

**GLOBAL  
PARTNERSHIP  
FOR THE  
PREVENTION  
OF ARMED  
CONFLICT**

# Global Partnership

*for the Prevention of Armed Conflict*



Submission to the Office for Disarmament Affairs  
of the United Nations  
Regarding GA Resolution 63/23

*On Promoting Development Through the  
Reduction and Prevention of Armed Violence*

## About GPPAC

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The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) is a global civil society-led network which seeks to build an international consensus on peacebuilding and the prevention of violent conflict. It was established in 2003 in response to the call made by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan for an international conference of civil society organisations working in the field of conflict prevention in his 2001 report *Prevention of Armed Conflict*. GPPAC works to strengthen civil society networks for peace and security by linking local, national, regional and global levels of action; to establish effective engagement with governments, the UN system and regional organisations; and to carry out projects within the [five main programme areas](#) identified in its [Global Work Plan](#) (2007-2010): Awareness Raising; Interaction and Advocacy, Network Building; Knowledge Generation and Sharing; and Early Warning and Early response.

GPPAC consists of [fifteen regional networks](#), each of which has its own [Regional Action Agenda](#) and Work Plan and participates in activities at the global level. The [Regional Action Agendas](#) fed into [People Building Peace: A Global Action Agenda for the Prevention of Violent Conflict](#) - which incorporated input from more than one thousand organisations around the world and outlines key priorities for change. The final document was presented to the UN in July 2005 during the Global Conference *From Reaction to Prevention: Civil Society Forging Partnerships to Prevent Violent Conflict and Build Peace*, which was held at UN Headquarters and organised by GPPAC in partnership with the UNDPA. Since then, GPPAC has implemented work plans based on the Action Agendas.

GPPAC is governed by an International Steering Group which consists of representatives from all regions and a number of international NGOs. Its [five main programmes](#) are developed and run by member-driven Working Groups that are coordinated by the Global Secretariat, which is held by the [European Centre for Conflict Prevention](#) (ECCP) in The Hague, The Netherlands.

To learn more about the Global Partnership, please visit us at <http://www.gppac.net>.

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## Executive Summary

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1. In the framework of the *Geneva Declaration*, much emphasis has quite rightly been given to reducing armed violence, encouraging disarmament and engaging with the issue of small arms. We do not seek to diminish the importance of this focus, but argue that a more coherent policy which incorporates substantive commitments to the *prevention* of armed conflict and peacebuilding is necessary if the international community is to realise the objectives of the Declaration. While we recognise that the present plan for implementation of the Declaration seeks to reduce armed violence and improve development, to adjust development policy so that it is sensitive to the unique circumstances of conflict situations, and to develop an integrative approach, we submit that the pillar of conflict *prevention* must be considered.
2. Armed violence is not a path dependent phenomenon, but is instead a dynamic process that can arise and change with great ease and speed. Considering the significant body of research which suggests that there will be an increase in violent conflicts over issues of environmental degradation, climate change, resource competition, and the fallout from the present global economic downturn, it is imperative that national and international communities redress their inability to respond to such crises. To this end, preparation should start at the lowest levels and continue up from the district to regional and national levels to build an inclusive Infrastructure for Peace.
3. Within the context of the *Geneva Declaration*, we suggest that mechanisms for exchange and cooperation between governments and CSO actors should be established at different levels: at the level of focus countries, at the level of the Core Group meetings in Geneva, and as follow-up to the Regional Conferences.
4. Since 9/11, conflict prevention has received very little attention and was overshadowed by the War on Terror. There is a growing acknowledgement in recent years that we have to give more priority to the prevention of violent conflict. This is especially important because we have not seen the results we had hoped for with the MDGs, which is partly due to the fact that conflict prevention was not included in this agenda. If we don't address this issue specifically, we will also fail to achieve results with the MDGs.
5. Developing an integrated policy in this respect requires the development of specific policies, strategies and programmes on early warning and response, the prevention of violent conflict and peacebuilding. As the case study of Kenya illustrates, concerted efforts from the international community in association with the initiatives of local peacebuilders are necessary and reinforce each other. In addition to the practical benefits of employing local, participatory processes that are supported by the international community, initiatives such as Concerned Citizens for Peace demonstrate that there is a clear financial benefit and incentive to invest in conflict prevention instead of intervention. Thus, **the time is ripe for investment in preventing violent conflict.**
6. To this end, we must **invest in Institutional Capacities** – such as *Building Infrastructures for Peace*, establishing *Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on Peacebuilding*, and *Redressing the Problems Associated with Funding*.
7. Moving forward from a genuine and reconceptualised approach to social inclusion, we must also **mitigate societal risks and work towards sustainable peace** by learning from previous successes in civil society (such as the response in Kenya during post-election violence in 2007), promoting a culture of peace, raising awareness about the benefits of conflict prevention and peacebuilding and investing in Peace Education.

## Introduction

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The *Geneva Declaration* stresses quite rightly that “Armed violence destroys lives and livelihoods, breeds insecurity, fear and terror, and has a profoundly negative impact on human development.” In the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, global leaders recognized the strong linkage and mutual reinforcement between development, peace, security and human rights. The international community has acknowledged that armed violence and conflict impede realization of the Millennium Development Goals and that conflict prevention, resolution and violence reduction are key steps towards reducing poverty, promoting growth and improving people’s lives.

We support Resolution 63/23 of the General Assembly on ***Promoting Development Through the Reduction and Prevention of Armed Violence*** (17 November 2008), which:

- recognizes that sustained socio-economic development and the reduction of inequalities, including measures aimed at improving social inclusion, constitute essential requirements for reducing levels of armed violence;
- aims to develop goals, targets and measurable indicators on armed violence and development as a complement to the MDGs;
- stresses the need for a coherent and integrated approach to the prevention of armed violence, with a view to achieving sustainable peace and development.

As a global network of peacebuilding organisations, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict fully supports this view and welcomes the endorsement of the *Geneva Declaration* by more than 100 governments to date. In light of this support, GPPAC became involved in the Geneva Declaration Process and has concentrated its efforts in this regard at the regional level. One of our key members, Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa, was one of the three presenters from CSOs at the Review Summit on 12 September 2008 in Geneva, and highlighted how CSOs played a crucial role in reducing the violence in Kenya during the post-electoral violence. In addition to these efforts, GPPAC has played a role since the beginning of this process by informing its network about the developments of the Geneva Declaration and involving as many stakeholders as possible in an effort to achieve a balanced and transparent process with input from all interested parties.

We welcome the fact that the Secretary General of the UN has requested member states to give their views on Armed Violence and Development in order to submit a Report to the General Assembly. Moreover, we welcome the fact that the Core Group of the Geneva Declaration wants to cooperate more closely with CSOs at all different levels and look forward to discussing ways in which this exchange can take shape. We would suggest that mechanisms for exchange and cooperation between governments and CSO actors should be established at different levels: at the level of focus countries, at the level of the Core Group meetings in Geneva, and as follow-up to the Regional Conferences.

In the following paragraphs, we will highlight some issues which we feel should be given greater consideration in the implementation process of the *Geneva Declaration*, and make these arguments based on our own experiences. While we acknowledge the importance of programmes which have a focus on Armed Violence (such as reduction, disarmament and weapons issues) within the paradigm of a conflict sensitive development agenda, we also believe that much more attention should be given to the prevention of armed violence and conflict. Indeed, the time is ripe for an increased focus on Preventive Action.

## I. Now is the Time to Invest in Preventive Action

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The *Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development* deals with two crucial issues: Armed Violence and Development. A key aspect of the document is that it does not view these issues as mutually exclusive, but instead stresses the need for a coherent and integrated approach to the prevention of armed violence with a view to achieving sustainable peace and development.

As a global network of organisations that is focused on the Prevention of Armed Conflict and Peacebuilding, we feel that in addition to the planning and programming focused on 'Armed Violence' and 'Development', a key strategy for the implementation of the Declaration should focus on the Prevention of Armed Conflict. This is all the more pressing in light of a general consensus among experts that the number of violent conflicts will increase substantively in the near future due to environmental degradation, climate change, resource competition, the fallout from the present global economic downturn, migration and state fragility, among others. The burden presented by these conflicts will be added to that presented by the numerous civil wars that have already been taking place for many years.

Since 9/11, conflict prevention has received very little attention and was overshadowed by the War on Terror. There has been a growing acknowledgement in recent years that we have to give more priority to the prevention of violent conflict. This is especially important because we have not seen the results we had hoped for with the MDGs, which is partly due to the fact that conflict prevention was not included in this agenda. If we don't address this issue specifically, we will also fail to achieve results with the MDGs.

Just one year ago, the international community was shocked at the post-electoral violence that took place in Kenya – a country which was perceived to be stable and peaceful. How many early warning lists was Kenya on before the elections? Who expected these events? We submit that if such sudden violence can happen in Kenya, it can happen in many more countries. At both the national and international level, we must be more prepared to deal with such events by investing in conflict prevention – especially in light of the evidence that more conflicts and armed violence will soon develop. As this eruption of violence has yet to occur, now is the time to focus and invest in early warning and response mechanisms and to develop policies, structures and mechanisms which can help the international community deal with the escalation of conflict effectively. At present, international and national communities are inadequately prepared to address the diversity of conflicts before them.

Cooperation between different stakeholders is imperative in this respect. This is the reason why we welcome the willingness of the Core Group of the Geneva Declaration to cooperate with CSOs. Yet broader international cooperation is needed as well, and with a new administration in Washington there is a good opportunity for this to take shape. A host of international organisations (including the UN, numerous NGOs, charities and national governments) have recognised the need for a "joined up" approach to conflict prevention and peace building for some time already. Notably, we've seen the results.

Since the early 1990s, more wars have ended by negotiated settlement than by military victory; in fact, almost twice as many.

However, the chances of conflicts reigniting within five years after the signing of a peace agreement still stand at almost 50%. That is most likely to happen where there is no systematic 'insider' effort to match the 'outsider' negotiations; where local people – local peace builders - are insufficiently mobilised to

enable the population to engage in the peace process, to feel that they are part of the agreement, and to help carry out its terms.<sup>1</sup>

For every dollar spent on peace building around the world, nearly two thousand times as much is spent on defence and the military.<sup>2</sup> The recent downturn in the global economy means that there is now less money to go around, so all governments need to re-examine the amounts they invest in defence. It's financial common sense to use limited resources to prevent conflicts instead of intervening or financing the 'mop up' afterwards. We believe that redirecting some development funding for supporting "Insider Power" will prove to be financially sound. Pre-conflict peace building, early warnings and intervention by local peace builders are likely to be more cost effective than the emergency funding poured into humanitarian disasters that are produced after conflicts escalate.

With growing unwillingness among taxpayers around the world to foot the bill for projects "over there", particularly those that have no apparent effect other than to provide emergency aid, it is vital to demonstrate that preventing conflict is cost effective in order to illustrate our argument that money from the defence budget would be better spent on peace building.<sup>3</sup>

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#### **Conflict prevention using local people not only saves lives, but also money**

- The cost of civil society networking that complemented Kofi Annan's efforts to end the post-election crisis in Kenya was only **several hundred thousand US dollars**.
- During 1998-2000, an election monitoring campaign in Serbia cost **just \$5 USD per student trained and deployed**, of whom there were an estimated 20,000. This prevented the election results being distorted and led to the expulsion of Milosevic.
- The weapons collection scheme in El Salvador that ended the hijacking of trucks after the civil war cost approximately **\$1.5 million USD**.

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<sup>1</sup> Scilla Elworthy, "Insider Power: Saving Lives, Saving Money", a Lecture to the All Party Parliamentary Group on Conflict Issues of the United Kingdom. London: 24 February 2009.

<sup>2</sup> Figures from the OECD, taken from *Smart Power - Saving Money, Saving Lives: Why Conflict Prevention Policy Needs to be Joined Up*. Forthcoming Publication of the International Task Force on Preventive Diplomacy.

<sup>3</sup> For more information, please see Gayle E. Smith, David Sullivan and Andrew Sweet, "The Price of Prevention: Getting Ahead of Global Crises," *Sustainable Security Series*. Washington: Centre for American Progress, 2008.

## II. Institutional Capacities

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Within the broader framework of institutional capacities, we want to focus on three aspects. Specifically, these are:

1. **Infrastructures for Peace.** Most countries are not prepared to deal with an escalation of violence. There are no structures in place and no individuals trained in mediation at different levels. We have to *build Infrastructures for Peace*.
2. **Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on Peacebuilding.** Peacebuilding is a very complex issue with many different roles and functions and different stakeholders fulfilling complementary roles. Unfortunately, these individuals rarely – if ever – meet. Compared to many other fields, no structured exchange and dialogue between different stakeholders has been organized. There is a need for a *Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on Peacebuilding* which involves representatives of all stakeholders.
3. **Funding.** The *funding* of this field continues to present a serious problem. If one compares the field of Conflict Prevention & Peacebuilding with other fields such as Development, Environment, and even those more closely related to the field such as Peacekeeping or Humanitarian Assistance, the resources for the field of conflict prevention remain very small. If we believe we have to give more focus to preventing violent conflict, we should increase the funding for the field substantively.

### II.1 Infrastructures for Peace

The governments of Ghana and Kenya are establishing an Infrastructure for Peace in their respective countries in cooperation with UNDP-BCPR. Given the important role played by national and local peace councils in Ghana in preventing large scale violence during the last general elections, and the roles played by district peace councils in Kenya during the post-election violence in 2008, it is clear that the time has come to devote time to considering what national infrastructures for peace can achieve and to discuss how we can build some sort of Infrastructure for Peace in many more countries, especially where elections will be held soon.

#### Ghana

Between 1980 and 2002, 23 *known* violent conflicts were recorded in the three northern regions of Ghana. There were growing concerns about the impacts of these conflicts on both sub-regional and regional stability and security – which would have significant negative implications for economic growth, the environment and development.

In the nineties, dozens of delegates from seven ethnic groups, members of a government mediation team, opinion makers and youth leaders met several times and signed the *Kumasi Accord on Peace and Reconciliation*. Yet when violence erupted once again in the Dagombas in 2002 and threatened the elections, the government of Ghana sought advice and support from the UNDP. Based upon this request, a UNDP Peace and Governance Advisor was appointed, a Peacebuilding Support Unit within the Ministry for the Interior was established, and many consultations – including discussions with CSOs – were organised. Thus, the peace architecture in Ghana was coordinated by UNDP, and in its opening paragraph the framework recognizes the value of a collaborative approach to building peace. It clearly states that “*The national architecture for peace brings civil society groups, community organisations, professional bodies and faith based organisations together with governance structures and security agencies, into a national framework for anticipating and responding to signs of conflict*”.

One of the proposals was to establish a National Peace Council (NPC). Considering that many issues often become polarized at the political level, it was important that members of the NPC carry leverage and high moral standing and respect amongst the citizens. The membership is currently made up of renowned and respected Ghanians of distinction, including the Roman Catholic Cardinal, the National Chief Iman, a bishop, and a professor. The calibre of these individuals and the integrity that they bring to the NPC makes it a non-partisan body that can provide a national platform for consensus building on potentially divisive issues. It is important to note that the GPPAC Regional Secretariat, WANEP (the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding), co-facilitated the training for members of the NPC. Regional Peace Councils were established as well. Under these, District Peace Councils should be established, but this has yet to be implemented.

Ghana has taken a bold step in designing the first official national level programme for peace building in Africa. It is consonant with the Resolution of African leaders at the first Standing Conference on Stability, Security and Development in Durban in 2002, which called for each country to establish a national framework for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. Beyond setting up this architecture, it is important that the Infrastructure for Peace is operational, functions efficiently and is capable of changing the approach to responding and managing violent conflicts within the country.

While Ghana was praised for organising a peaceful electoral process, the particular challenges which arose in the post-electoral period would have been much more severe had there not been a response from the local Infrastructure for Peace. Civil Society, including WANEP and IDEG, provided technical support to the National Peace Council (NPC) to manage emerging electoral challenges in December 2008 and January 2009.

Following the second round of voting on 28 December 2008, tensions mounted to unprecedented levels over new voting figures that were introduced by the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Working with members of the NPC and other eminent personalities, it was possible to engage government, candidates of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the NPP to facilitate intermediary initiatives that responded to the challenges of the elections. By creating space for dialogue through various meetings, the candidates committed themselves to non-interference with the duties of the Electoral Commission and adopted a policy of non-violence with respect to resolving any outstanding issues.

While the final outcome was peaceful, the NPC (with support from CSOs) facilitated a successful transition and made the elections in Ghana another good example of democratic practice and peaceful transitions in Africa.<sup>4</sup>

## II.2 The Need for a Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Between All Stakeholders

Peacebuilding is a very complex issue with many different functions and stakeholders that fulfil complementary roles. As noted previously, there has been no structured dialogue between the different stakeholders that aims to establish cooperation and joint solutions. In the peacebuilding field, the UN agencies meet in New York or Geneva, governments meet in Paris at the OECD, and civil society meets at conferences or gatherings, but there is no structured dialogue.

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<sup>4</sup> Emmanuel Bombande, "Developing an Institutional Framework for Sustainable Peace: UN, Government and Civil Society Collaboration for Conflict Prevention in Ghana," in *Joint Action for Prevention: Civil Society and Government Cooperation on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding*, Issue Paper 4, Research Series of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (Den Haag: GPPAC, 2007). Also available at <http://gppac.net/page.php?id=1857#par2104>.

We see a growing recognition from governments at the national level that there is complementary role for CSOs; that they provide added value to the peacebuilding field. Unfortunately, these same reasons have hardly been recognised at the international level.

Many of us know how the UNDP, governments and CSOs cooperate within the MDG framework. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which won the Nobel Prize for Peace in 2007 together with Al Gore, can provide yet another interesting example. The IPCC has three working groups and a Task Force, and while it remains an intergovernmental body, there are around 3.000 researchers and NGOs from all over the world who cooperate in working groups. Another instructive example can be found in the Stop TB partnership, which was established by the WHO in 2000 and represents a network of more than 500 donors, national and international organisations, governments, NGOs and academics who are working together to reduce the toll of tuberculosis worldwide and ultimately achieve a world free of TB. One final example can be seen in The Proventium Consortium. Hosted by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the Consortium is a global coalition of international organisations, governments, private sector, CSOs and academic institutions that are dedicated to increasing the safety of vulnerable communities and reducing the impacts of disasters in developing countries.

These examples demonstrate that dialogue has taken place between different stakeholders on other global issues of development (such as the MDGs), public health issues, climate change and hydrological issues because it is needed, urgent and found to be productive. Several dozens of such multi-stakeholder networks exist, and they set norms, draft solutions and devise mechanisms for implementation. Multi-stakeholder dialogues or partnerships are being established because stakeholders see a need to cooperate and develop their complementary roles so that they can contribute to global issues in different ways. These roles include:

- setting and prioritizing the agenda for the field;
- exchanging experiences and learning from each other;
- social mobilization and outreach;
- implementing specific programs.

Importantly, the overriding acknowledgement is that the different stakeholders need to cooperate to achieve common goals.

Recently, GPPAC initiated a process that will produce a *Global Multi-Stakeholder Summit on Conflict Prevention & Peacebuilding* in 2011. As part of the preparatory phase, regional multi-stakeholder meetings will be held on all continents from the beginning of 2010 onwards.<sup>5</sup> The main purpose of this *Global Multi-Stakeholder Summit* is:

- to facilitate dialogue and encourage stronger links between different stakeholders in the field of peacebuilding, including representatives from governments, UN agencies, Regional Organisations, CSOs, and academics.
- to build a global consensus on the priority areas for policy and actions aimed at preventing state failure and violent conflict
- to reframe the traditional security policy approach by developing a common agenda for the prevention of violent conflict

Following this first Global Summit, we plan to make it a biannual event which brings together key stakeholders to assess and discuss the state of the field. In intervening years, Regional Summits will be

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<sup>5</sup> For more information, please see Paul van Tongeren, "A Multi-Stakeholder Partnership on Peacebuilding," in *Joint Action for Prevention: Civil Society and Government Cooperation on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding*, Issue Paper 4, Research Series of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (Den Haag: GPPAC, 2007). Also available at <http://gppac.net/page.php?id=1857#par2104>.

held which bring together stakeholders within the regions to monitor the implementation of previous recommendations from Regional and Global Summits and provide input for future direction.

### II.3 Funding the Field of Peacebuilding

The field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding is under funded. If one compares the budget lines for development, environment, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping, the budget lines for prevention and peacebuilding are but a tiny fraction of the overall total.




Diagram One: Funding Comparison of Military, Peacework and Conflict Prevention<sup>6</sup>

This can be demonstrated with concrete cases, and once again the case of post-election violence in Kenya just one year ago is both relevant and meaningful. To read more about what CSOs have done in response to electoral violence in Kenya, please see paragraph 4.A. In addition to these efforts, however, the mediation effort led by former Secretary General Kofi Annan has achieved much greater recognition and visibility. There are estimates that the cost of this mediation was several hundred thousand dollars (USD). When combined with the costs of *Concerned Citizens for Peace* in Kenya and related initiatives at another several hundred thousand dollars, it is clear that the international community funded two initiatives which played a key role in reducing the violence for less than one million dollars. This is all the more striking when compared to the average costs associated with a single violent conflict, which has been estimated by Paul Collier to be \$64 billion.<sup>7</sup>

Thus, when comparing budget lines, it is clear that far more should be spent on *conflict prevention* and *peacebuilding*. Within this broader segment, we believe that much more should be spent on *preventing violent conflict* by investing in initiatives such as *Infrastructures for Peace* (section 3.A), or on what CSOs are already contributing to prevention and peacebuilding. An example of an effective cooperation in financing such initiatives can be drawn from the peace architecture framework in Ghana, which was fully funded by the United Nations for its first three years and gradually funded by the government of Ghana

<sup>6</sup> OECD Data from 2005, Cited in *Smart Power - Saving Money, Saving Lives: Why Conflict Prevention Policy Needs to be Joined Up*. Forthcoming Publication of the International Task Force on Preventive Diplomacy.

<sup>7</sup>Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007).

from the fourth year onward. Over this four year period, UN investments in this initiative registered at \$2,5 million.

However, it is not only the volume of the resources which matter. *Modalities* are also very important. In the field of peacebuilding, more *flexibility, efficient processing of applications*, a willingness to *accept risks*, and recognition that peacebuilding is a *long term commitment* is required. These are some of many modalities that matter.

There is broad acknowledgement that CSOs can play important roles in the field of peacebuilding. In addition to being able to provide better information about 'reality on the ground', CSOs can work where governments can not, speak to parties that governments cannot reach, work on social change issues when governments are often unable to, and inform and monitor policies while operating flexibly and adapting to the context.<sup>8</sup>

If CSOs can fulfil so many of those very important roles, it is clear that the necessary resources should be made available.

### III. Mitigating Societal Risks and Working Towards Sustainable Peace

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Civil Society in Kenya gave an impressive response after the elections in December 2007 when post-election violence broke out. With a broad diversity of initiatives, they played an instrumental role in reducing the violence. Yet there are many more examples like the Kenyan situation where CSOs have played important roles in mitigating social tensions and reducing the violence by seeking to achieve social inclusion. In addition to this, there is a clear need to engage in long-term strategies which recognise that conflict is inevitable and can be managed and transformed. Learning such strategies from an early age is vitally important, and it is here that civil society also sees a role for peace education and the promotion of a culture of peace.

#### III.1 Concerned Citizen for Peace in Kenya

The initiative of the *Concerned Citizens for Peace* in Kenya in the aftermath of the post-election crisis in Kenya is an inspiring example in terms of the speed with which it implemented its objectives and for its deployment of strategic, multi-level and multi-sector actions and linkages (political and community, public and behind the scenes, local and international actors, media, private sector, women, youth) which mobilized a large constituency for peace. In addition to its use of strategic analysis, it also managed the relationship between civil society-led efforts and the formal mediation process led by Kofi Annan.

Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP) was launched on 31 December 2007 by prominent Kenyan civil society peace workers and mediators and immediately emerged as a rallying point for national peace and dialogue. At a time when the country was paralysed and shocked by violence, CCP occupied a crucial space and recognised at that early stage that dialogue was the only way out of the crisis. The initial focus was to plead publicly and privately with the political leadership for dialogue while calling upon Kenyans to stop the violence and wanton destruction of property. In this way, CCP became the voice and space for dialogue and served as the forerunner to the international mediation process.

Some of the key features of CCP's interventions include:

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<sup>8</sup> "Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Potential, Limitations and Critical Factors," A Report of the Sustainable Development Department of the World Bank (Report No. 36445-GLB). page 15). Cited in *Joint Action for Prevention: Civil Society and Government Cooperation on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding*, GPPAC Issue Paper Series (Den Haag: GPPAC, 2007): 15.

*A Focus on All levels of Society:* mobilising the public to stop the violence while urging politicians to resolve the crisis through dialogue; working with relevant government and public institutions to lay strategies for peace; strategically working with the media and the Private Sector; supporting local level actions by key individuals and groups to respond to the violence, and offering practical support for confidence building and healing.

*Supporting Mediation at the Top Level:* CCP was crucial in setting the pace for international mediation by facilitating the visit of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, briefing the Eminent Persons, and interacting with the process led by Kofi Annan. Interestingly, the hotel where CCP worked from turned out to be the venue for the Kofi Annan process, which created a strategic entry point for CCP.

*Mobilising Broad Participation:* From the very beginning, the 5 initiators called on Kenyans to join and contribute their thoughts towards the resolution of the crisis. In a matter of days, six different Working Committees were formed, while 'Concern' became a brand name used by other affiliates of CCP (Concerned Writers of Kenya, Concerned Women, Concerned Youth for Peace, etc). The *Open Forum* of CCP became a place where Kenyans of all walks of life came together to reflect, analyse, strategise and act jointly for several hours every day. These reflections formed the basis of the *Citizens Agenda for Peace* launched on 9 January 2008. This document became a major source of input for the formal mediation process.

*Preventive Action:* At a point when violence was threatening to engulf the capital city of Nairobi, CCP worked with the Internal Security Ministry and mobilized for peace. This led to training and capacity-building activities, as well as the formation of the *Nairobi Peace Forum* – a platform composed of previously established *District Peace Councils*. In both Nairobi and Northeastern Kenya, these District Councils helped reduce and mediate differences, which thus prevented the escalation of violence.

CCP, NPI-Africa and the groups they worked with have had a substantial impact in reducing the violence. In addition to providing an excellent example of outreach to all levels of society, the diversity of their activities and programming is unquestionably unique and inspiring.<sup>9</sup>

### III.2 Other Examples of CSO Efforts to Respond to Crises

GPPACs Early Warning Early Response (EWER) programme seeks to enhance the capacity and professionalism of civil society organisations to engage in early warning and early response efforts, and to advance interaction with governments, regional intergovernmental organisations, and UN agencies. As part of the EWER programme, the GPPAC Regional Secretariat for West Africa (WANEP) organised an international conference in Côte d'Ivoire from 23-26 February 2009 on Mobilising for Early Response. Peacebuilding practitioners, GPPAC members and CSO representatives discussed the programme's new initiative called the Mobilising Early Response Project. This project aims to provide a bridge from early warning to early response, and while many of the regions within GPPAC have been working on early response mechanisms, they are not yet ready to implement early response actions.

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<sup>9</sup> See *Concerned Citizens for Peace and CSO Responses to the Kenyan 2008 Political Crisis*. Forthcoming publication by NPI-Africa in association with the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict. Please see <http://www.npi-africa.org> for more information.

To assess the various methods currently employed, the Mobilising for Early Response Project conducted three concrete assessments in Kenya, Transdneistria, and Central America. The regional groups were able to outline specific actions needed to prevent future violence. In the case of Central America (Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala), the assessment gathered valuable information and the research group is planning to conduct additional analysis and action in the coming months. Based on the realities of conflict outlined in all three assessments, an implementation agenda has been developed for the Mobilising Early Response process. Following the identification of priority areas, a conflict assessment is made and regions develop a draft Action Plan that includes all actors. Other civil society and international organisations are thus consulted and engaged in implementing the Action Plan. In this effort, concerted advocacy efforts are necessary to promote action by governments and to ensure that they implement their portions of the Action Plan.

Civil Society Organisations in each region should work to identify the countries, sub-regions or cross-border situations which threaten to deteriorate into armed political conflict in three to five years time. Most civil society organisations and networks are better suited to engage in long-term efforts to address structural conflict; a fact that is recognized and accounted for within the strategy of this project. The Mobilising Early Response Project adopts an approach that focuses on action, which allows for a common approach among civil society to adequately respond to increased risks of violence.

### **III.3 Peace Education**

Peace education, while not offering all the answers, holds the possibility that we can instill the values of non-violent conflict resolution in our children from an early age and build the foundations for peace at a societal level. Throughout the GPPAC network, there are numerous initiatives which seek to equip a core of formal and community educators with the knowledge required to disseminate peace education; to encourage them to generate feasible action plans for implementation in schools, organisations and/or communities; to encourage the development of core teams capable of promoting peace education in each country; and to facilitate the development of Regional Education Networks that can foster both intra and inter-regional dialogue. Several successful conferences have been held – most recently in Southeast Asia and East & Central Africa – which have attracted significant interest from national Ministries of Education, devised measurable goals for curricula, and fostered dialogue and reflection on how to build peace through education.

### **III.4 Awareness Raising and the International Day of Peace**

Although the UN International Day of Peace (IDP) has been celebrated since 1981, its existence remained largely unknown and unrecognised outside of UN circles. At the time, it had no fixed calendar date and was celebrated on the third Tuesday of September to coincide with the first session of the General Assembly announcing the new UN work year. It was not until five years ago that the UN General Assembly voted to set aside a fixed calendar date for the Day of Peace. Since 2001, the day has been fixed on 21 September.

UN Resolution 55/282, adopted unanimously to fix a calendar date for the day, ends with a clear call for action, and *'invites all Member States, organisations of the United Nations system, regional and non-governmental organisations and individuals to commemorate, in an appropriate manner, the International Day of Peace, including through education and public awareness raising, and to cooperate with the United Nations in the establishment of the global ceasefire.'*

GPPAC believes that the IDP presents a great opportunity to create extra awareness and interest in issues of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and as such uses the IDP as a rallying point to raise awareness about the value and necessity of conflict prevention and peacebuilding work. Recognizing that knowledge and support for these issues remains low among the general public and many policymakers, the GPPAC network engages in collaborative efforts to highlight some of the many successful civil society

peacebuilding and conflict prevention stories. We also aim to raise awareness about the potential for conflict prevention work in general.

The success of the International Day of Peace depends on organisations and individuals honouring and celebrating the day. GPPAC encourages its member organisations to be active and join in the efforts to use the day to hold candlelight vigils, peace demonstrations, concerts and performances, public debates, conferences and seminars, media campaigns, press briefings and peace rallies. In addition to our own efforts, the General Assembly of the UN adopted the *Declaration and Programme of Action for a Culture of Peace* which provides guidelines to governments and civil society organisation to work together in their efforts to strengthen and promote the 'culture of peace.'

### III.5 Social Inclusion

The coming decades will see a huge increase in the diversity of citizens within each country of the world. Economic and forced migration means that over 90% of our countries now have a minority of at least 10%. In 9/11, 89 nationalities were represented in the dead. Over 40% of the population of Rotterdam were not born in the Netherlands. In Latvia, over 30% of the population is Russian. Such diversity will continue to increase (e.g. by 2042, non-Hispanic whites will be a minority in the United States). Everywhere states are having a problem in managing the tensions which arise from diversity, many of which lead to violence. If agreed to by governments, the Club de Madrid commitments (see below) will mean that there will be a concerted effort to manage diversity effectively and ensure the peaceful development of Shared Societies, in which different groups can live together for mutual advantage and the pursuit of well being.

The Resolution of the General Assembly on *Promoting Development Through the Reduction and Prevention of Armed Violence* (17 November 2008) recognises the need for such measures and aims to improve social inclusion, which is an essential requirement for reducing levels of armed violence. The Club de Madrid, which is composed of 72 current and former heads of state and government from 51 countries, adopted a Call to Action on 14 November 2008 which called on leaders around the world to ensure that no-one is excluded and to work together to promote and ensure social inclusion and cohesion. The Call mentions that "if individuals and peoples are not able to express themselves in their language, enjoy their culture and traditions, and pursue their aspirations, they will not live freely nor fulfil their dreams."<sup>10</sup> This exclusion can lead to tensions in society, which in turn can lead to conflict.

Mari Fitzduff of Brandeis University is currently developing a multivariate, comparative coexistence index. Among other goals, this index will serve as an early warning system to detect coexistence problems. Possible measurable indicators include inequalities that are related to identity, exclusion of groups from economic power and the economic life of a country, media that is not inclusive of all cultures and politics that employ coexistence issues in a negative fashion. This index could be used by policy makers to measure social inclusion, and to devise appropriate action.<sup>11</sup>

Given the fact that the coming decades will see a huge increase in the diversity of citizens within each country, it is essential that we commit ourselves to managing this diversity effectively to ensure the peaceful development of shared societies. Yet in our pursuit of improving the dialogue amongst various groups, there is a very serious need to move beyond a traditional framework of social inclusion that is reliant upon static categories such as 'nationality'. Indeed, social inclusion must be approached as a dialogic process in which *all concerned cultures*, including that of the social majority, engage in a mutually constitutive learning process that extends to deeply entrenched and socially constituted categories that are already present within societies (such as class and ethnic divisions). In this respect, it is important to note that there is a difference between truly living together while preserving a mosaic of identities, and simply co-existing. While the latter may serve as a foundation for peace, the former is the only guarantee of its preservation.

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<sup>10</sup> For more information, please see <http://www.thesharedsocietiesproject.clubmadrid.org>.

<sup>11</sup> For more information, please see <http://www.brandeis.edu/coexistence/pubs/other.html>.

## IV. Conclusion

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In the framework of the *Geneva Declaration*, much emphasis has quite rightly been given to reducing armed violence, encouraging disarmament, and engaging with the issue of small arms. We do not seek to diminish the importance of this focus, but argue that a more coherent policy which incorporates substantive commitments to the *prevention* of armed conflict and peacebuilding is necessary if the international community is to realise the objectives of the Declaration. While we recognise that the present plan for implementation of the Declaration seeks to reduce armed violence and improve development, to adjust development policy so that it is sensitive to the unique circumstances of conflict situations, and to develop an integrative approach, we submit that the pillar of conflict *prevention* must be considered.

Armed violence is not a path dependent phenomenon, but is instead a dynamic process that can arise and change with great ease and speed. Considering the significant body of research which suggests that there will be an increase in violent conflicts over issues of environmental degradation, climate change, resource competition, and the fallout from the present global economic downturn, it is imperative that national and international communities redress their inability to respond to such crises. To this end, preparation should start at the lowest levels and continue up from the district to regional and national levels to build an inclusive Infrastructure for Peace.

Developing an integrated policy in this respect requires the development of specific policies, strategies and programmes on early warning and response, the prevention of violent conflict and peacebuilding. As the case study of Kenya illustrates, concerted efforts from the international community in association with the initiatives of local peacebuilders are necessary and reinforce each other. In addition to the practical benefits of employing local, participatory processes that are supported by the international community, initiatives such as Concerned Citizens for Peace demonstrate that there is a clear financial benefit and incentive to invest in conflict prevention instead of intervention.