Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation have played significant roles in efforts to preserve international peace and security since the creation of the United Nations. Agreements at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels have resulted in reductions in nuclear arsenals, the exclusion of nuclear weapons from certain regions and environments, and the establishment of international norms against nuclear proliferation and testing. The United Nations has been engaged with all Member States and groups of States in support of the implementation of the various relevant instruments.
A number of agreements at the bilateral level have been concluded between the Russian Federation and the United States regarding the reduction of their nuclear arsenals. On 31 July 1991, the two States signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), pledging to reduce their strategic arsenals to no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads each, over a period of seven years. The parties completed the reductions stipulated by START I by December of 2001. A second agreement, START II, was signed on 3 January 1993. It was intended to further reduce each party's strategic nuclear arsenal to no more than 3,000 to 3,500 warheads, and its entry into force was linked to the continuation of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM). In December 2001, the United States formally declared its intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, which took effect in June of 2002. The Russian Federation then indicated that it no longer considered the START II Treaty to be in effect. START II was subsequently replaced by a new strategic framework between the two States with the conclusion of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), or the Moscow Treaty, which entered into force on 1 June 2003. The Treaty requires both parties to reduce their deployed strategic nuclear weapons to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by 31 December 2012.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 and was extended indefinitely at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, is considered the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for nuclear disarmament. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, States parties adopted by consensus a Final Document containing numerous agreements and undertakings. These measures aimed to strengthen the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and achieve its universality as well as to improve the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty. The 2005 Review Conference was held in New York, from 2 to 27 May, but was unable to produce a consensus substantive outcome on the review of the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Its adoption by the General Assembly, in 1996, was the culmination of over four decades of efforts by the international community to ban nuclear testing in all environments. Its entry into force will occur when the forty-four States that possess nuclear power or research reactors listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty have ratified it. From 1999, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as Depositary of the Treaty, has convened conferences on facilitating its entry into force every other year.
Since 1998, the persisting divergence of views on a number of disarmament-related issues, including nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, has prevented the Conference on Disarmament (the Conference), the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, from commencing its substantive work. While Member States and presidents of the Conference have put forth proposals and initiatives to begin negotiations, the Conference has failed to agree on a programme of work.
Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were discussed during the preparations for the 2005 World Summit in September. However, lack of agreement mainly on ways to balance concerns between the two issues prevented Member States from agreeing on any provisions to be included in the Summit Outcome Document.
This chapter deals with a range of issues relating to developments in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that occurred during 2005 and includes an extensive section on developments in the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Concerns regarding nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation received considerable attention by the international community throughout 2005, particularly at the seventh Review Conference of States Parties to the NPT2 and the fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT. Of the sixty resolutions and decisions considered by the First Committee, twenty-four pertained to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Furthermore, the IAEA, and its Director General, Mohammed ElBaradei, received international commendation by being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Despite this attention, political divisions within the international community led to continuing difficulties in finding agreement on these issues. The 2005 NPT Review Conference was unable to conclude a substantive final document and the 2005 World Summit failed to agree on text related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Moreover, while the CTBT ratifications had increased, the Treaty continued to lack the ratifications required for its entry into force.
The international community continued its efforts to resolve concerns regarding the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran). Through nearly three years of investigations, the IAEA made significant progress in finding answers to many of the initial questions raised when Iran's undeclared nuclear activities were first discovered. However, the Agency indicated that outstanding issues still remained, and expressed its intention to continue its investigations in order to resolve these concerns. Diplomatic efforts to establish confidence-building measures between Iran and the international community were also pursued. These efforts primarily consisted of negotiations between Iran and France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (E3-EU) with the support of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) February declaration of its possession of nuclear weapons heightened the concerns of the international community regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsula. In July, it agreed to return to a fourth round of the six party talks with Japan, China, Republic of Korea (ROK), Russian Federation and the United States to resolve the nuclear issue. In September, a Joint Statement was agreed outlining an overall framework and principles in which the DPRK committed to abandoning its nuclear weapons and programmes, rejoining the NPT and allowing inspections in exchange for energy assistance and other benefits. A fifth round of the six-party talks took place in November with few results and entered into a recess with an agreement to resume talks but without setting a specific date.
On the positive side, representatives of eighty-nine States agreed on amendments to strengthen the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). The amendments established legally binding obligations for States to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage, or transport.
In addition, the General Assembly unanimously adopted the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The Convention requires States parties to adopt legislation criminalizing any activities relating to the use or intended use of radiological or nuclear devices to cause bodily harm or damage to property or the environment.
The fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT was held in New York, from 21 to 23 September, and was convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his capacity as its Depositary following a request by a majority of States that had ratified the Treaty. In accordance with article XIV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, such conferences have been convened every other year (1999, 2001 and 2003), with the venue alternating between Vienna and New York.3
Preparations for the 2005 Conference commenced informally in Vienna, in June, among signatory and ratifying States. The consultations focused on the necessary organizational arrangements as well as drafting the final declaration of the Conference.
Alexander Downer of Australia was elected President of the Conference. One hundred seventeen signatory and ratifying States4 attended the Conference and three non-signatory States (Cuba, Iraq and Trinidad and Tobago) were also present. A number of specialized agencies, related organizations, intergovernmental organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations, also attended.5
In his address to the Conference, the Secretary-General stated: "We meet at a time of heightened global anxiety about weapons of mass destruction - in particular nuclear weapons. It is our collective duty to promote and strengthen the various multilateral instruments which reduce the threat that these weapons pose to all." He called upon all States that had not signed6 or ratified the Treaty to do so without delay - particularly those States which must ratify the Treaty for it to enter into force.7 He further urged all States to maintain a moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions.
In his statement to the Conference, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom)8 highlighted that the success of the CTBT depended on two crucial factors: its universality and verifiability. He underlined that substantial progress that had been made in these two areas. In this connection, he reported on the level and pace of signatures and ratifications as indicators of the international community's firm support for the Treaty. He underscored the Preparatory Commission's efforts in ensuring that the CTBT's verification system was credible, functional and cost effective.
Jaap Ramaker (Netherlands), the Special Representative of the Ratifying States to promote the CTBT's entry into force, provided the Conference with an overview of activities in order to further facilitate signatures and ratifications, focusing on States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, whose ratification was required for the Treaty's entry into force.9 The Special Representative also stressed that he would continue to maintain contact at the bilateral level with all States that had not signed and ratified the CTBT in order to promote their early signature or its ratification.
The Conference provided States with an opportunity to review overall progress made during the past nine years and focus on developments since the last Conference in September 2003. During the general exchange of views in which fifty-eight States took part, delegations called upon all States that had not yet done so, to sign and ratify the CTBT in order to ensure its entry into force as soon as possible. Among the signatory States, Antigua and Barbuda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala and Haiti expressed their intention to ratify the Treaty. Moreover, all States were urged to sustain the moratorium on nuclear testing. The majority of participants also noted and expressed satisfaction on the progress made by the CTBTO PrepCom and urged States to actively continue to support the activities of the Organization both politically and financially. The majority of delegations welcomed progress in establishing the CTBT's verification regime and many supported its use for civilian purposes as an early warning system for tsunamis and other natural disasters.10
The European Union reiterated its call on all States to abide by a moratorium on nuclear test explosions and to refrain from actions that would defeat the object and purposes of the Treaty. This position was also expressed by Malaysia, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). China and Indonesia separately noted that they had completed reviews of the Treaty and would continue the ratification process.
In a joint statement, the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) participating in the Conference11 called upon the ratifying States to step up their efforts to promote the necessary signatures and ratifications and to do so without delay, in particular the eleven remaining States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty. They urged States to support efforts to ensure the continuation of the moratoria on nuclear testing as well as efforts for the completion of the Treaty's verification regime.
On 23 September, the Conference adopted a Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the CTBT, (see appendix III), which reiterated that the cessation of all nuclear-weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions constituted an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. The Declaration called upon all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay, in particular those States whose ratification was needed for its entry into force. It strongly encouraged those States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty to take individual initiatives to ratify the CTBT. It reaffirmed the firm determination to end nuclear test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and called upon States to continue and sustain their voluntary adherence to a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions and any other nuclear explosions and to refrain from acts contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force. It also reaffirmed that ratifiers, together with signatory States, would continue to provide the support required to enable the CTBT PrepCom to complete its tasks in the most efficient and cost effective way.
Among the twelve measures contained in the Final Declaration, Australia, which held the Presidency of the Conference, was entrusted with coordinating informal consultations with all interested States to promote the Treaty's entry into force and to encourage regional and multilateral initiatives aimed at promoting further signatures and ratifications. States agreed that the Special Representative appointed in 2003 should continue to assist the coordinating State in the performance of its function.12 The Declaration recommended that ratifying States consider establishing a trust fund,13 financed through voluntary contributions, to support an outreach programme to promote the Treaty.
On 11 October, in his statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly under the agenda item entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO PrepCom reported on its work during the year 2004.14 He also reported on the outcome of the fourth Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT and on the level and pace of signatures and ratifications of the Treaty.15
The Executive Secretary also provided an overview of activities carried out in 2004 to establish the CTBT's global verification regime to monitor Treaty compliance. Steady progress had been made in the establishment of the International Monitoring System (IMS). He reported that 217 of the 321 IMS stations had been installed and substantially met the Commission's specifications. He further reported that around eighty-nine national data centres currently in operation had almost tripled their capacity from five to fourteen gigabytes per day. As a result, over three million data segments and products had been distributed to authorized users.
The Executive Secretary emphasized that the CTBT verification system empowered each signatory State to make its own judgment about events based on the data and products provided by the Organization. This enabled all signatory States to fully participate in the verification work and benefit from the data, including its civil and scientific applications. He noted that in the wake of the tsunami catastrophe of 26 December 2004, the Preparatory Commission decided to test the usefulness of IMS data in the context of a tsunami alert. He reported that the Provisional Technical Secretariat was working closely with international and national tsunami warning centres through UNESCO to ascertain the potential contribution of IMS and the International Data Centre (IDC) for this humanitarian purpose.16
In 2005, the Conference on Disarmament again failed to adopt a programme of work and, consequently, did not establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. Therefore, the issue of nuclear disarmament was addressed during the plenary meetings. It was hoped that a successful outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference would have generated the necessary political will to overcome the differences among Members. However, the negative results of the former as well as the outcome of the 2005 World Summit contributed to a further entrenchment of divergent positions among delegations.
The proposal on the programme of work by five former Presidents of the Conference (the so-called A5 Proposal) was again considered the preferred basis for a programme of work by many delegations.17
The Non-Aligned Movement continued to give the highest priority to the issue of the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe.18 The Western Group underscored the high importance attached to negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) as a contribution to nuclear disarmament. China and the Russian Federation continued to emphasize the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS).19
In an attempt by the Norwegian presidency to use the time allotted to the Conference as beneficially as possible, discussions were initiated during the plenary meetings on the four core topics on the agenda, namely, nuclear disarmament, an FMCT, PAROS and negative security assurances (NSA).
During the discussion of the agenda item on nuclear disarmament, many delegations reasserted the link between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.20
The representative of Ethiopia, on behalf of the Group of 21 (G-21), emphasized that nuclear disarmament remained for them the highest priority in the Conference. New Zealand urged all members of the Conference to agree to a programme of work with nuclear disarmament as one of its central components. Malaysia held the opinion that the systematic and progressive reduction of nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of their complete elimination, should remain the highest priority on the global disarmament agenda. Mexico affirmed the vital need to start a multilateral dialogue on nuclear disarmament. France stated that the Conference had a mandate to discuss nuclear disarmament in order to identify subjects that were ripe for negotiations, such as an FMCT
France, Russia and the United Kingdom elaborated on their progress made towards nuclear disarmament, in particular in fulfilling their NPT obligations under its article VI.
South Africa believed that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) was incompatible with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security. Switzerland called on the NWS to gradually implement their disarmament obligations and considered that any nuclear disarmament measure should follow the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verification. Chile specifically underlined the importance of the principle of irreversibility.
Peru, Republic of Korea, South Africa and Sweden concurred that the present lack of political will in the Conference was a serious impediment to nuclear disarmament.
During the session devoted to nuclear disarmament, several delegations also expressed their positions on the question of the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.
Canada, Cuba, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, the Arab Group and the G-21 expressed their support for the creation of such a body. However, for many delegations, in particular the G-21, such a body would have its place in a "comprehensive and balanced" programme of work, including the four basic items on the Conference's agenda, namely, nuclear disarmament, PAROS, NSA and the negotiation of an FMCT.
At its 987th plenary meeting on 28 June, in accordance with the proposal by the presidency of Norway to dedicate four sessions to the core issues on the agenda, the meeting was devoted to the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.21 During the meeting, Member States discussed ideas on how to start negotiating an FMCT. Delegations also provided their views on the possible scope of such a treaty.
According to the European Union's common position, adopted at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, France, Germany and Italy appealed again to the Conference "for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable FMCT, without preconditions and bearing in mind the Special Coordinator's report and the mandate included therein."22
The G-21 emphasized the priority they attached to creating an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament over that of negotiating an FMCT.
The majority of delegations, including China and Pakistan, agreed with the Shannon Mandate, which called for "a universal, non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". Although Canada, Japan and Peru continued to find that the Shannon mandate was the best basis for initiating negotiations, they indicated that they were prepared to be flexible, in order to engage in FMCT negotiations.
On the other hand, the United States continued to believe that its own proposal on an FMCT, without a verification mechanism and consideration of existing stocks, constituted an important and achievable goal.23
Other delegations also addressed the issue of verification as a possible element of the FMCT. Egypt, Germany, Japan, Pakistan, Peru and Switzerland were in favour of a verification system. Germany also mentioned that the extent of the limits to verification was unidentifiable, unless the treaty's scope was defined. Japan maintained that IAEA safeguards measures would provide a good basis for consideration. Canada, Italy, Japan, Malaysia and Switzerland argued that verification should be an integral part of negotiations.
China recommended a careful study on the question and the opinions of all parties, including those who advocated an "FMCT without verification".
Positions continued to diverge with regard to the inclusion of existing stocks of nuclear materials. China, the Russian Federation and the United States held the position that negotiations should not touch on the issue of stockpiles, with the Russian Federation stating that it would entail, inter alia, establishing a cumbersome verification mechanism and consequently involve unacceptably high costs. Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan and South Africa insisted that the treaty should cover existing stocks of fissile material as well as future production, with Pakistan expressing the view that transparency in the amount of fissile material each country possessed (past production) was vital to achieve nuclear disarmament.
On the question of the declaration of a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, France recalled the EU's common position expressed at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, in which the EU called upon all States to declare a moratorium on the production of such material.24 For its part, Pakistan declared that, because of prevailing conditions, it could not envisage or accept a moratorium before the conclusion of a treaty.
As the Conference on Disarmament could not again reach agreement on a programme of work, no subsidiary body was established to deal with the issue of "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". NSAs were discussed primarily at the thematic debate, on 7 July, in accordance with the schedule proposed by the Norwegian presidency to address the four core issues.25
Many delegations made references to the NPT, Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and linked the need for security assurances with the provisions of article VI of the NPT. The 1996 ruling by the International Court of Justice was frequently mentioned.
Members of the NAM once again expressed their serious concern about the development of new types of nuclear weapons and new security doctrines expounding their possible use. The NAM consistently underlined that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts towards the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) should be pursued.
Canada believed that action was required pursuant to commitments undertaken under the NPT in 2000, such as agreement to begin discussions to codify negative security assurances. While the NPT would be the preferred forum for such discussion as NSAs were one of the benefits of adhering to the Treaty, it also recognized that NSAs had long been an issue on the Conference's agenda. Given the importance many States attached to the issue, Canada felt the best use should be made of the available multilateral forums to address it.
For Italy, positive and negative assurances, as stated in the European Union strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), could serve as an incentive to forgo the acquisition of WMD and also as a deterrent. On the basis of the EU's common position, Italy called on the NWS to reaffirm existing security assurances noted in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and to sign and ratify the relevant protocols on nuclear-weapon-free zones, which were drawn up following requisite consultations, and made treaty-based security assurances available to such zones.26
China stated that NNWS must be entitled to security assurances from NWS. It supported the Conference's establishment of an ad hoc committee on NSAs, pursuant to the mandate contained in the A5 proposal, so that substantive work could begin on negotiating an international legal instrument on security assurances for NNWS. China also supported the negotiation of a protocol on security assurances for NNWS within the framework of the NPT.
With a view to enhancing security assurances over and above the measures taken in 1995, France remained in favor of the regional approach via the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones.
In order to help achieve a compromise on the programme of work, the Russian Federation declared that it would be willing to support a possible consensus based on the A5 proposal, and in this context, would not object to the proposal formulated therein to establish an ad hoc committee in the Conference on the issue of NSAs.
The United Kingdom considered that the 1995 negative and positive security assurances to NNWS noted in Security Council resolution 984, together with the relevant protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties, were sufficient to give NNWS the assurances they sought regarding the use of nuclear weapons.
On 1 June 2003, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as Moscow Treaty, between the Russian Federation and the United States entered into force. Article I of the Treaty established a legal obligation for each party to reduce their deployments of strategic nuclear warheads to a level of between 1,700 to 2,200 by 31 December 2012. The Treaty further provided that each party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads.
Article III of the Moscow Treaty established the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC) as a forum in which the Russian Federation and the United States would meet twice each year to discuss and exchange information on their respective Treaty implementation efforts. No public information was available on the proceedings of the first two meetings of the BIC in Geneva, from 8 to 9 April and 14 to 15 October 2004.
According to the Department of State's 2005 annual report to Congress on SORT implementation, the United States planned to reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,500-4,000 by 2007. Further anticipated reductions beyond 2007 would involve decreasing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles and lowering the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads at heavy bomber bases.
During its sixtieth session, the General Assembly, while welcoming the progress made on their nuclear reductions, encouraged the two States to fully implement SORT and to undertake nuclear arms reductions beyond those provided for by the Treaty. In this regard, on 8 December, the General Assembly adopted a new resolution, 60/65, entitled "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons". (For discussion of the resolution and the explanations of vote, see the General Assembly section of this chapter.)
On 1 April, the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210, of 17 December 1996, entitled "Measures to eliminate international terrorism", successfully concluded the drafting of an International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.27 The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee asserted that the draft defined a wide range of acts of nuclear terrorism and required that those who planned, threatened or committed such crimes be extradited or prosecuted. He further stated that the Convention encouraged the exchange of information and cooperation among States as well as a broad range of mutual assistance and obligations, thus strengthening the international framework to combat such acts. The Convention would become the thirteenth counter-terrorism related convention.
The Secretary-General, in his remarks to the Ad Hoc Committee, congratulated all delegations on their achievement, thus setting the stage for the adoption of the draft. He highlighted that the Convention would encourage cooperation among States, which was crucial in defeating terrorism, would advance the rule of law and would contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. He noted that the adoption of the Convention was one of the recommendations contained in his report, "In larger freedom."28 He called upon all States to become party to the Convention as well as to all other counter-terrorism instruments.
The General Assembly adopted, without a vote, the resolution entitled "International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism", on 13 April. It called upon all States to sign and ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Convention. On 14 September, the Convention was opened for signature by the Secretary-General, in his capacity as Depositary, at United Nations Headquarters.29
On 8 December, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, a resolution entitled "Measures to eliminate international terrorism", by which it requested the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Vienna to continue its efforts to enhance, through its mandate, the capabilities of the United Nations in the prevention of terrorism, and recognized its role in assisting States in becoming parties to and implementing the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and in strengthening international cooperation mechanisms in criminal matters related to terrorism, including national capacity-building.30
As of 31 December, ninety-six States had signed the Convention. It will enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General.
In 2005, the Agency continued its activities to encourage and facilitate wider adherence to the strengthened nuclear safeguards system. Agency outreach events were arranged in New York and Rabat, and three States - Algeria, Malaysia and Vietnam - arranged national additional protocol seminars with Agency participation.
It was a good year in terms of the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Seventeen States signed additional protocols and eight States signed comprehensive safeguards agreements during the year. In addition, comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to the NPT entered into force for four new States and protocols additional to safeguards agreements for nine more States. The number of States that had yet to bring into force their comprehensive safeguards agreements in accordance with their obligations under the NPT, decreased from forty to thirty-six. Despite this decrease, the number of NPT States without comprehensive safeguards agreements in force remained undesirably high. For these States the Agency could not provide any level of assurance or draw any conclusion. The number of States with additional protocols in force increased from sixty-two to seventy-one by the end of the year, and such protocols continued to be otherwise applied in two States.
Integrated safeguards, which are the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, were implemented in nine States in 2005.31 The Agency continued its efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation through the introduction of a comprehensive quality management system in the Department of Safeguards.
In 2005, Agency safeguards were applied in 156 States, of which seventy had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force or being otherwise applied. In seventy-eight States32 only comprehensive safeguards agreements were in force, voluntary offer safeguards agreements were implemented at select facilities in four NWS,33 and facility specific (or limited) safeguards were implemented in three States not party to the NPT.34 In 2005, the Agency performed 2,142 inspections, and safeguards were applied to some 185,000 tonnes of nuclear material, including twelve tonnes of fresh highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and ninety tonnes of separated plutonium. By the end of 2005, the Agency had more than 950 cameras connected to more than 400 unattended monitoring systems installed in more than 200 safeguarded sites in over thirty States. At the end of the year, 924 facilities and locations outside facilities (LOFs) were under Agency safeguards or contained safeguarded nuclear material.
An international Expert Group, appointed by the Director General, in February 2005, released (as INFCIRC/640) the findings of its extensive look at the civil nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) citing five approaches to strengthen controls over sensitive nuclear materials and technologies of proliferation concern. The Expert Group included representatives from twenty-six countries and convened during a seven-month period. The Expert Group concluded that the objective of increasing non-proliferation assurances associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, while preserving assurances of supply and services around the world, could be achieved through a set of gradually introduced multilateral nuclear approaches (MNA).
In July 2005, the Agency supported an international conference held in Moscow by the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency to consider multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. The Summary of the Conference stated, inter alia, that continuing large-scale use of nuclear power was directly linked to the reduction of proliferation risks and to secure control over sensitive NFC production facilities; there may be a variety of multilateral nuclear approaches (MNAs) for assuring fuel supply to States not possessing domestic NFC capabilities for their nuclear power requirements; concepts for MNAs for the back-end of the NFC were technically achievable, could be economically attractive, and could provide benefits such as more effective burn-up of uranium fuel leading to a reduction in the need for enriched uranium as well as minimization of nuclear waste; and it was essential to maintain a balance between the commitments and rights under the NPT for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and providing for the further development of nuclear energy.
The Advisory Committee of the Board of Governors on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute held its first meeting in November in which it was agreed that the Secretariat would make presentations to the Committee in January 2006. These presentations would cover a review of selected capabilities required for safeguards implementation and would propose measures for enhancing these capabilities, specifically in the areas of: (i) environmental sampling; (ii) satellite imagery; and (iii) information provided by Member States on procurement and supply of nuclear items.
The Board, having endorsed the Director General's view that the "Small Quantities Protocols" to safeguards agreements (SQPs) constituted a weakness of the safeguards system, decided, in September 2005, to retain the SQPs as part of the Agency's safeguards system, but subject to modification of the text of the SQPs to allow for initial reports on nuclear material, early design information and inspection activities. The Board also decided that SQPs should no longer be made available to States with a planned or existing nuclear facility, and requested the Secretariat to assist States with SQPs, including non-Members of the Agency, subject to available assistance, to establish and maintain their State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). At the end of 2005, the Secretariat conveyed the Board's decision to States with SQPs with a view to effectuating the modification of their SQPs. One country signed the modified SQP in 2005.
Since December 2002, the DPRK has not permitted the Agency to perform any verification activities on its territory; therefore the Agency could not draw any conclusions regarding that State's nuclear materials or activities. The Agency continued to maintain its capability to resume verification in the DPRK at short notice.
During 2005, the Director General submitted two comprehensive written reports to the Board of Governors,35 in September and November, on the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Board adopted two resolutions on the subject.36
Two important issues were identified in the Director General's November 2004 report as relevant to the Agency's efforts to provide assurance that there were no undeclared enrichment activities in Iran, specifically the origin of low enriched uranium (LEU) and high enriched uranium (HEU) particle contamination found at various locations in Iran, and the extent of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 designs. By the end of 2005, with respect to the first issue - contamination - the results of the environmental sample analysis tended, on balance, to support Iran's statement about the foreign origin of most of the observed HEU contamination. By the end of 2005, it was still not possible, however, to establish a definitive conclusion with respect to all of the contamination, particularly the LEU contamination. This again underscored the importance of additional work on the scope and chronology of Iran's P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes, which could greatly contribute to the resolution of the remaining contamination issues.
With respect to the second issue - the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes - although some progress had been made since November 2004 in the verification of statements by Iran regarding the chronology of its centrifuge enrichment programme, the Agency had not yet been able to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran's statements concerning those programmes. While Iran had provided further clarification, and access to additional documentation, concerning the P-1 centrifuge programme, the Agency's investigation of the supply network indicated that Iran should have had additional supporting information that could have been useful in this regard. Iran was requested to provide further supporting information and documentation on both the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes. The Agency was still assessing other aspects of Iran's past nuclear programme, including its statements about plutonium research, in particular with respect to the dates the research was carried out, and its activities involving plutonium.
The Agency continued to follow up on information pertaining to Iran's nuclear programme and activities. In this regard, it should be noted that, absent some nexus to nuclear material, the Agency's legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons-related activity was limited. The Agency has, however, continued to seek Iran's cooperation in following up on reports relating to equipment, materials and activities which had applications in the conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area. As a measure of transparency, Iran had permitted the Agency to visit defence-related sites at Kolahdouz, Lavisan and Parchin.
While the Agency found no nuclear related activities at Kolahdouz, it was still assessing information (and awaiting some additional information) regarding the Lavisan site. The Agency revisited the Parchin site and took environmental samples. The Agency did not observe any unusual activities in the buildings visited at Parchin. Final assessment was pending the results of the environmental sample analysis.
Considering that by the end of 2005 the Agency was not yet in a position to clarify some important outstanding issues after two and a half years of intensive inspections and investigation, Iran's full transparency was deemed indispensable and overdue. Given Iran's past concealment efforts over many years, such transparency measures should extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol and include access to individuals, documentation related to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops and research and development locations. Without such transparency measures, the Agency's ability to reconstruct, in particular, the chronology of enrichment research and development, which was essential for the Agency to verify the correctness and completeness of the statements made by Iran, would be restricted.
In its September 2005 report, the Agency stated that, as indicated to the Board in November 2004, all the declared nuclear material in Iran had been accounted for, and therefore such material was not diverted to prohibited activities. The Agency was, however, still not in a position to conclude that there were no undeclared materials or activities in that State.
Pursuant to the Board's resolution37 of November 2004, and previous resolutions, during 2005, the Agency continued its activities to verify and monitor all elements of Iran's voluntary suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities. Prior to November 2004, the Agency had already established a baseline inventory of all uranium hexafluoride (UF6), essential centrifuge components, key raw materials and equipment, and the assembled centrifuge rotors at declared workshops said by Iran to have been involved in the manufacturing of centrifuge components, and had applied containment and surveillance measures to these items.
The Agency continued its monthly monitoring activities at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz to ensure that the suspension of enrichment activities at PFEP was fully implemented. In August 2005, Iran informed the Agency of its decision to resume uranium activities at the Esfahan uranium conversion facility (UCF). The Agency installed additional surveillance equipment at UCF in August 2005. On 8 August 2005, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities under Agency safeguards. In its November 2005 report, the Agency stated, inter alia, that, all UF6 so far produced at UCF remained under Agency containment and surveillance measures; and that the Agency had continued to monitor installations related to the uranium gas centrifuge and laser enrichment programmes, and had not observed any inconsistency with Iran's voluntary undertaking not to carry out any enrichment activities.
In a resolution adopted in August 2005, the Board, inter alia, expressed serious concern regarding Iran's decision to resume uranium conversion activities and urged it to re-establish full suspension.38
On 24 September 2005, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution in which, inter alia, it urged Iran to resolve outstanding questions and provide the necessary assurances, to implement transparency measures which extended beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops and research and development locations; to re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity and reprocessing activity; to reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water; to promptly ratify and implement in full the Additional Protocol; pending completion of the ratification of the Additional Protocol, to continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol, which Iran signed on 18 December 2003.39
In its September resolution, the Board found that Iran's many failures and breaches of obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement constituted non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute. Moreover, the history of concealment of its nuclear activities and the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency's verification of its declarations since September 2002 and the resulting absence of confidence that its nuclear programme was exclusively for peaceful purposes, had given rise to questions that were within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in the context of Article III.B.4 of the Statute. The Board stated that it would separately address the timing and content of the report required under Article XII.C and the notification required under Article III.B.4.
During 2005, consultations continued between the IAEA and the States of the Middle East region on the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, and on the development of model agreements as a necessary step towards the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone.
There has been increased application of the IAEA Safety Standards as the global reference for protecting people and the environment against nuclear accidents and the harmful effects of radiation exposure. In 2005, the Agency collected relevant information on the use of the IAEA Safety Standards and feedback from regulatory bodies and other users. This showed that some countries made direct use of the standards for licensing, while others used them as reference for establishing and reviewing national regulations and effective regulatory oversight. Most countries incorporated the Agency's Regulations for the Transport of Radioactive Material (Transport Regulations) into their national laws and international organizations included the provisions of those Regulations in their instruments governing the safe transport of dangerous goods. The Regulations were also an important input to the UN Model Regulations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods.
The Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) now has fifty-six Contracting Parties, including all IAEA Member States operating nuclear power plants. From 11 to 22 April, Contracting Parties to the CNS met in Vienna for the third Review Meeting. The meeting was attended by fifty Contracting Parties.
All Contracting Parties identified the fundamental need for openness and transparency in the nuclear industry. Special emphasis was also put on the need for both regulators and operators to show leadership in nuclear safety and about the need to continue and improve communication between regulators and operators. Safety management received a great deal of attention, and is particularly important for operational safety. The meeting reinforced the fact that the IAEA Safety Standards have matured and now offered a comprehensive suite of nuclear safety standards that embodied good practices and a reference point to the high level of safety required for all nuclear activities.
The Joint Convention is the only international legally binding instrument addressing the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste resulting from civilian nuclear activities and applications and to planned and controlled releases into the environment of liquid or gaseous radioactive materials from regulated nuclear facilities. In 2005, EURATOM and Uruguay acceded to the Joint Convention, which had thirty-six Contracting Parties at the end of the year. Considering that the vast majority of Member States had some requirements for radioactive waste management, it was hoped that more States would adhere to the Joint Convention. In this respect the General Conference in September 2005, once again appealed to all Member States which had not yet taken the steps necessary to become Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention to do so. The Agency conducted four regional seminars where more than thirty Member States heard presentations regarding the benefits of adherence to the Joint Convention.
The good safety record for the transport of radioactive materials continued in 2005. During the year, the Agency issued the latest edition of Transport Regulations and the Board of Governors also approved a new policy for reviewing and revising the Transport Regulations. This should enhance their stability and allow Member States to more easily harmonize national regulations with the current version of the Transport Regulations.
In 2005, there was much work to address the issue of denial of shipments of radioactive materials intended for use in medical diagnosis and treatment. There was increasing awareness and discussion of the issue among carriers and relevant international organizations (such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA)).
The overall goal of the IAEA's nuclear security activities is, upon request, to assist Member States in improving their nuclear security, thereby reducing the risk of a successful act of nuclear terrorism. Its role in achieving this goal consists of the following broad areas; facilitating the development of, and adherence to, legally binding and non-binding international instruments; developing international guidelines and recommendations acceptable to the international community; providing related assessment services, training, equipment and technical advice; and providing or facilitating exchange of information and related services.
The Director General's proposals for activities in the area of nuclear security approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2002 set an ambitious agenda for the Agency. It combined the acceleration of existing Agency activities with the development of an extensive range of new measures to assist Member States, upon request, in the prevention, detection and response to malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials and their associated facilities and transports. Specific measures included effective management and control of materials through regulation and accountancy; prevention of theft; physical protection of materials, locations and transports against attacks; and detection of illicit trafficking; and radiological emergency response measures.
The Agency has continued to seek liaisons, collaboration and coordination with other regional, transnational and international organizations, including, but not limited to: the UN Security Council's Counter Terrorism Committee, Interpol, the World Customs Organization, Europol, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union, and the Universal Postal Union.
The Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009 (the Plan) was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors in September 2005 and will follow the completion of the three-year Plan of Activities which was approved by the IAEA Board in 2002.
The primary objective of the new Plan was to provide, upon request, assistance to IAEA Member States to help them in their efforts to establish, maintain and sustain an effective national nuclear security framework. The Plan will improve States' capabilities through the provision of guidelines and recommendations, human resource development, expert services and implementation support. The activities included assistance to improve or establish national legislative and regulatory frameworks, physical protection, accounting and control, detection and monitoring capabilities, transport security, incident and emergency response measures, and nuclear security culture and sustainability.
The Plan has three main activity areas. The first activity area, Needs Assessment, Analysis and Coordination, covers activities that underpin the entire Plan. A structured approach to nuclear security implementation requires effective information to support prioritization, to monitor progress and to target new activities. The second activity area, Prevention, covers IAEA activities that help States to protect nuclear and other radioactive material from malicious acts, such as theft and sabotage, carried out by terrorists or criminals. The third activity area, Detection and Response, covers assistance to help States to combat illicit trafficking - the "second line of defence" - and emergency response. The Plan also covers other activities which support the objectives of nuclear security; e.g. State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSACs), radiation and installation safety and the management of radioactive waste.
The CPPNM is so far the only international legally binding instrument by which States make specific undertakings for protecting nuclear material. Its objective is to ensure as far as practicable that, during international nuclear transport, nuclear material is protected. By 19 January, the Director General had received requests from fifty-five States parties (which represented the majority of States parties to the CPPNM), to convene a conference to consider proposed amendments to the Convention. These proposed amendments had been circulated by the Director General on 5 July 2004, at the request of the Government of Austria and twenty-four cosponsoring States, and in accordance with article 20, paragraph 1 of the CPPNM.
The Conference to consider the proposed amendments to the CPPNM was held at IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, from 4 to 8 July. Eighty-eight States parties and EURATOM participated in the Conference. Eighteen States not party and three intergovernmental organizations participated as observers. While there were still some open issues at the start of the Conference, on the basis of its deliberations, the Conference adopted by consensus an Amendment to the CPPNM, on 8 July. Delegates of eighty-one States parties signed the Final Act of the Conference.
The Amendment provided for an expanded regime. It extended the scope of the Convention to cover the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport against, inter alia, theft, smuggling and sabotage and the protection of nuclear material and facilities against sabotage. It also provided for expanded cooperation between States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, to mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage and to prevent and combat relevant offences. In addition, the Amendment strengthened the previous Convention in the area of prevention and combating of offences relating to nuclear material and nuclear facilities worldwide.
On 25 July, the Director General, in his capacity as Depositary, circulated a certified copy of the Amendment to the CPPNM to all States Parties and EURATOM. The Amendment will enter into force in accordance with paragraph 2 on the thirtieth day after the date on which two-thirds of the States parties had deposited their relevant instruments with the Director General.
The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (the Code) is a non-binding international legal instrument that applies to civilian radioactive sources that may pose a significant risk to individuals, society and the environment. The Code's objectives are to achieve and maintain a high level of safety and security of radioactive sources. By the end of 2005, seventy-nine States had expressed their political support and intent to work toward following the Code.
Additional details to the Code are provided in the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources (the Guidance) which functions as supplementary guidance. Work has continued throughout 2005 to facilitate the implementation of the Guidance, with some States wishing to do so by the beginning of 2006. In a meeting in December, States and observers from the European Commission, the World Customs Organization and the International Source Suppliers Association shared experiences in implementing the Guidance. Communication between exporting and importing States will be important and participants considered two draft "model" forms - Request for Consent and Notification of Shipment - that States could adapt for use.
The IAEA continued to carry out missions to appraise the effectiveness of national regulatory infrastructures governing both the safety and security of radioactive sources and to promote the adoption of information systems to manage source inventories and control systems. The IAEA also developed the International Catalogue of Radioactive Sources and Devices to aid source identification and recovery efforts.
Extensive work was performed under the umbrella of the Tripartite Initiative, a multilateral effort between the IAEA, the Russian Federation and the United States for securing vulnerable radioactive sources in the former Soviet Union. By the end of the year, the dismantlement and relocation of the highest-risk radioactive sources in six countries was completed. Further regional partnerships were developed in Asia and Africa.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)40 held its fifteenth Plenary Meeting in Oslo, from 23 to 24 June, under the chairmanship of Norway. The forty-four Participating Governments took stock of developments since the last Plenary Meeting in Göteborg, Sweden, in May 2004.
In order to strengthen further the Participating Governments' national export controls, the NSG decided to adopt, inter alia, the following measures: (i) the establishment of a procedure towards suspending through national decisions nuclear transfers to countries that were non-compliant with their safeguards agreements; (ii) the supplier and the recipient states should elaborate appropriate measures to evoke fall-back safeguards if the IAEA could no longer undertake its Safeguard mandate in a recipient state; and (iii) to introduce the existence of effective export controls in the recipient state as a criterion of supply for nuclear material, equipment and technology and a factor for consideration for dual use items and technologies.
The NSG further agreed to continue enhancing information exchange in all aspects, particularly regarding discussions of the IAEA Additional Protocol as a condition of supply as well as with a view to an agreement on further strengthening of the NSG guidelines with respect to enrichment and reprocessing technologies.
The Plenary reiterated its firm support for the NPT, while noting that the 2005 Review Conference did not reach a substantive outcome. Moreover, the NSG members welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and stated its readiness to co-operate in the ongoing process of fully implementing this resolution.
Participating Governments also noted that the recognition of NSG control measures as an international benchmark had grown over the last year, and welcomed announcements by non-Participating governments to adhere to the NSG guidelines, as a positive expression of implementation of internationally agreed export control guidelines.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)41 held its 20th Plenary Meeting in Madrid, from 12 to 16 September to review its activities and further strengthen the efforts to prevent missile proliferation.
Recalling the language of Security Council resolution 1540, as well as other instruments, the MTCR Partners (the Partners)42 stressed that the proliferation of WMD delivery systems constituted a threat to international peace and security and stressed the need to reduce the risks associated with terrorism in this regard. The Partners also welcomed the announcement that India would unilaterally adhere to the MTCR Guidelines and encouraged all other countries to do so. The Partners also renewed their commitment to strict implementation and enforcement of export controls, including adapting and strengthening of existing rules to respond to technological developments and the evolving security environment. In this regard, the Partners agreed to a number of amendments to the MTCR Annex. The Partner States continued to examine matters such as tangible transfer of technology, transit and trans-shipment, brokering and the activities of intermediaries and front companies.
Denmark offered to host the next Plenary Meeting in the second half of 2006 and to serve as chair of the MTCR for the subsequent term of office.
The Subscribing States43 held their fourth Regular Meeting in Vienna, from 2 to 3 June. The meeting discussed, inter alia, the continuation and improved implementation of confidence-building measures such as pre-launch notifications and annual declarations. Concerning the issue of future outreach activities, discussions centered on the need for focus on promoting the univeralization of the Code in specific regions. The Subscribing States agreed on a text for a draft resolution to be tabled at the sixtieth session of the General Assembly.
The Philippines agreed to continue its chairmanship until the nomination of the new chairman. It was decided to hold the fifth regular meeting of Subscribing States in Vienna, from 22 to 23 June 2006, to discuss the main topics of confidence-building measures and universalization of the Code.
Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), unanimously adopted on 28 April 2004, stipulated that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, and required all States to adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws to this effect. The resolution also required States to take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and their means of delivery.
During the year, the 1540 Committee, established pursuant to operative paragraph 4 of the resolution, entered the substantive stage of its work. Between January and July, it recruited eight experts to assist in its work, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the resolution and the Committee's guidelines for the conduct of its work.
Operational paragraph 4 of the resolution called upon States to present national reports to the Committee on steps they had taken or intended to take to implement the resolution. By the end of the year, 124 States and one organization had submitted such reports.
To facilitate examination of the reports, the Committee, with support of the experts, developed a matrix summarizing the information they contained. On the basis of this examination, the Chairman of the 1540 Committee sent letters to all 124 States submitting national reports, requesting additional information or clarifications or both on the steps undertaken in response to obligations set forth in the resolution. At the end of 2005, forty-one States submitted updated reports to the Committee.
By the end of the year, sixty-seven States had yet to present a first national report to the 1540 Committee. For the purpose of calling upon Member States to submit reports, the Chairman sent reminder letters to non-reporting States, and participated in a meeting in New York organized by the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States and another by the Group of Asian States.
On 8 September, the Chairman addressed the second World Conference of Speakers of Parliaments. This was the first occasion to reach out to leaders of national legislatures to inform them of resolution 1540 and seek their support in its implementation by incorporating its provisions into national legislation.
From 26 to 28 September, a regional seminar for the Latin American and Caribbean States was held in Buenos Aires, organized by the Government of Argentina with the support of the United Kingdom entitled "Advancing in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)". The Vice-Chair, members of the Committee, experts and staff members of DDA participated in the seminar.
The Chairman, the members of the Committee and the experts also participated in numerous other seminars, workshops and conferences during the year, in order to explain the requirements of resolution 1540 and the activities of the Committee and with a view to raising awareness and seeking support for its implementation.
Operative paragraph 7 of the resolution recognized that some States might require assistance in implementing the provisions of the resolution within their territories and invited States in a position to do so to offer assistance, as appropriate. In response, a number of States included requests for offers of assistance in their national reports.
Following a decision by the 1540 Committee, the experts identified the information available in the reports regarding requests for assistance and types of assistance available from potential donors. The information was then made public on the Committee's web site, indicating in which areas assistance could be provided by a specific country as well as the way in which contacts for assistance could be established on a bilateral basis.
The list of requests for assistance had also been circulated in a note verbale to all States that requested assistance with their national reports. Furthermore, and in order to effectively perform its role as a clearinghouse on assistance, the Committee had also requested States, as appropriate, to designate Points of Contact on assistance.
Cooperation was established during the year with relevant international organizations such as the IAEA, the OPCW and the NSG.
On 13 April, at the invitation of the Chairman of the Committee, the Director-General of the OPCW and representatives of the IAEA informed the Committee about the activities of their respective organizations, especially in the area of assistance provided to improve national implementation of the obligations under the CWC, the NPT and conventions on nuclear safety and security. On 30 November, the Chairman of the NSG briefed the members of the Committee on the activities of the Group.
The Chairman of the 1540 Committee gave briefings to the three meetings of the Security Council (25 April, 11 July and 26 October), along with the Chairs of the Counter Terrorism Committee and the 1267 Committee. The Chairman briefed the Council on progress achieved so far during the past three-quarters (1 April-30 June, 1 July-30 September and 1 October-31 December) and on the Committee's continuing programme of work. On 19 December, the Chairman gave an annual report to the Security Council on activities undertaken and progress achieved by the 1540 Committee during the past year.44
On 6 and 7 May, the Foreign Ministers of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) met in Kyoto. In the Chairman's statement, the Ministers emphasized the need to promote universalization and domestic implementation of treaties and norms in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, and stressed the importance of enhanced export control systems. The Ministers called upon all States parties to accede to, ratify and implement all of the twelve international counter-terrorism conventions and the protocol as a matter of urgency, and implement relevant UN Security Council resolutions. They also welcomed the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. In addition, they stressed the need to further promote the development of the counter-terrorism capacity in the countries fighting against terrorism and requiring assistance in this area, while acknowledging the ASEM Seminar on Anti-Terrorism held in Berlin in October 2004, as well as the preparations for a related seminar in Indonesia in September.45
On 13 June, the Special Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Movement in Doha, Qatar, issued a declaration in preparation for the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly in September. As part of the declaration, the Ministers reaffirmed the importance of achieving the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, also recalling paragraph 9 of the UN Millennium Declaration in this respect.46 Disappointment was expressed over the inability of the 2005 NPT Review Conference to reach consensus on substantive issues relating to the three NPT pillars. However, the Ministers remained committed to the Treaty and reaffirmed that it remained the cornerstone of the global disarmament and non-proliferation framework.47
The European Union and the United States issued two documents related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at their Summit on 20 June in Washington. In the EU-US Declaration on Enhancing Cooperation in the field of Non-Proliferation and the Fight Against Terrorism support was expressed for the important role of the United Nations in assisting Member States to combat both challenges. In this regard, particular emphasis was given to the Secretary-General's comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, as proposed at the Madrid Conference in March 2005. The parties stated that they would remain united in their determination to see the proliferation implications of Iran's nuclear programme resolved, reconfirming full support of the ongoing E3/EU efforts to secure Iran's agreement to provide objective guarantees that its nuclear programme was intended for exclusively peaceful purposes. The EU and the US also noted with concern the DPRK's nuclear weapons programme and its 10 February statement that it had manufactured nuclear weapons, urging it to comply fully with its non-proliferation obligations, and dismantle its nuclear weapons in a permanent, transparent, thorough, and verifiable manner.48
The EU-US Joint Programme of Work on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction noted enhanced efforts to strengthen cooperation and coordination in a broad range of disarmament and non-proliferation-related agreements, namely, the NPT, BWC and CWC. As to Security Council resolution 1540, the parties announced that they would coordinate efforts to enhance compliance with the resolution and provide assistance requested from States parties seeking to implement respective requirements. In a general call for establishing a dialogue on compliance, the Joint Programme of Work, in particular, welcomed the newly established IAEA Committee on Safeguards and Verification. Moreover, it also noted efforts to strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and encouraged PSI countries to support enhanced cooperation against proliferation networks.49
At its Summit in Gleneagles (United Kingdom), from 6 to 8 July, the G850 reiterated their commitment to the Action Plan on Non-Proliferation announced at the Summit on Sea Island in 2004. In the Gleneagles Statement on Non-Proliferation, the G8 pointed out that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, together with international terrorism, remained the pre-eminent threats to international peace and security. Furthermore, they called on all States to uphold in full international norms on non-proliferation and to meet their arms control and disarmament obligations. They emphasized their determination to meet proliferation challenges decisively, through both national and multilateral efforts, and expressed particular concern about the threat of proliferation in the DPRK and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The G8 supported the efforts of E3-EU (France, Germany and the United Kingdom), together with the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, to address through negotiation the concerns about Iran's nuclear programme. They expressed support for the six party talks on DPRK and urged that State to return promptly to them. In addition, they called on the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons-related programmes.51
In the framework of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),52 from 15 to 19 August, Singapore hosted the eighteenth PSI interdiction training exercise, entitled "Deep Sabre", the first one in the South China Sea. The exercise was aimed at advancing the operational capabilities of PSI participating nations by integrating an at-sea boarding, conducted by a combination of military and law enforcement forces, with a port search operation, conducted primarily by law enforcement. Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom, and the United States contributed operational assets to the exercise, while a number of other countries from the Asia-Pacific region participated.
Against the backdrop of the disappointing result of the NPT Review Conference, in a statement on 26 July, the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa and the United Kingdom announced an initiative ("Norwegian Initiative") as a contribution to the current debates at the United Nations in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.53
In both a political declaration and proposed language for the outcome document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly,54 from 14 to 16 September, the Ministers affirmed that nuclear non-proliferation, continued progress on nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were all vital and imposed responsibilities on all States. In addition, all States were urged to accede to the NPT, the CWC and the BWC.
The initiative also addressed various related issues such as the commencement in the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on an FMCT, the maintenance of a moratorium on nuclear-test explosions, and the early entry into force of the CTBT. The Ministers emphasized the inalienable right of all States parties to the NPT to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and called for a strengthening of the IAEA Safeguards system. As for the threat of non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the initiative also emphasized the obligation of all States to implement Security Council resolution 1540.
Despite the efforts of the Norwegian Initiative, the World Summit Outcome Document contained no reference to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In a subsequent statement, the Secretary-General noted that the biggest gap by far in the agreements was the failure to address nuclear proliferation, which he called "the most alarming threat we face in the immediate future, given the danger of such weapons being acquired by terrorists".55
On 17 November, the European Parliament adopted a resolution entitled "Review of the Non-proliferation Treaty - Nuclear arms in North Korea and Iran". In addition to reaffirming the importance of the NPT on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, the resolution specifically called for EU countries to work towards the effective implementation of article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12, also known as the "thirteen steps", of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Furthermore, the European Council, as well as the European Commission, were called upon to set up a programme aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials, technology and knowledge, and the EU, in general, was urged to support recent initiatives related to nuclear dangers, as proposed by the Secretary-General and IAEA Director General. In addition, the resolution supported the proposal made by the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. On Iran's nuclear programme, the resolution reaffirmed full support for the approach under the leadership of the E3/EU for a dialogue with the Iranian authorities in order to ensure a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the nuclear issues concerning that country. In this regard, the resolution also called on the European Council and the European Commission to enter negotiations with Iran on the transfer of technology and know-how as well as on financial support for renewable energy. The resolution also expressed deep concern over the DPRK's declaration that it possessed nuclear weapons, and, in this respect, urged it to rejoin the NPT and to revoke its decision to withdraw from the six-party talks in order to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Korean peninsula. It also asked the European Council and the European Commission to make necessary approaches regarding the EU's participation at future six-party talks.56
The General Assembly took action on twelve draft resolutions and two draft decisions related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues.
Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament. The draft resolution was introduced by Belarus, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 2 for the sponsors), on 12 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 24 October as follows: (150-1-1) and by the General Assembly as follows: (180:1:1) on 8 December. For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 6 and 2.
The resolution requested the Conference on Disarmament to keep the matter under review with a view to making recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on identified types of such weapons, when necessary; called upon all States to give favourable consideration to those recommendations; and requested the Conference to report the results of any consideration of the matter in its annual reports to the General Assembly. It also decided to include this item in the provisional agenda of its sixty-third session.
Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution was introduced by Pakistan, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 3 for the sponsors), on 20 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 24 October as follows: (98-0-55) and by the General Assembly as follows: (120-0-59) on 8 December. For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 3.
Among other things, the resolution recommended that further intensive efforts be devoted to the search for a common approach or common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally-binding character, and that the various alternative approaches, particularly those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, be explored further. It also recommended that the Conference actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching agreement and concluding effective international arrangements on the issue of security assurances, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.
Explaining its abstention after the vote, the Republic of Korea stated that it did not believe that full-fledged negative security assurances from the NWS should be provided to all States parties, even to those States that were not compliant with their Treaty obligations. In its view, the draft resolution continued to ignore that concern. It added that confidence-building measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation should precede genuine discussions on providing legally binding negative security assurances.
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments. The draft resolution was introduced by South Africa, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the New Agenda Coalition,57 on 10 October 2005. It was adopted by the First Committee on 26 October as follows: as a whole: (144-5-19); and operative paragraph 4 (148-3-9), and by the General Assembly on 8 December as follows: as a whole (158-5-20); and operative paragraph 4 (158-2-11). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 21 and 8.
The resolution called upon the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate the implementation of the practical steps towards nuclear disarmament agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference; also called upon all States to comply fully with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation commitments and refrain from actions that might cause or lead to a new nuclear arms race; and further called upon all States parties to spare no efforts to achieve the universality of the NPT, and urged India, Israel and Pakistan, not yet parties to the Treaty, to accede to it as non-nuclear weapon States promptly and unconditionally.
While India was committed to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it stated that it would vote against the draft resolution on the grounds that references to no first-use, negative security assurances, as well as the reduction of nuclear dangers were omitted in the resolution. Moreover, as a non-party to the NPT, India could not accept the draft resolution's call to accede to that Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon State. Japan remarked that it would support the draft resolution and operative paragraph 4. Though not in agreement with all of the points contained therein, Japan was appreciative of the NACs support for its own draft resolution on nuclear disarmament and hoped that such mutual efforts and cooperation would help to create a strong momentum to further strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation.
After the vote, France, speaking on behalf of itself, the United Kingdom and the United States, explained their negative votes. They maintained that the title did not reflect the progress to date towards nuclear disarmament such as the Moscow Treaty; the content did not take due account of a full range of their nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament obligations under article VI of the NPT, or the most pressing contemporary challenges to the NPT and global security.
Pakistan abstained on the draft resolution as a whole and explained that it voted against operative paragraph 4 because the draft resolution named the countries outside the NPT, called for accession to the Treaty without conditions, and included references to the NPT final documents.
Two States that abstained on the draft resolution as a whole and supported operative paragraph 4 explained their positions. The Russian Federation held that the issue in the title of an "artificial acceleration of nuclear disarmament" did not reflect political, technical and financial restrictions. On that point, it affirmed its commitment to the article VI, NPT obligations and to its belief in the total elimination of nuclear weapons through a staged progress, based on a comprehensive approach, with the participation of all NWS, and in circumstances where strategic stability and compliance with the principle of equal security for all were retained. Secondly, it could not agree on the words "lack of implementation of binding obligations and agreed steps toward nuclear disarmament", in preambular paragraph 6, as an assessment of Russia's real, major and irreversible practical steps towards reducing nuclear weapons in accordance with existing commitments. Spain stated that in the context of its own international and regional commitments in the area of security, it had to abstain in the vote.
Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution was introduced by Japan, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 7 for the sponsors), on 26 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 26 October as follows: (166-2-7) and by the General Assembly on 8 December as follows: (168-2-7). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 36 and 14.
Among other things, the resolution called upon States not parties to the NPT to accede to it as a NNWS without delay and without conditions; encouraged further steps leading to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty, emphasizing the importance of applying irreversibility, verifiability and increased transparency in a way that promoted international stability and undiminished security for all; urged all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT; emphasized the importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and its early conclusion; called upon all nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the NPT to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for any nuclear weapons pending the entry into force of the Treaty; encouraged all States to undertake concrete activities to implement, as appropriate, the recommendations in the Secretary-General's report on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education;58 and encouraged the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
China indicated that it would abstain in the vote stating that the draft resolution did not reflect the basic principles of nuclear disarmament, including no-first use of nuclear weapons, security assurances, nuclear deterrence, weaponization of and an arms race in outer space, and resumption of a programme of work and establishment of ad hoc committees in the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear disarmament, security assurances, fissile material cut-off, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
Several States that intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution expressed some reservations. The Russian Federation said that it was prepared to adopt a realistic and balanced approach to nuclear disarmament; however, it emphasized that the progress made in the sphere of nuclear weapons must not be underestimated, specifically the obligations of Member States and their fulfilment of those obligations. South Africa, speaking on behalf of the NAC, preferred that the draft contain stronger references to the practical steps for nuclear disarmament and the unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, as agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Regarding the issue of strengthening the IAEA safeguards regime and contents of the Additional Protocol, Egypt affirmed that its position on that issue was governed by two main factors - that accession to the Additional Protocol was optional; and that it was not prepared to enter into additional commitments at a time when a single State in the Middle East remained outside the NPT and refused to place its nuclear programme under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime. Iran remarked that the draft lacked sufficient emphasis on other important aspects of nuclear disarmament, particularly the important role of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.
India, which supported the basic intent of the draft resolution, had to vote against it due to its call for States to accede to the NPT as NNWS, which it could not accept.
Pakistan abstained in the vote and held that the inordinate emphasis on non-proliferation in the draft reflected a regression in the area of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, consistent with its position on the NPT, it could not accept the call to accede to the Treaty as a NNWS, nor could it be bound by any of the provisions of the NPT Review Conferences or other forums where it was not represented.
Four States supported the draft resolution. France remarked that its affirmative vote did not imply its renunciation of the EU's Common Position on the two issues of irreversibility and transparency.59 Two States made statements on the references to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty contained in the draft. Syria drew attention to preambular paragraph 10 and operative paragraph 8 on the CTBT and asserted its belief that those provisions were keeping the draft from reaching its nuclear disarmament objective. Colombia reiterated its longstanding position that in line with international law and its country's constitution, it could only be called upon to implement the CTBT following its ratification. Venezuela expressed dissatisfaction that the operative section did not sufficiently highlight the problems of the victims of the nuclear bombings and, in that connection, recalled the duty of States to guarantee respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.
Nuclear disarmament The draft resolution was introduced by Myanmar, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 8 for the sponsors), on 12 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 24 October as follows: (94-42-17) and by the General Assembly as follows: (113-45-20) on 8 December. For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 45 and 17.
Among other things, the resolution urged the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) to immediately stop the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems; and also urged them, as an interim measure, to immediately de-alert and deactivate their nuclear weapons and to take other concrete measures to further reduce the operational status of their nuclear weapon systems. It called upon the NWS, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to agree on internationally and legally binding instruments on a joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and on negative security assurances. The resolution also called for the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects at an early date to identify and deal with concrete measures of disarmament; and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly's sixty-first session.
Speaking before the vote, China and Cuba expressed their support for the draft resolution. China supported the main thrust, objectives and major elements of the draft resolution, but underscored that it still had not reflected the basic nuclear disarmament principles and therefore needed improvement. Cuba felt that the text appropriately reflected the priority attached to nuclear disarmament.
Two States which supported the goal of nuclear disarmament were constrained to abstain in the voting. Both India and Pakistan, not Parties to the NPT, noted that the text incorporated references to the Treaty, on which their positions were well-known.
While Japan voted in favour of the draft resolution, it felt that the text did not contain the necessary elements for the international community, including the NWS, to form an agreement on nuclear disarmament. It preferred to see an approach toward the shared goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, involving the NWS - a different approach from that proposed in the draft resolution.
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. The draft resolution was introduced by Malaysia, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 8 for the sponsors), on 11 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 24 October as follows: as a whole (103-29-21); and to retain operative paragraph 1 (142-3-5); and by the General Assembly on 8 December as follows: (126-29-24); and to retain operative paragraph 1 (165-3-4). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 59 and 20.
The resolution called upon all States to immediately fulfil the obligation under the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. It also requested all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they have taken to implement the present resolution and nuclear disarmament..
After the vote, Japan stated that it abstained in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole based on its belief that steady, incremental progress should be made prior to embarking on the negotiations which the draft resolution urged all States to commence.
Reducing nuclear danger. The draft resolution was introduced by India, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 11 for the sponsors), on 11 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 24 October as follows: (94-45-14); and by the General Assembly on 8 December as follows: (115-49-15). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 65 and 21.
The resolution called for a review of nuclear doctrines and, in that context, immediate and urgent steps by the five NWS to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. It also requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the seven recommendations in the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters,60 and also to continue to encourage Member States to endeavour to create conditions that would allow the emergence of an international consensus to hold an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, as proposed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration,61 and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session.
Convention on Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons. The draft resolution was introduced by India, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 15 for the sponsors), on 11 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 24 October as follows: (97-46-11) and by the General Assembly on 8 December as follows: (111-49-13). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 83 and 24.
The resolution reiterated its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The draft resolution was introduced by Egypt, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the League of Arab States, on 18 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 24 October as follows: as a whole (149-2-4) and preambular paragraph 6 (145-2-5); and by the General Assembly on 8 December as follows: as a whole (164-5-5) and preambular paragraph 6 (162-2-6). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 88 and 25.
The resolution called upon Israel to accede to the NPT, and not to develop, produce, test or acquire nuclear weapons, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. It also requested the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly's sixty-first session on the implementation of the resolution [A/C.1/60/L.6, operative paragraphs 3 and 4].
Israel said that it would cast a negative vote based on its consistent view that the draft resolution was blatantly one-sided, contentious and divisive and it undermined confidence among the States of the region. The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the EU would vote in favour of the draft resolution despite concerns that the text did not reflect Iran's decision to resume its uranium conversion activity.
Canada and Switzerland, casting two affirmative votes, and Australia abstaining on the draft as a whole and voting for preambular paragraph 6, expressed concern that there was no reference to the IAEA Board of Governor's resolution on Iran's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations pursuant to the NPT.62 In that regard, Canada believed that the draft resolution could have been strengthened by including a reference to Iran's non-compliance accompanied by a call for full compliance with its international nuclear non-proliferation obligations and full cooperation with the IAEA. Switzerland added that to ensure the broadest possible support, the authors had to take into account the current context and all events that affected the countries in the region. Australia had substantive difficulties, notably the draft's emphasis on the State of Israel, with no reference to other Middle Eastern States of nuclear proliferation concern. Iran, which voted in favour, believed that universal adherence to the NPT in the ME would effectively ensure the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, therefore it was necessary for the international community to put pressure on Israel to accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.
India abstained on the draft because the text did not focus on the region it was intended to address, and it attributed its negative vote on preambular paragraph 6 to its long-standing position on the NPT.
United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament. The draft decision was introduced by Mexico, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 19 for the sponsors) on 24 October. It was adopted by the First Committee at the same meeting as follows: (108-5-39); and by the General Assembly on 8 December as follows: (128-5-40). For the text of the draft decision and the voting pattern, see pages 101 and 29.
By its terms, the General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session the item entitled "United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The draft resolution was introduced by Mexico, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 17 for the sponsors), on 19 October. The revised draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on 24 October as follows: (149-1-4) and by the General Assembly on 8 December as follows: (172-1-4). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 95 and 26.
The resolution urged all States to maintain their moratoriums on nuclear-weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty; it also urged all States that had not yet signed the Treaty to sign and ratify it as soon as possible, and all States that had signed but not yet ratified the Treaty, in particular those whose ratification was needed for its entry into force, to accelerate their ratification processes at the earliest. It also requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, to prepare a report on the efforts of States that had ratified the Treaty towards its universalization and possibilities for providing assistance on ratification procedures to States that so requested it, and to submit such a report to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session.
The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the European Union and the countries that had aligned themselves the explanation of vote, stated that the EU would support the draft resolution because it attached importance to the Treaty's early entry into force and ratification, and believed that the legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons test explosions and credible verification were vital to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Israel decided it would vote in favour of the draft resolution because of its commitment to CTBT's objectives. It added, however, that progress was pending on some issues, including the verification regime, resolution of political issues in the Middle East and South Asian regions, and reversal of the negative dynamics evolving in the Middle East where certain States signatories were not fully cooperative with efforts to complete and test the international monitoring element of the verification regime.
The Syrian Arab Republic abstained in the voting because it felt that the CTBT contained many loopholes: it ignored the legitimate concerns of non-nuclear States, such as security assurances, contained no reference to the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, nor emphasis on universalization of the NPT. Colombia said that despite its commitment to the spirit and letter of the Treaty, it was obliged to abstain in the vote owing to its constitutional difficulties in becoming a State party.
Pakistan supported the draft resolution, but stated that its call for promoting signatures and ratifications leading to the Treaty's entry into force would be facilitated when major supporters of the CTBT decided to restore their support and when the Treaty's obligations were accepted on a regional basis in South Asia.
Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes. The draft resolution was introduced by Nigeria, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States, on 24 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee at the same meeting and by the General Assembly on 8 December. For the text of the resolution, see pages 23 and 9.
The resolution called upon all States to take appropriate measures with a view to preventing the dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States; requested the Conference on Disarmament to take into account, in the negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, radioactive wastes as part of the scope of such a convention; and also requested the Conference to intensify efforts towards an early conclusion of such a convention and to include in its report to the General Assembly at its sixty-second session the progress recorded in the negotiations on this subject. It also appealed to all Member States that had not yet done so, to take the necessary steps to become party to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, as soon as possible .
In its statement after the vote and referring to operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution concerning spent fuel, India reiterated its consistent position within the IAEA that spent fuel is not just a waste product, but also a valuable resource.
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. . The draft resolution was introduced by the Philippines, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 6 for the sponsors) on 20 October. On 28 October the Islamic Republic of Iran, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 6 for the sponsors) introduced some proposed written amendments to the draft resolution which were rejected. At the same meeting, draft resolution L.22, as orally amended, was adopted by the First Committee as follows: (151-1-11) and by the General Assembly on 8 December as follows: (158-1-11). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 32 and 13.
The resolution invited all States that had not yet subscribed to the Code of Conduct to do so; and encouraged the exploration of further ways and means to deal effectively with the problem of the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction .
Speaking before the vote, Egypt maintained that the HCOC did not address the issue of missiles in a balanced manner nor could it do so unless structural adjustments were made to its text. In that connection, it would join other delegations in submitting amendments to the draft resolution.
Algeria voted against the draft resolution contending that the balanced and non-discriminatory treatment of missiles should include vertical elements like their design, development, testing and deployment. It stressed that the United Nations remained the natural framework for negotiations on those issues and adoption of instruments of such importance and that the Conference on Disarmament was the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum.
Six States that abstained in the vote - India, Pakistan, Iran, Cuba, Syrian Arab Republic and Indonesia - objected to the non-inclusive and non-transparent approach in which the HCOC was negotiated. India believed that a multilateral and inclusive process would deal with ballistic missile proliferation in a comprehensive way. Pakistan, highlighting that the final product could not gain the support and acceptance of several missile-possessing States, pointed out that the Code did not address its own security concerns. Iran explained that a draft resolution introduced at the United Nations should have involved all Member States, including non-subscribing States to the Code and unfortunately, that approach was not taken. Cuba gave several reasons for its abstention: the Code was a political instrument that did not reflect the interests of many countries, it did not address the peaceful use of missile technology or the need for cooperation and thus hampered the economic and social development of a large number of countries, its focus was limited to the horizontal aspect of proliferation, and it did not address the need to achieve disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, given that the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD is only one part of the problem. The Syrian Arab Republic asserted that the Code was selective and discriminatory. Moreover, the HCOC ran counter to the multilateral approach of the United Nations. Indonesia had procedural concerns, such as the non-inclusive and non-transparent negotiating process, and was firmly convinced that the missile issue should be addressed within the UN system. It added that because of the Code's non-legally binding nature, many States perceived it as a confidence-building measure.
China supported the draft resolution, stating that it agreed with the Code's non-proliferation objective, and added that the United Nations should play its full role in the broad-based dialogue and cooperation on the issue.
Missiles. The draft decision was introduced by the Islamic Republic of Iran, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 18 for the sponsors) on 11 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 24 October as follows: (101-2-50); and by the General Assembly on 8 December as follows: (120-2-53). For the text of the draft decision and the voting pattern, see pages 101 and 28.
By its terms, the General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session the item entitled "Missiles".
The United States, which cast a negative vote, drew attention to the excellent progress made by the second Panel of Governmental Experts on achieving a final report on missiles,63 and stressed that the Panel's draft report should be the basis for beginning further work on this issue.
The divergence of views that prevented agreement at the seventh NPT Review Conference also prevailed in the negotiations on the World Summit in September and, therefore, resulted in no references to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the Outcome Document of the Summit. Although the NPT remained the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, the Treaty continued to be challenged in 2005 by questions of compliance and withdrawal. Consequently, the question of how to achieve credible progress towards nuclear disarmament remained a major task of the international community.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty still lacked the eleven ratifications necessary for its entry into force. The Final Document of the fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT again stressed the importance of the Treaty and its entry into force.
Progress was made in regard to the application of IAEA safeguards, with seventeen States signing additional protocols and eight States signing comprehensive safeguards agreements. In addition, the Advisory Committee of the Board of Governors on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute held its first meeting in November to consider ways to enhance the IAEA's verification capabilities. The application of the IAEA nuclear safety standards increased, throughout 2005, underscoring the role of the standards as the global reference for protecting people and the environment against nuclear accidents and the harmful effects of radiation exposure. Further, the IAEA's new Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009 was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors in September, to frame and sustain the efforts of IAEA Member States to establish and maintain an effective national nuclear security framework.
Despite such developments, concerns over the nuclear programmes of the DPRK and Iran continued to pre-occupy the international community throughout 2005. Although efforts to resolve those issues are ongoing, much more remains to be done.
The General Assembly unanimously adopted the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, requiring States parties to adopt legislation criminalizing any activities relating to the use or intended use of radiological or nuclear devices to cause bodily harm or damage to property or the environment.