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***THE INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING CHALLENGE:  
CAN NEW PLAYERS AND NEW APPROACHES BRING NEW RESULTS?***  
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Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a privilege to be in Halifax on this occasion, and an honour to be this year's Lloyd Shaw Lecturer. I would like to extend my appreciation to Dalhousie University and the organizers of the Lloyd Shaw Lecture for inviting me.

My topic today is an examination of peacebuilding and how it has evolved. Fifteen years after UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali's groundbreaking 1992 Agenda for Peace which introduced the concept of peacebuilding within the UN, the international community has put together new peacebuilding architecture to support countries in transition from conflict to peace and development.

There is now convincing evidence that despite the overwhelming impact of major crises, whether Iraq, Afghanistan or the Middle East, the actual number of conflicts has been reduced roughly by half between 1992 and 2005. A growing success rate in international peacemaking and peacekeeping, including major Security Council mandated UN efforts, have brought about important and encouraging results across Africa and elsewhere, particularly in this century. At the same time, however, research shows us that too many post-conflict countries either fall back into violence or fail to get on the path to sustainable peace.

It was into this environment that the new peacebuilding architecture was born and my theme today is "The International Peacebuilding Challenge: Can New Players and New Approaches Bring New Results?" I have divided my remarks into three areas:

1. A recent historic overview;
2. A description of the key features of the international peacebuilding architecture and the very first steps it is taking; and
3. Some recommendations for new approaches and, hopefully, new results.

## I. HISTORIC OVERVIEW: THE PEACEBUILDING CHALLENGE

The end of the Cold War changed the nature of the threats to peace and security and called for a re-examination of methodologies for dealing with violent conflicts. The breakdown of the East/West dynamic changed the basis for state interaction and several long-standing conflicts such as Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique and El Salvador came to an end, although each for reasons of its own.

However, in the immediate post Cold War period of the mid nineties, conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti were stark reminders that the end of the Cold War did not usher in an era of peace and stability, but the nature of conflicts changed with a number of largely intra-state conflicts finding the space to erupt.

As a result, the international community grappled with the challenges of identifying diagnostics, and developing policy instruments and new practices. There were incremental efforts to overcome the shortcomings of existing tools and approaches, and encourage more integrated efforts of a range of actors who had traditionally worked in their own sectors - whether in peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief or development, with human rights issues gradually playing a more important role.

### *1.1. Evolution of Peacekeeping*

As this audience is well aware, the concept of UN peacekeeping came out of Canada's response to the Suez Crisis in the 1950's. Lester Pearson, Foreign Minister at the time, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for this effort. By 1989, however, the UN had mounted few peacekeeping missions, a situation which would change dramatically as the cold war came to an end. The 1992 *Agenda for Peace* identified preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding as key instruments in the UN's toolkit in responding to violent conflicts.

Peacemaking would involve a hands-on approach with the use of special mediators and the development of the "good offices" concept of the Secretary-General. Peacekeeping, which was expected to take place after a peace agreement was defined as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well." Peacebuilding, appearing for the first time as an official concept, was defined as "post-conflict

action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict.”

This distinction was largely based upon a sequential approach to the transition from war to peace which had characterized inter-state conflicts. The fact was, however, it did not hold true in the complex political emergencies and violent intra-state conflicts that were confronting the international community in the immediate post-Cold War years. Whether Cambodia, Somalia or Haiti, the international community was called upon to deal with transitions that did not involve a linear progression from war to peace, and there was not yet a recognition of peacebuilding as a concept which would bring together peacemaking, peacekeeping and post conflict development for peace.

Very often these conflicts did not end in a decisive military victory, even when there was a formal peace agreement, but remained in an uncertain state of no-war/no-peace – with a complex set of outstanding problems such as upholding a ceasefire, disarming former combatants, resettling refugees and internally displaced people, holding elections and rehabilitating a war-ravaged economy. As a result, they required a simultaneous mix of military and civilian interventions.

In fact, traditional peacekeeping operations were already extending their mandates through the addition of a wide range of activities that fall under the banner of peacebuilding, including the monitoring and organization of elections and the reform, or even the creation, of governmental institutions.

The United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia (1989-1990) was the first such type of operation, with a mandate including elections, policing, and demilitarization. This was followed by complex peacebuilding operations in El Salvador (ONUSAL, 1991-5), Angola (UNAVEM II, 1991-5), and Cambodia (UNTAC, 1991-3). They included in their mandates human rights and elections monitoring, the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants into civilian life, and the promotion of economic liberalization.

Despite the expansion of multi-dimensional peace operations in numbers and scope, the 1990s also witnessed serious setbacks as countries such as Angola, Somalia, Haiti, Zaire/DRC and Burundi relapsed into violence. These cases confirmed that the transitions from conflict were bound to be long, multi-faceted and potentially reversible, requiring sustained post-peacekeeping attention.

In addition, the shortcomings to peacekeeping, whether within the UN Secretariat, or among member states, were dramatically highlighted in the tragedies of Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica, giving rise to fundamental questions

on how mandates should be designed and executed, including the responsibilities of the Security Council.

In 2000, Secretary General Kofi Annan commissioned a comprehensive review of peace operations designed to recommend fundamental changes to UN Peacekeeping. The Brahimi report, as it came to be known after its main author, senior Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, introduced more robust, complex and sustained missions which were to “stay the course”. It also heralded to member states that the UN secretariat would tell the Security Council what it had to know, and not what it wanted to hear.

By 2000, interventions in Kosovo (UNMIK), Timor Leste (UNTAET), and Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) with ambitious mandates of nation-building reflected this trend. These operations were soon followed by complex missions in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Burundi (ONUB), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Liberia (UNMIL), Haiti (MINUSTAH), and the Sudan (UNMIS) following the North/South agreement.

By 2005, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations was overseeing referenda and elections in countries with populations totaling over 100 million people. And as of August 2007, the UN had over 100,000 military and civilians in the field.

## ***1.2 Relapse into Conflict.***

Concurrently, the academic and development communities, recognizing the difficulties, were looking at how to assist countries stay the course. The development policies of economic reform were increasingly based on rewarding performance and were clearly leaving out a large percentage of the poorer developing world which were either failed or failing states. Despite the gloom and doom analyses of the effectiveness of aid, policy makers believe that while other instruments are essential, including trade, aid has contributed to a more poor centred growth in the developing world. But not for all. In 2004, the World Bank published its annual development study, on Conflict and Development, showing that close to half of countries coming out of conflict since 1945 had fallen back within five to ten years after a peace agreement. The statistics have since been revised and academics are not fully in agreement which figure to use, but it is clear that a quarter to possibly a third of countries remain at risk. We only have to look at Haiti in our own hemisphere to see that the international community has a habit of mounting complex efforts and then leaving too soon. Liberia has seen several interventions. Central Africa and Africa’s Great Lakes region have experienced serious and repetitive conflicts in the immediate post-Cold War years, despite

repeated interventions. And in 2006 just as the new Peacebuilding Commission was opening its doors, Timor Leste had a substantial relapse requiring the re-engagement of the Security Council.

### ***1.3 Relief and Development Assistance.***

Traditionally, there has been a reasonably clear division of labour among peacekeepers, humanitarian actors and development agencies. Humanitarian actors worked in conflict or disaster zones, guided by the humanitarian principle of impartiality. They avoided too close an association with peacekeepers to protect their neutral humanitarian space. Development actors generally avoided working in conflict zones, focusing their efforts on socio-economic issues in peaceful or post-conflict contexts.

However, given the nature of intra-state conflicts that came to preoccupy the international community at the end of the Cold War, both relief and development actors found themselves facing significantly different environments. Following the first Gulf War, the humanitarian business mushroomed, giving rise to calls for better international management of humanitarian response. This led to the creation of what is now OCHA, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Humanitarian actors found themselves at risk in complex political emergencies and civil wars such as in Somalia and Rwanda where established humanitarian principles and international humanitarian law did not hold. The worst moment was at the end of the nineties when we realized that more humanitarian actors were dying in wars than peacekeepers. Development actors were increasingly called upon to provide assistance to countries that were at various phases of the transition from conflict even though their tool kit was not designed to deal with the challenges facing conflict or post-conflict countries trying to maintain the basic functions of the state.

A small but significant number of donors, UK and the Nordics, began to develop new approaches to peacebuilding. At the United Nations, the publication of the *Agenda for Development* and the *Supplement to the Agenda for Peace* confirmed the need for greater collaboration between civilian and military actors in conflict and post-conflict contexts, and there were numerous attempts by the development and humanitarian actors to deal with what was called the transition from relief to development. The publication of the OECD DAC study on Preventing Violent Conflict opened the door for development actors to design new programs and projects in such areas as security sector reform, rule of law and DDR.

Canada in the mid-nineties began to look at ways to address what was now being called peacebuilding. Under Lloyd Axworthy, Foreign Affairs and CIDA launched modest peacebuilding programs. Along with IDRC's Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program and the NGO-led Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, the different sectors started to engage, but there remained little taste within CIDA to divert significant bilateral funding to countries in post-conflict situations. It was not till later into this century that this involved increasing, if controversial, cooperation with the Department of Defense and a more comprehensive Foreign Affairs-led interdepartmental process. Apart from Afghanistan, and contributions to Sudan and Haiti, however, there appears to be little political interest in making Canada a serious post-conflict player across the board.

Greater UN efforts were being made to improve coordination on the ground, particularly through the system of humanitarian coordinators who worked with UN agencies, Red Cross and civil society and provided a vehicle for bilateral actors to address the human cost of complex emergencies. At UN headquarters various exercises were underway, starting with Sadako Ogata's Brookings Project and various inter-agency studies and strategies to deal with the transition from conflict to development. Some of the main problems identified were lack of tools and lack of donor funding for the unique type of assistance required in the post conflict environment.

The International Financial Institutions, particularly the World Bank, and the UN agencies, particularly UNDP, began developing instruments to deal with fragile states and conflict prone countries. The Post Conflict Needs Assessment is a broad based analytical tool being applied by members of the UN Development Group in cooperation other multilateral actors. The IFIs are developing more tools and increasing their assistance to fragile states.

At the same time, with the development of more complex peacekeeping operations, there was a push to integrate UN security/political efforts on the ground with humanitarian/development efforts, a move long resisted by the humanitarian/development community. This resistance was over-ruled by the Secretary General who decided to appoint the newly assigned Head of the UN Development Team in Sierra Leone as the first Deputy SRSG in the Sierra Leone peacekeeping mission thereby achieving de facto integration. This has now evolved to be the standard for all missions.

## ***1.4 Towards a More Comprehensive Approach***

Concepts and practices of peacebuilding, therefore, were moving ahead, informing peacekeeping, humanitarian and development approaches, although still on parallel, rather than fully integrated tracks. It was still not universally defined as such, but gradually, particularly through missions such as Kosovo, Afghanistan, East Timor, peacebuilding came to be seen as facilitating processes and building new national capabilities to address the causes of conflict as a basis for longer term peace. However, its infrastructure remained spread across multiple institutions and actors spanning the military-civilian and the bilateral-multilateral divide.

For policy makers, peacebuilders and academics alike, it was obvious that war termination was the beginning of the next set of challenges, requiring major financial and continued military resources along with political commitments. There were a number of attempts to address this. The Security Council in 1998 encouraged the Secretary-General to find ways to establish a peacebuilding capability and two years later, the Brahimi Report recommended the creation of a focal point for peacebuilding within the United Nations Secretariat to coordinate the many different activities that peace entails. However, no funding was allocated by member states to the proposal for such a unit within the Department of Political Affairs.

## ***1.5 The Road to Peacebuilding***

Peacebuilding raises special challenges for the international community by requiring cooperation on many levels whether across disciplines, military, civilian, humanitarian, human rights, political and developmental, between bilateral and multilateral actors or in an improved dialogue between national and international authorities.

Fragmented approaches in the past often reflected multiple and competing priorities. Equally important, however, the international community consistently lacked the sustained span of attention and the necessary resources to accompany countries emerging from conflict beyond the immediate post-war years.

The pressure to improve was driven by success in managing conflicts as documented in the Report of the Human Security Centre, now situated in Simon Fraser University, that international efforts at peacemaking and peacekeeping were largely responsible for the reduction in the number of post war conflicts. With peace gradually coming to Haiti, Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRC, Burundi and the Sudan (North/South), the question was “what next?”

## ***1.6 Conceptual Beginnings of the Peacebuilding Architecture***

It was within this context that in 2004, the *Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change* suggested the creation of a new intergovernmental body to provide the sustained attention that had been lacking. In his report, *In Larger Freedom*, prepared for the World Summit in September 2005, the Secretary-General proposed that this body advise on and promote integrated strategies for peacebuilding, with a primary focus on country specific activities in support of effective country-level planning. In his words, “no part of the UN system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries transition from war to lasting peace.”

The core of the proposal was the creation of a forum, a Peacebuilding Commission, in which the UN, major bilateral donors, troop contributors, relevant regional actors and organizations, IFIs, civil society and national governments could share information about post-conflict recovery strategies and facilitate coherent decision-making. It would rally all of the various actors, governmental and non-governmental, around common priorities, ensure predictable financing and sustained political and financial attention. The Commission would be matched with a Peacebuilding Fund and an office in the UN Secretariat to support the Commission and bring coherence to UN efforts.

## **II. THE PEACE BUILDING ARCHITECTURE:**

It is perhaps a miracle that in the corrosive UN atmosphere of the summer of 2005 it was possible for Member States to agree at the World Summit to establish all three elements of the proposed Peacebuilding Architecture.<sup>1</sup>

### ***2.1. The Peacebuilding Commission***

The UN General Assembly's Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit laid down as one of its most important reform proposals, a Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory committee, a subsidiary of both the Security Council and the General Assembly, to address the critical gap in the international community's ability to meet the needs of countries emerging from violent conflict.

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<sup>1</sup> On 20 December 2005, in response to a decision by Heads of State/Government at the 2005 World Summit to establish a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and a Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), the Security Council and the General Assembly simultaneously adopted resolutions A/RES/60/180 and 1645 (2005) respectively.

The PBC's central purpose would be to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. In doing so, it would:

- Help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment over the medium to long-term;
- Extend the period of attention provided by the international community to post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; and
- Develop best practices on issues that require extensive collaboration among political, security, humanitarian and development actors.

The Commission's organizational committee is made up of 31 member states: 7 Security Council members (including all permanent members); 7 Economic and Social Council members; 5 top providers of assessed and voluntary contributions to the UN; 5 top providers of military personnel and civilian police to UN missions; and 7 additional members that help to ensure adequate regional representation selected by the General Assembly. In addition to the Organizational Committee, the PBC meets in country specific committees and has also set up a Working Group on Lessons Learned to distill lessons from post-conflict engagements.

## ***2.2 The PBC's first year***

The PBC had a difficult procedural birth, with the inevitable focus on process over substance. But it has shown that it wants to make a real name for itself as a working, knowledge based body with a substantive agenda. The test of relevance will be in whether it can bring financial and political results for Burundi and Sierra Leone – the first two countries on its agenda.

In engaging with these countries, it has taken seriously its mandate “to bring together all the relevant actors”. If peacebuilding is going to work, it must do so on a shared understanding of the problems and a shared commitment to work together to address them effectively. It is in this way that we can address the gap identified and bring all the sectors including bilateral and multilateral, national and international actors together in the search for strategic and meaningful solutions. Its country committees bring in all the political, financial and development actors, including, as an essential element, the country itself. The concept of local ownership is paramount. A country must decide to engage with the PBC, and its own priorities are at the heart of the work of the commission.

Within the country committees, the PBC engages with the country to develop a clear strategy based on priorities and commitments from the country and

its partners to address the priorities. The PBC recognizes that after a devastating civil conflict, everything legitimately can be a priority. However, it is essential for all actors to agree on a short list of key priorities which need to be addressed to keep the country on track politically, enable it to meet the urgent needs of its citizens and begin the process of economic recovery.

One worry was that the PBC would focus exclusively on financing. Financing for post conflict recovery is essential, particularly as many of the affected countries are ones described as “aid orphans” by the World Bank, and which have been the “forgotten crises”. Serious financial attention, including broadening the donor base, is fundamental to recovery. However, it was important for the PBC to understand the political fragilities inherent in post conflict situations and to help newly minted governments stay on track. In the North/South atmosphere which prevails in New York, this might have proven difficult. However, both in the case of Burundi and the case of the Sierra Leone elections, the PBC has proven that it will speak frankly and seek to influence the countries. There is evidence that this has had a positive effect in both cases.

The strategic approach is now being worked out and as a first attempt is encouraging. In both cases, local steering committees, co-chaired by the government and the UN, and bringing together other donors, IFIs, political actors and civil society, have been the key drivers of the country strategies being adopted by the PBC. In fact, in some ways the local process has been more successful in being inclusive than the New York level bodies. There remain real difficulties in bringing in civil society to an inter-governmental body, and it is physically impossible to engage the sub-regional actors in New York.

In both cases, funds have been allocated from the Peacebuilding Fund, but the risk here is that this be seen as meeting the responsibility to mobilize funding for peacebuilding. The PBF is a useful instrument and is being applied strategically but funding for peacebuilding will require massive amounts well beyond the capacity of the fund. If member states are prepared to see the annual budget (from assessed budgets) for peacekeeping grow to \$8 billion a year, then where is the equivalent effort for ensuring that peacekeeping efforts are not wasted due to lack of support for peacebuilding?

### ***2.3 PBC Priorities***

As the PBC enters its second year, we anticipate that Members States will begin addressing several priorities, including:

- The addition of new countries on the PBC’s agenda, including agreement on a process to determine which countries it should consider.
- Strengthening the Commission’s relationship with other UN bodies and relevant operational actors, including the General Assembly, Security Council, ECOSOC, IFIs and regional financial institutions.
- Determining the indicators for success. The Commission will want to understand better the causes of conflict to assist it in keeping countries on track.
- Exploring thematic issues relevant to peacebuilding. This is linked to the Commission’s desire to be a substantive knowledge based body whose influence on peacebuilding should go beyond the countries on its agenda.

#### ***2.4. The Peacebuilding Fund***

The Peacebuilding Fund, established as the second pillar of the architecture, responds to the reality that, all too often, peacebuilding was hindered by a scarcity of financing for critical elements which could not be covered by traditional development funding mechanisms.

The Fund is intended to serve as a catalyst – to ‘kick-start’ critical peacebuilding interventions and support peace processes, but, as mentioned, the long-term funding must still come from multilateral and bilateral supporters. Set to reach an initial target of US\$ 250 million, the Fund has so far collected deposits worth almost \$150 million from 38 donors, against pledges of \$230 million.

The bulk of the fund will go to countries on the agenda of the PBC, but the UN Secretary General can declare other countries eligible. An independent advisory group has been appointed by the Secretary-General to provide advice and oversight of the speed and appropriateness of fund allocations and to examine performance and financial reports.

#### ***2.5 The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)***

The third pillar is the UN Secretariat office created to support the work of the Peacebuilding Commission, manage the Peacebuilding Fund and support the Secretary-General in convening the UN System for peacebuilding.

The PBSO supports the commission’s agenda through the country processes, both in supporting the design and implementation of the strategic approaches to peacebuilding. The bulk of the work is done by the UN operational actors, particularly in the field, working closely with national governments. Linked to this is the concept of a knowledge centre for lessons learned and good practices on

peacebuilding. An important aspect of this will be the creation of web-based networks to bring together the growing number of civil society, academic and government efforts in peacebuilding.

It is important to note that within the UN, the office's function is to convene and coordinate and not to add another operational layer. The Office is positioned to convene the system to undertake strategic discussions around peacebuilding, whether in the context of integrated peacebuilding strategies or during the planning of Integrated Missions. It is a small office with a modest budget, but in the recognition that peacebuilding is not exclusively either political or developmental, it is an independent office reporting directly to the Secretary General. If the office itself is not operational, it must be accepted by all the players that the strategic process which it leads must have operational implications for the departments, programmes, and agencies as we start developing new types of strategic tools to better align all of our work in the area of peacebuilding. If not, we will not meet the test implicit in the creation of the new peacebuilding entities. We must recognize that the architecture exists because we have not been getting it right. This means we must do things differently.

## ***2.6. Other Peacebuilding Actors***

There is no monopoly over peacebuilding activities within the UN system. Many organizations and bodies have peacebuilding mandates and components. The 20 UN peacekeeping operations include mandates covering an array of peace building activities. 10 special political missions and peacebuilding support offices in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia fielded by the Department of Political Affairs are active on peacemaking and peacekeeping. UNDP's Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, UNDESA, along with the World Bank, regional organizations, bilateral donors, NGOs, research centres and institutions contribute to the rich peacebuilding field, where everyone is quickly learning lessons.

Beyond the UN, more and more peacebuilding actors are appearing on the scene, including regional actors such as the AU and the EU. The financial institutions constitute a set of serious players which will have an enormous impact given their financial and policy clout. More and more bilateral donors are entering the field. The challenge for the Peacebuilding Architecture in this regard remains to bring together this expertise to build a cohesive approach and put forward a coherent effort with all actors focused on agreed priorities.

### III. THE CHALLENGES: NEW APPROACHES FOR NEW RESULTS

Peacebuilding through the new architecture has made a modest but encouraging start. There are a number of challenges, some of them related to ensuring an effective process for the Commission itself, but others related to a broader strategic vision for Commission members and the UN more broadly.

On the workings of the Commission:

- It is important to keep the PBC focused, at least initially, on those crises that would otherwise be the forgotten countries. If the PBC is drawn into the major crises which are already the subject of massive international effort it will risk having little value added at this stage. It is in Haiti and Liberia, Burundi and Sierra Leone, that the PBC can make a difference, not in Afghanistan or Iraq which already have access to sustained attention.
- In coordinating the efforts of all the players, the Commission must involve active and operational participation of the IFIs and the donors, not just UN actors. This can happen through a mechanism whereby the donors and IFIs as well as the UN participate with the Commission in designing strategic approaches and then commit to applying them to their own operations. If there are no operational implications, the PBC's work will have no meaning. Donors in a sense must give up some sovereignty and commit to a collective effort.
- Countries under consideration must engage with the PBC to find ways to stay on track. Sovereignty and ownership does not preclude the fact that they have come to the Commission for help and advice.
- The strategic approaches of the Commission must be funded, and we must not confuse the Peacebuilding Fund (\$250m) with Funding for Peacebuilding. If peacekeeping can rightly draw on up to \$8 billion to fund its operations through assessed budgets, how can we ensure that the PBC can develop the capacity to generate predictable resources for peacebuilding?
- Each member of the PBC will need to determine what contribution it can make individually to the PBC's success on the ground. The PBC success will be the sum of its parts and we must avoid the tendency to hide behind the collective nature of an inter-governmental body.

## On the broader agenda

- The Commission will not be able to address all the world's post conflict situations. We must use the process to learn lessons to apply more broadly to ensure the widest possible multiplier effect. The Commission can direct this effort.
- The PB architecture will need to enhance the study of root causes to help assess how we can make a real difference in understanding why countries fall back into conflict as a basis for keeping them on track. How can we ensure that our actions and investments are as effective as possible and aimed at the right targets?
- We need to invest more in understanding the history of neglect and devise means to ensure that donor decision-making on the allocation of aid funds doesn't leave some countries out in the cold.
- On a more strategic level, this means that the Commission can become the place in the international structure where we can address state failure as an issue of a level of neglect which has strategic global implications. Modern society can not afford to see a large segment of the world's population slip further and further back from the growth pattern which increasingly characterizes the rest of the world.
- Finally, can we use the PBC to overcome the ongoing tension in the UN on the North-South divide? Can success in peacebuilding help us to bring the Peace and Security agenda closer to the Development agenda and help us find ways of working together on these issues which we now realize are often two sides of the same coin?

I believe that there is genuine commitment to solve some of the developing world's intractable problems and a growing consensus on the priorities. World commitment to the Millennium Development Goals is a case in point, along with the recent announcement that infant mortality has been cut in half. What has been lacking has been a way to bring certain countries, war torn and painfully poor into the world community. There is surely now a realization that if not for reasons of justice, then for reasons of security, we must address that class of countries which are sliding back. Paul Collier, one of the main authors of the World Bank's report on Conflict and Development of 2004, one of the documents behind the creation of the Peacebuilding Architecture, has now addressed the question of what he calls "The Bottom Billion". Rather than continue to see the world in terms of the billion haves and the five billion have-nots, we need to recognize that of the five billion in the developing world, about 80% now live in countries where there is discernible progress. It is the last billion who live in countries, many but not all in Africa, that are stagnant or sliding back which represent the great challenge. These countries

are often the ones where the international community is now committed to making massive security investments. The concomitant investments in helping them stay the course must be seen as an obligatory follow on. Similar investments in conflict countries which have not benefited from a peacekeeping mission are equally essential. We must avoid a pattern which sees peacebuilding only as something which follows peacekeeping as in this way we will lose the learned lesson of recognizing peacebuilding as a multi-disciplinary non-linear concept.

The challenge, therefore, is to increase our understanding of why certain countries fall back and how we can prevent this and get them on track. This is not an easy task. In a world contextualized by North-South tensions, conflicting views of globalization, its benefits and constraints, and the ‘war on terror,’ where issues of ‘hard’ security have superimposed themselves on a ‘softer’ premise of peace and development, it will be a genuine challenge for the peacebuilding architecture to keep attention focused on peacebuilding for countries that are off the international agenda. It is neither acceptable nor practical that any nation should be left out of the modern world.

In closing I would like to say that the developing concepts of peacebuilding in general and the Peacebuilding architecture in particular represent concrete steps forward, and symbols of both hope and perseverance: hope for the many millions of people throughout the world who are striving to keep their societies on the fragile road to peace; and perseverance, for Member States and the United Nations System, to find creative means to overcome the obstacles that impede sustained support to end suffering and ensure sustainable peace and development.

Thank you.

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## ANNEX: Some examples of recurring conflict

**Central Africa:** Very few sub-regions in the world have experienced greater conflict in the post-Cold War years than central Africa, with no fewer than 10 UN peacekeeping operations, or specialized missions, to address seven major conflicts in Angola, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville; Zaire-DRC; low intensity conflict in Uganda; genocide in Rwanda; and three successive *coups d'état* in the Central African Republic. Until recently, genuine elections were few and far between, conflicts and instability have claimed millions of lives and left millions more displaced from their homes, and some economies in the region dropped below pre-independence levels.

**Central African Republic (CAR):** In 1998, the United Nations Verification Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was deployed to maintain security following three successive mutinies of elements of the Armed Forces. The crisis stemmed from widespread public discontent over social and economic problems exacerbated by prolonged non-payment of salary arrears. In 2000, the United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) took over from MINURCA to provide assistance to the peace-building effort. A new mission, based mainly on the situation in Chad and the spillover from Darfur, has been established on 25 September 2007, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT).

**Liberia:** In 1993, the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established to support ECOWAS in its efforts to end a civil war that had broken out in late 1989. Following the completion of UNOMIL's mandate, the United Nations established a post-conflict peace-building support office. Unresolved issues of governance, systematic abuses of human rights, the exclusion and harassment of political opponents and the absence of security sector reform, contributed to the resumption of civil war in Liberia, prompting the international community to call on the warring parties to seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict. On 8 July 2003, as fighting between Government forces and various warring factions intensified and the humanitarian crisis worsened. A Chapter VII peacekeeping operation with 15,000 authorized troops - The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) - was established two months later. This mission remains on in Liberia well beyond elections with the full support of the new government to support a fragile security situation,

**East Timor:** The current United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) established in 2006 — was preceded by no less than two UN peacekeeping operations (UNTAET and UNMISSET); and two UN political missions (UNAMET and UNOTIL). The tragedy following many years of Timorese pressure and protest has launched a series of international efforts to address the aftermath of conflict, and establish institutions and police forces in accordance with democratic governance and human rights. This has taken the active interventions of third parties i.e. police and military assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal, United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding assistance and the return of a security mission to help protect the fragile peace process.

**Haiti:** Over the past decade, Haiti has received massive foreign aid and hosted five UN peacekeeping missions. In Haiti, one can see poignantly the sad results of withdrawal before the job was completed, before institutions such as a professional police force were ready to shoulder their responsibilities for good governance and rule of law. The most recent mission, MINUSTAH, remains well after the most recent elections, as in Liberia, with the full support of the newly elected government to ensure a stable environment and security sector development.