Continuing CHAPTER I

Issues related to NPT

Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference

The Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) convened its third session in New York from 26 April to 7 May. At the session the Committee elected Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat (Indonesia) as chairman of the third session. Participants included 123 States parties, five specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations. Representatives of 69 non-governmental organizations attended the third session of the Preparatory Committee as observers.
The Third Session was tasked to produce recommendations and finalise arrangements for the 2005 Conference, such as the rules of procedure, background documentation and agenda. However, the issue of whether the review and discussions in 2005 should be framed in terms of the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference dominated deliberations. As a result there was no agreement on any substantive recommendations as well as no agreement on the agenda or background documentation. The final report adopted on 7 May therefore contained only minimal agreements on procedural matters to enable the 2005 Review Conference to take place.

Substantive work

The Committee held 30 meetings devoted to the substantive discussion of item 6 of its agenda1 namely, preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty.
The Preparatory Committee held a general exchange of views on issues related to all aspects of its work during which 55 statements were made.2
During the substantive discussions, the Committee considered the following three clusters and three specific blocs of issues. States parties put forward documents and proposals in which they reviewed developments since the 2000 NPT Review Conference and outlined measures for further action.

(a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security
States parties reaffirmed that the NPT was the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. They reaffirmed the best way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons was through universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance of all States parties with its provisions. States parties also reaffirmed that effective implementation of the Treaty was vital for maintaining its validity and integrity. A number of States parties noted with grave concern the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to international peace and security. Some States parties also warned that the failure to address and resolve instances of non-compliance would directly undermine the credibility of the Treaty. The United States submitted a document on "the contemporary crisis of compliance,"3 in which it stated that the agreement on non-proliferation principles in the NPT incorporated an understanding that the States should be entitled to cooperate to obtain the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and research, but they may do so only if they complied with the provisions of the Treaty on preventing the misuse of such technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. France submitted a working paper on "strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime"4 in which it proposed the strengthening and universalizing of the rules for sensitive equipment, that new guarantees be given to States in good standing and that action be taken to prevent new breaches of confidence.
Germany submitted a working paper on "Strengthening the NPT against withdrawal and non-compliance"5 as a follow-up to its suggestion made at the second session on the subject. In the working paper, Germany proposed that the Review Conference look for an agreement on the rules and procedures to be observed in case a State party intended to withdraw from the Treaty. France, in its working paper, expressed its views that a State that withdrew from the NPT remained responsible for violations committed while still a party to the Treaty; a withdrawing State should no longer make use of all nuclear materials, facilities, equipment or technologies acquired in a third country before its withdrawal; and inter-Governmental agreements setting the framework for sensitive or major nuclear transfers should include a clause forbidding the use of the transferred nuclear materials, facilities, equipment or technologies in case of a withdrawal.6 The United States noted the proposal made by its President in February 2004 on creating a special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors to focus intensively on safeguards and verification which would strengthen the IAEA's capability to enforce compliance with international nuclear non-proliferation obligations.


Concern was expressed over the continued retention of a nuclear weapons option by the States that remained outside the NPT. A number of non nuclear weapon States (NNWS) cautioned against research and development of new types of nuclear weapons. The possibility of terrorists or non-State actors acquiring nuclear weapons and materials was mentioned as a threat that would undermine the NPT regime.
Some States parties stressed the importance of the Security Council as an international body with enforcement powers and expressed support for Security Council resolution 1540 on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. The Global Partnership Initiative of the Group of 8 (G8), the PSI and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) were discussed as measures taken voluntarily in non-proliferation and counter-proliferation efforts outside the NPT. While some States parties expressed their support for those initiatives, others noted the need for a cautious approach to them.

Security assurances

NAM expressed support for a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances by the nuclear weapon States (NWS) to the NNWS as a matter of priority and called for the establishment of a subsidiary body on the issue at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. It also underlined that the third session of the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the issue of security assurances, given that the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference mandated the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations on the issue to the 2005 Review Conference. Switzerland noted that the security assurances provided outside the NPT were not satisfactory and stressed that NNWS parties to the NPT had a legitimate right to legally-binding security assurances from the NWS. NAC called upon the NWS to respect fully their existing commitments on security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally-binding security assurances for all NNW States parties, which could either be in the form of a separate agreement reached in the context of the NPT, or as a protocol to the Treaty. China submitted a working paper on security assurances7 which contained proposals for the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 NPT Review Conference on this subject. They included no first use of nuclear weapons or no threat of use of nuclear weapons against NNWS; a diminished role for nuclear weapons in national security strategies; support of the NWS for nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ); and the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament. The Republic of Korea stressed that only the NNW States parties complying fully with their obligations under the NPT had a legitimate right to credible and reliable negative security assurances from the NWS.

(b) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones
General support was expressed for the concept of NWFZs established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned. The contribution of such zones to enhancing global and regional peace and security was recognized. A number of States parties welcomed the progress made so far in concluding an agreement to establish a NWFZ in Central Asia. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan submitted a working paper proposing elements on the subject to be included in the report of the Preparatory Committee.8 The ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) Member States submitted a working paper on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone,9 in which the Association reported that it had been holding direct consultations with the NWS on their terms of accession to the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty. Mexico stated that it would continue to promote cooperation and exchange of information among the Member States of the existing NWFZs with the eventual holding of a conference of States parties and signatories of the NWFZ treaties.
The NWS were urged to conclude protocols to respective NWFZ treaties. In that regard, NAM stressed that the NWS should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of NWFZs.


States parties stressed the need for the universalization of strengthened IAEA safeguards. In that connection, they urged the 44 States that had not yet concluded any safeguards agreements with the IAEA to do so without delay. Australia stated that the revelations of previously undeclared nuclear programmes in Libya and Iran clearly showed that comprehensive IAEA safeguards were not sufficient to prevent proliferating States covertly acquiring sensitive nuclear materials and technology, and that there should be no question of the urgency of universal application of the strengthened IAEA safeguards system. The United States recalled the steps outlined by its President to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which included universal adoption of the Additional Protocol and making signature of the Additional Protocol a condition of nuclear supply by the end of 2005.
The announcement by the EU that the Additional Protocols of all its Member States were entering into force was welcomed. The NWS were urged to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification, and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes.
NAM reaffirmed its view that the IAEA was the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1 of the NPT. Further, they believed that States parties that had concerns regarding non-compliance by other States parties with their safeguards agreements should direct such concerns to the IAEA for action in accordance with its mandate. States parties welcomed the completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards by the IAEA.
Some States parties recognized that the strengthened safeguards system, comprised of safeguards arrangements as contained in INFCIRC/153 (comprehensive safeguards agreements) and the Additional Protocol, should be a condition for new nuclear supply arrangements to NNWS and verification standards. Canada urged the Preparatory Committee to recommend that the 2005 NPT Review Conference take a decision that the Additional Protocol be mandatory under Article III of the Treaty.
Iran's signature of the Additional Protocol in December 2003 and its announcement that the State would act as if it had ratified the Protocol pending its actual ratification were welcomed. The announcement by Libya of its decision to sign the Additional Protocol was also welcomed.

Export controls

The role of export controls in preventing proliferation was discussed. The United States underlined that in order to fulfil Article I obligations, the NWS must have in place comprehensive and effective export controls and must protect sensitive nuclear weapons information, facilities and material. Germany submitted a working paper on export controls10 and stressed the need for defining a minimum standard of export controls which addressed the question of "dual-use" items as well and proposed an active role for the IAEA in enhancing nuclear export controls as required by Article III.

(c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II
States parties reaffirmed the inalienable right of the States parties to engage in research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as well as Article IV of the NPT which provided a framework for cooperation in that area. At the same time, some States parties reiterated that such a right must be in conformity with obligations under Articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Some also expressed support for strengthening control over the export and transfer of nuclear material and technology in view of the revelation of illicit trade and trafficking of such material, technology and equipment. Switzerland, in that connection, noted that a fair balance had to be struck between rules to avoid misuse of nuclear energy and technology and the risk of unjustified discrimination against NNWS that had demonstrated excellent non-proliferation credentials. The United Kingdom recalled its proposal of February 2004 that States parties that had failed to comply with their safeguards obligations should forfeit the right to access to some of the benefits of peaceful uses. Brazil expressed concern over the risk that new restrictions on nuclear research and development would be decided and enforced by small groups of like-minded nations or even unilaterally and stressed the importance of differentiating between States in good standing in the matter and would-be proliferators and respecting the legitimate scientific and/or commercial interests of developing nations.
Some States parties underscored the role of nuclear technology and science in sustainable development, health and human security. States parties commended the work of the IAEA in implementing its Technical Cooperation Programme. They stressed the importance of ensuring that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund received sufficient financing. The IAEA gave the Preparatory Committee an overview of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme.
China submitted a working paper on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,11 which put forward possible recommendations from the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 NPT Review Conference on the subject.

Specific blocs
(a) Implementation of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", as well as the agreements, conclusions and commitments listed under the section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
A number of NNWS continued to express their disappointment over the slow progress made in implementing the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", as agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. These practical steps were considered a strong basis for progress in the field of nuclear disarmament by many. NAM, Austria and Switzerland called on the NWS to reaffirm and fully implement the unequivocal undertaking through accelerated, progressive and full implementation of all the practical steps. Some States parties recognized the nuclear disarmament measures taken so far. The EU encouraged further progress towards systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament.
NAM underscored that indefinite extension of the NPT did not imply the indefinite possession by the NWS of their nuclear weapons arsenals and that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons was incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. NAC stressed the need for the NWS to effectively reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally and formalize their unilateral declarations into legal instruments including provisions ensuring transparency, verification and irreversibility.12
The NWS reiterated their commitment to nuclear disarmament and noted the progress that had been made in nuclear disarmament. They respectively presented the measures taken in reducing their nuclear weapons arsenals. China presented its basic positions and policies on nuclear disarmament. France reported on its efforts in reducing its nuclear arsenal and delivery vehicles as well as dismantling its nuclear testing sites. Russia presented the nuclear disarmament measures it had taken both unilaterally and through bilateral agreements. The United States presented a record of its compliance with Article VI. The United Kingdom submitted the second interim report on studies into the verification of nuclear warheads and their components.13
While many States parties and the EU welcomed the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, they called upon the United States and Russia to make the Treaty reductions irreversible and verifiable.
A number of States parties stressed the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT and called upon all States that had not yet signed and ratified the Treaty, particularly the 12 States whose ratification was required for its entry into force, to do so without delay and unconditionally. At the same time, they urged all States to abide by a moratorium and to refrain from any actions which were contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT. The United States was urged to change its position on the Treaty.
States parties called for the immediate commencement of a negotiation on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material (FMCT) for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Until a cut-off treaty entered into force, all relevant States were urged to uphold or declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material destined for nuclear weapons. NAC called for an appropriate subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament. NAM stressed the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specific time frame, and thus the importance of establishing a subsidiary body in the Conference with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament as the highest priority.
A number of States parties, including Canada and the EU members, underlined the importance of applying the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament. NAC called for irreversible destruction (rather than storage) of non-deployed nuclear warheads, as well as closing and dismantling of nuclear test sites. It was stressed that the fundamental principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility be applied to all nuclear disarmament measures.14 The NWS were urged to take further measures to de-alert and de-activate nuclear weapons systems, to remove nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles and to withdraw nuclear forces from active deployment pending the total elimination of those weapons.
Many NNWS expressed concern over strategic and military doctrines based on the possession of nuclear weapons, on the possibility of pre-emptive use of such weapons and on the possible development of new types of nuclear weapons which would lower the nuclear threshold and undermine disarmament commitments.
Reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons were considered by Austria, Sweden, Ukraine, NAC and the EU to be an integral part of the nuclear arms control and disarmament process which should be given priority. Canada and the EU encouraged all States concerned to start negotiations on an effectively verifiable agreement to best achieve the greatest reductions in these weapons. NAC called for achievement of further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons.15 While the progress made in the implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of the United States and Russia in 1991 and 1992 was welcomed, the NAC called upon the two States to preserve, reaffirm and formalize the Initiatives into a legally-binding agreement, ensuring the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verification. The United States and Russia pointed to the progress that had been made in reducing their non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenals. Russia reported that it had practically completed all its initiatives concerning non-strategic nuclear weapons reductions, except for elimination of its army's nuclear munitions. Austria, Sweden and Ukraine submitted a working paper on "reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons".16 The paper proposed specific recommendations to be made on this subject by the PrepCom to the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
The issue of regular reporting on the implementation of Article VI as called for in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference was also discussed by a number of States parties. NNWS underscored the importance of regular reporting in enhancing transparency and accountability in the Treaty's implementation as well as in confidence-building. Many considered reporting as an obligation and that reports should be submitted to each Preparatory Commission and Review Conference. As for the contents of the reports, many concurred that they should address policies and provide comprehensive and specific information on measures taken in nuclear disarmament.
The responsibility of the NWS to submit reports was underlined and the information already made available by the NWS was welcomed. Canada, however, noted that it would be desirable to receive information from the NWS on their nuclear arsenals (both strategic and non-strategic), operational status, and policy and doctrine, preferably in the form of a formal report.17 In its working paper, Canada provided ideas to improve the reporting with a view to taking a decision at the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
(b) Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution and the commitments, conclusions and follow-up submissions to the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 2005 Review Conference and the Chairpersons of the Preparatory Committee meetings, in accordance with the relevant sub-paragraphs listed under the section entitled "Regional issues: The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East", contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference
The Arab Group stated that the 2005 NPT Review Conference must stress the importance of Israel's ratification of the NPT as a first step towards the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East. In that regard, Canada appealed to all States in the region to further contribute to regional stability and security and demonstrate greater openness and transparency by concluding Additional Protocols to their respective safeguards agreements. Australia urged the States in the Middle East that had not signed or ratified the NPT, the CTBT, the BWC and the CWC to do so without delay. The United Kingdom reaffirmed its commitment to moving the Middle East peace process forward and stated that the roadmap still described the best route to peace. In its working paper,18 the Arab Group recalled that the resolution on the Middle East constituted an inseparable part of the NPT review process and thus it must be accorded due attention and sufficient time for discussion and the submission of recommendations regarding it from the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 Review Conference.
Some States parties welcomed the signature by Iran of the IAEA Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003 and called for its early ratification. Some other States parties expressed concern over the remaining issues regarding IAEA verification of Iran's nuclear programme and called upon the latter to fully cooperate with the Agency. Iran stated that it had been vigilant regarding compliance with its obligations under Article II and non-diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons. Iran also noted that it had embarked on a programme of cooperation with the IAEA on the basis of full transparency and that it was provisionally implementing the Additional Protocol, undergoing intensive rounds of inspections and complementary access to different sites inside the country. States parties welcomed the decision by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to abandon its WMD programme and ratify the CTBT and the CWC.
States parties called on the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and reverse its announced withdrawal from the NPT. They expressed support for the Six Party Talks as the best prospect for establishing peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.
States parties called on India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT as NNWS and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and conclude Additional Protocols. They welcomed the continuing moratoria of India and Pakistan on nuclear testing and called on them to sign and ratify the CTBT and to continue their mutual confidence-building measures.

(c) Safety and security of peaceful nuclear programmes
The increased risk of nuclear weapons, technology and material falling into the hands of terrorists and the possibility of terrorists attacking nuclear facilities were underscored. The importance of enhancing physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, as well as national measures to protect sensitive technology and material, including export controls, was stressed. States parties underscored the importance of ensuring that peaceful nuclear activities were carried out in accordance with the highest international safety and security standards. States parties commended the contribution of the IAEA in the area of nuclear security and safety.
Germany, in its working paper,19 noting the continuing risk of non-State actors acquiring nuclear material, expressed its view that it was necessary for the States parties to adopt a set of mutually reinforcing measures to enhance the security of existing stocks of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. To that end, it suggested that the 2005 Review Conference should give an impetus to the elaboration and establishment of such measures like a data exchange of existing stocks and a legally-binding universal standard for physical protection of nuclear material. The Conference should also urge the elimination of all (surplus) stocks and recommend the cessation of the production of weapons usable material.
The EU reaffirmed the importance of the safe and effective management of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes and recognized the work done for the disposition of weapons origin material in the United States and the Russian Federation, including the verification of the disposition by the IAEA. Switzerland, on behalf of several countries, submitted a working paper on "Plutonium Management Group: Activities since the 2000 NPT Review Conference."20 In the paper, the States parties participating in the Plutonium Management Guidelines (INFCIRC/549) reviewed their activities since the 2000 NPT Review Conference and suggested that the 2005 NPT Review Conference should encourage all other States who separate, hold, process or use separated plutonium in their civil nuclear activities to adopt policies similar to those adopted by the participants in the Guidelines.
States parties called on the States that had not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). They also urged all IAEA Member States to accelerate final negotiations on an amendment to strengthen the CPPNM and support a diplomatic conference by the end of 2004. States parties welcomed the conclusion of the negotiations on the revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its adoption by the IAEA General Conference. They also welcomed the progress made in the improvement of IAEA safety standards and their application.
NAM stressed the importance of GA resolution 58/60 on the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes and called upon States to take appropriate measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States. NAM also called for effective implementation of the IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste as a means to enhance the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories.
States parties also called for the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities as part of the non-proliferation regime, in light of the heightened risk of nuclear terrorism. In this connection, States parties expressed support for the IAEA action plan on protection against nuclear terrorism. Russia announced that the first phase of its initiative put forward at the Millennium Summit to develop proliferation resistant nuclear technologies had been successfully implemented within the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) under the IAEA auspices, and called upon all the States parties to join the project in full scale.
The IAEA made a presentation on the enhanced physical protection measures and the Agency's Plan of Action for Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism.

Procedural issues
On the issue of the status of the DPRK, the Chairman made a statement21 informing the meeting that as a result of his consultations on the issue, he would retain the nameplate of DPRK temporarily in his custody. The Committee took note of the statement.
The Committee considered the draft rules of procedure for the Conference and agreed to recommend them to the Conference. At the session, the Committee unanimously endorsed the candidacy of Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil for the presidency of the 2005 Review Conference. The Committee agreed to recommend that Main Committee I should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States, i.e., the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee (Indonesia); Main Committee II should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States, i.e., the Chairman of the second session of the Preparatory Committee (Hungary); and that Main Committee III should be chaired by a representative of the Western Group, i.e., the Chairman of the first session of the Preparatory Committee (Sweden). The Committee also agreed to recommend that the post of Chairman of the Drafting Committee be assumed by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States, and the post of Chairman of the Credentials Committee by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States.
The Committee authorized its Bureau and the President-Elect to handle technical and other organizational matters, as well as to carry out consultations with States parties in the period before the Conference. It also decided that the Chairman of the third session should open the Conference.
The Committee agreed to the schedule for the division of costs. The schedule for the division of costs is contained in the appendix to the draft rules of procedure as reflected in annex III to the final report of the Preparatory Committee.
The Committee decided to defer the consideration of final document(s) of the 2005 NPT Review Conference to the Review Conference.
Despite the efforts of the States parties, the Preparatory Committee was unable to reach agreement on the provisional agenda of the Review Conference, background documentation and substantive recommendations for the Conference. The Preparatory Committee adopted its final report at its last meeting, on 7 May 2004.

1NPT/CONF.2005/1, para.18. This and all subsequent documents of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference are available from
2NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/SR.1-3 and 5, available from the web site of the Official Document System of the United Nations,
6See footnote 14.
14NPT/CONF.2005/ PC.III/11.
15Ibid., p. 4.
20NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.10. Working paper submitted by Switzerland, on behalf of Belgium, China, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.
21"I would like to refer to some aspects of my consultations prior to this session, which I carried out in accordance with the mandate given to the Chairpersons of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee as contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. My consultations revealed, inter alia, the continuation of divergent views on the status of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the NPT. The consultations also revealed that States Parties were ready to uphold, in this regard, the procedure applied by my predecessor, Ambassador László Molnár. Accordingly, it is the intention of the Chair, under his own responsibility, not to open a debate on this issue and to retain the nameplate of the said country temporarily in his custody. The Chair has therefore asked the Secretariat to hold the nameplate in the conference room for the duration of the third session of the Preparatory Committee. This is in no way meant to prejudice the outcome of ongoing consultations on this issue."