The peacekeeping operation established by the Security Council in its resolution 1704 (2006)—the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)—was preceded by a number of other United Nations operations or missions deployed in this country beginning in 1999.
Past United Nations missions
- The United Nations Mission in East Timor ( UNAMET ) ( June—October 1999) was mandated to organize and conduct a popular consultation to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accepted a special autonomy within Indonesia or rejected the proposed special autonomy, leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia . UNAMET was a political mission.
- The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor ( UNTAET ) (October 1999—May 2002) was a peacekeeping operation. The Security Council established UNTAET following rejection by the East Timorese of special autonomy. UNTAET exercised administrative authority over East Timor during the transition to independence.
- The United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor ( UNMISET ) (May 2002—May 2005), also a peacekeeping mission, was mandated to provide assistance to the newly independent East Timor until all operational responsibilities were fully devolved to the East Timor authorities, and to permit the new nation, now called Timor-Leste, to attain self-sufficiency.
- Once the peacekeeping mission withdrew, a new political mission, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) (May 2005—August 2006), supported the development of critical State institutions and the police and provided training in observance of democratic governance and human rights.
Political, humanitarian and security crisis
UNOTIL was scheduled to end its mandate in May 2006, and the Security Council had already received the Secretary-General's recommendations for the post-UNOTIL period. However, a series of events culminating in a political, humanitarian and security crisis of major dimensions led the Council to prolong UNOTIL's mandate, ultimately to 20 August 2006 , and to request new recommendations taking into account the need for a strengthened United Nations presence. Against this background, Timor-Leste urgently requested police and military assistance from Australia , New Zealand , Malaysia and Portugal . On 26 May, incoming international forces began securing key installations in the country.
Reporting to the Council in August 2006, the Secretary-General noted that the level of violence had abated significantly since its peak in late May and early June and that a new Government had been installed on the pledge to unify the nation. His view, however, was that the crisis was far from resolved, with many of the underlying factors needing attention over the longer term. Among these, identified in speeches made by the President and the Prime Minister at the time of the inauguration of the new Government, were the failure of government to engage with people, the unhealed wounds of the past and high youth unemployment. The Secretary-General noted that the resolution of the political stand-off merely created an opportunity to address the grievances that gave rise to the crisis and the longer-term issues.
In assessing the situation, the Secretary-General's report pointed to the mixed legacy of the 24 years of occupation, resulting in a gulf of understanding separating those who spent years as resistance fighters, those who lived in occupied towns and villages and those who went into exile. Veterans and young people were also likely to be divided by a generation gap. Past intra-Timorese political conflicts had bequeathed a deeply ingrained fear of any form of political contention. Furthermore, the single party that had dominated politics since 2001 rested its claim to be the party of government as much on its standing as the original advocate of independence as its programme for the current time. Among other factors were long-standing frictions between easterners and westerners in the armed forces and the police and in neighbourhoods of the capital city. The report also noted that the roots of the imbalance in power between the institutions of State, allowing the executive to operate with few constraints, were political, institutional and constitutional. Poverty and its associated deprivations had contributed to the crisis.
Request for a new mission
On 11 June 2006, the President of Timor-Leste, the President of the National Parliament and the Prime Minister wrote to the Secretary-General requesting that he propose to the Security Council to establish a United Nations police force in Timor-Leste to maintain law and order until the national police could undergo reorganization and restructuring. The Secretary-General requested his Special Envoy, appointed on 25 May 2006 , to lead a multidisciplinary assessment mission to Timor-Leste to identify the scope of tasks to be undertaken by a post-UNOTIL mission and to develop recommendations for a future UN presence. The mission conducted its assessment from 26 June to 9 July.
Secretary-General's recommendations
In his report to the Security Council dated 8 August 2006 , the Secretary-General stated that much had been achieved since independence in major areas of institutional capacity building. Nevertheless, the United Nations and the international community had learned from lessons elsewhere, and had been starkly reminded by the Timor-Leste crisis, that nation-building and peace-building were long-term tasks. This was especially true of the time required to build a new police service and justice system.
The Secretary-General went on to note that successes achieved through the work of successive peacekeeping missions would be undermined if a failure of socio-economic development left the people of Timor-Leste in poverty and unemployment. Long-term development efforts to translate available budgetary resources into programmes addressing rural poverty and urban unemployment were as crucial as anything that could be done through a new United Nations mission.
He stressed that an enhanced international role in the security sector and elsewhere must fully respect the national sovereignty of Timor-Leste, and the process of nation-building must be Timorese-owned and led. At the same time, the international community should be able to expect that the country's political leadership, having reflected on the crisis, would work together to broaden the country's political functioning into an open, pluralistic democracy in which all Timorese felt that they have a stake.
The Secretary-General recommended the establishment of a United Nations multidimensional, integrated mission, with the mandate to support the Government of Timor-Leste and to assist it in its efforts to bring about a process of national reconciliation; to support the country in all aspects of the 2007 presidential and parliamentary electoral process; to ensure, through the presence of United Nations police with an executive policing mandate, the restoration and maintenance of public security; to assist in liaising with the Indonesian military through the impartial presence of United Nations Military Liaison Officers; and to assist in further strengthening the national capacity for the monitoring, promotion and protection of human rights.
The mandate would also include provisions to assist the Prosecutor-General in resuming the investigative functions of the former Serious Crimes Unit; mainstream gender perspectives and those of children and youth; and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel. The Secretary-General recommends that the mission be established for an initial period of 12 months, until after the implementation of the 2007 election results.
To fulfil the mandate of the mission, a strong civilian component would be required. The component would include a United Nations civilian police element of substantially greater strength than that in UNOTIL, with the support of a small United Nations military component. The mission would operate under the leadership of the Secretary-General's Special Representative. The Special Representative would have overall authority over other United Nations activities in Timor-Leste in support of the mission's mandate, and would provide leadership, political guidance and support to the United Nations system in this regard. The Special Representative would be assisted by a senior management team, comprising among others, a police commissioner and a force commander.
The Special Representative would be supported by a political affairs unit, a planning and best practices unit, a legal affairs unit, a conduct and discipline unit, a public information and outreach unit, a joint operations centre, a joint mission analysis centre, a resident auditor's unit and a senior gender adviser.
A Deputy Special Representative for Security Sector Support and Rule of Law would have responsibility for the security sector support unit, the human rights and transitional justice unit, the administration of justice support unit, the civilian police component, the military component, the United Nations security section and the administrative support section. A Deputy Special Representative for Governance Support, Development and Humanitarian Coordination, also serving as the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, would have primary responsibility for the electoral unit, the democratic governance support unit, the economic development support unit and the donor resource mobilization and coordination unit, as well as the HIV/AIDS adviser.
Concluding his report, the Secretary-General said that the new Government, and the one to follow elections in 2007, faced a difficult challenge if they were to establish the full trust of the Timorese people in their politicians and confidence in the ability of the State to uphold the rule of law. The Timorese leaders and people should know that the United Nations would be ready to offer its good offices, as well as the support of a new and sustained mission in Timor-Leste, alongside the United Nations country team, as a candid and self-critical friend and partner in helping them to do so.
Establishment of UNMIT
Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General and, among other things expressing its appreciation and support for the deployment of the international security forces, the Security Council, by its resolution 1704 (2006) of 25 August 2006, decided to establish the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) for an initial period of six months, with the intention to renew for further periods. The Council also decided that UNMIT would consist of an appropriate civilian component, including up to 1,608 police personnel, and an initial component of up to 34 military liaison and staff officers. The Council requested the Secretary-General to review the arrangements to be established between UNMIT and the international security forces and affirmed that it would consider possible adjustments in the mission structure taking into account the views of the Secretary-General.
The Security Council mandated UNMIT to, among other things, support the Government and relevant institutions with a view to consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance and facilitating political dialogue; and to support Timor-Leste in all aspects of the 2007 presidential and parliamentary electoral process. UNMIT would also provide support to the national police, assist in conducting a comprehensive review of the role and needs of the security sector and cooperate and coordinate with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and all relevant partners in view of making maximum use of assistance in post conflict peace-building and capacity building. For complete details of the mandate, see Mandate section. |