Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix
Mr. President,
Since I reported to the Security
Council on 27 January, UNMOVIC has had two further weeks of operational and analytical
work in New York and active inspections in Iraq. This brings the total period of inspections so far to 11
weeks. Since then, we have also
listened on 5 February to the presentation to the Council by the US Secretary
of State and the discussion that followed.
Lastly, Dr. ElBaradei and I have held another round of talks in Baghdad
with our counterparts and with Vice President Ramadan on 8 and 9 February.
Let me begin today’s briefing with a
short account of the work being performed by UNMOVIC in Iraq.
We have continued to build up our
capabilities. The regional office in
Mosul is now fully operational at its temporary headquarters. Plans for a regional office at Basra are being
developed. Our Hercules L-100 aircraft
continues to operate routine flights between Baghdad and Larnaca. The eight helicopters are fully
operational. With the resolution of the
problems raised by Iraq for the transportation of minders into the no-fly
zones, our mobility in these zones has improved. We expect to increase utilization of the helicopters. The number of Iraqi minders during
inspections had often reached a ratio as high as five per inspector. During the talks in January in Baghdad, the
Iraqi side agreed to keep the ratio to about one to one. The situation has improved.
Since we arrived in Iraq, we have
conducted more than 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites. All inspections were performed without
notice, and access was almost always provided promptly. In no case have we seen convincing evidence
that the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were coming.
The inspections have taken place
throughout Iraq at industrial sites, ammunition depots, research centres,
universities, presidential sites, mobile laboratories, private houses, missile
production facilities, military camps and agricultural sites. At all sites which had been inspected before
1998, re-baselining activities were performed.
This included the identification of the function and contents of each
building, new or old, at a site. It
also included verification of previously tagged equipment, application of seals
and tags, taking samples and discussions with the site personnel regarding past
and present activities. At certain
sites, ground-penetrating radar was used to look for underground structures or
buried equipment.
Through the inspections conducted so
far, we have obtained a good knowledge of the industrial and scientific
landscape of Iraq, as well as of its missile capability but, as before, we do not
know every cave and corner. Inspections
are effectively helping to bridge the gap in knowledge that arose due to the
absence of inspections between December 1998 and November 2002.
More than 200 chemical and more than
100 biological samples have been collected at different sites. Three-quarters of these have been screened
using our own analytical laboratory capabilities at the Baghdad Centre
(BOMVIC). The results to date have been
consistent with Iraq’s declarations.
We have now commenced the process of
destroying approximately 50 litres of mustard gas declared by Iraq that was
being kept under UNMOVIC seal at the Muthanna site. One-third of the quantity has already been destroyed. The laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a
mustard gas precursor, which we found at another site, has also been destroyed.
The total number of staff in Iraq
now exceeds 250 from 60 countries. This
includes about 100 UNMOVIC inspectors, 15 IAEA inspectors, 50 aircrew, and 65
support staff.
Mr. President,
In my 27 January update to the
Council, I said that it seemed from our experience that Iraq had decided in
principle to provide cooperation on process, most importantly prompt access to
all sites and assistance to UNMOVIC in the establishment of the necessary infrastructure.
This impression remains, and we note that access to sites has so far been
without problems, including those that had never been declared or inspected, as
well as to Presidential sites and private residences.
In my last updating, I also said
that a decision to cooperate on substance was indispensable in order to bring,
through inspection, the disarmament task to completion and to set the
monitoring system on a firm course.
Such cooperation, as I have noted, requires more than the opening of
doors. In the words of resolution 1441
(2002) – it requires immediate, unconditional and active efforts by Iraq to
resolve existing questions of disarmament – either by presenting remaining
proscribed items and programmes for elimination or by presenting convincing
evidence that they have been eliminated.
In the current situation, one would expect Iraq to be eager to comply.
While we were in Baghdad, we met a delegation from the Government of South
Africa. It was there to explain how
South Africa gained the confidence of the world in its dismantling of the
nuclear weapons programme, by a wholehearted cooperation over two years with
IAEA inspectors. I have just learned
that Iraq has accepted an offer by South Africa to send a group of experts for
further talks.
How much, if any, is left of Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction and related proscribed items and programmes? So far, UNMOVIC has not found any such
weapons, only a small number of empty chemical munitions, which should have
been declared and destroyed. Another
matter – and one of great significance – is that many proscribed weapons and
items are not accounted for. To take an
example, a document, which Iraq provided, suggested to us that some 1,000
tonnes of chemical agent were “unaccounted for”. One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist. However, that possibility is also not
excluded. If they exist, they should be
presented for destruction. If they do
not exist, credible evidence to that effect should be presented.
We are fully aware that many
governmental intelligence organizations are convinced and assert that
proscribed weapons, items and programmes continue to exist. The US Secretary of State presented material
in support of this conclusion.
Governments have many sources of information that are not available to
inspectors. Inspectors, for their part,
must base their reports only on evidence, which they can, themselves, examine
and present publicly. Without evidence,
confidence cannot arise.
Mr. President,
In my earlier briefings, I have
noted that significant outstanding issues of substance were listed in two
Security Council documents from early 1999 (S/1999/94 and S/1999/356) and
should be well known to Iraq. I
referred, as examples, to the issues of anthrax, the nerve agent VX and
long-range missiles, and said that such issues “deserve to be taken seriously
by Iraq rather than being brushed aside…”.
The declaration submitted by Iraq on 7 December last year, despite its
large volume, missed the opportunity to provide the fresh material and evidence
needed to respond to the open questions.
This is perhaps the most important problem we are facing. Although I can understand that it may not be
easy for Iraq in all cases to provide the evidence needed, it is not the task
of the inspectors to find it. Iraq
itself must squarely tackle this task and avoid belittling the questions.
In my January update to the Council,
I referred to the Al Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah missiles, reconstituted casting
chambers, construction of a missile engine test stand and the import of rocket
engines, which were all declared to UNMOVIC by Iraq. I noted that the Al Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah could very well
represent prima facie cases of proscribed missile systems, as they had
been tested to ranges exceeding the 150-kilometre limit set by the Security
Council. I also noted that Iraq had
been requested to cease flight tests of these missiles until UNMOVIC completed
a technical review.
Earlier this week, UNMOVIC missile
experts met for two days with experts from a number of Member States to discuss
these items. The experts concluded
unanimously that, based on the data provided by Iraq, the two declared variants
of the Al Samoud 2 missile were capable of exceeding 150 kilometres in range.
This missile system is therefore proscribed for Iraq pursuant to resolution 687
(1991) and the monitoring plan adopted by resolution 715 (1991).
As for the Al Fatah, the experts
found that clarification of the missile data supplied by Iraq was required
before the capability of the missile system could be fully assessed.
With respect to the casting
chambers, I note the following: UNSCOM
ordered and supervised the destruction of the casting chambers, which had been
intended for use in the production of the proscribed Badr-2000 missile
system. Iraq has declared that it has
reconstituted these chambers. The
experts have confirmed that the reconstituted casting chambers could still be
used to produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater
than 150 kilometres. Accordingly, these
chambers remain proscribed.
The experts also studied the data on
the missile engine test stand that is nearing completion and have assessed it
to be capable of testing missile engines with thrusts greater than that of the
SA-2 engine. So far, the test stand has
not been associated with a proscribed activity.
On the matter of the 380 SA-2
missile engines imported outside of the export/import mechanism and in
contravention of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), UNMOVIC inspectors were
informed by Iraq during an official briefing that these engines were intended
for use in the Al Samoud 2 missile system, which has now been assessed to be
proscribed. Any such engines configured
for use in this missile system would also be proscribed.
I intend to communicate these findings to the Government of Iraq.
At the meeting in Baghdad on 8 and 9
February, the Iraqi side addressed some of the important outstanding
disarmament issues and gave us a number of papers, e.g. regarding anthrax and
growth material, the nerve agent VX and missile production. Experts who were present from our side
studied the papers during the evening of 8 February and met with Iraqi experts
in the morning of 9 February for further clarifications. Although no new evidence was provided in the
papers and no open issues were closed through them or the expert discussions,
the presentation of the papers could be indicative of a more active attitude
focusing on important open issues.
The Iraqi side suggested that the
problem of verifying the quantities of anthrax and two VX-precursors, which had
been declared unilaterally destroyed, might be tackled through certain
technical and analytical methods.
Although our experts are still assessing the suggestions, they are not
very hopeful that it could prove possible to assess the quantities of material
poured into the ground years ago.
Documentary evidence and testimony by staff that dealt with the items
still appears to be needed.
Not least against this background, a
letter of 12 February from Iraq’s National Monitoring Directorate may be of
relevance. It presents a list of 83
names of participants “in the unilateral destruction in the chemical field,
which took place in the summer of 1991”.
As the absence of adequate evidence of that destruction has been and
remains an important reason why quantities of chemicals have been deemed
“unaccounted for”, the presentation of a list of persons who can be interviewed
about the actions appears useful and pertains to cooperation on substance. I trust that the Iraqi side will put
together a similar list of names of persons who participated in the unilateral
destruction of other proscribed items, notably in the biological field.
The Iraqi side also informed us that
the commission, which had been appointed in the wake of our finding 12 empty
chemical weapons warheads, had had its mandate expanded to look for any
still existing proscribed items.
This was welcomed.
A second commission, we learnt, has
now been appointed with the task of searching all over Iraq for more documents
relevant to the elimination of proscribed items and programmes. It is headed by the former Minister of Oil,
General Amer Rashid, and is to have very extensive powers of search in
industry, administration and even private houses.
The two commissions could be useful tools to come up with proscribed
items to be destroyed and with new documentary evidence. They evidently need to work fast and
effectively to convince us, and the world, that it is a serious effort.
The matter of private interviews was
discussed at length during our meeting in Baghdad. The Iraqi side confirmed the commitment, which it made to us on
20 January, to encourage persons asked to accept such interviews, whether in or
out of Iraq. So far, we have only had
interviews in Baghdad. A number of
persons have declined to be interviewed, unless they were allowed to have an
official present or were allowed to tape the interview. Three persons that had previously refused
interviews on UNMOVIC’s terms, subsequently accepted such interviews just prior
to our talks in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February.
These interviews proved informative.
No further interviews have since been accepted on our terms. I hope this will change. We feel that interviews conducted without
any third party present and without tape recording would provide the greatest
credibility.
At the recent meeting in Baghdad, as
on several earlier occasions, my colleague Dr. ElBaradei and I have urged the
Iraqi side to enact legislation implementing the UN prohibitions regarding
weapons of mass destruction. This
morning we had a message that a Presidential decree has now been issued
containing prohibitions with regard to importation and production of
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.
We have not yet had time to study the details of the text of the
decree.
Intelligence
Mr. President, I
should like to make some comments on the role of intelligence in connection
with inspections in Iraq.
A credible inspection
regime requires that Iraq provide full cooperation on “process” – granting
immediate access everywhere to inspectors – and on substance, providing full
declarations supported by relevant information and material and evidence. However, with the closed society in Iraq of
today and the history of inspections there, other sources of information, such
as defectors and government intelligence agencies are required to aid the
inspection process.
I remember myself how,
in 1991, several inspections in Iraq, which were based on information received
from a Government, helped to disclose important parts of the nuclear weapons
programme. It was realized that an
international organization authorized to perform inspections anywhere on the
ground could make good use of information obtained from governments with eyes
in the sky, ears in the ether, access to defectors, and both eyes and ears on
the market for weapons-related material.
It was understood that the information residing in the intelligence
services of governments could come to very active use in the international
effort to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This remains true and we have by now a good
deal of experience in the matter.
International organizations
need to analyse such information critically and especially benefit when it
comes from more than one source. The
intelligence agencies, for their part, must protect their sources and methods. Those who provide such information must know
that it will be kept in strict confidence and be known to very few people. UNMOVIC has achieved good working relations
with intelligence agencies and the amount of information provided has been
gradually increasing. However, we must
recognize that there are limitations and that misinterpretations can occur.
Intelligence
information has been useful for UNMOVIC.
In one case, it led us to a private home where documents mainly relating
to laser enrichment of uranium were found.
In other cases, intelligence has led to sites where no proscribed items
were found. Even in such cases,
however, inspection of these sites were useful in proving the absence of such
items and in some cases the presence of other items – conventional munitions. It showed that conventional arms are being
moved around the country and that movements are not necessarily related to
weapons of mass destruction.
The presentation of
intelligence information by the US Secretary of State suggested that Iraq had
prepared for inspections by cleaning up sites and removing evidence of
proscribed weapons programmes. I would
like to comment only on one case, which we are familiar with, namely, the
trucks identified by analysts as being for chemical decontamination at a
munitions depot. This was a declared
site, and it was certainly one of the sites Iraq would have expected us to
inspect. We have noted that the two
satellite images of the site were taken several weeks apart. The reported movement of
munitions at the site could just as easily have been a routine activity as a
movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent inspection. Our reservation on this point does not
detract from our appreciation of the briefing.
Plans for the
immediate future
Yesterday, UNMOVIC informed the
Iraqi authorities of its intention to start using the U-2 surveillance aircraft
early next week under arrangements similar to those UNSCOM had followed. We are also in the process of working out
modalities for the use of the French Mirage aircraft starting late next week
and for the drones supplied by the German Government. The offer from Russia of an Antonov aircraft, with night vision
capabilities, is a welcome one and is next on our agenda for further improving
UNMOVIC’s and IAEA’s technical capabilities.
These developments are in line with suggestions made in a non-paper
recently circulated by France, suggesting a further strengthening of the
inspection capabilities.
It is our intention to examine the
possibilities for surveying ground movements, notably by trucks. In the face of persistent intelligence
reports for instance about mobile biological weapons production units, such
measures could well increase the effectiveness of inspections.
UNMOVIC is still expanding its
capabilities, both in terms of numbers of staff and technical resources. On my way to the recent Baghdad meeting, I
stopped in Vienna to meet 60 experts, who had just completed our general
training course for inspectors. They
came from 22 countries, including Arab countries.
Mr. President,
UNMOVIC is not infrequently asked
how much more time it needs to complete its task in Iraq. The answer depends upon which task one has
in mind – the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and related items and programmes,
which were prohibited in 1991 – the disarmament task – or the monitoring that
no new proscribed activities occur. The
latter task, though not often focused upon, is highly significant – and not
controversial. It will require
monitoring, which is “ongoing”, that is, open-ended until the Council decides
otherwise.
By contrast, the task of
“disarmament” foreseen in resolution 687 (1991) and the progress on “key
remaining disarmament tasks” foreseen in resolution 1284 (1999) as well as the
“disarmament obligations”, which Iraq was given a “final opportunity to comply
with” under resolution 1441 (2002), were always required to be fulfilled in a
shorter time span. Regrettably, the
high degree of cooperation required of Iraq for disarmament through inspection
was not forthcoming in 1991. Despite
the elimination, under UNSCOM and IAEA supervision, of large amounts of
weapons, weapons-related items and installations over the years, the task
remained incomplete, when inspectors were withdrawn almost 8 years later at the
end of 1998.
If Iraq had provided the necessary
cooperation in 1991, the phase of disarmament – under resolution 687 (1991) –
could have been short and a decade of sanctions could have been avoided. Today, three months after the adoption of
resolution 1441 (2002), the period of disarmament through inspection could
still be short, if “immediate, active and unconditional cooperation” with
UNMOVIC and the IAEA were to be forthcoming.