clear  workable   arrangements,  recent  experience  reinforces  the
importance of  involving at an early stage of the negotiations officials who
will be responsible for implementing verification. 125/

234.  Conclusion.   In the coming years,  new initiatives and activities  in
the  areas  of arms  limitation  and  disarmament,  confidence-building  and
conflict  management are likely to continue apace.   Assuring cost-effective
verification will  be a  key issue  in the  implementation of  multilateral,
regional  and local  area agreements.    In thinking  through the  design of
verification regimes for future agreements, it will  be important to draw on
the lessons of  past verification experiences as well  as to reflect on  the
changes that  are taking  place  in the  world.    The Group  believes  that
examining the  lessons from recent  United Nations verification  experiences
and other international  developments should lead  to a better understanding
of the full range of potential  verification approaches and tools for future
agreements.


B.  Ideas for guidelines and principles

235.   Guidelines and  principles for involvement  of the  United Nations in
verification  continue  to be  important subjects  for  consideration.   The
Group of Experts has been requested, in paragraph 2 (b) of General  Assembly
resolution  48/68, to  "Explore the  further  development of  guidelines and

principles for the involvement  of the United Nations  in verification".  In
fulfilling  this mandate,  the Group  reviewed two  documents in particular,
which provide verification guidelines and  principles adopted by  the United
Nations  - the Final  Document of  the Tenth Special Session  of the General
Assembly,  the first special  session devoted  to disarmament,  126/ and the
Sixteen  Verification Principles (1988),  127/ in  the light  of the lessons
learned  from  recent  United  Nations  verification  experience  and  other
relevant international developments.

 236.  The key ideas  contained in the 1978 and 1988 principles have  served
the  test  of time  well;  they  remain  clear  and appropriate  guideposts,
reflecting an  international consensus on  the main  objectives and criteria
for verification. The Group of Experts  affirms the continued importance and
applicability of the 1978 and 1988 principles. 

237.   Those principles, however, were  developed primarily  with respect to
verification  in  the context  of  formal  arms  limitation and  disarmament
agreements  and  during  a significantly  different  international  security
environment.  The review of recent experiences  and lessons drawn from  them
indicate  that  it  is  timely to  explore  whether  and,  if  so,  how  the
principles can  be refined and  further developed in  order to ensure  their
continued relevance and utility.   In carrying  out this task, the Group  is
suggesting areas where  additional principles might be appropriate and  some
possible formulations  of them.    In doing  so,  the  Group has  sought  to
develop ideas which both take into  account the traditional arms  limitation
and  disarmament context  and the  new  contexts  to which  verification has
relevance such as confidence-building and conflict management. 

238.  Even  as the role for verification  expands into new areas, it remains
an essential component of the processes  of arms limitation and disarmament.
An examination of the  existing principles both in  the light of the changed
international environment  and in  relation to  new verification  objectives
will, it is to  be hoped, contribute to  the goal of  effective verification
in all relevant contexts.

239.  No verification  system can be expected  to provide perfect  assurance
of compliance.   This is as true today  as it was in  1978 or 1988, when the
earlier  verification  principles  were  drafted.    Verification  in   both
traditional and  new contexts should  be both effective  and seen  to be so.
It should not generate a false sense of security.

240.   The following ideas are offered as complementary  or supplementary to
the existing principles, not as replacements.   Formulated in general terms,
these ideas  are  applicable to  the involvement  of the  United Nations  in
verification; they  may also  have relevance to  other organizations  beyond
the  United  Nations.  Use  of  the  term  "parties",  rather  than  "States
parties", reflects the increased application of verification and  monitoring
to situations of intra-State conflict.

241.   The  ideas are  arranged into  two broad  categories:   first,  ideas
relating  to  principles  about  the  concept  and  general  application  of
verification, and second, ideas about the  management of verification.  This
arrangement is not intended to be definitive; some ideas may be relevant  to
both categories.  The ideas are presented below in no order of priority.


1.  Concept

242.  Transparency.   The expanding applications of verification in all  its
aspects   places  even   greater   emphasis  on   enhancing   openness   and
transparency. 

 243.  Early warning.  The increased salience  of the early warning function
of verification should be recognized.

244.    Neutral "third  party".    Neutral "third-party"  verification, when

requested   by  the   parties,  may   be  essential  in   certain  contexts,
particularly when the level of hostility among the parties is high.

245.    Undeclared  activities  and  facilities.    Adequate  and  effective
verification of arms limitation and disarmament obligations encompasses  the
requirement  to verify, to  the extent  possible, the  absence of undeclared
activities  and   facilities,  in  addition   to  declared  activities   and
facilities.

246.  Abuse  of verification.  Care should  be taken to prevent the  abusive
use of verification, and measures that  could reduce this possibility should
be  carefully   considered  and  deliberated   during  the  negotiation   of
verification provisions, while  recognizing that parties have an  obligation
to  cooperate  in  an  agreed  verification  process  and  to  refrain  from
impairing, evading or interfering with verification.

247.   Cross-fertilization of  lessons.   Lessons from  verification in  one
context may have application in others.


2.  Management

248.  Verification means and ends.  Verification means should be matched  to
verification  ends;  the  choice of  verification means  should  reflect the
different  basic  purposes  of  verification:    confidence-building,  early
warning,  crisis   management,  maintaining,   building,  and/or   restoring
international peace and security. 

249.  Cost-effectiveness.  Verification in  all its aspects should endeavour
to be cost-effective.

250.    Synergies.    In  the  design  and  implementation  of  verification
arrangements,  the multiplier  effects of  relationships among  the  methods
utilized should be explored  in order to  improve verification effectiveness
and make better use of limited resources.

251.     Harmonization.     Appropriate   linkages  and   harmonization   of
verification  efforts at  the  global, regional  and subregional  levels can
enhance efforts at each level.

252.   Pooling and  common services.   Pooling  verification resources among
the parties  and utilizing  common services  should be seriously  considered
when designing verification arrangements.

253.  Safety.   The safety of  personnel engaged in verification  activities
should  be a fundamental  concern of  those responsible  for the negotiation
and implementation of verification arrangements. 

 254.    Spillover  of  verification  technology.    Sensors,   information-
processing  systems  and   communications  systems  designed  and  developed
through arms  control verification  research have  potential application  in
many areas of conflict management, confidence-building and disarmament.

255.  Simplicity.    Effective  verification  need  not  require  the   most
technologically advanced tools or methodologies.

256.     Additional  applications  of   verification  data.     Verification
technologies  and  data may  have  applications  in  other  fields, such  as
environmental monitoring,  and approaches could  be developed which  exploit
such multiple uses.

257.   Verification negotiations.   It is advisable  that officials who will
be charged  with implementing verification should  be involved  early in the
negotiating process to help ensure that  the methods and procedures  adopted
are as workable and efficient as possible.

258.  Start-up period.   Incorporating a start-up period before an agreement
comes  into  effect  will  permit  appropriate  planning  for  verification,
training of personnel and testing of procedures.

259.    Cooperative   preparations.    The  design  and  implementation   of
verification  regimes  can   be  facilitated  by  mutually  accepted   joint
verification experiments, trial inspections and similar cooperative  testing
of verification methods, procedures and techniques.

260.    Environmental protection.    Verification  methods,  techniques  and
procedures should  be implemented in a  manner that avoids  or, at the  very
least, minimizes adverse environmental consequences.

261.   Assistance.  Appropriate assistance,  including training, to  parties
in developing  national verification and  compliance structures can  greatly
facilitate implementation of verification arrangements.

262.  Baseline data.  Establishing  accurate baseline information upon which
to  base  subsequent  verification  activities  is  critical  for  effective
verification.

263.   Cooperative data  sharing.   Mutually agreed  sharing of  appropriate
data from national and multinational sources  can contribute to the efficacy
of verification.

264.   Independence and  impartiality.   It is  important for  international
verification organizations to have an independent and impartial capacity  to
collect, reduce and analyse data associated with verification requirements.

265.   Verification and Implementation  Mechanisms.  Appropriate  mechanisms
should  be established  in  order  to  ensure  effective  implementation  of
verification measures  and to resolve  ambiguities resulting from  differing
interpretations and possible false alarms. 


                VI.  FUTURE ACTIVITIES BY THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE
                     FIELD OF VERIFICATION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS

A.  Introduction

266.  An enhanced  role for the United Nations in verification processes  is
already a  reality.  The present chapter seeks to  examine future activities
of  the United  Nations  commensurate  with its  growing verification  role.
Particular  attention   is  given  to  the  ways  in  which  a  more  robust
verification  capability  can  facilitate  United  Nations  activities  with
respect  to   disarmament,  confidence-building   and  conflict   management
processes.


             B.  Verification in the context of arms limitation and
                 disarmament agreements

267.  The direct  role of the United  Nations has  thus far been minimal  in
relation  to most  treaty-specific verification  activities.   It is  likely
that the current segmented approach to  implementation will continue for the
foreseeable future. However, the Organization could  play a valuable role in
the future by providing assistance on  request to parties to such agreements
through  its  databases,  exchanges,  information  centres,  registers   and
training activities.   It  could also  provide "common  services" to  Member
States  upon request through,  for example,  an imagery  analysis centre, as
outlined in paragraphs 307 and 308 below.

268.   An important  role  for the  United  Nations  could be  to  encourage
linkages  between the various  verification and implementation bodies and to
assist in the  sharing of verification experience  among countries.  Such  a
facilitating  and coordinating role  by the  United Nations  seems much more

achievable, given current fiscal and political constraints. 128/

269.   Given the problems associated  with the  availability, complexity and
cost  associated  with certain  sophisticated Biological  Weapons Convention
verification technology, parties may wish to participate in an  organization
which undertakes, on  their behalf, some of  the analysis resulting from the
collection of data associated with the  Biological Weapons Convention.   The
United  Nations  may  be  called  upon  to  assist  Member  States  who  are
signatories  to  the Biologoical  Weapons  Convention  in  fulfilling  their
obligations  under the  Convention.   The  United Nations  may also  have  a
verification role under an amended Inhumane Weapons Convention.


C.  Verification and confidence-building

270.   In  addition  to  being a  channel  for the  exchange of  information
associated with global confidence-building measures such  as the Register of
Conventional Arms, the United Nations  could serve as a  forum for resolving
concerns  raised by the information exchanged under these measures, provided
that differences  of view on such a forum can be resolved. 129/  Also, there
would  seem to  be  an opportunity  for  the United  Nations  to  facilitate
complementary  regional  derivatives   of  global  efforts  for  confidence-
building measures.    The United  Nations  Regional  Centres for  Peace  and
Disarmament  are  already  engaged  in  verification  of confidence-building
measures  in appropriate  circumstances,  130/  to the  extent that  limited
financial resources  will permit.   The  SecretaryGeneral  might consider  a
more active role in promoting the merits of  the centres as an indispensable
part  of  the Organization's  preventive diplomacy  efforts over  the longer
term.    In  specific  cases of  conflict  management,  including thirdparty
monitoring of  demilitarized or "thin-out"  border zones, entry/exit  points
and  troop withdrawals, the  United Nations  is particularly  well placed to
facilitate  consideration  of  verifiable  confidence-building  measures  in
appropriate circumstances.

271.  Regional  arms limitations could  be supported  by confidence-building
measures  such as  cooperative monitoring,  limited aerial  overflights  and
possibly inspections by invitation conducted by United Nations personnel.

272.   The  preamble to the  Treaty on Open  Skies explicitly refers  to the
possibility  of  employing overflights  "to  facilitate  the  monitoring  of
compliance  with  existing   or  future  arms  control  agreements  and   to
strengthen  the capacity  for conflict  prevention and  crisis  management".
There has been considerable interest in  the use of this confidence-building
measure because  of  its  potential  application  to  peace  operations  and
regional stabilizing  activities and  because of the  synergies inherent  in
combining monitoring from aircraft with ground- and space-based  monitoring.
The  United  Nations,  in the  light  of  its  growing  capacity  to monitor
regional  situations on  a  systematic  basis,  should actively  assess  the
potential  for this  confidence-building/verification  measure  in conflict-
management situations.


D.  Verification and conflict management

273. In the area  of conflict management, the United Nations can be expected
to continue to  have a pre-eminent role, often  on its own  and sometimes in
cooperation  with regional organizations.   The  range of  means employed by
the United Nations for the maintenance  of international peace and  security
(preventive  diplomacy, peacemaking,  peace-keeping, peace  enforcement  and
peace-building) may  involve  efforts to  control arms  and military  forces
with  a   concomitant  requirement  for   monitoring  and  verification   of
compliance.   The assembly,  control  and  disposal of  weapons has  been  a
central feature of most of the comprehensive  peace settlements in which the
United Nations has played a peace-keeping  role.  This practical disarmament
process is  termed "micro-disarmament".   It occurs  in the  context of  the
conflicts with  which the United Nations  is dealing most often and involves

the light weapons that  are actually killing hundreds of thousands of people
(A/50/60-S/1995/1,  para. 60).  The  following analysis  does not  take into
account  the  ongoing  discussions  on  "An   Agenda  for  Peace"  and   its
"Supplement"  within  the  General Assembly's  Informal  Open-ended  Working
Group on An Agenda for Peace.






 1.  Preventive diplomacy

274.   Preventive diplomacy, understood as  action to  prevent disputes from
arising between  parties, to prevent  existing disputes from escalating into
conflicts  and to  limit the  spread of  the latter  when they occur,  is an
increasingly  important  dimension of  United  Nations  activities.    Early
warning of potential crises is essential  so that preventive measures  might
be  undertaken,  and the  United  Nations  has  already  initiated steps  to
improve its capacity to monitor developing  regional situations on a  world-
wide basis.   While fact-finding missions  will of  necessity largely remain
ad hoc in nature, a comprehensive  monitoring capacity will facilitate  both
timely and appropriately tailored responses.  Consideration should be  given
to the augmentation of the current Situation Centre  to enable it to access,
analyse and  report on regional  developments on a  continuous basis  and to
include  in its mandate  the maintenance  of baseline  data for verification
purposes.


2.  Peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building

275.   Peacemaking  is  diplomatic action  to  bring hostile  parties  to  a
negotiated  agreement  through  peaceful means.   In  the  new international
context, exacerbated ethnic, religious, linguistic or other group  interests
represent sources of tension leading, when  they take the form,  inter alia,
of  aggressive   nationalism  or  aggressive   separatism,  to  open   armed
confrontation in  an intra-State context. With  the consent  of the parties,
the  verification role  of a neutral  third party, in  particular the United
Nations or  a major regional organization,  could be  valuable for restoring
confidence between the parties  involved.  This role  could take the form of
fact-finding missions and  related activities to, inter alia, ascertain  the
accuracy of  declarations respecting the  nature, deployments or  activities
of  military forces.    To  be most  effective,  these measures  have to  be
undertaken from the very beginning of the crisis.

276.     Such  measures,  however,  can  make  meaningful  contributions  to
peacemaking only to  the degree that they are  credible; that is, they  must
be seen to address the concerns of  the parties and they must be effectively
implemented. Verification can be an essential  ingredient in this process if
it is  able to provide credible  evidence about  compliance with obligations
that are assumed during the  peacemaking process or timely  evidence of non-
compliance so that breaches can be satisfactorily addressed.

277.   Peace-keeping involves  a wide,  and growing,  range of  verification
activities  that  are  central  to  overall  mission  objectives,  including
supervising, monitoring and  verifying the withdrawal  of foreign forces and
their non-return;  monitoring the cessation  of outside military  assistance
to  parties;  locating  and  confiscating  weapons  and  military  supplies;
supervising the regrouping  and relocation of military forces to  designated
cantonment  areas  and   verifying  the  process  of  demobilization,   arms
limitation  and arms reduction.  Demanding new  tasks include the monitoring
of "safe" or "protected" areas. Verifying  compliance with these obligations
is  essential to  a  successful  operation, providing  the  credibility  and
confidence  in  the   process  to  undertake  further  conflict   resolution
activities.  Verification, of course, cannot alone ensure compliance.
  278.  Just  as  the verification  of obligations  to  control arms  may be

important for  short-term stabilization purposes,  agreements to disarm,  to
demilitarize or to limit armaments and military forces in other ways can  be
an  indispensable ingredient  to  success in  the  longer  term.   For  such
agreements  to  be  credible,  effective  monitoring  and  verification   of
compliance  is required.  The United Nations may, upon request, provide such
monitoring  and  could  assist  the  parties involved  in  their  monitoring
activities in other instances.

279.  Recent experience suggests that more focused attention  should be paid
to  the disarmament  dimension of  peace and security  operations including,
inter alia,  the verification  aspects.   The United  Nations should  better
prepare itself  for its increasing,  and increasingly complex,  verification
tasks in peace operations by exploring  how it might better  standardize its
verification  procedures,   including  the   development  of   a  range   of
verification  "protocols" outlining  the verification  methods applicable to
particular objectives.    This would  aid  in  more precisely  defining  the
relevant  portions of  the mission  mandates  and  in ensuring  the informed
consent of  the  parties.    Of  course,  flexibility and  the  exercise  of
professional  judgement  by peace-keepers  in the  context  of the  specific
situation  on the  ground will  continue to  be central  to the  success  of
peace-keeping missions.   It is  the Group's belief  that more precision  in
defining the verification objectives  and methodologies, both  in a  generic
sense and during the  development of mission mandates, will provide a better
context for the exercise of those judgements.

280.  Efforts  should also be directed at  identifying ways to exploit  more
fully advances in technology, especially in  the areas of communication  and
surveillance,  and towards the development of better, and more standardized,
training methods  in relation to  the techniques  of arms control  and force
limitation (such as  relocation, disarming, cantonment and  demobilization).
Consideration  should be  given  to  further  improvements  in  agreed  data
collection  and analysis  from ground reconnaissance,  overhead surveillance
and  informationprocessing systems, including greater  means for independent
sources of information and analysis.


                3.  Disarmament measures within the framework of
                    peace enforcement

281.   Disarmament, inspection, monitoring  and verification procedures  are
playing  an  important  role  in  the  implementation  of  Security  Council
resolution 687 (1991) concerning Iraq.   United Nations personnel have  been
directly   involved  in   achieving   important  milestones   regarding  the
implementation of disarmament measures and considerable experience has  been
gained in the mechanics of weapons  inspection and disposal, particularly in
relation to the mounting of complex  multinational inspection teams on short
notice and  in the  use of  a number  of  mutually reinforcing  verification
methods  in combination.  While  the disarmament  and  long-term  monitoring
regime,  as mandated by  the Security Council in  its resolutions 687 (1991)
and 715 (1991) is unique -  and unlikely, it is hoped, to be repeated in its
entirety  elsewhere -  care should  be  taken to  ensure that  the practical
experience  gained is not  lost to the  United Nations  or the international
community  at  large.    A  systematic   collection  and  analysis  of   the
Organization's  verification  experience,  including  in   relation  to  the
implementation  of resolution 687  (1991), should  be undertaken  as part of
the  broader  effort  by  the  United  Nations  to enhance  its  ability  to
implement the verification objectives of peace and security operations.


E.  Linkages and synergies

282.  In paragraph 2  (c) of General Assembly resolution 48/68 the Group  of
Experts  was  requested to  consider  ways  that  the  United Nations  might
"facilitate verification through  relevant procedures, processes  and bodies
for acquiring,  integrating and  analysing verification  information from  a
variety of  sources". The Group  has interpreted this request  to include an

exploration of verification linkages and synergies.

283.  Verification synergies involve  the multiplier effects associated with
the  combination of  separate  verification elements.    When  combined, the
total ability to verify is greater than the sum of the verification  efforts
taken separately.  Recent experience  has amply demonstrated that  there are
high-value synergies associated with  the combination of  technical means of
verification,  data exchanges,  notifications  and on-site  inspections, and
among disarmament and conflict management processes. 131/

284.  The  verification experience of the United  Nations will be useful  in
the successful finalization of new consensus  principles based on the  ideas
presented  in chapter  V of  the  present  report.   These principles  could
reflect  the  linkages   among  arms  limitation,  confidence-building   and
conflict-management processes.


1.  Cooperative monitoring

285.    With   the  increased   emphasis  on  multilateral  agreements   and
arrangements, greater attention is being paid  to the concept of cooperative
monitoring, in which inherent synergies and  linkages can be exploited, both
to enhance the effectiveness  of verification and to  reduce its costs. 132/
Cooperative  monitoring involves  the collection,  analysis and  sharing  of
information among parties to  an agreement. 133/   Technologies incorporated
into a cooperative monitoring  regime must be capable of being shared  among
all  parties,  and  all  parties  must  receive  equal  access  to  data  or
information  acquired by  the system.  Use of such  technologies facilitates
implementation  of  agreements  by  providing  the  capability  to   observe
relevant  activities,  to define  and  measure  agreed-upon  parameters,  to
record  and  manage  information   and  to  carry   out  inspections   using
standardized monitoring systems that balance the  ability of all parties  to
the agreement  to detect  and to analyse  relevant information.   Because it
may be shared, the  results of cooperative monitoring can have great utility
in  open discussions  of compliance.    It  should be  noted, however,  that
States  that participate  in  cooperative monitoring  arrangements generally
retain  the  right  to  make  compliance  decisions  themselves,  using  all
available  information,  whether  from   shared  technologies  or   national
technical  means.   Cooperative monitoring  should  therefore  be seen  as a
supplement to, not a replacement for, national capabilities.

 286.    The  cooperative  acquisition  of  agreed-upon  information   using
shareable  technologies  can  involve   a  wide  variety  of  activities  of
relevance  to  future  activities of  the  United Nations  in  the field  of
verification.   Some of  the activities  described below  also represent new
development in relation to the recommendations of the 1990 study.

(a)  Information gathering

287.  United  Nations activities related  to assisting the transfer  of data
among  Member States - for  example, the Register  of Conventional Arms, the
Standardized Military  Budget Data Exchange,  as well as  agreement-specific
activities  such  as those  related  to  the  Biological Weapons  Convention
confidence-building  measures -  are important  examples of  how the  United
Nations  can facilitate transparency in military matters.  Such transparency
can  in some  contexts facilitate  verification of  compliance with specific
obligations.    The data  exchanged  may  also  form the  basis  for further
activities in  the field  of verification.   Throughout  the Expert  Group's
deliberations, the  important and  close  relationship between  verification
and  transparency was made  evident.  It appears  likely that United Nations
efforts to promote transparency  will continue.   Regional organizations are
also  in  various  stages  of  consideration,  or  development,  of  similar
activities.

288.   Further dimensions  to a United  Nations role in  the collection  and
exchange   of    verification-related   information   could   prove   useful

particularly  if information from  a wide  variety of  sources were gathered
and made  available for  dissemination in  one place,  accessible to  Member
States  through data  networks and  other  cooperative data  access systems.
Consideration  would then have  to be  given to the development  of a rapid,
computerized retrieval system.

289.   Member States with  relevant experience in  the field of verification
should be urged to contribute to the United Nations databases.  Many  Member
States have  extant national  data banks  which could  be incorporated  into
that of the United Nations.  The usefulness of the United Nations data  bank
will be determined in  large measure by the support it receives from  Member
States in providing  as comprehensive, timely, authoritative and  accessible
data as possible.

290.   Registers of experts with  their qualifications  and availability for
verification inspections and operations could prove  useful.  A catalogue of
their  actual  experiences in  monitoring  operations  would  be a  valuable
training aid for future inspectors.   The questionnaire developed by  UNIDIR
in the first stage of  its major study on the  disarming of warring factions
in  the context  of  efforts  to  resolve  an  intra-State  conflict  is  an
important  attempt  in  that  direction,  as  is  an  effort  begun  by  the
Department  of Peace-keeping Operations  in early  1995 to  begin to collect
and collate the verification experience of United Nations peace-keepers.

291.  The recently established United  Nations Register of Conventional Arms
has  the  potential  in the  longer  term,  particularly  if  its  scope  is
expanded,  to   provide  relevant   data  for  future   verification-related
activities,  as does  the United Nations Standardized  Reporting of Military
Budgets, provided that continuing differences as  to the direction and  pace
of expansion  of the former,  and as to  the comparability  of reported data
with  respect to the latter,  can be satisfactorily addressed.   The current
United Nations Situation Centre could also provide useful operational  data,
particularly if  its mandate  were extended  to include  the maintenance  of
baseline data for verification. 134/

292.   To support  its peace  and security  operations,  the United  Nations
could establish a  database of specific, potentially available  capabilities
in the  field  of verification  broadly  defined  that Member  States  could
provide for the  full range  of peace-keeping  and humanitarian  operations.
This  could include  capabilities  relevant to  verifying  obligations  with
respect to the control of arms in peace and security operations.

293.  During the third session of the  Ad Hoc Group of Governmental  Experts
established at  the 1991 Conference of  States Parties to the Biological and
Toxins  Weapons  Conventions,   in  the  course  of  an  informal   meeting,
delegations  had an opportunity  to discuss  the lessons  learned from trial
inspections  carried  out  by  certain  States  parties.   Operational  data
associated  with   such  exercises   and  similar   types  of   verification
experiences would be of value to all Member States, and the data might  form
the basis for  United Nations activity  in facilitating the sharing  of this
information.

294.   Consideration could  be given  to the  inclusion of  an inventory  of
available  data  from  national  sources,  including  NTM;  a  catalogue  of
commercially available satellite, airborne and other technical data  indexed
by type, resolution, timeliness, sources, and  cost; an inventory of sensors
available for cooperative monitoring and their  sources; and an inventory of
available  verification training  aids,  for example,  manuals  or  courses,
including their  nature, type, application, availability  and cost.   Member
States should  be  encouraged to  provide information  on their  experiences
with  verification and  confidencebuilding  measures  for the  use of  other
countries contemplating such measures.

295.    International cooperation  to identify  common problems  and develop
common  solutions  for implementing  arms  control  obligations,  especially
prior to the coming into force  of agreements, could be beneficial.   In the

CFE  context, for  example, there  were  a  number of  international efforts
among  the  States  parties  to  share  experience  in  preparation  for the
implementation of the  Treaty, including  joint trial  inspections and  data
exchanges.  This process is ongoing in seminars and joint training  courses.
Similar  efforts   are  beginning   to  occur  as   countries  prepare   for
implementing the  Chemical Weapons  Convention, notably with respect  to the
establishment  of "national  authorities".   Such international  cooperation
has  proved advantageous for  most participating  countries, not  just those
with limited resources,  and the United  Nations is well  placed to  promote
and facilitate these efforts.

296.  In a  world of often troubling complexity, exchanges between diplomats
and  experts  become   increasingly  relevant  and  important.     Moreover,
exchanges  among  groups  of  scientific  experts  in  different  fields  of
problem-solving can  produce synergistic effects  leading to new  solutions.
Exchanges on  implementation problems  and solutions  would be  particularly
helpful  in such  areas as  techniques  for  resolving ambiguities  and non-
compliance  concerns.    Exchanges  associated  with  important,  unresolved
proliferation  problems would also be beneficial - for example, information-
sharing  on  approaches  for  restraining  the  proliferation  of  ballistic
missiles, advanced conventional weapons and  land-mines.  The United Nations
might consider  establishing regular, perhaps  annual, forums, seminars,  or
conferences for facilitating such exchanges.

(b)  Cooperative verification technologies

297.      Cooperative   monitoring  requires   shareable   technologies  and
methodologies  which can  provide  useful information  on  a  cost-effective
basis.   Many of the technologies  developed to  support cold-war objectives
are neither  exportcontrolled nor classified and  are applicable  to a broad
spectrum of  arms control  and confidence-building  applications.   Examples
include detection  and assessment  technologies, such  as unattended  ground
sensor systems, aerial  overflight systems and commercial satellite  imaging
systems;  data  security  technologies,  such  as  data  authentication  and
tamper-indication systems;  computer modelling and simulation  capabilities;
and data  management, analysis  and fusion systems.  All these  developments
regarding  database  software and  technologies  could  be assisted  by  the
United  Nations through  the  facilitation of  information exchanges  on the
software.  Expert seminars and training  might be particularly helpful. Some
specific examples, including  their capabilities  and possible  verification
applications, are  examined  further in  annex  II.   Because  aircraft  and
satellites figured  prominently in the report of the 1990  study group, they
are discussed below.

298.  Aircraft.   The use of aircraft with  an appropriate mix of sensors in
contexts  that  involve  the  monitoring  of  compliance  with   obligations
intended to control  arms and enhance transparency has evolved dramatically.
135/   The  various types  of available  sensors  and  the quality  of their
information  has  markedly  improved  since  the  completion   of  the  1990
verification  study.   This powerful  tool  can  be applied  effectively for
verifying  negotiated arms  limitation  and disarmament  agreements  and  in
peace and  security operations. Utilizing aircraft  for monitoring  is not a
panacea, however.  Nor should it  be seen necessarily as a  way of replacing
large  numbers of  ground inspectors  or  peace-keepers.   Rather, it  is  a
method of  making the work of  these ground-based  monitoring personnel more
effective and,  ultimately, of improving  the overall cost-effectiveness  of
verification.

299.  In the  context of conflict management, the United Nations has  relied
in  large measure on  support from Member States,  or from regional security
organizations, for  the provision of aircraft,  crews and  sensors.  Another
option, which  to date  has only  been pursued to  a limited  extent by  the
United  Nations  (chiefly  in  relation  to  aircraft),  is  the  leasing of
commercially available aircraft, sensors and analysis capabilities.

300.   Given  the  cost of  developing  or  leasing  and operating  its  own

airborne  monitoring capability, the  most realistic approach for the United
Nations  in  the   foreseeable  future  may  remain  reliance  on  continued
contributions  from  Member  States   for  airborne  monitoring  activities.
Without  the ability to  acquire and  process data  from airborne platforms,
the overall effectiveness of United Nations  operations and support in  arms
limitation  and  disarmament,  conflict  management and  confidence-building
activities may be seriously  curtailed. Further options  should therefore be
developed  to  promote  greater  use  of  aircraft  in  peace  and  security
operations,  including  the means  to  ensure  availability  of  specialized
aircraft and sensors from Member States.
  301.   Satellites.   Since the  1990 report  there have  been a number  of
notable developments with regard to the  potential utilization of data  from
satellites in  verification.   Potential compliance-monitoring  applications
of satellite  imagery are expanding.  Despite its effectiveness,  especially
when  used in  combination with  information  and  assisted by  other means,
including  continuous ground  monitoring, inspections  and exchange  visits,
the very high  costs of satellite surveillance limit its feasibility in most
multilateral contexts.   It remains a  highly attractive verification  tool,
provided that  financial and political barriers  attendant on  its wider use
in multilateral contexts can be overcome.

302.   There has  been growing  movement recently in  some Western  European
countries  to  develop  a  multilateral  satellite  capability  relevant  to
verification of  arms limitation and disarmament obligations.  Such interest
by the Western European Union underlines  the increasing recognition of  the
utility  of  this method.    The  contribution  that  such regionally  based
systems  might make  in providing information  to the United  Nations in the
future is an area of research worth exploring.

303.   The  provision  of  verification-related  information to  the  United
Nations  from national sources, including from national  technical means, is
another area that has  seen some significant developments since 1990.   Both
the Secretary-General  of the United Nations and the Director General of the
IAEA have  underlined the  usefulness  of such  information, in  appropriate
circumstances, and have encouraged Member States  to be more forthcoming  in
its  provision.  Member States should continue to  be actively encouraged to
provide such information, as well as  other related, useful and  appropriate
data,  including, inter alia, satellite  data which could be used to confirm
the  information  provided  the  United  Nations  on  required  space launch
notifications under the 1975 Convention on Registration  of Objects Launched
into  Outer  Space. If  this information  is  to  be fully  useful, however,
issues  of selectivity,  confidentiality,  political sensitivities  and  the
requirement for  in-house expertise in relation  to data  analysis will have
to be addressed.   The role that the  United Nations might play through  the
development of a modest imagery analysis capability is explored below.

304.  Consideration might  also be given to the use of commercial  satellite
imagery when such data are useful.  UNSCOM has usefully employed  commercial
satellite  imagery  data.    Until  recently,  commercial  satellites   have
generally  proved  of  limited utility  for  verification  purposes.    This
situation has  already changed  quite radically, as resolution  and analysis
techniques improve and as  more commercial satellite  imagery sources become
available in  a timely manner. Of course, unlike the  provision of satellite
data from Member States, the acquisition  and analysis of commercial imagery
could  entail direct  costs  to  the United  Nations that  would need  to be
carefully considered.

305.    Satellite communications  can  be  an  invaluable  asset for  United
Nations peace and security operations because  they can provide direct links
to United  Nations  operations and  operators  throughout  the world.    The
commercial  capabilities  associated  with   satellite  communications  have
improved  vastly over the  past five  years, greatly  increasing the amount,
type  and  quality  of  information  related  to  verification  that  can be
transmitted in a timely manner. 136/
  306.    In  the  longer  term,  the  United  Nations  could  also   become
responsible for  cooperative monitoring  efforts aimed  at providing  timely

warning  of potential crises  and conflicts.  Cooperative space surveillance
in the form  of international or  multilateral technical  means would be  an
example of  a technology supportive  of cooperative  monitoring and relevant
for verification of non-proliferation agreements.  Satellites are  currently
under  development  that  will  test  new  instruments  designed  to  detect
electromagnetic pulses  produced by secret  nuclear tests.  An international
technical means under the auspices  of the United Nations would also promote
increased transparency  and global and regional  stability and  would have a
range  of potential applications  in areas  unrelated to  the maintenance of
international peace  and security including,  in particular, monitoring  for
environmental early-warning purposes.   Such an undertaking, however,  would
have  significant  monetary  and  resource  costs,  which  could  limit  its
feasibility in the short, or even medium term.

(c)  Imagery Analysis Centre

307.    Isolated  images  from  national  or  commercial  satellites  do not
constitute  a  true   satellite  verification  capability.    An   effective
capability  in  this regard  implies  some  minimum  ability  to reduce  and
analyse appropriately  and independently the  imagery received from  various
satellite sources.   Because of the importance  of data from satellites  and
aerial platforms  to its current and  future operations,  the United Nations
could  consider establishing  its own  imagery  analysis centre  to  service
verification  activities  associated  with  conflict-management  activities,
confidence-building  measures   and   multilateral   arms   limitation   and
disarmament  agreements.   Such a  centre  could  assist in  data reduction,
processing and  analysis  as well  as  in  training technicians  and  photo-
interpreters  from  Member  States.    It  could be  used  by  a  variety of
organizations  responsible  for  verification,  including  those within  the
United Nations system,  137/ as well  as those  outside it,  138/ on an  as-
required  and,  possibly, a  cost-recovery  basis.    The  centre could  use
commercial  as  well  as  nationally  provided  satellite  imagery.     Once
established the centre could also be  useful for interpreting aerial imagery
as needed.  The  development of the centre  would provide a basic capability
that could support a wide variety  of compliance-monitoring requirements  of
Member States  and of  the United  Nations in  its  operational roles.  139/
Careful  consideration should also  be given  to whether,  and how, relevant
technical analysis  and  database  components developed  as part  of  UNSCOM
might facilitate the development of such a centre.

308.  Such a proposal is  not a new one.   France, among others, put forward
a similar idea  in 1989 140/ and the 1990 study examined the concept without
passing  definitive judgement.   A modest  imagery analysis capability might
offer the  United  Nations  the  most  cost-effective  means  of  exploiting
satellite data for a variety of cooperative monitoring purposes.

(d)  United Nations studies on cooperative monitoring

309.   Proposals  have recently  been made for  the eventual  negotiation of
politically  binding agreements  on  global confidence-building  measures or
regional questions. 141/  To prepare  for such negotiations, expert  studies
on the potential relevance of cooperative monitoring should be considered.

 310.   Such studies  could explore, inter  alia, the  development of  open-
source information,  a methodology which is  both a verification tool and an
important component of transparency.  Open  sources are useful and effective
in  providing   information.  142/     However,   concepts,  doctrines   and
information organization capabilities need to be  developed in order to  use
the wealth of available information in a cost-effective manner.


F.  Future activities by the Conference on Disarmament

311.   In resolution  48/68 the  Experts Group was directed  to, inter alia,
consider future activities of the Conference on Disarmament in the field  of
verification.  Conscious   of  the  independence   of  that   body  and  the

sensitivity  of topics under  active negotiation,  the Group  is reticent to
offer  specific advice  on the  role  of  the Conference  on Disarmament  in
verification, except to make the following general observations.

312.    As   the  sole  multilateral  disarmament  negotiating  forum,   the
Conference  on   Disarmament  will  continue  to  be  involved  in  detailed
discussions  on  verification  provisions  for  specific  agreements.    For
example,  the  Conference  on  Disarmament  is  currently  engaged  in  such
verification discussions  with respect  to a  comprehensive test-ban  treaty
and  will likely  soon  begin such  discussions  with respect  to  a  treaty
banning the  production of  fissile material  for nuclear  weapons or  other
explosive devices ("cut-off" agreement).

313.  In the  context of such negotiations in the Conference on  Disarmament
on  specific  arms  limitation and  disarmament  agreements,  the ideas  for
possible  verification principles and  guidelines suggested  in chapter V of
the present report may be relevant.

314.  The experience  of the Conference of Disarmament in the negotiation of
specific agreements  may also support some of the conclusions  of this Study
Group,  notably regarding  ideas for  possible verification  principles  and
guidelines.    In  particular, the  Ad Hoc  Group  of Scientific  Experts to
Consider International Cooperative  Measures to Detect and Identify  Events,
a group  established by  the Conference  on  Disarmament in  July 1976,  has
played  a prominent  role in  the  development  of a  potential verification
regime  for the  comprehensive test-ban  treaty.    The Group  of Scientific
Experts  is an important  example of the value  of technical and operational
research into  verification before an agreement  is reached,  or even before
negotiations  begin.  It  is also  an example  of international cooperation;
its work  in the  seismic community  can be  seen  as the  beginning of  the
development of a cadre of professional  verification experts in the  context
of the  comprehensive test-ban  treaty, as well  as a  demonstration of  the
advantage of  pooling verification resources,  the potential of synergies of
verification  with applications  in other  fields (for  example,  earthquake
detection),  the   importance  of  including   implementers  early  in   the
negotiating process and the utility of verification experiments.
/...  A/50/377
  English
  Page

A/50/377
English
Page

VII.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

A.  Introduction

315.  As laid down in General Assembly resolution 48/68, the mandate of  the
Group of Experts was  not just to  examine verification as a process  but to
generate practical  ideas for the enhancement of United Nations capabilities
for   verification  in  all   its  aspects   with  respect  to  disarmament,
confidence-building and conflict management.

316.   In the post-cold war environment, the United Nations has demonstrated
its  ability  to  be  directly  involved   in  a  variety  of   verification
activities.  Its future role in the field  of verification appears likely to
be  a mix of facilitation, coordination and  implementation, varying greatly
with  the context.  For  this  final chapter,  the  Group's  recommendations
concerning the role of the United Nations in  the field of verification  are
organized into three  general functional categories, recognizing that  these
categories are not mutually exclusive: 143/

-A  facilitative/coordinating role  among  existing  verification procedures
and implementation bodies;

-A common services role  - a particularly  important kind of facilitation  -
involving the development of expertise within  the United Nations upon which
other organizations, other parts of the United Nations  or Member States can
draw to meet verification requirements;

-An  operational  role   directed  at  specific  obligations  that   require
verification, for which the United Nations has responsibility.

Where  implementation  of  a  recommendation  of  the  Group  could  involve
significant resources, the Group has so indicated. 


B.  Facilitation/coordination

1.  Exchange of verification knowledge and expertise

317.  The  Group of Experts has noted  that informal lines of  communication
have developed among implementing bodies  - for example, as  far as chemical
weapons  are concerned, among  OPCW/PTS for the Chemical Weapons Convention,
IAEA and UNSCOM.  While there are obvious and  important differences between
these bodies in  scope as well  as mandate,  regular exchanges  of views  on
technical,  administrative,  research   and  substantive  issues  have  been
helpful.  Indeed, the  IAEA experience was used by OPCW/PTS in devising  the
broad outline  of the Verification  Division's structure, the development of
health  and   safety  policy,   inspection  planning,   information-handling
procedures and the development  of facility agreements.  The Group has  also
noted  that  the  Director  of  the  OSCE  Conflict  Prevention  Centre  has
requested  United Nations  assistance in  establishing contacts  with  other
implementing organizations.

 318.   The Group  of Experts  has concluded  that the United  Nations could
play   a  valuable   facilitative  and   coordinating  role   in   assisting
implementing  bodies  responsible for  verification  activities.    Thus  it
recommends the following:

-The initiation,  under the auspices of  the Secretary-General,  of a series
of annual  symposia or workshops, possibly  in cooperation  with regional or
treaty-specific organizations,  the aim  of which  would be  to promote  the
exchange of verification knowledge and  experience.  The  subject-matter for
these  symposia might include the further regional  applications of concepts
such as open skies or verification  tools such as inter-State communications
networks.   In order to finance  these activities,  co-sponsorship by Member
States could be sought;

-The  encouragement  and  facilitation  by  the  Secretary-General  of   the
development of communication channels and other contacts among  verification
implementing organizations.


                 2.  Encouragement of cooperative monitoring and
                     verification experiments

319.   The development of cooperative forms of verification  can evolve both
within and outside of  formal treaty structures.  Parties to agreements  may
join  together  to  pool  resources  or  to  coordinate  their  verification
activities among themselves.  Cooperative monitoring for verification  among
parties  to  an  agreement  can  involve  the  employment  of  a variety  of
different methods and techniques in order  to acquire, process, collate  and
analyse all  the information needed to  ensure compliance with  obligations.
The Group  recognizes  that encouraging  the sharing  of technologies  would
involve  those technologies  that are  not  considered  by Member  States as
restricted for national security purposes. 144/

320.  The synergies associated with  the combination of multiple independent
sources of information  make a cooperative  monitoring system more effective
and  transparency  more  convincing.    This  is  particularly  true  in the

increasingly complex  and  extensive  verification regimes  associated  with
current  and   potential  multilateral  arms   limitation  and   disarmament
obligations.  Therefore, the Group recommends the following:

-The  United Nations  should encourage  research  to  compare the  costs and
benefits  for   multilateral  verification  of   the  provision  of   common
verification services by international  organizations, pooling  verification
resources among parties and other approaches;

-Recognizing  that appropriate equipment  may help to reduce human resources
requirements, improve  the capacity of  existing verification resources  and
reduce intrusiveness,  the United Nations  should encourage the  development
and sharing  by Member  States of  multi-use, multi-purpose,  cost-effective
cooperative verification  methods, procedures and  technologies, as well  as
training assistance  in those  methods, procedures  and technologies.   This
sharing should serve to  encourage greater access to verification technology
among parties to agreements;

-Because  the  design and  implementation  of  verification regimes  can  be
greatly facilitated  by  joint verification  experiments, trial  inspections
and  similar cooperative  testing of  verification methods,  procedures  and
technologies,  the  United Nations  should  encourage  and,  possibly,  upon
request and  where appropriate  resources and expertise  exist, develop  and
implement such arrangements.


C.  Common services

321.  The  Group concurs with the conclusion  reached in the 1990 study that
the development of an international verification system  must be seen as  an
evolutionary  process.    The  development  of  common  services  for  other
verification organizations can be seen as a step towards such a system. 


1.  Databases

322.   The 1990  Study pointed to the role that  can be played by the United
Nations   in   data   collection   and   exchange   of  verification-related
information.   The  1995 Group  of Experts  has concluded that  expansion of
that role would prove useful  and desirable because it  would facilitate the
availability  of  relevant  information to  Member  States  that  might  not
otherwise  have such  access;  it would  facilitate  cross-fertilization  of
verification ideas in both operational and  research contexts, and it  would
promote  verification  synergies.   This  is  an area  in  which the  United
Nations  has   a  demonstrated  expertise   and  potential.  Therefore,   it
recommends the following:

-The  United Nations  should continue  its  work to  develop a  database  of
bibliographic references relating to literature on verification for  public,
research  and  training  purposes,  drawing  on  contributions  from  Member
States;

-The United Nations  should develop, as  required, other  databases oriented
towards specific operational requirements related  to compliance monitoring,
such as the Biological Weapons Convention confidence-building measures;

-In support of the United  Nations operational activities,  the Organization
should develop  registers of  relevant verification  data sources,  methods,
experts, organizations,  and training  courses, using  information submitted
by  Member  States,  including maintenance  by  the  Secretary-General of  a
specific roster of verification experts;

-Efforts  should be  undertaken to  promote cooperation  between the  United
Nations  and regional organizations in the development of databases relating
to verification;

 -Member States should be  encouraged to develop  and share with the  United
Nations and with other Member States  improved technologies and methods  for
data collection, reduction, analysis and  organization, as well as efficient
management  information systems  to handle  the expanding  volume  of United
Nations verification data becoming available from a variety of sources.


                   2.  A United Nations Information, Training,
                       and Analysis Centre

323.  The United Nations would perform a valuable service by establishing  a
capability  for acquiring,  integrating  and analysing  information  from  a
variety of  sources  to assist  all  Member  States in  accomplishing  their
individual  responsibilities  for  verifying  compliance  with  global   and
regional arms  limitation, disarmament  and confidence-building  agreements.
In addition, the Group believes that  verification is a learning  experience
for implementers. Career patterns and opportunities  for inspectors need  to
be  enhanced,  especially  in  specialized  verification  systems;  training
programmes are essential if  each party is to  be able to make authoritative
compliance judgements.  Also, such a capability could be used by the  United
Nations itself to help  meet its own operational verification tasks.   There
are  also  distinct  cost  and  other  advantages  in  utilizing  short-term
contractors for particular tasks.   In order to  strengthen these aspects of
the role of the  United Nations with respect  to verification, the  Group of
Experts recommends that the following actions be considered:

-The  United  Nations should  establish  a  modest,  operationally  oriented
information  collection and analysis capability for the analysis of overhead
imagery acquired  for verification  purposes associated  with specific  arms
limitation  and  disarmament  agreements,  confidencebuilding  measures  and
conflict-management  activities.   This  facility  might  service  both  the
United Nations  and other international agencies  on a cost-recovery  basis.
It would draw upon commercial imagery as well  as imagery provided by Member
States.   In developing  this capability,  the United Nations  would seek to
achieve economies  of  scale and  avoid  duplication  of effort  with  other
verification organizations.   Through such a capability, the United  Nations
would  become  a source  for  information  regarding  specific,  potentially
available verification capabilities  accessible by Member  States.  It could
provide for a  full range of  activities and  operations.   In addition,  it
could   be  utilized  to  provide  training  in   verification  methods  and
technologies for Member States, as requested;

-The   United  Nations   should   assign  responsibility   for  verification
information  management to  an existing  division within  the  Organization,
which  would  be  responsible  for  a   work  programme  to  coordinate  the
development  and  operation of  a United  Nations information,  training and
analysis centre, as described above;

-The United Nations should develop standard operating  procedures, forms and
channels  for  the provision  of  verification-related  information  to  the
United Nations and its related organizations  from national sources.  Member
States should  be encouraged  to share  with the  Organization the  greatest
possible amount of information relevant to  its verification activities from
their national sources in a usable form and in a timely fashion;

-The  Secretary-General   of  the   United  Nations   should  consider   the
development of a training programme  for "verification implementers". Such a
programme could be instituted with assistance  from Member States having the
requisite expertise.   Such an activity, over a  period of time, could  help
in  the  development  of  a  corps  of  independent,  neutral  "third-party"
implementers.  The  provision of  this service would  also be a  substantial
contribution to  the development of  multinational professional verification
expertise;

-By   encouraging   the  active   sharing   of   verification   information,
facilitating training  and developing a  basic imagery analysis  capability,

the  United  Nations  could  promote  greater   access  by  all  parties  to
verification data and technology. 


                  3.  Expansion of existing agreed verification
                      principles and guidelines

324.   The United Nations  is uniquely qualified to provide  a forum for the
discussion and  elaboration of  new consensus principles  and guidelines  on
verification.

325.   The  Group  reaffirms that  the  key  ideas  contained in  the  Final
Document of the  Tenth Special Session  of the  General Assembly, the  first
special session  devoted to disarmament, and  in the Disarmament  Commission
Principles of Verification have served the test of  time well and that  they
remain clear and appropriate  guideposts for those  charged with negotiating
or implementing verification arrangements.  Having  explored whether and, if
so, how  those principles can  be expanded in  the light  of a significantly
changed international security  environment in  which verifying  obligations
associated with  arms  limitation and  disarmament, confidence-building  and
conflict management takes a variety of forms, the Group recommends that:

-An appropriate United Nations forum should consider expanding the  existing
agreed verification  principles and guidelines, in accordance with the ideas
discussed in chapter V  of the present report  and other relevant  proposals
as may be developed. 


                    D.  Role of the United Nations in neutral
                        third-party verification

326.   Through its  conflict-prevention and management  efforts, the  United
Nations  is directly involved  in a  wide range  of verification activities.
In addition to such  operational roles in the  context of peace and security
operations,  it is also  uniquely qualified  to undertake  a neutral "third-
party"  verification  or  confidence-building  role  for  global,  regional,
subregional  and  local  agreements  in  situations  where  such  a  role is
acceptable to  all the parties.   In  order to  facilitate the  role of  the
United Nations in  such operational  capacities, the  Group recommends  that
the following courses of action be considered:

-The United  Nations should be prepared to provide assistance  on request to
parties  negotiating  and  implementing   verification  regimes   concerning
obligations  to control  arms through  its  Regional  Centres for  Peace and
Disarmament, reporting  instruments, fact-finding  and training  activities,
among others;

-The  United Nations should  explore how  to better  prepare and systematize
verification  in its  preventive diplomacy,  peacemaking, peace-keeping  and
peace-building  activities, so  that  such arrangements  can  be  undertaken
rapidly  and  in  a  cost-effective  manner.     In  addition  to   standard
verification  protocols, attention  should  also  be paid  to equipment  and
personnel expertise and training requirements;

-Efforts  should also be  made to  develop more  systematized procedures for
the  monitoring  and  enforcement  of  measures  not involving  force  under
Article 41 of the Charter (commonly called sanctions);

-The systematic collection and analysis of verification experience  deriving
from United  Nations peace and security  operations should  be undertaken as
part of the  broader effort to  improve the Organization's capacity  in this
area;

-The  United Nations should explore the organizational, legal, technical and
financial parameters  relating  to  the leasing  or purchase  of  commercial
remote-sensing  aircraft for  its  verification activities.  Study  of  this

subject  should include the questions of processing, reducing, analysing and
disseminating the data  acquired through the  use of  aircraft, the role  of
assistance from Member States, as well as the  possible sources of financing
of such  a capability.   The future potential  of unmanned aerial  vehicles,
given cost constraints  and asymmetries in technical capabilities,  warrants
closer examination. 145/

327.   The Group  concurs with the conclusion  reached by the 1990  Group of
Experts  that the development  and launching  of a  United Nations satellite
network  would  involve major  investments,  including  the  acquisition  of
relevant technology, expertise and an image  analysis capability.  The Group
also notes  that the 1990  study described a  first step  in this direction,
consisting of organizing a  clearing-house for data  gathered from  existing
satellites,  where training would  also be  offered in  the field  of photo-
interpretation.     This  first   step  is  considered,  along   with  other
recommendations  above, in  section C.2 above.   The development  of a basic
imagery  analysis capability  offers  the United  Nations  a  cost-effective
means of exploiting satellite data for  a variety of cooperative  monitoring
purposes, where the Organization itself is  engaged, or in facilitating such
activities by Member States and other parties to verification arrangements.

  E.  Concluding observations

328.   There is  a strong  imperative for  the United  Nations to  discharge
effectively the verification  responsibilities that are increasingly a  part
of its role  in the maintenance of international  peace and security and  to
provide appropriate services to Member States  in the field of  verification
in all  its  aspects.   Modest  steps, within  the  budgetary and  political
constraints currently facing  the Organization, to enhance its  verification
role will have a positive impact on  efforts by the international  community
to successfully implement disarmament treaties, to develop effective  early-
warning mechanisms for  impending conflicts and to respond with  appropriate
strategies to manage and resolve conflicts that have occurred.


Notes

  1/  General Assembly resolution S-10/2, paras. 31, 91 and 92.

  2/  Study  on the role of the United Nations in the  field of verification
(A/45/372) henceforth referred to as "the 1990 study".

  3/  Resolution 48/68  was sponsored by 23 countries:  Armenia,  Australia,
Austria, Brazil,  Bulgaria, Cameroon,  Canada, Costa  Rica, Czech  Republic,
Finland,  Hungary,  India, Kenya,  Mexico,  New  Zealand,  Nigeria,  Panama,
Republic of  Korea, Russian  Federation, Singapore,  Slovakia, Thailand  and
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

  4/  Resolution 48/68, para. 2 (c).

  5/   Canada, in  particular,  made  a major  early contribution  with  the
provision  of   extensive  bibliographic   information  in   the  field   of
verification.

  6/   On the basis  of the confidence-building measures  agreed in relation
to  the Biological  Weapons Convention,  the Centre  for Disarmament Affairs
has  received and  distributed information  submitted  by States  parties as
follows:  in 1991, 46 States parties (BWC/CONF.III/2  and Add.1-3); in 1992,
36 States parties (DDA/4-92/BWIII and Add.1-4);  in 1993, 40 States  parties
(ODA/9-93/BWIII and  Add.1  and 2);  in  1994,  40 States  parties  (CDA/16-
94/BWIII and Add.1  and 2); and in 1995, 52 States parties (CDA/14-95/BW-III
and Add.1 and 2).

  7/  Resolution 35/148  of 12 December 1980  called for annual reporting of
military expenditures  to the Secretary-General.   Paragraphs 147  to 151 of
the  1990  study  contain  a  brief  history  of  the  development  of  this

mechanism.   The Register of Conventional  Arms was  established pursuant to
General Assembly resolution 46/36 L of 9 December 1991.

  8/   See, for example,  E. Laurence and  H. Wulf,  "Lessons from the First
Year"  in Developing  the  United  Nations Register  of  Conventional  Arms,
Bradford Arms Register Studies No. 4,  Department of Peace Studies, Bradford
University, 1994, p. 44.

   9/  See Official Records of  the General Assembly, Forty-eighth  Session,
Supplement No. 1 (A/48/1) and ibid.,  Forty-ninth Session, Supplement No.  1
(A/49/1).

  10/   As of  August 1995, a total  of 89 Member States  had submitted data
and  information on  weapons  transfers for  the  calendar  year  1993.   In
addition, 35 States submitted background information, including listings  of
military holdings  from 29 States and  data on  procurement through national
production from 17 States (see A/49/352).

  11/  See Official Records of  the General Assembly, Forty-eighth  Session,
Supplement No. 1 (A/48/1).

  12/   In 1991:   Confidence- and Security-Building Measures:   From Europe
to  Other Regions,  Vienna, Austria,  February; Challenges  to  Multilateral
Disarmament in  the Post-Cold-War  and Post-Gulf-War  Period, Kyoto,  Japan,
May;  United Nations  Workshop on  Disarmament and  International  Security,
Mexico, July.

  13/  In  1991:   Regional Meeting on  Confidence-Building Measures in  the
Asia-Pacific Region, Kathmandu,  Nepal, 24-26 January;  Regional Disarmament
Workshop  for  Asia  and  the  Pacific,  Bandung,  Indonesia,  28  January-1
February; Seminar  on Confidence-  and  Security-Building Measures,  Vienna,
Austria, 25-27  February; Conference  on Disarmament  Issues, Kyoto,  Japan,
27-30 May;  Training Programme on Conflict Resolution, Crisis Prevention and
Management  and  Confidence-Building among  the  States  Members  of  ECCAS,
Yaounde,  Cameroon, 17-21  June;  Regional Disarmament  Workshop  for  Latin
America and the  Caribbean, Mexico City, Mexico, 1-5  July.  In 1992:   Non-
Proliferation  and ConfidenceBuilding  Measures  in Asia  and  the  Pacific,
Hiroshima, Japan, June;  Disarmament and Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific
Region,  Shanghai, China,  August; Seminar  on  Disarmament and  Security in
Africa, Cairo,  Egypt, September.  In  1993: National  Security and Building
of Confidence  among Nations in the  Asia-Pacific Region, Kathmandu,  Nepal,
February;  International Seminar  on  Confidence- and  Security-Building  in
Southern Africa  in Windhoek,  Namibia, February;  Disarmament and  National
Security  in an Interdependent  World, Kyoto,  Japan, April;  United Nations
Symposium  on  Regional  Approaches  to  Confidence-  and  Security-Building
Measures,   June,  Graz,  Austria;  Security,  Disarmament  and  Confidence-
Building  in  the  CIS  Context,  Kiev,   Ukraine,  September.    In   1994:
Cooperation  in the  Maintenance  of  Peace  and Security  and  Disarmament,
Kathmandu,  Nepal, 31  January2  February;  and  the  Second  Conference  on
Disarmament  Issues,  Hiroshima, Japan,  24-27  May.    In  1995:   Regional
Meeting  on Openness,  Disarmament and  Assurances of  Security,  Kathmandu,
Nepal, 13-15 February; Standing  Advisory Committee on Security Questions in
Central Africa, Brazzaville,  Congo, 20-24 March;  Seminar on  Arms Register
for Central  Africa, Brazzaville,  Congo, 25 March;  Regional Conference  on
Disarmament Issues:    Efforts in  the Last  Half Century  and Their  Future
Prospects, Nagasaki, Japan,  12-16 June;  Subregional Meeting on North  Asia
Regional Dialogue, Kanazawa, Japan, 22-24 June.

  14/   Mikhail  Kokeyev and  Andrei  Androsov,  Verification:   the  Soviet
stance, its  past,  present and  future  (Geneva,  1990).   (United  Nations
publication, Sales No. GV.E.90.0.6.)

   15/    Serge  Sur,  ed.  Verification  of  current  disarmament  and arms
limitation  agreements:   ways,  means  and  practices  (London,  Dartmouth,
1991).  (In French: United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.F.91.0.9.)

  16/    Allan  V.  Banner;  Andrew  J.  Young  and Keith  W.  Hall,  Aerial
reconnaissance  for  verification   of  arms  limitation  agreements:     an
introduction  (New  York, 1990).    (United  Nations publication,  Sales No.
GV.E.90.0.11.);  Stanislav Rodinov,  Technical problems in  the verification
of a ban on space  weapons, UNIDIR Research Paper No. 17, June 1993  (United
Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.93.0.12).

  17/   A neutral  "third party" is an  impartial actor not involved  in the
conflict, which assists in verification with the consent  of the parties.  A
neutral third party can include an  international organization (such as  the
United  Nations),  a regional  organization,  a  group  of  countries or  an
individual country.

  18/    See:    Status  of  Multilateral  Arms  Regulation  and Disarmament
Agreements, fourth edition:  1992, vol. 2, pp. 113-282.

  19/  Article XXI of the Convention reads as follows:

  "(1)  This Convention shall  enter into force  180 days after the date  of
deposit of  the  sixty-fifth instrument  of  ratification,  but in  no  case
earlier than two years after its opening for signature."

  20/    As of  21  July  1995  there have  been  32  ratifications  of  the
Conventions.

  21/  For example, monitoring efforts in Iraq pursuant to Security  Council
resolution  687 (1991),  and relevant  IAEA  activities  in relation  to the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

  22/  See annex I for additional information.

  23/   As of  31 December 1994,  there were 170  facilities containing  207
power  reactors,  156  facilities  containing  167  research  reactors   and
critical assemblies and 188  other nuclear facilities  under IAEA safeguards
or containing safeguarded nuclear material.   There were also 327  locations
outside facilities containing small amounts of safeguarded material and  two
safeguarded non-nuclear installations.  In 1994, IAEA safeguards  activities
gave  rise  to 2,343  inspections.   Over  60 countries  have a  significant
nuclear fuel cycle under safeguard agreements with IAEA.

  24/  INFCIRC/53 (Corr.), 1970, para. 73.

  25/  GC (XXXVI)/1017.

  26/  See  submission by Dr.  Bruno Pellaud,  document of  the Study  Group
SVG/CRP.13.

   27/    It should  be  noted  that these  were  activities  involving  the
implementation  of safeguards on declared materials and  facilities and thus
were distinct from the requested special  inspection in connection with  the
possible existence of undeclared nuclear material.

  28/   Environmental  monitoring  is used  in the  nuclear  area  to detect
traces  of radioactive  materials from  samples  swiped from  buildings  and
collected from vegetation, the  soil and water  sources.  It was first  used
by IAEA  in its  inspections in Iraq  and later in  the Democratic  People's
Republic  of  Korea  to  detect   the  possibility  of   undeclared  nuclear
activities.

  29/   The  text  of the  Protocol  is  reproduced  in The  United  Nations
Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 17:  1992, pp. 328-330.

  30/   The implementing agreements followed  Umbrella Agreements signed  by
the United States with the Russian  Federation (July 1992); Belarus (October
1992); Ukraine  (October 1993); and Kazakstan  (December 1993).   The formal
title of the Nunn-Lugar  Act is the Soviet  Nuclear Threat Reduction  Act of

1991 (PL 102-228). The  Act, inter alia,  is intended to finance  assistance
in the Russian  Federation and other  CIS countries  for programmes for  the
elimination,  safe  and  secure  transportation  and  storage  of   nuclear,
chemical and  other  weapons and  delivery  vehicles;  the safe  and  secure
storage  of fissile  materials; the  expansion of  military-to-military  and
defence contacts; the demilitarization of defence industries and  conversion
of  military technology and  capabilities into  civilian activities; and the
environmental restoration of  former sites and  installations of  weapons of
mass destruction.

  31/   As  the term is  used here,  transparency may  be defined  as both a
process and a product.   The process  of transparency is increased  openness
through  cooperative  and, ideally,  reciprocal  measures;  the  product  is
greater access  to, and  information regarding,  relevant military  security
activities  or   weapons-related  facilities,   materials  and   activities.
Transparency   measures   may  be   unilateral,   bilateral,   regional   or
multilateral.

  32/   See the  submission provided  by Ian  Kenyon, document of  the Study
Group (SVG/CRP.7).

  33/  DDA/20-87/BW;  DDA/20-87/BW/1 and Add.1-3; DDA/16-88/BW and  Add.1-3;
BWC/Conf.III/2 and Add.1-3;  DDA/4-92/BWIII and Add.1-4; ODA/9-93/BWIII  and
Add.1 and 2; CDA/16-94/BWII and Add.1  and 2; CDA/14-95/BW-III and Add.1 and
2.

  34/  BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9 and Corr.1.

  35/  Para. 38 of the Final Declaration (BWC/SPCONF/1, part II).

  36/   The CFE  Treaty was  opened for signature  on 19  November 1990  and
entered into force on 9 November 1992.

  37/   The CFE 1A  Agreement signed at Helsinki CSCE  Summit, 10 July 1992,
inter alia,  set limits  on the  number of  military personnel  permitted to
specific national thresholds.

   38/   See the presentation by  Mr. Necil Nedimoglu  (SVG/CRP.14).  It  is
important   to  emphasize   that  NATO's  Verification   Implementation  and
Coordination Staff  is not  mandated  to  implement the  CFE Treaty  or  its
verification components as  IAEA does with respect to the  non-proliferation
Treaty; rather, it assists in coordinating national verification aspects.

  39/  Experts  involved in CFE verification have  cited the utility of  the
UNSCOM experience in regard to coordinating multinational teams.

  40/   The 1990  study has  already mentioned  that the Secretary-General's
fact-finding  mandate  could  be  extended  to  cover  the  Inhumane Weapons
Convention (see para. 27 above).

  41/  CCW/CONF.I/GE.23.

  42/  General Assembly resolution 46/59, annex.

  43/  Ibid., para. 6.

  44/  Ibid.,  paras. 28 and 29.   In the Declaration, the General  Assembly
also stipulates that:

  "The Secretary-General  should pay  special attention to using  the United
Nations fact-finding capabilities at an early  stage in order to  contribute
to the preventing of disputes and situations;

  "The Secretary-General, on  his own initiative  or at the  request of  the
States concerned, should  consider undertaking a fact-finding mission when a
dispute or a situation exists;

  "The  Secretary-General  should prepare  and update  lists  of experts  in
various fields who would be available  for fact-finding missions.  He should
also maintain and develop, within  the existing resources,  capabilities for
monitoring emergency fact-finding missions."  (paras. 12-14)

  In addition,  the  General  Assembly, in  its resolution  47/120  A of  18
December  1992,  further  emphasized  the  importance  of  the  role  of the
Secretary-General regarding early warning and fact-finding.   Thus, in  part
II of the resolution, the Assembly:

  "Encourages  the Secretary-General  to set  up an  adequate  early-warning
mechanism  for situations which  are likely  to endanger  the maintenance of
international peace and security,  in close cooperation  with Member  States
and  United  Nations   agencies,  as  well  as  regional  arrangements   and
organizations as  appropriate, making  use of  the information available  to
these organizations and/or received from Member  States, and to keep  Member
States informed of the mechanism established;

  "Invites  the  Secretary-General   to  strengthen  the  capacity  of   the
Secretariat for the collection of information  and analysis to serve  better
the  early-warning needs of  the Organization  and, to  that end, encourages
the  Secretary-General to ensure that staff members  receive proper training
in  all  aspects  of preventive  diplomacy,  including  the  collection  and
analysis of information".  (paras. 1 and 2)

And in part III of the same resolution the Assembly:

  "Recommends  to the  Secretary-General that he should  continue to utilize
the services  of eminent  and qualified  experts in  fact-finding and  other
missions, selected on as wide a geographical  basis as possible, taking into
account candidates with the highest standards of  efficiency, competence and
integrity;

  "Invites the  Secretary-General to continue  to dispatch fact-finding  and
other missions in  a timely  manner in  order to  assist him  in the  proper
discharge  of  his functions  under  the  Charter  of  the United  Nations".
(paras. 2 and 5)

  45/    Official Records  of  the  General Assembly,  Forty-eighth Session,
Supplement No. 1 (A/48/1).

  46/  Ibid., paras. 279-281.

  47/   See ibid.,  Forty-ninth Session,  Supplement No.  1 (A/49/1), paras.
437706.

  48/  S/PRST/1995/9, p. 1.

  49/    These  guidelines were  adopted  by  the General  Assembly  in  its
resolution 43/78 H  of 7 December 1988.   Paragraph 2.3.3 of the  guidelines
reads in part:  "Confidence-building  is a step-by-step process. ... At each
stage of  this process  States must  be able  to measure and  assess results
achieved. Verification  of compliance  with agreed  provisions  should be  a
continuing process."

  50/  See Official Records of  the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session,
Supplement No. 42 (A/47/42), annex.

  51/   In  1994, the  Secretary-General  issued  the following  reports  on
military expenditures in standardized form, as  well as replies from  Member
States:    A/49/190  and  Corr.1  and  Add.1-3  and Add.3/Corr.1;  A/49/225;
A/49/210 and Add.1.

  52/   The  1975 Helsinki  Final  Document  contains texts  on  confidence-
building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

  53/  CPC Study Group document SVG/CRP.16.

  54/  CPC Study Group document SVG/CRP.21.

  55/  The  Treaty on Open Skies was opened for signature at  Helsinki on 27
March  1992; depositary  Governments:   Canada and  Hungary.  See  Status of
Multilateral  Arms Regulation  and Disarmament  Agreements, Fourth  Edition:
1992, vol. 2  (United Nations publication, Sales  No. 93.IX.1 (vol.  2)), p.
5.
    56/  A/46/463, annex, and CD/1126.

  57/  "Procedures  for the Establishment  of a  Firm and  Lasting Peace  in
Central America", 7 August 1987; see S/19085, annex.

  58/   The development  of confidence-building  measures owes  much to  the
events in the Middle  East, in particular the  Camp David Accords, which led
ultimately to  the setting  up of  the multinational  forces and  observers,
currently operating in the Sinai.

  59/  The  Working Group is chaired  by the United  States and  the Russian
Federation.    Extraregional  States  serve  as  "mentors"  on  the specific
proposals  for confidence-building  measures.   The  Netherlands  serves  as
mentor for the work  on the communications network;  Turkey serves as mentor
on information  exchange; Canada  serves as mentor on  maritime cooperation;
and Australia  is coordinating work  in relation to  the development  of the
regional security centres.

  60/  See ASEAN  Regional Forum Chairman's  statement of 25 July 1994;  BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 July 1994, part 3 - Asia:  FE/2059/B.

  61/  General Assembly resolution 47/53 B of 9 December 1992.

  62/  See  A/48/403; this term is  in current usage  at the  United Nations
but does not represent official terminology.

  63/  United Nations peace forces in the former Yugoslavia.

  64/   The  concept  of  protected areas  has  been used  in  Croatia;  see
Security Council resolution 743 (1992).

  65/  On the  basis of Security Council resolution 824 (1993), the  Council
decided  that  the  capital  of  the  Republic  of  Bosnia  and Herzegovina,
Sarajevo, and  other  such threatened  areas,  in  particular the  towns  of
Tuzla, Zepa,  Gorazde,  Bihac and  Srebrenica,  should  be treated  as  safe
areas.

  66/   In  the  case of  Rwanda  the  Security  Council established  secure
humanitarian areas; see Council resolution 965 (1994).

  67/  In  its resolution  795 (1992), the  Security Council authorized  the
Secretary-General to  establish an UNPROFOR  presence in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia.

  68/  See A/50/60 and S/PRST/1995/9.

  69/  Security Council resolution 724 (1991).

  70/  Security Council resolutions 787 (1992) and 820 (1993).

  71/   South Africa  - Security Council resolution  421 (1977); Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya resolution 883 (1993); Angola - resolution 864 (1993).

   72/  Haiti - Security Council resolution  841 (1993); Angola - resolution
864 (1993).

  73/   Libyan Arab  Jamahiriya -  Security Council  resolution 748  (1992);

Iraq - resolution 687 (1991); Haiti - resolution 841 (1993).

  74/    The  IAEA  inspections  have  uncovered  three  clandestine uranium
enrichment  programmes:   electromagnetic,  centrifuge and  chemical isotope
separation; as  well as  laboratory-scale plutonium separation.   The  sixth
nuclear  inspection  uncovered  conclusive  evidence  of  a  nuclear-weapons
development programme  aimed at an  implosion-type nuclear weapon,  possibly
linked to a surface-to-surface missile project.

  75/  The IAEA  teams ordered and supervised  the destruction of over 1,900
individual  items as  well  as 600  tons of  specialty  alloys useful  in  a
nuclear  weapons  programme  or  in  enrichment  activities.    At  nuclear-
dedicated sites, specialized process  buildings covering a  surface area  of
some 32,500  square metres were demolished  with explosives, also  entailing
the destruction of a  large amount of high-quality equipment which had  been
installed   or  stored  at  those   sites.    With  the  completion  of  the
"destruction, removal and  rendering harmless" activities  to date,  IAEA is
confident that  there  remain no  practical  capabilities  in Iraq  for  the
production of  nuclear weapons or  of nuclearweapons-usable material  (i.e.,
highly enriched uranium or plutonium).  Highly enriched uranium  in the form
of  reactor fuel  elements and  a few  grammes of  separated plutonium  were
removed from Iraq under IAEA oversight.

  76/   At  the  end  of the  Gulf conflict,  Iraq had  declared,  as stocks
remaining,  over 500 tons  of bulk  agent, 28,000  munitions and  some 4,000
tons  of precursors.    Those items  which were  judged  safe to  move  were
transported to a central location for  destruction, while the remainder  was
destroyed  on site by  UNSCOM.   In the field of  ballistic missiles, UNSCOM
inspection teams  have  supervised  the destruction  of 151  missiles,  plus
launchers and related equipment.

  77/  United Nations Special Commission information note, March 1994.

  78/  Interview with UNSCOM personnel, May 1994.

  79/  The  U-2 aircraft, provided by the  United States, uses two types  of
sensors, a "sweeping camera" and a  high-resolution camera and is reportedly
the first reconnaissance system to be  placed under full-time United Nations
control. The three German-supplied helicopters  regularly fly with an aerial
inspection  team   on  board,  using   both  hand-held  and   gyroscopically
stabilized photographic equipment with the capability of providing a  ground
resolution in  millimetres.  Helicopters were  also used  to deploy  ground-
penetrating radar for the purpose of  identifying cavities, metal and  wires
buried underground.   Other helicopters used forward-looking infrared  radar
to provide  a  night-vision capability  for  the  immediate securing  of  an
intended  inspection site and gamma-detection equipment in order to identify
nuclear-radiation hot  spots  or emissions  that  could  be checked  out  by
ground teams.

  80/  Security Council resolution 715 (1991).
   81/   Recent  experience in  verifying  arms  control obligations  in the
context of peace-keeping operations, suggests that  there may be a  tendency
with detrimental  effects to  bypass, rather  than  adapt, approaches  which
have  proved effective  in more  traditional  contexts.   This  tendency may
result  in imprecise mandates,  lack of  proper equipment,  lack of training
and  lack of  a  complete  understanding by  the parties  themselves  of the
obligations they have assumed.

  82/   The verification experiences associated  with the implementation  of
the  INF  and  CFE  provisions  have  clearly  been  of  importance  in  the
development of subsequent multilateral verification regimes.

  83/  For example, in the experience  of the Biological Weapons Convention.
An  evolution  has  also  taken  place  with  respect  to   the  CFE  Treaty
verification regime.

  84/  See the OSCE example in particular.

  85/    See  the  OSCE  and  CFE  examples.    The  operation  of  such  an
evolutionary process seems to  be the hope  with respect to the Middle  East
peace process, South Asia and other regional cases.

  86/   Note, for example,  the emphasis placed  on enhanced transparency in
current  IAEA efforts to  strengthen the safeguards  system.   It has become
especially  clear that  greater openness  and  transparency  on the  part of
States with regard  to their nuclear activities  are crucial to the  optimum
effectiveness  of safeguards  implementation.   It has  also become apparent
that if data about such activities from all  sources available to the Agency
are more systematically collected and evaluated,  they can help better equip
the safeguards system to provide assurance about compliance with  safeguards
and  non-proliferation.    Note also  the  beneficial  effects of  increased
East/West transparency for  cooperative verification activities between  the
Russian Federation and  the United States  and between NATO and  the Central
and Eastern European States.

  87/   See for  example:   INF, START  I and  II,  other bilateral  Russian
Federation/United  States   experience.    CFE,   OSCE,  Conventional   Arms
Register, the United Nations  standardized military budgets  and the  United
Nations Principles on Objective Military Information.

  88/  This was  the case for the  IAEA verification activities with respect
to the South African nuclear-weapons programme.

  89/    See  for  example,  START  I and  II  and  other  bilateral Russian
Federation/United States experience.

  90/  See  for example:  the UNSCOM/IAEA  activities in Iraq, and the  IAEA
"Programme 93+2".

  91/   Several arms limitation and  disarmament agreements  seek to address
this question through the use of  challenge inspection provisions and  other
measures.

  92/  Challenge and short-notice inspections imply enhanced openness.
    93/  The Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly  an example on a  global
basis  of the  development  of  a  non-discriminatory  arms  limitation  and
disarmament agreement:   its ban on chemical weapons possession,  production
and  use  applies  equally  to  all   States  parties.    The   multilateral
comprehensive  test-ban treaty  and cut-off  agreements will  also  probably
need to  be non-discriminatory in  the scope of their  limitations and their
verification regimes if they are to achieve their objectives.

  94/   For example, in the CFE  quotas of inspections based on the quantity
of military equipment and facilities possessed  will lead to unequal numbers
of  inspections liabilities among  States.  In this  case, applying the same
criteria  for  determination  of  quotas  results  in  different  inspection
burdens among States.

  95/   The handling of confidential information in the  IAEA safeguards and
in  the  Chemical Weapons  Convention  are  examples.    The development  of
verification procedures  in the  bilateral Russian Federation/United  States
contexts,  which  both confirm  compliance  and  protect  sensitive  weapons
design, may have important lessons for other agreements.

  96/   See  for  example:   the UNSCOM/IAEA  activities  in Iraq  and  IAEA
safeguards.

  97/  See for example, the INF Treaty and the Chemical Weapons  Convention.
An example of what is meant by this lesson would be  the care that should be
exercised to  ensure that  the verified  destruction of  weapons should  not
cause harm to the natural environment of the State on which the  destruction
takes place or  to other States.   As  a general rule, the  agreement should

specifically   require   observance    of   an   appropriate   standard   of
"environmental care".

  98/   This  is the  case in  many United  Nations peace-keeping  operation
contexts.  See also the Middle East peace process.

  99/   Indeed, the need  to compensate  for asymmetries in  capabilities of
States in  this field was noted by  the 1990 Study Group, which, inter alia,
suggested  that  the United  Nations  could,  on  request,  explore ways  to
provide  expert  advice   to  States  contemplating  the  establishment   of
verification  structures.  The  1990 Group  also advocated  an enhanced role
for   the   United  Nations   Secretary-General   in   certain  fact-finding
activities.

  100/ This trend     is  suggested, among other cases, by the fact that the
unilateral  elimination of  all Soviet/Russian  and United  States  surface-
launched theatre  nuclear weapons and  the reciprocal bilateral  disarmament
agreements  announced  by  Presidents  Bush,  Gorbachev,  and  Yeltsin  were
implemented  with  no  agreed-upon  verification  procedures.    In  certain
circumstances,  national means  of verification  are  coming  to be  seen as
sufficient   when  combined   with  a   general  atmosphere   of   increased
transparency.

  101/  For  example,  the  CFE  Treaty verification  regime  as  originally
designed.

   102/  This  is suggested  strongly by  the  CFE experience  and the  role
assumed by  NATO's VICS.   See  also the  discussion regarding the  need for
sharing United Nations sanctions monitoring costs.

  103/  The  Open  Skies   Treaty,  for  example,   involves  some   parties
cooperating in  developing shared equipment for  surveillance aircraft.   In
the  CFE context,  NATO  countries cooperated  in  developing  multinational
inspection teams,  which  later evolved  to  include  other parties  to  the
Treaty.  The Ad Hoc Group of  Scientific Experts discussed in chapter  VI is
another  example of  the advantages  of pooling  verification resources,  in
this  case regarding  research.   United  Nations  peace-keeping  operations
reflect the ad hoc pooling by the international community of a wide  variety
of military forces and equipment.

  104/ The key example here is the CFE experience where the  absence of such
a body in  the Treaty provisions  has led  NATO's VICS  gradually to  assume
data management,  inspection coordination and  training functions on  behalf
of all the parties, in an ad hoc fashion.

  105/ This is suggested by the  Biological Weapons Convention VEREX report,
which  indicated that  the  highest-synergy potential  seemed to  be between
data declarations and on-site inspections.   This echoes lessons from  other
examples, that basic data exchanges form  the crucial foundation upon  which
subsequent verification activities occur.

  106/  The "multi-method"  verification  package  employed by  UNSCOM is  a
classic  example of a  multi-method verification  package.   While the long-
term monitoring  programme being put in  place pursuant  to General Assembly
resolution  687  (1991)  is unique  in its  scope  and intrusiveness,  it is
possible that some of  the techniques and methods  utilized in the programme
may  be  relevant  to  ongoing  efforts  to  develop  a  multilateral regime
governing  the  transfer   for  peaceful  purposes  of  sensitive   dual-use
technologies.   The  1992 Vienna  Document  has demonstrated  the use  of  a
variety  of   verification  methods   to  confirm   compliance.  The   Sinai
disengagement   process  also  made   use  of   a  multi-method  process  of
verification, as  does the multinational force  and observers  (see also the
discussion of the Biological Weapons Convention VEREX).

  107/ With the  increase in regional  organizations engaged in verification
activities  and   the  prospect   of   several  international   verification

authorities,  serious  attention should  be  paid  to the  harmonization  of
potentially overlapping and complementary activities among global,  regional
and  subregional  organizations  in  order  to  maximize  effectiveness  and
minimize both the costs  and the disruptions  associated with  verification.
The most striking  example is in the area  of nuclear safeguards where  IAEA
safeguards,  regional agreements such  as the  Treaty of  Tlatelolco and the
Euratom Treaty  and bilateral  accords such  as that  between Argentina  and
Brazil  work  in a  complementary fashion.    In  his recent  position paper
entitled  "Supplement  to   an  Agenda  for  Peace"  (A/50/60S/1995/1)   the
Secretary-General outlined several principles  relating to the  coordination
of efforts by regional  organizations and the United Nations in the area  of
peace-keeping  and  peacemaking,  which  could  also  have  application   in
verification contexts.

   108/  This point  was made  in briefings  by Ambassador  R. Ekeus  (Study
Group  document SVG/CRP.12)  and  Mr.  Bruno Pellaud  (Study Group  document
SVG/CRP.13) regarding  links between the  Chemical Weapons Convention,  IAEA
and UNSCOM.   Also, the CSCE CPC has  asked the United  Nations to assist in
making contacts (see its submission, Study Group document SVG/CRP.21).

  109/  Examples  of   potential  additional  application  of   verification
technology  include seismic monitoring  of a  nuclear test  ban treaty which
could have relevance for  geophysical research (such as  through the work of
the  Group of  Scientific Experts  discussed in  chap.  VI)  and the  use of
verification   or   confidence-building  overflight   regimes   to  aid   in
environmental monitoring. Hungary has found data  from overflights under its
bilateral  Open  Skies Agreement  with Romania  to be  of use  for pollution
control.   Opportunities  for  the additional  application  of  verification
measures may be significant  in the area of BW, because of the  considerable
overlap of civilian and military expertise.  Certain types of United Nations
peace operations may also involve verification
tasks that  could address both military  security and  environmental or land
use  applications.    Such  efforts  at additional  applications  should  be
undertaken  in a  manner  which  does not  reduce the  effectiveness  of the
technology in accomplishing its primary verification mission.

  110/  Practical experience  in the implementation of  the Chemical Weapons
Convention may contribute  to the  development of verification measures  for
the Biological Weapons Convention.  In this regard  it should be noted that,
given the overlap (i.e.  in the area of toxins) between the two Conventions,
cooperative  techniques  should  be  explored  with  a  view  to   promoting
costeffectiveness and reducing the potential for unnecessary duplication  of
effort.  See  also  the  UNSCOM/IAEA  experience  in  Iraq,  which  has been
described as a "laboratory" for verification methods.

  111/ Donated overhead imagery has been  used by UNSCOM and IAEA inspection
teams in Iraq, and  by IAEA with regard to the Democratic People's  Republic
of Korea as a supplement to other verification activities.

  112/ See,  for example,  the INF  and CFE treaties.   This need  will only
increase with the implementation of  complex agreements such as  START I and
II  and the  Chemical  Weapons  Convention.   The need  for better  and more
systematic collection and analysis of information  is also indicated in  the
context of peace operations and sanctions monitoring.

  113/ Bilateral hotlines or data lines  and the OSCE communications network
point to this.

  114/ See, for example, the submission by Dr. Arian Pregenzer (Study  Group
document SVG/CRP.28).   The  experience of  UNSCOM in  some respects  echoes
this lesson.

  115/ See in particular recent IAEA verification experience.

  116/ See, for example,  the experience of UNSCOM and IAEA with respect  to
Iraq, as well as the INF and CFE treaties.

   117/  See, for example,  the CFE  Treaty as well as  the Chemical Weapons
Convention.   The INF Treaty experience  similarly demonstrated  the need to
build  flexibility into  the  implementation  process  in order  to  provide
sufficient  time to prepare  for treaty  implementation.   It also indicated
that  there  was a  need  in advance  to  carefully evaluate  time-lines  in
reference to  the  human resource  and  equipment  requirements needed  to  
implement treaty provisions.

  118/ See, for example, the START I  and CFE experiences.  In the bilateral
United States/Russian  Federation context,  the  cooperative development  of
technological equipment  such as  fissile material  containers and  flexible
armour  blankets, the  provision of  design  assistance and  construction of
fissile material storage facilities and the development  of enhanced fissile
material  control   and  accounting   procedures  will  aid   in  the   safe
dismantlement  of  nuclear  weapons  in  the  former  Soviet  Union.   These
procedures and technologies could  be utilized for  dismantlement and secure
storage of  such weapons  in other  areas of  the  world.   As discussed  in
chapter VI, the Ad Hoc  Group of Scientific Experts  represents an important
example   of  the   value  of   technical  and  operational   research  into
verification  before an agreement is  reached to limit arms,  or even before
negotiations  begin.   The Group  is also  an example  of how  international
cooperation can be built through verification research.

  119/ See,  for example,  the CFE  Treaty.   START I  and II, the  Chemical
Weapons Convention, OSCE, and  the Open Skies Treaty.   See also the  Ad Hoc
Experts Group  discussed in  chapter VI.   The Netherlands,  Canada and  the
United  Kingdom  have  engaged  in  a  series  of  practice  inspections  of
industrial  sites in  order to  provide useful  data and experience  for the
Biological  Weapons Convention  negotiations on  the level  of confidence in
verification procedures which, might be achieved in certain circumstances.

  120/  The  experience  of  the  CFE  Treaty,  OSCE,  the  Chemical Weapons
Convention   and  of   some  bilateral   Russian   Federation/United  States
agreements highlight the importance  of providing assistance to countries in
developing such  national verification and  implementation structures.   The
same can  be said  regarding many confidence-building  agreements.   Indeed,
provision of such assistance can serve  a useful confidence-building role in
itself.   In  the context  of peace and  security operations,  assisting the
parties  in  developing  their  own  national  verification  and  compliance
structures  can form  an  integral part  of  a  post-conflict peace-building
strategy.   Asymmetries  in the  ability  of  parties to  establish national
systems for  verification and implementation was  a subject  of attention in
the 1990 Study.   Indeed, two of  its recommendations (regarding the  United
Nations  database  and  the  promotion  of  exchanges  between  experts  and
diplomats) were, in part, intended to address this problem.

  121/  See, for  example, the  UNSCOM experience  in Iraq  as well  as  the
discussion of peace  and security operations.   See also the submissions  to
the  United Nations Verification Group  by Mr. Peter von Butler; Study Group
document  SVG/CRP.5; the  submission of  Dr.  Bruno  Pellaud in  Study Group
document SVG/CRP.13; and CSCE/CPC Study Group  document SVG/CRP.16.  The  Ad
Hoc Experts Group discussed  in chapter VI can also be seen as an example in
this context.


   122/  OPCW  verifiers  working  in  the  area  of  chemical  weapons, for
example,  will  encounter  special  health  and  safety  risks.   Similarly,
verifiers in  United Nations peace-keeping  operations will encounter  risks
because  of  tensions   inherent  in  the  context  in  which   verification
activities are occurring.  See also:  UNSCOM, IAEA safeguards and CFE.

  123/  See, for example,  the CFE  and bilateral  Russian Federation/United
States  agreements.  In  peace and security  operations, in  addition to the
Security  Council,  appropriate  procedures,  forums  or  bodies  are  often
established locally among the parties to discuss such issues.

  124/  See,  for   example,  bilateral  Russian   Federation/United  States
agreements and the CFE.

  125/ The  benefits of involving  implementers in  the negotiating  process
were evident in the INF, START I and II, CFE and CSCE,  the Chemical Weapons
Convention,  the  Open  Skies  Treaty and  the  Ad Hoc  Group  of Scientific
Experts discussed in chapter VI.   This lesson may have particular relevance
in  the context of  United Nations peace  and security  operations where the
parties themselves may not be directly  involved in elaborating the specific
verification provisions and therefore have to  rely on the implementers  for
appropriate guidance.

  126/ General Assembly resolution S-10/2.   The relevant paragraphs read as
follows:

  "Disarmament and  arms limitation agreements  should provide for  adequate
measures of verification satisfactory to all  parties concerned in order  to
create the necessary confidence and  ensure that they are  being observed by
all  parties.  The  form and  modalities of the verification  to be provided
for in any  specific agreement depend upon and  should be determined by  the
purposes, scope and nature of the agreement.  Agreements should provide  for
the participation of parties directly or  through the United Nations  system
in the  verification process.  Where  appropriate, a  combination of several
methods  of verification as  well as  other compliance  procedures should be
employed." (para. 31)

    ...

  "In  order to  facilitate the  conclusion and  effective implementation of
disarmament  agreements  and to  create  confidence,  States  should  accept
appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements. (para. 91)

  "In the  context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of
verification should be further  examined and adequate methods and procedures
in  this field  be  considered.   Every effort  should  be made  to  develop
appropriate methods  and procedures which  are non-discriminatory and  which
do  not unduly  interfere  with the  internal  affairs of  other  States  or
jeopardize their economic and social development." (para. 92)


   127/  See Official  Records of  the General  Assembly, Fifteenth  Special
Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3), para. 60.  The 16 principles are:

  "(1)   Adequate and effective verification  is an essential element of all
arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

  "(2)   Verification is not  an aim in itself, but  an essential element in
the process of achieving arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

  "(3)   Verification should promote the  implementation of arms  limitation
and disarmament  measures,  build confidence  among States  and ensure  that
agreements are being observed by all parties.

  "(4)    Adequate   and  effective  verification  requires  employment   of
different  techniques,  such  as  national  technical  means,  international
technical   means   and   international   procedures,   including    on-site
inspections.

  "(5)   Verification in  the arms  limitation and  disarmament process will
benefit from greater openness.  

  "(6)  Arms limitation and disarmament  agreements should include  explicit
provisions whereby  each party undertakes not  to interfere  with the agreed
methods,  procedures  and   techniques  of  verification,  when  these   are
operating in a  manner consistent with the  provisions of the agreement  and
generally recognized principles of international law.

  "(7)   Arms limitation  and disarmament agreements should include explicit
provisions whereby each  party undertakes not  to use deliberate concealment
measures which impede verification of compliance with the agreement.

  "(8)    To  assess  the  continuing  adequacy  and  effectiveness  of  the
verification system,  an arms  limitation and  disarmament agreement  should
provide for  procedures and  mechanisms for  review and  evaluation.   Where
possible,  time  frames for  such  reviews  should  be  agreed  in order  to
facilitate this assessment.

  "(9)   Verification arrangements should be  addressed at the outset and at
every  stage of  negotiations on  specific  arms limitation  and disarmament
agreements.

  "(10)  All States  have equal  rights  to participate  in the  process  of
international verification of agreements to which they are parties.

  "(11) Adequate and effective verification arrangements must be capable  of
providing, in a timely fashion, clear  and convincing evidence of compliance
or  non-compliance.   Continued confirmation  of compliance  is an essential
ingredient to building and maintaining confidence among the parties.

   "(12) Determinations about the adequacy, effectiveness and  acceptability
of specific methods and arrangements intended  to verify compliance with the
provisions of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement  can only be made
within the context of that agreement.

  "(13) Verification of compliance with the  obligations imposed by an  arms
limitation  and  disarmament  agreement  is  an  activity conducted  by  the
parties  to  an  arms  limitation  and   disarmament  agreement  or  by   an
organization  at the request and  with the explicit consent  of the parties,
and is  an expression of  the sovereign  right of States to  enter into such
arrangements.

  "(14) Requests  for  inspections or  information  in  accordance with  the
provisions  of an  arms  limitation  and disarmament  agreement,  should  be
considered  as  a  normal  component  of  the  verification  process.   Such
requests  should  be used  only for  the  purposes of  the determination  of
compliance, care being taken to avoid abuses.

  "(15)   Verification   arrangements   should   be   implemented    without
discrimination,   and,  in   accomplishing  their   purpose,  avoid   unduly
interfering with the internal affairs of States parties or other States,  or
jeopardizing their economic, technological and social development.

  "(16)  To  be  adequate  and  effective,  a  verification  regime  for  an
agreement   must  cover   all  relevant   weapons,   facilities,  locations,
installations and activities."
 
  128/ The Secretary-General  might encourage Member States with  experience
in  the area of verifying  the destruction of  weapons to develop programmes
to assist other Member States in  their verification responsibilities.  This
might  be  done   by  organizing  visits   to  destruction   facilities,  by
demonstrations  of  systems  for  weapons  detection  and  by  demonstrating
protective equipment and procedures for weapons inspectors.

  129/ The Group  of Governmental  Experts (1991)  recommended, inter  alia,
that:  "(iv) The register  should be so designed and  maintained as to build
confidence, promote restraint  in arms transfers on a unilateral,  bilateral
or multilateral basis to enhance security ..."; see  Study on Ways and Means
of  Promoting  Transparency  in  International   Transfers  of  Conventional
Weapons  (United Nations  publication, Sales  No.  E.93.IX.6,  p. 36).   The
Group also concluded that a consultative mechanism  would be useful but that
a recommendation on  this was beyond  its mandate.   The subsequent  experts
panels (1992 and  1994) could not agree on  a recommendation on this  issue.
See A/47/342 and Corr.1, annex, and A/49/316.

  130/  See  Official Records  of the  General  Assembly, Fifteenth  Special
Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3), para. 41, and A/48/42, annex II.

  131/  The  Biological  Weapons  Convention  VEREX  report,  for   example,
concluded  that some  verification  measures in  combination  could  provide
enhanced monitoring  capabilities by increasing  the focus and improving the
quality  of  information obtained,  thereby  improving  the  possibility  of
differentiating   between  prohibited   and  permitted   activities  and  of
resolving ambiguities  about compliance.  The  United Nations could  explore
more fully the synergies associated with global agreements.

  132/  This  description  of  cooperative   monitoring  is  based   on  the
submission  on cooperative  monitoring by  Arian L.  Pregenzer,  Study Group
document SVG/CRP.28.

  133/ Note that the  information gathered and shared is only in relation to
the parties to the agreement.

  134/ Note, however,  that if the proposal  for an imagery  analysis centre
(see paras.  308-309)  is  acted upon,  it  could  assume  the  function  of
maintaining such baseline data.

  135/ The term aircraft  as used in the  present report includes fixed-wing
airplanes,  helicopters, airships,  balloons  and  unmanned aerial  vehicles
which can  be  used as  platforms  to carry  one  or  more sensors  such  as
optical,   infrared,   synthetic   aperture   radar   and   remote   optical
spectroscopy.   Gliders and ultra-light  aerial vehicles can also be used to
carry sensors.   Aircraft utilized for  surveillance can carry out  not only
photo  reconnaissance, but  also radar  surveillance, electro-optical signal
analysis and electronic information gathering.   Among other tasks, aircraft
can  help monitor  international agreements  and track  troop  and equipment
movements.

  136/ Global  Positioning System  (GPS)  equipment, which  is dependent  on
satellites,  has proven  invaluable  for many  United  Nations  verification
activities, including UNSCOM and some peace-keeping operations that  require
the accurate or rapid determination of locations.

  137/ For example, the Security Council, the Secretary-General and IAEA.

  138/ For example, OPCW.

  139/  Such  a  centre  could  provide  the  basis  for  a  United  Nations
capability  for acquiring,  integrating  and analysing  information  from  a
variety of  sources to  assist Member  States in  verifying compliance  with
multilateral and regional agreements.  This  capability to integrate or fuse
data from many sources  could allow the United Nations to provide a  channel
for exchange  of  relevant information  among  the  parties to  current  and
future  agreements aimed at controlling arms and among those bodies that are
charged  with implementing  those agreements.   See  Patricia Bliss  McFate,
Sidney  N.  Graybeal,  George Lindsey  and  D.  Marc Kilgour,  "Constraining
proliferation:   the contribution of  verification synergies", Arms  Control
Verification Studies, No. 5 (Ottawa:   Department of External Affairs, March
1993), p. 40.

  140/ France,  "Working  paper:   Space  in  the service  of  verification.
Proposal concerning a satellite imagery processing agency", CD/945.

  141/  See, for  example, a  Swedish proposal  made in  an address  to  the
Conference on Disarmament on 1 September 1994.

   142/  During his briefing  to the  group, Bruno  Pellaud, Deputy Director
General of  Safeguards, indicated  that IAEA was  seriously considering  the
development  of  a capability  to collect,  filter  and analyse  open-source
information as part of its efforts to strengthen safeguards.

  143/ In order to  reduce repetition, this  approach was preferred to  that
of organizing  the  recommendations  under the  headings of  United  Nations
activities in disarmament, confidence-building and conflict management.

  144/ The submission by Arian Pregenzer  provides excellent examples of the
sort of  commercially  available technology  that  can  form the  basis  for
productive  sharing.    In   addition,  there  are  novel  technologies  not
commercially available which  Member States may be  willing to share.   See:
document of the Study Group, SVG/CRP.28.

  145/  For further  information  see Unmanned  Aerial Vehicles  and Targets
(Coulsdon, Surrey, United Kingdom, Jane's Information Group, 1995).


/...  A/50/377
  English
  Page

A/50/377
English
Page

/...A/50/377
English
Page

A/50/377
English
Page

ANNEX I

Current applied verification experience a/

Source of
obligation b/
Verification objective
Verification
organization/
body c/
Year
Verification methods1. Peace operations
   under the Charter
   of the United
   Nations
(a) Confirm cease-fires/
    cessation of hostilities,
    troop withdrawals and
    redeployments
UNTSO
UNMOGIP
UNDOF
UNFICYP
UNIKOM
UNAVEM III
MINURSO
UNPROFOR
UNAMIR
UNOMIG
UNMOT
UNIFIL
1948-present
1949-present
1974-present
1964-present
1991-present

1995-present
1991-present
1992-present
1993-present
1993-present
1994-present
1978-present
(a) Observation posts
(b) Foot patrols
(c) Maritime patrols
(d) Aerial surveillance
(e) Liaison officers
(b)  Confirm  demilitarized  zones;  areas  of  limitation,  no-fly   zones,
protected and safe areas
UNDOF
UNFICYP
UNIKOM
UNPROFOR
UNOMIG
UNAMIR
UNOMIL
1974-present
1964-present
1991-present
1992-present
1993-present
1993-present
1993-present
(a) Observation posts
(b) Foot patrols
(c) Vehicle patrols
(d) Maritime patrols
(e) Aerial surveillance
(f) Liaison officers
(g) Satellite
    surveillance
(h) Peace-keeping
    forces
    (including
    "preventive
    deployment")
(c) Confirm relocation,
    cantonment, disarming and
    demobilization of forces
    in intra-State conflict
MINURSO
UNAMIR
UNOMIL
UNAVEM III
1991-present
1993-present
1993-present
1995-present
(a) Observation posts
(b) Foot patrols
(c) Vehicle
(d) Maritime patrols
(e) Aerial surveillance
(f) Liaison officers
(g) Escorts
(h) Destruction of arms
(i) Peace-keeping
    forces
(d) Validate sanctions
UNPROFOR
UNAVEM III

UNAMIR
1992-present
1995-present
1993-present
(a) Observation posts
(b) Check points
(c) Foot patrols
(d) Vehicle patrols
(e) Maritime patrols
(f) Aerial surveillance
(g) Satellite
    surveillance
(h) Liaison officers

(e) Validate the conduct of
    free and fair elections and
    referendums
UNAVEM III
MINURSO
1995-present
1991-present
(a) Observation
(b) Presence
(c) Security
(f) Monitor functioning of the
    local police/record major
    violations of human rights
UNAVEM III
UNPROFOR
UNMIH
UNAMIR
1995-present
1992-present
1993-present
1993-present
(a) Patrolling
(b) Investigations
(c) Inspections
(g) Monitor provision of
    humanitarian relief
UNOSOM
UNMIH
UNAMIR
UNPROFOR
1992-1994
1993-present
1993-present
1992-present
(a) Patrolling
(b) Escorts
(c) Liaison officers
(d) Investigations
(e) Inspections
(f) Peace-keeping
    forcesSecurity Council resolution 687 (1991)
(h) Confirm elimination of Iraqi
    weapons of mass destruction
    and certain ballistic
    missiles.  Confirm prevention
    of acquisition and production
    of same.
(a) UNSCOM
(b) IAEA
3 April 1991present
(a) On-site inspection
(b) Sample analysis

(c) Satellite
    surveillance
(d) Aerial surveillance
(e) Environmental
    monitoring
(f) In situ cameras,
    seals and sensors
(g) Collateral analysis
(h) Data exchanges2. Nuclear
   Non-Proliferation
   Treaty
(a) Transfers
(b) Peaceful uses
(c) Production
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
1970-present
(signed
1 July 1968)
IAEA safeguards:
(a) On-site inspection
    - Ad hoc
    - Routine
    - Special
(b) Sample analysis
(c) Records auditing
(d) In situ cameras,
    seals and sensors
(e) Data exchanges
(f) Collateral analyses3. Partial test-ban
   treaty
(a) Testing
(b) Environmental
Each party
1963-present
National Means d/4. 1925 Geneva
   Protocol (chemical
   weapons)
(a) South-East Asia
(b) Iran (Islamic
    Republic of)
(c) Azerbaijan
(d) Mozambique
(e) Bosnia
(a) Use
SecretaryGeneral
1980-present


1980
1984-1989

1992
1992
1994
(a) ad hoc on-site
    inspections
(b) Chemical analysis
(c) National means5. Chemical Weapons
   Convention
(a) Destruction
(b) Production
(c) Testing/research and
    development
(d) Transfers
(e) Use
(f) Peaceful uses

Organization for the
Prohibition of
Chemical
Weapons (OPCW)
Not yet in force (signed
13 January 1993)
(a) On-site inspections
    - Regular
    - Challenge
(b) Sample analysis
(c) Records auditing
(d) Data exchanges
(e) National means6. Biological Weapons
   Convention
(a) Destruction
(b) Production
(c) Transfers
Each party
(United Nations
Centre for Disarmament Affairs)
1975-present (signed
10 April 1972)
National means7. ENMOD Convention
(a) Use
(Consultative Committee of Experts)
1978-present (signed
18 May 1977)
National means8. Inhumane Weapons
   Convention
(a) Use
SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations
1983-present (signed
10 April 1981)
Fact-finding9. Outer Space Treaty
(a) Peaceful use
(b) Deployment
Each party
1967-present
(signed
27 January 1967)
(a) On-site inspection
    (certain
     provisions)
(b) National means10. Seabed Treaty
(a) Deployment
Each party (with assistance of United Nations)
1972-present
(signed
11 February 1971)
(a) On-site inspection
(b) National means11. Treaty of
    Tlateloco
(a) Peaceful uses
(b) Transfers
(c) Production
(d) Deployment
OPANAL
IAEA
1967-present
(signed
14 February 1967)
(a) On-site inspections
(b) Data exchanges
(c) IAEA safeguards12. Treaty of
    Rarotonga
(a) Peaceful uses

(b) Transfers
(c) Production
(d) Deployment
IAEA
1986-present
(signed
6 August 1985)
(a) IAEA safeguards13. Antarctic Treaty
(a) Peaceful uses
(b) Deployment
Each party
1961-present
(signed
1 December 1959)
(a) On-site inspection
(b) National means14. CFE Treaty;
    Concluding Act of
    the Negotiations
    on Personnel
    Strength of
    Conventional
    Armed Forces in
    Europe (CFEIA)
(a) Destruction
(b) Deployment
(c) Force levels
(d) Removal
Each party (NATO/
Verification
Coordination
Committee) (Joint
Consultative
Group)
1992-present
(CFE Treaty signed
19 November 1990; CFE 1A
Agreement
signed
29 June 1992)
(a) On-site inspections
    - Ad hoc
    - Challenge
(b) National Technical
    Means
(c) Aerial inspections
(d) Data exchanges15. OSCE Vienna
    Document
    1990/1992/1994
    (Stockholm
    Document/1986)
(a) Data
(b) Training
(c) Confidence-building
Each party (OSCE Conflict
Prevention Centre)
1986-present
(Vienna
document)
signed
4 March 1992;
Stockholm
document signed
19 September 1986)
(a) Data exchanges
(b) On-site inspections
(c) National technical

    means
(d) Confidence-building
    measures16. Open Skies Treaty
(a) Confidence-building
Each party (Open Skies Consultative Commission)
Not yet in force (signed
25 March 1992)
Aerial overflights17. Mendoza Agreement
    (chemical
    weapons)
(a) Transfers
Each party
1991-present
(signed
5 September 1991)
On-site inspections18. Joint US/UK/
    Russian Statement
    on Biological
    Weapons
(a) Destruction
(b) Production
(c) Environmental
Each party
1992-present
(signed
14 September 1992)
(a) On-site inspections
(b) National means19. Anti-Ballistic
    Missile Treaty
(a) Deployment
(b) Force levels
(c) Testing
(d) Transfers
Each party (Standing Consultative Commission)
1972-present
(signed
26 May 1972)
National technical means20. Threshold Test-    Ban Treaty
(a) Testing
Each party (Bilateral Consultative Commission)
1990-present
(signed
3 July 1974)
(a) National technical
    means
(b) Information
    exchanges
(c) On-site inspections
(d) In situ sensors
    - Seismic21. Peaceful Nuclear
    Explosions Treaty
(As under Threshold Test-Ban Treaty)
Each party (Joint Consultative Commission)
1990-present (signed
28 May 1976)
(As under Threshold Test-Ban Treaty)22.  INF Treaty
(a) Destruction
(b) Deployment
(c) Production
(d) Testing/research and
    development
Each party (Special Verification Commission)
1988-present
(signed
8 December 1987)
(a) National technical

    means
(b) Data exchanges
(c) On-site inspections23. START I and
    START II
(a) Destruction
(b) Force levels
(c) Testing (research and
    development)
(d) Transfers
Each party (Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission)
1994- (START I signed
30 July 1991;
START II signed
3 January 1993 not yet in force)  
(a) National technical
    means
(b) Data exchanges
(c) On-site inspections24. Agreement between
    the United States
    of America and
    USSR on
    Destruction and
    Non-Production of
    Chemical Weapons
    and on Measures
    to Facilitate the
    Multilateral
    Convention on
    Banning Chemicals
(a) Destruction
(b) Production
(c) Environmental
Each party
Not yet in force (signed
1 June 1990)
(a) On-site inspections
(b) National means25. Memorandum of
    Understanding
    between the
    Government of the
    United States of
    America and the
    Government of the      USSR regarding a
    Bilateral
    Verification
    Experiment and
    Data Exchange
    Related to
    Prohibition of
    Chemical Weapons
(a) Quantities
(b) Destruction
(c) Production
Each party
1990-1991
(signed
23 September 1989) (completed)
(a) National means
(b) On-site inspections
(c) Data exchanges26. Understanding
    Between the
    Government of
    the United
    States of
    America and the
    Government of

    the Russian
    Federation on
    Measures for the
    Preparation and
    Implementation
    of the Second
    Phase of the
    Wyoming
    Memorandum of
    Understanding
(a) Quantities
(b) Production
(c) Testing/research and
    development
(d) Destruction
Each party
1994 (signed
14 January 1994) (completed)
(a) Data exchanges
(b) On-site inspections
(c) National means27. Agreement Between
    Argentina and
    Brazil for the
    Exclusively
    Peaceful Use of
    Nuclear Energy
(a) Peaceful uses
(b) Transfers
(c) Production
Argentinian-Brazilian  Agency   for  Accounting  and   Control  of   Nuclear
Materials (ABACC)
1991-present
(signed
17 July 1991)
(a) On-site inspections
(b) IAEA safeguards28. Various bilateral
    nuclear trade
    agreements
(a) Production
(b) Peaceful uses
(c) Transfers
IAEA
1957-present
IAEA safeguards29. Joint Declaration
    of the
    Denuclearization
    of the Korean
    Peninsula
(a) Transfers
(b) Production
(c) Testing/Research and
    Development
(d) Peaceful uses
Each party (South/North Joint Nuclear Control Commission)
February 1992 (signed
 20 January 1992)
On-site inspections30. Agreement on
    Reconciliation,
    Non-Aggression
    and Cooperation
    and Exchange
    Between North
    and South (Korea)
(a) Force levels
(b) Deployment
(c) Confidence-building

Each party (South/North Joint Military Commission, established 7 May 1992)
February 1992
(signed
15 December 1991)
(a) Data exchanges
(b) On side inspections31. India/Pakistan
    Non-Attack on
    Nuclear Facility
    Agreement
(a) Confidence-building
Each party
1991-present
(signed
 December 1988)
National means
32. India/Pakistan
    Agreement on
    Chemical Weapons
(a) Production
(b) Deployment
(c) Use
(d) Confidence-building
Each party
1992-present
(signed
 19 August 1992)
National means33. Egypt-Israel
    peace treaty
(a) Deployment
(b) Removal
"Third-party"
(multinational
 forces and
 observers
 (MFO))
1979-present
(signed
 26 March 1979)
(a) On-site inspections
    (MFO)
(b) Control posts
(c) Aerial inspections
    (MFO)
(d) National technical
    means34. Agreement between
    Hungary and
    Romania on the
    Establishment of
    an Open Skies
    Regime
(a) Confidence-building
Each party
1991-present
(signed
 11 May 1991)
Aerial overflights35. Joint Statement
    on Inspection of
    Facilities
    containing
    Fissile Materials
    Removed from
    Nuclear Weapons
    (Russian
    Federation and
    United States)
 

(a) Destruction
(b) Quantities
Each party; IAEA
1994-present
(a) On-site inspections
(b) Data exchanges
(c) National Technical
    Means36. Joint Statement
    on Transparency
    and
    Irreversibility
    of the Process of
    Reducing Nuclear
    Weapons (Russian
    Federation and
    United States)
(a) Quantities
(b) Destruction
Each party
1995-present
(a) Data exchanges
(b) On-site inspection
/...  A/50/377
  English
  Page

A/50/377
English
Page

Notes

  a/   The  information presented  herein  is  for illustrative  rather than
interpretative purposes.  It does not  represent a judgement or  endorsement
by the Group  of Experts.   Readers  are advised  to refer  to the  original
documents  for additional detail.   The  information is  not intended  to be
exhaustive,  but  reflects   those  verification  obligations  judged   most
pertinent to the work of the Group of Experts.

  b/  The information  is presented primarily according to the nature of the
regime, moving from  the global  sphere to  the regional,  to the  bilateral
one.

  c/   Also  included in  this  column  are organizations/forums  where  the
parties to agreements discuss verification and compliance questions.

  d/   "National means" is used generally when  the verification methods are
not  specified.   When  a  treaty/agreement  explicitly  mentions  "national
technical  means" or other  methods, these  are specified in the  table.  In
general, it is  to be expected that States  parties will use their  national
technical means and their national intelligence  means in addition to  those
methods specified in the treaty/agreement.

/...  A/50/377
  English
  Page

A/50/377
English
Page

ANNEX II

Selected examples of cooperative verification technologies

1.   Database  management systems  that  store  and retrieve  extensive  and
detailed  information  have  already  become  a  major  verification   tool.
Research associated with  the development  of a  compatible system  covering
the data associated with  START I and II  will be  useful in areas in  which
international agreements  require  the  collection,  analysis,  storage  and
retrieval  of  vast   amounts  of  data.  Research   has  also  led  to  the
development, testing  and demonstration of  a comprehensive  data-management
system  to   meet  the   information  collection,   storage  and   retrieval
requirements for  the Technical Secretariat of  OPCW.   The Chemical Weapons
Convention calls for a large  and complex array of data on such subjects  as
scheduled chemicals, military  and industrial production and storage  sites,
analytical   and   toxicological   data,   scheduled  chemicals   production
quantities, as well as administrative data.   UNSCOM has developed automated
data fusion  software to assist  in planning its  inspections and  its long-
term   compliancemonitoring   activities   pursuant   to  Security   Council
resolution 687 (1991).

2.    Software  tools  are  needed   to  access  databases  containing   the
information   exchanges  and  updates   required  by  the  CFE  Treaty,  the
agreements on  confidenceand security-building measures  and the Open  Skies
Treaty.   NATO's Verification and  Implementation Coordination Staff  (VICS)
has developed VERITY, a database for managing  data exchanges, notifications
and inspection  reports regarding  the CFE  Treaty.   Each regime  generates
large amounts of  information which must  be analysed  and archived.   While
the  data  are valuable  when  analysed  solely  within  a specific  regime,
additional insights  can be  gained through analyses  of the  full range  of
data associated with the three agreements.

3.    Advanced  sensors,  information-processing  systems and  communication
systems,  designed  and developed  through  arms  control research  and from
other sources, have potential  applications in many  areas of  peace-keeping
and  disarmament/arms limitation.   Sensor  monitoring was  employed in  the
Sinai to  monitor troop  withdrawal (1976-1982).   Some types of  short- and
intermediate-range  sensors   are   installed  for   portal  and   perimeter
monitoring under the INF and START  treaties. Many sensor types  exist which
can be  used to  detect land  vehicles or  aircraft. They  have ranges  from
dozens  of metres to  several kilometres.   Some can also  detect persons at
close range.   The  types include:   pressure  sensors, ultrasound  sensors,
weighbridges,  induction loops, magnetic  sensors, passive infrared sensors,
arrays  of light-beam  interruption devices,  microphones,  seismic sensors,
photo and video cameras and radar.  They can be used,  often in combination,
to  monitor:    (a) points  (portals of  installations,  declared exit/entry
points,  road controls);  (b)  lines  (perimeters of  installations with  or
without fences  or  walls,  designated  lines  -  without  physical  barrier
through cross  country); or  (c)  areas (airbases  or larger  areas).   Some
sensor types function in a passive  mode and some function  independently of
lighting or weather conditions.

4.  These verification  technologies are especially  useful for  continuous,
permanent  monitoring  tasks.    They  might  increase  the  efficiency   of
personnel, possibly  reducing the  requirement for supporting manpower.   In
disarmament, they might make possible new, farther-reaching quantitative  or
qualitative limits on arms and armed  forces.  In peace-keeping  operations,
they  might   allow  more  comprehensive  monitoring   of  zones  and   zone
boundaries.  They might  lower the risk of casualties from friendly fire and
achieve substantial reductions in financial costs.

5.    Requirements  of the  Chemical  Weapons  Convention  have  led  to the
development  of a  number of  new  verification tools,  including  hand-held
detectors  and  highly  portable analytical  instrumentation,  required  for
conducting on-site  inspections and  on-site analysis  of samples  collected
during the  inspections.  The sample  collection, handling  and analysis and
the  methodologies  required  to  implement  the  various  Chemical  Weapons
Convention verification  regimes must meet  stringent standards for  quality
assurance and accountability  to ensure that analytical results are credible
and replicable within the international  laboratory system, certified by the

Convention.   These sampling  and analysis methodologies are being developed
to meet these standards.

6.  The hand-held microchip gas chromatograph is  an example of an effort to
miniaturize  the detection  equipment needed  by  the inspectors  under  the
Chemical Weapons  Convention to transport, while still allowing for analysis
of samples during the  conduct of inspections.  The generic detector, a tool
of  the  Convention  designed  continuously  and  automatically  to   detect
volatile Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals below human  response levels, is in  the
developmental stage; it should  be portable enough to deploy on all types of
inspections.   Two acoustic techniques,  ultrasonic pulse-echo and  acoustic
resonance spectroscopy, have  also been  developed; the  former can  measure
the fill  level in  bulk storage  containers,  and the  latter can  identify
liquid-filled munitions and categorize munitions of a similar fill type.

7.  Chemical-weapons "signatures"  analysis research has been established to
identify  and   examine  the   characteristics  (signatures)   exhibited  by
activities  which are  prohibited  or  limited under  the  Chemical  Weapons
Convention.  Knowledge of  these signatures  will support  the  development,
testing and  evaluation of systems to  detect or  recognize such activities.
The results of this research effort are expected to provide the  Preparatory
Committee  with  time  frames within  which  challenge  inspections  must be
accomplished in order to have technically justifiable results.

8.   Advanced  research  in  verification technologies  includes efforts  to
develop tags and seals.  A tamper-resistant tag is irremovably connected  to
a  piece of treaty-limited equipment  (such as a tank, aircraft or ballistic
missile).  It functions  as a unique  identifier; it proves the legality  of
the item under a  treaty and alleviates counting (each item found without  a
valid tag is immediately  recognized as a violation).   A seal  ensures that
two objects remain linked  together or that a  hatch or door remains closed.
"Remotely-interrogated" seals can be  used in a system to track and  monitor
on a  global scale  sensitive items  such as nuclear  weapons components  or
weapon-delivery systems.   Additional  emerging technologies include  "smart
video"  equipment and, with  potential future  use in  the implementation of
the  verification  of  the  Chemical  Weapons  Convention,  or  a   possible
verification  regime  for   the  Biological  Weapons  Convention,   acoustic
interferometry spectroscopy and large-volume air sampling.
ANNEX III

List of written submissions and presentations


1.  SVG/CRP.1  Contribution by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

2.   SVG/CRP.2 Contribution by Mr.  Michael Krepon, President,  The Henry L.
Stimson Center, Washington, D.C.

3.   SVG/CRP.3 Contribution by  the Stockholm  International Peace  Research
Institute (SIPRI).

4.  SVG/CRP.4 Contribution by the  United Nations Institute for  Disarmament
Research (UNIDIR).

5.   SVG/CRP.5 "Developing verification arrangements:  lessons from European
experience",  contribution by  Mr. Peter  von  Butler,  on behalf  of German
experts.

6.   SVG/CRP.6 Contribution  by Verification  Technology Information  Centre
(VERTIC), London.

7.   SVG/CRP.7 "The  Chemical Weapons  Convention:   preparations for  entry
into  force",   contribution  by  Mr.   Ian  Kenyon,  Executive   Secretary,
Preparatory  Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons, Provisional Technical Secretariat.

8.  SVG/CRP.8 "The Conference on  Disarmament's Group of Scientific Experts:
overview",  contribution  by  Dr.  Ola  Dahlman,  summarized  by  Dr.  Frode
Ringdal, Scientific Secretary of the Group of Scientific Experts.

9.   SVG/CRP.12 Summary  of points made at  presentation by UNSCOM Executive
Chairman, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus.

10.    SVG/CRP.13 Summary  of  points  made  by  Mr.  Bruno Pellaud,  Deputy
Director General of Safeguards, IAEA.

11.  SVG/CRP.14 "NATO's role in  verification and compliance monitoring  for
the CFE  Treaty and  the Vienna  Document", presentation  by Mr.  Nedimoglu,
Head, VICS, NATO.

12.     SVG/CRP.16CSCE  contribution   to  the   United  Nations  study   on
verification in all its aspects.

13.   SVG/CRP.18 Summary of  points made by  Ambassador Tibor  Toth on VEREX
experience.

14.  SVG/CRP.19Summary  of points made by  Mr. Necil Nedimoglu, Head,  VICS,
NATO.
 15.    SVG/CRP.21Further  contribution  of  the  OSCE  Conflict  Prevention
Centre, Ambassador Jan Kubis, Director.

16.    SVG/CRP.23Further  contribution  by  Mr.  Ian  R.  Kenyon,  Executive
Secretary, Preparatory Commission  for the Organization for the  Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons, Provisional Technical Secretariat.

17.   SVG/CRP.28 Submission by Mr.  Arian L.  Pregenzer, "Enhancing regional
security  agreements  through  cooperative   monitoring",  Sandia   National
Laboratories,  Albuquerque,  New  Mexico; Sandia  report,  SAND94-3250,  May
1995.


In addition to the foregoing, the Group received oral presentations from:

-Mr. Ron Cleminson,  Senior Verification Adviser,  Department of Foreign and
International Trade, Ottawa, Canada.

-Mr.  Joachim  Hutter,  Director,  Department of  Peace-keeping  Operations,
United Nations.


----- 


 

This document has been posted online by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). Reproduction and dissemination of the document - in electronic and/or printed format - is encouraged, provided acknowledgement is made of the role of the United Nations in making it available.

Date last posted: 18 December 1999 16:30:10
Comments and suggestions: esa@un.org