The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has served as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime for the past thirty-five years. With a membership of 188 States parties, of the 191 UN Member States, it is the most universal multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament agreement in force.2
Conferences to review the operation of the Treaty have been held every five years since its entry into force. Only three of these review conferences (1975, 1985 and 2000) were able to reach agreement on a substantive final document concerning progress on the articles of the Treaty. The remaining review conferences failed to adopt a consensus final document for various reasons, in particular due to disagreements over article VI and related issues. However, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference adopted a package of decisions3 as well as a resolution on the Middle East. Decision 1 consisted of elements to strengthen the review process, including the determination that subsequent review conferences should, "look forward as well as back", Decision 2 contained a set of principles and objectives for non-proliferation and disarmament, and Decision 3 determined that the NPT would remain in force indefinitely.
The last NPT Review Conference in 2000 was considered a success due to the agreement reached on detailed language regarding all provisions of the Treaty, and, in part, from the incorporation of the result of intense negotiations between the five nuclear-weapon States4 (NWS) and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC).5 In particular, these negotiations resulted in agreement on "practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI".6 The 2000 NPT Review Conference also reached agreement on "improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process", determining that the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee for each review conference would provide summaries of their deliberations to the third session, which would then provide recommendations for the review conference. Consequently, the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference operated within this framework.
The Preparatory Committee held three sessions between April 2002 and May 2004.7 The Committee was responsible for a number of procedural and substantive matters regarding the Treaty review process. During its first session, the Committee chairs and the locations for the second and third sessions were selected.8 Owing to differences regarding the agenda items for the 2005 Review Conference, the third session of the Preparatory Committee was able to reach agreement only on the minimum necessary arrangements for that Conference. These decisions included an endorsement of the President and chairs of the three Main Committees, the dates, draft rules of procedure, financing, and the nomination of the Secretary-General of the Conference.
In addition to procedural arrangements, each session of the Preparatory Committee considered three clusters of issues as stipulated in the final report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference.9 The first cluster addressed the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation and disarmament, international peace and security, and security assurances. The second cluster considered the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to safeguards, nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs), and other regional issues. The third cluster dealt with the provisions of the Treaty regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A number of new substantive issues were raised during the course of the Preparatory Committee, including the threat of nuclear terrorism and efforts to address the proliferation sensitivity of the nuclear fuel cycle. In particular, the issue of Treaty withdrawal arose in reaction to the 10 January 2003 declaration by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) of an "automatic and immediate" withdrawal from the NPT and its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To avoid a divisive debate over the DPRK's withdrawal, the chair of the 2003 session of the Preparatory Committee announced that he would take custody of the DPRK's nameplate, which would remain in the conference room, but would not be displayed among those of the States parties. This procedure was followed by the chair of the third session.
In accordance with the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document,10 the chairs of the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference prepared factual summaries of the substantive discussions which were attached to the final reports of each session for transmittal to the next session. During the 2002 session, the chair produced a summary under his sole responsibility which was not subject to negotiation. The chair of the 2003 session invited some delegations to offer specific text proposals and to consult with him on the contents of the summary. During the third session, which was tasked with taking account of these summaries and making every effort to provide consensus recommendations to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the chair was unable to attach his factual summary to the final report of the Preparatory Committee. This inability was due to significant criticism of the summary from a number of States parties. The Chairman's factual summary was therefore submitted as a working paper together with papers submitted by national delegations. The Preparatory Committee therefore submitted a strictly procedural final report to the 2005 NPT Review Conference,11 with neither substantive recommendations nor agreement on the preparation of background documentation for the Conference.
The 2005 Review Conference was held from 2 to 27 May in New York, with the participation of 153 States parties12 as well as representatives of the United Nations and the IAEA. In accordance with the relevant rules of procedure, a number of specialized agencies and intergovernmental organizations were granted observer agency status.13 Some of these observer agencies were invited to submit their views in writing for circulation as conference documents.14 In addition, 119 research institutes and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attended in accordance with the rules of procedure.15
A number of procedural arrangements were decided during the opening plenary meeting of the Conference. These included the election by acclamation of Sergio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil as President of the Conference, the confirmation of the Conference Secretary-General and election of the remaining Conference officers.16 The Conference also adopted the rules of procedure as recommended by the Preparatory Committee.17
The United Nations Secretary-General and the IAEA Director General addressed the Conference during the opening plenary session. A total of 93 States parties made opening statements during the general debate between 2 and 11 May.18 While most statements identified the central role played by the NPT in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and enhancing international security, the overwhelming majority recognized that the Treaty was facing serious challenges, and expressed divergent opinions regarding what comprised those challenges.
A number of States parties focused on the challenge of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Several delegations expressed dismay regarding compliance with the non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty, citing as particular concerns the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's past non-compliance, and the IAEA's investigation into Iran's nuclear programmes. The conditionality of peaceful nuclear cooperation with a State's compliance with its safeguards and non-proliferation obligations was underscored.
Many delegations called for the DPRK to return to the six-party talks to reach a diplomatic solution. Moreover, in light of the DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT, a number of States parties shared proposals for ways to discourage and respond to Treaty withdrawals. During the Conference, President Duarte followed the practice used during the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee and withheld the DPRK nameplate to prevent a discussion of its status.
Several delegations addressed the challenges arising from possible proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-State actors, invoking the discovery of clandestine nuclear proliferation networks and the threat of nuclear terrorism. Most of these delegations drew attention to the potential impact of Security Council resolution 154019 and the adoption of the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in this regard.
The issue of safeguards also featured prominently in the statements of the majority of States parties, particularly the status of the 1997 IAEA Model Protocol Additional to Existing Safeguards Arrangements between States20 and the Agency's Comprehensive safeguard agreement. A large number of delegations called for the Additional Protocol to become the IAEA safeguards standard.
Divisions were apparent regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy, particularly the security-sensitive nature of the nuclear fuel cycle. Some delegations echoed the sentiment expressed by IAEA Director General ElBaradei that greater controls must be put in place over uranium enrichment and plutonium separation technologies, and welcomed the report by the IAEA Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.21 Other States parties expressed concern regarding the possibility of a curtailment of the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Many non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) parties expressed their continued disappointment at the lack of progress on implementation of article VI, particularly in light of the 2000 agreement on the 13 practical steps. A number of delegations voiced concern that new nuclear weapon systems were being developed and strategic doctrines which lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons were being adopted. They conveyed the view that such actions undermined the "unequivocal undertaking" towards nuclear disarmament agreed to during the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The majority of States parties reiterated support for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), with several expressing concern that States whose ratification was needed for the Treaty's entry into force had not yet ratified the CTBT.22 Most delegations also called for negotiations to commence in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material. However, States parties indicated differences on the role of verification in such negotiations. A number of delegations also called for further reductions in the non-strategic nuclear arsenals possessed by nuclear-weapon States.
Many NNWS reiterated their demands for the provision of legally-binding assurances against the use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. Several of these States parties called for the creation of a subsidiary body within the Conference to address this issue.
Most delegations expressed strong support for the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Many statements welcomed the recent agreement on a treaty to establish a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ). Calls continued for the creation of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East. The need for the universality of the Treaty was also stressed, with most delegations calling on the three States which were still not party to the Treaty to join as NNWS.
Following the practice begun during the 2000 NPT Review Conference, representatives from the NGO community were invited to address the Conference to discuss issues related to the Treaty. Several of the Conference side events, such as the Mayors for Peace appeal, commemorated the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.23
Since the Preparatory Committee for the Conference had not agreed on an agenda and programmes of work, much of the first three weeks was spent negotiating procedural issues. The key contention to the adoption of the agenda was the way in which the outcomes of previous review conferences, in particular, the 2000 Review Conference, would be considered for discussion. This dispute was resolved on the tenth day of the Conference through the addition of an asterisk to paragraph 16 of the agenda,24 making reference to a presidential statement and a statement by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which were both read in conjunction with the agenda.25 The presidential statement read: "It is understood that the review will be conducted in the light of the decisions and the resolution of previous Conferences, and allow for discussion of any issue raised by States parties."26 In its statement, the NAM expressed the understanding that the review of the Treaty would be conducted, "in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3 of the Treaty, the decisions and the resolution of previous Conferences, in particular the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the decision of the 2000 Review Conference to adopt by consensus its Final Document".27
Despite the adoption of the agenda on 11 May, disagreement regarding procedural issues continued to delay significant discussion regarding the implementation of the Treaty. In particular, the States parties differed on the issues that would be addressed by the subsidiary bodies. The President initially proposed the creation of one subsidiary body under each Main Committee, with one to discuss disarmament and security assurances under Main Committee I, one to address regional issues and the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East under Main Committee II, and one to consider article X withdrawal issues under Main Committee III. While the NAM delegations insisted on the creation of a separate subsidiary body to discuss security assurances, the United States indicated that it did not want security assurances to be the focus of a subsidiary body. States parties also experienced difficulties regarding agreement on the amount of time to allocate to the subsidiary bodies, as well as the Main Committees. On 18 May, the Conference arrived at an agreement as to the mandates and the time allocated for the Main Committees and the three subsidiary bodies.28 It was decided that, in addition to discussing the items determined for each Main Committee in 2000, Main Committee I would consider non-proliferation and disarmament education, and Main Committee II would address institutional issues, including proposals for institutionally strengthening accountability, compliance and implementation powers.29
While differences over procedural issues were taking place, President Duarte allocated time for the introduction of working papers. Several delegations, along with the European Union (EU), the G-1030, and NAM, presented working papers on substantive topics.
The following sections provide brief descriptions of the discussions that took place in the Main Committees and Subsidiary Bodies of the Conference, along with reference to several working papers by States parties, regional and political groupings that provided substantive recommendations.
Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security
States parties continued to stress the importance of the NPT and most delegations reaffirmed the Treaty's place as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Emphasis was given to the need for States parties to comply with all the provisions of the Treaty's three pillars: nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Many States parties reiterated the need for the universality of the Treaty and called upon the three States that had not yet joined the NPT to accede to the Treaty as NNWS and place all their facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
Compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty continued to be of concern. The United States insisted that States parties should focus on addressing the proliferation threats posed by particular States, non-compliance, and illicit trafficking in nuclear technologies. The EU and the United States stressed the Security Council's role in compliance enforcement.
Several States parties also reiterated continued concern regarding the placement of nuclear weapons outside the territories of the possessor State, with some arguing that such a practice was a violation of article I.
Concerns were also expressed regarding the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons and related materials to non-State actors. In this regard, many States parties supported a reference to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).31 Cuba expressed opposition to that reference and noted that there were other means of addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism.
The issue of disarmament and non-proliferation education (DNP) was discussed. States parties were encouraged to undertake the recommendations provided in the Secretary-General's report on disarmament and non-proliferation education submitted to the fifty-seventy session of the General Assembly. Egypt, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Poland and Sweden submitted a working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education32 which encouraged States parties to support and develop disarmament and non-proliferation activities, to cooperate with academic institutions to develop model curricula on the consequences of proliferation and the importance of disarmament, to designate a focal point on disarmament and non-proliferation education and training, and to inform the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs on steps taken to implement the DNP study.
The majority of NNWS continued to express frustration regarding the pace of progress on nuclear disarmament, particularly with respect to the 13 practical steps agreed to in 2000. Several delegations expressed the belief that certain nuclear-weapon States were stepping back from their commitments at previous conferences, particularly the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and concerns that the military doctrines of the NWS contemplated both the use of nuclear weapons and the development of new ones. The Non-Aligned Movement sought reaffirmation of the need for nuclear-weapon States to fully comply with all their obligations and commitments under article VI, including the 13 practical steps, to which they agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, with a view to accomplishing the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Many States parties also asserted the need for the Conference to produce an outcome which built on the agreements in 1995 and 2000, and continued to stress the principle that the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 did not provide for the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS.
The NAC asserted that progress on the implementation of the 13 practical steps needed to be accelerated and stressed the principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility as they applied to disarmament measures. They submitted a working paper on Main Committee I issues which indicated desired future efforts to implement many of the 13 practical steps.33
The EU welcomed the progress made on disarmament, noting the agreement of the Moscow Treaty, while calling for further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation. The EU also called for the fulfilment of the United States and the Russian Federation's 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives on the reduction of their non-strategic nuclear arsenals, and for further measures to be taken to achieve the greatest possible reductions of these weapons.
The majority of States parties expressed their support for expediting the entry into force of the CTBT. Many delegations continued to call upon the remainder of the 44 Annex II States to ratify the Treaty.
The need for the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a programmes of work, in particular to begin negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices was stressed. While many States parties insisted on language which encouraged negotiations on a fissile material treaty or a fissile material cut-off treaty, disagreements regarding the need for addressing verification continued. The Non-Aligned Movement reiterated its call for the creation of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for negotiations on a phased programmes for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe. A similar call was made by the NAC for a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to address nuclear disarmament.
The moratorium on the testing of, and the production of fissile materials for, nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices pending the entry into force of the relevant treaties continued to receive widespread support from the States parties.
The responsibility of States parties to report on the implementation of article VI was also discussed. Many delegations welcomed the reports that had been submitted to the Conference. The NAC recalled the obligation to report in the context of increasing the transparency and accountability of the NWS in regard to their nuclear arsenals. Canada continued to stress the need for reporting and urged the Conference to adopt a decision to require annual reporting on all provisions of the Treaty by all States parties.
Several NWS issued statements and circulated fact sheets detailing progress on their disarmament obligations. The United States declared its full compliance with article VI. The United States and the Russian Federation, in particular, noted the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty as a sign of progress on disarmament. The United Kingdom submitted a working paper entitled "Verification of nuclear disarmament: final report on studies into the verification of nuclear warheads and their components",34 which detailed its work in determining potential verification procedures for nuclear disarmament. China also submitted a working paper entitled "Nuclear disarmament and reduction of the danger of nuclear war",35 which outlined steps for the NWS to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies.
Many State parties expressed the view that the NNWS had a legitimate right to legally-binding security assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against them by the NWS. The Non-Aligned Movement submitted a working paper on Main Committee I issues36 which expressed the view that the negotiation of a universal, unconditional, and legally-binding instrument on security assurances was necessary for strengthening the NPT regime, and reiterated that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Proposals for the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate legally-binding negative security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament were supported by several NAM States parties.
The NAC underscored that the reaffirmation of Security Council resolution 984 (1995)37 fell short of the commitments made during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in regard to security assurances. They indicated that the 2000 NPT Review Conference went a step further by agreeing that the 2005 NPT Preparatory Committee should make recommendations regarding legally-binding security assurances. In addition, noting the limited time available at the Conference, the NAC expressed a desire to make progress on such work for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
The NWS reiterated their unilateral security assurances contained in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), and their security assurance commitments under the relevant protocols of NWFZs. The United States declared that the best assurance was compliance with obligations of the Treaty, and France expressed the view that States parties in non-compliance should not receive security assurances. China reaffirmed its "no first use" policy, and submitted a working paper entitled "Security Assurances"38 which also called for the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate legally-binding negative security assurances without delay.
While disagreements on language in both Main Committee I and Subsidiary Body I prevented the adoption of text by consensus, the States parties expressed the desire to report the outcome of the deliberations to the Conference as a whole. Two substantive Chairmen's papers were therefore attached to the report of Main Committee I with the understanding that they did not reflect the views of all States parties.
Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards, and nuclear-weapon-free zones
States parties underlined the importance of the strengthened IAEA safeguards and the need for its universalization was stressed. The 43 States parties which had yet to bring into force a safeguards agreement39 with the IAEA were called upon to do so as soon as possible. The IAEA made a statement which provided an overview of the safeguards regime and developments since 2000, outlined the IAEA's efforts to enhance nuclear security, indicated that the strengthened safeguards system must be continuously reviewed and strengthened as appropriate, and expressed the need for the Security Council to promptly consider cases of non-compliance.
Most States parties expressed support for the IAEA Model Additional Protocol. A number of delegations highlighted recent examples of States parties found to be in non-compliance despite their implementation of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements as evidence that such safeguards were insufficient for providing assurances against the existence of undeclared activities. Many delegations considered that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol constituted the IAEA verification standard and proposed that the Conference adopt language to recommend such standardization. A number of delegations proposed that the ratification of an Additional Protocol be made a condition of supply for nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies. Australia indicated that it intended to make the Additional Protocol a condition of supply for the uranium it supplied to NNWS. Some delegations, however, highlighted the voluntary nature of the Additional Protocol, and the NAM emphasized the need to make the distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures.
The United States reiterated its proposal for the establishment of a special safeguards committee of the IAEA Board of Governors to focus on compliance and safeguards issues. The United States also reiterated its view that States parties under investigation by the IAEA should not sit on the Board of Governors.
A number of States parties noted IAEA Director General ElBaradei's description of the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) as a weakness in the IAEA safeguards system and supported a review of the SQP mechanism to resolve this issue.
The NAM reaffirmed its view that the IAEA was the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by State parties with their safeguards agreements. In addition, it maintained that concerns regarding a State party's compliance with the Treaty should be directed to the IAEA for action in accordance with its mandate.
The need to strengthen export controls to prevent the risk of proliferation and the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials was stressed by a number of States parties. As chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Sweden promoted the role of the NSG in nuclear non-proliferation and noted a number of steps the Group had taken to enhance its export control guidelines and measures. The role of Security Council resolution 1540 was also highlighted by many States parties in the context of strengthening national export controls. The G-10 submitted a working paper which promoted transparency in export controls, proposed that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards be reviewed intermittently to account for advances in technology, proposed that Comprehensive Safeguards along with an Additional Protocol be a condition of supply for new nuclear supply arrangements to NNWS, and maintained that transfers of nuclear material should only take place if the recipient State had an effective and adequate national system of nuclear security in place.40
The NAM expressed concern regarding the use of export controls and suggested that undue restrictions were being placed on the export of material, equipment, and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to developing countries. It also maintained that any undue restrictions incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty should be removed and reiterated its position that proliferation concerns were best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory arrangements.
Institutional issues regarding the strengthened review process and preparations for the 2010 Review Conference were also discussed. States parties determined a number of procedural arrangements for the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference. The participation of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations was also encouraged.
Canada stressed the need to overcome the institutional deficit of the Treaty. It submitted a working paper entitled "Achieving permanence with accountability"41 which outlined a number of proposals for this purpose, including holding an annual one-week Conference of States parties to discuss the implementation of the Treaty with a two-week Preparatory Committee two years prior to a Review Conference, and the establishment of a standing bureau of the Treaty to provide oversight and empowered to convene extraordinary meetings of States parties.
Widespread support was expressed for the establishment of NWFZs on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned. Cuba's ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the universalization of the Latin American and Caribbean NWFZ, in 2002, were welcomed. States parties also welcomed the outcome of the Conference of States parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones held in Mexico from 26 to 28 April.42 The need for the respective regional States to sign and ratify the Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba was also stressed. The decision by all five Central Asian States to sign the Central Asian NWFZ was welcomed. Many delegations maintained that NWS should provide unconditional security assurances to all members of a NWFZ.
Australia, the EU, and the United States continued to express concerns regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's (Iran) nuclear programmes. The United States expressed the view that Iran was in violation of both its NPT article II and article III obligations. For its part, the EU noted efforts under the Paris agreement between France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Iran of 15 November 2004, and urged the latter to comply with all of the provisions of the agreement by voluntarily suspending all enrichment and reprocessing activities. At the same time, many delegations also welcomed Iran's December 2003 agreement to sign the Additional Protocol and apply it as if it were in force pending its ratification. Iran insisted that it should not be singled out for criticism of any non-compliance of its obligations and maintained that it was in compliance with the NPT and was cooperating with the IAEA.
A number of States parties welcomed the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's decision, in December 2003, to dismantle its programmes for the development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic delivery systems, its ratification of the CTBT, its implementation of an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and international efforts to verify the dismantlement of these programmes.43 Concern regarding Libya's past non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and its clandestine acquisition of sensitive nuclear technologies through illicit supply networks while party to the NPT and subject to safeguards was also expressed by certain delegations.
Several countries expressed serious concern regarding the DPRK's withdrawal from the Treaty and its 10 February announcement that it had produced nuclear weapons. Many States parties urged the DPRK to return to full compliance with its international non-proliferation obligations under the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and supported the framework of the six-party talks as the appropriate mechanism to address the issue.
States parties also reaffirmed the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. A number of States parties recognized the resolution as one of the elements of the "package deal" which led to the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and efforts to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction were also reiterated.
Many States parties, including the NAM and the League of Arab States, (LAS) reaffirmed the importance of Israel's prompt accession to the NPT and the placement of all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards in order to advance the goals of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.
The League of Arab States submitted a working paper regarding the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East44 which called upon the United Nations to convene a conference to create a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East; sought to obtain a commitment from all NWS to act in conformity with their article I obligations, and for all States parties to act in conformity with their article IV obligations, with respect to Israel; proposed the monitoring of these commitments through reports by the States parties to the 2010 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee; and requested the UN Secretariat to prepare a compilation of such reports for consideration during the 2010 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.
The United States expressed the view that a comprehensive regional peace and an end to weapons of mass destruction programmes in the region might hasten Israel's accession to the NPT and support the objective of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.
Australia urged the countries of the Middle East that had yet signed and ratified the NPT, CTBT, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC), and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC), to do so without delay and encouraged countries in the Middle East to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
The need for India and Pakistan to join the NPT as NNWS was also stressed. States parties reiterated their regret regarding India and Pakistan's nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1998, and called upon both States to take all measures outlined in Security Council resolution 1172 (1998).45 Both countries were also urged to strengthen their export controls over nuclear material, equipment and technologies.
Due to divergent views regarding the language on Iran and proposals for additional efforts to promote Israel's accession to the Treaty, the chair of Subsidiary Body II reported to Main Committee II that there was no consensus on various proposals and that he would submit his working paper under his own responsibility with the understanding that there was no agreement on any part of the text. Main Committee II was similarly unable to reach agreement on its report, and the chair provided the options of either adopting the current paper as a draft for further consultation, while acknowledging that some elements did not enjoy consensus, or not including the paper in the report of Main Committee II to the Conference. Deadlock over these proposals persisted until the time available for negotiations in the Committee elapsed, requiring the chair to declare that consensus could not be reached and the chair's draft would not be attached to the report of Main Committee II.
Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II
The inalienable right of States parties to engage in research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III was reaffirmed. Significant disagreements remained regarding the need to strengthen non-proliferation efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation by States parties and non-State actors and the need to recognize the right of States parties to benefit from the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. China submitted a working paper46 on peaceful uses which underscored the proper balance between safeguards and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and asserted that nuclear non-proliferation efforts should not undermine the legitimate rights of other countries, particularly developing countries, to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Many Western European and Others Group (WEOG) delegations reiterated their support for peaceful nuclear cooperation while stressing the linkage between article IV and compliance with the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations. The EU, G-10, and the United States underscored their belief that a State party which did not comply with its Treaty obligations could not invoke the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The issue of the nuclear fuel cycle remained a matter of serious contention. Many delegations welcomed the report by the IAEA Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, and expressed support for continued work to develop international approaches to reduce the need for States parties to develop the capacity to produce fissile material while ensuring access to nuclear fuel for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The United States continued to cite the misuse of fuel cycle technologies by particular States parties for efforts to develop nuclear weapons and reiterated its proposal to ensure reliable access to nuclear fuel at reasonable cost to NPT States parties that would comply with their obligations and forgo enrichment and reprocessing technologies.
The Russian Federation supported the proposals made by IAEA Director General ElBaradei regarding the establishment of international fuel cycle centers and the provision of guaranteed access to nuclear fuel to States parties.
Argentina submitted a working paper entitled "Multilateral nuclear fuel cycle arrangements",47 which expressed the view that the limitation of nuclear fuel cycle activities to multinational approaches is not practicable and that the effective and efficient implementation of existing non-proliferation measures was the best way to address non-proliferation concerns.
Japan opposed the moratorium on the development of new fuel cycle facilities, suggesting that such an approach did not effectively address proliferation concerns and would unnecessarily hamper nuclear activities for peaceful uses.
States parties continued to express significant support for the role of an IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, and reiterated the 1995 agreement that every effort should be made to ensure that the Agency had the financial and human resources available in order to effectively meet its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation. The EU provided a proposed methodology for the IAEA to adopt its technical cooperation efforts, which included: model projects based on demand and needs; national programming frameworks for the process of selecting projects; thematic planning to ensure a decisive impact on human health, agricultural development, industrial applications, radiological protection, self-sufficiency and sustainability; and the adoption of projects that meet the central criterion of the IAEA Strategy. The NAM insisted that the Technical Cooperation Programme must not be used as a tool for political purposes, and that each State party's decision regarding its peaceful use of nuclear energy must be respected.
General concern was also expressed regarding the safety and security of nuclear facilities and materials used in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The linkage between safety and security concerns and the threat of nuclear terrorism was underscored. Recognizing this linkage, many States parties called for strengthening physical protection efforts for nuclear materials and facilities. Support for the IAEA action plan for the prevention of nuclear terrorism was expressed. Several delegations underscored the need to amend and strengthen the provisions of the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), and called on all States not yet party to accede to the Convention. A number of States parties highlighted the work of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative in securing nuclear facilities and materials internationally. The NAM also underlined the principle that nuclear facilities used for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must not be the targets of attack and expressed a need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting such attacks or threats of attack.
Widespread support was expressed for the work of the IAEA in regard to nuclear safety, including the TranSAS service and the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors. The importance of the Convention for Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Disposal was also widely recognized, and several delegations called on States parties not yet party to these conventions to accede to them. Japan stressed the role of transparency in the transport of nuclear materials in the context of ensuring nuclear security and physical protection. Concerns regarding the transport of nuclear materials by sea were raised by small island developing States parties. The Marshall Islands also submitted a working paper to Main Committee III which called attention to the adverse effects of nuclear testing on the environment and health of affected areas.48
Based on the experience of the DPRK's withdrawal from the Treaty and its previous non-compliance with its non-proliferation obligations, the issue of Treaty withdrawal was given special consideration under Subsidiary Body III. While the sovereign right of any State party to withdraw from the Treaty was reaffirmed, a number of States parties expressed the view that the Conference must make the price of withdrawal from the NPT more costly. A number of delegations cited the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and customary international law as the basis for decisions on withdrawal from the NPT.
The notion that a State remained accountable for any violations committed while party to the Treaty after it had withdrawn received considerable support. The role of the IAEA in verifying a withdrawing State's compliance, as well as providing information on its fissile material production capabilities and holdings was stressed by the United States. The denial of nuclear cooperation with a State which had withdrawn from the Treaty was also widely supported. A number of delegations proposed that supplier countries to a State which had withdrawn should make arrangements for the return or neutralization of nuclear material, facilities and equipment that was provided to the State prior to its withdrawal.
A number of WEOG members stressed the need for the Security Council to promptly consider the extraordinary reasons put forth by a withdrawing State and to address the consequences of such withdrawal. Other States parties expressed opposition to the notion that a withdrawal from the Treaty must be considered a threat to international peace and security. The potential for an extraordinary meeting of NPT States parties in the event of a notice of withdrawal was also proposed.
Despite agreement on the text in a number of areas in Main Committee III, divergent views regarding the text of Subsidiary Body III resulted in the lack of a substantive report of the Main Committee. Egypt insisted that the language on withdrawal should not be included in the report of the Main Committee on the basis that the revised text prepared by the chair had not been discussed. In turn, the United States expressed opposition to the text of the Main Committee just prior to its adoption. Like Main Committee II, Main Committee III was therefore, left with an entirely procedural report without the inclusion of any disputed text.
The First Committee took action on one draft resolution relating to the subject of this chapter.
Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The draft resolution was introduced by the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 9 for the sponsors), on 11 October. The orally revised draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee as follows: as a whole (70-52-22), and preambular paragraph six49 (58-54-23). It was adopted by the General Assembly as follows: as a whole (87-56-26), and preambular paragraph 6 (78-56-27) on 8 December.
The resolution urged the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to follow up on the implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty and agreed to at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference of its States Parties within the framework of the 2010 Review Conference and its preparatory committees; and to include the item in the provisional agenda of the Assembly's sixty-second session.
Four States explained their positions before voting. The United Kingdom, on behalf of itself and the States members of the European Union, would vote against the draft resolution as a whole and the proposed amendment to the sixth preambular paragraph. France said that it would cast negative votes to be consistent with the EUs position and in light of the context in which the draft resolution had been introduced. South Africa would support the draft resolution as a whole and orally revised preambular paragraph six because the text was compatible with its own national nuclear disarmament policy and consistent with the NAM position. On the basis of objective considerations, Egypt stated that it would cast two affirmative votes, even though no references to NPT universality and IAEA safeguards appeared in the draft resolution's operative paragraphs.
After the vote, the United States explained its negative votes by stating that the draft resolution shrouded proliferation and non-compliance under the false mantle of the pace of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. It added that there was a need for rigorous compliance by all nations with their international obligations, including their non-proliferation obligations.
India abstained on the draft resolution as a whole and voted against preambular paragraph six because the draft resolution was embedded in the framework of the NPT of which India was not a State party. It also stated that it could not accept the call for universal adherence to the NPT and the placement of its facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.
Two States explained their affirmative votes. Mexico stressed the urgency of substantive progress in the application of the NPT provisions, particularly to the measures adopted at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. It also appealed to the sponsor of the draft resolution to act in accordance with its commitments to international disarmament instruments, organizations and bodies, and to comply with the nuclear disarmament verification mechanisms. Sri Lanka voted for the draft resolution, but noted that the text lacked balance because it focused only on the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons connected with Article VI of the NPT.
Given the continuing divergences of views over various nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament related issues, the Final Document produced by the Review Conference only outlined the procedural arrangements and proceedings of the Conference.50
A number of delegations delivered closing statements during the last day of the Conference in which they expressed considerable disappointment at the failure of the Conference to produce a consensus outcome on the review of the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Several States parties stressed the need to strengthen the Treaty and to address the challenges facing it. Some delegations also reiterated their respective efforts to advance the objectives of the NPT, both inside and outside the context of the Treaty. Despite the difficulties, the President of the Conference concluded that the proceedings of the Review Conference strengthened his conviction that the NPT still enjoyed the strong support of all States parties.