News
Statement
of Mr. Magdy Martinez-Soliman 15-17 April 2006
1. Opening Statement: I would like to thank the United Nations and
UNDP, the SEAL project and the friends and colleagues who provide their
support and technical expertise to the Afghani experts and practitioners,
MPs and parliament service professionals. I am deeply honoured to have
been invited - I guess somewhere in the middle of the road and of my
time as one of the persons responsible for the UNDP policy on democratic
governance and as the recently appointed Executive Head, ad interim,
of the new UN Democracy Fund.
b. Legislating human rights guarantees - the whole reconciliation and justice package c. And addressing post conflict security issues - another issue where heavily armed post-conflict societies have looked into reasserting civilian authority - especially the Parliament's - over all armed forces, bodies and institutions 7. At times, we refer to legislative-executive relations in terms of the separation of powers between the parliament and the executive branch and the reinforcement of that separation. This often refers to the extent to which parliament can exercise oversight such as through:
b. Its powers to remove the Chief Executive (President or Prime Minister) through censure and no-confidence; and c. The responsibilities for initiating and amending legislation - such as the national budget for example 9. I have observed in long years of parliamentary practice - sitting myself first, then being the spokesman of the government before Parliament, later as a member of government, answerable to Parliament, and finally as political advisor to Parliament Speakers throughout the world, that all too often, we get this equation wrong. I understand that there are two words in your language that can describe these two mistakes: when we want to belittle Parliament from the government end - and the excuse is typically anti-democratic - to "be more effective" and "act faster", what we do is "zulm": we obtain only oppression through too strong a rule. When we swing to far the pendulum to the other side, and every simplest step of the executive has to be scrutinized ad nauseam by the Legislature, we may fall into "fitna", and not enough government will only have chaos to offer. 10. In both cases, the government has an easy excuse: we want to act faster, or they don't let us do anything. Parliament, on the other hand, has a more difficult explanation to offer to its constituents. Hence the need to dose wisely the amount of control that is needed with the amount of executive freedom one has to give to the Executive. Effective and legitimacy have to walk hand in hand: one without the other opens avenues to authoritarian rule or to grandstanding without results. 11. A Legislature can be treated differently by Government, depending on its relationship with the political party in power. I have served a government in majority in the House, and then the next government that was the largest minority in Parliament. In the first case, the temptation was always there to ignore the Parliament: they were from the same party, no need to consult a lot. A Parliament must always be aware that it needs to preserve its institutional leverage, especially when the majority coincides with that of government. In the second case, there was a risk of obstruction and indeed a situation where the Legislature battled the government perhaps too hard. Parliament also needs to know where the limits are, precisely to avoid giving the government the excuse of paralysis leading to the inevitable dissolution of the House (and often, loss of prestige of the parliamentary institutions). 12. In the law making process for example - legislative/executive interaction is vital. Both are responsible for doing their best to see draft laws progress through the legislative process. The executive can facilitate this by providing timely information to the legislature - ensuring that committees are appropriately briefed and received requested information in a timely manner. But also, the legislature must have the resources to undertake its share - legal resources, capacity and resources to hold hearings. Members need to be given the time and resources to review bills. These are fundamental give and take aspects of the legislative processes - which do have an impact on building sound democracy and people's confidence in their representatives and understanding of their role. Remember always that legislating is about problem-solving: for this to happen, one needs to know the facts of the problem, and only then come up with solutions. 13. This example brings me to the statement of a fundamental dissymmetry of forces. Parliament is weak, poor, misinformed and understaffed. Even in poor countries, government has thousands of civil servants, all the information and the power of the purse (albeit approved by the House!). There needs therefore to be a struggle to reestablish a reasonable balance: of information, of technical support and of time. I recently met Chairman Anh, the Speaker of the Vietnamese National Assembly, and we discussed an interesting topic: he had obtained from the Central Committee of the Party and agreement that the Parliament would now have 33% of Professional full-time MPs, as opposed to only 25%. These MPs would not be civil servants anymore, under the hierarchy of their respective Ministers. Non-professional MPs or Members submitted to the authority of the Executive, in such extreme ways as in Vietnam, are of course a recipe for a hand-cuffed Legislature. 14. Let me dwell on the issue of information-sharing to enounce a couple of principles: one is that a Parliament, in my views and in numerous legislations in the world, has the right to access ALL documents in power of anyone in the country, and no-one can prevent the House from having that access. Special measures and limitations are in place for reasons of national security or protection of intellectual property, like information is only released to very Senior MPs, but the fact remains that the Parliament can see anything that has been written by government, a company or an individual. The second principle relates to officials, witnesses and their opinions: in many countries and Parliaments of the world, the Committees of the House have the power to summon and hear any individual whose views are deemed important for Parliamentary work or decision. Due respect and regards are to be paid to status and office (for instance, the Committee will visit the Prime Minister instead of calling him or her to the Committee room, but the principle remains that there is a questioning right established in favour of Parliament, to obtain information. This right is clearly superior to that of the Executive, and helps balance the equation of powers. 15. It is equally important to use and work with the media in the context of the Legislative-Executive relationships. Parliament can facilitate broadcasting of question time, hearings and plenary sessions, as well as open the doors to the cameras and microphones of the press. This has proven another important way of leveling the relationship with government. 16. I can cite very recent examples of countries, from East Timor to Benin, from Nigeria to Bangladesh, from Kosovo to South Africa, navigating a complex democratic transition, where the effort has been that of improving, when not establishing the ground rules, for a relationship between the Legislature and the Executive. 17. Some Parliaments have understood that they did not understand public finance, revenue management and budget spending. They have established, with the assistance of the UN and UNDP, Budget Analysis Cells to better manage the budget process. Indeed, no MP needs to be a fiscal expert to become an MP: what is asked from him or her is to ably represent his people. But then, to continue representing well, he needs to know how to deal with taxes and public investments, when to demand and when to support. Again, too many times, we see Parliamentarians supporting a budget they don't understand or opposing a budget they have not read. In the interaction with the executive, this is in my views the very first task - and the most difficult to tackle. 18. Some Parliaments have decided to take the Executive with them when pieces of Legislation tabled before the house are of national importance and generated the model of public consultations. In Niger, the President and the 5 VPs of the National Assembly (each from a different party) led delegations to their provinces to discuss and hear the people on the new package of decentralisation laws, whereby Local Councils (and local taxes) would be established. They came back to Niamey, the capital and siege of the National Assembly, with over 30,000 kilometers in their cars and over 300 amendments to the bills, which were passed by a multi-party coalition. This is again an example which shows that strengthening representation allows for a less dissymmetric relationship with government. 19. The relationship between a Parliament and a Government has many more critical junctions:
b. How powerful are the Standing Committees? How much do they know, how well are they known and how respected are they? c. How easy is it to create an inquiry committee - enough to respond to any grounded suspicion, but not that much that it can be used for parliamentary filibusterism… d. How multi-partisan is the Bureau of the House or the Board of the Assembly - and how does the Speaker behave as the umpire of the parliamentary debates? e. Are there parliamentary bodies and commissioners, external to the machinery of the House but accountable to it, that have a specialised mandate to strengthen the oversight capacities of the MPs? f. How is ICT used at the service of this relationship? Can the Parliament access government information, and as important, can citizens use IT to have their voices heard by Parliament? g. How can finally the Government structure itself to work better with parliament? In this aspect, I did a couple of things that proved quite useful to the government I served: under the "name, shame and blame" strategy, I published a very telling parliamentary statistical annex that the Prime Minister would use to reprimand Ministers who would neglect their parliamentary duties. I also instituted the breakfasts of the Speaker, where a Minister would be invited to share informally general policy matters with parliamentary leaders from the different parties. I finally brokered an agreement to eradicate parliamentary blockades instrumented through written or oral questions that would keep a full army of civil servants busy, without much benefit for anyone (such as Does the Minister know how much his or her Department invested in the last decade in the Northern provinces - followed of course by the same question referred to the Southern provinces and so forth…). 20. All these issues will be addressed in this very interesting international
conference. Afghanistan is very fortunate. By heading the call to create
a vibrant and strong representative institution early in your post conflict
experience you are addressing the asymmetry in power that characterizes
nearly every post-conflict country. And UNDP is proud to be part of
that effort. In many transitional or emerging democracies, executive
dominance is so exacerbated that unless addressed, it can actually destabilize
or derail the political transition.
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