| United Nations | A/50/203-E/1995/79 |
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr. GENERAL
14 June 1995
ORIGINAL:
ENGLISH
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
Fiftieth session Substantive session of 1995
Item 20 (a) of the preliminary Item 5 of the provisional
list* agenda**
STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF SOCIAL, HUMANITARIAN AND
HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS:
ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, REPORTS OF SUBSIDIARY
INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC BODIES, CONFERENCES AND
ASSISTANCE: STRENGTHENING OF THE RELATED QUESTIONS
COORDINATION OF EMERGENCY
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS
Report of the Secretary-General
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
I. INTRODUCTION .........................................1 - 53
II. THE VOLATILE CONTEXT OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ......6 - 244
III. THE CHALLENGE OF COORDINATION ........................25 -697
A. Department of Humanitarian Affairs ...............26 - 338
B. Inter-Agency Standing Committee ..................34 - 369
C. Central Emergency Revolving Fund .................37 - 4410
D. Support for in-country coordination ..............45 - 5812
________________________
* A/50/50/Rev.1.
** E/1995/100.
95-16549 (E) 060795/...
*9516549*
CONTENTS (continued)
Paragraphs Page
E. Consolidated appeals process .....................59 - 6714
F. Information sharing ..............................68 - 6916
IV. CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM ...70 -12817
A. Operational capacity .............................74 - 11217
B. Financial capacity ...............................113 -12824
V. RECOVERY AND TRANSITION ..............................129 -13528
VI. THE CHALLENGE OF PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS .........136 -15429
A. Early warning capacity and action on such warnings140 -14530
B. Training programmes ..............................146 -15032
C. Building national capacity for natural disaster
management .......................................151 -15433
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................155 -16434
Annexes
I. Casualties among United Nations civilian personnel ...............37
II. Central Emergency Revolving Fund .................................38
III. Analysis of United Nations consolidated inter-agency humanitarian
assistance appeals ...............................................42
IV. Budgets, emergency expenditures and emergency reserves in 1994 of
selected organizations ...........................................48
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Humanitarian assistance has been subjected to profound and dramatic
change in recent years. An unprecedented number of people are caught in,
and made vulnerable by, disasters and violent upheaval which kill, maim and
displace and destroy vital means of survival.
2. In man-made disasters, humanitarian organizations are compelled to
operate in war-torn societies where conflicting parties are often openly
contemptuous of fundamental humanitarian norms. A major challenge for
these organizations is safeguarding the well-being of civilians and the
provision of assistance in a manner consistent with humanitarian
principles.
3. In addition, the international community is faced with the paradox of
needing ever larger resources to address the immediate survival needs of
victims while simultaneously recognizing that such action may deflect
attention and support from initiatives essential to undoing the root causes
of vulnerability and strife. Faced with these conflicting trends,
humanitarian organizations have been reassessing the processes that shape
the nature and impact of their interventions.
4. The onslaught of sudden crises, new challenges and competing needs have
repeatedly highlighted the importance of a well-organized and adequately
resourced mechanism for coordination, both within the multi-actor
humanitarian arena and with other elements of the international system
involved in crisis management and preemptive action. This is particularly
evident in rapid and simultaneous mass population movements. It is often
difficult to mobilize and deploy resources quickly in a manner which will
prevent avoidable deaths. However, notwithstanding the importance of
support from the international community, it is the people of the country
directly affected who are primarily responsible for their own recovery and
that of their communities.
5. Some vital progress has been made both in responding to the needs of
victims and in generating a more cohesive approach within the United
Nations system. However, as outlined in the present report, there are
continuing areas of concern which weaken and impede the work of
humanitarian organizations. The report opens with an examination of the
volatile context within which the bulk of humanitarian assistance is being
provided today. It examines the capacity of the United Nations system to
respond to emergencies and reviews issues which affect recovery programmes.
Recent activities in prevention and preparedness, especially with reference
to natural disasters, are also highlighted. It should be noted that an
extensive examination of natural disasters and disaster reduction activity
will be the exclusive focus of a separate report to the Economic and Social
Council in July 1995 on the International Decade for Natural Disaster
Reduction. Finally, the present report concludes with recommendations for
the consideration of Member States.
II. THE VOLATILE CONTEXT OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
6. The volatile context within which humanitarian assistance is provided
is a major determinant in the overall capacity of the United Nations system
to preempt and respond to crises in a manner which minimizes avoidable
suffering. The formal organization of humanitarian assistance, and the
principles that have been codified in refugee and international
humanitarian law, reflect a belief that individuals have rights that are
implicit in our shared humanity. In struggling to render these rights
meaningful, the international community has saved countless lives and
enabled numerous survivors to commence the difficult process of rebuilding
their lives and their societies.
7. However, while there is a greater understanding of the processes
through which needs are identified, and much worthwhile action has been
taken to improve the response capacity of the United Nations system, there
are, none the less, major challenges which need to be addressed in the
dramatically changed climate of the post-cold-war era.
8. The growth in the frequency and brutality of internal conflict is one
of the defining features of the 1990s. The reality of contemporary warfare
is self-evident. Victims are primarily civilians. They represent more
than 90 per cent of casualties in most of the recent conflicts. Women and
children bear the brunt of the fighting and are, invariably, a majority of
those seeking refuge either as refugees or as internally displaced persons.
In addition to physical abuse and deprivation, the victims of violence are
often severely traumatized. Women must often contend with rape and sexual
abuse and must assume sole responsibility for the safety of their families.
Children are particularly vulnerable to violence and many are forcibly
recruited into combat. People who are trapped in war zones, or who are
unable or unwilling to flee, face major problems which have not yet been
adequately dealt with by the international community. The absence of the
protection and assistance which is generally available for refugees adds to
the dangers faced by internally displaced persons and war-affected groups.
In some situations, people in flight from the horrors of war are obliged to
cross an international border in order to receive assistance from
humanitarian agencies.
9. The violence of modern warfare is compounded by the increase in the
number of people affected. In 1960 there were 1.4 million refugees around
the world. By 1985, that figure had risen to 11.6 million and it had risen
substantially again to 18.2 million by 1992. Currently, there are some 25
to 30 million people who are internally displaced and in need of assistance
from the international community. In addition, there are many other war-
affected civilians, as well as individuals who suffer tremendously in
natural disasters.
10. The phenomenal increase in the number of people in need of
humanitarian assistance is directly related to the growing number of crises
that erupt in violent conflict. In 1959, 10 wars were raging, while some
50 conflicts scar the international landscape in 1995. The bulk of these
wars are within States, a fact which has major implications for ensuring
compliance with humanitarian law.
11. The scale and depth of suffering in conflict situations confronting
the international community today is too often a consequence of a disregard
for fundamental humanitarian norms. In many instances, the suffering
endured by civilians is not an incidental element of political and military
strategies but constitutes its major objective. Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Rwanda are alarming examples of what occurs when civilians are subjected to
the full brutality of contemporary warfare and gross violations of human
rights. Determination must be shown to enforce the rule of law and to hold
accountable those who are responsible for heinous crimes. The
establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute alleged
perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda is a significant development which signals an end to
a culture of impunity. The inclusion of rape as a war crime is equally
significant and demonstrates an unwillingness to ignore abuse that
specifically targets women and girls. Taking action that will advance the
cause of justice in these conflicts will also act as a deterrent to gross
violations of human rights in other volatile situations.
12. Action on human rights may also assist in resolving crises, or at
least facilitate the development of an environment conducive to the
homeward return of uprooted people. It is within this context that funds
from the Central Emergency Revolving Fund were made available to accelerate
and support activities undertaken by the Centre for Human Rights in Rwanda.
The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other relief
organizations also offered logistical and other support. Human rights and
related action is of critical importance to the effectiveness of
humanitarian programmes.
13. Disregard for humanitarian norms has major implications for the
overall impact and effectiveness of humanitarian action and the well-being
of those it is intended to support. The situation in the former Yugoslavia
is but one example of the way in which humanitarian activity is restricted
and supplies are diverted and abused to achieve objectives that are
diametrically opposed to those of humanitarians. In other conflict
settings, such as Liberia, access to humanitarian assistance as an urgent
and inalienable right has been disrupted and denied for the express purpose
of achieving political objectives.
14. The limited means of humanitarian organizations to provide protection
is particularly glaring in conflict settings and in situations
characterized by gross violations of human rights. The Rwandan experience
illustrates the way in which the capacity of the United Nations to provide
protection and assistance is undermined when inputs and distribution
mechanisms are used for purposes that are inimical to humanitarian
objectives. Finding the means to reach those in need without entrenching
the power of abusive elements is one of the most difficult challenges
facing the humanitarian community in recent times.
15. Disrespect for humanitarian norms also often implies added risk for
relief workers. As the number of conflicts increases so too does the
number of practitioners who have been wounded and killed, sometimes
deliberately, while carrying out their humanitarian tasks (see annex I).
Left unchecked, this pattern is likely to have a negative impact on the
capacity of organizations to protect and provide assistance to disaster
victims. Disruption and diversion of relief supplies has seen the
emergence of "negotiated access" as a widely used tool, notwithstanding its
potential ramifications. Dependence on the agreement of armed groups often
makes the provision of humanitarian assistance tenuous and subject to
unacceptable and dangerous conditions. Significantly, such "negotiated
presence" often serves to undermine the protection capacity of
organizations involved in humanitarian activities. Safeguarding the
concept and reality of "humanitarian space" when the needs of war-affected
groups are deemed secondary to political and military priorities is one of
the most significant challenges currently confronting the humanitarian
community.
16. The major obstacle facing humanitarian organizations is the absence of
sufficient political will and support for action to address the underlying
causes of crises. The provision of humanitarian assistance in a vacuum is
tantamount to managing only the symptoms of a crisis. Experience shows
that, in most instances, the effectiveness of humanitarian endeavours in
conflict settings is largely predicated on successful action by the
international community to resolve the problems that provoked the crisis.
17. In some situations, such as Angola and Mozambique, a determined effort
has been made to stop the fighting and to consolidate the peace. In other
settings, such as Haiti, assertive action has been taken to end oppression
and the potential for violent conflict. This is in dramatic contrast to
other settings, such as the Sudan where conflict has smouldered for 28 of
the last 39 years. In Burundi and Liberia, a volatile mix of circumstances
points to the need for action to strengthen the push for peace.
18. Liberia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia illustrate how the work of
humanitarian organizations is severely constrained in the absence of
measures focused on resolving the underlying causes of crises. In sum, it
is critically important that the international community acknowledges the
vital but limited role of humanitarian action in complex crises. It is
equally important to ensure that humanitarian programmes are not used as a
substitute for action needed to reverse the dynamics of war and the
circumstances which led to armed conflict.
19. The humanitarian agenda is often shaped by political attitudes to
particular crises, strategic interests in specific areas and the attention
span of the media. Such factors, which are for the most part beyond the
control of humanitarian organizations, play an important role in the low
level of attention and support provided to victims of "silent" emergencies.
Ideally, and in a more humane world, assistance would be provided according
to need and the core principle of impartiality would have greater relevance
when responding to emergencies.
20. Action taken by the international community to end oppression or bring
about change by non-military means can have major ramifications for those
who are already victimized by inequitable political and economic
structures. Economic sanctions hit the poor hardest and can have a
deleterious impact on the work of humanitarian organizations. As outlined
in the position paper of the Secretary-General entitled "Supplement to an
Agenda for Peace" (A/50/60S/1995/1), there is a need for prior assessment
of the likely impact of sanctions and how these affect humanitarian
considerations.
21. The scourge of land-mines is yet another major concern. The reality
of this insidious weapon demands greater accountability and more
accelerated action to curtail its use. Land-mines are both a cause of
suffering and an obstacle to its alleviation. Mines kill some 800 people
every month, maim thousands and are a major hazard for impoverished rural
dwellers uprooted by war. For many people unable to cultivate land or to
return home, the presence of land-mines precludes meaningful peace long
after wars have officially ceased. An international meeting on mine
clearance, to be held in July 1995, is being organized to heighten
awareness regarding issues of uncleared mines and the coordination of
assistance in mine clearance. However, de-mining by itself is not a
satisfactory solution. The solution is a total ban on all forms of land-
mines and the components to make them.
22. Other factors which have an impact on the effectiveness of relief and
protection organizations include the relationship between the level of
resources and attention devoted to the prevention of, preparedness for and
recovery from disasters, and the amount of resources required to meet the
daily needs of people in camp situations. Rwanda is but one example of
current trends. Some US$ 1 billion was spent in the first six months of
the crisis. The bulk of this was used for the immediate survival needs of
the millions who were uprooted and displaced in 1994. Although resources
were requested at an early stage for confidence-building measures to
facilitate and encourage the return of those who had fled, and for action
focused on the problem of genocide, only a minuscule amount has been made
available for activities that are essential to ameliorating and resolving
the underlying causes of the cyclical strife which now characterizes Rwanda
and other parts of the Great Lakes region.
23. In more general terms, refugee spending doubled between 1990 and 1992.
The cost of peace operations increased 5-fold in the same period and 10-
fold in 1994. Between 1989 and 1994, the amount of resources used for
humanitarian programmes has tripled from $845 million to some $3 billion.
The implications of these figures cannot be ignored, particularly given the
diminishing amount of resources available to strengthen indigenous capacity
and to reduce vulnerability to crises.
24. There are obvious limitations to the capacity of humanitarian
organizations to assist people whose usual means of coping has been
violently disrupted or destroyed. Human insecurity and marginalization fed
by oppression, deprivation, abuse of fundamental rights, social and
economic imbalances, or a combination of these, are common features of the
many crisis situations now confronting the international community. The
need to tackle the root causes of suffering and vulnerability is more acute
than ever.
III. THE CHALLENGE OF COORDINATION
25. Much attention has been devoted in recent years to improving the
overall coordination of the multi-actor humanitarian relief system. Member
States, the United Nations system, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and international organizations continue exploration of the most effective
methods of cooperation and coordination among themselves and with
indigenous authorities and communities. Lessons from past experience have
helped to identify and develop specific coordination mechanisms and tools
to facilitate response to emergencies. This section examines some of those
mechanisms,identifies recentdevelopmentsandnotes areasofoutstandingconcern.
A. Department of Humanitarian Affairs
26. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs is the entity within the United
Nations charged with ensuring the effective coordination of United Nations
humanitarian assistance, and with promoting actions to prevent, or at least
mitigate, the effects of natural and man-made disasters. Within this
larger context, the Department has focused its efforts on five areas during
the past year and will continue to do so in the coming year.
27. A major focus for the Department of Humanitarian Affairs is the
advancement of humanitarian concerns. It is actively aware of the need to
ensure respect for the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian action
and is a strong advocate of strengthening compliance with humanitarian law.
28. A second theme is the ongoing refinement of the main tools provided to
the Department to promote coordination: the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee, the Central Emergency Revolving Fund and the consolidated
appeals process.
29. The third focus is the broadening and strengthening of the involvement
of all relevant entities in emergency coordination activities. For
example, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the
representative of the Secretary-General for internally displaced persons
are now invited to attend Inter-Agency Standing Committee meetings on items
of concern to them. A "framework for coordination" between the Department
of Humanitarian Affairs and the Departments of Political Affairs and of
Peace-Keeping Operations has been initiated. This process strengthens
cooperation in the analysis of early warning information and the planning
of preventive action, as well as fact finding and operations planning
during a crisis. In Rwanda, NGOs have formed part of the United Nations
coordination structure. NGOs also participated in several consolidated
appeals. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs is working with the Office
of the United Nations Security Coordinator to strengthen further the
capacity of that Office for quick action.
30. The fourth theme is the strengthening of support for in-country
coordination. With respect to natural disasters, the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs has strengthened stand-by capacities through the
further development of United Nations disaster assessment and coordination
teams and the military and civil defence assets project. With respect to
complex emergencies, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee agreed in 1994 on
the terms of reference for humanitarian coordinators and the process and
circumstances under which they would be appointed. The restructured
Department includes a Rapid Response Unit, which has strengthened stand-by
mechanisms to provide staff in the field with the necessary support for the
coordination of humanitarian assistance.
31. The fifth focus is the promotion of system-wide improvements by acting
upon lessons learned from humanitarian experience and the identification of
new opportunities. Early warning systems, de-mining and disaster
management training are areas in which the Department of Humanitarian
Affairs is taking a lead to add value to the United Nations humanitarian
system. Recognizing the opportunities inherent in the new information
technologies, the Department has been working closely with the United
Nations organizations concerned, NGOs and Governments to develop ReliefNet,
an international information sharing system focused on humanitarian needs
and responses.
32. In addition to these five programmatic themes, the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs continues to engage in continuous efforts to improve
its internal functioning. In 1994, the Department addressed its most
pressing internal concerns with a reorganization, creating a unified desk
officer structure in New York as the core of a new Complex Emergency
Division. Among other changes was the consolidation of the Mitigation
Branch and the secretariat of the International Decade for Natural Disaster
Reduction into one division dealing with natural disaster reduction. In
1995, the Department initiated a strategic planning process which will be
followed by a management study to identify the core resources required by
the Department to discharge its mandate, as well as ways and means to
enhance its effectiveness.
33. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs has steadily progressed in
achieving greater effectiveness. One major impediment, however, is the
funding pattern it inherited at its inception. Only a third of the staff
of the Department are funded from the regular budget and since the
beginning efforts have been made to establish more regular-budget posts.
Efforts to elaborate a financial strategy to put the funding of the
Department on a viable and sustainable basis will continue.
B. Inter-Agency Standing Committee
34. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee is a unique forum in that its
membership brings together the United Nations organizations directly
involved in humanitarian response activities and also extends participation
beyond the United Nations to include NGOs and other international
organizations. The Committee therefore has the potential to provide
collective leadership and to articulate principles and policy on strategic
issues geared to enhancing the effectiveness of humanitarian operations.
35. In 1994, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee agreed on a set of
guidelines relating to the humanitarian mandate and to the appointment of
and terms of reference for humanitarian coordinators. The Committee also
designated the Emergency Relief Coordinator as the reference point for
matters concerning internally displaced persons and established a task
force to develop recommendations regarding them. In 1995, the Committee
will continue to examine policies and general implications with respect to
the humanitarian impact of sanctions, de-mining and internally displaced
persons. It will also examine and adopt an inter-agency approach to the
utilization of military and civil defence assets for humanitarian
assistance and pursue increased operational coordination and cooperation in
emergency telecommunications.
36. Members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee recognize the need for
it to focus on key policy issues which require discussion and action at the
executive level. The working group of the Committee is designed to address
operational issues and to manage the work of task forces established to
address specific topics. The adoption by the Committee in 1994 of a set of
action-oriented procedures should facilitate the tasks of the working group
in discharging its supportive and managerial functions. The full potential
of the Committee has yet to be realized. This will require the collective
commitment of all its members and the leadership of the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs to make it a reality.
C. Central Emergency Revolving Fund
37. The usefulness of the Central Emergency Revolving Fund in facilitating
a timely response to emergencies is well-recognized by the United Nations
operational organizations. Details of advances made to and reimbursements
received from operational organizations and on the status of the Fund are
given in annex II. The Fund has served as a predominant source of funding
for United Nations organizations in the critical initial phase of
emergencies to supplement their own emergency funding capacity. Despite
these very encouraging results, however, the level of resources of the Fund
and certain constraints in its utilization need to be addressed to ensure
its continued effectiveness.
38. These concerns were acknowledged by the General Assembly in its
resolution 49/139 A of 20 December 1994, where the Assembly noted the need
to increase the resources available in the Central Emergency Revolving Fund
and the need to ensure that the Fund is maintained at an adequate level to
respond to new emergencies at any time. The Assembly invited potential
donors to make additional contributions to the Fund and, in that context,
requested the Secretary-General to explore the feasibility of seeking in-
kind donations.
39. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs has undertaken extensive
consultations with its humanitarian partners and with both the traditional
and non-traditional donor community in order to increase financial support
for and broaden the donor base of the Central Emergency Revolving Fund.
The current status of contributions made to the Fund is shown in annex II.
40. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs, in cooperation with its United
Nations humanitarian partners, has reviewed the implications of in-kind
contributions as a possible additional resource for the Central Emergency
Revolving Fund. The general consensus among operational organizations is
that in-kind contributions would be neither practical nor consistent with
the envisaged use and revolving nature of the Fund. Concern was also
expressed about management and overhead costs associated with in-kind
contributions. Furthermore, certain humanitarian supplies, such as
agricultural seeds and medicines, must conform to strict technical
specifications of recipient organizations. Questions have been raised
concerning the mechanism for accounting and reimbursement of in-kind
contributions, in the light of the revolving nature of the Fund. It is
generally agreed, however, that in-kind contributions are useful in the
context of overall emergency response and therefore should be encouraged as
direct bilateral contributions to the organizations concerned.
41. The need for timely replenishment of the Central Emergency Revolving
Fund cannot be overemphasized. Delayed reimbursements could have a serious
impact on the Fund's ability to meet requirements in emergency situations.
In efforts to ensure the timely recovery of advances, the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs has taken steps to strengthen existing procedures,
shortening the period for reimbursement, encouraging partial repayment
whenever possible and drawing the attention of donors in consolidated
appeals to prior utilization of the Fund. Despite such initiatives,
however, a number of advances have remained outstanding for more than a
year owing to weak responses to certain consolidated appeals. These
include advances drawn by the World Food Programme (WFP) for Tajikistan
($2,463,879), by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)
for Lebanon ($3,306,724) and by the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) for Zaire ($350,153).
42. In such cases, measures were taken to restore the balance of the
Central Emergency Revolving Fund, in accordance with the provisions of the
guidelines 1/ governing its operation, paragraph 16 of which states, inter
alia, that the Emergency Relief Coordinator may:
(a) Utilize such balances of the Fund, including accumulated interest,
as may exceed the target level of $50 million;
(b) Appeal to donors to make specific contributions to the Fund to cover
the amounts advanced;
(c) Require the operational organization to repay the balance of the
advance from its own resources.
43. Given that the Central Emergency Revolving Fund, interest included,
remained at a level only slightly above the minimum $50 million level, and
therefore could not be utilized for absorbing the outstanding advances, the
Department of Humanitarian Affairs requested the organizations concerned to
consider reimbursing the Fund from their own resources. The organizations
responded that, in the absence of donor contributions, they were not in a
position to repay the Fund from their own resources. Under the
circumstances, the only remaining alternative is to seek the support of
donor Governments to make specific contributions to cover the outstanding
advances so that the level of resources of the Fund can be maintained at
the minimum level of $50 million as stipulated by the General Assembly in
its resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991.
44. On occasion, United Nations organizations have requested Central
Emergency Revolving Fund resources for ongoing emergency programmes in
order to avoid serious interruption or scaling down of much needed
humanitarian relief activities. While these demands go beyond the
envisaged scope of the Fund, the judicious use of the Fund for such
purposes has proved to be necessary under exceptional circumstances. It
has, however, been pointed out that the Fund was established primarily to
ensure a timely response in the initial phase of an emergency. The General
Assembly may wish therefore to authorize the use of the Fund, in compelling
circumstances, for meeting critical humanitarian requirements of protracted
emergencies.
D. Support for in-country coordination
45. In recent years, as the number of major complex emergencies has
increased, so too has the United Nations been increasingly called upon to
play an active coordination role in such circumstances. In the case of
Somalia, the Security Council, in its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January
1992, requested the Secretary-General to appoint a humanitarian
coordinator. Subsequently, the size and complexity of the crises in Angola
and Mozambique led to similar appointments by the Emergency Relief
Coordinator on behalf of the SecretaryGeneral after consultations with the
Inter-Agency Standing Committee.
46. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee has recognized that a more
systematic approach is needed for the selection and appointment of
humanitarian coordinators in special circumstances. This led in 1994 to
the approval by the Committee of specific terms of reference for such
coordinators, their desired profile and the procedure for their
appointment, as well as the creation of a stand-by roster of qualified
potential coordinators. The terms of reference also apply to resident
coordinators when they serve as the coordinator for humanitarian
assistance. These steps were designed to ensure the provision in larger
complex emergency situations of coordinators who have the special
experience and skills needed for such work and for them to be able to focus
their full attention on the tasks involved.
47. While this mechanism is still relatively new, it is possible to make
some general observations on its use to date. The mechanism is being used,
as appropriate, in support of and as a complement to the United Nations
resident coordinator system. As at May 1995, a total of five humanitarian
coordinators had been appointed; in Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda
and Somalia. Thus, for the majority of emergencies, United Nations in-
country coordination is undertaken by the United Nations resident
coordinator, under the direct supervision of the Emergency Relief
Coordinator.
48. The humanitarian coordinator post is meant to be temporary, reflecting
the large scale and acuteness of the emergency in question. As the relief
phase of the complex emergency recedes and the focus of humanitarian
efforts shifts towards rehabilitation and recovery, the remaining functions
of the humanitarian coordinator are phased over to the traditional United
Nations coordination mechanisms. For conflict situations, one important
indicator for the need for such a transition has been the creation and
initial implementation of a formal peace process.
49. Thus, for example, in Somalia the humanitarian coordinator is now also
the same person as the United Nations resident coordinator and United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) resident representative. In
Mozambique, the post of humanitarian coordinator has been phased out, and
the United Nations resident coordinator also serves as the coordinator for
humanitarian assistance.
50. Humanitarian coordinators work closely with national Governments
regarding humanitarian assistance matters. While in exceptional cases such
national Governments may not exist, such as Somalia or in the initial
period of the Rwanda crisis in 1994, this remains the exception.
Humanitarian coordinators, like resident coordinators, are committed to
supporting the capacity of Governments to take responsibility for their
countries' own recovery. In Rwanda, the humanitarian coordinator has set
up an integrated structure with the Ministry of Rehabilitation. This
structure, staffed by United Nations, NGO and government officials, is
responsible for ensuring the daily coordination of relief activities as
well as encouraging recovery programmes.
51. Lastly, the process of designating humanitarian coordinators has
allowed the Emergency Relief Coordinator to tap effectively the broader
pool of talent among the various United Nations organizations. Thus,
humanitarian coordinators have been appointed from among the staff of UNDP,
UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs.
52. The complexity of recent crises has highlighted the need to initiate
or implement key coordination and planning actions at the very onset of a
complex emergency. The United Nations resident coordinator is tasked with
the immediate response to an emergency, but the scope or complexity of
emergency activities may necessitate the strengthening of in-country
coordination capacity. In the light of past experience, most United
Nations operational organizations have tried to build up their rapid
response capacity in their appropriate sectoral area in order to facilitate
the emergency response (see sect. IV below).
53. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs has developed rapid response
facilities for both natural and man-made disasters which aim to support the
immediate in-country emergency coordination efforts of national authorities
and the United Nations resident representative as they confront the demands
of emergency response.
54. United Nations disaster assessment and coordination teams were created
specifically for natural disasters. These teams consist of emergency
management experts who can be deployed within hours of a disaster to work
with local authorities. The teams aim to facilitate a coordinated and
effective response to natural and environmental disasters. They can assist
local authorities with coordination, provide for immediate assessment of
damage and humanitarian relief needs, facilitate access by national
Governments to international stand-by resources and promote exchange of
know-how and techniques.
55. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs is strengthening regional and
national capacities to manage disaster response by increasing the number of
countries participating in the system of disaster assessment and
coordination teams. It has also established a Latin American team staffed
by local personnel familiar with local conditions. Steps were also taken
in 1994 to reinforce the readiness of such teams through training and
increasing the number of team members available. Missions by such teams in
1994 assisted in the assessment and coordination of appropriate relief
responses following torrential rainstorms in China, floods in Egypt and
Djibouti, tropical storms in Haiti and in preparation for a cyclone in
Bangladesh.
56. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs also continues work with the
International Search and Rescue Advisory Group, which was initiated to
benefit from experience in dealing with major disasters involving collapsed
structures. Today, the Advisory Group, through its International Steering
Group, regional groups and working groups, addresses a wide range of
international cooperation issues in the mobilization, dispatch and
coordination of international relief resources in sudden-onset disasters.
57. With respect to complex or man-made emergencies, the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs has established a Rapid Response Unit to deploy
experienced personnel to work with the United Nations resident coordinator
or the humanitarian coordinator so as to ensure immediate coordination and
to build systematic support for coordination activities as the emergency
evolves. The Department has deployed its rapid response capacity
repeatedly. In Kigali in April 1994, the advance humanitarian team,
staffed with Department of Humanitarian Affairs and United Nations
organization representatives, re-established a United Nations humanitarian
presence during a very difficult period and was able to lay the groundwork
for the expansion of humanitarian activities as the situation permitted.
In Haiti, a combined Department of Humanitarian Affairs/UNDP team was
deployed to support the United Nations coordinator for humanitarian
assistance in the immediate aftermath of United Nations action in September
1994. The team focused on providing increased information services,
liaising with NGOs and bilateral/United Nations Mission in Haiti military
forces and preparing the humanitarian strategy and the consolidated appeal
for Haiti. During the crisis in Chechnya, Russian Federation, the
Department worked closely with UNHCR, focusing on facilitating the
establishment of operating procedures and assisting in the start-up of
humanitarian assistance deliveries by WFP and UNICEF.
58. In order to ensure the provision of immediate and effective support
for in-country coordination, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs has
expanded its cooperative arrangements with the Norwegian and Danish Refugee
Councils and with the Swedish Rescue Services Agency to utilize their
capacities on a stand-by basis for supporting field coordination in complex
emergencies.
E. Consolidated appeals process
59. In 1994, 14 consolidated inter-agency humanitarian assistance appeals
were launched, reflecting the needs of 15 countries and covering a
population of 39.5 million. Of the $2.76 billion requested, $2.13 billion
was pledged to the organizations participating in the appeals. Although at
the aggregate level contributions equalled 77 per cent of requirements, the
rate of response varied from 14.8 per cent for the appeal for Yemen to 105
per cent for the appeal for the former Yugoslavia. Although the number of
appeals declined from 21 in 1993 to 14 in 1994, the average required amount
for an appeal increased by approximately 35 per cent. Though an average of
77 per cent is encouraging, additional funding is sorely needed for many
critical emergency situations. A detailed analysis of the response to
consolidated appeals in given in annex III.
60. The consolidated appeals process was envisaged as a mechanism to
promote integrated needs assessments and greater prioritization and to help
to mobilize financial support for humanitarian programmes. In order to set
priorities among the funds requested in appeals, the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs seeks consensus from the individual organizations on
the priorities for emergencies in recognition that each organization can
best evaluate the urgency of their activities. In many cases, the process
has proved useful in presenting donors with a balanced view of humanitarian
needs and funding requirements. In 1995, appeals for NGO projects were
included in a number of appeals, a development which strengthens
coordination and complementarity between United Nations and NGO programmes.
Given the particular status of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC), their programmes are not integrated into consolidated
appeal documents, although ICRC and IFRC data may appear in the annex of
relevant documents.
61. Unfortunately, the quality of consolidated appeals continues to vary.
One important factor is the coordination and support that exists in the
field. Poor in-country cooperation may result in the perception that the
consolidated appeals process is a burden rather than an opportunity. In
such situations, the appeal does little more than present unprioritized
programmes of the organizations. Where effective field-level cooperation
does exist, the development of a consolidated appeal reflects joint
programming.
62. Experience has also shown that highly integrated appeals do not
necessarily guarantee good donor response. In ongoing emergencies such as
in Iraq, improved coordination on the ground may contribute to an improved
appeal that may nevertheless receive little funding because of lack of
political or media interest. Despite a deteriorating humanitarian
situation, the 1994 appeal for Afghanistan received a little over 35 per
cent funding, whereas the 1994 appeal for the countries of the former
Yugoslavia received nearly 106 per cent. The funding for Rwanda was barely
40 per cent in 1993. After the mass exodus of July 1994 drew world-wide
attention, the new appeal raised almost 96 per cent of the funds requested.
63. In addition, appeals with a high degree of geographical or sectoral
complementarity are nevertheless funded in a selective manner; there is a
tendency to provide strong support only for certain life-saving
interventions and to particular United Nations organizations. For example,
within the 1994 appeals for Angola, Burundi and Tajikistan (1993-1994),
responses to the food components were at least 100 per cent for each
appeal. This was in stark contrast to funding provided to the non-food
sectors, which was barely 52 per cent for Angola, 40 per cent for
Tajikistan and 21 per cent for Burundi. Likewise, there are dramatic
variations in response to different United Nations organizations. In the
case of the 1993 Somalia appeal, UNHCR received 78 per cent of requested
funds, compared to an average of 24 per cent for other organizations.
64. However, this uneven response is due, in part, to the effectiveness of
each organization's own fund-raising efforts and its track record in
emergency situations. A coherent response to an emergency requires the
availability of funding for a balanced response to vital sectors and
activities. Additional funding is therefore needed for relatively
neglected yet critical relief activities such as health, agriculture, water
and sanitation, as well as for immediate rehabilitation and recovery
activities.
65. As a result of growing resource requirements and intensifying
competition for scarce funds, some donors are increasingly providing
earmarked contributions. A balance must be found between the donors' need
for accountability in the utilization of funds and the organizations' need
for flexibility so as to enable them to respond rapidly.
66. In an attempt to broaden the donor base for consolidated appeals,
consideration is being given to a coordinated effort among organizations to
approach new donors to increase their familiarity with the multilateral
humanitarian system. Given that success in mobilizing resources for
emergencies is often linked to media coverage, the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee is examining ways in which the humanitarian organizations might
collectively (through pooling the efforts of media/public relations
officers of the organizations concerned) keep the focus on both high
profile and less visible, protracted emergencies.
67. When an emergency first occurs and a first-time consolidated appeal is
necessary, the challenge for the Department of Humanitarian Affairs is to
foster an integrated appeals process without unduly delaying the response
of individual organizations. Flash appeals have been issued, for instance
in Rwanda and Chechnya, Russian Federation, to facilitate a timely appeal;
these appeals were subsequently followed by a more thorough consolidated
appeal. The Department recognizes the need to increase the speed with
which consolidated appeals are processed and issued and to maximize the
inter-agency collaborative planning aspects of flash appeals, including
initial agreements regarding division of responsibility.
F. Information sharing
68. Exchange of timely, relevant and reliable information is an essential
tool for assessing an emergency situation and for coordinating inputs
designed to prevent it, reduce its impact, or respond to it. Communication
technology available today provides an opportunity for humanitarian actors
to share information more efficiently and effectively than ever before.
While there is informal exchange of information between organizations, work
needs to be done to increase the exchange in order to facilitate
consistency in the assessment of changing situations, determination of
priorities and progress towards objectives.
69. In cooperation with interested Governments, United Nations
organizations, and NGOs, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs is
presently establishing an international information sharing system known as
"Reliefnet". Reliefnet's primary objective is to make available emergency
information that will be of operational use for emergency actors. A
secondary objective is to devise an information system that will be
available globally, irrespective of the information technology available in
a particular location. The realization of these objectives is critically
dependent on the sharing of information among humanitarian partners.
IV. CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM
70. While coordination is crucial to an effective system-wide response to
humanitarian emergencies, humanitarian organizations have found it
necessary to strengthen their response capacity to crises, which have
increased both in number and in magnitude. As a result, the international
community has witnessed in recent years a rapid expansion in the capacity
of humanitarian organizations, which are now quite capable of moving with
speed to address most crises.
71. At the same time, humanitarian organizations have also come to realize
that, in order to respond to crises of the magnitude seen in the recent
past, they must work closely with and rely on the expertise of other
organizations, NGOs and interested Governments to augment their own
capacity. In this context, it is also important that these organizations
should be able to draw on available stand-by capacity available both within
and outside interested Governments, including the possible use of military
and civilian assets.
72. More importantly, it has increasingly been recognized that indigenous
capacities to cope must be strengthened and fully utilized since the
affected communities and authorities are ultimately responsible for
ensuring that the needs of victims are met. This approach is particularly
important for ensuring the timely and effective transition from relief to
recovery and rehabilitation, for which the people of the country concerned
must assume primary responsibility.
73. It would therefore be appropriate in reviewing the capacity of the
United Nations system to take into account the need for international
humanitarian organizations to support the strengthening of national
capacities. Such a review should facilitate efforts by Member States to
address possible constraints, gaps and imbalances in the system, which has
evolved rapidly in an ad hoc manner in recent years.
A. Operational capacity
74. United Nations organizations have adapted their operational capacity
to the growing demands either through reorganization to give more focus to
emergency response or through the development of new management, staffing
and administrative structures. It is clear that flexibility and adequate
delegation of authority are two of the key elements of a rapid response.
1. Emergency management structures
75. United Nations organizations differ considerably in terms of
management structure, delegation of authority, human resources, degree of
centralization and organization of their emergency and development
capacities. Such variation gives rise to different strengths in terms of
flexibility, rapidity of response, accountability and integration of
rehabilitation and recovery activities. While decentralization and
delegation of authority may increase flexibility and speed of response, as
well as allow organizations to work more closely with local communities,
concerns about accountability and transparency may increase.
76. The fast breaking nature of most natural and many complex crises
necessitates access to people with the right profile and the ability to
deploy them at short notice. High turnover of staff is characteristic of
many relief organizations. This high turnover, due to the stressful nature
of the work and the short-term, temporary nature of most employment
contracts, means that valuable experience and lessons are lost to the
employing organization. Rapid staff turnover sometimes results in
personnel ill-prepared to perform the role required of them. Whether staff
are trained or inexperienced, their commitment to humanitarian goals is
generally very strong.
77. Some imbalances still need to be addressed in order to give the
overall system the possibility to adjust to the fast-changing humanitarian
environment. A brief summary of the crisis management structures of United
Nations organizations is provided in paragraphs 78 to 88 below.
78. UNHCR has established additional mechanisms during the past three
years to increase the efficiency of its emergency response, including rapid
deployment teams and stand-by arrangements with external partners to
increase its staffing and programme delivery capacity. In addition, UNHCR
has considerable structural flexibility to respond to emergencies. UNHCR
country representatives are authorized to reallocate up to 15 per cent of
their budget between sectors without reverting to headquarters. In cases
of sudden large population movements, a UNHCR representative can request an
allocation from the UNHCR Emergency Fund and authority to disburse funds
under an emergency letter of instruction. Upon issuance of such a letter,
the representative may initiate a letter of intent with an implementing
partner to incur expenditures, pending signature of a more formal
agreement.
79. WFP's operations rely heavily on its network of field offices, which
implement relief programmes jointly with recipient Governments, local
authorities and NGOs and provide first assessments of relief requirements.
Until recently, WFP relied upon its development personnel to deal with
emergencies as well. Now, however, the growth of relief operations world
wide has necessitated the deployment of dedicated emergency personnel to
the field as well as to headquarters. The sudden increase in emergency
requirements has given rise to short-term contracts, substantial local
recruitment of both expatriate and local staff and additional need for
volunteers, both United Nations and others. WFP's emergency training
capacity has been enhanced as a result.
80. WFP has created a rapid response facility with staff ready for travel
at a moment's notice and the immediate availability of funds to set up
operations, including communications, offices and other support services.
Funding for the rapid response team has now been incorporated into the
regular WFP support budget. In addition, WFP has delegated considerable
authority to the country offices, both in terms of cash allocations for
local food purchases and setting up of response structures.
81. The formalities for accessing resources are minimal; requests for food
and funds can be submitted through WFP country offices or directly to
headquarters, are processed immediately and are subject to either local
assessment or assessment with headquarters participation, often on joint
inter-agency missions.
82. UNICEF is a highly decentralized organization with a ratio of
staffing between headquarters and the field of 20 to 80. Over the past two
years, UNICEF has strengthened its emergency management structures in New
York and Geneva, and, through the use of short-term staff, in regional
offices in Africa. UNICEF's strong field presence, including external
relations, networks and counterpart mechanisms in most countries, ensures a
linkage between preparation, response and post-emergency activities and the
ability to mobilize local resources quickly.
83. UNICEF's emergency operations have been reviewed to improve its
emergency responsiveness. Within its headquarters, a weekly high-level
task force reviews all ongoing emergencies and reports directly to the
Deputy Executive Director. The rapid response team is the heart of UNICEF's
rapid response capacity, with five or six staff members per team,
participating on a voluntary basis, all selected for their emergency skills
and experience. The specific objectives of the rapid response team are to
support existing UNICEF presence, set up operations (programme, supply,
communication, security and logistics systems); undertake a rapid
assessment of the situation of women and children; undertake the initial
distribution of assistance; establish initial contacts with the Government
and prepare a plan of action.
84. UNDP's emergency capacity is structured around three areas: its
national development programmes in prevention and mitigation, support to
coordination of relief activities and support to national efforts for
recovery and rehabilitation. The Emergency Response Division is the focal
point for emergency-related policy, funding and training matters as well as
in-house and external coordination. Regional bureaux, each with an
emergency focal point, provide operational guidance and support to country
offices. The country offices have considerable programme, administrative
and financial authority to react to a budding crisis. In the case of a
declared emergency, there are simplified procedures for the establishment
of local funds, recruitment and procurement. UNDP has a roster of
experienced staff available on short notice and 15 budgeted posts reserved
for strengthening offices in emergency affected countries.
85. The World Health Organization (WHO) has a three-tiered management
structure. Its headquarters, including a Division of Emergency and
Humanitarian Action, is responsible for overall policies, which are carried
out at the regional level by regional offices in collaboration with WHO
country representatives acting at the country level. Country offices have
only limited authority and latitude to decide on major administrative and
financial actions. WHO is reviewing its procedures with a view to
augmenting the operational latitude and responsibilities of its
representatives, as has already been done in the African region, where WHO
representatives can reprogramme regular country resources for funding
emergency response activities with the agreement of the Government.
86. WHO country offices are also being strengthened with additional
international and national staff. In addition, WHO is taking the steps
necessary to permit a rapid mobilization of its technical staff in support
of its country representatives. WHO is establishing a system of emergency
health assessment teams and emergency health coordinators, which will be on
stand-by within the WHO structure.
87. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has
a Global Information and Early Warning System for Food and Agriculture
(GIEWS), which is responsible for the assessment of food needs, including
food-aid requirements in emergency situations. The Office for Special
Relief Operations is in charge of assessing immediate emergency needs and
the mobilization, coordination, transport and distribution of emergency
relief assistance. The number of Special Relief Operations personnel at
headquarters is limited, as ample use is made of external consultants and
of FAO's resources in technical expertise. The Office also receives
crucial support from FAO representatives in the field.
88. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) has an Emergency Operations Unit, which coordinates the agency's
work in the early stages of an emergency. Focal points within the UNESCO
secretariat are designated for specific operations. Both the Unit and the
focal points report directly to the Director-General or the Assistant
Director-General for the Directorate. Simplified administrative and
financial procedures for emergency situations have also been elaborated.
2. Technical requirements and bilateral stand-by capacity
89. A key element for a successful response to an emergency, whether
natural or man-made, is access to technical support, special skills and the
minimum requirements to initiate the assessment of and response to
emergency needs. United Nations organizations have developed the full gamut
of rapid deployment teams, field kits, stand-by arrangements with donor
Governments and stockpiles of equipment and relief supplies.
90. Essential requirements for a rapid response to a crisis include
logistics, telecommunications, office equipment and living arrangements.
The personnel and equipment necessary to set up field operations must be
established quickly and in most cases with little reliance on local
procurement or support. To meet the needs of field personnel, some
organization, have developed field kits with a comprehensive range of
survival items.
91. In collaboration with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs at the
warehouse located at Pisa, Italy, WHO stockpiles essential logistics and
communication equipment for quick delivery and use by countries affected by
emergencies. WFP has similar strategic stocks of equipment at Nairobi.
Along with its well-known ready-to-use medical kits, UNICEF has developed
and assembled other field-support-oriented ready-to-use kits and has
communication and security equipment for use in most emergency situations.
92. While the vast majority of humanitarian assistance is delivered by
existing capacities, organizations cannot maintain a level of readiness on
the scale required to guarantee rapid mobilization of personnel and
equipment to meet extraordinary crises. Various donor Governments have
offered stand-by facilities with staff, turnkey services and equipment
available at short notice. Most organizations are improving the speed with
which they can assemble and deploy a team at short notice by resorting to
these bilateral arrangements with Governments.
93. A recent innovative means of improving operational capacity is the
UNHCR concept of the "service package": self-contained facilities and
services provided by donor Governments when traditional emergency response
mechanisms are insufficient. This "service package" was used in Rwanda and
is in the process of being developed and refined in order to ensure that
the packages are truly self-supporting and require minimum
supervision/coordination.
94. The military and civil defence assets of many Member States are well
situated to provide support to a full range of emergency services in
natural disasters in the fields of, inter alia, communications, transport,
medical services and search and rescue activities. In addition to
provision of support for emergency field operations, defence assets could
carry out critical infrastructure construction and repairs. Their
structures are intended to respond rapidly in a self-contained and highly
mobile fashion. The military and civil defence assets project of the
Department of Humanitarian Affairs is similarly aimed at improving the
management of military assets in natural and technological emergencies. In
the framework of this project, a network of networks among relevant
international and regional institutions was launched to enhance
cooperation. It includes close cooperation with the Partner for Peace
programme, as well as the establishment of a dedicated database on national
military and civil defence capabilities.
95. In 1994, military assets continued to play a vital role in the UNHCR
airlift to Sarajevo and were mobilized on a large scale in response to the
massive exodus of Rwandans to eastern Zaire. Military and civil defence
expertise was integrated into field missions to the Republic of Moldova and
Algeria in connection with floods in those countries. In the light of the
potential of military and civil defence assets, an Inter-Agency Standing
Committee task force is developing a common framework for their use when
appropriate in support of all types of humanitarian operations.
96. WFP's capacity to move large quantities quickly by sea, air and land
is renowned and many relief organizations, from both within and outside the
United Nations system call upon WFP to assist. While the cost is extremely
competitive, the transport costs are relatively high in contrast to the
costs of the basic commodities, such as grains, that are shipped. WFP has
often brought in outside truck fleets in order to augment the transport
capacity of hosting countries.
97. WHO is developing stand-by arrangements to complement its staffing
resources with the medical emergency response units of a number of
countries, as well as with schools of public health and other specialized
centres. In Rwanda, UNICEF reached an agreement with the American Public
Health Association, Center for Disease Control. Building on the Rwanda
experience, UNICEF has commenced negotiations with Governments and
institutions to develop additional stand-by response facilities to meet
needs in health, nutrition, water and sanitation, logistics, security,
unaccompanied children, education, social mobilization and publicity.
98. UNICEF is developing basic assistance kits to support emergency
response in the areas identified above. In addition, UNICEF has developed
and assembled medical, school and office ready-to-use kits. UNESCO has
developed a teacher emergency package, comprising a kit of materials for
teaching basic literacy and numeracy accompanied by a training programme
for implementation based on a "train the trainer" approach for emergency
situations.
99. An additional important component of stand-by capacity for rapid
response to both natural and man-made emergencies is the existing system of
stockpiles of emergency supplies run by the United Nations, Governments and
NGOs. These stockpiles provide a stand-by source for relief supplies that
can be flown to the site of an emergency within hours of a disaster
declaration.
100. Many organizations have stockpiles of pertinent assistance items.
UNICEF has a well-established stockpile facility at Copenhagen with the
capacity to respond globally at competitive prices. WFP and WHO have
joined the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in stockpiling food and
medical supplies in a warehouse at Pisa, Italy. This warehouse aims to
fill gaps which cannot be met by another United Nations organization or
donor nation.
101. In order to improve the usefulness of the various stockpiles, the
Department of Humanitarian Affairs has established a register of emergency
stockpiles, which includes both specifications and available quantities and
provides easily accessible information as to the potential for immediate
shipment of relief consignments to affected areas. The register is an
important tool to increase awareness of existing capacities among the
humanitarian community and recipient countries. The Department is also
working with the World Customs Organization on a model agreement between
the United Nations and a Member State, which would expedite the movement of
humanitarian consignments and disaster relief teams in the event of an
emergency.
102. In the past, the best efforts of humanitarian organizations to deploy
supporting telecommunications equipment such as radios and satellite
communications have sometimes been delayed at national borders owing to
lack of prior customs clearance. In October 1994, the Plenipotentiary
Conference of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) adopted
resolution 36, in which Member States are urged to take all practical steps
for facilitating the rapid deployment and the effective use of
telecommunication equipment for disaster mitigation and for disaster relief
operations by reducing and, where possible, removing regulatory barriers
and strengthening transborder cooperation between States. It is hoped that
steps will be taken by the Economic and Social Council in 1995 to move this
process forward. It is recommended that an open-ended ad hoc
intergovernmental working group of experts be established by the Council to
examine proposals and draft a basic text for consideration and adoption as
a convention on emergency telecommunications.
3. Cooperative arrangements
103. Humanitarian response to many emergencies is a multifaceted operation
calling upon the capacity of numerous organizations, both indigenous and
international. Within the existing system, no single organization can
possibly meet all the needs of a suffering population. Several United
Nations humanitarian organizations have moved to optimize the collective
response through regularizing coordination with other humanitarian
organizations within the United Nations and with NGOs, as well as the
above-mentioned bilateral arrangements.
(a)Memoranda of understanding among United Nations organizations
104. Most of the United Nations humanitarian organizations have recognized
the importance of relying on one another's comparative advantages and
special skills. Memoranda of understanding have been signed between many
United Nations organizations to provide guidance to inter-agency
collaboration. Some of these memoranda extend beyond a specific emergency;
almost all refugee food requirements are channelled through WFP under the
WFP/UNHCR memorandum of understanding. Other memoranda, such as the one
between UNDP and UNHCR, are country-level agreements that spell out
collaborative arrangements between the organizations in order to facilitate
seamless programme support to affected populations. UNICEF is actively
seeking to develop memoranda of understanding with WFP, UNHCR and WHO.
105. In addition, some inter-agency relationships, like the one between
UNHCR and UNICEF, are based on mostly field-oriented letters of
understanding and other ad hoc arrangements. FAO and WFP collaborate in
food assessments and in early warning based upon their long-standing
collaboration.
106. Longer-term arrangements between United Nations organizations have
also been developed. The increase in industrial accidents, the magnitude
and potential consequences of which demand an international emergency
response, has led to a joint Environment Unit between the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs.
UNEP retains substantive responsibility for dealing with environmental
aspects of emergencies, including industrial accidents, while the
Department of Humanitarian Affairs assures operational coordination.
107. Organizations of the system have also increased cooperation with the
United Nations Volunteers Programme in meeting some of their staffing
requirements in the field.
(b)Collaboration between United Nations organizations and NGOs
108. The humanitarian community could not function without local and
international NGOs. Their enormous contribution goes beyond that of
implementing partners. Use of indigenous NGOs should be encouraged to
mobilize local resources and to ensure that there is a proper transition
from relief to rehabilitation and recovery.
109. NGOs have emerged as mainstream partners in emergencies. UNHCR and
UNICEF have long experience in working closely with NGOs in emergency
settings. To strengthen collaboration, both organizations have developed
guidelines to enhance their partnership with NGOs. In addition, UNICEF has
been pursuing initiatives to enhance relationships with NGOs in the field
by concluding memoranda of understanding, and to strengthen capacity-
building and other links with indigenous NGOs. WFP and FAO systematically
engage NGOs as implementing partners to assist in the distribution and
monitoring of humanitarian assistance because of their relevant experience
and presence in the field.
110. WHO has regularly worked with NGOs in many areas of the world. WHO
is presently consulting with major medical NGOs to define how such
collaboration can be further developed. UNESCO has established cooperation
with national and international bodies such as the Norwegian Refugee
Council and the Jesuit Refugee Service to provide short-term staff for
emergencies. UNICEF presently relies on stand-by/turnkey arrangements with
Swedrelief and the Norwegian Refugee Council for training in emergency
preparedness and staff security.
(c)Potential of "White Helmets"
111. The General Assembly, in its resolution 49/139 B of 20 December 1994,
envisages the participation of volunteers or "White Helmets" in the
activities of the United Nations in the field of humanitarian relief,
rehabilitation and technical cooperation for development. The main benefit
accruing to the United Nations from the White Helmets initiative would be
the easing of the capacity and resource problems encountered by the United
Nations system as a result of the high level of instability and friction
world wide. In addition, the White Helmets concept could strengthen South-
South collaboration and enhance national operational capacities.
112. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations
Volunteers Programme, in consultation with Member States and
intergovernmental organizations, have looked at the feasibility of this
proposal and considered how qualified national volunteer teams could
complement existing arrangements. Successful implementation of the White
Helmets initiative will depend on the willingness of Governments to marshal
qualified manpower for such voluntary service under United Nations auspices
and on the availability of the necessary resources. A detailed report on
the White Helmets initiative, prepared pursuant to General Assembly
resolution 49/139 B, will be issued as an addendum to the present report.
B. Financial capacity
113. In 1994, United Nations organizations had access to almost $3 billion
for humanitarian assistance. Adding to that figure the amount spent by the
rest of the humanitarian community (non-United Nations partners, NGOs,
IFRC, ICRC and aid agencies of major donors having an operational
capacity), substantially more than $5 billion was spent in 1994 for
programmes of humanitarian assistance.
114. The rising number of complex crises has placed a great burden on the
capability of the United Nations system to respond to emergencies. In some
organizations, Member States responded by providing more financial
flexibility and increasing access to emergency funds. These efforts are
laudable and must be pursued, and additional funds and flexibility must be
provided to enable the United Nations system as a whole to take a
multifaceted approach to tackle the complexity of the consequences of
crises, as well as their root causes. The situation, organization by
organization, is described in paragraphs 115 to 127 below. The table in
annex IV shows the budgets, emergency expenditures and emergency reserves
of selected organizations.
115. In UNHCR, within the general programmes budget approved annually by
the Executive Committee, there are three possibilities for funds to be used
in response to new humanitarian situations. As a result of flexibility
provided by the Executive Committee, these budgetary arrangements, which
are not earmarked to regions or commodities, have been created or increased
over the past few years.
116. These budget allocations ensure significant resources and flexibility
to allow an immediate response to crises. The Emergency Fund now stands at
$25 million, from which up to $8 million can be allocated to any one
emergency during the year. If this fund is depleted, UNHCR can draw
temporarily up to $8 million from its Working Capital and Guaranteed Fund,
established at $50 million. The programme reserve, currently set at 10 per
cent of annual programmed activities (or some $34 million in 1995) can also
be used to respond to needs resulting from new influxes of refugees within
existing case-loads. Finally, UNHCR is authorized to use a general
allocation for voluntary repatriation, currently set at $20 million, to
promote or initiate voluntary repatriation activities whenever the
possibility arises.
117. WFP relies for its funding for relief operations principally on the
International Emergency Food Reserve, which has an annual target of 500,000
tons. Although this target has invariably been exceeded, it remains
insufficient to respond to all emergency situations. The second source of
funding, a subset of the regular WFP budget, is for protracted refugee and
displaced persons relief operations. This mechanism depends on voluntary
pledging for specific operations and provides no guarantee of continuity in
the long term.
118. The third source of funding is the immediate response account, which
has an annual target of $30 million to allow for early interventions when
an emergency occurs. This account has never been fully funded and
therefore tends to get exhausted early in the year. An additional source
of funding for relief operations is bilateral pledges, either in response
to WFP requests for specific emergency operations or as a result of donors'
decisions to channel their bilateral contribution through WFP. This
funding has been extremely useful in resolving many acute emergency
requirements, such as road repairs and airlifts, and to finance operations
not falling into the classic group of natural and manmade emergencies.
However, pledges are often for specific emergencies and thus restrict WFP
action considerably.
119. Although contributions to the protracted relief operations are more
secure, some of them are also specifically directed and do not permit
reallocation by WFP to the most deserving operations when shortages occur.
WFP can borrow from development resources, both financially and for food,
which allows for rapid access to essential supplies of food. However, such
loans are constrained by the reduction in development-oriented resource
flows; furthermore some recent emergency operations are situated in areas
where little development activity takes place. In order to ensure the
availability of cash for management of emergency operations, WFP emergency
budgets now include delivery and administration costs.
120. UNICEF mobilizes resources for emergency activities through diversion
of funding already allocated to the country, reprogramming, the Emergency
Programme Fund, supplementary funds received against appeals and the
Central Emergency Revolving Fund. Diversion of funds already available to
the country is often the first recourse. For diversions up to $50,000
Government consent is sought, although UNICEF headquarters approval is not
necessary. Reprogramming involves the reallocation of more than $50,000 of
country programme resources previously earmarked for development
programmes. For reprogramming and diversion, if there are no recognized
authorities with which to negotiate, the representative has the discretion
to reallocate or divert funds as long as there is headquarters approval.
121. UNICEF has a biannual Emergency Programme Fund of $30 million.
Resources from the Fund are used to provide the cash necessary for the
initial response in complex emergencies in order to meet interim needs in
expectation of the launching of a consolidated inter-agency appeal or
pending receipt of donor contributions against an appeal. Occasionally,
resources from the Fund will be used to initiate action at the initial
stage of an emergency when there is no appeal and are thus allocated
without the expectation of being replenished.
122. UNDP emergency relief assistance is largely funded from special
programme resources, which are approved by the Executive Board over a five-
year planning cycle for the purpose of disaster mitigation. All activities
proposed for funding under special programme resources must have been fully
discussed at the country level with the United Nations disaster management
team. Requests for approval of special programme resources funds for
specific activities must be directed to UNDP headquarters from country
offices, except in selected countries classified as highly vulnerable to
sudden natural disasters, where approval authority for emergency phase
activities has been delegated to the UNDP resident representative.
123. Two subcategories of special programme resources funds are available
to meet immediate humanitarian assistance requirements. The first is for
emergency phase activities, and usually contains an average annual amount
of $1 million for allocations to a maximum of $50,000 per disaster per
country. These funds can be used for emergency-related coordination,
support services for deployment of relief supplies and for direct emergency
assistance (provided that the relief supplies to be procured are not
covered under the mandate of a different United Nations organization and
they are not to be used for rehabilitation and/or reconstruction purposes).
124. The second subcategory, for refugees, displaced persons and
returnees, is funded at an average annual level of $1.4 million. Funds
from this category also have spending caps. A maximum of $50,000 per
situation is available for emergency assistance to internally displaced
persons to fill crucial gaps not met by other United Nations system
resources and for activities oriented to needs assessment and project
development pertaining to refugees and returnees. Funds for the
coordination of assistance to displaced persons are limited to $100,000 per
displacement situation.
125. WHO has an Emergency Revolving Fund of $900,000 in unearmarked
resources available for immediate emergency response for each biennium.
The Fund is divided into a $400,000 replenishable component and a $500,000
allocation. WHO must rely on resources mobilized through consolidated
appeals or the limited amounts available through regional offices for its
response to urgent emergency requirements.
126. Emergency projects undertaken by the Office for Special Relief
Operations of FAO are financed by its own technical cooperation programme
from contributions from governmental, non-governmental and United Nations
organizations. There is no flexibility in the use of funds allocated by
donors for specific activities. FAO has recognized the need to establish
an emergency revolving fund to meet immediate requirements, including for
teams to assess the impact of a calamity on the agricultural sector and to
formulate interventions.
127. In 1993, UNESCO's General Conference approved $2.4 million for
addressing emergency needs in 1994 and 1995. There is an accelerated
procedure to process requests for emergency assistance. Such requests must
be addressed to UNESCO by the Government concerned. The Director-General
has also financed UNESCO emergency operations with savings from the regular
budget, that is, limited reallocations of funds foreseen for a specific
activity. Essentially, however, UNESCO's emergency operations rely on
extrabudgetary funding. An Emergency Relief Fund has been established for
voluntary contributions. UNESCO does collect funds for countries emerging
from emergency situations. Significant funding is collected within this
context for activities within the Culture of Peace Programme and the unit
dealing with refugee education.
128. Given the recent increase in the number and complexity of emergencies
to which the United Nations system has been called upon to respond, it is
timely for Member States to review the capacity of the United Nations
humanitarian organizations. In doing so, Governments may wish to take
appropriate measures to strengthen the operational and financial capacities
of these organizations so that the system as a whole can respond quickly,
effectively and equitably to the range of critical short- and medium-term
needs of those affected by disasters and emergencies.
V. RECOVERY AND TRANSITION
129. The ability of the humanitarian community effectively to assist
countries damaged by systemic breakdowns or societal implosion to move from
relief assistance to steps towards rebuilding a civil society depends on
the political resolve of the international community to address fully the
underlying problems of emergencies. This ability is also affected by the
intricate process of identifying, engaging with and making accountable
local community authorities and structures. Without such commitments,
humanitarian organizations and development agencies, such as UNDP, the
World Bank and bilateral aid agencies can do little to assist societies in
their transition from dependency upon relief assistance to affirmative,
engaged participation in the restructuring of their nation. In this
context, it is often difficult to define the appropriate transition away
from humanitarian operations.
130. Until recently, traditional wisdom argued that responsibility for the
convalescence of a society was transferred from humanitarian actors to
development partners in a linear progression along what was called the
"relief to development continuum". The assumption was that such baton
hand-overs could be accomplished smoothly and that donor momentum or
interest would remain constant throughout the process. In fact, in many
situations, success by the international community in stabilizing the
humanitarian crisis is not accompanied by longer-term political stability.
Protracted political instability often results in a reduction of
international assistance, thus limiting resources available to support a
transition to recovery. The experiences of Rwanda, Somalia and the Sudan,
as well as concerns about the future of such ongoing operations as those in
Angola, reveal a fundamental flaw in the traditional notion of a relief to
development continuum.
131. Recent experiences have highlighted difficulties which have to be
addressed in dealing with recovery and transition. Such problems include
the following:
(a) A perceived scarcity of empowered local leadership able to interact
with the international community to take over and guide the transition
process. A classic example is Somalia, where only limited numbers of local
leaders who could assume the responsibility for peacemaking, political
accommodation and rehabilitation emerged;
(b) Frequent donor fatigue when a protracted conflict or emergency seems
to lead nowhere. After years of war and crisis, the situation in the Sudan
only occasionally grabs the international community's attention;
(c) An absence of significant donor resources for the rehabilitation and
recovery phases. Most donor funds are earmarked for either disaster
assistance or long-term development. In Burundi and Rwanda, opportunities
for breaking the cycle of impunity and starting on a path to reconciliation
are being forfeited because of delays in and lack of resources targeted to
the judicial systems.
132. The goodwill associated with a successful international emergency
operation provides a window of opportunity upon which the international
community must capitalize. A community's goodwill and its willingness to
compromise among its own members and with others are often lost if
resources for recovery and follow-up support are not forthcoming in a
timely manner.
133. To begin to address these problems, the international community
should, at the very inception of an emergency, focus on the sustainability
of the impact of humanitarian assistance, especially through the
empowerment of local authorities and structures. Supporting local
structures in their efforts to guide the humanitarian endeavour will
greatly enhance the international community's ability to address the
essence of a crisis and to identify and support opportunities for diffusing
tensions. Continued support to representative local structures beyond the
emergency relief stage through the recovery process has the potential to
assist nascent and fragile peace efforts to flourish.
134. To date, attempts by the United Nations system to bridge the recovery
funding gap have focused on a number of mechanisms, of which the two most
prominent are the consolidated appeal and round-table discussions.
Recognizing the protracted and complex nature of many crises, UNDP has
expanded the roundtable concept to assist States in situations of
protracted instability; a round table was held for Rwanda. Round tables,
in facilitating the interaction between donors and the Governments
concerned, are, by their very nature, country specific, and require
significant preparation. In situations such as Somalia where government
structures remain to be established, round tables remain fairly complicated
to organize. The consolidated appeal has also been utilized in some
instances to address immediate recovery requirements. Such appeals aim to
address the totality of needs in an emergency situation and provide
sufficient time for the preparation of follow-up activities by other
partners. Recognizing the potential overlap between the round-table
mechanism and the consolidated appeals process, the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs and UNDP are currently reviewing these mechanisms to
ensure complementarity.
135. One critical constraint which organizations of the system face in a
period of transition is the availability of upfront resources to address
immediate recovery needs. In conflict situations where peace has just been
restored, such activities could be critical to stabilizing and improving
fragile situations. The window of opportunity for such activities, however,
is often limited and should be fully utilized. Experience has shown that
the response of donors to longer-term rehabilitation requirements often
takes time. In the light of these circumstances, it is proposed that a
window of an additional $30 million be created in the Central Emergency
Revolving Fund to be used for quick action to support immediate recovery
and transition activities undertaken by organizations of the United Nations
system. This new facility is intended to be a bridge between emergency
relief operations and the beginning of reconstruction and rehabilitation.
The Department of Humanitarian Affairs and UNDP, in consultation with other
partners of the United Nations system, will jointly work out modalities for
the use of this new facility.
VI. THE CHALLENGE OF PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS
136. With respect to natural disasters, the response capacity discussed in
the previous section (rapid response teams, stockpiles and stand-by
capacities) provides critical life-saving support at the onset of a natural
disaster. However, support for the building of national capacity in
natural disaster management is well-recognized as the most effective
ongoing assistance the international community can provide. This
principle, enunciated in Yokohama in 1994 at the World Conference on
Natural Disaster Reduction, must be translated into action through early
warning programmes, training, workshops, education and technical support.
137. Over the last 25 years, the damage caused by natural phenomena to
people and the productive infrastructure of developing countries has
steadily risen. Economic damage has more than tripled from $40 billion in
the 1960s to $140 billion in the 1980s. There are strong indications that
this trend will continue. Natural disasters, like complex emergencies,
absorb increasing amounts of global resources and set back development
agendas. Besides human and economic losses, they also can destabilize the
social and political fabric.
138. Successful disaster preparedness and mitigation programmes can save
thousands of lives. In 1977, some 10,000 persons died when a tropical
cyclone hit the coast of Andhra Pradesh in India. Thirteen years later, a
storm of similar force struck the same area, but less than 1,000 deaths
were reported because 600,000 persons had been evacuated in the previous 2
days. Nations once known for their devastating droughts have set up food
security arrangements that now almost totally protect them from the impact
of major droughts.
139. However, the challenge remains. The factors that make countries
vulnerable to disasters increase in dimension much faster than the means of
Governments to control them. The Governments concerned, international
development organizations and donors realize that vulnerability to
disasters has become a major obstacle to economic and social development.
It is estimated that the impact of natural disasters is 20 times greater in
poorer countries than in industrialized settings. While many disaster-
prone developing countries have to contend with competing demands on their
scarce resources, vulnerability reduction programmes are considered as an
important, integral part of their development strategies.
A. Early warning capacity and action on such warnings
140. Radar systems installed in countries bordering the Bay of Bengal,
rainfall monitoring stations in the Himalayas, the data-gathering and
evaluation mechanisms in the Sahel countries detecting the development of
drought situations, together with other early warning systems, have
undoubtedly saved many lives. New technologies, particularly in data
gathering and communication, have made possible many advances in the
predictability of potentially destructive natural phenomena.
141. Although technological improvements have increased the capacity of
early warning systems, they have also, to a certain degree, widened the gap
between the alert message and the end receiver in developing, disaster-
prone countries. The discrepancy lies in the often highly technical content
of the warning itself and the capacity of communities in disaster-prone
areas to first of all understand and secondly act upon it. This,
obviously, is particularly important in countries with different languages
and local dialects. The point to note, and one needing continuous
attention, is that early warning is not yet a disaster preparedness measure
in itself. It takes a functioning disaster preparedness system at the
national and local levels to translate early warning signals into an
understandable message for the end users at the community level. An example
of such a system is the cyclone preparedness project in Bangladesh. The
project draws on the services of more than 20,000 volunteers in the
country's cyclone exposed coastal areas who, when the meteorological
service gives the alarm over pre-established communication lines, go with
megaphones to villages and ensure a prompt reaction. Here is an obvious
area for disaster mitigation work at the local level for the United Nations
organizations concerned in collaboration with Governments and grass-roots
non-governmental organizations.
142. The United Nations is currently reviewing existing natural disaster
early warning arrangements and a report will be presented in September 1995
to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session.
143. Within the United Nations system, there are various early warning
capacities focused by sector. To name but a few, FAO's GIEWS, in
association with WFP, has the overall responsibility for crop monitoring
and food-needs assessments, for the assessment of emergency requirements,
as well as for the rapid dissemination of its assessments. The World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) has the responsibility and strong
capacity for early warning information relating to meteorological data.
Outside the United Nations system, the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS),
sponsored by the United States of America, and work on vulnerability
assessment maps, a collaborative effort of Save the Children UK, FEWS, FAO
and WFP and funded by both the European Union and the Government of the
United States, are mechanisms that contribute to a better understanding of
the development of complex and man-made emergencies.
144. As a coordinating body for humanitarian affairs, the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs has been involved in the development of a mechanism
which cuts across sectors for early warning information. The Humanitarian
Early Warning System (HEWS) is being developed to provide up-to-date
warnings of country situations through analysis of its database, drawing
upon the various early warning mechanisms of other United Nations
organizations, as well as non-United Nations information sources. HEWS
completed its prototype in January 1995 and has expanded its country
coverage since then. It will become operational very shortly. UNDP is
developing a risk analysis and vulnerability indicators programme to
analyse the risks arising from social, economic and political tensions.
145. In the case of complex crises, even with the presence of early
warning mechanisms, the international community may only be able to
mitigate the suffering. However, even this response requires action that
is often lacking, as was the case in Somalia. The Department of
Humanitarian Affairs is looking at means of encouraging action upon receipt
of an early warning. A recent development is joint, ad hoc consultations
between the Departments of Humanitarian Affairs, Peace-keeping Operations
and Political Affairs to ensure a common understanding and appreciation of
the nature and potential impact of looming crises. When appropriate, these
meetings will produce joint proposals for preventive measures for
consideration by the senior task force on United Nations operations.
B. Training programmes
146. The scarcity of resources for humanitarian assistance highlights the
importance of investment in human resources development, particularly at
the local and national levels.
147. The efforts of the United Nations to implement the concept of
disaster mitigation as a multisectoral and inter-ministerial discipline
rely heavily upon training. Disaster mitigation in the multisectoral sense
is of recent origin, and consequently requires intensive awareness raising
among government officials at all levels. Specialized training activities
are an excellent means to reach a large number of officials concerned as
well as representatives from the non-governmental sector.
148. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs/UNDP disaster management
training programme facilitates national capacity-building for all phases of
emergency management (prevention through reconstruction). Fifty per cent
of the participants in disaster management training events are nationals of
developing countries, and the training programme has recently enlarged its
target group to 70 emergency-prone countries. In countries where national
workshops for disaster management training are conducted, UNDP may propose
funding for projects to strengthen national capacity for disaster
prevention, mitigation and management from its special programme resources
up to $250,000.
149. Specific sectoral emergency training programmes are the key to
sectorally appropriate emergency response, and most United Nations
humanitarian organizations have developed and refined such training
programmes for their staff. For instance, UNICEF has a well-developed
training programme for emergency preparedness and management, including
security and critical stress management. It has trained over 300 staff
members at all levels, as well as staff from other United Nations
organizations and NGOs. The disaster management training programme,
envisaged as a training programme for natural disasters, draws upon these
existing training capacities and adds to them through its focus on
coordination and team-building among United Nations organizations, donors,
NGOs and national Governments, particularly in the field but also at
headquarters. The training programme is working to enhance the
participation of and full coordination among United Nations organizations.
The programme also aims to generate and disseminate new doctrine and
concepts and lessons learned from past emergencies.
150. On the basis of experience from disaster management training for
natural disasters, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee working group has
agreed that an inter-agency core group will be established to pursue
humanitarian training issues in the complex emergency sphere, including
development of linkages between humanitarian training, human rights, peace-
keeping and peacemaking.
C. Building national capacity for natural disaster management
151. Building national capacity for natural disaster mitigation and
management takes the form of advisory services, group training, seminars
and workshops, fellowships, field projects and publications. Numerous
United Nations organizations, working within their mandate, promote and
assist countries to implement disaster reduction programmes and develop
institutional capabilities for disaster management. These organizations
provide further service to countries by making international knowledge on
disaster reduction experiences, concepts and approaches accessible. For
example, UNESCO promotes research on the causes of hazards and on technical
and engineering means to mitigate their effects, and works to further
public awareness through education, information and communication.
Recently, in response to the risks from volcanoes for the very large local
and refugee population in eastern Zaire, UNHCR, UNICEF and WHO as well as
ICRC and IFRC delegates and national officials, held a series of meetings
coordinated by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs to contribute the
perspective and knowledge of their organizations for disaster reduction.
152. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs is often an orchestrator and
promoter of disaster-reduction efforts. It aims to reduce human suffering
and damage and destruction from natural disasters through activities that
address the preventive aspects of humanitarian assistance and create
awareness and opportunities for disaster reduction in a development
context. For instance, the Department worked in close collaboration with
UNDP, UNICEF, FAO, WMO, ITU and Habitat to hold subregional workshops in
Africa to promote and plan activities for disaster reduction.
153. In its facilitation role, the activities of the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs include servicing of International Decade for Natural
Disaster Reduction bodies, international liaison, information dissemination
and the development of new initiatives to contribute to the development of
national and regional disaster-reduction capabilities. This approach is
complemented by other technical support activities, including advisory
services, group training, seminars and workshops, fellowships and field
projects. A full report on the International Decade for Natural Disaster
Reduction will be before the General Assembly at its fiftieth session and
the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 1995.
154. Disaster reduction efforts of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs
have traditionally been carried out in liaison with national disaster
management authorities. While it remains important to facilitate and
support adequate attention for pre-disaster measures by the disaster
management authorities, the need to increase the involvement of national
and United Nations development institutions is becoming apparent. This
will require much closer cooperation with development planning authorities,
local government and public and private investors. The Department and UNDP
are developing tools to allow development officials to assess potential
disaster risks and integrate these considerations into their daily work,
and UNDP is expected to fund the UNDP/Department of Humanitarian Affairs
project on disaster impact assessment for development projects.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
155. Humanitarian organizations are on the front lines today both in
meeting the immediate needs of disaster victims and in confronting the
challenges inherent in the dramatically changed environment of humanitarian
assistance. There is greater awareness of the dynamics which generate
marginalization and disintegration and of the limited, albeit significant,
role of humanitarian assistance in the alleviation of suffering and in
helping people to survive. Humanitarian organizations are also in the
forefront of devising innovative strategies both to strengthen core
capacities that form the backbone of relief operations and to identify new
means of responding to the unprecedented needs. However, in the absence of
effective measures to address the root causes of conflict, humanitarian
assistance will be reduced to merely a tool to contain crises and the most
visible aspects of their destructiveness.
156. The ability of humanitarian organizations to respond to disasters
that destroy lives and means of livelihood is seriously compromised by an
alarming disrespect for fundamental humanitarian norms. One of the great
challenges in responding to crises is to find ways to ensure compliance
with international humanitarian law.
157. The well-being and integrity of victims of armed conflict, and their
right to humanitarian assistance, must be recognized and respected. The
international community has both a moral and a legal obligation to hold
accountable those who violate fundamental humanitarian norms. It is
recommended that, in accordance with the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,
Member States should use their influence with parties to an armed conflict
to strengthen compliance with international humanitarian law and respect
for the activities undertaken by impartial humanitarian organizations such
as ICRC. For its part, the United Nations, and in particular those charged
with preventive diplomacy and peacemaking tasks, will endeavour to make
compliance with humanitarian law a central focus of its activities.
158. Commensurate with the protection and provision of assistance to
civilians is the security that must be afforded to humanitarian
practitioners who carry out these activities. Member States should take
greater cognizance of the myriad dangers and threats to personal safety
faced by humanitarian workers and support the enhancement of existing
security arrangements, as recognized in the Convention on the Safety of
United Nations and Associated Personnel. Specifically, it is recommended
that the United Nations should have the capacity to make adequate security
arrangements from the onset of any crisis that has the potential to
endanger humanitarian workers. This may require rapid deployment of one or
more officers provided by the United Nations Security Coordinator's office
at the beginning of a crisis either to supplement existing security
arrangements or to establish a presence where none previously existed. To
deploy this capacity quickly, it is further recommended that interest
accrued on the Central Emergency Revolving Fund should be utilized to
support the deployment to initiate security arrangements and that donors
should respond positively to requests for funding of security arrangements
that are included in consolidated appeals in order to reimburse the Fund.
159. Within the humanitarian community, much has been accomplished in
defining common objectives and strategies geared to achieving greater
complementarity of inputs and more effective use of limited resources.
However, greater synergies could be achieved if the advice and direction
given by Member States to the governing bodies of individual agencies and
programmes was geared to a more unified approach within the United Nations
system. Thus, it is recommended that Member States take account of the
larger context within which humanitarian assistance is provided in order to
ensure greater coherence in the direction given to the governing bodies of
United Nations specialized agencies and programmes. It is further
recommended that Member States give adequate support to all United Nations
organizations and give due consideration to the importance of funding
consolidated rather than individual appeals to ensure more coherent
implementation of humanitarian programmes.
160. The consolidated appeals process has proved its worth in both
generating coherent programmes and in mobilizing resources in a manner that
facilitates a balanced response to needs. However, it is fully understood
that, in some instances, needs are poorly prioritized within specific
crises and there is room for additional streamlining in both the
organization and the presentation of appeals. The Department of
Humanitarian Affairs, and its collaborating partners, are fully committed
to strengthening the appeals process. However, the effectiveness of the
consolidated appeals process is largely dependent upon the response of
Member States. There is, for example, a continuing discrepancy in
resources made available for food and for non-food requirements, and
rehabilitation programmes are often poorly funded compared to other
activities. The availability of additional unearmarked contributions for a
particular crisis would help ensure that all vital needs are met and would
strengthen the capacity of organizations to work together in developing a
consolidated programme. It is recommended that Member States give due
consideration to the possibility of furnishing such support when responding
to future appeals.
161. One of the most glaring deficiencies in the overall response of the
international community is the general lack of support for strengthening
indigenous capacities and local mechanisms to cope throughout a crisis.
Yet the strength of these local mechanisms is a major determinant in the
struggle of affected communities to recover. It is recommended that United
Nations humanitarian organizations, as well as international NGOs, consider
the greater use of local NGOs and other indigenous expertise in the
planning and execution of relief and rehabilitation activities.
162. Despite recognition of the importance of rehabilitation and
confidencebuilding measures, there is a dramatic dearth of funding for such
activities. Even when donor support for rehabilitation programmes exists,
the funding mechanisms are often too slow to maintain the necessary
momentum to break the cycle of violence or address the conditions that
perpetuate instability. It is important that funds which can be accessed
quickly are set aside for immediate rehabilitation activities. In this
connection, it is recommended that a separate window with an additional $30
million be opened within the Central Emergency Revolving Fund to act as a
catalyst for such activities.
163. The Central Emergency Revolving Fund has proved its value in
facilitating a both rapid and joint response by United Nations
organizations to fast-breaking emergencies. However, the revolving nature
of the Fund demands that resources are replenished quickly to ensure its
full utility. Except on three occasions, United Nations organizations have
been able to repay funds extended to them. In order to maintain the Fund
at the minimum level of $50 million as stipulated by the General Assembly
in its resolution 48/186, it is recommended that Member States respond
favourably to the proposal to replenish the Fund to cover advances that
have been outstanding for more than a year in the amount of $6.12 million.
It is also recommended that the scope of the Fund be expanded to facilitate
the provision of emergency assistance in the case of protracted
emergencies. The Fund would only be drawn upon in such circumstances in a
judicious manner.
164. Recent experience has demonstrated the necessity and value of
coordination of international humanitarian efforts in managing crisis
response. Ensuring adequate interaction, exchange of information and
coherence in policy and approach between all actors at various levels in
fast-moving, complex crisis situations demands a structure that is
adequately resourced and able to function in a timely and effective manner.
While much has been accomplished, as evidenced by the rapid system-wide
response to recent crises, coordination of the United Nations humanitarian
system remains an ongoing challenge. The limited regular budget funding
available to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs due to overall resource
constraints of the Organization, poses limitations in its capacity in the
face of accelerated incidence of humanitarian emergencies. It is a matter
of some importance that Member States consider ways to provide the
necessary extrabudgetary support to the Department on a sustainable basis.
This will help ensure both continuity and strengthening of the Department's
key coordination role within the international humanitarian system. In
this context, the proposal for donors to earmark a percentage of their
contributions to consolidated appeals for the Department's coordination
activities merits serious consideration.
Notes
1/ ST/SGB/251.
ANNEX I
Casualties among United Nations civilian personnel
Source: Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator.
Note: For details on these incidents, consult the annual report of the
Secretary-General to the General Assembly regarding respect for the
privileges and immunities of officials of the United Nations, the
specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
ANNEX II
Central Emergency Revolving Fund
A. Advances and reimbursements
(as at 31 May 1995)
Year
Operational organization
Project area
Date of advance
Amount of advance
Date of reimbursement
Amount of reimbursement
Amount outstanding1992UNICEFKenya24 Aug. 19922 000 00031 Dec. 1992 and 22
Oct. 19932 000 000-UNICEFSomalia24 Aug. 19925 000 00022 Dec. 19925 000 000-
UNCHASSomalia10 Sep. 1992500 00029 Jan. 1993500 000-FAOSomalia30 Sep. 19921
600 00024 June 19931 600 000-WHOSomalia24 Oct. 19922 000 00029 Mar. 19932
000 000-UNICEFIraq11 Nov. 19925 000 00015 Apr. 19935 000 000-
UNHCRAfghanistan24 Nov. 19925 000 0006 Jan. 19935 000 000-
1993UNICEFMozambique22 Jan. 19932 000 0002 Feb. 1994 and 1 Aug. 19942 000
000-WFPTajikistan25 Mar. 19934 500 0003 May 1994 and 10 June 19942 036 1212
463 879WHOFormer
Yugoslavia26 Mar. 19932 500 0005 May 19942 500 000-UNHCRGeorgia22 Apr.
19932 000 00016 Sep. 19932 000 000-UNICEFIraq14 June 19935 000 00021 Oct.
19935 000 000-UNHCRTajikistan18 June 19935 000 00029 Dec. 1993 and May
19945 000 000-WFPIraq21 June 19934 000 0003 May 1994 and 9 Aug. 19944 000
000-UNICEFHaiti23 July 19931 000 00025 Apr. 1994 and 1 Aug. 19941 000 000-
WFPLebanon3 Sep. 1993560 0003 Jan. 1994560 000-HabitatLebanon9 Sep. 19935
000 00021 Mar. 1994 and 17 June 19941 693 2763 306 724UNICEFIraq27 Oct.
19937 000 0001 Feb. 19947 000 000-UNHCRBurundi19 Nov. 19935 000 0001 June
19945 000 000-WFPBurundi22 Dec. 19935 000 0003 May 19945 000 000-
1994UNICEFAngola6 Jan. 19941 500 00019 May 19941 500 000-IOMZaire6 Jan.
19941 000 0008 July 1994649 846350 154UNICEFSudan17 Feb. 19941 000 00020
June 19941 000 000-FAOSudan23 Feb. 1994200 00016 May 1994200 000-
UNICEFFormer
Yugoslavia16 Mar. 19941 000 00031 Aug. 19941 000 000-UNDPKenya18 Mar.
1994500 00013 Apr. 1995500 000-WHOFormer
Yugoslavia29 Mar. 19942 500 00031 Oct. 19942 500 000-UNICEFSomalia28 Apr.
19944 870 00022 July 1994 and 24 Oct. 19944 870 000-UNREORwanda28 Apr.
1994200 0008 Sep. 1994200 000-UNHCRTajikistan 20 May 19943 000 00021 Dec.
19943 000 000-UNHCRRwanda1 June 199410 000 00029 Sep. 1994 and 21 Nov.
199410 000 000-UNICEFRwanda21 July 19943 000 00030 Dec. 19943 000 000-
WFPRwanda22 July 19945 000 00030 Dec. 19945 000 000-HCHR/HRRwanda7 Oct.
19943 000 000-3 000 000UNICEFSudan28 Dec. 19943 000 00024 May 19951 684
7211 315 2791995UNICEFNorthern
Iraq4 Jan. 1995930 00026 Apr. 1995930 000-UCAHAngola27 Jan. 1995480 600-
480 600WFPRwanda7 Mar. 19955 000 000-5 000 000Total115 840 60099 923 96415
916 636
Note: UNCHAS = United Nations Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance in
Somalia.
UNREO = United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office.
HCHR/HR = High Commissioner for Human Rights/Human Rights.
UCAH = Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit.
B. Status of contributions
(as at 26 June 1995)
Pledges
(United States dollars)
Collections
(United States dollars)
Date paidAlgeria20 00020 0007 Dec. 1994Australia800 000743 60027 July
1992Austria500 000500 00030 Mar. 1992Belgium330 000327 32717 Sep.
1992Canada2 300 0002 195 32116 and 22 June 1992Colombia10 00010 0004 Feb.
1993Denmark2 000 0001 999 98531 Aug. 1992Finland1 500 0001 533 80418 June
1992France5 600 000934 57916 Nov. 19924 545 4558 and 27 Jan. 1993Germany5
000 0005 000 00030 June 1992Holy See50 00050 00022 May 199220 00020 00020
Dec. 1994Iceland10 00010 0006 July 1992Ireland100 000100 00018 June
1992Italy5 000 0004 284 18410 Dec. 1992Japan5 000 0005 000 00027 July
1992Libyan Arab Jamahiriya5 000 5 0006 Oct. 1993Liechtenstein7 0006 64110
Apr. 1992Luxembourg100 000100 00013 Aug. 1992Malaysia20 00020 00015 June
1993Mauritius10 00010 0001 July 1992Monaco40 111.7320 00019 July 199422
2604 May 1995Netherlands3 000 0003 083 59012 June 1992New Zealand140 000136
82523 Mar. 1992Norway1 850 0001 849 9705 May and 10 June 1992Republic of
Korea50 00050 00011 June 1992Russian Federation250 00023 May 1995Spain750
000671 5447 June 199388 4534 Mar. 1994Sweden2 750 0002 408 74425 Nov.
1992Switzerland2 000 000999 98525 Aug. 1992999 98513 Jan. 1993United
Kingdom5 000 0005 000 00024 Apr. 1992United States6 200 0002 500 00015 Apr.
19923 700 00023 Feb. and 19 July 1993NGOs1 0001 00017 June 1992
Total
50 163 111
49 198 252
C. Status of utilization of the Fund
(United States
dollars)
Contributions received49 198 252
Less: advances(115 840 600)
Add: reimbursements99 923 964
Add: interest earned (as at 30 April 1995) 2 560 789
Fund balance (as at 31 May 1995)35 842 405
1992199319941995
(up to 31 May 1995)Total number of advances713153
Total number of reimbursements2 9303
ANNEX III
Analysis of United Nations consolidated inter-agency
humanitarian assistance appeals
A. List of appeals launched or ongoing
(mid-1992 to mid-1995)
(Compiled by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs on the basis of
information provided by the respective appealing organizations.)
AppealLaunch date (inclusive dates)Revised requirements (United States
dollars)Income (contributions/
pledges and carryover) (United States dollars)Needs covered
(percentage)Target beneficiaries1992Afghanistan a/June 1992-Dec. 1992179
700 00085 167 56247.42 500 000DESAJune 1992-May 1993950 621 543724 236
15576.225 876 775Iraq (phase IV) b/Jan. 1992-June 1992145 000 000120 000
00082.82 775 000Iraq (phase V) b/July 1992-Mar. 1993265 000 000217 000
00081.92 775 000Liberia c/July 1991-Sep. 1993149 958 000102 012 00068.01
400 000SEPHAJan. 1992-Dec. 19921 145 765 086913 298 76279.719 000 000
Total for appeals launched in 1992:
Number of appeals: 6
Number of countries: 18
2 836 044 629
2 161 714 479
76.2
54 326 7751993Afghanistan a/Oct. 1993-Mar. 199459 828 00029 440 63849.22
000 000Afghanistan a/Jan. 1993-Sep. 1993112 600 00047 231 02641.91 300
000AngolaMay 1993-Apr. 1994226 054 100104 054 45046.01 963 000ArmeniaJuly
1993-Mar. 199426 204 20114 380 58454.91 820 000AzerbaijanJuly 1993-Mar.
199425 592 20318 203 47171.11 000 000BurundiNov. 1993-Feb. 19947 949 7224
781 28660.11 827 000EritreaJan. 1993-Dec. 199380 511 85543 475 43454.01 560
000EthiopiaJan. 1993-Dec. 1993300 965 048146 322 46948.68 261 500Former
YugoslaviaJan. 1993-Dec. 1993993 856 315989 423 70299.63 820 000GeorgiaMar.
1993-May 199427 454 02514 351 74352.3250 000Haiti c/Mar. 1993-Sep. 199362
727 00011 907 33619.06 500 000Iraq (phase VI) b/Apr. 1993-Mar. 1994467 067
650122 962 59326.32 775 000KenyaJan. 1993-Dec. 1993185 651 470124 322
50767.02 373 000LiberiaNov. 1993-Dec. 1994168 435 17985 398 36350.73 000
000Mozambique d/May 1993-Apr. 1994616 170 254542 205 54588.08 250
000RwandaApr. 1993-Dec. 199378 533 51930 816 10539.21 192 000SomaliaMar.
1993-Dec. 1993148 086 95036 086 95024.44 447 000South Lebanon/West
BekaaAug. 1993-Jan. 199428 745 2003 447 46212.0350 000SudanJan. 1993-Dec.
1993194 536 780124 228 36363.93 270 000TajikistanJan. 1993-Mar. 199432 517
84017 523 47453.9400 000ZaireOct. 1993-June 199476 222 52010 085 98913.22
247 000
Total for appeals launched in 1993:
Number of appeals: 21
Number of countries: 24
3 919 709 831
2 520 649 490
64.3
58 605 5001994Afghanistan a/Oct. 1994-Sep. 1995106 393 0006 904 9826.51 700
000Afghanistan a/Apr. 1994-Sep. 199462 067 00021 372 93434.41 000
000AngolaFeb. 1994-Dec. 1994181 229 482158 253 59287.33 284 300BurundiMar.
1994-Aug. 199459 189 82736 816 02962.21 368 000CaucasusApr. 1994-Mar.
1995123 900 90577 261 62462.43 077 000Former YugoslaviaJan. 1994-Dec.
1994721 169 025761 215 468105.64 259 000HaitiDec. 1994-May 199578 005 00040
316 06651.72 220 000Iraq (phase VII) b/Apr. 1994-Mar. 1995288 514 23792 499
62132.11 300 000KenyaJan. 1994-Dec. 199496 413 99754 860 33156.91 620
000Mozambique d/May 1994-Dec. 1994205 979 833128 155 13862.28 250
000RwandaJuly 1994-Dec. 1994589 403 829562 127 17195.43 900 000SudanJan.
1994-Dec. 1994185 936 129157 892 85684.96 500 000TajikistanApr. 1994-Dec.
199442 539 51025 706 90560.4605 000YemenAug. 1994-Feb. 199521 715 2403 205
01814.8375 000
Total for appeals launched in 1994:
Number of appeals: 14
Number of countries: 19
2 762 457 014
2 126 587 735
77.0
39 458 3001995AngolaJan. 1995-Dec. 1995212 766 4091 962 0020.93 226
543CaucasusApr. 1995-Mar. 1996118 004 5815 236 5924.43 170 737ChechnyaJan.
1995-June 199525 053 6608 079 80232.2220 000Former YugoslaviaJan. 1995-June
1995241 731 697171 859 98271.12 244 400Iraq (phase VIII)Apr. 1995-Mar.
1996183 311 662Update pending0.01 300 000LiberiaJan. 1995-June 199565 348
94726 931 72341.21 500 000Rwanda/SubregionJan. 1995-Dec. 1995766 512 672309
672 94740.43 700 000Sierra Leone/GuineaMar. 1995-Dec. 199514 672 958Update
pending0.0500 000SomaliaJan. 1995-June 199570 310 2356 693 3399.51 550
000SudanJan. 1995-Dec. 1995101 082 4623 196 3363.25 866 816TajikistanJan.
1995-Dec. 199537 289 9239 965 22126.7600 000
Total for appeals launched in 1995:
Number of appeals: 11
Number of countries: 17
1 836 085 206
543 597 944
29.6
23 878 496
Note: DESA = Drought emergency in southern Africa.
SEPHA = Special emergency programme for the Horn of Africa.
a/ As reported by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan.
b/ As reported by the special emergency programme for Iraq.
c/ As reported by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, New York.
d/ As reported by the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance
Coordination, Mozambique.
B. Summary of requirements, contributions and target populations
(mid-1992 to mid-1995)
YearNumber of appeals launchedNumber of countries included in
appealsRequirements (United States dollars)Funding as reported by appealing
organization (contributions/
pledges)
(United States dollars)Target populationsNeeds covered (percentage)June-
Dec. 1992 6182 836 044 6292 161 714 47954 326 77576.22199321243 919 709
8312 520 649 49058 605 50064.31199414192 762 457 0142 126 587 73539 458
30076.98Jan.-May 199511171 836 085 206543 597 94423 878 49629.61
D. Analysis of donor response in 1994
Other a/ (3.35%)
EC b/ (22.03%)
a/ Includes Andorra, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei
Darussalam, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Gabon, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland,
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Republic of Korea, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Micronesia, Monaco, New Zealand, Oman, Pakistan,
Portugal, Russian Federation, San Marino, Spain, Thailand and Turkey.
b/ Total for European Community does not include aid accorded by
Member States (amounting to approximately $365.3 million).
E. Summary of donor contributions in 1994 as percentage gross national
product
(Thousands)
Andorra a/
Monaco a/
United States
San Marino a/
Micronesia a/
Brunei Darussalam a/
Republic of Korea
Source: World Bank World Atlas, 1995, pp. 18-19, except where otherwise
indicated.
a/ Data taken from World Data Book, second edition, Guiness Publishing
Ltd., pp. 54-59. Dates for GNP are as follows: Andorra (1992), Brunei
(1989), Micronesia (1989), Monaco (1992), San Marino (1992).for stripping
/... A/50/203
E/1995/79
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A/50/203
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ANNEX IV
Budgets, emergency expenditures and emergency reserves in 1994
of selected organizations
(United States dollars)
BudgetAmount/
percentage to emergencies Emergency
reserve
(if any)FAO673 114 000 a/5 603 600 b/N/AUNHCR1 200 000 000 N/A25 000
000UNICEF801 000 000216 000 000
27% 9 000 000WFP1 400 000 000980 000 000
70% c/WHO1 000 000 00034 000 000
3.4% 900 000 d/
a/ Biennium 1994-1995.
b/ Technical cooperation programme; expenditures from trust funds
amounted to $30,868,514.
c/ International Emergency Food Reserve.
d/ Comprises $500,000 per biennium (non-replenishable) suballocated to
Division of Emergency and Humanitarian Action from Development Programme
and $400,000 transferred from the WHO Voluntary Fund for Health Promotion
to the Special Account for Disasters and Natural Catastrophes.
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