Concepts of Security
NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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FOREWORD BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. The present study was carried out by a group of governmental experts appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 38/188 H of 20 December 1983, which called for "a comprehensive study of concepts of security, in particular security policies which emphasize co-operative efforts and mutual understanding between States, with a view to developing proposals for policies aimed at preventing the arms race, building confidence in relations between States, enhancing the possibility of reaching agreements on arms limitation and disarmament and promoting political and economic security".

2. As experts concluded in the study, concepts of security are the different bases on which States and the international community as a whole rely for their security. Any discussion of security concepts is complex and, understandably, controversial. Nevertheless, the need to discuss these issues is real if mutual trust, respect and understanding are to be enhanced.

3. In their report, the group recognized that the different security concepts have evolved in response to the need for national security and as a result of changing political, military, economic and other circumstances. Concepts of security contain different elements such as military capabilities, economic strength, social development, technological and scientific progress as well as political co-operation through the use of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, also involving international organizations. Concepts of security may emphasize any one of these elements or a combination of them and may stress national unilateral action to maintain security or multilateral co-operative approaches. Traditionally concepts of security have emphasized unilateral steps to reduce national vulnerabilities through military defence.

4. All nations have the right to defend their own security. There is, however, a responsibility borne by all to ensure that national policies do not jeopardize global security. As the General Assembly declared in 1978, mankind is today confronted with a threat of self-extinction arising from the massive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. To avoid the risk of nuclear war it is necessary to reverse the nuclear arms race. The group believes that sharing by all nations of the following common understandings, which are set forth in the present report, can be particularly important in the present nuclear age:

   a. All nations have the right to security;

   b. The use of military force for purposes other than self-defence is not a legitimate instrument of national policy;

   c. Security should be understood in comprehensive terms, recognizing the growing interdependence of political, military, economic, social, geographical and technological factors;

   d. Security is the concern of all nations and in the light of the threat of proliferating challenges to global security all nations have the right and duty to participate in the search for constructive solutions;
e. The world's diversities with respect to ethnic origins, language, culture, history, customs, ideologies, political institutions, socio-economic systems and levels of development should not be allowed to constitute obstacles to international co-operation for peace and security.

f. Disarmament and arms limitation, particularly nuclear disarmament, is an important approach to international peace and security and it has thus become the most urgent task facing the entire international community.

5. It should be understood that the observations and recommendations contained in the present report are those of the members of the Group of Experts. I wish to take this opportunity to thank them for their valuable efforts in preparing this study, which was adopted by consensus on 19 July 1985 and which is hereby submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration.
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

19 July 1985

Sir,

I have the honour to submit herewith the report of the Group of Governmental Experts to Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security, which was appointed by you in pursuance of paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 38/188 H of 20 December 1983.

The experts appointed in accordance with the General Assembly resolution were the following:

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Mr. Ross Thomas
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Department of Defence
Australia

The report was prepared between July 1984 and July 1985, during which period
the Group held four sessions, the first from 23 to 27 July 1984, the second from
7 to 18 January 1985, the third from 8 to 19 April 1985 and the fourth from 8 to
19 July 1985. All sessions were held at United Nations Headquarters in New York.
The members of the Group of Experts wish to express their gratitude for the assistance that they received from members of the Secretariat of the United Nations. They wish, in particular, to thank Mr. Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General, and Mr. Lin Kuo-Chung of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, who served as Secretary of the Group.

It is with satisfaction that I am able to inform you, on behalf of all members of the Group, that the report as a whole has been adopted by consensus.

(Signed) Anders FERM
Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts to Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 38/188 H of 20 December 1983, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study of concepts of security. In the operative paragraphs of that resolution, the General Assembly:

"1. Welcomes the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1/ as a timely and constructive contribution to international efforts to achieve disarmament and to maintain and strengthen international peace and security;

"2. Recommends that the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues be duly taken into account in ongoing and future disarmament efforts;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, 2/ to carry out a comprehensive study of concepts of security, in particular security policies which emphasize co-operative efforts and mutual understanding between States, with a view to developing proposals for policies aimed at preventing the arms race, building confidence in the relations between States, enhancing the possibility of reaching agreements on arms limitation and disarmament and promoting political and economic security;

"4. Invites all States to submit to the Secretary-General, not later than 1 April 1984, their views on the content of such a study and to co-operate with him in order to achieve the objectives of the study;

"5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session."

1/ A/CN.10/38; see also A/CN.10/51.

2/ Subsequently referred to as the Group of Governmental Experts to Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security.

2. The subjects of this study are basic concepts and policies of security. It includes consideration of several specific questions, such as the meaning of security, security perceptions and needs in the context of contemporary circumstances, the relationships between international, regional, national and individual security concerns, and international security in connection with individual national security policies. The study attempts to address some of these issues in the belief that an understanding of the broader scope of global security should make it possible for States to deal more effectively, both individually and collectively, with current problems and threats to peace.
3. In principle, security is a condition in which States consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressure or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely their own development and progress. International security is thus the result and the sum of the security of each and every State member of the international community; accordingly, international security cannot be reached without full international co-operation. However, security is a relative rather than an absolute term. National and international security need to be viewed as matters of degree.

4. The study of security concepts and policies arises from several major developments in international relations. Force continues to be widely used as a means of promoting national security. Developments in science and technology and military strategy are driving the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, to new heights and are thus increasing the dangers of nuclear war. New weapons systems and technologies, such as anti-satellite systems, laser and particle-beam weapons and long-range cruise missiles are significantly altering the composition of the military relationships among the major Powers. In addition, the international diffusion of advanced military technologies and military capabilities is exacerbating the dangers of international conflicts. Meanwhile, the process of negotiation on measures of arms limitation and disarmament has so far achieved very little and lagged far behind arms technology developments. Issues relating to international peace and security are prominent among matters dealt with in various organs of the United Nations, such as the Security Council, the General Assembly both in its regular sessions and in special sessions devoted to disarmament, in subsidiary bodies of the Assembly, particularly the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission, as well as in the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. Through the years the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted by consensus a number of documents on this important subject. In addition to various deliberations on the question of international peace and security within the United Nations framework, a series of expert studies, carried out by the Secretary-General with the assistance of qualified experts, has further demonstrated the efforts of the United Nations devoted to this important subject. 1/

5. In addition to these worsening military developments, there are serious new challenges to global political and economic problems. The emergence of new centres of political and economic power, resource scarcities, trade deficits, financial debts, over-population and threats posed by natural calamities and environmental degradation have combined to create hitherto unforeseen problems in the period following the Second World War. New actors, new issues, more complicated linkages between old issues all tug at the fabric of international relations. These circumstances challenge the capacity of the international community to adapt to the rapidity of global change and indeed create growing challenges in all aspects of human activities. As pointed out by the Secretary-General, they have placed the world on the thin margin between catastrophe and survival. 2/ The shadow of nuclear war has given a historically unprecedented and urgent dimension to the concerns for global security.

6. However, if the current situation is filled with danger, it is also filled with opportunity. At the very time when the consequences of nuclear war and the dangers of instability are greater than ever, so also are the potential rewards of
co-operation and mutual understanding. Thus, the conditions that pose new threats also provide the incentive to search for new means of attaining security, new efforts to build a more stable world capable of accommodating global change peacefully, achieving arms reduction and disarmament, enhancing respect for sovereignty and human rights, and solving economic problems.

7. In addition to various efforts made within the United Nations framework, security-related analysis has been the subject of both individual and collective endeavours. This is a result of the growing concern with security in the nuclear age that has led to the formation and the growth of popular peace movements. An important example of documents prepared by non-governmental organizations is the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues.

8. One nation's security is often another's insecurity, and between such diverging perceptions there is often little room for compromise and negotiation. Against the range of perceived threats and vulnerabilities that enter into the calculations of those entrusted with the safety and prosperity of individual nations, the logic of co-operation and accommodation often counts for little. The attempt to review concepts of security has never been so timely and the need for defining norms of international behaviour never more urgent.

9. The purpose of this study is to encourage national policy-makers to look into the problem in its entirety, to see the growing interactions between issues and to understand that the security of nations can no longer be divorced from the security of the entire international community of which they are an ever more integral part. In view of the militarily important positions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, it is recognized that their support of this approach to security is particularly significant. However, the objective of ensuring security for the world requires the endeavours of every member of the international community. It will therefore be the task of all nations to weigh the recommendations contained in this study and to translate them into national policies.

10. Chapter II, entitled "Overview of security concepts", examines various security concepts. Chapter III, "Problems and threats in international security", describes the emerging challenges posed to older concepts of security along with the development of modern science and technology as well as the complication of international relations, the dynamics of development in the developing regions, military aspects of the nuclear and conventional arms race, the emergence of new global resources and modern environmental issues. Chapter IV, "Measures to promote international peace and security", defines principles, approaches, measures and mechanisms to deal with threats to global security. The chapter focuses on the need to strengthen the role of the United Nations and its security system, on ways and means to enhance regional co-operation, on effective measures and opportunities for arms negotiations, especially the prevention of nuclear war, and the need for expanded confidence-building measures among States, particularly the nuclear States. Chapter V contains the conclusions and recommendations of this study with a view to facilitating the formulation of national security policies that would promote international peace and security.
11. Concepts of security are the different bases on which States and the international community as a whole rely for their security. Examples of concepts are the "balance of power", "deterrence", "peaceful coexistence" and "collective security". Security policies, on the other hand, are means to promote security, such as disarmament and arms limitation arrangements or the maintenance and development of military capabilities. There is no clear-cut line between a "concept" and a "policy" and it is not necessary to define one as long as the general thrust is kept in mind.

12. Any discussion of security concepts is complex and, understandably, controversial. It concerns important and sensitive political issues. The perspectives differ. Even the most basic definitions and perceptions may be subject to controversy. Nevertheless, the need to discuss these issues is real if mutual trust, respect and understanding are to be enhanced. This discussion should take place on the broadest possible basis. No nation should withdraw from this challenge, but contribute to efforts that seek to identify the common ground between nations.

13. This chapter endeavours to give an overview of various security concepts and approaches through which States have striven to maximize their national security. In this context the relationship of such concepts, policies and principles to the broader issues of international security will also be considered. The discussion of those security concepts, principles and policies in this chapter is descriptive. The order in which they are listed is without prejudice with regard to their validity, importance or priority.

A. Concept of balance of power

14. In one form or another, the "balance of power" has been a feature of international relations since the advent of the state system. Although the meaning of the term "balance of power" appears self-evident, it may be understood in several ways. It may describe the general character of an international system where States, in the absence of a higher authority regulating relations between them, seek security by creating power arrangements that reduce the risk of attack upon them, a process that has tended to produce offsetting coalitions against emerging concentrations of power anywhere in the system. It may refer to a situation in which equivalent power is held by two or more nations or groups of nations and to a policy of promoting the creation or preservation of such equivalence in power. Also, it is sometimes understood as a system of international relations in which agreed arrangements are made by States concerning the operation and adjustment of their power relationships, which may be reflected either in a lower or higher level of armaments.
15. The concept of balance of power had its heyday in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In Europe, the concept was expressed as a multiple balance among at least five great Powers, any combination of which was considered capable of neutralizing an aggressor. The system had no central organization. However, the concept suffered disrepute during the first half of the twentieth century.

16. Various problems are inherent in the balance of power concept. In addition to the difficulty of defining and measuring "power", the concept implicitly legitimizes the use of force in international relations. Furthermore, in their pursuit of security States often try to create and maintain a "favourable" balance of power, i.e. a preponderance of power for themselves, which adds to international tension and stimulates arms races. The balance of power as a system was not capable of dealing with the security needs of all States. It often produced equilibrium between the great Powers but tolerated both territorial annexations in Europe and imperial expansion in regions of developing countries.

17. The relative balance between countries in a region is a factor that States consider in addressing their security concerns. The perspective of a small and weak State is different from that of a major Power, and also depends on whether the State is a member of an alliance or not. Major powers can influence and upset the balance, while, very often, small nations do not have many options but to adjust to the situation and to try to stay out of the struggle for power and influence as best they can. Often they have become the victims of the power struggle and of situations when the balance is upset.

18. The balance of power concept has often been the basis for the formation of military alliances. However, the various alliances that have been formed in the years since the Second World War have been the product of a range of causes. In existing international conditions, a number of States, including many smaller and less powerful ones, see substantial value in arrangements with other countries for the provision of mutual assistance in the event of an armed attack against any of them.

19. The roots of the present arms race are many and complex. To a large extent they can be found in political and socio-economic differences between the countries from the two groups of States that later came to form the two main alliances. In political terms, the tensions between East and West still constitute the central feature of the present arms race.

20. The post-war alliance system has not been able to eliminate the essential dilemma of security in the nuclear age: the problem of ensuring mutual security. Any measure designed to improve the military security of one side may weaken the security of the other. The post-war alliances have been able to increase their collective military strength but not to solve the problem of insecurity in the international system, especially in the nuclear age. States members of the Warsaw Treaty have proposed on various occasions the simultaneous dissolution of their alliance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and, as a first step, their military organizations.
B. Concept of deterrence

21. According to the advocates of this concept, deterrence is a security concept whose objective is to dissuade a potential adversary from initiating war, by threatening the use of force in order either to deny an adversary from gaining his objectives by military means or to punish the adversary should he seek to do so. In effect it seeks to persuade an adversary that the risks and costs of acts of aggression will exceed any gains that might be obtained from such acts. If war is not avoided, deterrence has failed.

22. Deterrence has probably been practised since the earliest stages of human existence. Although the concept of deterrence is not supported by all the major Powers or for that matter by various other countries, it remains an important concept because, with the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the growth in the size and destructive capacities of arsenals of conventional weapons, the pursuit of national policies designed to sustain deterrence inevitably has major implications for other countries and for broad international security.

23. In the view of some States, conventional deterrence depends for its effectiveness primarily on the possession by States of military capabilities that are structured for self-defence of their national territory, so as to deny an adversary the prospect of securing territorial, political or economic gains by the use of military force. In their view nuclear deterrence, in contrast, relies mainly on the possession of offensive nuclear capabilities that would be used to punish an adversary in the event that that adversary were to initiate conflict. Some of them consider that some additional capabilities may also be needed, such as those that would enable retaliatory attacks to be conducted against military installations in an aggressor State's own territory.

24. In the view of some other States, conventional deterrence is based on the same negative features as nuclear deterrence. They consider that the creation of highly precise weapons of great destructive power on the basis of the most modern technology, which in their destructive capacity approach nuclear weapons, lead to lowering the threshold between conventional and nuclear deterrence; the plans providing for the use of such weapons by a nuclear weapon State or by its ally against targets in the territory of a presumed adversary would lower the "nuclear threshold" and would inevitably increase the risk of nuclear war.

25. A distinction that can be made between conventional and nuclear deterrence relates to their consequences, should deterrence fail and conflict eventuate. Although failures in conventional deterrence could well result in wars causing enormous devastation, failure of nuclear deterrence would threaten the very survival of humankind. As the possibility that nuclear deterrence might fail cannot be ruled out, the viability and implications of this concept of security are of major concern to all.

26. The notions of "balance" and "parity" play an important role in the relationship between East and West and in nuclear deterrence. However, these terms are interpreted in different ways. Sometimes the "balance" is calculated on the level of a region or on the level of specific weapon systems. Sometimes it is
interpreted on the global level, taking into account conventional and nuclear forces and allowing for the wide difference in the structure of deployed weapons. "Parity" is sometimes defined as a situation when neither side possesses the capacity for a "disarming" nuclear missile strike; if either side became the victim of nuclear aggression it would preserve sufficient means to deal a retaliating blow to the aggressor. It can also, however, refer to quantitative and qualitative aspects of the nuclear arsenals of the two sides.

27. The concept of nuclear deterrence is subject to great controversy. In the following paragraphs an attempt is made to summarize the differing views on this concept.

28. Some States that are proponents of nuclear deterrence consider that possession of a capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons has been and is likely to remain a virtual guarantee preventing the outbreak of any major conflict - either conventional or nuclear - among the nuclear-weapon States. They argue that the prospect of mutual devastation that each would suffer from nuclear conflict gives all concerned a fundamental interest in the avoidance of war. They note in this regard the absence of armed conflict in Europe or between the United States and the Soviet Union for 40 years as prima facie evidence of the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence as a means of preserving peace. Decisions to acquire nuclear weapons are justified with what they perceive as requirements to deter war. It is central to the concept of deterrence that force would be used only in response to an attack by an adversary. Furthermore, the proponents argue that nuclear deterrence serves not only to deter war but also to compel both sides to seek to avoid situations in which their vital interests may become directly opposed.

29. Many opponents of the concept of deterrence reject the concept out of hand. They challenge its basic assumptions. In their view, the doctrine of deterrence is by nature aggressive and relies on force and provides a basis for an unrestricted arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race. They argue that the nuclear deterrence policy pursued by some States ranks first in their approach to agreements on disarmament, especially to a comprehensive test ban treaty, a nuclear weapon freeze and non-first-use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, they hold the view that it also feeds the arms spiral in the conventional field and firmly believe that deterrence objectively leads to a higher risk of nuclear war and more tensions in international relations. This concept of security, they conclude, entails an unprecedented threat to human survival.

30. Some other States, though critical of various aspects of the concept of nuclear deterrence, regard it as being the only reliable arrangement against nuclear war at present in operation. Pending the development of effective collective security arrangements and major reductions in nuclear arms, these States consider that it is important to assist in the maintenance of the system of nuclear deterrence because of the importance of the contribution they consider it makes to international stability. Without such stability, they consider that arms reduction agreements and progress toward effective collective security arrangements would be impossible.
31. Many other States, which do not possess nuclear weapons, may accept
conventional deterrence as a means for achieving national security but have serious
doubts about the concept of nuclear deterrence. As long as nuclear weapons exist
national security planners must develop concepts to guide decisions on nuclear
weapons. These States are of the opinion that nuclear weapons do not serve any
military purpose and that as long as nuclear disarmament is not achieved, any
nuclear weapons concept must assure the avoidance of nuclear war. These States
question the capability of the concept of nuclear deterrence to serve this purpose
in the long-term perspective. For one thing, they argue that nuclear deterrence
cannot be made foolproof. The doctrine provides no guarantee against irrational
human behaviour or the malfunctioning of command and control systems. They further
challenge the proposition that the absence of nuclear war so far can be attributed
to nuclear deterrence. They also believe that nuclear deterrence has not prevented
intervention by great Powers in developing countries and may have served to
disperse great Power conflicts to these developing areas. In their view the
arguments about the peace-keeping effects of nuclear deterrence may influence
decisions regarding possible acquisition of nuclear weapons of non-nuclear-weapon
States and have a negative influence on the non-proliferation régime. They believe
that the stability of nuclear deterrence is constantly threatened by technological
advances. The concept, they argue, implies a complacency with nuclear weapons and
more and more serves to vindicate decisions to expand nuclear weapons programmes;
nuclear deterrence has not been conducive to reductions in armaments. They feel
that inherent in the concept is a strong element of offensive threat and mutual
insecurity that breeds suspicion and fear; this hampers efforts to build confidence
and reduce tensions between States.

32. The present level of nuclear arsenals, all but a fraction of which is in the
hands of the two leading military Powers, is enough to destroy human civilization.
Notwithstanding the differences in the nuclear weapons policies of the States that
possess such weapons, the fact remains that in certain circumstances they may be
used. No nuclear-weapon State has completely renounced the possibility of their
use. Any use of nuclear weapons is at the same time a threat against all mankind.
Nuclear warfare, if it were to occur, would have consequences affecting not only
the nuclear-weapon States and their allies. The assured destruction would not be
mutual between the adversaries, but global. Among the non-nuclear-weapon States
there is therefore a growing sense of insecurity and of loss of their right to
determine their own destiny. They feel that they are unjustly exposed to the
nuclear threat despite the fact that they are not taking part in the nuclear arms
race.

C. Equal security

33. Equal security is not a security concept but a principle for bilateral arms
negotiations that parties may agree upon. For example, in a joint communiqué
issued on 29 May 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union declared their
intentions to limit strategic offensive arms "and to conduct them [their
negotiations] in a spirit of goodwill, respect for each other's legitimate
interests and observance of the principle of equal security".
34. This principle would seem to embrace the notion that neither State has the right to claim exclusivity or to demand for itself any special privileges or advantages. Indeed, it has been stated that mutual security between the two major nuclear-weapon States can only be assured by equality. However, questions have been raised as to its exact meaning and wider applicability. Critics maintain that this principle does not address the security concerns of medium-sized and small States, particularly in the light of the wide disparities in military capabilities that exist in the world.

D. Concept of collective security

35. The concept of collective security, as understood in this study, is based on a global commitment to international peace and security undertaken as a legal obligation of all nations. It is the first attempt to institutionalize and enforce the rule of international law to enhance the security of all nations. The international community, acting together, is committed to move promptly to encounter any act of aggression by one nation against another.

36. Collective security implies an acknowledgement that security is indivisible. It provides protection of national interests and sovereignty in a collective manner and leads to the strengthening of international security. As a concept it aims at a broader objective than just the absence of war by taking into account the wider requirements of international peace and security. It is based on renunciation of force, except in self-defence, commitment to the peaceful settlement of international disputes and obligation to support collective measures, both military and non-military, to defeat aggression.

37. A major problem with the concept of collective security is that on a number of occasions States have been reluctant to fulfil their obligations, which is the basic condition for the functioning of the system. In the case of the League of Nations this lack of political will was aggravated by the absence of an effective enforcement mechanism and by the lack of universality in the League.

38. Within the United Nations special voting powers have been accorded to five States as permanent members of the Security Council. Collective security action by the United Nations requires the concurrence of the five permanent members of the Council: a negative vote by any one of the five States "vetoes" the proposed action. However, the "veto" provision reflects the original assumption that the great Powers would maintain a co-operative working relationship among themselves and, therefore, only use the veto in exceptional circumstances. In practice, however, disagreements between the permanent members have in a number of cases led to the use of the veto, which, in turn, has prevented collective security action. The view has been expressed that the veto power has been abused. Another reason why the collective security system of the United Nations has not always functioned as effectively as expected is the lack of political will to co-operate.
E. Neutrality

39. One principal means of promoting national security has been the pursuance of policies of staying outside military alliances. The policy of neutrality practised by a few, mainly European, countries is one such policy. Historically a function of great Power relations and armed hostilities in Europe, it has currently evolved in response to the East-West conflict. In strict usage, the term neutrality is applicable only in times of war, indicating the legal status of a State that has declared itself neutral in relation to the belligerents during armed hostilities. The rights and obligations of neutrals in times of war are laid down in international law. In order to remain neutral in war a State abstains from participation in the war efforts of the belligerents. In a war situation, the Hague Conventions of 1907 and 1912 have to be taken into account. As long as a State acts in accordance with the international rules on neutrality, international law safeguards the status of neutrality. There are no rules of international law concerning how a neutral State must act in peace-time. Neutral States are thus not required to refrain from taking a position on political, economic or social issues facing the international community.

40. Neutrality in war and policies during peace-time are necessarily connected. In some instances, neutrality has been confirmed by international guarantees or reinforced through constitutional arrangements. Most importantly, however, the neutral States avoid such peace-time commitments as might jeopardize the possibility of upholding neutrality in war-time and therefore do not participate in military alliances. Also in other respects a policy is pursued that inspires and sustains the confidence in the determination and ability to remain neutral and independent in war-time.

41. The pursuit of a policy of neutrality aims at ensuring the security of neutral countries in accordance with their national interests. One basic characteristic of a security policy based on neutrality is that it is not offensive. The military forces of neutral countries are designed to make credible the commitment to uphold their neutral status in war.

42. Because of their independence from military alliances neutral States have been able to contribute substantially to reducing international tensions and antagonisms in their regions and on a larger scale. Through the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and other international forums, neutral States have taken an active part in the processes of co-operation, mediation and peace-keeping.

F. Non-alignment

43. Non-alignment is not merely a policy of Governments but also a movement of the peoples of non-aligned countries. A number of newly independent nations emerged in the post-war era. During the same period the power and rivalry of military alliances also increased. In this climate of the cold war, it was only natural that non-aligned nations should get together to protect themselves from its consequences. They did not wish to take sides in a conflict from which they had
little to gain and much to lose. The realization of this common danger, which was nothing short of a danger to their newly won independence, persuaded them to co-ordinate their perceptions and policies on a more regular basis. Non-alignment may be seen as a response not only to the cold war that characterized the period after the Second World War, but also to the challenges of the process of decolonization, especially in Africa. It has reacted against the dangers inherent in great power struggles, military alliances and the arms race, voiced its opposition to colonialism and expressed a reaffirmation of the principle of the equality of all nations in the international system. The Bandung Conference of Asian and African countries, held at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, was an important milestone in Afro-Asian history and some of the ideas were later taken up by non-aligned nations.

44. In developing the concept of non-alignment, a number of political leaders from the countries concerned made a considerable contribution to this concept with the following basic elements: (a) staying out of military blocs or other forms of great Power entanglements; (b) working towards defusing international tensions and promoting peace; (c) peaceful coexistence and peaceful co-operation among States irrespective of their social or political systems; (d) support for people struggling for freedom from colonialism, opposition to racism, apartheid, etc.; (e) support for disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament; (f) working towards a more just and equitable international order. These elements formed the core of the non-aligned policies in the 1950s and 1960s and constituted rallying posts for the non-aligned movement as a whole.

45. The first Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries was held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1961, with 25 countries participating and 3 countries represented by observers. At the Belgrade Conference, a number of issues related to international peace and security as well as social and economic development were considered, particularly the questions of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban. The appeal of non-aligned countries on the nuclear test ban made an important contribution to the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty of 1963. The Heads of State or Government of participating countries adopted a declaration that upheld the following principles: (a) a new world order should be based on co-operation between nations and founded on freedom, equality and social justice for the promotion of prosperity; (b) lasting peace can be achieved only if the domination of colonialism-imperialism and neo-colonialism in all their manifestations is radically eliminated; (c) to eradicate the source of conflict threatening world peace nations should accept and practise a policy of peaceful coexistence in the world; (d) all peoples and nations have to solve the problems of their own political, economic, social and cultural systems in accordance with their own conditions, needs and potentialities; (e) peoples and Governments shall refrain from any use of ideologies for the purpose of waging cold war, exercising pressure or imposing their will. In addition, they stated that non-aligned countries "do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc" and considered that "under present conditions, the existence and the activities of non-aligned countries in the interests of peace are one of the more important factors for safeguarding world peace". These principles laid down in the Belgrade and subsequent conferences have constituted the basic platform of the non-aligned movement.
46. At the same time, there have been some adjustments in accordance with changing international situations during the past decades. For instance, the second summit, in 1964 in Cairo, put forward a programme for peace and international co-operation and focused attention on the as yet unfinished struggle for the liberation of Africa. These ideas were carried a step forward at the 1970 Lusaka summit where focus was placed on peace, independence, development, co-operation and democratization of international relations. Apart from giving greater attention to economic issues, the Lusaka summit made an appeal for the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. It also helped consolidate the non-aligned position on the law of the sea issue at the United Nations. The Algiers summit in 1973 laid stress on making détente a wider concept, applicable to all parts of the world, and not confined to a particular region. The Colombo summit in 1976 called for the preservation of the essential character of non-alignment and the strengthening of its resistance to politics of pressure, and rejected the notions of an international order based on power blocs, balance of power and spheres of influence. The Havana summit in 1979 confirmed the concept of non-alignment and called for global negotiations for the new international economic order. A unique feature of this summit was the special attention given to issues in Latin America and the Caribbean. The New Delhi summit in 1983 particularly underlined the importance of peace, nuclear disarmament and development. For the past decades, the non-aligned countries have made considerable efforts and contributions to the question of nuclear disarmament both within and outside the framework of the United Nations.

47. In addition to the political aspect of non-alignment, the economic factor constituted one of the main motive forces and later became the strongest motive that impelled the non-aligned countries to co-operation and joint action. More recently, the movement has become a forum for promoting the new international economic order based on equity, co-operation and interdependence.

48. The Non-Aligned Movement has been active in formulating and pursuing the interests of developing countries within the international system, including the United Nations and regional organizations. Non-alignment is thus not an expression of non-involvement but a means of attaining security goals within an international system dominated by the opposing political and military alliances.

49. The Non-Aligned Movement has made several positive contributions to international security. Individual countries or groups of non-aligned nations have sought to help resolve specific conflicts among members of the Movement, as, for example, the Iran-Iraq war. The Movement has strengthened the independence of new nations by enhancing respect for their positions in international affairs. Moreover, it has provided an effective means of gaining collective weight in international forums to press for important issues of racial, political and economic justice. More importantly, by offering an alternative to bloc politics, non-alignment has helped to avoid or reduce tensions in the international system.
G. Peaceful coexistence

50. Since the First World War, the concept of peaceful coexistence has been put forward as a fundamental norm in international relations. In the light of the complexity of the contemporary world, with some 160 independent countries of different peoples, language, culture, customs, ideology, political institutions and socio-economic systems, the idea of peaceful coexistence is designed to accommodate the perceivable conflicts and contending interests among States. Peaceful coexistence is not intended to mean just passive coexistence, but also active co-operation and understanding among all States on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Furthermore, it could also be regarded as an effective and practical contribution to confidence-building among nations. In the opinion of its proponents, peaceful coexistence applies universally to all States regardless of their size, international status or political and socio-economic systems. They also underline that the threats and problems mankind is facing now, in the nuclear age, make it a matter of extraordinary importance that all States meet the demands inherent in the principles of peaceful coexistence; this would be an important contribution to the strengthening of international security.

H. Common security

51. The idea of common security was put forward in the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (A/CN.10/38 and Corr.1). The Commission stated that "a doctrine of common security must replace the present expedient of deterrence through armaments. International peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual destruction".

52. The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues convened with the purpose of finding new ways of thinking about and organizing for security in response to the failure of mutual deterrence to lessen international insecurities. The Commission began with the premise that threats to security - the conventional and nuclear arms races, resource shortages, environmental degradation, underdevelopment - are threats that nations increasingly have in common, and that solutions should therefore be sought in common. As the Commission reported, the key to security lies in the willingness of nations to organize their security policies in co-operation with each other.

53. The Commission recommended that the process of co-operation begin with relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and their respective alliance systems, in particular, with negotiations over conventional and nuclear arms limitation and with policies to encourage rapprochement and normalization of relations between the super-Powers. The objective of these efforts, the Commission noted, should be the re-establishment of peaceful relations, policies of restraint, reversal of the arms race and the implementation of confidence-building measures between the Soviet Union and the United States.

54. The Commission also proposed that the search for co-operative solutions should include the developing countries, which share the risks and therefore the responsibilities for peace. The Commission recommended measures to mitigate the
circumstances that feed conflict and crisis in the developing countries and pose threats of great Power involvement. In particular, the Commission addressed the problem of underdevelopment, which fuels the discontent that leads to expanding arms budgets, civil conflict and international destabilization and war.

55. The concept of common security has relevance first of all to the relationship between the nuclear alliances in general and to the relation between the Soviet Union and the United States in particular. Common security is a recognition of the fact that nuclear weapons have changed not only the scale of warfare but the very concept of war itself. In the nuclear age war cannot be an instrument of policy. A nuclear war would have no winners, only losers. There is no defence against nuclear weapons. The only protection against nuclear destruction is the avoidance of nuclear war itself. Even ideological opponents have a shared interest in survival and, thus, in the avoidance of war.

56. Common security as a concept is based on two preferences: for international over national means of achieving security; and for means that are peaceful over those that rely on the use or the threatened use of force. These extremely venerable preferences are interpreted in the light of modern destructive technologies, principally nuclear but also "conventional", chemical and biological weapons. On the other hand, the existence of modern weapons makes it likely that the costs of resorting to military force (certainly to nuclear force) would exceed the benefits; no one would win a nuclear war. On the other hand, the effects of the use of modern weapons would cross international frontiers. No country would be secure from the consequences of nuclear war: "national" and "international" interests coincide in the need to prevent war.

57. The notion of common security is founded on the assumption that in an age of interdependence no nation can find security by itself. Thus, the goal of common security is to begin a positive process that will eventually lead to peace and disarmament, and that will tap the recent outpouring of popular concern over the dangers of war. The results of this process would be a safer, more secure international order: a world with no nuclear weapons, with peace and security maintained at lower levels of conventional arms, and with increased national and international resources reallocated to the purpose of improving the quality of life.

CHAPTER III

PROBLEMS AND THREATS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

58. This chapter elucidates major problems and threats to international peace and security. Specifically, it will discuss (a) the relationship between national and international security; (b) threats to security in the nuclear age; (c) the risks associated with the increased tempo of competition in conventional arms and other types of military equipment; (d) threats to the security of the developing countries; and (e) the security of small States.
A. The relationship between national and international security

59. National and international security are becoming increasingly interrelated, thereby challenging the notion that security is primarily a function of national power or military and economic strength. Searching for solutions to the problem of insecurity, many nations increasingly find themselves face-to-face with circumstances beyond their direct control, such as a structural economic crisis and global economic, population, environmental and resource trends. All nations face universal threats posed by the nuclear arms race. Global interdependence has created a situation in which actions not only by major Powers but also by other nations can have major regional or even international repercussions.

60. Only by recognizing that security is not divisible, either in its military, economic, social and political dimensions or as between its national and international aspects, can nations evolve the co-operative measures necessary to achieve security in an interdependent age. This requires a comprehensive and co-operative approach to international security. The unrestrained pursuit of national security interests at the expense of others is not conducive to international security and may even lead to disaster. With the existence of nuclear weapons such policies constitute a potential threat to the survival of mankind. It is imperative that nations reconcile the contradictions between individual national security interests and the overall interest of international security and peace.

61. There is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The enormous sums spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources that are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries. Thus, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is obviously incompatible with the implementation of a new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation.

62. Another illustration of the interrelationship between national and international security is the extent to which global economic trends have increased the economic and social vulnerability of all countries, in particular the developing countries. Whereas the disturbances caused by the socio-economic dislocations of the 1970s were generally limited in scope and less harmful in their impact, in the 1980s the imbalance in the international economic, financial and trading framework have affected most countries and have generally not been mitigated by sufficiently offsetting sources of official or private funds. This situation has had an unequal impact, moreover, striking with particular severity the very nations already facing long-term problems of underdevelopment. During the last five years, the trend has been towards constantly declining prices for raw materials, the chief items of production and source of income in the developing
countries, while the cost of manufactured goods that these countries must import has been rising. The growing trend towards protectionism, particularly in the major industrialized countries, has been particularly damaging as this reduces the export opportunities of the weaker nations. These factors, combined with a sharp rise in the real interest rate charged on foreign loans, contribute to a chronic current account deficit in the balance of payments of developing countries. The consequent adjustment measures undertaken in these countries to overcome such difficulties have, in turn, resulted in a widespread and sharp reduction in investment spending, both by public and private sources, over the first half of the 1980s. This, plus the less than optimistic outlook for a recovery in spending levels over the next term, will continue to constrain economic growth rates through the rest of the decade. The subsequent impact on real per capita income and living standards will remain negative. 4/

63. The dilemma facing developing countries is that without a measure of political and economic stability development is difficult to achieve, while without development it is difficult to establish and maintain order.

64. However, this dilemma is difficult to resolve in the present situation, where the economic and political problems of developing countries arise, not only from the ordinary functioning of economic forces, but also from actions taken by some industrial countries that seek to maintain or strengthen their economic and political standing, or remedy their own domestic difficulties. For example, the pressures exerted upon developing countries by debts that they cannot pay and by the demands of their own development create conditions where national and international security could be seriously threatened.

B. Security in the nuclear age

65. As pointed out in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, "removing the threat of a world war - a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation". The nuclear arms race constitutes the main threat to international security. The nuclear competition has led to a capability of assured mutual destruction. Given the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, nuclear war is not a rational instrument of national policy. There could be no winner in such a conflict.

66. Nuclear war could be the result of escalation of an armed conflict involving nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear devastation could also be caused by unforeseen human or technical factors. It may result from mechanical malfunctions, or a coincidence of errors by the warning and control systems. Alternatively, it may also occur as a result of irrational human behaviour.

67. The continued and further development of military technologies may add new threats by creating the illusion of a potential to survive or even to "win" a nuclear war.
68. Using national technical means of verification, it is possible to count the number of strategic launchers and even to gauge some of their characteristics. Certain new technologies may pose problems for the national means of verification, which may complicate future talks on arms limitation and disarmament. The problem of verification is epitomized by newer generations of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which, because they can be launched from mobile platforms instead of fixed silos, can more easily escape detection. The deployment of modern cruise missiles and increased numbers of warheads on modern ballistic missiles also has ominous implications in this regard. In the case of cruise missiles, it might be easier to circumvent negotiate restrictions on such performance characteristics as range. Moreover, since cruise missiles are relatively small and can be fired from standard launchers on a variety of platforms, any negotiated restrictions on the number of deployed weapons would be more difficult to verify than comparable limitations on weapons that must be launched from dedicated and clearly recognizable platforms.

69. The development of multiple warheads and the much greater accuracy of missiles and re-entry vehicles have created the theoretical possibility of destroying at least a portion of an adversary's fixed, land-based missiles in a first-strike. Such capabilities suggest the possibility of greatly eroding an opponent's retaliatory capability through a pre-emptive strike. Acquisition of the ability to conduct a strike that disarmed the other side of its intercontinental ballistic missiles would have serious consequences for international security.

70. Of particular concern is the situation that has been created in Europe as a result of the deployment of new nuclear missiles. This has led to a marked deterioration of the situation on the continent and an increase in insecurity there.

71. A special danger is posed by potential advances in anti-ballistic missile defence systems. It is argued that space-based anti-ballistic missile defences could offer some degree of protection against ballistic missile attack. Combined with counter-force capabilities, such defences might provide a temptation, in a crisis, to strike first, with a reduced fear of effective retaliation. It is argued that, if anti-missile defences were coupled with strict limits on offensive capabilities - that is, if both major Powers had very capable defences and only small, yet invulnerable, offensive forces - a defensive strategy could provide a basis for strategic parity and equal security.

72. However, the advent of defensive missile systems could, on the contrary, be highly destabilizing. It is also argued that an arms race in outer space would inevitably lead to an unabated arms race in all dimensions and would make limitations of and reductions in strategic offensive weapons virtually impossible.

73. A serious challenge to stability between the major Powers arises from anti-satellite capabilities. Satellite-based systems can provide means for verification of arms limitation agreements, give early warning of attack, monitor events on the battlefield, provide strategic and tactical intelligence to military commanders and facilitate communications between commanders in the field and higher-level authorities. The loss of such capabilities could have adverse effects on the ability of both sides to respond to attacks, creating new uncertainties with
the potential to aggravate the dangers of the nuclear age appreciably. One obvious risk is that in preparing for the potential loss of satellites, one or both nations might establish procedures such that in the event of certain contingencies - greater freedom of action would be provided to field commanders, thus reducing the positive controls on military forces that now exist.

74. The development and deployment of anti-satellite systems has the potential to undermine international security seriously and to promote further escalation of the nuclear arms race. It would be particularly destabilizing if either side were to acquire the ability to destroy or otherwise incapacitate the other's satellite early-warning systems and their associated ground stations. Improvements in the accuracy of missiles, advances in command and control and targeting systems, the avid pursuit of anti-satellite and defensive systems, the proliferation of weapons, all increase the impression of a potential role for nuclear forces in combat.

75. The inherent dangers of an arms race in outer space have caused increasing concern in the international community, particularly in the light of the anti-satellite systems being developed and ongoing efforts regarding space-based anti-ballistic missile systems, including laser-beam weapons and particle-beam technology, now pursued. An arms race in outer space could increase the danger of nuclear war. It would also add to the already vast military expenditures and further drain the resources needed for economic and social development. Furthermore, an arms race in outer space would have negative effects on the peaceful uses of outer space.

76. Under these conditions, the nuclear arms race has taken on new and more ominous implications. Technological advances are creating pressures to attempt to break out from the situation of mutual vulnerability and strategic parity altogether.

77. The consequences of a nuclear war, in terms of loss of life and human suffering, have been well documented. Recent studies of "nuclear winter" have indicated that, together, a number of nuclear explosions, perhaps no more than dozens of explosions, within a short period of time, might have such catastrophic effects on the earth's climate, the world's food production and distribution system, and the basic physical determinants of life on earth as to threaten the survival of humanity. A major first strike may be an act of national suicide, even if no retaliation occurs.

78. Important as policy declarations and technical safeguards may be, they cannot adequately guarantee the safety of mankind and no national rivalry or ideological confrontation could justify putting the world at risk. Therefore, it is imperative to achieve dramatic reductions in nuclear armaments as a step towards their total elimination.

C. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

79. A milestone in efforts to ban chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons was the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, as well as of bacteriological methods of warfare. However, a considerable
stockpile of various chemical weapons continues to be maintained by the major Powers and a number of smaller countries. Concern has been aroused about the use of chemical weapons. Research and development on new generations of chemical weapons, including "binary" chemical munitions have been intensified. The urgency of a complete ban on chemical weapons is therefore greater than ever. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction entered into force in 1975. Since then international efforts have been centred on the elaboration of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of all chemical weapons and their destruction, under effective verification.

D. The conventional arms race in its various aspects

80. Modern conventional warfare is extremely destructive. There have been quantum advances in the firepower and mobility of modern conventional forces. Widespread resort to sophisticated conventional weaponry in densely populated areas would certainly result in casualties and destruction of unprecedented proportions. Any conventional conflict between nuclear-armed nations, or between nations allied to opposing nuclear Powers, would contain the seeds of escalation to nuclear confrontation. Many modern weapon systems, such as some artillery and fighter aircraft, have a dual capability. They can be used to fire either conventional or nuclear ordnance. It is possible that the nuclear Powers sometimes co-locate both types of weapons with their forces in the field. As a result, there is a risk of nuclear war by escalation from a conventional war.

81. War has resulted in an extraordinary toll in lives and human suffering. It has been estimated that there have probably been over 150 armed conflicts since 1945. The average duration of such wars has been three and one-half years. Estimates of casualties from all wars fought since 1945 range between 16 and 25 million killed. In addition to actual deaths and human suffering, the costs of conventional wars must be measured in terms of the destruction of economic infrastructure, lost educational opportunities and damage to prospects for economic growth. Recent wars have produced the largest waves of refugees in modern times, a wave comprised principally of women and children. By the estimates of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the refugee population world-wide now totals some eight million. Millions more, for whom no accurate count is possible, may be displaced within their own countries.

82. The conventional arms race is extremely costly, accounting, it is generally believed, for roughly 80 per cent of global military spending as indicated in the United Nations study on conventional disarmament. Some 70 per cent of world military spending is attributable to a small number of States and the largest share to the Soviet Union and the United States. At the same time the growth rate of military spending has steadily increased among some of the developing countries. The rapid extension of the conventional arms competition to regions of the developing countries drains enormous resources and technical capabilities that could be used to advance the quality of life of people throughout the world.
83. The social and economic costs of military expenditures are hard to calculate. The opportunity costs represented by such expenditures are reflected in the loss of investment capital for civilian projects. Consequently, there is an urgent need for determined efforts to stop the continuous increase of military expenditures and negotiate a concrete agreement or agreements for their gradual reduction, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States. In this process, the elaboration of guidelines to govern activities of States in these negotiations would be extremely useful.

84. New conventional weapons can be used with far greater precision, moved more easily and applied more flexibly, thus bringing virtually the entire world into the potential keg of modern conventional war. Moreover, when weapons that are deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects are directed against civilian populations, by accident or by design, the effects can be devastating. In addition, the stocks of weapons deployed in peace-time have multiplied, increasing both the size of inventories maintained by individual nations and the number of nations who maintain large stocks of modern conventional weapons. Should conventional warfare take place in Europe, where the two great alliances could truly concentrate their firepower, the destruction could be unimaginable. And this is even without regard to the real danger that any conventional conflict in Europe or elsewhere might escalate to nuclear war. Moreover, advances in the technology of conventional weapons, the development of new and more lethal types of weapons and increases in the size of weapon inventories, have magnified the destructiveness of war. World-wide competition in conventional weapons has thus acquired special dangers of its own. Advancing technology has produced some "conventional" weapons that are increasingly capable of massive and indiscriminate destruction.

E. The security of developing countries

85. Security issues in developing countries have acquired a special degree of urgency. Many developing countries are faced with war and deprivation. Given the growing economic and political links of interdependence between the developed and developing regions, security concerns of the developing countries increasingly influence the entire international system. The security implications of unrest in developing countries are magnified by the possibility of political, economic or military intervention by the great Powers.

86. For many of the four billion inhabitants in the developing countries, security is conceived at the most basic level of the struggle for individual survival. Eight hundred millions live in absolute poverty and deprivation. Five hundred millions are malnourished. Many millions have no access to safe drinking-water and do not have the income necessary to purchase food. They lack protection against the consequences of environmental degradation and natural calamities, such as floods and drought, which, in Africa in particular, have produced famine and suffering of unprecedented proportions.

87. The continuation of colonialism and racism in certain parts of the world, particularly in southern Africa, has added to the insecurity of those areas. South Africa's policy of racial oppression and apartheid against its majority African population and acts of aggression against neighbouring African States cause
international destabilization in the continent and constitute threats to international peace and security. South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia is contrary to the principles of self-determination enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, the nuclear capability that South Africa appears to have developed during the recent years has increased the tensions in the African continent and jeopardized international security as a whole. Despite the fact that considerable efforts have been made in the international community, particularly within the framework of the United Nations, on the elimination of colonialism and the racist policy of apartheid, no substantive progress has been achieved.

88. Since 1945 the developing countries have experienced some 150 armed conflicts. Although most of these were the outcome of struggles for independence and self-determination from colonial rule, some involved territorial disputes. Many of them have been marked by various forms of intervention, sometimes at the request of one or both parties, on the part of developed countries, varying from covert assistance or logistic support to full participation.

89. The interference of those States with the largest military arsenals can greatly deepen local conflicts and plunge regions into protracted turmoil. Particularly, in regions that may be regarded as strategically or economically sensitive, such interference can threaten international security.

90. In addition to threats posed by proliferating arms technology, spiralling nuclear and conventional arms races, problems of development, population and environmental resource issues have emerged as major new challenges to global peace and stability. The recent United Nations population conferences in Mexico City and Bucharest have increased the awareness of the enormous impact that current population trends will have on efforts for development for the foreseeable future.

F. Security of small States

91. A significant number of small States have become independent members of the international community relatively recently. It has become apparent that they have specific security problems of their own. Their emergence in large numbers and recent developments in some of them have highlighted the special needs and vulnerabilities of small States. Although the special needs of these States have given rise to such categories as "small island States", "mini·States", "micro-States", the concept of small States is more relative than precise. The one characteristic which all small States have in common is a very small population. For example, among the members of the United Nations there are 34 States with a population of approximately one million or less. 8/ In addition, small States usually suffer from other disadvantages such as a small territory, limited natural resources, geographical isolation and economic and social underdevelopment.

92. These factors place a severe limitation on the capacity of small States to organize and guarantee their national security on their own. This basic defencelessness is what makes small States especially vulnerable to external attacks and intervention. Their smallness makes them easy targets for aggression by more powerful States or bands of mercenaries and more vulnerable to concerted
external propaganda. Other forms of intervention include the use of externally sponsored insurgents, economic pressure and destabilization. Moreover, small States that are strategically located in relation to the interests of the big Powers or those that possess valuable natural resources face even more formidable problems: they are under great pressure to accommodate the wishes of the more powerful States. In addition, with the advent of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, many small States will experience difficulties in maintaining adequate surveillance over their exclusive economic zone.

93. It is necessary to emphasize that small States, no less than the other members of the international community, are fully entitled to the rights of independence, sovereign equality and territorial integrity. This can be achieved by greater public awareness of the special vulnerabilities of small States and concerted action by the international community as a whole. In this connection, it is clear that the best prospects for ensuring the national security of the small States lie in the collective security system of the United Nations. But that system needs to be strengthened and made fully functional if it is to provide an effective security umbrella for the small States. The fact that small States comprise a significant proportion of membership of the United Nations is in itself a reason for the Organization to pay attention to their security problems.

94. In addition, the early adoption of a convention against the recruitment, training and financing of mercenaries, together with an absolute prohibition on the use of the territory of one State to destabilize another, would further enhance the security of small States.

CHAPTER IV

MEASURES TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

95. Promotion of international security requires the commitment of and active participation of all nations. It requires more extensive adoption of security measures designed to be co-operative in their approach rather than to secure unilateral advantage. Recognizing that in present international circumstances States have no option but to make their own arrangements for defence, the Group of Experts considers that in making such arrangements it is important for States to take proper account of their implications for the security of other countries. This chapter discusses steps that are considered by the Group to be of particular importance in the promotion of a co-operative approach to international peace and security.
A. Strengthening the role of the United Nations for international peace and security

1. General

96. The United Nations has made substantial contributions to international security, the codification of basic principles that should govern international relations, the observance of international law, economic and social development, issues of arms limitation and disarmament, the process of decolonization, the struggle against the evil system of apartheid, the elimination of racial discrimination, the observance of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, etc. The General Assembly has adopted by consensus a number of important documents, such as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960), the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970), the Definition of Aggression (resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974), etc. Special sessions of the General Assembly have been held to discuss disarmament: in 1978 at the tenth special session, the first devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly adopted the Final Document, which was reaffirmed in 1982 at the twelfth special session. Special sessions of the General Assembly have also been held to consider other major issues such as the establishment of a new international economic order.

97. As stated in the Charter, the maintenance of international peace and security is one of the main purposes of the United Nations (Art. 1). The Charter provided the Security Council with a mandate to take action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression (Chap. VII). In practice, however, it has not been possible to develop the United Nations collective security system to prevent or counter aggression effectively. In particular there have been numerous occasions when the permanent members of the Security Council have failed to reach agreement on such matters.

98. Although humanitarian and peace-keeping operations have been of great importance, they have only had a limited impact on the larger needs of international security. With respect to peace-keeping and settlement of international disputes, serious obstacles have been encountered.

99. International security requires that the gap between the collective security system envisioned for the United Nations in its Charter and its present limited role be bridged. Efforts to implement the security functions of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter require a realistic approach. Collective security can be upgraded, but only under circumstances in which consensus can be reached among the permanent members of the Security Council.

2. Observance of the Charter of the United Nations

100. The basic principles contained in the Charter are not only legal rules and norms for international conduct among Member States, but are also recognized as principles of international law applicable to all States. All States that have
become members of the United Nations are obligated to fulfil the provisions of the Charter. Some of the most important of these principles include:

(a) Peaceful settlement of international disputes (Art. 2, para. 3);

(b) Non-use of force: States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations (Art. 2, para. 4);

(c) Non-intervention: States shall not intervene in the affairs of other States; this follows from the prohibition of the use of force, the obligation to respect the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples (Art. 1, para. 2);

(d) The principle of sovereign equality of States (Art. 2, para. 1);

(e) Territorial integrity: States shall respect the frontiers and territorial integrity of other States (Art. 2, paras. 1 and 4);

(f) Fulfilment in good faith of the obligations assumed by Members in accordance with the Charter (Art. 2, para. 2).

101. Too often, the use of force is claimed to be in self-defence. The Charter in Article 51 recognizes the right to self-defence only when "an armed attack occurs". The provisions of Article 51 concerning action to maintain or restore international peace in case of armed attack should be strictly adhered to.

102. It is obvious that if these fundamental rules of the Charter were upheld by all members of the international community it would lead to a drastic improvement of the security of individual countries and an improvement of the international situation. It is vital for the maintenance of international peace and security that States strictly follow the fundamental rules of the Charter of the United Nations.

3. Full utilization of the existing collective security system of the United Nations

103. The United Nations machinery for collective security, if better utilized, could greatly improve international peace and security. The effectiveness of the Organization depends first and foremost upon the readiness of Member States to fulfil their obligations under the Charter, to co-operate and to seek agreed solutions especially when the maintenance of international peace and security is at stake. Their political will to use the potential of the collective security system is essential for its function. Particularly, the absence of co-operation among the major Powers has often made it difficult for the United Nations to fulfil the role of maintaining international peace and security in the manner envisaged in the Charter. There have also been occasions when issues have not been brought before the Security Council early enough to avert the outbreak of military conflict. On a number of occasions the Security Council has been unable to act to bring conflicts
to an end. In a number of cases, the Security Council failed to adopt measures because of the lack of concurring votes of the permanent members. Moreover, several duly adopted decisions of the Security Council concerning the maintenance of international peace and security remain unimplemented. The effectiveness of the collective security system needs to be improved so that States will not be discouraged from turning to the Security Council for a solution of their security problems.

(a) The role of the Security Council and the Secretary-General

104. The strengthening of the United Nations depends to a large extent upon the effectiveness of the Security Council, which is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security and whose decisions should be carried out without fail by all Member States. Therefore, strengthening the role of the Security Council and effective implementation of its decisions is central to the whole structure of the United Nations in its responsibility for international peace and security under the Charter.

105. The Council was intended to act as the supreme organ of a world-wide collective security system and for this purpose it was vested with the power to make decisions binding upon Member States. Yet too often at moments of crisis or conflicts threatening the peace of the world, the Security Council has been by-passed by events.

106. Periodic meetings of the Security Council are provided for in the Charter of the United Nations in Article 28, paragraph 2. The Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, which seek to implement this provision of the Charter, stipulate that periodic meetings of the Security Council shall be held twice a year, at such times as the Security Council may decide (rule 4). That provision has never been fully utilized. The first and so far only such meeting took place in October 1970.

107. The Security Council should consider holding periodic meetings in specific cases to examine and review outstanding problems and crises, thus enabling the Council to play a more active role in preventing conflicts. The international situation requires an effective Security Council and, to that end, the Security Council should examine mechanisms and working methods on a continuous basis in order to enhance its authority and enforcement capacity in accordance with the Charter.

108. The Council should consider the possibility of organizing some of its meetings outside the United Nations Headquarters (Art. 28, para. 3). Another possibility might be to hold some of the periodic meetings outside Headquarters.

109. For its part, the Security Council in the future could do more to deal with potentially dangerous situations through measures that can have a restraining influence. A broader use of peace-keeping forces in accordance with the Charter might be contemplated in the future by the Council, where their presence, with the consent of the parties, might help to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.
110. Early warning is an essential element for preventive action, but there must also be the readiness to act and the resources to undertake preventive measures in time. Early notification by the Secretary-General to Member States of impending danger will do no good unless members of the Security Council are prepared to join forces in a decisive effort to prevent conflict. It is of greatest importance that members of the Security Council show readiness to take and persevere in preventive measures.

111. Since the Second World War the developing world has been the stage and indeed the victim of almost all armed conflicts, many of which might have escalated to situations dangerous for world security. Many of these conflicts have tended to be drawn into the East-West context, which has sometimes led to the exacerbation of these conflicts themselves and East-West tensions. In many of these conflicts no vital great Power interest has been directly at stake. However, because of lack of agreement between the permanent members of the Security Council no action has been taken to deter or resolve these conflicts.

112. In order to facilitate and make possible the effective implementation of the collective security system of the Charter it is important that a co-operative relationship be established among the permanent members of the Security Council as well as between them and the non-permanent members. It is necessary that the permanent members of the Security Council should use all opportunities to co-operate in supporting collective security action by the Council. If disputes that might develop into armed conflicts were identified at an early stage, it would enhance the possibilities to take effective action to prevent the outbreak of hostilities and to settle the disputes by peaceful means. Such steps could initiate a wider use of the collective security machinery of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter.

113. Members of the United Nations have agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter (Art. 25). Failure on the part of Member States to implement decisions of the Security Council constitutes a violation of their Charter obligations. Furthermore, all Members are required to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and should not assist any State against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action (Art. 2, para. 5).

114. According to the Charter, the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security (Art. 99). This is an important provision, which the Secretary-General should use whenever possible, with the full understanding and support of the Security Council, particularly its permanent members.

115. The Secretary-General can play a very useful role through "quiet diplomacy". This may help to defuse potentially explosive situations or help to identify opportunities for resolving conflicts, and possibly improve communication between parties to a conflict. The Secretary-General should keep the Security Council informed of these efforts.

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(b) The role of the General Assembly

116. The General Assembly, the forum in which all Members of the United Nations are represented according to the Charter, may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the State or States concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Except in cases where the Security Council is exercising its functions, the General Assembly in fulfilling its functions for the maintenance of international peace and security could consider initiating consultations with a view to bringing together parties to a dispute for beginning or securing negotiations, making recommendations for the peaceful settlement of disputes, promoting as much as possible the elaboration of such decisions on a very wide basis, so as to encourage their adoption by consensus.

4. The role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament

117. The arms race and in particular the threat of nuclear war concern the security of all nations. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. The United Nations is the forum where all nations have the opportunity to contribute to the process of disarmament deliberations and negotiations.

118. The United Nations offers four areas for the promotion of disarmament. First, it provides a unique public forum, in which proposals can be articulated and debated, the members of the world community can press their views and concerns, and the need for disarmament measures can be brought clearly before the world community. Second, the United Nations can in some areas contribute to the implementation of arms limitation agreements. Third, the United Nations can serve as a major source of information and ideas through studies and research conducted by relevant organs in support of disarmament activities, including the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Fourth, a multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, has been created with broadly representative participation in a negotiating process that concerns the interests of all nations and peoples.

119. The role of the United Nations in promoting the cause of disarmament should be strengthened. These efforts should aim at mobilizing the will of all States to use fully the existing institutional arrangements as well as other appropriate arrangements to be agreed upon by all Member States.

120. The close relationship between disarmament and development has been recognized by the General Assembly. The release of resources by the achievement of disarmament measures could do much to promote the economic and social development of all nations and assist in relieving the difficulties arising from the economic gap between developed and developing countries.
5. The role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes

121. Instead of resorting to armed force, States are obliged under the Charter of the United Nations to settle their disputes by peaceful means (Art. 2, para. 3). They should, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other procedures of their own choice (Art. 33). The means would be selected according to their interest and to the nature and importance of the difference. Alternatively, States can refer a dispute to a regional system of peaceful settlement or apply any other provisions contained in existing treaties between the parties in conflict. They can also submit the difference to the different organs for peaceful settlement of disputes established in the Charter of the United Nations.

122. The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any difference between nations that could threaten the maintenance of peace and security. Also, any Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly any dispute or situation that is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means. Subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter, the General Assembly may recommend to the parties methods of pacific settlement deemed appropriate for the conflict.

123. If any State is reluctant to submit a conflict to the appropriate methods of peaceful settlement and the Council deems that the continuance of that situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of peace and security, it can recommend the terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate. In such cases the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should, as a general rule, be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

124. The Statute of the International Court of Justice (Art. 36, para. 2) provides that States Parties to it may declare that they recognize the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning specified cases as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation. It is important that this possibility be borne in mind and considered by States.

125. Future treaties and other international agreements among States should, wherever possible, include procedures for the settlement of disputes that may arise out of the implementation of the terms of such agreements and treaties.

126. For the protection of the security of weaker countries, among the methods for peaceful settlement of disputes those that provide for third party settlement, such as arbitration or reference to the International Court of Justice, could be of value. Such procedures would enhance the important principle of equality between States in international relations. Commissions of inquiry and consultation, peace observation commissions and registers of experts for fact-finding or arbitration are among means available especially in the settlement of regional disputes.
6. Improved capabilities for peace-keeping

127. All peace-keeping operations so far have been arranged after hostilities have broken out. A broader use of peace-keeping forces might be contemplated in the future by the Council in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The possible use of peace-keeping operations as a fire-break to preclude the outbreak of armed conflict should be considered. There might be some situations in which introduction of a military force authorized by the Security Council could contribute to the prevention of a conflict.

128. In the light of past experience, it is clear that all peace-keeping operations must have a clearly defined and operationally feasible mandate. Full support from the Security Council is crucial for the success of peace-keeping operations and for the willingness of States to provide peace-keeping forces. Consent must be obtained from the parties to a conflict; they must be ready and willing to co-operate with the peace-keeping force in discharging its mandate.

129. Financial considerations are also an important factor. Of particular concern in this respect is the financial burden of peace-keeping operations placed on troop-contributing countries.

7. Regional approaches to maintenance of international peace and security

130. Under the Charter of the United Nations, regional arrangements have been developed for dealing with regional problems through regional actions in various parts of the world. The United Nations should encourage such actions. This question is dealt with under section F of this chapter.

8. Threats to international security arising out of breaches of international conventions and covenants on human rights

131. Over the years the international community has adopted a set of conventions and covenants on human rights. It is imperative to have universal adherence to these instruments and to ensure their strict observance by all States. Any massive and systematic violation of the provisions of these instruments is likely to exercise a negative influence on international security as a whole. All efforts should be exerted by the international community to prevent such developments from occurring.

132. It must be stressed that the non-adherence of a State to these instruments does not relieve it of the duty to respect their provisions in so far as they emanate from the Charter of the United Nations and other agreed principles of international law. In cases of developments that threaten international peace and security, the Security Council has the power to investigate such situations according to Article 34 of the Charter. Furthermore, the General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the Charter and may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council (Art. 10).
133. For their part, in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe have undertaken to act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to fulfil their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including, inter alia, the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound (Principle VII of the Final Act adopted at Helsinki on 1 August 1975).

9. Elimination of colonialism and the system of apartheid

134. Over the last four decades, nationalist movements all over the world, with the active assistance of the United Nations, achieved great success in the field of decolonization, leading to the independence of many countries. However, despite this achievement, some territories still remain under colonial domination. These colonial situations constitute a denial of the right to self-determination and some threaten international peace and security.

135. Of particular international concern in this regard is the situation prevailing in Namibia. South Africa persists in its occupation of Namibia in contravention of resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as the 1971 determination of the International Court of Justice declaring such occupation illegal. Two dimensions of this colonial problem have seriously undermined international peace and security. Firstly, within Namibia itself, South Africa maintains a vicious system of colonial oppression through a massive military build-up. Secondly, South Africa has used the territory of Namibia as a springboard to launch aggression and other acts of destabilization against neighbouring independent States. South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its campaign against neighbouring States have therefore constituted aggression, breaches of the peace and threats to international peace and security, within the meaning of the Charter.

136. Closely associated with colonial oppression and domination are the phenomena of racism and racial discrimination. While in the course of history various forms of racial discrimination have led to international conflicts, the institutionalized racist system of apartheid practised by the South African régime has very serious implications for international peace and security. Apartheid, which has been condemned as a crime against humanity, has been made punishable under the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. The Security Council has adopted an arms embargo against South Africa (resolution 418 (1977)). This embargo, which is the only United Nations sanction in force, should be rigorously and effectively implemented. The situation within South Africa continues to become more explosive. Externally, South Africa has repeatedly unleashed military aggression, political destabilization and economic sabotage against neighbouring and other African States. The threat South Africa poses to its neighbours has been compounded by its nuclear capability.

137. The dangers to international peace and security arising from colonialism and apartheid require resolute and concerted international action. In the particular case of Namibia, it is incumbent upon the United Nations to take urgent measures
for the early independence of Namibia in accordance with Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and the United Nations Plan for Namibia. Similarly, the eradication of apartheid should remain a high priority for the international community. To that end, there is need to adopt comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa. Furthermore, all States should terminate acts of collaboration with South Africa as this only strengthens the South African régime and consolidates the evil system of apartheid.

B. Co-operation and other measures to avoid nuclear war

138. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. Effective measures to promote nuclear disarmament and to prevent nuclear war must have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, other measures designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to lessen the danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be taken, bearing in mind that such a danger can be removed only through the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this context it is important to note that the principle of non-first-use of nuclear weapons has already been declared unilaterally by two nuclear-weapon States. The other nuclear-weapon States have declared that they would use nuclear weapons only in response to an attack.

139. The Charter of the United Nations is the highest expression of international law. Full respect for and observance of the Charter as well as observance of the whole body of international law would promote international security. That part of international law that is applicable in armed conflicts contains a number of principles that are relevant to military planning and the formulation of strategic doctrines. If it were known that international humanitarian law of armed conflict were fully respected by all, potential adversaries would more easily trust each other's commitment never to use force in a manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. International humanitarian law has been elaborated over decades to apply to conventional methods of warfare. Traditional international law relating to armed conflict contains some general principles that in fact outlaw certain practices in war. Relevant in this context are, inter alia, the principles of distinction between military and civilian objects, the prohibition of causing unnecessary suffering in warfare, and the principle of proportionality prohibiting attacks that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantages anticipated. Nuclear weapons have introduced a completely new and qualitatively different dimension. It is not conceivable that nuclear weapons could be used in a manner consistent with the principles mentioned above. Further efforts should be made to include in international law the clear and complete prohibition and total destruction of all nuclear weapons, as well as the clear and complete prohibition on the development, testing, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons.

140. While the final objective of the efforts of all States should continue to be general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal is the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and nuclear
disarmament. In carrying out this task, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those that possess the largest nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

141. All over the world, growing apprehensions have been expressed in recent years regarding the dangers caused by the nuclear arms race, as evidenced in particular by the advent of vocal anti-nuclear movements in Europe, North America and elsewhere. The intervention of the peace movement in the international debate over arms issues is an index of the increasing world-wide concern over the dangers inherent in the unabated nuclear arms race.

142. Although some treaties have been negotiated concerning the qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of offensive strategic weapons that prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons in certain areas, limit missile defences and restrict the testing of nuclear weapons in certain environments, the threat posed by nuclear weapons has grown more ominous than ever before.

143. Even during the 1970s, when there was progress in arms negotiations, technology outpaced negotiations. During the past few years, the hiatus in progress towards arms limitation has permitted weapon programmes on both sides to gain a momentum that is threatening to raise unprecedented problems of instability in crises and war. Some recent improvements in the capabilities of nuclear-weapon systems that are already deployed, and developments in military technology that may extend the arms race into outer space, undermine strategic stability and increase the danger of nuclear war.

144. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the unconditional assurance made by China, and the declarations by France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, efforts should be pursued to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

145. The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones is of long standing. However, over the years technological advances have resulted in weapon delivery systems that might make any country vulnerable. Nevertheless, by providing assurances by the nuclear-weapon States not under any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States that have chosen not to acquire or to allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories, and by eliminating the possibility of regional nuclear arms races, nuclear-weapon-free zones would represent an important contribution to regional confidence and security-building in lessening the threat of nuclear conflict. The General Assembly has concluded that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure.

146. The first, and as yet only, formally established nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area was created under the terms of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Nuclear-weapon-free zones have also been proposed, in the United Nations and elsewhere, for the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the South Pacific, South Asia, Central Europe, the Balkans and the
In Africa, the Declaration on the denuclearization of that continent has not been realized because of the nuclear capability of South Africa. For various reasons, however, none of the proposals referred to has been implemented. Such proposals will have to take into account the specific characteristics of each potential nuclear-weapon-free region. Special arrangements in accordance with the norms of international law would be necessary if areas of international sea were intended to be included in a nuclear-weapon-free zone. As an interim measure, individual States might wish to pledge not to become the first to introduce nuclear weapons into a region. Both such interim arrangements and, in some regions, more formal arrangements for the prohibition of nuclear weapons could represent important contributions both to world and regional security.

147. The existence in both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization of a large number and variety of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons to complement their conventional defences increases the danger that if a conventional war were to start in Europe, it could easily escalate into a full-scale nuclear war.

148. In the perspective of NATO, nuclear weapons offer one means of compensating for the perceived imbalance in European conventional force levels. NATO has sought to secure itself from attack by threatening to counter any such attack with nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, for its part, rejects that there exists an imbalance in conventional forces in Europe and has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It has declared that in responding to an attack it would use all its military power.

149. Battlefield nuclear weapons, in particular, raise important problems of stability, creating pressures for their early use in battle. Their location near the front lines of any war would mean that political leaders may face a choice early in any conflict of either authorizing the use of battlefield weapons or watching them being overrun. Security for both sides would be improved if these nuclear weapons were further reduced in number and withdrawn from the front lines. The strategic concept of "limited nuclear war" should be abandoned since it is unlikely that a nuclear war could be limited or controlled to a certain level without escalating to a total nuclear war.

150. With respect to the two major nuclear Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, there are steps that could be taken to improve their ability to communicate with one another in order to avoid the unfolding of situations in which actions and reactions through misperceptions or misjudgement could lead to a greater risk of conflict. Those steps could also bring a crisis, once it develops, under control.

151. The recent agreement to upgrade the United States - Soviet "Hot Line" is a useful step. Other ideas have been proposed to improve communications and build confidence between the two leading military Powers. Separate negotiations specifically for these types of measure, in which progress would not be dependent upon progress in the politically more sensitive talks on the size and characteristics of nuclear arsenals, might prove a more effective means to reducing super-Power tensions and building confidence.
C. Negotiations and effective measures for arms limitation and disarmament

152. For more than a decade there have been no negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Disarmament has become an imperative and most urgent task facing the international community. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries. There should also be negotiations on the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons, based in particular on the same principle, and taking into account the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, as well as the need of recipient States to protect their security.

153. A measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, would be gradual reduction of military expenditures on a mutually agreed basis.

154. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the right and the duty to participate on an equal footing in multilateral disarmament negotiations that have a bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation.

155. The negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban should be resumed and intensified. Nuclear weapons testing has played an indispensable role in the development of the nuclear weapons programs of the great Powers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), since 1945 some 1,500 nuclear tests have been conducted, over 90 per cent of them by the two leading nuclear-weapon Powers.

156. A Partial Test Ban Treaty was concluded in 1963 prohibiting nuclear-weapon testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, but it does not prohibit testing underground and therefore has not curbed the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. In 1974, the Soviet Union and the United States reached agreement on a Threshold Test Ban Treaty that restricts underground explosions at nuclear test sites to an explosive yield below 150 kilotons. In 1976, the Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions Treaty placed a similar restriction on explosions at locations other than test sites. While neither of these treaties has yet been ratified, the signatories have indicated their intentions of abiding by their terms.

157. Proposals for a comprehensive test ban have been discussed in a variety of multilateral and bilateral forums for more than two decades, with considerable progress but, so far, no final result. Among the factors at issue, according to certain States, have been the question of verification, compliance with a total ban and the argument that some testing is necessary to maintain confidence in the reliability of existing nuclear stockpiles. Others considered that such arguments were only attempts to avoid the formulation and conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, since they considered that no such technical obstacles exist.

158. Even with the existence of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, nuclear weapons might still be built but the confidence in untested weapons would necessarily be low. The same would gradually apply to the reliability of stockpiles of older tested types of weapons. At the same time, a prohibition on future tests would retard the nuclear programmes of the existing nuclear States by effectively limiting qualitative improvements resulting from new designs for warheads. A comprehensive test ban might thus help restrain both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

159. The conclusion of a comprehensive test ban would be a clear signal to non-nuclear-weapon States that the nuclear-weapon States had taken seriously the undertaking made in the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to move towards nuclear disarmament. If the nuclear-weapon States demonstrate a serious interest in halting the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, this example might encourage restraint on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States and their agreement to tightened safeguards. In the absence of progress in negotiations leading towards arms reduction or towards a comprehensive test ban treaty, there is a risk that pressures will mount against the non-proliferation régime established in the Treaty of 1968. Among the States Parties there is a widespread view that a comprehensive test ban has world-wide significance as an indicator of the seriousness of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in pursuit of their obligations under the Treaty.

160. At the present time, the relationship in strategic arms between the Soviet Union and the United States is governed by treaties within the framework of the SALT process, in particular by the 1972 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) (SALT I) and the 1979 Treaty between the United States of America and the Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II), which has not yet been ratified. Both sides have declared their commitment to abiding by the provisions of these treaties. By SALT I and SALT II ceilings were placed on the aggregate number of land-based and sea-based ballistic missile launchers and bombers on the two sides, as well as sub-ceilings on certain types, and certain combinations of types, of such weapons. They also placed restrictions on certain characteristics of the two Parties' long-range missiles and bombers, as well as some restrictions on the modernization of existing weapon systems and the means that otherwise could be used to conceal their existence.
161. Negotiations during the SALT process, which began in 1969, have been arduous and difficult politically, and progress has often been painfully slow. Still, in an historical context, the very fact of negotiations on this subject was widely viewed as a positive sign. Never before have two States devoted so much effort, for so long a period of time, in an attempt to restrain military forces believed to be central to their national security.

162. At the same time, the results of arms limitation talks have not matched the expectations of world public opinion or satisfied the proponents of the negotiating process. Indeed, since 1969, when the talks began, the number of bombs and warheads deployed by the two sides in their strategic forces has increased at an alarming rate, largely as a result of the introduction of multiple warheads on missiles. Determined efforts for drastic reduction of nuclear arsenals are urgently needed.

163. The bilateral negotiations that began in Geneva in 1985 have as their agreed subject a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship and as their agreed objectives to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and terminating it on earth, and limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability.

164. The United States and the Soviet Union have certain shared interests. Pre-eminent among these common interests is the avoidance of nuclear war. Neither society faces any greater danger to its security and even its survival. Consequently, this one shared key objective should be the dominant guideline for negotiations, thus maximizing the prospects for mutual co-operation and reducing political conflicts.

165. Today the world finds itself on the verge of a major arms race in outer space. A particularly beneficial step would be the prevention of the development of space weapons. The 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems must be upheld. It undoubtedly represents the signal accomplishment of 15 years of negotiations to limit the growth of nuclear weapons and to lessen the risk of war.

166. In agreeing to the above Treaty, the two major nuclear Powers have precluded for all practical purposes the deployment of ballistic missile defence systems capable of protecting large areas, and have assured that they would each remain vulnerable to nuclear-armed missile attack. This, it is believed, makes the risk of either side initiating a war, even in crisis, less likely, and enforces a certain degree of co-operation upon the two nations in situations short of crisis. By implication, the avoidance of deployments of anti-ballistic missiles may also have had the beneficial consequence of reducing competition in offensive weaponry. Deployments of ballistic missile defence systems would be likely to lead to attempts to overwhelm whatever increment of defensive capability the other was obtaining by deploying even larger increments of offensive striking power.
167. These developments may portend a destabilizing trend by contributing to the perception that the capability to fight and survive a nuclear war may be acquired. At the very least, development of anti-satellite capabilities dampens confidence in the reliability of verification systems and adds a new dimension of uncertainty to the arms race.

168. So far, the use of space technology has helped to stabilize the nuclear relationship. Satellite-based early warning systems provide the Soviet Union and the United States with capabilities to know of ballistic missile launchings virtually instantaneously. Satellite communications systems permit rapid and reliable communications between political authorities and commanders in the field and have helped reduce dangers of unauthorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Still other systems that are available to a few countries assist in verifying arms limitation agreements. Such systems would be placed at risk by the existence or development of anti-satellite weapons.

169. In addition to testing and deploying anti-satellite systems that rely on the use of projectiles, increased attention is devoted to research and development of more advanced space weapons systems, for instance laser-beam weapons and particle-beam weapons, which would further diminish stability and confidence. Therefore, it is urgent that negotiations be pursued leading to effective measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space before such technological developments become realities. It is important that all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

170. Biological weapons have been completely banned by the Biological Weapons Convention in 1975. The threat of other weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons, must also be contained. But while the actual use of chemical weapons was prohibited in the 1925 Geneva Protocol no restrictions exist on the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons. Concern has been aroused about the use of chemical weapons. Research and development on new generations of chemical weapons including "binary" chemical munitions have been intensified. The urgency of a complete ban on chemical weapons is therefore greater than ever. Negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament on this matter were intensified in 1984 and have made some progress. The conclusion of such a treaty would represent an important step forward in the common quest for security.

171. Arms transfers between nations are not new. As long as war and military preparedness have been features of international relations, weapons have been principal commodities of international trade. Over the past 20 years, however, conventional arms transfers have acquired particularly serious implications as the growth of such transfers indicates. In less than two decades, the total annual value of international arms sales has jumped from $3.8 billion to over $30 billion. Moreover, the quantitative increase in arms transfers has been accompanied by dramatic qualitative improvements. Whereas transfers from advanced nations traditionally comprised older weapons, in recent years the transfer or sale of more technologically sophisticated weapons has become commonplace.
172. Establishing criteria for restraining the flow of arms both quantitatively and qualitatively has been proposed at the United Nations, but not acted upon. However, measures in this regard have already been taken in Latin America where 20 Latin American and Caribbean nations agreed in 1978 to exchange information on weapon purchases with the goal of working toward greater restraints on arms transfers.

173. The problem of arms transfers is a complex one. Between 1977 and 1979, the Soviet Union and the United States held talks for the purpose of establishing guidelines to limit the transfer of conventional arms. The resumption of talks like these should be considered. Curbing the arms race will require a co-ordinated multinational approach. Moreover, recipient nations might consider the example of the Latin American nations in adopting guidelines to restrain the flow of arms to particular regions. In particular, it is in the interest of nations in every region to bar or limit weapons that will have the effect of enhancing the offensive capabilities of potential adversaries and/or increasing the incentive for pre-emptive action in a time of crisis. The subject of arms transfers, which arouses many concerns, was one of the issues addressed in the Study on Conventional Disarmament carried out by the United Nations (A/39/348).

174. Whatever political arrangements may be reached, in Europe the continuing competition in both conventional and nuclear forces poses a serious obstacle to creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence and security. Achieving a rough parity at lower levels of armaments in Europe would serve to diminish tensions on the continent.

175. The talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments as well as associated measures in central Europe have been going on at Vienna since October 1973. However, no practical results have been achieved at them so far. At the same time, agreement on tangible reduction in the level of military confrontation in the heart of the continent of Europe based on the principle of undiminished security to either side could have a substantive importance for the strengthening of security not only in Europe but throughout the world.

D. Implementation of disarmament agreements: compliance and verification

176. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purpose, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Whereas 100 per cent verifiability of compliance cannot be expected in most cases, it is necessary that all agreements include co-operative measures and other steps to assure the effective verification of the treaty provisions. However, the elusiveness of perfect verifiability must not be allowed to become an obstacle to further agreements.
177. Given the vital importance of verification to disarmament, a United Nations capacity to provide this service, if the States concerned so request, could constitute a valuable asset in the implementation of future disarmament agreements. Implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection responsibilities under the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been effective in maintaining international confidence that nuclear material, present in peaceful installations covered by the Treaty or other safeguard agreements, is not being diverted for military use. The objectivity of the inspections has never been seriously challenged.

178. There are several arms limitation treaties that remain unratified and only informally adhered to. Such treaties are the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the 1976 Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions and the 1979 SALT II Treaty. The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which would make Latin America a nuclear-weapon-free zone, is another treaty that has not been ratified by some of its signatories.

179. Although signatories have stated their intent to abide by the provisions of most of these agreements, numerous questions have been posed concerning the degree to which they are being observed. Formal ratification of these agreements would set in place various co-operative arrangements incorporated in their texts that would make the assurance of compliance with treaty provisions a less uncertain matter. It is in the interest of not only the signatories but all the world that these agreements be duly ratified.

180. Compliance with existing treaties by parties to them is a broader problem than that pertaining to unratified treaties. Proven violations of existing arms limitation treaties could not only threaten the purposes implicit in the particular treaty in question, but may also jeopardize the prospects for future negotiations, making it more difficult to motivate and muster popular support for additional and more far-reaching treaties.

181. The further spread of nuclear weapons to States that do not have them now would be a source of instability adding to the risk of nuclear war. It is in the interest of strengthening peace and security to prevent further vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The fact that some 125 non-nuclear-weapon States have become Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty demonstrates that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional States is seen to be of common security interest. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them that possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. Nuclear-weapon States should make effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

182. The Non-Proliferation Treaty represents an undertaking by non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to accept that the peaceful uses of atomic energy be put under international safeguards and inspection through IAEA. The nuclear-weapon States undertake not to transfer to or assist non-nuclear-weapon States to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament. All States should have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The safeguard provisions of the Treaty have been supplemented by arrangements among nations producing nuclear technology and materials to restrict the export of certain items that could be used for the production of nuclear weapons. Some countries maintain that, while serving non-proliferation purposes, these arrangements also represent a supplementary obstacle for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by some non-nuclear-weapon States.

183. Since 1964, the number of declared nuclear-weapon States has not increased. Undoubtedly, part of the credit goes to restraints accepted under the Non-Proliferation Treaty or exercised as a result of the norm established by it. Israel and South Africa are widely believed either already to have undeclared arsenals of untested nuclear weapons or to be capable of manufacturing such weapons very rapidly. Certain other States are reportedly pursuing nuclear weapon programmes.

184. The non-proliferation régime should be strengthened. Many States argue that, by its very nature, the Non-Proliferation Treaty institutionalizes a condition of inequality by obliging non-nuclear-weapon States to forego the nuclear option. To match the self-restraint of the non-nuclear-weapon States, it is imperative that the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty give meaning to their undertaking under article VI of the Treaty to negotiate an end to the arms race and disarmament. Giving full effect to the provision of article IV with regard to the inalienable right of the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is also of great significance for a viable non-proliferation régime. The safeguards provided under the Treaty should be further strengthened, taking into account new technological developments, in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. Effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would also strengthen non-proliferation.

185. In this connection, further international co-operation on nuclear non-proliferation to minimize the dangers that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes will lead to the diversion of nuclear materials for weapons purposes should be pursued. Multilateral efforts could be explored for expanding the safeguards systems of IAEA, inter alia, to cover the civilian nuclear fuel cycle of the nuclear-weapon States. Certain regional security arrangements could encourage existing threshold countries to abstain from the nuclear weapon option.

E. Confidence-building among States

186. Security depends not only on limitation of arms, but is also a consequence of the state of political and economic relations among nations. The two conditions are inseparable. Progress on arms limitation needs to be accompanied by increased co-operation in a variety of areas, including economic, social, scientific and cultural affairs. It also needs to be coupled with efforts to extend a spirit of confidence into military relations. Ideological differences must not be made an obstacle to confidence-building and co-operation in various fields among States.
187. The potential of confidence-building measures among nations has been suggested by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Conference was established by 33 European signatories, plus the United States and Canada, to reduce tensions and to build on the spirit of détente. It has accommodated a variety of concerns, and its Final Act of 1975 reflected the following principles:
(a) sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;
(b) refraining from the threat or use of force; (c) inviolability of frontiers;
(d) territorial integrity of States; (e) peaceful settlement of disputes; (f) non-intervention in internal affairs; (g) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; (h) equal rights and self-determination of peoples; (i) co-operation among States; (j) fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law. At the level of military relations, the Conference has been instrumental in instituting some important confidence-building measures designed to address the insecurities created by the conduct of large-scale military activities. The specific provisions of the Final Act of the Conference include a commitment to announce major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops at least 21 days in advance. Other measures agreed to include the exchange of observers at these exercises and other voluntary steps to ease tensions in Europe.

188. Additional measures are now being discussed at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, currently being held at Stockholm. In the European context it would be an important achievement if that Conference were to produce substantial results so as to pave the way for a second stage that should be devoted to concrete disarmament measures.

189. Approaches and measures regarding confidence-building applicable to other regions of the world and the specific threats prevalent in those regions could also be explored and adopted with a view to improving international relations and thus promote negotiations on arms limitations and disarmament. In this connection, the United Nations may, to a certain extent, take part in such an endeavour. For instance, the United Nations concluded a Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures, and since 1983 this subject has been under consideration by the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

190. The United Nations has an important role to play in the identification and promotion of agreements on confidence-building measures and their implementation, as recognized in paragraph 8 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The United Nations can encourage Member States to consider and enter into negotiations on confidence-building measures. It can also help to establish a political climate in which successful negotiations can be conducted. It plays an essential role in maintaining and strengthening the will of its Member States to negotiate and implement agreements on the application of confidence-building measures. Negotiations on confidence-building measures must, in conformity with paragraph 8 of the Final Document, be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.
P. **Enhancing regional co-operation**

191. Regional arrangements such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have provided a means of co-ordinating regional political activity and at times of resolving concerns of regional security.

192. Although there has been some success in the political and economic fields, regional arrangements have not been equally effective for security purposes. Successful peace-keeping efforts by the OAS in the 1969 war between Honduras and El Salvador hint at the possibilities, but so far such examples stand as exceptions. While regional organizations are well placed to define the needs for peace-keeping, they have insufficient means for its implementation. In some instances, OAU has played an important role in reconciling, mediating and solving local conflicts on the continent.

193. Urgent measures to strengthen the role of the United Nations should go hand in hand with measures to strengthen regional approaches to security, provided that such arrangements or activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

194. Efforts to establish local and regional security arrangements were undertaken to supplement the collective security system of the United Nations. Regional organizations have been formed in various parts of the world and in some cases have attempted to function in peace-keeping roles, though such peace-keeping capabilities of regional organizations so far have been quite limited. Provisions to settle disputes among States by peaceful means are included in several regional treaties and instruments. In some cases permanent institutions have been created. The effectiveness of such arrangements could be enhanced in various ways in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

195. Regional arrangements or agencies dealing with regional security, arms limitation and disarmament and other relevant problems should make a positive contribution to the security and development of co-operation among the States within the region. The United Nations should encourage such efforts. Arrangements and agencies should include all the States of a region and take due account of their security needs and problems. Important beginnings in this regard have already been made.

196. There may be circumstances in which regional forums outside the framework of the United Nations would provide appropriate vehicles for pre-empting or resolving local problems. Regional organizations may be in a good position to analyze and to propose solutions to conflicts in their area as well as to determine the need for peace-keeping and other measures, but often lack the means to implement them. To capitalize on such opportunities it would be important to strengthen the cohesion of various regional groupings, to consolidate their organizational and economic basis and to ensure that they are properly representative within their respective regions.
197. Regional diplomacy could help minimize the temptation of parties to local disputes to appeal to Powers outside the region for political support and military assistance, and at the same time could reduce the risks of great Power involvement. The recent experience of the Contadora Group in Central America represents an important effort to isolate local conflicts from great Power intervention and to find local solutions to local problems.

198. Regional efforts should be a complement to, not a substitute for, United Nations peace-keeping efforts. The United Nations is well positioned to strengthen the peace-keeping potential of regional organizations. The best route to regional peace might be through collaborative efforts that bring the international resources of the United Nations to the service of regional strategies for peace and conflict resolution. In this regard, the co-operation and co-ordination between the United Nations and the regional organizations should be enhanced in all aspects.

199. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe at Helsinki, Finland, in 1973 and 1975, and follow-up sessions in Belgrade and Madrid in 1977-1978 and 1980-1983 respectively have demonstrated a versatile and practical approach to formulating policies designed to enhance regional security. The Final Act of the Conference is not a treaty but represents a politically binding commitment among the 35 participating nations to foster security through wider co-operation and sustained dialogue on European issues. Where relevant to other regions, the conference arrangement may offer new possibilities for fostering respect for the territorial integrity of nations, for peacefully settling regional disputes and for enhancing regional economic, scientific and cultural co-operation.

200. Regional conferences could provide an approach to dealing with security concerns specific to a particular region or subregion. Since participation in a regional conference would have different implications than membership in a formal regional organization, the conference mechanism might offer the possibility of drawing on wider regional support. Regional meetings would not be limited to matters relating exclusively to military security but could define other non-military aspects of security, including economic and cultural problems. It would also be a vehicle for gaining consensus on adopting other confidence-building measures between States in the region.

**G. Efforts to improve international economic co-operation**

201. In the present era, all nations are linked in a complex network of trade, development, energy, raw materials and monetary exchanges. Few nations have escaped from the effects of contemporary international economic crises. The general situation of the world economy is characterized today by monetary, financial and trade instability that has affected growth and development in most countries. Few countries can retreat behind their borders and hope to escape such factors as the effects on their economy of high interest rates, unstable currency rates, changing costs of energy imports, falling prices of export commodities vital to their economy, rising protectionism and other deteriorations in terms of trade. These economic disruptions have severe effects, particularly on the developing countries. Their efforts towards development have suffered a serious set-back. In
Africa, economic and social problems have been aggravated by the prolonged drought, with the consequence that millions of people are exposed to famine. Moreover, such economic disruptions can have negative implications for the political stability of developed and developing nations alike, particularly the small and weak States in many cases, and eventually result in threats to security.

202. The multilateral financial institutions that were created after the Second World War and are affiliated with the United Nations have performed satisfactorily in the first two post-War decades, at least for some parts of the world. While they still play an important role they are not able to cope adequately with the current crisis nor effectively promote development. With the world more interdependent economically, solutions to the present economic problems can be found only through intensified, multilateral efforts. It is clear that the present crisis is of a structural nature. An international economic system on a sounder footing will strengthen peace, reduce tensions and give new impetus to mutually beneficial co-operation and development. The international economic system needs to be reconfigured for the benefit of all States, especially for the benefit of developing countries.

203. The current effort to establish a new international economic order is aimed to solve such a problem with a view to bringing about economic justice among nations so as to promote international peace and security. Therefore, the North-South dialogue on the economic relations between the developed and developing countries should be promoted. The United Nations should play a greater role in this field through its various relevant organs and the specialized agencies, including regional economic commissions around the world.

H. Non-alignment

204. The Non-Aligned Movement has made an important contribution to international security, helping to strengthen the role and security of medium-sized and smaller nations and holding larger nations to account on the critical issues of colonialism and the arms race. A greater role for the Non-Aligned Movement may exist in the future. Firstly, the Movement may be able to play a more instrumental role in finding peaceful solutions to regional disputes. The potential here is suggested by the contribution of non-aligned nations to peace efforts in South-West Asia and Central America, the last in support of the Contadora Group. Secondly, the Non-Aligned Movement will likely continue to be an effective advocate of racial and political justice, reflecting the commitment of the United Nations to the protection of basic human rights. Thirdly, the Movement has an important role as spokesman for the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all nations in the international community, also supporting the interests of the United Nations in this role as well. Fourthly, the Non-Aligned Movement can press for needed reforms in the international economic system, seeking greater equality in international trade and access to civilian technologies among nations. Finally, as an organization devoted to the preservation of international peace and security, the Non-Aligned Movement may help to encourage restraint in the nuclear and conventional arms race, and to underscore the critical relationship between disarmament and development. With such an agenda, the non-aligned nations can continue to make a unique and essential contribution to international security.
I. Peaceful coexistence

205. Many nations suggest that international security and confidence between nations can be promoted on the basis of the principles expressed in the concept of peaceful coexistence. The concept of peaceful coexistence is applicable not only between countries with differing social systems, but also between countries sharing the same social system. When this concept is violated, even nations of similar social system may find themselves in sharp conflict. The urgency of applying the concept of peaceful coexistence has rarely been greater. The 160 and more independent countries of today's world differ widely in all aspects of livelihood, including different ideologies and social systems. Yet they all face common threats posed by the nuclear and conventional arms race and international economic problems. Respect for peaceful coexistence would help to promote and ensure international security. The possession of nuclear weapons imposes a special responsibility on the nuclear Powers, particularly the two major Powers possessing the largest nuclear arsenals, to respect this concept. In the opinion of its proponents all nations are called upon to observe this fundamental norm of international behaviour, which in their view is in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

206. In principle, security is a condition in which States consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressure or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely their own development and progress. International security is thus the result and the sum of the security of each and every State member of the international community; accordingly, international security cannot be reached without full international co-operation. However, security is a relative rather than an absolute term. National and international security need to be viewed as matters of degree.

207. Concepts of security are the different bases on which States and the international community as a whole rely for their security. Examples of concepts are the "balance of power", "deterrence", "peaceful coexistence" and "collective security". Security policies, on the other hand, are means to promote security, such as disarmament and arms limitation arrangements or the maintenance and development of military capabilities. There is no clear-cut line between a "concept" and a "policy" and it is not necessary to define one as long as the general thrust is kept in mind.

208. Any discussion of security concepts is complex and, understandably, controversial. It concerns important and sensitive political issues. The perspectives differ. Even the most basic definitions and perceptions may be subject to controversy. Nevertheless, the need to discuss these issues is real if mutual trust, respect and understanding are to be enhanced. This discussion should take place on the broadest possible basis. No nation should withdraw from this challenge, but contribute to efforts that seek to identify the common ground between nations.
The different security concepts have as a common objective the protection of national security. They have evolved in response to the need for national security and as a result of changing political, military, economic and other circumstances. Concepts of security contain different elements such as military capabilities, economic strength, social development, technological and scientific progress as well as political co-operation through the use of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, also involving international organizations. Concepts of security may emphasize any one of these elements or a combination of them. Concepts of security may stress national unilateral action to maintain security or multilateral co-operative approaches. Traditionally concepts of security have emphasized unilateral steps to reduce national vulnerabilities through military defence. A number of concepts, such as the collective security concept contained in the United Nations Charter, the concept of peaceful coexistence between all nations, non-alignment and common security, place emphasis on political co-operation.

All nations have the right to maintain military forces for national defence and they have the right to decide on matters concerning their own security. But if nations pursue security policies that rely primarily on their own military strength and narrow national interests, serious problems may arise for international security. Individual States may temporarily achieve an increase in their security through the development of their military capabilities but they will ultimately be negatively affected by offsetting measures undertaken by other States and the resulting deterioration in international security. International security requires a balance between military and non-military elements and between national and international interests.

It has been estimated that there have probably been over 150 armed conflicts since 1945. Estimates of casualties from all wars fought since 1945 range between 16 and 25 million killed. In addition to actual deaths and human suffering, the costs of conventional wars must be measured in terms of the destruction of economic infrastructure, lost educational opportunities and damage to prospects for economic growth. Recent wars have produced very large waves of refugees, comprised principally of women and children.

National and international security are becoming increasingly interrelated, thereby challenging the notion that security is primarily a function of national power or military and economic strength. Searching for solutions to the problem of insecurity, many nations increasingly find themselves face-to-face with circumstances beyond their direct control such as a structural economic crisis, and global economic, population, environmental and resource trends. At the same time, elements such as the international tensions and armed conflicts in different regions of the world, the spiralling nuclear and conventional arms race and the continuation of colonialism and racism, are also affecting the search for security. Global interdependence has created a situation in which actions not only by major Powers but also by other nations can have major regional or even international repercussions.

Interdependence is, in particular, underscored by the fact that all nations face universal threats posed by the nuclear arms race. As long as nuclear weapons exist their use in certain circumstances cannot be totally discounted. No nuclear-weapon State has completely renounced the possibility of their use. The
assured destruction that would follow a nuclear exchange would not be mutual but
global and use of nuclear weapons would threaten all mankind. Non-nuclear-weapon
States therefore feel a growing sense of insecurity and loss of their right to
decide on their own destiny. They feel unjustly exposed to the nuclear threat
while taking no part in the nuclear arms race, which therefore becomes a matter of
criucal concern to the non-nuclear-weapon States. No State can now, by itself, attain absolute security.

214. In reviewing various concepts of security and assessing the elements required
for global security, the Group has generally shared the following common
understandings:

(1) **All nations have the right to security**

All States have, regardless of size, geographic location, social system,
political or ideological belief, or level of development, a legitimate right
to security. This means that the security needs of one State must not be
defined in such a way as to undermine the legitimate security needs of
others. Definitions of national security that require the subordination or
subjugation of other States and peoples are not legitimate. Security implies
not only freedom from war and from the threat of war, but from any form of
covert or overt intervention. The security of small States is as important as
the security of large States.

(2) **The use of military force for purposes other than self-defence is not a legitimate instrument of national policy**

The right to use military force in self-defence is recognized and
reaffirmed in the Charter of the United Nations and military preparedness is
no less a basic feature of national policy than it ever was. However, the use
of force to gain security at the expense of other States is unacceptable. It
is evident that a competitive, open-ended accumulation of weapons by nations
aggravates political conflicts and increases the risk of war and can lead to
less, rather than more, security. This has never been more true than in the
nuclear age.

(3) **Security should be understood in comprehensive terms**

Security policies can no longer be concerned with peace, defined merely
as the absence of war, but must deal effectively with the broader and more
complex questions of the interrelationship between military and non-military
elements of security. It is essential to address underlying political, social
and economic problems. A strong emphasis on the military aspects in security
policies has increased the tempo of the arms race, exacerbated international
tensions and heightened the danger of war. Policies centred on military
strength have also diverted attention from other serious threats to global
security such as political disorder, problems of development, apartheid,
denial of the right to self-determination and unequal distribution of
resources. The threat of war cannot be dealt with effectively without a prior
analysis of and effective measures directed at the roots of international
tensions and antagonisms that often give rise to competition in the fields of
nuclear and conventional arms. Consequently, a comprehensive approach to security, recognizing the growing interdependence of political, military, economic, social, geographical and technological factors, has become essential. Security is equally important at the national and international level and should be ensured at both levels.

(4) Security is the concern of all nations

Nuclear weapons have transformed the conditions of security. Ultimately, the fates of all States are affected by the continuing increase in the nuclear arsenals or by failure to negotiate arms limitations. No nation can escape the threat of proliferating challenges to global security. All nations have the right and duty to participate in the search for constructive solutions. As all nations are subject to the ultimate threat of annihilation, all nations must have a say in the quest for international security. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them that possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

(5) The world's diversities should not constitute obstacles to international co-operation for peace and security

The world has over 160 independent States. There are wide differences among them with respect to ethnic origins, language, culture, history, customs, ideologies, political institutions, socio-economic systems and levels of development. In the nuclear age the interest in survival must transcend differences in ideology, political institutions and socio-economic systems. Political conflicts and contending interests among States will not disappear, but they must not be allowed to override the collective interest in survival. The differences in ideology, political institutions and socio-economic systems that currently create obstacles to international co-operation for peace and security must be moderated by strict observance of generally accepted norms for relations between States. It will never be easy to create attitudes of tolerance between political systems based on contradictory ideologies. However, it must be recognized that the constant threat of war prevents the realization of higher political goals in all nations. The reality of modern war would reduce the accomplishments and the hopes of every political system to nothing. Consequently it is vital that security policies should be adjusted to reconcile national security interests and the requirements of international security. Nations are not expected to give up their ideological and political convictions but ideological differences should not be transferred to interstate relations. There is a need for self-restraint on the part of the States involved.

(6) Disarmament and arms limitation is an important approach to international peace and security

The arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, has reached an unprecedented level. Mankind is today confronted with a threat of self-extinction arising from the massive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. To avoid the risk of nuclear war it is necessary to
reverse the nuclear arms race. Those powers that possess the most important nuclear arsenals have a special responsibility to the rest of the world to proceed with nuclear disarmament since they have the capability to destroy mankind. Other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical weapons, and the maintenance, expansion and modernization of large arsenals of conventional weapons add to the dangers facing the world. Agreed reductions of military expenditures would be an important measure in curbing the arms race. The arms race runs counter to efforts to maintain international peace and security, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. It impedes the realization of the purposes of the United Nations. Arms limitation and disarmament have thus become the most urgent task facing the international community. No effort should be spared to promote disarmament negotiations to reach the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Agreement to reduce nuclear and conventional weapons would reduce mutual fears and mistrust and would greatly assist the improvement of political relations between countries.

215. This review of prevailing security policies leads to the conclusion that nations should move towards common security. A number of proposals to this effect are made in chapter IV. Actions in the following four main areas are of particular importance:

(a) Renewed efforts in the field of disarmament to reduce the risk of war, in particular nuclear war;

(b) Maintenance of the rule of law in international relations through the strict observance of the Charter of the United Nations and effective application of the collective security concept;

(c) Decolonization and elimination of apartheid;

(d) Political and economic co-operation for development and security.

Renewed efforts in the field of disarmament to reduce the risk of war, in particular nuclear war

216. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind. Effective measures to promote nuclear disarmament and to prevent nuclear war must have the highest priority. In carrying out this task, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those that possess the largest nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. It is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, other measures designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to lessen the danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be taken.

217. Too often, the use of force is claimed to be in self-defence. The Charter in Article 51 recognizes the right to self-defence only when "an armed attack occurs". The provisions of Article 51, concerning action to maintain or restore international peace in case of armed attack, should be strictly adhered to. Traditional international law relating to armed conflict contains some general
principles that in fact outlaw certain practices in war. Relevant in this context are, inter alia, the principles of distinction between military and civilian objects, the prohibition of causing unnecessary suffering in warfare and the principle of proportionality prohibiting attacks that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantages anticipated. Nuclear weapons have introduced a completely new and qualitatively different dimension. It is not conceivable that nuclear weapons could be used in a manner consistent with the principles mentioned above. Further efforts should be made to include in international law the clear and complete prohibition and total destruction of all nuclear weapons, as well as the clear and complete prohibition on the development, testing, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons.

218. Improved international security requires a realization by the two major nuclear-weapon States that they have a common stake not only in survival, but also in the pursuit of common security. Acting towards this goal, the Soviet Union and the United States should also take into account each other's differing interests when determining their respective security policies and seek to manage their relations with each other in such a way as to reduce the risk of war both to themselves and to the rest of the international community. It is of major importance that relations between them be improved and that actions and rhetoric be adjusted to that objective.

219. The prevention of an arms race in outer space is more urgent than ever before. States, in particular those with major space capabilities, should refrain from development of space weapon systems and take measures to avoid the extension of an arms race into outer space as it would constitute a destabilizing factor to international peace and security. As a common heritage of mankind, outer space should be reserved for peaceful purposes.

220. All nations have a common interest in the maintenance of international peace and security. Military conflicts entail the risk of spreading and escalation. Regional conflicts may escalate into global war. It is, therefore, essential to settle international disputes by peaceful means, to prevent such disputes from developing into armed conflicts and to restrain and seek solutions to conflicts where hostilities have already broken out.

Maintenance of the rule of law in international relations through the strict observance of the Charter of the United Nations and effective application of the collective security concept

221. Disregard for international law and reliance on force for resolving disputes is dangerous and offers no prospect of finding lasting solutions to the problem of international security. It has led to a situation that is dangerously close to international anarchy. This situation must be reversed. All States must observe legal principles in their behaviour. The basic principles are contained in the Charter of the United Nations, which is the paramount set of principles to which all Member States have subscribed. The Charter of the United Nations must be observed.

222. The following legal principles are of particular relevance: peaceful settlement of disputes; prohibition of the use or threat of force, and non-aggression; non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States; respect
for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States; respect for the right to self-determination and independence of all peoples.

223. It is the obligation of all States under international law to abide by these principles. It is vital for the achievement of international security that all States abide by their obligations under international law. If the corresponding provisions of the Charter were strictly observed this would lead to a drastic improvement of the international situation.

224. One of the main tasks of the United Nations is to maintain and strengthen international peace and security. It has, however, not always been possible to implement its collective security system to prevent or counter aggression. Steps should be taken to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations and to improve its possibilities to fulfil its fundamental task of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the Charter.

225. The Security Council has been entrusted with the primary responsibility with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. The effective use of the Security Council and the collective security system of the United Nations requires consensus among the great Powers. This imposes on them a special responsibility for the effective functioning of the Security Council and the collective security system of the Charter. Implementation of the decisions of the Security Council is central to the effectiveness of the United Nations in this field. Regrettably, many Security Council resolutions remain unimplemented. This is dangerous and detrimental to the authority of the Council.

226. Preventive actions by the United Nations are important in order to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. Such actions could offer time for the peaceful resolution of disputes before they develop into armed conflicts. A number of measures should be considered in this regard. The Security Council should consider holding periodic meetings in specific cases to examine and review outstanding problems and crises, thus enabling the Council to play a more active role in preventing conflicts. The international situation requires an effective Security Council and, to that end, the Security Council should examine mechanisms and working methods on a continuous basis in order to enhance its authority and enforcement capacity in accordance with the Charter.

227. It is also important to enhance the role of the General Assembly in the maintenance of international peace and security, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

228. It is important that full use be made of the means of peaceful settlement of disputes as provided for in the Charter. For the protection of the security of weaker countries, among the methods for peaceful settlement of disputes those that provide for third party settlement, such as arbitration or reference to the International Court of Justice, could be of value.

229. Massive and systematic violations of the provisions of international instruments on human rights are likely to exercise a negative influence on international security. All efforts should be made by the international community to prevent such developments.
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