C H A P T E R I

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues


"We seem to have reached a crossroads. Before us lie two very divergent courses. One path can take us to a world, in which the proliferation of nuclear weapons is restricted and reversed, through trust, dialogue and negotiated agreement, with international guarantees ensuring the supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes, thereby advancing development and economic well-being. The other path leads to a world, in which a rapidly growing number of States feel obliged to arm themselves with nuclear weapons, and in which non-State actors acquire the means to carry out nuclear terrorism."1
Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General

Developments and trends, 2006

Little progress was achieved in nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control during 2006 and the disappointing outcomes of both the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference and the World Summit continued to have an impact on nuclear issues.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) marked the tenth anniversary of its opening for signature and, with 176 signatories, has achieved near universal adherence, though it has not yet entered into force. More efforts were undertaken to focus attention on the Treaty, especially to promote measures to facilitate the ratification process.
The Conference on Disarmament (CD or the Conference) paid considerable attention to nuclear issues, such as discussions on negotiating a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. However, due to the persisting divergence of views, no agreement was reached on a programme of work and the Conference was unable to proceed to its substantive work.
Growing concerns regarding confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation regime were reflected in the adoption of a number of United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) adopted throughout the year. Resolution 1696 (2006) was adopted on 31 July in response to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports stating that the Agency had been unable to verify the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.2 Following the IAEA Director General's reports issued on 31 August and 14 November, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1737 (2006) on 23 December whereby a series of sanctions were applied.3
The Security Council, in response to testing long-range ballistic missiles by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) on 5 July, adopted UNSCR 1695 (2006) condemning the testing and demanding that it suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme. It further urged the DPRK to return to the six-party talks, the NPT and the IAEA safeguards regime.4 After the DPRK announced on 9 October that it had carried out a nuclear test, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1718 (2006) on 14 October, which condemned the test, and reiterated its demand that the DPRK return to IAEA safeguards and to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. The resolution also imposed a number of sanctions on the DPRK.5
On the bilateral front, the United States and India negotiated an agreement on the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology. It has generated both international and domestic commentary because India remains outside of the NPT and is without full-scope safeguards. Detractors believe that the deal runs the risk of weakening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as the military nuclear programmes of India would not be affected, or might even be enhanced. Supporters believe that it would benefit the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as India's military and civil nuclear facilities and programmes would be separated with the civilian component placed under IAEA safeguards. India would also sign an Additional Protocol and engage in further work to prevent the proliferation of any nuclear materials. Before entering into force, certain steps are required, inter alia, approval of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). A thorough assessment of the agreement will have to wait until the publication of further details.6
Throughout the year, a number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives were also announced to provide nuclear fuel cycle services, prevent proliferation through nuclear energy use and lower the risk of nuclear terrorism, such as International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers (INFCC)7 and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).8
In June, the Russian Federation and the United States announced that they had signed a Protocol to extend the Cooperative Threat Reduction Umbrella Agreement (CTR) for another seven years.9 The CTR, also known as the Nunn-Lugar Program, was completed in 1992 to help secure, eliminate and account for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and safeguard related materials and facilities. Through its efforts, thousands of missiles and warheads have been deactivated.
In November, the United Kingdom announced plans to extend the life of its Trident nuclear-weapon system, underlining the need to retain an independent British nuclear deterrent. At the same time, it announced a 20 per cent cut in its nuclear arsenal, to a total of 160 warheads.10
In a significant development, in September, after seven years of negotiations, five Central Asian States (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) signed the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ),11 whereby they agreed to forbid the development, manufacturing, stockpiling, acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices within the declared zone. By the end of the year, the Treaty's protocol on security assurances, however, was not signed by the nuclear-weapon States (NWS). (See chapter IV for more information.)

Issues related to the CTBT

Third Joint Ministerial Statement

On 20 September, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Australia, Canada, Finland, Japan and the Netherlands launched the third Joint Ministerial Statement in support of the CTBT at the United Nations,12 ten years after it opened for signature on 24 September 1996. At the meeting, ministers from 59 countries associated their Governments with the Joint Statement.13 In the Statement, they affirmed that the Treaty had an essential role to play in strengthening global peace and security and underlined its contribution towards preventing the proliferation of materials, technologies and knowledge that can be used for nuclear weapons. They further noted that the Treaty's verification system would bring scientific and civil benefits, including tsunami warning systems and possibly other disaster alert systems.
The Ministers welcomed the fact that a total of 176 States had signed the CTBT and 135 had ratified it, and hailed the progress made in building up a verification regime to confirm compliance when the Treaty enters into force. They called upon States that had not yet signed and ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible, in particular those whose ratification was needed for its entry into force. They also called upon all States to continue a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions.
In his message on the occasion of launching the third Joint Ministerial Statement, the Secretary-General of the United Nations welcomed the Joint Statement and urged all States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty to do so. He stated that "each additional signature would bring the world closer to achieving its long-standing goal of outlawing all nuclear tests".14

The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom)

On 20 October, in his statement to the General Assembly under the agenda item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization", the Executive Secretary15 of the CTBTO PrepCom provided an overview of the activities it had carried out in 2005.16 In light of the underground nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 9 October, he drew the Assembly's attention to the importance of the CTBT's entry into force.17 He highlighted that during the special session of the Preparatory Commission on 13 October, States signatories expressed deep concern and regret over the test. The Executive Secretary stated that such action was against the letter and spirit of the Treaty and added that the nuclear test would refocus the international community's attention on the CTBT as a key disarmament and non-proliferation instrument.
In highlighting the level and pace of signatures and ratifications, the Executive Secretary reported that in the two years since the last report to the Assembly, three States had signed and 16 had ratified the Treaty.18
The Executive Secretary also provided an overview of activities regarding the establishment of the CTBT's global verification regime, which monitors compliance with the treaty. He highlighted that in accordance with its mandate, the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the CTBTO PrepCom provided States signatories with data collected by the International Monitoring System (IMS) as well as information prepared by the International Data Centre (IDC).
He reported that 90 countries were hosting monitoring stations and contributing to verification capabilities and noted that the Preparatory Commission continued organizing training programmes and workshops to support States signatories in implementing the Treaty. The training for station operators, managers and technical staff of National Data Centres included courses on data analysis, storage and management, global communication and technologies for use in on-site inspections. He further reported that in the field of international cooperation, the PTS continued providing support for the advancement of the Preparatory Commission's work as well as serving to advance national implementation of the Treaty.
He acknowledged the particular importance of cooperation between the CTBTO PrepCom and the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), including its three regional centres. He also mentioned the conclusion of a service agreement with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which would provide the CTBTO PrepCom with operational support. Potential fields for cooperation had been explored with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) as well as with other organizations within the United Nations system, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in relation to the provision of data for tsunami warning. He reiterated the request of the CTBTO PrepCom for full membership in the United Nations System Chief Executives Board (CEB).19
As part of the commemorative events on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the CTBT's opening for signature, a symposium entitled "CTBT: Synergies with Science, 1996-2006 and Beyond", organized by the CTBT PrepCom, was held in Vienna from 31 August to 1 September.20 This first scientific symposium was aimed at strengthening the relationship between the global scientific community and the CTBTO PrepCom. There was general agreement among participants that exploiting synergies between the CTBTO PrepCom and the scientific community would be of mutual benefit to both communities.
On 4 December, the General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization". The resolution was introduced by Ukraine in its capacity as Chair of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO.21

Conference on Disarmament 2006

Nuclear disarmament

Long-standing positions were reiterated during the focused, structured debates on the issue of nuclear disarmament, which took place at formal and informal plenary meetings under the Presidency of the Republic of Korea.22
The Group of 21 (G-21) continued to emphasize that nuclear disarmament remained, as before, their highest priority for the CD. In this respect, the Group drew attention to proposals23 such as for the establishment of an ad hoc committee for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, including a nuclear weapons convention, and the start of negotiations on a phased programme within a specified framework of time. While the Group took the position that the mandate for nuclear disarmament in the A-5 proposal24 fell short of its expectations, it did express willingness to join a consensus based on that proposal. It also lamented the lack of progress under the NPT by NWS to eliminate nuclear weapons. Members of the Group highlighted their concern at the apparent shift of focus by NWS away from nuclear disarmament commitments to an emphasis on non-proliferation.
Most Members of the Western Group and Eastern European Group saw the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) as a priority. A number of members of the Western Group viewed progress on the CTBT ratification process and an FMCT negotiation as complementary to the undertakings of NWS under Article VI of the NPT.
Norway and Sweden put forward a proposal to create a global inventory of nuclear arsenals and stockpiles that would be systematic, transparent and available to the public. It would also include fissile material stockpiles, which should be under international safeguards to deter non-State actors from stealing this material for terrorist activities.

Fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices

The Conference held a number of formal as well as informal plenary meetings on the topic of fissile materials.25
To enhance the breath of discussion, experts from capitals were invited to exchange views on specific sub-items related to fissile materials, namely definitions, scope, stocks, compliance and verification. On 18 May, the United States delegation tabled a draft mandate for the CD to start negotiating a FMCT together with a draft text.26
The United States proposal received a wide variety of reactions. Many Western countries took a reserved, but favourable stance, especially on the new level of engagement demonstrated by the United States. However, a number of non-aligned States had a negative response. The main difficulty that several delegations had with the proposal was the absence of provisions in the draft Convention dealing with existing stocks and the lack of an effective verification mechanism.
A number of delegates reviewed the long history of the issue, including the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD I), which called for a ban on fissile material as part of the twin objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;27 the 1993 consensus General Assembly resolution calling for the negotiation of "a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices";28 the commitment made at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, repeated again at the NPT Review Conference in 2000;29 and the 1995 Report of the Special Coordinator, Gerald Shannon (Canada), outlining the mandate for such negotiations.30
Many members continued to support the initiation of a treaty dealing with fissile materials, albeit with diverging issues over the scope of the agreement, such as whether it would cover existing as well as future stocks, compliance and verification.
A large number of countries from the Western Group together with a number of Latin American States indicated that they could generally go along with the idea of negotiating such a treaty based on either the Shannon mandate or any other mandate, without any preconditions as to the outcome. However, there were other Western countries and a majority of the non-aligned States that were of the view that without covering existing stocks, particularly with no verification mechanism, the treaty would be rendered inadequate to meet the challenge of ensuring full implementation.
A complicating factor in seeking agreement on a mandate continued to be that of the linkages drawn by some Members to other core issues. While welcoming a treaty to deal with these materials, China and several non-aligned States were prepared to consider dealing with fissile material only within the framework of a "balanced and comprehensive" programme of work which included other core issues, namely nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and negative security assurances (NSAs). Those delegations believed that the five Ambassadors' proposal (A-5) would offer such an approach.31
Among the five permanent members of the Security Council, Russia and China continued to place a heavy emphasis on taking forward the issue of PAROS. As far as the nuclear-capable States were concerned, Pakistan insisted, along with some non-aligned countries, on addressing the issues of fissile material linked together with the other disarmament issues while India focused on the necessity of a verification mechanism.

Negative security assurances

Under the Senegalese Presidency, the CD addressed the issue of "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".32
Divergence of views continued over the issue, including differences on the appropriate forums to deal with the subject and concerns over the adequacy of existing security assurances - whether given under the nuclear-weapon-free zones by unilateral declarations or pursuant to Security Council resolutions.
Most non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) continued to regard existing security assurances as inadequate for their needs, and pressed for a universal and legally-binding agreement on such assurances. With respect to the NWFZ, a number of delegations, in particular, from non-aligned countries, referred to the fact that the Treaty of Pelindaba had not yet entered into force and that none of the NWS had signed the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty. Furthermore, they referred to the not-yet-completed negotiations on the NWFZ treaty in Central Asia and the absence of a WMD-free zone treaty in the Middle East, both of which contributed to the fragmented geographic coverage of NWFZs.
With respect to the forum in which the issue should be dealt with, India and Pakistan preferred the CD to address the issue. Others voiced support for discussions to be held within the framework of the NPT, asserting that only NNWS in compliance with the Treaty should benefit from these assurances. France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States stressed that the assurances given in the context of the NPT and through signature to some of the NWFZ's Protocols were sufficiently strong pledges. China reiterated its policy of not using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.33

Radiological weapons

The CD held a number of formal, as well as one informal, plenary meetings on agenda item 5: "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons".34
Despite diverging opinions on the priority of this agenda item, in the context of the ongoing search for compromise on the Conference's programme of work, no Member questioned the approach of holding a comprehensive consideration of the traditional aspects of this item.
Some Members recalled efforts in the General Assembly on the issue, under the initiative of Belarus.35 Germany illustrated the dangers of radioactivity through the tragedy of Chernobyl 20 years ago. It also underscored that radiological weapons were often considered a secondary issue because their use seemed to be a non-imminent threat. Others drew attention to the risk of terrorists exploding a crude nuclear device or setting off a so-called "dirty bomb".
Numerous delegations lauded the efforts by the IAEA to prevent potential nuclear terrorism and the process to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM).36 Despite these contributions by the Agency, delegates appeared keen to keep the issue of radiological weapons under the CD's active consideration. Some saw merit in the CD reaching a future understanding on banning and forswearing the development of radiological weapons. Such a step was seen as complementary to ongoing national and international efforts, including confidence-building measures (CBMs), to ensure effective protection and control over radioactive materials as well as in preventing their access to non-State actors.

Bilateral agreements and other issues

United States-India Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement37

In 2006, the United States Congress approved a bill allowing the Government to conclude an agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with India, which was previously prohibited by the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The bill created exemptions from the Act, making it possible to export nuclear equipment and materials to India for peaceful purposes. In return, India was expected to separate its civilian and military nuclear programmes; file a complete declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities and materials with the IAEA; and place such facilities, programmes and materials under the IAEA safeguards. Other conditions included India working towards implementing an Additional Protocol, and cooperating with the United States to conclude a multilateral treaty on halting production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The bill also required that India implement comprehensive export control legislation and harmonize its control lists with, and adhere to, the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) (see p. 1) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) (see p. 2).
However, the agreement would exempt India from the requirement for comprehensive ("full-scope") IAEA safeguards - a multilateral standard endorsed at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences and by several General Assembly resolutions.38
On 26 July, over a year after the joint statement of the United States President and Indian Prime Minister declaring the intent to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement, the United States House of Representatives adopted a bill "To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India". The bill was passed by a recorded vote of 359 in favour and 68 against. Seven amendments to the proposed text were introduced, and five were agreed to by the House of Representatives. One of the overturned amendments required that prior to nuclear cooperation with India, and every year thereafter, the United States President had to certify that India had not increased the level of domestic uranium used in its military programme during the preceding year. The second overturned amendment sought to restrict uranium and other nuclear reactor fuel exported to India until it ceased producing fissile material for its nuclear weapons programme.
On 16 November, the United States Senate approved the same bill by a vote of 85 in favour and 12 against. The Senate did not favour the proposed amendment that declared it the policy of the United States to continue to support implementation of UNSCR 1172 (1998), which condemned the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 and encouraged all States to "prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons".39
On 18 December, President Bush signed into law the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act at a ceremony in the White House.40 He stated that the agreement would help meet energy and security challenges and pave "the way for India to join the global effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons".41
The United States has several times briefed the NSG about its agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation with India and proposed that an exception be made in the NSG Guidelines to allow it.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Two major developments on the Korean Peninsula caused international concern in 2006.
On 5 July (local time), the DPRK test-fired seven ballistic missiles, including a long-range Taepodong-2 (TP-2). As the first test of a long-range missile conducted by the DPRK since 1998, the country broke its 1999 self-declared moratorium on such tests.
The DPRK commented that this was part of a routine military exercise aimed at strengthening the country's defence, and had nothing to do with the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.
However, through the adoption of resolution 1695 on 15 July, the Security Council condemned the missile tests and demanded that the DPRK suspend its ballistic missile activities and resume its moratorium.42 The resolution also imposed sanctions on the DPRK, requiring all Member States to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer or procurement of missiles and related items to or from the DPRK, and demanded that it halt its ballistic missile programme. (See also MTCR on p. 3).
In a further development, on 9 October, the DPRK announced that it had successfully carried out a nuclear test, resulting in international condemnation.43 The United States confirmed the nuclear test a few days later44 when it found evidence of radiation in air samples retrieved in the vicinity of DPRK, but some experts have questioned whether the test was fully successful.
On 14 October, the Security Council adopted resolution 1718, which condemned the nuclear test proclaimed by the DPRK and demanded that DPRK not conduct any further nuclear tests or launch of a ballistic missile, abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes "in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner", return to the NPT and abandon all other existing WMD.45 In addition to those sanctions already imposed by UNSCR 1695 and 1718, including specific prohibitions on the transfer of UN Register of Conventional Arms items relating to WMD and on luxury goods, the sanctions also required the DPRK to cease exporting all conventional arms and WMD-related items while prohibiting States from supplying any technical advice or assistance to the DPRK in acquiring such items. The resolution also established financial and travel sanctions against entities associated with the DPRK's WMD and ballistic missile programmes, and called upon States to cooperate in inspecting cargo to and from the DPRK, as necessary.
The Secretary-General stated that he was "deeply concerned" by the nuclear test as it "violates international norms of disarmament and non-proliferation". He added that the test was "yet another reason" for the world community to bring into force the CTBT.46 The General Assembly, in response, condemned it in three separate resolutions.47
Through diplomatic efforts made by the parties involved during the weeks following the nuclear test, an agreement was reached on resuming the stalled six-party talks on 18 December.

IAEA verification

Strengthened safeguards system48

Comprehensive safeguards agreements, additional protocols and small quantities protocols

The entry into force of safeguards agreements and additional protocols continue to hold the key to a significantly strengthened IAEA safeguards system. During 2006, comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) entered into force for Botswana, Haiti, Oman, Republic of Moldova, Turkmenistan and Uganda, increasing the number of States with IAEA safeguards agreements to 162. However, at the end of the year, 30 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT had yet to bring the IAEA agreements into force, as required under Article III of the Treaty.
Additional protocols (APs) to safeguards agreements entered into force for seven States, including two with operating nuclear facilities.49 Of the two States that, at the end of 2005, were implementing APs pending their formal entry into force, Libya brought its protocol into force, while Iran informed the Agency in February that it would no longer implement it. Of the 162 States with safeguards agreements, 105 had signed APs and 78 had brought APs into force.50
The conclusion of such legal instruments was the focus of consultations and training by the IAEA Secretariat, including an interregional event at Vienna Headquarters51 and subregional seminars in Quito52 and Sydney.53 Another major focus of such outreach was the amendment of small quantities protocols (SQPs) to CSAs - in the context of the Board's 2005 decisions on SQPs - to allow for the implementation of more safeguards measures in States with limited nuclear activities. During the year, SQPs were amended in 9 of the 97 States with SQPs in force, and rescinded by one such State.54
The Board of Governors also approved an item-specific safeguards agreement for Pakistan in respect of a nuclear power station (Chashma Unit 2) under construction.55

Addressing challenges to the IAEA safeguards system

A Committee established by the Board of Governors to consider ways and means to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system met three times in 2006. In response to requests from the Committee, the Secretariat prepared related documents, such as the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols; the IAEA's capabilities in environmental samples analysis and satellite imagery; and safeguards relevant information to be provided to the IAEA voluntarily or under the existing legal framework.56

Integrated safeguards

As the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under CSAs and APs, integrated safeguards achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the resources available. As such, the Agency seeks to implement integrated safeguards once it has concluded that all nuclear materials in a State remain in peaceful activities. During 2006, integrated safeguards were implemented in 11 States, including two new countries.57

Assurances of supply of nuclear fuel

For consideration of the Board of Governors in 2007, the Agency continued to facilitate discussion on recent proposals to formulate well-structured recommendations on establishing assurance of supply mechanisms, with an initial focus on supply of nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants. Discussions at an IAEA Special Event entitled "New Framework for the Utilization of Nuclear Energy: Assurances of Supply and Non-Proliferation" during the fiftieth regular session of the IAEA General Conference in Vienna indicated that the various proposals were seen to be mutually compatible and supportive.58 In order to move forward, a number of policy, legal and technical issues remain to be addressed in greater detail.

Implementation of safeguards

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Since December 2002, the DPRK has not permitted the Agency to perform any verification activities on its territory, therefore, the IAEA could not draw any conclusions regarding that State's nuclear materials or activities. Notwithstanding, during the year, the IAEA continued to maintain and improve capabilities should its verification activities be resumed there.59 (See also p. 4).

Islamic Republic of Iran

During 2006, the Director General submitted five reports60 to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement in Iran, and the Board adopted one resolution61 on the subject.62
Iran continued to implement its CSA and AP until, in a letter dated 6 February, it informed the Agency that its voluntary commitment to implement the provisions of the AP had been suspended as of that date, and that the implementation of safeguards measures would be based only on its CSA.63
In a subsequent Board of Governors meeting on 4 February, the IAEA adopted a resolution which called upon Iran to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities; to promptly ratify and implement the AP in full; and to resolve outstanding issues. The resolution also requested the Director General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of that and the previous resolutions.64
Iran started tests at its pilot enrichment plant in Natanz in February 2006 where it also continued to prepare for the installation of 3,000 centrifuge machines in its underground fuel enrichment facility.
During the year, certain aspects of the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme remained unclear. The source(s) of low (LEU) and high (HEU) enriched uranium particles found at locations where Iran declared that centrifuge components had been manufactured, used and/or stored remained obscure. Iran did not make available to the Agency any new information concerning its P-1 or P-2 centrifuge programmes, nor did it provide a copy of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal, and the casting and machining of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres. Additionally, by the end of 2006, the issue of the plutonium experiments had not been resolved satisfactorily.
While the Agency was able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in the State, Iran's decision to suspend its voluntary commitment to the provisions of the AP limited the Agency's ability to clarify outstanding issues. It also restricted the IAEA's ability to verify the absence of Iran's undeclared nuclear material and activities.
On 31 July and 23 December, respectively, the Security Council adopted resolutions 1696 and 1737,65 in which it demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and called on Iran to act in accordance with the provisions of its AP. On 31 August, pursuant to UNSCR 1696, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council, which stated, inter alia, that Iran had not suspended its enrichment-related activities and had not implemented the provisions of its AP.66
Meanwhile, the EU-3,67 together with Javier Solana,68 continued to offer political and economic incentives to Iran in return for its cooperation and suspension of enrichment activities, while firmly supporting sanctions on Iran if it failed to comply with these demands.

Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East

During the year, consultations continued between the IAEA and the States of the Middle East on applying comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region, and on developing model agreements as a necessary step towards establishing a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Nuclear safety and security

Nuclear safety trends and issues

In response to the increasing interest of Member States to embark on nuclear power programmes, an interdepartmental Nuclear Power Support Group was established in 2006 in order to ensure coordinated IAEA support to Member States considering the construction of their first nuclear power plant or expanding small nuclear power programmes.69

Application of international safety standards

In 2006, the IAEA published the Fundamental Safety Principles, which consolidated and superseded the three previous documents, and established a unified set of principles representing a common safety philosophy across all areas of IAEA safety standards. Developed from a broad international consensus,70 the Fundamental Safety Principles form the basis for the development of future safety standards.71

Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

The Second Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties of the Joint Convention was held in Vienna from 15 to 24 May, with 41 Parties participating, including eight for the first time. Despite a large diversity of national situations, all Contracting Parties shared the view that progress had been made since the First Review Meeting.72 They demonstrated commitment to improving policies and practices, particularly in the areas of national strategies for spent fuel and radioactive waste management; engagement with stakeholders and the public; and control of disused sealed sources.
Challenges continued in a number of areas, including the implementation of national policies for the long-term management of spent fuel, disposal of high-level wastes, management of historic wastes, recovery of orphan sources, knowledge management, and human resources. The need to ensure that Contracting Parties' financial commitments are consistent with the extent of liabilities was also recognized. Many Parties saw the benefit of enhancing international cooperation through the exchange of information, experience and technology. In particular, needs for sharing knowledge and assistance were emphasized by Contracting Parties with limited radioactive waste management and research programmes.73

Incident and emergency response

In 2006, the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) underwent a major upgrade to enhance the Agency's capability as a global focal point for nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness and response. To achieve this, the IAEA, under the Early Notification and Assistance Conventions, organized and supported various levels of exercises (Convention Exercise/ConvEx). The IAEA also coordinated and supported the Action Plan for Strengthening International Preparedness and the Response System for Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies established under these Conventions.74

Safety and security of radioactive sources

International support for the non-legally-binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (the Code)75 grew to 88 Members with a number of States having amended, or in the process of strengthening, their national legislation to take its recommendations into account. Additionally, the number of Members agreeing to implement the Code's supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources (the Guidance) in a harmonized manner grew to 37 States.76
Although many Member States were working towards implementing the Code and the Guidance, much remained to be done, such as the establishment of national registers of Category 1 and 2 sources. In the meantime, the IAEA continued to provide assistance to improve Member States' capability to safely manage radioactive sources.77
At an open-ended meeting of technical and legal experts from 31 May to 2 June, consensus was reached on a formal mechanism for a voluntary, periodic exchange of information for all Member States to share experiences and lessons learned in implementing the Code and the Guidance. In September, the recommended mechanism was endorsed by the IAEA Board of Governors and noted by the IAEA General Conference. The new mechanism was primarily based on a single international meeting open to all States to be held every three years, subject to the availability of funding.78

Safe transport of nuclear and radioactive material

Respective national and international regulations are based on the IAEA's Transport Regulations.79 Despite compliance with these regulations, there continued to be instances where shipments have been denied or delayed. Denying or delaying a shipment of radioactive material for medical use could result in hardships to patients. In May, the IAEA held a technical meeting of experts to discuss further the progress on the issue of denials of shipments of radioactive material. The experts recommended the establishment of a steering committee to identify, evaluate and implement actions to alleviate denials of shipment on the basis of an action plan. This action plan was developed at the first meeting of this steering committee in Vienna in November.80

Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009

In 2006, the IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan, approved by the Board of Governors in September 2005, came into operation, and continued to be almost exclusively funded through extrabudgetary resources.81 Implementation covered prevention, detection and response activities underpinned by needs assessments and information. While the responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with each individual State, the IAEA continued to assist national efforts to enhance implementation.

Coordination on international instruments related to nuclear security

The IAEA's nuclear security work in 2006 took place in the context of increased commitment by Member States to expand the range of international instruments in that area. These instruments included the Amended CPPNM,82 the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,83 UNSCR 1540,84 and UNSCR 1673.85 Throughout the year, Member States called for continued and expanded action on nuclear security by the IAEA.

Physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material, facilities and transports

International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions continued to serve as the chief tool for evaluating existing physical protection arrangements in Member States. In 2006, the IAEA conducted five such missions. Four Radiation Safety and Security of Radioactive Source Infrastructure Appraisal (RaSSIA) missions carried out during the year assessed the effectiveness of existing national regulatory infrastructures for radiation safety and security of radioactive sources. The IAEA also introduced the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), a modular evaluation programme to help States improve the effectiveness of national regulatory bodies and implement national safety legislation and regulations.
The Agency continued to support the development of national strategies and provided advice to States on methodologies for locating "orphan" sources. Under the Tripartite Initiative - between the IAEA, the Russian Federation and the United States - the IAEA facilitated the dismantlement of vulnerable high-activity radioactive sources, and their transport into safe and secure storage. The IAEA worked with the United States Department of Energy and the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa in the recovery and disposition of approximately 67 vulnerable, high-risk radioactive sources from other African States. The IAEA also cooperated closely with the United States in recovering disused, vulnerable sources in other countries.86
Risk reduction was also achieved by converting reactors from HEU to LEU, by decommissioning shutdown reactors and by repatriating stocks of fresh and spent HEU fuel to the country where they were originally enriched. Supported by United States funding, the IAEA has arranged for the transportation of about 120 kg of fresh HEU fuel from nine States since 2002, with additional shipments under way and in planning stages.87

Combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material

In 2006, the IAEA continued to offer States a wide range of services and support in the area of combating illicit trafficking, inter alia by providing training to monitor, detect, identify and respond to incidents involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. Missions to States assessed technical and organizational means of combating illicit trafficking and, as appropriate, the IAEA complemented its advisory assistance with technical guidance and activities for building awareness among policymakers and other nuclear security stakeholders.88

Illicit Trafficking Database

The Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) programme continued to collect and analyse information on incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and other radioactive material. Participation in ITDB reached 95 States in 2006 and a meeting of national contact points was convened in May to review its scope, operation and development. In 2006, 149 incidents were reported to the ITDB.89

Nuclear security capacity-building

Capacity-building continued to be a cornerstone in IAEA's efforts to help States improve their nuclear security, with over 80 Member States receiving such assistance in 2006. Training in connection with, inter alia, upgrading equipment/facilities and with international legal instruments - both binding and non-binding - were essential components of such capacity-building. In 2006, this included 58 training events reaching some 1,700 participants from 120 States, including IAEA non-member States.
Beginning in 2005, the IAEA and the European Union (EU) started a Joint Action within the framework of the EU Strategy against the Spread of WMD. Main areas of work included strengthening the physical protection of nuclear material and of other radioactive sources in nuclear facilities, strengthening the security of radioactive sources in non-nuclear applications, and strengthening States' capabilities for detection of and response to illicit trafficking. A third joint Action, to be implemented from February 2007 to April 2008, was approved in June.

Export controls

Nuclear Suppliers Group

The sixteenth plenary meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)90 took place in Brasilia, from 1 to 2 June and was chaired by José Artur Denot Medeiros (Brazil), Special Representative for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.
The NSG took stock of developments since the last plenary meeting held in Oslo, in June 2005, and the Extraordinary Plenary Meeting held in Vienna in October 2005. In doing so, it recognized that UNSCR 1540 played a crucial role in developing an effective mechanism to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials to or from States and non-State actors, and welcomed the recent extension of the mandate of the 1540 Committee for an additional two years.
The exchange of information on current proliferation challenges focused principally on Iran. Participating Governments expressed their full support for the IAEA to continue fulfilling its mandate in Iran, and called on the latter to fully cooperate with the Agency. They recognized the importance of CBMs in resolving the matter and also expressed full support for the processes underway in various forums to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
In order to further strengthen the participating Governments' national export controls, the NSG decided to adopt, inter alia, the following measures:
(i) revised guidelines for information sharing within the NSG;
(ii) an approach to continue the Additional Protocol discussions in the Consultative Group;
(iii) an amendment to Part 1 of the Guidelines to include especially designed or prepared valves for use in enrichment plants;91
(iv) a means to incorporate the outcomes of the NSG Workshop on sensitive technologies into outreach activities.
The participating Governments also agreed to continue discussion on:
(i) the issue of non-Member States adhering to NSG Guidelines, to ensure wider implementation of comprehensive and effective control systems;
(ii) the further strengthening of the NSG Guidelines with respect to special controls on sensitive reports; and
(iii) the review or clarification of NSG internal procedures to enhance information exchange in all aspects.
Furthermore, in the framework of the existing NSG outreach programme, the participating Governments agreed to mandate the Chair and the Troika92 to continue contacts with non-participating Governments and international organizations.
Participating Governments continued to examine the issues raised by the United States-India Joint Statement of July 2005.93 In this context, they discussed a possible NSG-India relationship regarding civilian nuclear cooperation. They decided to continue their consultations and agreed to return to this matter at the next regular Consultative Group meeting, when further information might be available.

Missile Technology Control Regime

The MTCR held its 21st Plenary Meeting in Copenhagen from 2 to 6 October to review its activities and further strengthen efforts to prevent missile proliferation.94
MTCR Partners (the Partners)95 exchanged information and discussed growing trends in worldwide missile developments and tests. It also acknowledged the growing risk of proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery as well as proliferation of missiles in Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia. Noting the relevance of Security Council resolutions 1695 and 169696 (dealing with the DPRK) to MTCR export controls, the Partners expressed determination in implementing their calls to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to ballistic missile programmes of proliferation concern. This would be done in accordance with their national legislation and consistent with international law.
The plenary conveyed its strong support for UNSCR 1695, and underlined the Partners' determination to fully implement the export control requirements of the resolution. In this context, they also noted the DPRK's announcement of a nuclear test. They agreed on practical measures to implement the two Security Council resolutions.
The MTCR Partners reaffirmed their support for UNSCR 1540. The plenary confirmed the willingness of Partners in a position to do so to assist non-Member States and, in that connection, mandated the Chair to pursue contact with the 1540 Committee.
The Partners welcomed the intention of Denmark to host a conference in Copenhagen on missile proliferation in April 2007, on the occasion of MTCR's twentieth anniversary.

Missile-related issues

The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)

The subscribing States held their Fifth Regular Conference in Vienna, from 22 to 23 June.97 The Conference considered, inter alia, the strengthening of CBMs, which included pre-launch notification of ballistic missiles, space-launch vehicle (SLV) launches, annual declaration of ballistic missiles, and SLV policies. It also discussed the importance of outreach activities to support its universalization, with a view to increasing the number of subscribing States. The Chairman, Omar Zniber (Morocco), informed the Conference of his plans to promote the HCOC's focus on the Middle East and the African regions.
It was decided that the next Regular Conference of subscribing States would be held in Vienna, from 31 May 2007 through 1 June 2007.

Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006)

On 27 April, the Chairman of the 1540 Committee98 presented to the Security Council a report on the status of implementation of UNSCR 154099 including findings, conclusions and recommendations to further the implementation process as well as to enable States to continue fulfilling their requirements.
On the same day, the Security Council extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee for a further two years with the adoption of UNSCR 1673.100 Among other things, the resolution reiterated the decisions and requirements of UNSCR 1540, emphasizing the importance of full implementation by States and called for reports from non-submitting States. Furthermore, it encouraged ongoing dialogue between States and the 1540 Committee on the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 and invited the Committee to explore experience-sharing and lessons learned with States and international, regional and subregional organizations. UNSCR 1673 also decided that the 1540 Committee would report to the Security Council on compliance with UNSCR 1540 no later than 27 April 2008.

Examination of reports

As of the end of 2006, 133 Member States and one organization had submitted their first national reports to the Committee with 59 States having yet to submit.101 In response to the request by the Committee following its examination of first national reports, 84 States provided additional/updated information.102

Outreach activities

Throughout 2006, the Committee continued its outreach activities to promote States' implementation of resolutions 1540 and 1673. The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, in conjunction with and in support of the work of the 1540 Committee, held three regional seminars.

Beijing

The first seminar on the implementation of resolution 1540 in the Asia and the Pacific region was held from 12 to13 July in Beijing. It was hosted by the Government of China and co-sponsored by Australia, Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom and the European Union and supported by DDA. The seminar was attended by 70 participants from 23 countries of the region,103 other States members of the Security Council and international organizations.104
Presentations were made on a number of topics, including: the status of regional implementation; prohibitions vis-à-vis international treaties and conventions; implementation measures to account, secure and physically protect nuclear, chemical and biological materials and their means of delivery; and implementation and national experience related to export controls.105

Accra

Through the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), and in collaboration with the Government of Ghana, DDA organized the first seminar on the implementation of resolution 1540 in Africa, from 9 to 10 November. It was co-sponsored by Norway and the European Union, with representatives from 21 African States106 and two subregional organizations107 in attendance. Participants also included France, Kazakhstan, United Kingdom, United States, European Union and other international organizations.108 The seminar addressed a number of issues, including the need to: raise greater awareness within African Governments on all aspects of UNSCR 1540; build the capacities of Government officials and strengthen relevant institutions; and involve African regional and subregional organizations in the implementation process. The seminar also urged all African Governments to submit their national reports on implementation.109

Lima

Hosted by the Government of Peru, a seminar on implementing resolution 1540 in Latin America and the Caribbean region was held in Lima from 27 to 28 November. Co-sponsored by the EU and Spain, with the support of DDA and its Regional Centre in Lima (UN-LiREC), it followed up on the 2005 regional seminar held in Buenos Aires. Discussions focused on major developments, challenges and lessons learned since that time.
Representatives from 26 States in the region,110 regional and subregional organizations111 as well as international organizations112 participated in the seminar.113

Other outreach activities

The Chairman of the 1540 Committee addressed the eighteenth United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues, held in Yokohama, Japan, from 21 to 23 August. He provided a broad overview of the Committee's activities and reviewed the current implementation status of the resolution.114
On 8 November, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) held a workshop in Vienna on implementing UNSCR 1540. The Chairman of the 1540 Committee, a Committee expert and a representative of DDA also participated in a workshop held in Vienna by the OSCE on resolution 1540 on 8 November,115 and a special meeting in Washington held by the Committee for Hemispheric Security of the Organization of American States (OAS) on combating the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their delivery systems, and related materials on 11 December.116

Legislative database

As part of its efforts to promote information sharing on the implementation of UNSCR 1540, the Committee developed a database that provides additional information on the national implementation of laws, regulations and measures. Available on the Committee's official website, the database also aims to facilitate information exchange on the implementation efforts of States, and contains links to relevant public sources.117

Cooperation with other relevant UNSC Committees

The 1540 Committee cooperated closely with the Counter-Terrorism Committee118 and the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee (1267 Committee)119 in areas of common concern, as envisaged in resolution 1566 (2004)120 and the Security Council President's statement of 25 April 2005.121 During the year, the three Committees jointly briefed the Security Council on 21 February, 30 May and 28 September, respectively.122

Relevant IAEA activities

Many programmes and activities of the IAEA were also relevant to resolutions 1540 and 1673. In particular, the Agency's Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009123 provided a compilation of the activities and a plan for their implementation. Through these activities, the Agency assisted States in preventing nuclear material and related technologies from falling into the hands of non-State actors and, accordingly, helped States to fulfil their international obligations, including those required under UNSCR 1540.
The IAEA also suggested that the 1540 Committee actively inform Member States about the Agency's programmes and activities. The most practical way forward continued to be for the Committee to encourage Member States requiring IAEA assistance to work directly with the Agency, while reporting their progress in fulfilling the international obligations, as appropriate, to the relevant bodies, in particular to the 1540 Committee.

Political declarations and other initiatives

Trident nuclear deterrent

The United Kingdom's Labour Government issued a White Paper in December 2006 announcing its intention to maintain its nuclear deterrent.124
Presently, the United Kingdom is the only nuclear-weapon State with one nuclear-weapon delivery system. It consists of four Vanguard nuclear submarines carrying Trident II D5 missiles125 - each submarine is capable of carrying 16 such missiles, and each missile can carry up to 12 nuclear warheads. The number of warheads on each submarine has been reduced to 48, from a ceiling of 96.
As the current submarines are expected to end their service-life early in the 2020s, the United Kingdom has decided to replace the Vanguards and manufacture a new generation of submarines to retain its nuclear deterrent.
Although the United Kingdom will extend and modernize its nuclear deterrent, it reportedly will rely on a smaller number of nuclear weapons as it plans to reduce by 20 per cent the number of operationally available warheads to less than 160.

Visions for global supply mechanisms for nuclear fuel

International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers

On 25 January, at the summit of the Eurasian Economic Community in St. Petersburg, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed the creation of a Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure (GNPI), which would establish a network of INFCC to provide full fuel-cycle services, including uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing, to States lacking such capabilities.126 The Centers would be placed under IAEA safeguards and would provide States with fuel cycle services on a non-discriminatory basis. The initiative is aimed to limit the spread of proliferation-sensitive technologies while providing nuclear fuel supply assurances to States that refrain from acquiring full fuel-cycle capabilities.
Russia proposed that several International Nuclear Fuel Centers be operational in various global regions, offering to host the first one. Kazakhstan joined the initiative, and on 26 October the building of a joint Russian-Kazakh enrichment Center at the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Plant in eastern Siberia127 was announced with plans to enrich uranium from Kazakhstan.

Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

On 6 February, the United States announced the launch of a new GNEP initiative aimed to promote the use of nuclear energy while limiting the proliferation risks.128 Programme components include work on developing an advanced burner reactor to utilize spent nuclear fuel, which would eliminate the option of plutonium separation for use in nuclear weapons, and reduce the amount of nuclear waste. The GNEP also envisaged a consortium of States with advanced nuclear technologies to supply developing countries, currently lacking enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, with so-called grid-appropriate reactors and fresh fuel, upon their agreement to forgo fuel cycle activities. The reactors would be developed under the GNEP to match the needs of developing States, considering industry and electricity grids. Under the international fuel leasing arrangements within the GNEP, the suppliers would retain the responsibility for the security and final disposition of the spent nuclear fuel.

Ensuring supply security in the international fuel cycle

In May, a group of nuclear industry experts representing four major world uranium enrichment services suppliers presented a report through the World Nuclear Association (WNA),129 which intended to contribute to the IAEA initiative on "increasing non-proliferation assurances concerning the civilian nuclear fuel cycles, while preserving assurances of supply and services around the world".130 It also suggested a number of mechanisms to ensure the continuous safe supply of nuclear fuel to countries willing to forgo the establishment of their own nuclear fuel cycles.

Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF)

In June, six major enrichment services supplier States131 presented a proposal to IAEA member States entitled "Joint Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel". The proposal, which would ensure a supply of low-enriched uranium to States that decline having domestic enrichment facilities, was announced in July at the G-8 summit in St Petersburg by United States President George Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin;132 both Presidents also expressed their support for the initiatives on GNEP and GNPI mentioned above.

IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply

On 12 September, Japan suggested a plan, which complemented that of the RANF, called the "IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply".133 It suggested that in addition to the measures proposed by the six supplier States, it was imperative "To take care of not only uranium enrichment service but also all important activities of the front-end of nuclear fuel cycle, namely, uranium supply, uranium storage, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication as market failure might occur at various junctures" and "To focus not only on remedial responses to market failure for uranium fuel supply, but also on the prevention of the occurrence of such failure by reporting to the IAEA up-to-date information about the market, that is, each State's capacity in various activities related to fuel supply to nuclear power generation, so as to improve the transparency of the market and to alert the degradation of its adequacy if it is recognized."

International enrichment centre as proposed by the German Foreign Minister

On 18 September, as an alternative to the aforementioned suggestions, the German Foreign Minister134 proposed the creation of "multilateral uranium enrichment under the auspices of the IAEA and its export controls". In effect, this would establish an IAEA nuclear facility on an international (third country) site, which would be financed by the recipient country.135

Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) $50 million commitment

On 19 September, the NTI Co-Chairman136 announced that the organization would commit US$ 50 million to the IAEA for the creation of a stockpile of low-enriched uranium. Contingent on the additional commitment of $100 million by one or more Member States, and on the IAEA's approval of the proposal, it aimed to ensure a nuclear fuel supply to countries that have chosen not to establish their own nuclear fuel cycle.137

Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC)

Another significant development in 2006 was the publication of the final report of the international WMDC, chaired by Hans Blix.138 The Commission had been established in 2003 by the Swedish government, following an original proposal by former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala, who later served as a commissioner. The report's 60 recommendations stressed the need for further progress on nuclear disarmament, and included, inter alia, proposals for deep reductions and the outlawing of nuclear weapons, the creation of secretariats for the Biological Weapons Convention and NPT, the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, limitations on missile defense, a ban on space weapons, and a World Summit at the General Assembly on the theme of WMD in all its aspects. Excerpts of this report were circulated as a document of the General Assembly at its sixtieth session.139

General Assembly, 2006

61/57
Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution was introduced by Pakistan, on behalf of the sponsors (see p. 4 for sponsors), on 20 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 23 October (108-1-57), and on 6 December by the General Assembly (119-1-59). For the text of the resolution and voting pattern, see pages 5 and 6.
Among other things, the resolution recommended that further intensive efforts be devoted to the search for a common approach or common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally-binding character, and that the various alternative approaches, particularly those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, be explored further. It also recommended that the Conference actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching agreement and concluding effective international arrangements on the issue of security assurances, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.
First Committee
After the vote, the United States explained that it continued to oppose any proposal for a negative security assurances treaty or other global, legally-binding security assurances. Japan voted in favour with the view that negative assurances should be addressed in the framework of ongoing discussions in the Conference on Disarmament.
61/65
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments. The draft resolution was introduced by Mexico, on behalf of itself and the countries of the New Agenda Coalition (see p. 7 for sponsors), on 20 October. The revised draft was adopted by the First Committee on 27 October (147-8-12), and on 6 December by the General Assembly (157-7-13). For the text of the resolution and voting pattern, see pages 8 and 9.
The resolution continued to emphasize the central role of the NPT and its universality in achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and called upon all States parties to respect the Treaty's obligations; and condemned the announced nuclear-weapon test by the DPRK on 9 October 2006, all nuclear-weapon tests by States that are not yet parties to the NPT and any further nuclear-weapon test by any State whatsoever, and urged the DPRK to rescind its announced withdrawal from the Treaty.
First Committee
Before voting against the resolution, Pakistan explained that the changes made to the draft were unwarranted and unacceptable as they compromised the principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and fairness. India would not support the resolution because it lacked positive proposals and references to the no-first- and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States, and the reduction of nuclear dangers through de-alerting; and it no longer condemned nuclear-weapon tests by States parties to the NPT. Additionally, India could not accept the call to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. The DPRK would not support the resolution as it was one-sided and biased in dealing with their nuclear testing.
After supporting the resolution, Venezuela stated that without exception, given the threat that nuclear weapons posed against the survival of humanity, multilateral efforts should be implemented simultaneously and on a non-discriminatory basis for their total elimination. Voting in favour, Iran fully supported the total elimination of nuclear weapons, leading to a nuclear-weapon-free world, and viewed the NPT as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. China supported the resolution and outlined its position in seven points, including that nuclear disarmament measures should follow the guidelines of maintaining global strategic balance and undiminished security for all.
Australia abstained from voting due to reservations it had over certain elements, such as omitting mention of progress made in reducing nuclear arsenals, and by naming specific countries in calling for the universalization of the NPT.
The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of France, the United States and itself, felt the resolution took into account neither the progress they have achieved towards nuclear disarmament nor ongoing efforts to fulfil their obligations - such as the dismantling of fissile nuclear material facilities for weapons purposes or the reduction of nuclear arsenals. Russia abstained because it could not accept the idea of artificially accelerating nuclear disarmament without taking into account technical, political and financial constraints. Additionally, it found no reason to refer to recommendations made by non-governmental organizations.
61/74
Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution was introduced by Japan, on behalf of the sponsors (see p. 10 for sponsors), on 10 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 26 October (168-4-8), and on 6 December by the General Assembly (167-4-7). For the text of the resolution and voting pattern, see pages 11 and 12.
Among other things, the resolution stressed the importance of an effective Treaty review process, and called upon all States parties to the NPT to work together to ensure that the first session of the Preparatory Committee in 2007 is held constructively, to facilitate the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to NPT; encouraged States to continue to pursue efforts, within the framework of international cooperation, contributing to the reduction of nuclear-weapons-related materials; and called upon the Conference on Disarmament to immediately resume its substantive work to its fullest, considering the developments in 2006 in the CD.
First Committee
Before the vote, the DPRK said it could not support the draft because it dealt with its nuclear tests in a one-sided and biased manner. It felt the resolution selectively made an issue of its sovereign right to self-protection.
After voting in favour, France explained that while it wished to show support to States seriously considering the issue of nuclear disarmament, it hoped that in the future, questions regarding irreversibility and transparency would be better taken into account. Venezuela favoured the resolution and believed that nuclear weapons must be eliminated under the aegis of the United Nations through simultaneous multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.
India voted against the resolution as it incorporated unacceptable elements, such as the call for it to join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. The United States voted against because of the resolution's continued support for the CTBT. Pakistan did not support the resolution because it placed imbalanced emphasis on non-proliferation, rather than on nuclear disarmament. Additionally, it could neither accept calls for it to accede to the NPT nor be bound by any provisions emanating from forums in which it was not represented.
Egypt abstained from the vote and deemed it important for the resolution to reflect all norms governing the non-proliferation regime established by the NPT as well as the resolutions, decisions and final documents adopted by subsequent Review Conferences. It added that operative paragraph 11 ran counter to the consensus in the Disarmament Commission on negotiations for an international fissile material cut-off treaty. Iran abstained because it felt the text was not appropriately balanced as it focused only on the issue of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Israel abstained because it could not support some of the resolution's paragraphs, which differed significantly from its own policy. However, it was in accord with those related to non-proliferation.
61/78
Nuclear disarmament. The draft resolution was introduced by Myanmar, on behalf of the sponsors (see p. 13 for sponsors), on 18 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 23 October (105-45-16), and on 6 December by the General Assembly (115-48-18). For the text of the resolution and voting pattern, see pages 14 and 15.
Among other things, the resolution urged the nuclear-weapon States to immediately stop the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems; and also urged them, as an interim measure, to immediately de-alert and deactivate their nuclear weapons and to take other concrete measures to further reduce the operational status of their nuclear weapon systems. It called upon the NWS, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to agree on internationally and legally-binding instruments on a joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and on negative security assurances. The resolution also called for the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects at an early date to identify and deal with concrete measures of disarmament; and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly's sixty-second session.
First Committee
After the vote, three States explained their abstentions. India stated that nuclear weapons must be eliminated in a progressive and systematic manner through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory disarmament. Japan felt the resolution omitted elements necessary for the international community to form an agreement towards nuclear disarmament, which should be realistic and progressive, and involve all of the nuclear-weapon States. Pakistan was convinced that the resolution's references to documents relating to the NPT Review Conferences were unwarranted.
61/83
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. The draft resolution was introduced by Malaysia, on behalf of the sponsors (see p. 16 for sponsors), on 10 October. It was adopted as follows: by the First Committee on 27 October, as a whole (117-27-26), operative paragraph 1 (159-4-3); and on 6 December by the General Assembly as a whole (125-27-29), operative paragraph 1 (168-3-5). For the text of the resolution and voting pattern, see pages 17 and 18.
The resolution called upon all States to immediately fulfil the obligation under the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. It also requested all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they have taken to implement the present resolution and nuclear disarmament.
First Committee
After abstaining from the vote, Japan explained its belief that steady and incremental progress should be made prior to embarking upon the negotiations that all States were called upon to commence, under operative paragraph 2. Though Russia voted against the resolution, it supported the establishment of NWFZs and welcomed the signing of the CANWFZ Treaty in preambular paragraph 8, which it considered an important step in strengthening nuclear non-proliferation.
61/85
Reducing nuclear danger. The draft resolution was introduced by India, on behalf of the sponsors (see p. 19 for sponsors), on 10 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 23 October (105-50-13), and on 6 December by the General Assembly (118-52-13 ). For the text of the resolution and voting pattern, see pages 20 and 21.
The resolution called for a review of nuclear doctrines and, in that context, immediate and urgent steps by the five NWS to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. It also requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the seven recommendations in the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters,140 and also to continue to encourage Member States to endeavour to create conditions that would allow the emergence of an international consensus to hold an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, as proposed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration,141 and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixty-second session.
First Committee
Brazil voted in favour of the resolution, convinced that a review of nuclear doctrines could help reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons, and stressed that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons were essential to removing the danger of nuclear war.
61/97
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons. The draft resolution was introduced by India, on behalf of the sponsors (see p. 22 for sponsors), on 10 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 23 October (108-50-10), and on 6 December by the General Assembly (119-52-10). For the text of the resolution and voting pattern, see pages 23 and 24.
The resolution reiterated its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.
First Committee
Speaking after supporting the draft, Brazil agreed that a multilateral, universal and binding agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the elimination of nuclear danger.
61/103
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The draft resolution was introduced by Egypt, on behalf of the sponsors (see p. 25 for sponsors), on 19 October. It was adopted as follows: by the First Committee on 23 October, as a whole (156-4-6), preambular paragraph 6 (151-2-6); and on 6 December by the General Assembly as a whole (166-5-6), preambular paragraph 6 (165-2-6). For the text of the resolution and voting pattern, see pages 26 and 27.
The resolution called upon Israel to accede to the NPT, and not to develop, produce, test or acquire nuclear weapons, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all of its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. It also requested the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly's sixty-second session on the implementation of the resolution.
First Committee
Israel made a general statement on the draft resolution stating that because it was one-sided, contentious and divisive, the resolution undermined rather than enhanced confidence between the States of the region. Furthermore, it did not reflect the realities of the region and singled out Israel. Before voting, Finland, on behalf of the European Union, said it would support the draft, but was concerned that the resolution did not cover some recent developments on nuclear proliferation in the region namely, Iran's enrichment programme. Switzerland favoured the draft as a political appeal against nuclear proliferation in the region as a whole and called upon Iran to comply with UNSCR 1696 as soon as possible. Canada would abstain as it had reservations about the scope and unbalanced nature of the draft. The resolution should address the obligations of all States in the region to unequivocally adhere to and comply with the NPT. Australia would also abstain because of substantive difficulties it found with the text, notably the emphasis placed on Israel, with no reference to other Middle Eastern States of nuclear proliferation concern.
After the vote, two States explained their abstentions. Cameroon felt that the wording of the resolution, which by targeting a single State, would have benefited by a more balanced, less polemic reformulation. India believed that the focus of the draft should have been limited to the region it addressed.
61/515
United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament. The draft decision was sponsored by Mexico. It was adopted by the First Committee on 23 October (116-3-44), and on 6 December by the General Assembly (128-3-44). For the text of the decision and voting pattern, see pages 28 and 29.
By its terms, the General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-second session the item entitled "United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament".

Issues related to the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation

61/70
2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee. The draft resolution was introduced by Brazil on 10 October. The revised draft was adopted by the First Committee on 30 October (163-0-3), and on 6 December by the General Assembly (175-0-3). For the text of the resolution and voting pattern, see pages 30 and 31.
The resolution took note of the decision by States parties to hold the first session of the NPT PrepCom in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May 2007, and requested the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide services as required for the 2010 NPT Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.
First Committee
On behalf of the EU, Finland welcomed the selection of Vienna to host the first PrepCom of the NPT Review Conference in 2010 in honour of the fiftieth anniversary of the IAEA.

Issues related to the CTBT

61/104
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The draft resolution was introduced by Australia, on behalf of the sponsors (see p. 32 for sponsors), on 10 October. The revised draft was adopted by the First Committee on 26 October (175-2-4), and on 6 December by the General Assembly (172-2-4). For the text of the resolution and voting pattern, see pages 33 and 34.
The resolution condemned the nuclear testing proclaimed by the DPRK on 9 October 2006, and demanded that it not conduct any further testing, and urged all States to maintain their moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. While stressing that those measures did not have the same permanent and legally-binding effect as the entry into force of the Treaty, it urged all States to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level and, where in a position to do so, to promote adherence to the Treaty through bilateral and joint outreach, seminars and other means.
First Committee
Before supporting the draft, Finland, speaking on behalf of the European Union, strongly condemned the 9 October 2006 nuclear testing by DPRK. The EU believed that the legally-binding prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and explosions along with a credible verification regime were vital, and that the CTBT, as an essential part of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, needed urgently to enter into force. DPRK stated that it would vote against the draft since it addressed the nuclear tests in a one-sided, biased manner rather as a legitimate self-defence countermeasure to protect its security against nuclear war threat, sanctions and pressures from the United States.
After supporting the resolution, four States explained their vote. Iran stated that having received just partial support from the United States, the CTBT's entry into force faced a setback as only full ratification could offer a permanent and legally-binding commitment to end nuclear testing. Venezuela believed that it was essential for non-nuclear-weapon States to be provided with guarantees against nuclear weapons, and that the most effective means to a nuclear-weapon-free world was for all States to adhere to the relevant multilateral agreements and implement their provisions. Pakistan expressed disappointment that the text did not reflect its unilateral moratorium in nuclear testing, which it believed coincided with the CTBT. Israel underscored the importance of the CTBT, citing the nuclear explosion by the DPRK as a recent challenge to nuclear non-proliferation. Syria abstained because the CTBT ignored the legitimate concerns of non-nuclear States, which had neither been given assurance against nuclear weapons nor approval to acquire advanced peaceful technology for development. Though voting against the resolution, the United States noted its support for operative paragraph 5, which condemned the nuclear testing by DPRK.

Missile-related issues

61/59
Missiles. The draft resolution was introduced by Iran on 12 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 23 October (105-6-55), and on 6 December by the General Assembly (115-7-54). For the text of the resolution and voting pattern, see pages 35 and 36.
The resolution took note of the report of the Secretary-General on the issue of missiles in all its aspects, submitted pursuant to resolution 59/67;142 and decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-second session the item entitled "Missiles".
First Committee
Before abstaining from the vote, on behalf of the EU, Finland explained its regret that the draft did not mention the Hague Code of Conduct or the relevant resolutions adopted in 2006 by the Security Council. It also hoped that the third Panel of Governmental Experts to be convened in 2007 would base their work on the progress of the two previous Panels, and not repeat efforts already made. The United States voted against the resolution because it felt the item should not have been included in the agenda. In spite of its vote, it reiterated its belief that the work of the third Panel be based on the nearly completed final report rather than starting the process all over, and that it should conclude its work during 2007.

Conclusion

The lack of noticeable progress in the field of multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation continued throughout the year. Furthermore, a number of new and ongoing challenges added to the concerns of the international community about the nuclear question, including Iran's nuclear programme, the nuclear test by the DPRK and the United States-India nuclear agreement.
The impasse at the CD was not overcome despite long discussions concerning nuclear issues, which included talks on a possible FMCT negotiation.
The tenth anniversary of its opening for signature did not bring the CTBT closer to the ratifications necessary for it to enter into force. The signing of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty during the latter part of the year, the first nuclear-weapon-free zone entirely in the northern hemisphere, was an encouraging development. Nevertheless, differences between the Central Asian States and some of the NWS will need to be resolved before the Protocol dealing with negative security assurances can be signed.

Annex I

Security Council resolution 1673 (2006)
The Security Council,
Having considered the report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), hereafter the 1540 Committee (S/2006/257), and reaffirming its resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004,
Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
Endorsing the work already carried out by the 1540 Committee, particularly in its consideration of the national reports submitted by States pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004),
Recalling that not all States have presented to the 1540 Committee their reports on the steps they have taken or intend to take to implement resolution 1540 (2004),
Reaffirming its decision that none of the obligations in resolution 1540 (2004) shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
Noting that the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States, including the adoption of national laws and measures to ensure the implementation of these laws, is a long-term task that will require continuous efforts at national, regional and international levels,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Reiterates its decisions in and the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004) and emphasizes the importance for all States to implement fully that resolution;
2. Calls upon all States that have not yet presented a first report on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement resolution 1540 (2004) to submit such a report to the 1540 Committee without delay;
3. Encourages all States that have submitted such reports to provide, at any time or upon the request of the 1540 Committee, additional information on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);
4. Decides to extend the mandate of the 1540 Committee for a period of two years, with the continued assistance of experts, until 27 April 2008;
5. Decides that the 1540 Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation by all States of resolution 1540 (2004) through a work programme which shall include the compilation of information on the status of States' implementation of all aspects of resolution 1540 (2004), outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, and which shall address in particular all aspects of paragraphs 1 and 2 of that resolution, as well as of paragraph 3 which encompasses (a) accountability, (b) physical protection, (c) border controls and law enforcement efforts and (d) national export and trans-shipment controls including controls on providing funds and services such as financing to such export and trans-shipment, and in that regard:
(a) encourages the pursuit of the ongoing dialogue between the 1540 Committee and States on the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including on further actions needed from States to that end and on technical assistance needed and offered;
(b) invites the 1540 Committee to explore with States and international, regional and subregional organizations experience-sharing and lessons learned in the areas covered by resolution 1540 (2004), and the availability of programmes which might facilitate the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);
6. Decides that the 1540 Committee will submit to the Security Council a report no later than 27 April 2008 on compliance with resolution 1540 (2004) through the achievement of the implementation of its requirements;
7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Annex II

Security Council resolution 1695 (2006)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 825 (1993) of 11 May 1993 and 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004,
Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in north-east Asia at large,
Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
Expressing grave concern at the launch of ballistic missiles by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), given the potential of such systems to be used as a means to deliver nuclear, chemical or biological payloads,
Registering profound concern at the DPRK's breaking of its pledge to maintain its moratorium on missile launching,
Expressing further concern that the DPRK endangered civil aviation and shipping through its failure to provide adequate advance notice,
Expressing its grave concern about DPRK's indication of possible additional launches of ballistic missiles in the near future,
Expressing also its desire for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the situation and welcoming efforts by Council members as well as other Member States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue,
Recalling that the DPRK launched an object propelled by a missile without prior notification to the countries in the region, which fell into the waters in the vicinity of Japan on 31 August 1998,
Deploring the DPRK's announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Treaty) and its stated pursuit of nuclear weapons in spite of its Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards obligations,
Stressing the importance of the implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, DPRK, Japan, Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States,
Affirming that such launches jeopardize peace, stability and security in the region and beyond, particularly in light of the DPRK's claim that it has developed nuclear weapons,
Acting under its special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,
1. Condemns the multiple launches by the DPRK of ballistic missiles on 5 July 2006 local time;
2. Demands that the DPRK suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme, and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching;
3. Requires all Member States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to exercise vigilance and prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology being transferred to DPRK's missile or WMD programmes;
4. Requires all Member States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to exercise vigilance and prevent the procurement of missiles or missile related-items, materials, goods and technology from the DPRK, and the transfer of any financial resources in relation to DPRK's missile or WMD programmes;
5. Underlines, in particular to the DPRK, the need to show restraint and refrain from any action that might aggravate tension, and to continue to work on the resolution of non-proliferation concerns through political and diplomatic efforts;
6. Strongly urges the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition, to work towards the expeditious implementation of 19 September 2005 Joint Statement, in particular to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, and to return at an early date to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
7. Supports the six-party talks, calls for their early resumption, and urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;
8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Annex III

Security Council resolution 1696 (2006)
The Security Council,
Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006,
Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Noting with serious concern the many reports of the IAEA Director General and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to Iran's nuclear programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General, including IAEA Board resolution GOV/2006/14,
Noting with serious concern that the IAEA Director General's report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns on Iran's nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
Noting with serious concern the IAEA Director General's report of 28 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27) and its findings, including that, after more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern, and that the IAEA is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,
Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director General's report of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38) Iran has not taken the steps required of it by the IAEA Board of Governors, reiterated by the Council in its statement of 29 March and which are essential to build confidence, and in particular Iran's decision to resume enrichment-related activities, including research and development, its recent expansion of and announcements about such activities, and its continued suspension of cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol,
Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere,
Welcoming the statement by the Foreign Minister of France, Philippe Douste-Blazy, on behalf of the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States and the High Representative of the European Union, in Paris on 12 July 2006 (S/2006/573),
Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme, mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, and being determined to prevent an aggravation of the situation,
Acting under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in order to make mandatory the suspension required by the IAEA,
1. Calls upon Iran without further delay to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions;
2. Demands, in this context, that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA;
3. Expresses the conviction that such suspension as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;
4. Endorses, in this regard, the proposals of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative, for a long-term comprehensive arrangement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme (S/2006/521);
5. Calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and ballistic missile programmes;
6. Expresses its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA process, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the Agency, underlines the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme, and calls upon Iran to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol and to implement without delay all transparency measures as the IAEA may request in support of its ongoing investigations;
7. Requests by 31 August a report from the Director General of the IAEA primarily on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the above provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;
8. Expresses its intention, in the event that Iran has not by that date complied with this resolution, then to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;
9. Confirms that such additional measures will not be necessary in the event that Iran complies with this resolution;
10. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Annex IV

Security Council resolution 1718 (2006)
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004) and, in particular, resolution 1695 (2006), as well as the statement of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41),
Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
Expressing the gravest concern at the claim by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) that it has conducted a test of a nuclear weapon on 9 October 2006, and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,
Expressing its firm conviction that the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be maintained and recalling that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Deploring the DPRK's announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its pursuit of nuclear weapons,
Deploring further that the DPRK has refused to return to the Six-Party talks without precondition,
Endorsing the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States,
Underlining the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,
Expressing profound concern that the test claimed by the DPRK has generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and determining therefore that there is a clear threat to international peace and security,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,
1. Condemns the nuclear test proclaimed by the DPRK on 9 October 2006 in flagrant disregard of its relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 1695 (2006), as well as of the statement of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), including that such a test would bring universal condemnation of the international community and would represent a clear threat to international peace and security;
2. Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile;
3. Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
4. Demands further that the DPRK return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and underlines the need for all States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;
5. Decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching;
6. Decides that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the terms and conditions of its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipments and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA;
7. Decides also that the DPRK shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;
8. Decides that:
(a) All Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:
(i) Any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms, or related materiel including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 12 below (the Committee);
(ii) All items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in the lists in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815, unless within 14 days of adoption of this resolution the Committee has amended or completed their provisions also taking into account the list in document S/2006/816, as well as other items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined by the Security Council or the Committee, which could contribute to DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;
(iii) Luxury goods;
(b) The DPRK shall cease the export of all items covered in subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii) above and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK;
(c) All Member States shall prevent any transfers to the DPRK by their nationals or from their territories, or from the DPRK by its nationals or from its territory, of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items in subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii) above;
(d) All Member States shall, in accordance with their respective legal processes, freeze immediately the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of the adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the persons or entities designated by the Committee or by the Security Council as being engaged in or providing support for, including through other illicit means, DPRK's nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related programmes, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of such persons or entities;
(e) All Member States shall take the necessary steps to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated by the Committee or by the Security Council as being responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, DPRK policies in relation to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related and other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, together with their family members, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a state to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;
(f) In order to ensure compliance with the requirements of this paragraph, and thereby preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials, all Member States are called upon to take, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, cooperative action including through inspection of cargo to and from the DPRK, as necessary;
9. Decides that the provisions of paragraph 8 (d) above do not apply to financial or other assets or resources that have been determined by relevant States:
(a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges, or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets and economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;
(b) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee; or
(c) To be subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person referred to in paragraph 8 (d) above or an individual or entity identified by the Security Council or the Committee, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;
10. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 8 (e) above shall not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the present resolution;
11. Calls upon all Member States to report to the Security Council within thirty days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively the provisions of paragraph 8 above;
12. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:
(a) To seek from all States, in particular those producing or possessing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraph 8 (a) above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 8 above of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;
(b) To examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of measures imposed by paragraph 8 of this resolution;
(c) To consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in paragraphs 9 and 10 above;
(d) To determine additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraphs 8 (a) (i) and 8 (a) (ii) above;
(e) To designate additional individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 8 (d) and 8 (e) above;
(f) To promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution;
(g) To report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraph 8 above;
13. Welcomes and encourages further the efforts by all States concerned to intensify their diplomatic efforts, to refrain from any actions that might aggravate tension and to facilitate the early resumption of the Six-Party Talks, with a view to the expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;
14. Calls upon the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition and to work towards the expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States;
15. Affirms that it shall keep DPRK's actions under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in paragraph 8 above, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at that time in light of the DPRK's compliance with the provisions of the resolution;
16. Underlines that further decisions will be required, should additional measures be necessary;
17. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex V

Security Council resolution 1737 (2006)
The Security Council,
Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006,
Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Reiterating its serious concern over the many reports of the IAEA Director General and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to Iran's nuclear programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General, including IAEA Board resolution GOV/2006/14,
Reiterating its serious concern that the IAEA Director General's report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns on Iran's nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
Reiterating its serious concern over the IAEA Director General's report of 28 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27) and its findings, including that, after more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern, and that the IAEA is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,
Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director General's reports of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53) and 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required of it by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran's refusal to take these steps,
Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative to seek a negotiated solution,
Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran's development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of this resolution have been met,
Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran's continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Affirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions;
2. Decides, in this context, that Iran shall without further delay suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities:
(a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and
(b) work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA;
3. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, namely:
(a) those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814;
(b) those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer of:
(i) equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water reactors;
(ii) low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;
(c) those set out in document S/2006/815, except the supply, sale or transfer of items covered by 19.A.3 of Category II;
(d) any additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined as necessary by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 18 below (herein "the Committee"), which could contribute to enrichment-related, or reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
4. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of the following items, materials, equipment, goods and technology:
(a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities;
(b) any other items not listed in documents S/2006/814 or S/2006/815 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
(c) any further items if the State determines that they would contribute to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns or identified as outstanding;
5. Decides that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 the export of which to Iran is not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b), 3 (c) or 4 (a) above, States shall ensure that:
(a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and
(b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and
(c) they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer; and
(d) in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer;
6. Decides that all States shall also take the necessary measures to prevent the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above;
7. Decides that Iran shall not export any of the items in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;
8. Decides that Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports, and calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol;
9. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above shall not apply where the Committee determines in advance and on a case-by-case basis that such supply, sale, transfer or provision of such items or assistance would clearly not contribute to the development of Iran's technologies in support of its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and of development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including where such items or assistance are for food, agricultural, medical or other humanitarian purposes, provided that:
(a) contracts for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate end-user guarantees; and
(b) Iran has committed not to use such items in proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to this resolution (herein "the Annex"), as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above;
11. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
12. Decides that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and that the measures in this paragraph shall cease to apply in respect of such persons or entities if, and at such time as, the Security Council or the Committee removes them from the Annex, and decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these persons and entities;
13. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant States:
(a) to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;
(b) to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee;
(c) to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;
(d) to be necessary for activities directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) and have been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;
14. Decides that States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;
15. Decides that the measures in paragraph 12 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that:
(a) the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above;
(b) the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 12 above;
and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, ten working days prior to such authorization;
16. Decides that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or where it is necessary for projects directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above, but that no such technical cooperation shall be provided that relates to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities set out in paragraph 2 above;
17. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
18. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:
(a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;
(b) to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding the actions taken by the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 16 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;
(c) to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution;
(d) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;
(e) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 3 above;
(f) to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;
(g) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and any relevant identifying information;
(h) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;
19. Decides that all States shall report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 above;
20. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 above as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;
21. Welcomes the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme;
22. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme;
23. Requests within 60 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;
24. Affirms that it shall review Iran's actions in the light of the report referred to in paragraph 23 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations;
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12 of this resolution as soon as it determines that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 23 above shows that Iran has not complied with this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;
25. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Annex

A. Entities involved in the nuclear programme

1. Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran
2. Mesbah Energy Company (provider for A40 research reactor - Arak)
3. Kala-Electric (aka Kalaye Electric) (provider for PFEP - Natanz)
4. Pars Trash Company (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA reports)
5. Farayand Technique (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA reports)
6. Defence Industries Organisation (overarching MODAFL-controlled entity, some of whose subordinates have been involved in the centrifuge programme making components, and in the missile programme)
7. 7th of Tir (subordinate of DIO, widely recognized as being directly involved in the nuclear programme)

B. Entities involved in the ballistic missile programme

1. Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
2. Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
3. Fajr Industrial Group (formerly Instrumentation Factory Plant, subordinate entity of AIO)

C. Persons involved in the nuclear programme

1. Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development
2. Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager (Arak)
3. Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)
4. Ehsan Monajemi, Construction Project Manager, Natanz
5. Jafar Mohammadi, Technical Adviser to the AEOI (in charge of managing the production of valves for centrifuges)
6. Ali Hajinia Leilabadi, Director General of Mesbah Energy Company
7. Lt Gen Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri, Rector of Malek Ashtar University of Defence Technology (chemistry dept, affiliated to MODALF, has conducted experiments on beryllium)

D. Persons involved in the ballistic missile programme

1. Gen Hosein Salimi, Commander of the Air Force, IRGC (Pasdaran)
2. Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi, Head of the AIO
3. Reza-Gholi Esmaeli, Head of Trade & International Affairs Dept, AIO
4. Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar, Head of Finance & Budget Dept, AIO

E. Persons involved in both the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes

1. Maj Gen Yahya Rahim Safavi, Commander, IRGC (Pasdaran)

1The Secretary-General's full address at the University of Tokyo, 18 May 2006, is available at http://disarmament.un.org/stateme.htm.
2For text of the resolution, see annex III of this chapter on p. 38.
3For text of the resolution, see annex V of this chapter on p. 39.
4For text of the resolution, see annex II of this chapter on p. 40.
5For text of the resolution, see annex IV of this chapter on p. 41.
6See http://www.whitehouse.gov (accessed 31 July 2007).
7For more information on INFCC, see p. 42.
8For more information on the GNEP, see p. 43.
9See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060619-7.html (accessed 13 July 2007).
10See "The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent", available at http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf (accessed 15 August 2997).
11See appendix II on p. 44 for Treaty.
12The Joint Ministerial Statement on the CTBT was circulated as a document of the General Assembly at its sixty-first session. See the annex to the letter dated 13 December 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, A/61/638. This and all subsequent United Nations documents are available at http://ods.un.org.
13As at 13 December, the following 72 countries associated themselves with the Joint Statement: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
14For the Secretary-General's full message, see SG/SM/10648, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10648.doc.htm.
15The Executive Secretary was Tibor Tóth.
16See, the Secretary-General's note on the report of the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO PrepCom for 2005, 26 July 2006, A/61/184.
17DPRK is not party to the CTBT, but its ratification is required if the Treaty is to enter into force.
18At 20 October, the Treaty had 176 signatories of which 135 had ratified. Of the 44 States whose ratification is necessary for entry into force, 41 have signed and 34 have ratified.
19The CEB furthers coordination and cooperation on a range of substantive and management issues facing United Nations system organizations. It brings together on a regular basis the executive heads of the organizations of the United Nations system, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General.
20See www.ctbto.org > reference > symposiums > 2006 > symposium_0906.html (accessed 13 July 2007).
21See "Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization", A/RES/61/47.
22Mr. In-Kook Park served as President from 27 February to 3 March. See CD/PV.1006 through CD/PV.1013. These and subsequent documents on the Conference on Disarmament are available at http://www.unog.ch.
23See CD/1570 and CD/1571.
24The A-5 proposal was an initiative of the Ambassadors Dembri, Lint, Reyes, Salander and Vega, see CD/1693/Rev.1.
25The meetings were led by President Doru Costea (Romania), who served from 20 March to 28 May. See CD/PV.1014-1019 and 1021.
26For text, see CD/1777. For statement, see http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/37A707215A390F02C125717200479A9F?OpenDocument.
27See the final document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 30 June 1978, A/RES/S-10/2, available at http://disarmament.un.org.
28See A/RES/48/75 L, 16 December 1993, available at http://ods.org (Advanced search).
29See NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part III) and NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Part IV).
30See CD/1299.
31Mr. Ousmane Camara served as President from 31 July to 4 August. See CD/1693/Rev.1.
32See CD/PV.1031, 1032 and 1034.
33Since 1964, China's stated policy has been to "not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances".
34Mr. Valery Loshchinin, of the Russian Federation, served as President. See CD/PV.1027 and CD/PV.1029.
35Belarus is the initiator of General Assembly resolutions A/RES/51/37 of 10 December 1996, A/RES/54/44 of 1 December 1999, A/RES/57/50 of 22 November 2002 and A/RES/60/46 of 8 December 2005 concerning the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.
36For more information on the physical protection of nuclear material, see http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/PhysicalProtection/index.html (accessed 17 July 2007).
37For complete text of the bill, please see the United StatesLibrary of Congress website, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.3709: (accessed 14 July 2007).
38The most recent resolutions are A/RES/61/74, paragraph 13 and A/RES/61/103, preamble, available in appendix V on pp. 45 and 46, respectively.
39See the United States Library of Congress website, Bills and Resolutions, http://thomas.loc.gov (accessed 14 July 2007).
40The agreement was named in honour of Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chairman of the International Relations Committee, and a lead sponsor of the Act.
41See "President Signs U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act", White House website, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061218-1.html (accessed 14 July 2007).
42See S/RES/1695, annex II of this chapter.
43The nuclear test coincided with the discussions of the First Committee of the General Assembly, where many delegations gave statements criticizing the DPRK's actions. See A/C.1/61/PV.9.
44See the statement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (US) at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/odni101606.pdf (accessed 16 July 2007).
45See annex IV of this chapter.
46See SG/SM/10672, 9 October 2006, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10672.doc.htm.
47The texts of resolutions 61/65, 61/74 and 61/104 are available in appendix V.
48For the resolution on "Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Additional Protocol", see GC(50)/RES/14, available at http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC50/GC50Resolutions/English/gc50res-14_en.pdf (accessed 16 July 2007).
49Libya and Ukraine.
50For more information, see "Safeguards Statement for 2006, Background to Safeguards Statement and Executive Summary of the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2006", available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2006.html (accessed 16 July 2007).
51In February, 59 participants from 33 SQP countries and 10 observer States attended the event in Austria.
52In April, 44 participants from 20 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (including 17 SQP States) attended the seminar in Ecuador.
53In July, 56 participants from 33 countries in Asia/Pacific with limited nuclear material and activities, and from 2 observer States attended the seminar in Australia.
54For more information see the "Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols", available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_actionplan2006.pdf (accessed 16 July 2007).
55GC(49)/OR.5, available at http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC49/
GC49Records/English/gc49or-5_en.pdf
(accessed 16 July 2007).
56Op. cit., footnote 50.
57Latvia and Poland.
58See http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/PDFplus/cn147-stratford .pdf (accessed 16 July 2007).
59For more information, see http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk (accessed 16 July 2007).
60GOV/2006/64, GOV/2006/53, GOV/2006/38, GOV/2006/27 and GOV/2006/15.
61GOV/2006/14.
62Documents available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml (accessed 16 July 2007).
63Op. cit., footnote 50, see 1.5, number 32.
64Op. cit., footnote 61.
65Op. cit., footnotes 2 and 3, respectively.
66GOV/2006/53.
67France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
68High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Council of the European Union.
69Basic Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Project, available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/TE_1513_web.pdf and Potential for Sharing Nuclear Power Infrastructure between Countries, available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1522_web.pdf (accessed 16 July 2007).
70Co-sponsored by the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Labour Organization (ILO), International Maritime Organization (IMO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Health Organization (WHO).
71Fundamental Safety Principles, available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1273_web.pdf (accessed 16 July 2007).
72The First Review Meeting took place from 3 to 14 November 2003.
73For more information, see http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2006/MA200605.html (accessed 16 July 2007).
74For more information on the IEC, see http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/programme-budget2004.htm. See also http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/incident-emergency-centre.htm (accessed 16 July 2007).
75For the text of the Code, see http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Code-2004_web.pdf (accessed 16 July 2007).
76For a list of States that have committed to the Code and the Guidance, see http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/codeconduct_status.pdf (accessed 16 July 2007).
77See "Developing guidance for the safety and security of radiation sources", available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/radiation-safety/source.htm (accessed 17 July 2007).
78For Director General's Report, see http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC50/GC50Documents/English/gc50-3_en.pdf (accessed 17 July 2007).
79For "Reviewing the international regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material and associated guidance" see http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech
-areas/radiation-safety/transport.htm
(accessed 17 July 2007).
80See "Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources", available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/radiation-safety/code-of-conduct.htm (accessed 16 July 2007).
81See GC(49)/17, "Progress Report and Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009", available at http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC49/Documents/gc49-17.pdf (accessed 17 July 2007).
82Op. cit., footnote 36.
83Treaty available at http://untreaty.un.org.
84S/RES/1540 (2004), was adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, on 28 April 2004.
85S/RES/1673 (2006) is available in annex I of this chapter.
86Op. cit., footnote 36.
87See article "Conversion of Research from HEU to LEU Fuel" available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Newsletters/NEFW-02-01.pdf (accessed 17 July 2007).
88Three documents related to combating illicit trafficking were published in 2006 as part of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series: Technical and Functional Specifications for Border Monitoring Equipment; Nuclear Forensics Support; and Guidelines for Monitoring of Radioactive Material in International Mail Transported by Public Postal Operators. Relevant topics will continue to be addressed in forthcoming documents in the series.
89The "Preliminary 2006 Report from IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database" is available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2007/itdb_update.html (accessed 17 July 2007).
90The Nuclear Suppliers Group currently consists of 45 supplier countries, who aim to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by establishing strict Guidelines for the export of nuclear materials. The participating Governments are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.
91The Guidelines are available at http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/guide.htm (17 July 2007).
92The Troika is composed of the past, present and future NSG Chairs (Norway, Brazil and South Africa).
93The Joint Statement is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html (accessed 17 July 2007).
94The MTCR is an informal and voluntary association of countries that share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering WMD, and that seek to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation. More details are available at www.mtcr.info.
95Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.
96See annexes II and III of this chapter for the texts of the resolutions.
97By the end of 2006, the HCOC had 125 subscribing States: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Latvia, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Federated States of Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Morocco, Mozambique, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Zambia.
98The Chairman was Peter Burian (Slovakia).
99Op. cit., footnote 84.
100Op. cit., footnote 85.
101Montenegro, which had recently joined the United Nations, submitted its first report together with Serbia.
102For a list of submitting States with their reports, see http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/report.html.
103Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam.
104IAEA and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) attended.
105All presentations and statements made at the seminar are produced in DDA Occasional Papers No. 11 available at http://disarmament2.un.org/OccasionalPapers.html.
106Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa, Togo, United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
107The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) participated.
108CTBTO PrepCom, IAEA, World Customs Organization (WCO) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
109 All presentations and statements made at the seminar are produced in ODA Occasional Papers No. 12, available at http://disarmament2.un.org/OccasionalPapers.html.
110Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
111Andean Community, Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and OAS.
112IAEA, OPCW and CTBTO PrepCom.
113All the presentations and statements at the seminar will be produced in ODA Occasional Papers No. 13 (forthcoming), available at available at http://disarmament2.un.org /OccasionalPapers.html.
114For United Nations press release, see http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/dc3041.doc.htm.
115For more information on the workshop, see http://www.osce.org/item/22001.html.
116For more information on the meeting, see http://www.opcw.org/pressreleases/2006/PR96_2006.html.
117The database available at http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/legalDB.html.
118For more information on the Counter-Terrorism Committee, see http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/submitted_reports.html.
119For more information on the 1267 Committee, see http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/index.shtml.
120S/RES/1566 (2005) was adopted by the Security Council at its 5053rd meeting, on 8 October 2004.
121See S/PRST/2005/16.
122For more information on the 1540 Committee, see http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540.
123Op. cit., footnote 81.
124"The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent", Cm 6994,is available at http://www.mod.uk (accessed 18 July 2007).
125The Trident II D5 missiles was obtained by the United Kingdom through its traditionally close defense cooperation with the United States.
126See "Securing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: What Next?, Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure", available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull481/htmls/nuclear_fuel_cycle.html (accessed 1 August 2007).
127"Report: Russian nuclear chief says Russian-Kazakh uranium enrichment center to start work soon", in the International Herald Tribune, 26 October 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/26/europe/EU_GEN_Russia_Kazakhstan_Nuclear.php (accessed 1 August 2007).
128For full information on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, please see the website of the United States Department of Energy, http://www.gnep.energy.gov/gnepProgram.html (accessed 1 August 2007).
129See "Ensuring Security of Supply in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle", 12 May 2006, available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/reference/pdf/security.pdf (accessed 1 August 2007).
130See the Expert Group report to the Director-General of the IAEA, 22 February 2005, INFCIRC/640, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc640.pdf (accessed 1 August 2007).
131France, Germany, Netherlands, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.
132See Joint Statement at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060717-2.html or http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/20.html (accessed 1 August 2007).
133See Japan's proposal available in INFCIRC/683 of 15 September 2006 at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2006/infcirc683.pdf (accessed 1 August 2007).
134Frank-Walter Steinmeier.
135Interview of 18 September 2006, published by the Auswärtiges Amt is available at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Interview/2006/060918-Handelsblatt.html (accessed 1 August 2007).
136Sam Nunn.
137See IAEA/NTI Press Release of 19 September 2006, available at http://www.nti.org/c_press/release_IAEA_fuelbank_091906.pdf (accessed 1 August 2007).
138Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms (Stockholm, Sweden: Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006), http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/Weapons_of_Terror.pdf.
139See the letter dated 29 June 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations, A/60/934.
140See the Secretary-General's note on reducing nuclear danger, para. 3, 25 September 2001, A/56/400.
141See "United Nations Millennium Declaration", 13 September 2000, A/RES/55/2.
142See the Secretary-General's report on the issue of missiles in all its aspects, 20 July 2006, A/61/168.