Recommendations made by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters as its contribution to the work of the High Level Panel
Nuclear Weapons
Those NPT parties that have not yet done so should conclude safeguard agreements with the IAEA promptly.
The NPT Review Conference should make it politically binding for all NPT members to conclude Additional Protocols with the IAEA and to bring them into force expeditiously.
Complementary access as provided for in the Additional Protocol should be used regularly and effectively to create and uphold confidence in existing regimes.
Without prejudice to any action that the Security Council may decide to take, withdrawal should trigger an emergency meeting of NPT States parties, with a view to taking urgent action to correct the situation. The meeting should scrutinize the reasons given by the withdrawing State on its withdrawal in the declaration required by the Treaty; determine, on the basis of IAEA reporting, if the withdrawal was premeditated in bad faith under the deceptive cover of peaceful intentions; recommend to States parties the appropriate reaction towards the withdrawing state; and convey the results of the meeting to the Security Council.
A five-year moratorium on the new construction of such fuel cycle facilities should be declared, accompanied by a guarantee for fuel supply, at market prices, by present suppliers to all parties respecting the moratorium.
The results of the group of experts commissioned by the IAEA Director General to assess ways to "multinationalize" the fuel cycle, which will be available in 2005, should be carefully considered and, as appropriate, implemented by the international community.
The use of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in civilian uses should be considered. States using highly enriched uranium in naval fuel should consider turning to reactor technology that makes use of lower enrichment grades.
The thirteen steps agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, including, inter alia, enhanced transparency, the irreversibility of nuclear weapons reduction, bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty and beginning negotiations on a fissile material cut-off instrument should be implemented promptly.
The further reduction and eventual elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons is of particular priority with regard to the non-state actor threat, as these weapons are most susceptible to theft and easily usable by unauthorized persons.
The achievement of the universality of the NPT should remain one primary objective to be actively pursued and eventually realized by the international community.
Pending universalisation of the NPT, non-parties should undertake to take all necessary measures as contained in the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technology to other actors, and to be accountable, to the degree compatible with national security, to the international community for such measures. States parties should avoid the transfer of all nuclear-related materials, technology, equipment and scientific assistance to non-parties.
Non-parties should take all necessary measures - and the international community should insist they do - to prevent the dangers associated with a nuclear arms race and implied by operating unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
The 2005 NPT Review Conference should explicitly address the risk of non-state actor access to nuclear weapons, material and technology and declare explicitly that preventing such access is included in the undertakings of all parties to the Treaty.
All states should adhere to the Convention on the Physical Security of Nuclear Materials.
The Convention should extend from material in international transport to all nuclear material in domestic use, storage, and transport with a view to making protection for that material comparable to that recommended in the IAEA guideline INFCIRC 225/Rev. 4.
Parties should be requested to report to the IAEA on the adoption of measures undertaken to bring national regulations into conformity with this amendment.
Member states should also consider making extensive use of peer review mechanisms offered by the IAEA to obtain expert checks and recommendations on their national systems to control nuclear materials.
The IAEA should install a "physical security assistance pool", making available on request to member states in need of assistance its own technical, legal and personnel resources as well as resources offered by member states in a position to do so.
The IAEA counterterrorism programme should continue with adequate funding.
The organizations administering existing nuclear-weapon-free zones should alert their membership to the problem of physical security of fissile material.
Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty should begin forthwith in the CD and be conducted expeditiously.
Pending nuclear disarmament, States possessing unsafeguarded stocks of fissile material should undertake unilaterally to observe strict accountancy and physical security measures, and confidence-building measures and transparency should be applied.
The "10 plus 10" programme of the G-8 that offers assistance to republics of the former Soviet Union to secure fissile material both in the civilian and the military realm should be extended, on request, to other States in need of such assistance.
The CD should begin negotiations on a convention for the prohibition of radiological weapons/warfare.
This convention should also explicitly address the obligation by States Parties to prevent the diversion of radioactive material to non-state actors. This should include licensing, registration, reliable custody and orderly disposal of radiological sources.
IAEA activities to recover orphanised radiological sources must continue with adequate funding.
Biological Weapons
States parties should make a major effort to make good use of the measures identified in the draft protocol.
The achievements in the new BWC process must be consolidated.
Measures developed in the new BWC process should be made politically binding.
There should be an organized effort by countries in a position to do so to offer assistance in further national implementation efforts by countries in need of such assistance on a voluntary basis. Efforts should be made at global, regional and national levels.
The threat of BW proliferation, including to non-state actors, should be addressed at all relevant levels. Beyond the global level, efforts should be undertaken multilaterally, regionally, nationally and locally.
Strong efforts should be undertaken to raise awareness about ongoing activities and further needs outside the BWC framework.
Proposals should be prepared in time on how to carry forward the process in the context of the BWC beyond 2006.
All relevant organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) must be part of a sustained, integrated, multifaceted effort in a continuing process with frequent review.
Chemical Weapons
Strengthening and fully utilizing the existing regime. The legal basis is solid and the legitimacy is flawless and there is no doubt that a stronger regime is the best way to prevent access to chemical weapons by terrorist groups and to establish, through mechanisms of international cooperation, means of defence against possible attack by terrorists with such weapons. Specifically, a) achieving universality of the CWC must be accorded priority; and b) providing means and resources to OPCW to utilize fully the instruments of monitoring and verification with regard to both existing chemical weapons (prior to their destruction) and to relevant chemical industry facilities that produce, consume or store sensitive dual use chemicals.
States parties should fully comply with all their obligations under the CWC.
Achieving chemical weapons disarmament is fundamental to guaranteeing non-proliferation. It is vital that chemical disarmament should be tackled with urgency. Every effort should be made by those member States possessing chemical weapons in cooperation with the OPCW to ensure compliance with the destruction deadlines for chemical weapons stockpiles as provided in the CWC, if not sooner. The full implementation of the disarmament provisions of the CWC will contribute greatly to combating chemical terrorism. The possibilities of chemical weapons being subject to theft manifest the importance of destroying all stockpiles of chemical weapons as soon as practicable.
Promoting national implementation, including export controls. The ultimate responsibility for preventing CW from falling in the hands of terrorists rests with States. States should enact national legislation to implement fully the CWC, including criminalizing any activities that violate it. States should adopt stringent regulations obliging private actors handling dual use chemical substances and technologies to prevent the diversion of those assets into unauthorized hands, as well as strict export control measures with regard to dual use chemicals, especially those provided in the schedules of the CWC, reporting duly to OPCW on those transfers stipulated by CWC.
Fostering international cooperation and assistance. Practical mechanisms and measures need to be developed to promote the peaceful use of chemical activities by member States of CWC and to provide emergency assistance to member States against possible CW attacks. This would contribute greatly to promoting the universality and implementation of CWC. Training for special national police and military units to identify CW agents should be provided and on decontaminating affected areas. Technical knowledge should be shared about effective protective suits and modern gas masks preventing the intrusion of aerosolized particles into the respiratory system. Methods and experiences should be made available with respect to civil protection against chemical attacks, including an appropriately prepared national health system.
Following technical developments. OPCW should give high priority to developing its capacity to monitor and assess the risk of new chemical agents that could be relevant to the CWC in view of rapid scientific and technological developments. In this regard, full use should be made of the work of the Scientific Advisory Board. State parties should fully cooperate with the OPCW in this field.
Missiles
Since Security Council resolution 1540 only refers to the issue of missiles in the context of means of delivery of WMD, the Secretary-General should urge the Security Council to adopt a narrower and more operative resolution addressing the issue of shoulder- fired missiles (MANPADS) and their danger to civil aviation through terrorist use. This would constitute an important step in the joint areas of proliferation, terrorism and missiles that are in need of a combination of practical measures, greater international awareness and diplomatic leadership. This is a step that should be considered in the short and immediate term.
In addition, for the medium term, it would be timely for the Security Council and the Secretary-General to call for Member States of the United Nations to adopt effective national export controls in relation to missiles, rockets, MANPADS and any other means of delivery in transfers to other States and a total ban of such transfers to non-state actors that could cause extensive loss of life and mass-disruption in the post 9/11 context. Such export controls could also foster and develop confidence between countries in a regional and global context.
The present UN Panel of Governmental Experts on missiles in all their aspects should provide the Secretary-General with a more focused attempt to strengthen the emerging elements of 'greater agreement' indicated above. The Department of Disarmament Affairs could also provide the Secretary-General with an informal programme of action to strengthen and consolidate those emerging trends in the context of a longer time frame.
The Chairman of the CTC should undertake consultation with the chairmen of the MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Group, the IAEA, the OPCW, the WHO and other relevant organizations, to consider measures that could be taken to enhance the cooperative effort between non-proliferation and counter-terrorism tools. This could be of relevance to the area of missiles and rockets as well.
Small Arms and Light Weapons
Urgent action must be taken by the international community to curb the flow of small arms and light weapons to regions of conflict or with potential for conflict and to ban the supply of such weapons to non-State actors. States should be urged to reach consensus on the issue of banning the supply of SALW to non-State actors. Legal sanctions against perpetrators should be installed.
The Security Council should adopt a resolution obligating the United Nations Member States to enact national laws that implement Security Council arms embargoes and to prosecute violators.
The risks that the legal supply of small arms and light weapons could contribute to enhancing violence in local and regional conflict should be addressed. A universal code of conduct should be adopted on the trade in SALW. Global and regional transparency measures should be adopted.
Develop legally-binding international instruments regulating tracing, marking and controlling brokering of SALW expeditiously. The present negotiations should be pursued with expediency.
The United Nations should take the lead in coordinating more closely with other international organizations and regional organizations to produce synergy in the collective efforts to address the threat posed by the proliferation of SALW.
The United Nations should form a coalition with concerned Member States, parliamentarians, civil society, including non-governmental organizations, in launching a global campaign aimed at preventing, reducing and eradicating the proliferation of SALW.
Post-conflict small arms disarmament programmes should be community-based and human security-centred, and should include local security force reform. The United Nations should coordinate international efforts in collectively providing economic and social incentives to war-affected communities and populations. The successful model of "weapons for development" should be replicated in more communities and countries emerging from conflicts.
Landmines
All State must do their utmost to promote address the humanitarian objectives of the mine issue.
Mine-Ban Convention
Take concrete steps to promote the full implementation of the Convention, in particular, the prevention and suppression of prohibited acts, and ensuring compliance with the Convention. Greater efforts must be made to meet deadlines set out in the Convention, such as those on destruction of stockpiles, mine-clearance, etc.
States parties to the Mine-Ban Convention should promote the universality of the Convention as a priority task. They should undertake strong efforts to include anti-vehicle mines as these have also long-lasting effects on civilian life.
States that believe the Mine-Ban Convention is presently incompatible with their vital security interests should revisit their position regularly. Meanwhile, they should do their utmost to contribute to the fight against the negative humanitarian consequences of landmines by adhering to the Amended Protocol II to the CCW as well as through technical developments.
Utilize the First Review Conference of the Mine-Ban Convention, to renew the political momentum to continue to seek a comprehensive resolution to the humanitarian crises caused by APMs. The United Nations, States parties and civil society should strengthen their cooperation to ensure the participation in the First Review Conference at the highest possible level and the issuance of a strong Political Declaration by the High-Level Segment of the Conference. And all interested actors should help raise the profile of the Review Conference to ensure public pressure is brought to bear in advance to encourage renewed commitments.
Identify a concrete action plan at the First Review Conference aimed at achieving the core objectives of the Convention, namely, clearing mined areas, assisting mine victims, destroying stockpiled mines, and universalizing the Convention.
Efforts should be made to maintain global attention to the Convention, the need for governments and the UN system to assist in implementation by supporting the outcomes of the Review Conference, including mobilizing sufficient resources and providing assistance to mine-affected countries, with a particular emphasis on de-mining.
Further strengthen the comprehensive cooperation across the United Nations, through the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), in addressing the threat posed by APMs in the following areas: global coordination, emergency relief operations, peacekeeping operations, and reconstruction and development. Enhance United Nations' coordination and cooperation with other leading international organizations and NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Committee to Ban Landmines (ICBL), and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian D-mining (GICHD). Anti-vehicle mines should be included.
Amended Protocol II on Landmines
States parties should:
Take concrete measures to ensure the implementation of the Protocol, including the new criteria on mine detectability, self-deactivation and self-destruction, as well as the destruction of old stockpiles inconsistent with the new criteria.
Promote international cooperation aimed at assisting states parties to the Protocol in meeting the new criteria on mine detectability, self-deactivation and self-destruction.
Efforts should be made to persuade those countries not yet parties to the Mine-Ban Convention to agree to be bound by the Amended Protocol II to ensure no gap is left.
Develop a mechanism to hold non-state actors accountable for violating the provisions of Amended Protocol II during intra-state armed conflicts, e.g. making such violation a punishable war crime.
Export controls
It might be appropriate to set up open-ended working groups on the implementation of these export control obligations and to invite the NSG, the Australia Group and the MTCR to give input with regard to possible items to be listed and experiences and models Export control: multilateral cooperation for export control structures and licensing criteria. Other UN Members could draw on such advice on a voluntary basis.
Export control systems should include agreed lists of items to be subjected to export licensing, a catch-all clause dealing with non-listed items destined for weapons programmes, measures to cover the activities of intermediaries such as brokers, measures to ascertain the end use of transferred items, the intangible transfer of technology, a standard for enforcement measures, and an understanding not to undercut negative licensing decisions taken by another state.
At the same time, the members of the export control regimes should consider offers of systematic legal, technical, organizational and financial assistance for the creation of effective export control systems on which those UN Member States lacking the respective resources could draw. While the gap between members and non-members would not be completely closed, it would be narrowed considerably through such practical cooperation.
Open seminars should be offered to enhance information on export control issues and help to develop the skills of both civil society and officials in understanding and implementing export control law and regulation.
The role of the United Nations should be strengthened in fostering cooperation and coordination among Member States on export controls.
There should be a universal information system on illegal procurement and trafficking activities going beyond the present IAEA data base and integrating the insights from the various WMD fields to permit a more comprehensive picture; such a broader exchange would not prevent States from committing to more in-depth intelligence sharing in smaller settings if they so chose.
Efforts should be made to develop broad-based, universal norms and rules for export controls.
PSI should continue to be implemented in a manner consistent with international law.
Intercepts on the high seas where present legal authority is not sufficient should be based on specific Security Council authorization. The acting state should be obliged to report to the Council the evidence forcing interception and the results of the search.
Participants in PSI operations should have in place arrangements to cover any damages that result from intercept and search of transports that prove innocent.
It is advisable to initiate negotiations on ways and means to complement the Law of the Sea in order to cover the cases where presently legal authority for intercept is lacking.
All states should consider becoming supporters of PSI as to make the initiative into a universal, multilateral arrangement.
The Role of the United Nations
In cases of concern about non-compliance, the instruments available within established regimes should be fully utilized. Complementary access under the Additional Protocol (or special inspections as long as the Protocol has not been adopted by all NPT Parties), challenge inspections under the CWC, and investigations under the BWC should be invoked by the respective States Parties to regimes and the organization's bodies whenever needed.
For cases referred to the Security Council, timely and efficient decision-making should be ensured. All relevant information and aspects should be made available for consideration, including the views of states from the region concerned. If required, the Security Council should be able to obtain independent technical expertise on short notice, drawing, as appropriate, on the verification bodies of the regime concerned.
If the threat is not assessed by the Security Council as requiring immediate effective action and important questions of fact remain undisclosed, the imposition of intrusive inspection and elimination activities might be a useful way to address the situation. However, it must be ensured that inspections do not become a device to postpone necessary decisions.
There should be a core technical WMD verification and elimination capability with particular expertise in the BW and missile sector available at UN headquarters. This core organisation should be capable of drawing on a broad roster of experts.
In order to make the most economical use of this expertise, consideration should be given to locating a small core unit, designed to enhance the resources available to the Security Council, within the Department of Disarmament Affairs. Care should be taken to ensure efficiency while avoiding unnecessary growth of bureaucracy.
If existing WMD regimes do not yet contain necessary instruments to cope with new and urgent challenges, and the risk emerging from them appears immediate, the Security Council might decide to mandate steps to remedy the situation.
Measures adopted by the Security Council in such situations should carry a sunset clause, that is, they should be reviewed by the Security Council after an appropriate period of time and be extended only if such a review proved their effectiveness and they are still deemed necessary to combat a serious risk to peace and international security.
When the Security Council adopts a resolution imposing such measures, it should invite simultaneously the members of the respective regimes or, where appropriate, the General Assembly to set up a negotiating body to create a universal legal instrument for provisions that are not covered by existing treaties and agreements and are outside their scope.
Security Council resolution 1540 should be utilised to encourage members of the treaties and agreements to fully implement those provisions that help prevent the transfer of related items and technologies to non-state actors, and to continue their efforts to make the treaties and agreements universal. The Committee installed to supervise the operation of resolution 1540 should assist Member States to achieve at effective implementation and should develop recommendations at the end of its two-year mandate how the provisions of resolution 1540 might be improved.
When the Security Council considers universalizing measures which so far are only binding on regime members, there should be consultations with states not members to such the regimes. Their views and interests should be taken into account.
When the Security Council is considering measures in response to and for the prevention of the proliferation of weapons or other means of mass destruction, the General Assembly should be fully informed about the Council's deliberations and the views of General Assembly members should be taken into account. Close consultations and open sessions of the Security Council are useful in this regard.
The Secretary-General should make use of his article 99 authority whenever, in his opinion, this is necessary to face a threat to international peace and security, including those emerging from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
To be kept abreast of current developments, the Secretary-General should bring together regularly the heads of the OPCW, the IAEA, the CTBTO and the World Health Organisation to be briefed about events, findings and insights relevant to peace and international security.
