Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR THE
2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee.
2. Election of the President of the Conference.
3. Statement by the President of the Conference.
4. Address by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
5. Address by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
6. Submission of the final report of the Preparatory Committee.
7. Adoption of the rules of procedure.
8. Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee.
9. Election of Vice-Presidents.
10. Credentials of representatives to the Conference:
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    (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
11. Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General.
12. Adoption of the agenda.
13. Programme of work.
14. Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference.
15. General debate.
16. Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference:
    (a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:
        (i) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3;
        (ii) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12;
        (iii) Article VII with specific reference to the main issues in (a) and (b);
    (b) Security assurances:
        (i) United Nations Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and 984 (1995);
        (ii) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
(c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:
   (i) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7;
   (ii) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to articles III and IV;
   (iii) Article VII;

(d) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II:
   (i) Articles III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5;
   (ii) Article V.

(e) Other provisions of the Treaty.

17. Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality.

18. Reports of the Main Committees.

19. Consideration and adoption of Final Document(s).

20. Any other business.
THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS


The provisions of the Treaty, particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a review of the operation of the Treaty every five years, a provision which was reaffirmed by the States parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

The 2000 Review Conference is the first to meet following the Treaty’s indefinite extension at the 1995 Conference. States parties will examine the implementation of the Treaty’s provisions since 1995, taking into account the decisions on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the strengthening of the review process for the Treaty as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference.

The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The NPT represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States.

Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. By January 2000, a total of 187 parties had joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s significance.

To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA.

The Treaty promotes co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use. Together with other measures that comprise the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the NPT has succeeded in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in reducing existing arsenals.

History of the Treaty

From the beginning of the nuclear age, and the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, it has been apparent that the development of nuclear capabilities by States could enable them to divert technology and materials for weapons purposes. Thus the problem of preventing such diversions became a central issue in discussions on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Initial efforts, which began in 1946, to create an international system enabling all States to have access to nuclear technology under appropriate safeguards, were terminated in 1949 without the achievement of this objective, due to serious political differences between the major Powers. By then, both the United States and the Soviet Union had tested nuclear weapons, and were beginning to build their stockpiles.

In December 1953, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his “Atoms for Peace” proposal, presented to the eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, urged that an international organization be established to disseminate peaceful nuclear technology, while guarding against development of weapons capabilities in additional countries. His proposal resulted in 1957 in the establishment of the IAEA, which was charged with the dual responsibility of promotion and control of nuclear technology. IAEA technical assistance activities began in 1958. An interim safeguards system for small nuclear reactors, put in place in 1961, was replaced in 1964 by a system covering larger installations and, over the following years, was expanded to include additional nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/66 and revisions). The IAEA began to inspect and verify the peaceful application of nuclear materials and facilities.
acquired from the Agency or under agreements with supplier countries that required IAEA safeguards as part of the supply agreement. In recent years, efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system culminated in the approval of the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997. (For detailed information see Fact Sheet No. 3.)

While the IAEA began to develop a safeguards system, negotiations within the United Nations framework began to reach broad agreement on a treaty to uphold non-proliferation as a norm of international behaviour. The principle of nuclear non-proliferation was addressed in negotiations as early as 1957 and gained significant momentum in the early 1960s. The structure of a treaty had become clear by the mid-1960s, and by 1968 final agreement had been reached on a Treaty that would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons but would enable co-operation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Treaty provided, in article X, for a conference to be convened 25 years after its entry into force to decide whether the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely, or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. Accordingly, 25 years after the Treaty’s entry into force (1970), at the Review and Extension Conference in May 1995, States parties to the Treaty decided—without a vote—that the Treaty would continue in force indefinitely.

**The NPT Review Process**

Conferences to review the operation of the Treaty have been held at five-year intervals since the Treaty went into effect in 1970. Each conference has sought to find agreement on a final declaration that would assess the implementation of the Treaty’s provisions and make recommendations on measures to further strengthen it. Consensus on a final declaration was reached at the 1975 and 1985 Review Conferences, but could not be achieved in 1980 and 1990. Differences centred on the question of whether or not the nuclear-weapon States had sufficiently fulfilled the requirements of article VI (nuclear disarmament) as well as on issues such as nuclear testing, qualitative nuclear-weapon developments, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States by nuclear-weapon States, and co-operation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The 1995 Conference was of a different nature. It had, in addition to reviewing the implementation of the Treaty, the responsibility of deciding on its future. States parties were able to reach agreement in the form of a package of decisions comprising a strengthened review process for the Treaty, principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the indefinite extension of the Treaty and a resolution on the Middle East. The first decision stipulates that review conferences should continue to be held every five years. These conferences should look forward as well as back, evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought, and address what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality. The second decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament stresses universal adherence to the NPT as an urgent priority, reaffirms the nuclear-weapon States’ commitment to article VI, and outlines a programme of action for implementing it. This programme includes the completion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) no later than 1996, the commencement of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of their elimination. The decision also calls for the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, an internationally legally binding instrument on security assurances and strengthened IAEA safeguards. The third decision establishes that as a majority exists among States parties to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely. The resolution on the Middle East reaffirms the importance of universal adherence to the Treaty and of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in that region. (For the texts of the decisions and the resolution see Fact Sheet No. 5.)

It was not possible, however, to agree on a final declaration regarding the aspect of review because of insufficient time to deal with a number of sensitive issues on which positions were highly divergent.

**Preparations for the 2000 Review Conference**

The Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Conference, established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 51/45 A of 10 December 1996, held three sessions in the period April 1997 to May 1999. It devoted most of its meetings to a substantive preparation of the Conference and considered principles, ways and means for the implementation of the Treaty and the decisions and the resolution adopted in 1995. However, the Committee was unable to reach agreement on any substantive recommendation to the 2000 Conference. As regards the organizational and procedural preparations for the Conference, the Committee agreed on the provi-
Towards the 2000 Review Conference

Among the issues which are expected to be considered at great length at the Conference in view of recent developments are: universality of the Treaty, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones, security assurances, and safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, nine States have acceded: Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu. The international community welcomed these accessions as important developments in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Four States have chosen to remain outside the Treaty: Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan.

The nuclear tests carried out by the two South Asian non-NPT States in May 1998 constituted a serious challenge to the international community’s efforts to eliminate the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and to maintain and strengthen the prevailing global norms of disarmament, non-proliferation and non-testing. In June 1998, following the South Asian nuclear tests, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved resolution 1172 (1998), which urged India, Pakistan, and all other States that have not yet done so, to become parties to the NPT without delay and without conditions.

As agreed upon at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the first measure towards implementation of article VI of the NPT was to complete negotiations on the CTBT “no later than 1996”. The CTBT was opened for signature on 24 September 1996 and has been signed by 155 States. Fifty-one States have ratified it. All five nuclear-weapons States have signed the Treaty, but only France and the United Kingdom have ratified it. At the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in October 1999 in Vienna, ratifying and signatory States adopted a Final Declaration calling on all signatory States to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible, and urging those States whose ratification is required for the CTBT’s entry into force, but have not yet signed, to do so. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO Preparatory Commission), which was established in November 1996, has been at work in Vienna since March 1997 to carry out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the CTBT. Since its inception, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission has concentrated its work on establishing an effective global verification regime in the form of an International Monitoring System (IMS) and International Data Centre (IDC), and implementing necessary training programmes for the verification regime envisaged in the Treaty.

The second and third measures agreed upon in 1995 in the nuclear disarmament programme have not been realized. Negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons have not yet commenced in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. Progress towards further reductions in nuclear weapons remains limited and the absence of global negotiations on nuclear disarmament continues to be a source of disappointment and concern.

To date, 45 countries have signed agreements with the IAEA to implement strengthened safeguards, as outlined in the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540). In 1996, a trilateral initiative was agreed upon between the Russian Federation, the United States, and the IAEA to place excess weapons materials under IAEA supervision (For detailed information see Fact Sheet No. 3).

Concern over non-compliance with the safeguards provisions of the Treaty has continued since 1995, especially in view of the fact that the IAEA remains unable to verify that all nuclear material subject to safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been declared to the Agency. The IAEA is also still unable to carry out its Security Council-mandated responsibilities in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991), recently revised by Security Council resolution 1284 (1999).

Since the 1995 Conference, two further treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, in Southeast Asia (Bangkok Treaty) and Africa (Pelindaba Treaty), have been signed and the former has entered into force. Negotiations are under way on a treaty establishing a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. There has been little progress with respect to the implementation of the proposal on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

As in the past, the issue of the inalienable right of all the parties to the NPT to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination will continue to receive the highest attention.
The International Atomic Energy Agency was established in 1957 as an autonomous organization under the aegis of the United Nations.

**Aims and Activities**

In accordance with its Statute, the IAEA’s main objectives are to seek “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world”, and to ensure, “so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it, or at its request or under its supervision or control, is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose”.

To achieve these objectives, the IAEA fosters research and development in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, promotes the exchange of scientific and technical information, assists its 130 Member States through technical co-operation, administers safeguards verification of nuclear materials, establishes standards for nuclear safety and radiation protection, and provides for the application of these standards.

**Safeguards**

The Agency verifies non-proliferation commitments and provides assurance to the international community about the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities. Effective verification is vital to the continued success of nuclear non-proliferation efforts. In this regard, the Agency establishes and applies safeguards to ensure that nuclear materials and nuclear equipment intended for peaceful use are not used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying a State’s fulfilment of its commitments to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as reflected in such legal instruments as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

IAEA safeguards are applied pursuant to safeguards agreements concluded between the Agency and the State(s) concerned. In the case of non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) parties to the NPT, “comprehensive” (sometimes referred to as “full-scope”) safeguards agreements cover all of a State’s nuclear material and activities. Comprehensive safeguards agreements are also required by the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, which have been concluded to date for Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Additionally, safeguards agreements, known as “voluntary offer” agreements, are in force with each of the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) recognized as such under the NPT. These agreements, based on the model comprehensive safeguards agreement contained in the Agency document INFCIRC/153(Corr.), apply only to the nuclear material and facilities voluntarily submitted by the States concerned for Agency verification. Another type of safeguards agreement, modelled on Agency document INFCIRC/66 Rev.2, is “item specific” and covers individual nuclear facilities, specific items of equipment, or specific nuclear material.

The objectives of NPT safeguards are to ensure that safeguards are applied to all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities of the NNWS parties to the Treaty and to assure the international community that NNWS parties are complying with their peaceful use undertakings. The Agency endeavours to fulfil these objectives through a system that is designed to detect, in a timely manner, diversion of significant quantities (SQ)\(^1\) of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices and to deter such diversion by the risk of early detection.

\(^{1}\) A significant quantity is the approximate quantity of any given type of nuclear material which, taking into account any conversion process involved, is required for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device. The timely detection of diversion is a reference to the maximum time-frame within which the Agency seeks to detect any diversion from peaceful use. For this quantification, the Agency looks at the “conversion times” required to convert different types of nuclear material into a nuclear explosive device.
The basic features of the original NPT safeguards system are:

- nuclear material accounting, through which, on the basis of information provided primarily by the State, the Agency establishes an initial inventory of nuclear material in the State, and records subsequent changes to it;
- containment and surveillance measures to monitor access to and movement of nuclear material; and
- on-site inspections during which Agency inspectors have the right and obligation to carry out a variety of measures (such as the examination of records; taking measurements and samples of nuclear material for IAEA analysis; and verifying the functioning and calibration of instruments) for the purpose of verifying the correctness of States’ nuclear accountancy data and also the completeness of declarations related to their nuclear programmes.

On-site inspection is its most important feature. Inspections are of three types: ad hoc, routine and special. Ad hoc and routine inspections constitute the bulk of inspections. They give the Agency access to nuclear material and operating records and to specified locations where nuclear material is, or may be, used or stored. Special inspections are exceptional and may be prompted by the State itself, or by the IAEA, if it considers that information made available by the State is not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the relevant safeguards agreement.

Since their inception, safeguards have continually evolved taking into account changes in technology. Following the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine enrichment and nuclear weapons programmes, the shortcomings of the safeguards system became apparent, and it was agreed that the system would henceforth have to provide assurance, not only about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and facilities, but about the absence of any undeclared nuclear material and activities. To do this, the system has had to move beyond its traditional focus on nuclear material accountancy and also incorporate more qualitative assessments of the completeness of a State’s declared nuclear activities and facilities.

The IAEA began to introduce safeguards strengthening measures in 1992. The focus of these strengthening measures has been on obtaining more information from States about their nuclear material, facilities and plans, on gaining more access to locations at which nuclear material is or could be present, and on using new technology.

Between 1993-1995, the Agency developed further measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. Some of the measures could be implemented under the legal authority already conferred upon the Agency in comprehensive safeguards agreements. Others required complementary, legal authority. To this end, in June 1996, the Board of Governors decided to establish an open-ended Committee to negotiate a legal instrument that would provide that authority. The Committee negotiated the text of the Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements between States and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards (“Model Additional Protocol”), which was approved by the Board of Governors in May 1997.

The Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 Corr.) embodies powerful, new tools to help the Agency verify compliance with States’ safeguards undertakings. Building on earlier strengthening measures, an Additional Protocol, in combination with the relevant safeguards agreement, enables the IAEA to obtain as comprehensive a picture as practical of a State’s nuclear material, activities, and plans. Thus, under the Model Additional Protocol, a State is required to provide information to the Agency and access mechanisms related to: all aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle; nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development; all buildings on a nuclear “site”; the manufacture and any export of sensitive nuclear-related technologies; long-term plans for the development of the nuclear fuel cycle; and wider physical access than previously provided for the purpose of ensuring the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities or resolving questions and inconsistencies.

The Model Additional Protocol represents a balance between rights and obligations of States and the Agency. While a State concluding an Additional Protocol incurs certain additional, legal obligations under the Model Additional Protocol, the State’s rights are protected through the Agency’s obligation to: ensure that the broader access rights incorporated in the Model document are not applied in any mechanistic or systematic fashion; provide advance notice to the State in writing of requests for access; accept managed access upon request by the State; hold prior consultations with the State; inform the State in writing of the activities and results of activities carried out under the Additional Protocol and the resulting conclusions it has drawn; agree on Subsidiary Arrangements with the State, if either the State or the Agency considers it necessary; and maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection against disclosure of all commercial, technological, and industrial secrets and other confidential information.
Over 220 safeguards agreements are currently in force with some 140 States, including 127 comprehensive safeguards agreements with non-nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT. At the same time, however, 55 States parties to the NPT have yet to meet their treaty obligation to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency. Comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty commitments are in force with 31 of the 32 States party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); all 11 States party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga); and 7 of the 9 States party to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok). The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), which has not yet entered into force, also foresees the application of comprehensive Agency safeguards in States party to this treaty. Twenty of the 50 signatories to the Treaty of Pelindaba have comprehensive safeguards agreements in force pursuant to the NPT. As for Protocols Additional to States’ safeguards agreements, by the beginning of 2000, 46 such Protocols had been approved by the Board of Governors, 45 of them with States parties to the NPT.

Initial implementation of the new measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol began in 1998 in those countries where an Additional Protocol had already entered into force. The focus of ongoing and future safeguards work is continuing to develop the infrastructure necessary for Additional Protocol implementation and, even more significantly, to develop a system which integrates the “traditional” verification activities conducted under safeguards agreements with the new strengthened measures with a view to providing enhanced assurance to the international community about States’ compliance with their non-proliferation commitments.

The Agency’s Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 1998, the latest currently available, shows that, during 1998, as in previous years, the Agency did not find any indication:

1. that nuclear material, which had been declared and placed under safeguards in States had been diverted from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, or
2. that facilities, equipment, or non-nuclear material placed under safeguards were being misused.

In the future, as more and more States conclude Additional Protocols, the Agency will also be able, through Additional Protocol implementation, to provide credible assurance about the absence of any undeclared nuclear material and activities in States.

From 1991 until the end of 1999, Agency safeguards obligations in Iraq were subsumed in the mandate assigned to the Agency under UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 687 and related resolutions. The IAEA’s activities in Iraq under these UNSC resolutions were suspended in December 1998. The Agency was accordingly unable to implement its mandate in Iraq and, as a consequence, to provide any assurance that Iraq was in compliance with its obligations under the resolutions. In January 2000, IAEA inspectors returned to Iraq to conduct an inspection pursuant to Iraq’s NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency. The inspection was limited in scope and should not be seen as any substitute for the Agency’s work pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the UNSC.

The Agency is still unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) initial declaration of its nuclear material subject to safeguards and has therefore been unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK. The safeguards agreement between the DPRK and the Agency remains binding and in force, and the Agency is continuing to implement some safeguards measures in the DPRK, including monitoring the “freeze” on the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, as requested by the UN Security Council and as foreseen in the “Agreed Framework” of October 1994 between the DPRK and the United States. The DPRK continues to link the extent of its co-operation with the Agency with progress in the Agreed Framework.

**Nuclear Technology**

Hand in hand with its safeguards responsibilities, the Agency works to foster the role of nuclear science and technology in support of sustainable human development. This involves both advancing knowledge and exploiting this knowledge to tackle pressing worldwide challenges: hunger, disease, natural resource management, environmental pollution, and climate change.

The IAEA promotes the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to Member States with the appropriate infrastructure, including safeguards agreements, required to use the technology. Through its Technical Co-operation Programme (TC), the IAEA works in partnership with Member States using nuclear technology to assist them to achieve their major sustainable development priorities in a cost-effective manner. Each year the Agency supports some 800 technical co-
operation projects worldwide. The Agency’s assistance is targeted to priority needs and provided where: such technology is the most effective and appropriate, and the recipient Member State has adequate infrastructure to adopt and sustain such technology safely.

In 1998, the total resources available to the IAEA for TC amounted to $US 64.5 million. Of the assistance delivered in that year, the largest portion, 22%, related to nuclear safety, while 21% was devoted to projects relating to human health, 16% to food and agriculture, 11% to physical and chemical sciences and marine environment, water resources and industry, and 7% to nuclear fuel cycle and waste technology. In 1999, total resources for TC increased to $US 71.9 million.

Many nuclear techniques are relatively cheap, simple to handle and offer excellent and often unique benefits in such areas as insect control, water resources management, human health, and environmental protection.

The sterile insect technique has been successfully used in many parts of the world to combat insect pests of agricultural significance. By mass rearing and sterilizing male insects using nuclear techniques, the insect population can be controlled by releasing the treated males into the environment in large numbers. Unable to reproduce because of the large number of sterile males, the insect pest will gradually be eliminated. The Agency has participated in a multi-year, million dollar programme in Argentina to combat the fruit fly, a serious threat to the $US 450 million yearly fruit export industry. And, unlike most conventional insect control methods, the sterile insect technique has no negative impacts on the environment.

Water shortage and water quality are ongoing challenges to sustainable development worldwide. Isotope techniques provide information that is unobtainable by other means and contribute to sound water management practices. The movement of trace amounts of environmental isotopes in a water source can be tracked, thereby providing a better picture of how and where the water moves. Recognizing the significance of the water issue in the context of sustainable development, the Agency is currently sponsoring two major regional TC project involving 12 countries (Algeria, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe). The national activities supported by the Agency in these projects are part of high-priority government programmes, in many instances, linked to bilateral and multilateral donor-assisted water development projects. In addition to addressing practical issues relating to water resource assessment in this region, these projects also seek to foster regional co-operation and strengthen isotope hydrology capacity. In the Saudi Arabian Peninsula, field investigations have also been conducted to develop a more thorough understanding of recharge rates of the water in sand dune areas. In Jordan, isotopic studies have been undertaken to assess the effectiveness of surface reservoirs constructed to capture flood water for replenishing underground water aquifer systems.

Nuclear techniques are widely used in medical applications from x-rays and scintigraphy to radiation therapy. They are also very effective in the diagnosis and control of infectious disease. To combat the growing global problem of tuberculosis (TB), which kills an estimated 1.5 million people per year, the Agency is supporting several projects to improve the diagnosis of this infectious disease and to help curb the spread of its multi-drug resistant forms. In South Africa, the Agency has been assisting national efforts to develop isotope-based molecular methods for accurate and rapid detection of multi-drug resistant TB. The Agency is also supporting a regional project in Africa to use nuclear techniques to detect the genetic mutations in the malaria parasite which leads to drug resistance. Like TB, malaria is a growing global health concern, infecting some 300 million people worldwide each year.

The Agency operates its own research and services laboratories, which contribute significantly to the transfer of nuclear technology. For nearly 40 years, the IAEA’s Seibersdorf Laboratories, near Vienna, have carried out research and provided a diverse range of technical services in applied physics, chemistry, hydrology, agriculture, and nuclear instrumentation. Since 1961, the Agency has operated the Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco, which carries out research and training in marine science, particularly in environmental monitoring and in the study of radioactive and non-radioactive pollutants in oceans and seas. It has a Joint Division in Vienna with the Food and Agriculture Organization to undertake research on the applications of nuclear technology in food and agriculture. The Agency also works with the World Health Organization on radiation in medicine and biology and, with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, supports the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy. Additionally, information on virtually every aspect of nuclear science and technology is collected and disseminated by the IAEA through its International Nuclear Information System in Vienna.

Another major responsibility of the IAEA in the field of nuclear technology relates to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Agency advises and assists govern-
ments in the practical application of, and research on, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electricity, with special consideration being given to developing countries. Where Member States have decided to use nuclear energy to produce electricity, the Agency continuously seeks to strengthen their ability to plan and carry out related projects by organizing interregional and national training courses, seminars, workshops, technical co-operation projects, advisory missions, and technical committee meetings, and by publishing guidebooks and manuals. Where nuclear power plants have already been built, or are under construction, increased attention is given to promoting improvements in plant operation and maintenance practices. The objective is to achieve uniformly high levels of safety, reliability, and economic performance worldwide.

As a focal point for international exchange on nuclear technology and related issues within the United Nations system, the Agency seeks to broaden debate and information sharing. Since 1998, the Agency has organized the Scientific Forum, as an adjunct to its annual General Conference, where experts and delegates from Member States can exchange views and information on important technical issues relating to nuclear technology. The first Forum examined nuclear technology in relation to water resources and the aquatic environment. In 1999, the Forum examined the issue of sustainable development and the future role for nuclear power.

Reflecting its desire to broaden these outreach activities to the non-governmental and private sectors, in January 2000, the Agency organized the first Industry Forum. Bringing together some 35 participants from 20 groups dealing with industrial aspects of nuclear energy, the Industry Forum sought to canvas the views on trends in the nuclear and regulatory fields against the background of changing economic decision-making processes. The results from this successful initiative will be used to define possible areas for future synergy between industry and the IAEA.

Nuclear Research Centres play an important role in helping countries use nuclear technology safely. In December 1999, the Agency organized a meeting of these centres to provide a forum for exchange of views on the future work of such centres and the challenges faced in such areas as: waste management; reactor design; decommissioning; water, food, and the environment; and education for nuclear sciences and technology.

**Safety**

The IAEA promotes a comprehensive and effective worldwide safety culture through three key elements: binding international conventions, internationally accepted safety standards, and measures to assist Member States implement these conventions and standards.

There are several international conventions related to safety. These conventions are treaties between governments, but they were established under IAEA auspices and the Agency has defined roles in their administration. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency were established in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident in 1986, and each has more than 75 Contracting Parties. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, in force since 1987, applies to the protection of material that could be used for nuclear weapons. The Convention on Nuclear Safety, which entered into force in October 1996, places obligations on Contracting Parties to take appropriate steps to ensure the safety of their nuclear power plants. In April 1999, the first Review Meeting was held, at which each of the Contracting Parties reported on the steps that they had taken, and reviewed and discussed each others' reports. At present, 52 States are Contracting Parties, including all but one (India) of those with nuclear power plants in operation. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which was opened for signature in September 1997, will perform a similar function in relation to spent fuel and waste management facilities, but has not yet entered into force.

The IAEA establishes safety standards for nuclear power plants, research reactors, radioactive waste management, the transport of radioactive materials, and the use of radiation and radioactive materials in medicine, industry, and research. These standards include Safety Fundamentals (basic objectives, concepts and principles), Safety Requirements (requirements that need to be met to satisfy those basic objectives and principles), and Safety Guides (guidance on how to comply with the Safety Requirements). Where appropriate, these safety standards are co-sponsored by other relevant international organizations, such as the World Health Organization, the International Labour Organization, and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. All countries receiving Agency support for projects must adhere to these safety standards.

The IAEA contributes towards the application of safety standards in Member States by rendering safety services on request, by fostering international information exchange on safety, by promoting education and training in relevant subjects, and by providing safety related assistance.
A variety of safety services are offered on request, including:

- the Engineering Safety Review Service, which assesses a wide range of safety aspects of nuclear power plant design and engineering;
- International Regulatory Review Teams, which review how national authorities oversee nuclear-related activities;
- Operational Safety Review Teams, which review how operational safety performance at individual nuclear power plants is assured and how any shortcomings may be remedied; and
- the Transport Safety Appraisal Service, which examines how countries implement the international regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material.

The Agency acts as a central body for international information exchange by organizing conferences and seminars, by producing a wide range of publications and, increasingly, through the Internet. In the event of a radiological emergency or accident, it has specific information-exchange responsibilities: to convey authoritative information about the situation to all of its Member States rapidly.

Most of the Agency’s safety related assistance is delivered through TC. The Agency is undertaking a major TC project to improve the safety infrastructure for the use of nuclear technology in the fields of medicine, agriculture, industry, and research in more than 50 Member States. This ‘safety infrastructure’ includes national safety legislation and regulations, a regulatory body with the authority and resources to enforce the regulations, a system for controlling radiation sources, radiation protection measures, emergency plans, and related training of personnel. In recent years, assistance has, on average, been provided to approximately three countries per year, in most cases due to emergencies involving radiation sources.

**Policy-Making Organs and Management**

The Agency is made up of the General Conference, the Board of Governors, and the Secretariat. The General Conference consists of all Member States of the Agency, each having one vote. The Conference normally meets once a year and takes its decisions by consensus or by majority vote, except on matters regarding finance, amendments to the Agency Statute, and suspension of membership, which all require a two-thirds majority vote.

The Board of Governors, which currently consists of 35 members designated or elected on the basis of regional distribution or technological expertise, carries out the statutory functions of the Agency. The Board usually meets five times per year.

The Secretariat has six departments: Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Sciences and Applications, Safeguards, Technical Co-operation, and Management and is headed by the Director General, who is appointed for a four-year term by the Board with the approval of the General Conference. The current Director General, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, was appointed in December 1997.

The IAEA submits annual reports on its work to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

**Membership**

Membership in the Agency is open to States, whether or not Members of the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies, which deposit an instrument of acceptance of the IAEA’s Statute after their membership has been approved by the General Conference, on the recommendation of the Board of Governors. As of December 1999, there were 130 Member States.

**Budget**

The IAEA’s regular budget for 2000 is $US 229.4 million, including income (some $US 4.9 million) for reimbursable work.

**Headquarters**

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2 The 43rd General Conference, which concluded 1 October 1999, adopted a resolution to amend the Agency Statute to expand the Board’s membership to 43. This change will take effect once it has been accepted by two thirds of all Member States and once the General Conference has confirmed a list of all Member States which has been adopted by the Board, by which each Member is allocated to one of the eight regional areas listed in the Statute.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATING TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

25 March 1957
The Treaty formally establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) is signed in Rome.

29 July 1957
The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), opened for signature on 26 October 1956, comes into force. The Agency is established to facilitate the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while ensuring that the assistance the Agency provides will not be used for military purposes.

20 November 1959
On the initiative of Ireland, the UN General Assembly adopts resolution 1380 (XIV), by which it suggests that the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee consider the feasibility of an international agreement by which the nuclear-weapon Powers would not hand over control of those weapons to other Powers, and non-nuclear-weapon States would not manufacture such weapons.

1 December 1959
The Antarctic Treaty is signed in Washington, stipulating that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. It prohibits any measures of a military nature, including the testing of any type of weapons.

20 December 1960
On the initiative of Ireland, the General Assembly adopts resolution 1576 (XV), by which it calls upon both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States, pending agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, to refrain, as a temporary and voluntary measure, from acts that would lead to further proliferation.

1961
The IAEA establishes its first safeguards system.

4 December 1961
On the initiative of Sweden, the General Assembly adopts resolution 1664 (XVI), by which it requests the Secretary-General to inquire under what conditions States not possessing nuclear weapons would be willing to undertake not to acquire them.

Upon the initiative of Ireland, the General Assembly adopts, without a vote, resolution 1665 (XVI), by which it calls upon the nuclear-weapon States in particular to endeavour to conclude an international agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and upon all States to cooperate for this purpose.

5 August 1963
The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (the Partial Test-Ban Treaty) is signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. On 8 August, it is opened for signature in Moscow, London and Washington.

17 August 1965
The United States submits to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

24 September 1965
The USSR submits to the General Assembly a draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

19 November 1965
On the initiative of eight non-aligned States, the General Assembly adopts resolution 2028 (XX), which contains five principles on which negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty is to be based.

1965
The IAEA revises its safeguards system.

November 1966
The General Assembly adopts two resolutions on non-proliferation: resolution 2149 (XXI), by which it appeals to all States, pending conclusion of a nuclear non-
proliferation treaty, to renounce actions that might hamper agreement on such a treaty, and resolution 2153 A (XXI), in which it calls upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give priority to the question of non-proliferation and also to consider the question of assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

27 January 1967
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty) is opened for signature (A/RES/2222 (XI), annex). The Treaty prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction in outer space, stipulating that that environment shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

14 February 1967
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) is opened for signature in Mexico City. The Treaty establishes the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region, and creates the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) to oversee its implementation.

August 1967
The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament considers two separate but identical draft texts of a non-proliferation treaty, submitted by the USSR and the United States, as well as a number of amendments submitted by other members.

19 December 1967
The General Assembly adopts resolution 2346 A (XXII), in which it requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to present it with a full report on the negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty on or before 15 March 1968.

1 January 1968
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) enters into force.

January–March 1968
The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament examines further revisions of the draft treaty texts submitted by the USSR and the United States, which incorporate some of the suggestions of the non-nuclear-weapon States, and submits another revision to the General Assembly at its resumed twenty-second session.

12 June 1968
After further revision—concerning mainly the preamble and articles IV and V—the General Assembly commends the draft text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is annexed to Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII).

19 June 1968
The UN Security Council adopts resolution 255 (1968) on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

1 July 1968
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (also known as the “Non-Proliferation Treaty”, or the “NPT”) is opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington—the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States having been designated the depositary Governments.

16 September 1968
The IAEA revises its safeguards system with further additional provisions for safeguarded nuclear material in conversion plants and fabrication plants.

5 March 1970
The NPT enters into force. The IAEA establishes its safeguards system for NPT parties.

11 February 1971
The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (the Sea-Bed Treaty) is opened for signature.

26 May 1972
The United States and the USSR sign two agreements to halt the growth in their strategic arms: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. These agreements are referred to as SALT I.

3 July 1974
The United States and the USSR sign the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty).

5–30 May 1975
The First Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT is held in Geneva. The UN Secretary-General and the
Director General of the IAEA address the Conference. The Conference adopts a Final Declaration by consensus.

28 May 1976
The United States and the USSR sign the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty).

21 September 1977
Fifteen nuclear supplier countries, known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group or the London Club, reach agreement in London on a set of principles and guidelines to govern the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology. The suppliers’ policies are based on a “trigger list” of nuclear and other materials for which certain conditions would have to be met before they would be exported.

23 May–30 June 1978
The General Assembly holds its tenth special session—the first special session devoted to disarmament—in New York. The session ends with the adoption by consensus of a Final Document.

At the special session and later in the year, the five nuclear-weapon States make unilateral security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

18 June 1979
The United States and the USSR sign the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (referred to as SALT II).

3 March 1980
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is opened for signature in Vienna and New York; the Convention applies to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international nuclear transport (INFCIRC/274/Rev.1).

11 August–7 September 1980
The Second NPT Review Conference is held in Geneva. The UN Secretary-General conveys a message to the Conference and the Director General of the IAEA addresses the Conference.

7 June–10 July 1982
The General Assembly holds its second special session devoted to disarmament in New York. At the special session, China, France and the USSR make declarations regarding unilateral security assurances.

6 August 1985
The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Rarotonga) is opened for signature.

27 August–21 September 1985
The Third NPT Review Conference is held in Geneva. The UN Secretary-General conveys a message to the Conference and the Director General of the IAEA addresses the Conference. The Conference adopts a Final Declaration by consensus.

23 March–10 April 1987
The UN Conference for the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy is held in Geneva, but is unable to reach agreement on principles for international cooperation that would promote the objectives of the full utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

16 April 1987
The Missile Technology Control Regime, established by seven industrialized countries, establishes guidelines for sensitive missile-relevant transfers.

30 November 1987
The General Assembly, by its resolution 42/38 C in conjunction with resolution 41/59 N, establishes a system for an annual register of data on nuclear explosions to be submitted to it by the Secretary-General following notification of such tests by Member States.

8 December 1987
The United States and the USSR sign the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the INF Treaty).

1 June 1990

20 August–14 September 1990
The Fourth NPT Review Conference is held in Geneva. The UN Secretary-General conveys a message to the Conference and the Director General of IAEA addresses the Conference.

7–18 January 1991

10 July 1991
South Africa accedes to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State after terminating its nuclear weapons programme.
18 July 1991
Argentina and Brazil establish the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials.

31 July 1991
The United States and the USSR sign the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START I Treaty), by which the two sides undertake to reduce their nuclear weapons from their current levels of between 10,000 and 11,000 weapons to between 8,000 and 9,000 weapons.

September–October 1991
The United States and the USSR make unilateral announcements of further reductions and other measures for their respective nuclear arsenals.

31 January 1992
At the meeting of the Security Council held at the level of Heads of State or Government, the Council emphasizes the threat that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes to international peace and security.

9 March 1992
China accedes to the NPT.

3 April 1992
The Nuclear Suppliers Group, meeting in Warsaw, revises its “Guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and related technology”, requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of export.

23 May 1992
The Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty is signed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as successor States of the former USSR in connection with the Treaty, and by the United States. By the Protocol, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine undertake to adhere to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States in the shortest possible time.

2 August 1992
France accedes to the NPT.

27 October 1992
The UN Secretary-General submits to the First Committee of the General Assembly his report entitled “New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post–cold war era”, in which he refers to the NPT as providing an indispensable framework for global non-proliferation efforts.

3 January 1993
The United States and the Russian Federation sign the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty), by which they undertake further significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

9 February 1993
Belarus accedes to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

1 April 1993
The Nuclear Suppliers Group, meeting in Lucerne, Switzerland, revises the 1977 London Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers.

10 August 1993
The Conference on Disarmament decides to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. A special meeting (informal) of the Amendment Conference of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty is held in New York.

17 August 1993
The Russian Federation declares its policy regarding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

16 December 1993
The General Assembly adopts without a vote a resolution (48/70), sponsored by 157 States, on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, welcoming the decision of 10 August by the Conference on Disarmament.

February 1994
Negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty begin in the Conference on Disarmament. Consultations begin in the Conference on Disarmament regarding a mandate to negotiate a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

14 February 1994
Kazakhstan accedes to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

20 September 1994
The International Convention on Nuclear Safety is opened for signature in Vienna (INFCIRC/449 and Add.1).

5 December 1994
Ukraine accedes to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.
11 April 1995  
The Security Council adopts resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the NPT.

17 April–12 May 1995  
The Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT convenes. The NPT is indefinitely extended and decisions on “Strengthening the review process for the Treaty”, “Principles and objectives on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” and a “Resolution on the Middle East” are adopted without a vote.

9 December 1995  
The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is agreed to by 33 States.

15 December 1995  
The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (the Bangkok Treaty) is opened for signature.

26 January 1996  
The US Senate ratifies START II with an overwhelming majority and without amendment.

29 January 1996  
France declares a moratorium on nuclear testing.

11 April 1996  
The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty) is opened for signature.

19–20 April 1996  
The Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security is held in Moscow.

8 July 1996  
The International Court of Justice issues an advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Court agreed unanimously that the threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that was contrary to article 2, paragraph 4 (refraining from the threat or use of force) of the Charter and did not meet the requirements of article 51 (inherent right of individual or collective self-defence) was unlawful, and that such threat or use of force should be compatible with international law applicable in armed conflict. It decided unanimously that “there exists an obligation to… bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament”.

29 July 1996  
China declares a moratorium on nuclear testing.

14 August 1996  
The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons issues its report.

10 September 1996  
The General Assembly adopts the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by a vote of 158 to 3, with 5 abstentions.

24 September 1996  
The CTBT is opened for signature in New York. Seventy-one States, including all five nuclear-weapon States, sign the Treaty on that day.

19 November 1996  
The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization is established with its seat in Vienna.

7–18 April 1997  
The first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference is held in New York.

16 May 1997  
The IAEA Board of Governors approves the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540), which is aimed at strengthening safeguards.

27 March 1997  
The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (the Bangkok Treaty) enters into force.

27 April–8 May 1998  
The second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference is held in Geneva.

6 June 1998  
The Security Council, by its resolution 1172 (1998), condemns the nuclear tests conducted by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998 as a threat to global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The resolution urges the countries to become parties to the NPT without delay or conditions.

9 June 1998  
Foreign Ministers of eight States issue a joint declaration entitled Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need
for a new agenda, calling upon States to commit themselves to the elimination of their nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons capability.

11 August 1998
The Conference on Disarmament establishes an ad hoc committee to commence negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices (CD/1547).

18 September 1998
Brazil accedes to the NPT, thus increasing the number of States parties to 187.

4 December 1998
The General Assembly adopts resolution A/53/584 on “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status” by consensus.

10–21 May 1999
The third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference is held in New York.

June 1999
The United States and the Russian Federation agree to engage in discussions on START III negotiations.

25 July 1999
The Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament issues its report.

6–8 October 1999
A conference on facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT is held in Vienna and adopts a Final Declaration.

24 April–19 May 2000
The Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT is scheduled to convene in New York.
THE 1995 NPT REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE:
DECISIONS AND RESOLUTION ADOPTED

Decision 1

STRENGTHENING THE REVIEW PROCESS FOR THE TREATY

1. The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons examined the implementation of article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and agreed to strengthen the review process for the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

2. The States party to the Treaty participating in the Conference decided, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, that Review Conferences should continue to be held every five years and that, accordingly, the next Review Conference should be held in the year 2000.

3. The Conference decided that, beginning in 1997, the Preparatory Committee should hold, normally for a duration of 10 working days, a meeting in each of the three years prior to the Review Conference. If necessary, a fourth preparatory meeting may be held in the year of the Conference.

4. The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. These include those identified in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted on 11 May 1995. These meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference.

5. The Conference also concluded that the present structure of three Main Committees should continue and the question of an overlap of issues being discussed in more than one Committee should be resolved in the General Committee, which would coordinate the work of the Committees so that the substantive responsibility for the preparation of the report with respect to each specific issue is undertaken in only one Committee.

6. It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to provide for a focused consideration of such issues. The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference.

7. The Conference further agreed that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.

Decision 2

PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming the preamble and articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Welcoming the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Desiring a set of principles and objectives in accordance with which nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously pursued and progress, achievements and shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, the enhancement and strengthening of which is welcomed,
Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

The Conference affirms the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly adopts the following principles and objectives:

Universality

1. Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective.

Non-proliferation

2. The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.

Nuclear disarmament

3. Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

4. The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below:

(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint;

(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;

(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

5. The conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security is reaffirmed.

6. The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000 would be welcome.

7. The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant protocols.

Security assurances

8. Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which was adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995, as well as the declarations of the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.
Safeguards

9. The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

10. All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have not yet done so should do so without delay.

11. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated. Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of Agency safeguards should be supported and implemented and the Agency’s capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities should be increased. Also, States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be urged to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency.

12. New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency’s full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

13. Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under Agency safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

14. Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II as well as III of the Treaty.

15. Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.

16. In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into account.

17. Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty.

18. All States should, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in waste management, and observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials.

19. Every effort should be made to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the financial and human resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources.

20. Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Conference requests that the President of the Conference bring the present decision, the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to the attention of the heads of State or Government of all States and seek their full cooperation on these documents and in the furtherance of the goals of the Treaty.
Decision 3

EXTENSION OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Having convened in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, and article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty and affirming that there is a need for full compliance with the Treaty, its extension and its universal adherence, which are essential to international peace and security and the attainment of the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Having reaffirmed article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and the need for its continued implementation in a strengthened manner and, to this end, emphasizing the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, also adopted by the Conference,

Having established that the Conference is quorate in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty,

Decides that, as a majority exists among States party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.

Resolution on the Middle East

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming the purpose and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recognizing that, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime,

Recalling that the Security Council, in its statement of 31 January 1992, affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling also General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus supporting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the latest of which is resolution 49/71 of 15 December 1994,

Recalling further the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, the latest of which is GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21 of 23 September 1994, and noting the danger of nuclear proliferation, especially in areas of tension,

Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and in particular paragraph 14 thereof,

Noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and paragraph 8 of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,

Bearing in mind the other decisions adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,

1. Endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction;

2. Notes with satisfaction that, in its report (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1), Main Committee III of the Conference recommended that the Conference “call on those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities”;

3. Notes with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and reafirms in this connection the recommendation contained in section VI, paragraph 3, of the report of Main Committee III urging those non-parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

4. Reaffirms the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty, and calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

1 S/23500.
5. *Calls upon* all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, *inter alia*, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective;

6. *Calls upon* all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
## Current Status of the NPT
### List of the Parties as of 31 January 2000

(as reported by one or more of the Depositary Governments)

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Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United Republic of Tanzania
United States of America
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Viet Nam
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zambia
Zimbabwe
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapons States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

**Article I**

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
**Article II**

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

**Article III**

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

**Article IV**

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

**Article V**

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so
desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

**Article VI**

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

**Article VII**

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

**Article VIII**

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

**Article IX**

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

**Article X**

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.¹

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

¹ On 11 May 1995, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons decided that the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely (see decision 3 in Fact Sheet 5).
For general information about the NPT Review Conference, contact:

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