| United Nations | A/50/361 |
General Assembly
Distr. GENERAL
22 August 1995
ORIGINAL:
ENGLISH
Fiftieth session
Item 148 of the provisional agenda*
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND ON THE STRENGTHENING OF THE ROLE
OF THE ORGANIZATION
Implementation of the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations related to assistance to third States
affected by the application of sanctions under
Chapter VII of the Charter
Report of the Secretary-General
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
I. INTRODUCTION .........................................1 - 33
II. PROPOSALS AND SUGGESTIONS AIMED AT MINIMIZING THE
EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON THIRD STATES ..................4 - 383
A. Consultations with potentially affected States as
regards the imposition of sanctions, and
assessment of the potential impact of sanctions
on them .......................................... 4 - 113
B. Monitoring the effect of sanctions ............... 12 - 175
C. Possibility of establishing a time-frame for the
application of sanctions, based on their
objectives ....................................... 18 - 217
________________________
* A/50/150.
95-24605 (E) 060995
*9524605*/...
CONTENTS (continued)
Paragraphs Page
D. Improving the methods of work and ensuring the
transparency of the procedures of the Security
Council and the Sanctions Committees ............. 22 - 298
E. Exemptions from sanctions regimes ................ 30 - 389
III. PROPOSALS AND SUGGESTIONS ON THE PROVISION OF
ASSISTANCE TO THIRD STATES AFFECTED BY SANCTIONS .....39 - 8011
A. Establishment of guidelines for the consideration
of applications for assistance, including the
assessment of special economic problems faced by
third States as a result of sanctions ............ 39 - 4911
B. Establishment of a trust fund .................... 50 - 5615
C. Economic assistance by international financial
institutions ..................................... 57 - 6716
D. Bilateral economic assistance .................... 68 - 7219
E. Other forms of assistance ........................ 73 - 7621
F. Secretariat arrangements ......................... 77 - 8022
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The General Assembly, by resolution 49/58 of 9 December 1994 invited
the Secretary-General to submit a report on the question of the
implementation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,
including Article 50, related to the special economic problems confronting
States and arising from the carrying out of sanctions mandated under
Chapter VII of the Charter, analysing the proposals and suggestions on this
issue contained in the report of the Special Committee on the Charter of
the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the
Organization, on its 1994 session, giving due attention to the possible
practical ways and means of carrying them out.
2. At its 1995 session, 1/ the Special Committee:
(a) Recalled the above-mentioned invitation;
(b) Considered that the Secretary-General might usefully take into
account, in preparing the requested report, the suggestions and proposals
contained in the report of the Special Committee on its 1995 session;
(c) Invited the General Assembly to consider the establishment of an
openended working group within the framework of the Sixth Committee, at the
fiftieth session of the General Assembly, with a view to considering the
issue of the implementation of the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations related to assistance to third States affected by the application
of sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, on the basis of the
Secretary-General's report.
3. Further to the invitation contained in the above-mentioned General
Assembly resolution and in the report of the Special Committee, the
Secretary-General has prepared the present report which reviews the
proposals and suggestions made or referred to at the two above-mentioned
sessions of the Special Committee. The report also analyses, as the case
may be, the reaction that those proposals and suggestions elicited in the
Special Committee and suggests, where appropriate, possible practical ways
to carry them out, should States decide to adopt them.
II. PROPOSALS AND SUGGESTIONS AIMED AT MINIMIZING THE
EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON THIRD STATES
A. Consultations with potentially affected States
as regards the imposition of sanctions, and
assessment of the potential impact of sanctions
on them
4. At the 1994 session of the Special Committee, the following paragraph
was suggested for inclusion in a General Assembly resolution (see also
paras. 13, 39, 50 and 73 below):
"The General Assembly,
"...
"8. Also requests the Security Council to consider the establishment of
a permanent mechanism for consultation between the Council and those Member
States most likely to be affected as a result of their implementation of
Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions;" 2/
5. In favour of the proposal, the point was made that, if adopted, States
called upon to bear an inordinate burden of the sanctions would have early
warning and a chance to be consulted beforehand. It was also noted that
such a preventive approach would be preferable to ex post facto action. As
the goal of sanctions was not to harm third States, due consideration
should be given to their situation before applying sanctions.
6. It was further pointed out that while military action was urgent by
nature and did not admit delays, economic sanctions took time to put in
place and were slow to produce results, so that the holding of prior
consultations would not adversely affect their effectiveness.
7. On the other hand, the point was also made that a decision of the
Security Council to apply sanctions could not be subjected to any condition
not provided for in the Charter. In the maintenance of international peace
and security, it was stated, the Council must be able to act swiftly, and
urgency might make it difficult or impossible for it to conduct prior
consultations.
8. In this connection, the Secretary-General notes that, under Article 41
of the Charter, the Security Council may decide to employ various mandatory
measures, including economic sanctions, in order to modify the behaviour of
a party that represents a threat to international peace and security.
While all Members of the United Nations must apply such measures, the cost
for a few States that happen to be neighbours or major trading partners of
the target State may prove to be inordinately high.
9. In "An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111), the Secretary-General had
proposed that States suffering collateral damage from the sanctions regimes
should be entitled not only to consult the Security Council but also to
have a realistic possibility of having their difficulties addressed.
Subsequently, in the "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" (A/50/60-S/1995/1,
para. 75), the Secretary-General suggested the establishment of a mechanism
to carry out the following five main functions:
"(a) To assess, at the request of the Security Council, and before
sanctions are imposed, their potential impact on the target country and on
third countries;
"(b) To monitor application of the sanctions;
"(c) To measure their effects in order to enable the Security Council to
fine-tune them with a view to maximizing their political impact and
minimizing collateral damage;
"(d) To ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable
groups;
"(e) To explore ways of assisting Member States that are suffering
collateral damage and to evaluate claims submitted by such States under
Article 50."
10. Further to the above proposals, the Security Council, when considering
the imposition of a sanctions regime, may undertake consultations with
third States most likely to be affected as a result of the implementation
of the mandatory measures. Such consultations would be an essential factor
in ensuring the effectiveness of the sanctions by taking into account the
specific concerns of Member States. The Council may also wish to take into
consideration the views of relevant intergovernmental organizations with
regard to the scope and the modalities of the proposed sanctions regime.
11. Experience gained from the application of sanctions suggests that the
Security Council would benefit from an assessment of prevailing conditions
in the target State and its economic links, including an analysis of the
predictable effects of the intended measures on third countries. The
Secretariat would undertake such an analysis and assessment drawing on
expertise available not only in the Organization itself but also in the
international financial institutions and other programmes and agencies of
the United Nations system. If such expertise were not readily available
within the United Nations system, expert advice from external sources would
have to be sought. In this respect, it may be recalled that the guidelines
of the Sanctions Committee concerning the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had
envisaged the assistance of experts from outside the United Nations system,
whenever necessary. Such external expertise has also been utilized by the
United Nations in relation to the Iraqi and Yugoslav sanctions regimes.
B. Monitoring the effect of sanctions
12. At the 1995 session of the Special Committee, the proposal was made to
establish a permanent mechanism for consultations between the Security
Council and potentially affected third States, which might include: a
preliminary assessment of sanctions or a pre-feasibility study based on
objectivity and cost-effectiveness in terms of burden-sharing; regimes of
exemption and criteria for suspension; and effective ways and means for
addressing special economic problems arising from sanctions implementation.
In this connection, at the 1994 session of the Special Committee, it had
been proposed that the Council pay special attention to the problems
arising from the disruption of communication and transportation lines
caused by the implementation of sanctions, as well as to the need to
preserve existing infrastructural links, taking into account the
unnecessary adverse effects of sanctions as mentioned in section IV of
General Assembly resolution 47/120 B of 20 September 1993.
13. Also at the 1994 session and bearing in mind the need to avoid the
unnecessary adverse effects of sanctions, the following paragraph was
suggested for inclusion in a General Assembly resolution (see also paras. 4
above and 39, 50 and 73 below):
"The General Assembly,
"...
"3. Requests the Security Council to ensure that its committees and
other bodies entrusted with the task of monitoring the implementation of
sanctions take into account, in discharging their mandates, the need to
avoid hardship consequences for other Member States without prejudice to
the effectiveness of such sanctions;" 2/
14. Furthermore, at the 1995 session of the Special Committee, support was
expressed for the Secretary-General's proposal contained in his "Supplement
to an Agenda for Peace" to establish a mechanism, already referred to in
paragraph 9 above (particularly subpara. (c)), and paragraphs 15 and 77
below.
15. It is the view of the Secretary-General that this mechanism would
enable a comprehensive impact assessment to be undertaken at the request of
the Security Council, following the imposition of sanctions, with a view to
making necessary adjustments to the sanctions, in order to maximize their
political impact and minimize their collateral effects. Ideally, such
monitoring of the effects of the sanctions should take place on an ongoing
basis, so as to ensure that necessary modifications are made in a timely
and regular fashion. Under the relevant resolutions of the Council, the
general task of monitoring the application of the mandatory measures
imposed by the Council is entrusted, as a rule, to the relevant sanctions
committees which are serviced by the Security Council Affairs Division of
the Department of Political Affairs. The Council could entrust its
sanctions committees with the additional task of assessing the political
and socio-economic impact of the sanctions with a view to making necessary
recommendations to the Council. The addition of this substantive
functioning would, however, require a strengthening of the Security Council
Affairs Division.
16. Because of the need for specialized expertise, not readily available
in the United Nations, in the recent cases of sanctions against Haiti and
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the
Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU), jointly
with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the
latter two of which through a network of sanctions assistance missions
located in States neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), have played an important role in monitoring the
implementation and impact of sanctions. In order to better support the
various sanctions committees, the Secretariat should draw upon all
available expertise in the United Nations system and seek outside expert
advice on matters relating to the implementation of sanctions.
17. For the most severely affected third countries, the task of assessing
and verifying actual losses and additional costs incurred by the affected
country, as well as identifying particular areas of assistance, would best
be served by special fact-finding missions being dispatched by or on behalf
of the Security Council or its relevant sanctions committees. The Council
could draw upon such mission reports at the time it reviews the sanctions.
In the cases of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and Iraq, such
missions visited Zambia, Mozambique and Jordan, respectively (see S/26705,
pp. 7-12, 27 and 28).
C. Possibility of establishing a time-frame for
the application of sanctions, based on their
objectives
18. At the 1995 session of the Special Committee, it was suggested that a
solution to the question of assistance to affected third States could be
found by means of improving the mechanisms and criteria concerning the
implementation and lifting of sanctions. In this connection it was noted
that sanctions should have clearly defined objectives and should be lifted
once those objectives were met, so as not to prolong unnecessarily the
adverse effects on third States and on innocent civilians.
19. The Secretary-General has underlined in the "Supplement to An Agenda
for Peace" (A/50/60-S/1995/1, para. 68) the importance of clearly defining
the objectives for which specific sanctions regimes are imposed. The
SecretaryGeneral noted that such objectives are sometimes not clearly
defined or change over time. This makes it difficult for the Security
Council to determine when the objective can be considered as achieved and
sanctions lifted. The President of the Security Council, in a statement
made on behalf of the Council on 22 February 1995 (S/PRST/1995/9),
supported the views expressed by the Secretary-General, and stated: (a)
that the object of economic sanctions was to modify the behaviour of a
country or party which represented a threat to international peace and
security; (b) that the steps demanded of the country or party subject to
sanctions should be clearly defined by the Council; and (c) that the
sanctions regime should be subject to periodic review, and should be lifted
when the objective of the appropriate provisions of the relevant Council
resolutions were achieved.
20. A number of Member States have proposed that when the Security Council
decides to impose sanctions it should, at the same time, define objective
criteria for determining that their purpose has been achieved. This
function has to be seen in the light of the power of the Council, under the
Charter, to address on a case-by-case basis situations falling within the
purview of Article 39 of the Charter, and to lay out objectives and
conditions which have to be met by the target State or party.
21. It is recognized that there is a need for monitoring and review of the
situation which resulted in the imposition of the sanctions. Periodic
reviews should be made an integral component of a sanctions regime. Such
reviews have been provided in the case of sanctions against Iraq, the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and, most recently, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Resolutions imposing sanctions could
explicitly make provision for periodic reviews, rather than having the
reviews on an ad hoc or "continuous" basis. Reviews by the Council are
normally conducted in the course of informal consultations, with a view to
assessing the level of compliance of the target State or party with the
obligations and conditions stipulated in the relevant resolutions. The
work of the Council would benefit from reports submitted by the Secretary-
General, at the request of the Council, containing an impartial assessment
of the effectiveness of the sanctions and their impact. The strengthening
of the capacity of the Secretariat for monitoring and assessment of the
sanctions would make possible such timely and reliable reports.
D. Improving the methods of work and ensuring the transparency
of the procedures of the Security Council and the sanctions
committees
22. At the 1994 session of the Special Committee, it was argued that the
current method of work of the Security Council, which relies heavily on
closed informal consultations, prevents potentially affected States from
exercising their rights under Article 50 of the Charter at a sufficiently
early stage. It was suggested that those States should be invited by the
Council to take part in the consultations relating to the institution or
review of sanctions.
23. The above-mentioned suggestions, however, gave rise to objections.
Thus, it was said that the sensitive issues within the sanctions
committees' mandate were more appropriately discussed in closed meetings
and that suggestions of a lack of transparency in the work of the Security
Council largely ignored the realities of the situation. There was really
no lack of knowledge or information on the part of any delegation as to
what the Council was contemplating before it took action and Member States
were not denied the opportunity to make their views known to the Council at
any time.
24. At the 1995 Special Committee's session, 1/ the following specific
proposals were also made: that a press release be issued, as a general
rule, after each meeting of each sanctions committee; that a monthly
edition of the status of communications under the "no-objection" procedure
be prepared by the Secretariat in respect of the Committees established
under Security Council resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990 and 724
(1991) of 15 December 1991; that the Secretariat also prepare a monthly
list of favourable decisions by each sanctions committee; that the report
of the Council to the General Assembly contain more information on the work
of such committees; that consideration be given to the publication of an
annual report by each committee; and that the summary records of the
committees be issued in a more timely fashion.
25. The Secretary-General notes that, before imposing sanctions on the
target State, the Security Council may decide to invite neighbouring
States, as well as major trade partners of the target State, to participate
collectively or individually in its informal consultations, so as to give
them the possibility to apprise the Council of their concerns and submit
specific proposals.
26. In the course of the discussions in the Special Committee, a number of
States raised objections to any arrangements which might conflict with the
need of the Council to act swiftly in urgent situations. In this
connection, it may be noted that in cases in which the imposition of
sanctions represents an immediate reaction to a sudden event, as in the
case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the suggested consultations with the
affected States could take place immediately after the sanctions have been
imposed.
27. The monthly circulation of the tentative forecast of the Security
Council's programme of work, including a list of forthcoming reports of the
SecretaryGeneral and reviews of existing sanctions regimes, would help
affected States to plan in advance the submission of relevant data or
communications to the Council.
28. The Security Council could also mandate the relevant sanctions
committees and their working groups concerning Article 50 to monitor and
report on the response of the international community to the appeals
addressed by the Secretary-General for assistance to the applicant States
(see also, in this connection, para. 43 below).
29. With a view to further streamlining the working procedures of the
sanctions committees and promoting greater transparency in the conduct of
their work, the President of the Security Council on 29 March 1995 outlined
significant measures to be implemented by the various committees
(S/1995/234). In this regard, it should be noted that the respective
committees, drawing on their own experience as well as from the experience
of other sanctions committees, have also initiated certain measures to
simplify their procedures of work and promote more transparency. Without
prejudice to the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed by the Council, the
committees have attempted to minimize the hardship consequences on other
Member States by taking steps to facilitate the expeditious processing of
applications for shipments of allowable goods, particularly from affected
States. The sanctions committees have, when appropriate, made
recommendations to the Security Council to amend existing sanctions regimes
in order to respond to certain, mostly humanitarian, emergencies.
E. Exemptions from sanctions regimes
30. In the course of the 1994 and 1995 sessions of the Special Committee,
it was suggested that, when appropriate, the Security Council might decide
to allow some exceptions from the application of sanctions in favour of
States most likely to be affected by their implementation, provided that
those exceptions did not run counter to the object of the sanctions. When
necessary, a mechanism for international control could be introduced for
this purpose.
31. It was noted in this connection that the question of sanctions should
not be looked at in isolation. Due account should be taken of the
enforcement and implementation costs for the United Nations. Consideration
should be given in any study related to Article 50 of the Charter to
introducing in the administration of sanctions regimes an element of cost
recovery from those making applications to a sanctions committee.
32. The suggestion was also made that the sections of the Secretariat
dealing directly with sanctions, including the consideration of submissions
of affected third States, should be reinforced as envisaged by the
President of the Security Council in his statement of 22 February 1995
(S/PRST/1995/9) (see, in this connection, para. 78 below).
33. As regards this group of proposals, the Secretary-General notes that
the practice, so far, has been for the Security Council itself or the
relevant sanctions committees to grant partial or limited exemptions under
exceptional circumstances, on a case-by-case basis, and under appropriate
forms of monitoring or control.
34. Indeed, the Security Council has consistently made provision for
limited exemptions permitting certain transactions with the target State in
order to meet the essential humanitarian needs of its civilian population.
Furthermore, in the case of the sanctions against Haiti, in addition to
humanitarian supplies, "trade in informational materials" was exempted by
Security Council resolution 917 (1994) of 6 May 1994 in the interest of
ensuring the free flow of information. In its resolution 967 (1994) of 14
December 1994, the Council also authorized, for humanitarian
considerations, the export of diphtheria anti-serum for 30 days from the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as an exemption to
the mandatory sanctions against that country. Notwithstanding the existing
arms embargo, the Council in its resolution 1005 (1995) of 17 July 1995
authorized the supply to Rwanda of appropriate amounts of explosives
intended exclusively for use in established humanitarian de-mining
programmes.
35. Furthermore, the Security Council has authorized designated
transactions or services for specific commodities or products of crucial
importance to neighbouring States or the maintenance of certain
transportation or communication links. For example, by its resolution 883
(1993) of 11 November 1993 concerning the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the
Council exempted from the freeze specific funds derived from the sale or
supply of any petroleum or petroleum products, including natural gas and
natural gas products, or agricultural products or commodities, originating
in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and exported therefrom. In the case of the
Iraqi sanctions, the relevant committee, in view of Jordan's special
economic problems, took note in May 1991 of Jordan's request for resumption
of imports of oil and oil derivatives from Iraq, pending any arrangements
that could be made to obtain supplies of oil from other sources and on the
understanding that such Iraqi oil exports were subject to the provisions of
Council resolution 692 (1991) of 20 May 1991. With a view to preserving
the safety of international navigation on the River Danube, the Council has
exceptionally allowed vessels of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) to use the locks of the Iron Gates I system on the left
hand bank of the Danube while those on the right hand bank of the river
underwent urgent repairs (Security Council resolution 992 (1995) of 11 May
1995). In addition, the sanctions committee concerning Yugoslavia has, on
several occasions, authorized, as an exemption, the supply of fuel to the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for ice-breakers in
connection with navigation on the Danube and the transit of electric energy
through that country to Albania.
36. The authority to determine the circumstances under which exemptions
from the measures decided by the Security Council can be granted without
compromising the objective of the sanctions resides solely with the
Council. As to the form in which exemptions may be granted, the Council
could decide on such an exemption in the resolution by which it imposes
sanctions, or by a subsequent resolution. The Council could also delegate
to the relevant sanctions committee the authority to grant or renew an
exemption, especially if the conditions have been stated in a resolution.
The Council may adopt a flexible approach, initially granting the exemption
for a short period of time, and renewing or extending it if the intended
results were being achieved. On the other hand, the Council could withdraw
an earlier exemption or tighten the monitoring arrangements to ensure that
the effectiveness of the sanctions is not undermined.
37. In case an exemption is granted, the State or States in question
should report at specific intervals to the Security Council or the relevant
committee on the implementation of the exemption, providing details such as
quantities of goods traded, revenues involved, the volume of traffic
through authorized transportation and communication links, the progress in
solving the situation which determined the initial granting of the
exemption, violations detected and measures taken to prevent them.
38. The granting of exemptions and their monitoring would require an
enhanced capacity on the part of the Secretariat, particularly when the
Security Council or the relevant sanctions committee request the Secretary-
General to carry out ad hoc missions to verify the implementation of the
exemptions and submit periodic reports. In addition, the Council or the
sanctions committees could seek the assistance of regional and other
intergovernmental organizations.
III. PROPOSALS AND SUGGESTIONS ON THE PROVISION
OF ASSISTANCE TO THIRD STATES AFFECTED
BY SANCTIONS
A. Establishment of guidelines for the consideration of
applications for assistance, including the assessment
of special economic problems faced by third States as
a result of sanctions
39. At the 1994 session of the Special Committee, the following paragraph
was suggested for inclusion in a General Assembly resolution (see also
paras. 4 and 13 above, and 50 and 73 below):
"The General Assembly,
"...
"7. Requests the Security Council to consider preparing a set of
guidelines and/or procedure to be applied in the consideration of the
applications by the affected countries for assistance, in the context of
Article 50. The guidelines may include, inter alia:
"(a) The right to approach the Security Council for assistance;
"(b) Consideration, without exception and undue delay, of all
applications for assistance under Article 50;
"(c) Rendering non-preferential and fair treatment to all applications;
"(d) Inviting the affected Member States to its meetings and to the
meetings of its subsidiary bodies;
"(e) Procedure and methodology for determining and evaluating losses as
a result of the imposition of sanctions;" 2/
40. At the same session, it was suggested that the practical problem of
the assessment of the actual damage suffered by third States as a result of
the imposition of sanctions should be addressed and that a methodology
should be developed to that end. Such a methodology could not be developed
in the abstract and would have to be based on a technical study aimed at
determining the criteria to be applied, which should be carried out by
international financial institutions, the opinion of Member States being
also solicited. It was also proposed that the Secretary-General, in his
capacity as Chairman of the Administrative Committee on Coordination,
should be requested to undertake an in-depth study of the methodology to be
used in assessing damage caused to third States and that the role which
could be played by the Economic and Social Council should also be explored.
41. As regards these proposals, the Secretary-General notes that, in order
to permit the more effective and prompt consideration of applications under
Article 50 by the respective sanctions committees, a set of guidelines or
procedures would be useful. Such guidelines or procedures should cover,
inter alia, the following:
(a) The right to approach the Security Council;
(b) Expeditious consideration of all applications for assistance under
Article 50;
(c) Rendering non-preferential and fair treatment to all applications;
(d) Inviting the affected Member States to its meetings and to the
meetings of its subsidiary bodies;
(e) The methodology for determining and evaluating losses as a result of
the imposition of sanctions.
42. The guidelines should also include provision for the Security Council
to undertake periodic reviews of the response of the international
community to the appeals addressed by the Secretary-General for assistance
to the applicant States. To that end the Council could request the
Secretary-General, or the sanctions committees, to monitor the assistance
provided to affected States. The guidelines may also contain a general
statement to the effect that the resolutions imposing sanctions, or the
recommendations issued in response to applications under Article 50, will
include a request to States and international agencies to report to the
Secretary-General on the assistance provided. Such reports would be
consolidated for review and consideration by the Security Council.
43. In this connection, the Secretary-General, in his previous report
(A/48/573-S/26705, para. 159), observed that it was essential that both the
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council join and support the
appeal by the Security Council, in the context of Article 50 of the
Charter, and its follow-up by the Secretary-General for assistance to
States confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying
out of preventive or enforcement measures imposed by the Security Council.
He also observed that that would emphasize and enhance the commitment of
the international community to respond positively and expeditiously to the
requests for assistance in such circumstances. Moreover, given the
functions and powers vested in the Economic and Social Council under
Articles 63 and 64 of the Charter, it might play, within its new
structures, a useful coordination role in relation to relevant activities
of the specialized agencies and other components of the United Nations
system. In the Secretary-General's view, that would give a timely and
practical meaning to cooperation between the Security Council and the
Economic and Social Council, as provided under Article 65 of the Charter.
44. As regards the methodology for impact assessment, namely for
evaluating losses and special economic problems faced by third States as a
result of sanctions, it should be noted that, in practice, the essence of
the consultation process between the Security Council and an affected
State, under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter, has been the
examination by the Council or its subsidiary body of the State's request
for assistance, based on the State's own estimates of the losses and costs
incurred by it as a result of carrying out of the sanctions mandated by the
Council. Despite numerous cases of past and current application of Article
50, in connection with sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, Iraq and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), there is no uniform
and internationally recognized methodology for identifying and assessing
the special economic problems of non-target States affected by the
implementation of mandatory economic sanctions. Thus, affected countries
as well as the funding agencies have performed separately their
quantitative assessments, often applying different standards and criteria.
As a result, the available evaluations differ substantially in timing,
coverage and scope. Moreover, the range of remedial measures formulated in
the process of such examination and the level of the follow-up assistance
activities, have also been viewed differently by the affected countries and
the donor community.
45. Naturally, the actual magnitude of the sanctions collateral damage may
vary substantially from case to case. Among various affected countries,
those nations that are most contiguous -geographically and/or
economically - to the sanctioned State tend to experience the most severe
hardships as a result of the sanctions. In such instances, the tasks of
undertaking, in cooperation with the Government concerned, a reliable
assessment of the affected country's needs and suggesting appropriate
remedies can be best served by an ad hoc United Nations inter-agency
mission being dispatched on the spot. For example, in the case of
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, such missions visited Zambia and
Mozambique; and in the case of sanctions against Iraq, such a mission was
sent to Jordan. The missions' reports submitted to the Security Council
(and/or the Economic and Social Council) provided detailed analyses of the
specific country situations and served as an important basis for action on
behalf of those affected countries.
46. However, as sanctions have become a more commonly used instrument for
peace and security, a larger number of States have been affected by the
implementation of the United Nations-imposed sanctions and have invoked
Article 50 of the Charter. For this reason, it is essential to identify a
set of general principles or criteria for the purpose of impact analysis
and collateral damage assessment on a more standardized, comparable and
mutually acceptable basis. In turn, an accurate impact assessment is
necessary both to design the appropriate domestic policy response and to
seek the adequate external assistance. As regards the latter, the primary
task should be, therefore, to develop a truly common methodology which will
be used by the affected States in preparing the explanatory material for
their requests for assistance as well as by the United Nations system,
including the international financial institutions, in considering the
provision of assistance.
47. Most recently, methodological issues and data problems of impact
analysis were addressed in several United Nations publications 3/ prepared,
in particular, by the Department for Economic and Social Information and
Policy Analysis of the Secretariat, as well as special studies carried out
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP). Yet, no substantive intergovernmental or inter-agency
discussion on methodology of impact assessment has thus far taken place.
Nevertheless, there appears to be an emerging consensus on several basic
principles or guidelines for identifying and assessing the special economic
problems of States arising from the implementation by them of sanctions
imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter.
48. In order to ensure its system-wide origin and application, a general
methodology could be elaborated, as previously suggested (see A/48/573-
S/26705, para. 155), by an ad hoc expert body to be convened under the
auspices of the Administrative Committee on Coordination, with the
participation of the United Nations, including the Department for Economic
and Social Information and Policy Analysis, IMF, the World Bank, UNDP and
other competent organizations of the United Nations system. Upon
completion, the proposed methodology should be submitted to Member States
whose political support both at the United Nations intergovernmental bodies
(e.g., the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and
Social Council) and in the governing bodies of the agencies concerned would
be necessary for its universal acceptability and effective application.
Subsequently, UNDP could provide, through its resident coordinator system,
technical assistance to interested States with regard to the dissemination
and utilization of the methodology. When needed, the services of special
consultants or small expert missions could also be made available to the
most severely affected countries to assist them in quantifying their losses
and costs resulting from the implementation of sanctions, according to the
established methodology.
49. The credibility of the process is predicated upon the availability of
reliable and up-to-date macroeconomic data concerning the affected
countries. As this has not always been the case, data problems have imposed
considerable limitations on the evaluation of claims submitted by several
countries in question. For this reason, the proposed course of action in
developing a common methodology of impact assessment should be supplemented
and supported by furthering cooperation on a system-wide basis and beyond
in the area of statistics. As a result, this would not only improve the
collection and processing of statistical information, but also upgrade the
quality of impact assessment by the affected countries.
B. Establishment of a Trust Fund
50. At the 1994 session of the Special Committee, the following paragraphs
were suggested for inclusion in a General Assembly resolution (see also
paras. 4, 13 and 39 above and 73 below):
"The General Assembly,
"...
"1. Decides to establish a trust fund, consistent with relevant
resolutions of the Security Council, to assist financially third States
affected by the imposition of sanctions under Chapter VII; contributions to
the fund shall consist of:
"(a) A percentage of assessed contributions;
"(b) Voluntary contributions from Member States and from funds available
to international organizations both inside and outside the United Nations
system, in particular the international financial institutions and the
regional development banks, as well as non-governmental organizations and
private institutions and individuals;
"2. Invites the Security Council:
"(a) To determine the level of the Trust Fund for each particular case
of the imposition of sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter (on a
caseby-case basis), in accordance with the submissions made by the affected
Member States;
"(b) To manage and operate the Trust Fund where appropriate in
consultation with the Secretary-General, or any other body deemed
appropriate by the Security Council for this purpose, and the affected
Member States should be able to approach this body without any exception
for redressal of their problems;
"...
"4. Invites the Secretary-General to prepare draft guidelines on the
operation of the Trust Fund and to present these guidelines to the Security
Council for further consideration and adoption;
"5. Resources from the Trust Fund should be utilized to provide direct
financial assistance, inter alia, through bilateral or multilateral credit
lines, as well as to finance technical cooperation programmes in support of
the affected countries, in the context of Article 50;".
51. In favour of the proposal, the view was expressed in the Special
Committee that the idea of a fund was not new; it had found expression, for
instance, in the establishment in 1991 of the Global Environment Facility,
which had been set up to address specific environmental problems. It was
noted that a proposal of this nature provided a better response to the
problems of countries affected by the imposition of sanctions than
bilateral assistance or existing financial institutions, which were
established for different purposes. It was also pointed out, in support of
the proposal, that the right to consult provided for in Article 50 of the
Charter was not an end in itself and was intended by the drafters of the
Charter to have tangible and concrete effects.
52. On the other hand, the view was also expressed that the problem of
assistance to third States was very complex and of such magnitude that
requests for assistance were bound to exceed by far the resources of the
proposed fund. It was important to keep in mind that it was essential to
respect the basic provisions of the Charter and that there was an
unqualified obligation to apply mandatory sanctions. It was also noted
that the concept of compensation for any economic damage consequent on the
imposition of sanctions was not found in the Charter.
53. The draft resolution referred to in paragraph 50 above contains a
proposal for the General Assembly to establish a trust fund that would be
funded by a percentage of assessed contributions as well as by voluntary
contributions. The draft resolution would also invite the Security Council
to determine the level of the trust fund for each particular case of the
imposition of sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, and to manage and
operate the trust fund where appropriate in consultation with the
Secretary-General.
54. The establishment and management of trust funds are governed by the
Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations and require
observance of the Staff Regulations and Rules of the United Nations and
other policies or procedures promulgated by the Secretary-General.
Contributions to trust funds are made on a voluntary basis to finance the
activities for which the fund was established. It is therefore stressed
that if a trust fund is to be established, the principles of assessed
contributions, as proposed in operative paragraph 1 (a) of the draft
resolution, do not apply.
55. The administration of trust funds falls under the responsibility of
the Secretary-General. Should the General Assembly decide to adopt the
proposal referred to in paragraph 50 above, responsibility for the
establishment and management of the trust fund should be entrusted to the
Secretary-General in accordance with terms of reference as decided by the
Security Council.
56. It is also the view of the Secretary-General that prior to the
establishment of any such trust fund, there should be some clear indication
and assurance that voluntary contributions from Member States would be
forthcoming.
C. Economic assistance by international
financial institutions
57. At the 1994 and 1995 sessions of the Special Committee, it was
suggested that rather than envisaging the setting up of new institutions
for the assistance to third States affected by the application of
sanctions, utilization should be made of existing international financial
institutions, such as the World Bank, IMF, regional development banks, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), UNDP and non-governmental
organizations. Those institutions, it was argued, were well placed to
assist in the formulation of policies and in coordinating financial
assistance to adversely affected States. It was also noted, in this
connection, that international financial institutions should open special
windows of credit to provide direct assistance or to support technical
projects, and that the compensatory and contingency financing facility of
IMF should be more actively utilized.
58. On the other hand, the view was also expressed that international
financial institutions did not in themselves provide a comprehensive
solution, since they lacked the necessary additional resources and the
mechanisms to solve the problems.
59. The report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to the note by
the President of the Security Council (S/25036) regarding the question of
special economic problems of States as a result of sanctions imposed under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (A/48/573-S/26705)
contains, in its relevant sections, detailed information on the assistance
activities undertaken by the United Nations system, in particular the
international financial institutions (the World Bank and IMF) and UNDP, and
the regional development banks, on behalf of the affected countries
invoking Article 50 of the Charter. Additional and more recent information
in this regard is available in the report of the Secretary-General,
entitled "Economic assistance to States affected by the implementation of
the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" (A/49/356), as well as the
annual overview reports of the Administrative Committee on Coordination for
the years 1992 (E/1993/81), 1993 (E/1994/19) and 1994 (E/1995/21).
60. The information provided in those reports indicates that the competent
agencies, organizations and bodies of the United Nations system, including
the international financial institutions, share the concern about the
special economic problems of States arising from the implementation by them
of sanctions imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter and have taken due
note of the relevant recommendations of the Security Council sanctions
committees as well as the follow-up appeals for assistance to the affected
countries. In response, most of the agencies intensified their assistance
activities with regard to such countries, while acting within their
respective mandates, existing facilities and available financial resources.
In several cases, they undertook emergency measures and launched special
assistance projects with a view to mitigating the immediate hardships
encountered and urgent needs faced by the affected countries.
61. For example, IMF took prompt action, in 1990, to adapt and expand its
facilities and policies to provide financial support to its member
countries affected by the Gulf crisis. Those measures, which remained in
effect in 1991-1992, as appropriate, included: (a) introduction of a
temporary "oil element" into the compensatory and contingency financing
facility to compensate member countries for sharp, unexpected rises in the
cost of their imports of crude petroleum, petroleum products and natural
gas; (b) quicker access to compensatory credit - in the wake of a steep
fall in export receipts - by using more estimated, rather than actual, data
to calculate the shortfall; (c) broader coverage of compensatory financing
under the compensatory and contingency financing facility by extending
eligibility for financial compensation to a wider range of services,
including shortfalls in earnings from pipelines, canal transit fees,
shipping, transportation, construction and insurance; (d) added flexibility
in obtaining contingency financing in the framework of IMF stand-by and
extended arrangements already in force that would have at least six months
left to go, at the time of their review; (e) increased or accelerated
disbursement of financing under IMF arrangements by rephasing of drawings
and augmentation of financing to member countries reinforcing their
adjustment efforts; (f) increased flexibility with regard to the
availability of low-cost financing extended to poorer countries under the
enhanced structural adjustment facility; and (g) temporary relaxation or
suspension of some borrowing limits under the enlarged access policy.
62. In more general terms, IMF has indicated (see A/48/573-S/26705, para.
142) that it can provide help through policy advice, including a full
assessment of the country's external situation, aimed at ensuring that the
mix of adjustment policies and external financing adopted are consistent
with the country's medium-term objectives. The Fund can also assist
through efforts to mobilize financial assistance in the context of
consultative groups, including playing an important technical assistance
role for these and other groups. The Fund has also indicated that it
stands ready to provide financial assistance under its existing facilities
to any member experiencing balance of payments difficulties, including
those related to the spill-over effects of sanctions.
63. In its turn, the World Bank has reported (see A/48/573-S/26705, para.
143) that assistance measures available to Bank members provided adequate
flexibility for prompt actions to be taken to help meet the most immediate
needs of affected countries. The measures cover the following five main
areas: (a) assistance in designing appropriate policy responses; (b)
accelerated disbursements from existing loans and credits; (c) use of
coordination mechanisms such as consultative groups, to mobilize and
coordinate support for affected States; (d) increased cost-sharing limits
to enable the Bank to finance a higher proportion of costs of ongoing and
new projects; and (e) expanded lending by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or the International Development
Association (IDA).
64. At the regional level, financial and technical assistance to the
affected countries has also been provided by the regional development
banks: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Islamic Development Bank.
Thus, the responses of these institutions to the Gulf crisis comprised,
within their respective mandates and operational frameworks, the provision
of grants and soft loans to the most seriously affected countries, rapid-
disbursement funding for assistance programmes, financing of key production
inputs, enhanced lending and technical cooperation (see A/48/573-S/26705,
para. 123). However, some of these banks have indicated that their charter
and founding agreements impose certain limitations or prohibitions on
particular types of action (e.g., fast disbursing budgetary assistance, in
the case of EBRD). Nevertheless, it is essential that the regional
development banks realize, to the extent possible, their potential in
insulating member States from the collateral damage of sanctions.
65. Based on the available information, it appears that the international
financial institutions, both at the global and regional levels, possess, in
principle, the required expertise, existing instruments and resources to
assist Member States in coping with such external shocks to their economies
as the imposition of sanctions. Indeed, the World Bank and IMF have
substantial programmes of financial and technical assistance to most
countries that have been affected by the implementation of sanctions
against Iraq and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro). In practice, these programmes of assistance are designed in
the context of the country's overall economic situation and are intended to
support more comprehensive and longer term objectives of structural
adjustment, economic reform or systemic transformation. It is important,
therefore, that such ongoing assistance programmes be reviewed by these
institutions on a case-by-case basis when appeals for special economic
assistance under the provisions of Article 50 so require, in order to make
them as responsive as possible to the particular, sanctions-related
problems of the affected countries.
66. In this connection, Governments have called upon the international
financial institutions to consider how the existing facilities of IMF and
the World Bank's mechanisms might be better utilized to mitigate the
adverse effects of sanctions on third States. In response, IMF has
undertaken efforts to ensure that the affected countries receive a higher
than average access to the Fund's resources and that their drawings be made
on more favourable terms, in recognition of the losses and costs incurred
by them as a result of the sanctions regime. Similarly, within the
priorities of the investment programmes in the affected countries, the
World Bank and some regional development banks have contemplated
redesigning the relevant projects, to reallocate funds under existing loans
and credits and expanding lending, taking into account the sanctions-
related concerns. Most important, however, is the need to mobilize
additional financial resources from all potential funding sources (e.g.,
through Consultative Group meetings for the countries concerned), in order
to address specifically and directly the special economic problems of third
States arising from the implementation of measures imposed by the Security
Council.
67. Moreover, certain streamlining or adjustment may be desirable in
reporting procedures that would enable all the donors, including the
international financial institutions, to identify clearly and distinctly
the assistance provided by them to alleviate the special economic problems
of the affected countries invoking Article 50 of the Charter. In turn,
such improvements would make it easier to collect, aggregate and assess the
relevant information to be submitted by the Secretariat to the
intergovernmental bodies concerned, thereby facilitating their periodic
review and appraisal of the collective response of the United Nations
system and the international community at large to the appeals for
assistance to the affected States.
D. Bilateral economic assistance
68. In the course of the two most recent sessions of the Special
Committee, it was noted that third States affected by Security Council
sanctions could avail themselves of bilateral assistance from donor
countries and that a number of affected States had in fact already been
assisted in that manner. It was also noted that problems stemming from the
imposition of sanctions were in many cases part and parcel of the overall
economic situation of the affected States and did not lend themselves to a
piecemeal solution. It was also suggested that the possibilities offered
by trade preferences and investments in particularly affected industries
deserved to be further explored.
69. In connection with the possibility of bilateral economic assistance,
the Secretary-General would like to note that, in the absence of a
permanent mechanism at the United Nations for the implementation of Article
50, economic assistance to the affected States has thus far depended on the
political will of countries that are in a position to provide such
assistance and on the capacity of ad hoc assistance coordination
arrangements to mobilize and channel additional resources in support of the
countries in need. Appeals launched by the Secretary-General on behalf of
the affected countries have not necessarily evoked the full and effective
response of the international community, in part for lack of an established
forum for consultations between the countries concerned and the donor
community at large, where an assessment of needs, based on a common
methodology, could be correlated with joint elaboration of specific
remedial measures, including the identification of funding sources.
70. Although several donor countries provided to the Secretary-General
specific information on their assistance to the affected States, which was
summarized in the previous reports on the subject (see A/48/573-S/26705,
paras. 107-113, and A/49/356, paras. 35-43). It has not been possible in
all cases to identify distinctly and estimate fully the amount of
assistance directly intended to address the special economic problems of
the affected States. It would however appear that the bulk of the reported
assistance has been part of the ongoing assistance activities and has not
necessarily involved additionality of funds to compensate for the actual
losses and additional costs incurred by the affected countries as a result
of the sanctions. In many instances, such outcome has been disappointing
for the affected countries that, while appreciating the emergency relief
efforts, continue to believe that the response by the donor community at
large has not been commensurate with the magnitude of their hardships, in
particular the longer term effects of the sanctions on their economies.
71. For example, in the case of sanctions against Iraq, specific measures
of bilateral assistance included debt relief, untied emergency commodity
loans on highly concessional terms, project and development assistance
loans, food aid and oil deliveries. In cooperation with humanitarian
agencies, bilateral assistance was also provided to displaced persons and
refugees, including repatriation of migrant workers to their countries of
origin. Most important was the establishment, in September 1990, by States
members of the Group of Seven and of the European Community as well as the
Gulf States and the Republic of Korea, of the Gulf Crisis Financial
Coordination Group to mobilize financial assistance for the most seriously
affected countries. In 1990-1991, the Group committed a total of $15.7
billion, mainly to three "front-line" States (Egypt, Jordan and Turkey), of
which about $8.3 billion was disbursed, primarily as balance-of-payments
grants and highly concessional loans, in-kind assistance and project loans.
Since the emergency operations have been completed, no further information
regarding bilateral assistance to the affected States has been received.
72. In the case of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro), the important initiative of the then Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (now the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)) to convene, in early 1994 at Vienna, a
special meeting to identify international projects to help affected States
in the region to better cope with the effects of the sanctions has resulted
in defining a viable approach towards supporting a number of infrastructure
projects and integrating them into a longer term regional perspective of
transport, infrastructure and communications development. To this end, the
Commission of the European Communities allocated in 1994 some 100 million
European Currency Units (ECUs), and the transport infrastructure activities
financed under the Poland Hungary Aid for the Reconstruction of the Economy
(PHARE) programme included road rehabilitation projects, border-crossing
modernization, upgrading customs facilities and establishment of customs
corridors. However, the requirements of the affected countries go beyond
the existing funding. In particular, additional resources are needed to
carry out longer-term transport infrastructure projects as well as to take
special measures in the fields of telecommunications, energy, water supply
and the environment. A proposal to convene at the United Nations special
consultative meetings on those issues, with the participation of the donor
countries, relevant agencies and the affected countries, was recently
presented to the Secretary-General by Bulgaria, Greece, the Republic of
Moldova, Romania and Ukraine (A/50/189-S/1995/412).
E. Other forms of assistance
73. At the 1994 session of the Special Committee, the following paragraph
was suggested for inclusion in a General Assembly resolution (see also
paras. 4, 13, 39 and 50 above):
"6. All other types of support, including direct assistance in cash or
in kind, provision of alternative sources of supply and alternative
markets, specific commodity purchase agreements, compensatory adjustments
of international tariffs, assistance for promotion of investments and
technical cooperation to the affected countries, should be encouraged;" 2/
74. It should be noted in this connection that, in addition to the
economic assistance that can be provided by international financial
institutions and bilateral donors, there is also a wide range of other
types of support that can be provided to the affected countries
experiencing economic problems arising from the imposition of sanctions on
a State or States under Article 50 of the Charter. These can include
direct assistance in cash or in kind, technical cooperation, the provision
of alternative sources of supply and alternative markets, specific
commodity purchase agreements, compensatory adjustments of international
tariffs, and assistance for promotion of investments.
75. There are some organizational components of the United Nations system
that may be in a position to provide policy advice and/or assistance in
some of these areas, including UNDP, the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), given their mandates on various technical areas. In addition,
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor organization to GATT, can
also be of assistance in defining special trade provisions for States
affected by sanctions imposed on another State where the third countries
affected are contracting parties. Such provisions could include any of the
following: (a) the application of trade restrictions so as to safeguard
balance of payments; (b) the granting of special trade preferences to
affected countries on a temporary basis by other members of the United
Nations such as suspension of custom tariffs and non-tariff measures on
their export products, and (c) the granting of special measures in the form
of concessional credits and financial aid to offset critical shortages in
the supply of basic goods and commodities.
76. For example, in the case of sanctions against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), some ideas of alternative forms of
compensation/assistance, other than direct monetary compensation, to the
affected countries were elaborated (see A/49/356, paras. 64-66). These
included, inter alia: (a) a set-aside programme, under which a portion of
the future reconstruction and development projects in Bosnia and
Herzegovina could be set aside or subcontracted to the interested affected
countries to help them develop their businesses; (b) trade concessions,
such as allocating to the affected countries some of the quotas that had
previously belonged to the target State or otherwise providing favourable
access to markets for their goods and services; (c) "doable programmes" in
the affected countries, under which donors would contribute technical and
other project-specific assistance on a priority basis; and (d) promotion of
foreign investment to the affected countries, through multilateral or
bilateral investment guarantees by the donor Governments. Given the nature
of the above proposals, they were intended for consideration by the
competent national and international authorities on whom their possible
approval and realization would be incumbent.
F. Secretariat arrangements
77. At the 1995 session of the Special Committee, support was expressed
for the Secretary-General's proposal contained in his "Supplement to an
Agenda for Peace" to establish a mechanism, also referred to in paragraphs
9 and 14 above, which, inter alia, would explore ways of assisting Member
States that are suffering collateral damage and to evaluate claims
submitted by such States under Article 50.
78. In view of the increased reliance of the Security Council on the
instrument of sanctions, the Secretary-General has taken steps to reinforce
the unit dealing directly with sanctions in the Department of Political
Affairs. Furthermore, cooperation and coordination with regional
intergovernmental organizations has been considerably enhanced with a view
to providing the sanctions committees and the Secretariat with customs
advice and other needed expertise.
79. However, further steps need to be taken in order to tackle the whole
gamut of problems encountered in the implementation of sanctions and, in
particular, to strengthen the Secretariat's analytical and assessment
capability to gauge the effectiveness of sanctions and their collateral
effects. Since the purpose of the proposed mechanism would be to assist
the Security Council and its sanctions committees, it would have to be
located in the United Nations Secretariat, but should draw on expertise
available throughout the United Nations system, especially that of the
Bretton Woods institutions. It should also be in a position to benefit
from outside specialized expertise not readily available in the
Secretariat.
80. In the light of the above, it would appear as particularly important
that the proposed mechanism on sanctions should pay special attention to
exploring all appropriate ways and means of assisting - both on bilateral
and multilateral levels - States that are suffering collateral damage. A
first practical step in this direction could be the development, under the
auspices of the Administrative Committee on Coordination, of general
guidelines concerning assistance to countries invoking Article 50 of the
Charter. These guidelines, to be prepared in close cooperation with the
donor community, the relevant agencies of the United Nations system and the
affected countries, may contain such elements as (a) an inventory of
assistance measures used in the past and recommended for the future; (b) a
designation of an appropriate forum for consultations among all concerned
to mobilize and channel the resources to provide assistance; and (c)
monitoring, coordination and assessment arrangements. The proposed
methodology for impact assessment referred to in paragraph 44 above may
also become part of the guidelines, in order to ensure the needed link
between the two processes in the practical implementation of Article 50.
Notes
1/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session,
Supplement No. 33 (A/50/33).
2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session,
Supplement No. 33 (A/49/33), para. 52.
3/ See: report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to the note
by the President of the Security Council (S/25036) regarding the question
of special economic problems of States as a result of sanctions imposed
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (A/48/573-S/26705,
paras. 70-86); World Economic and Social Survey, 1994 (United Nations
publication, Sales No. E.94.II.C.1, Box IV.2); report of the Secretary-
General on economic assistance to States affected by the implementation of
the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (A/49/356).
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