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United Nations & Sudan

Introduction of the Secretary General's report on the Sudan by Jan Pronk to the Security Council

4 February

Check against delivery

You have before you the report of the Secretary General on the Sudan pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1547 (2004) and 1574 (2004), in which the Council asked the Secretary General to submit, as soon as possible after signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), recommendations on the size, structure and mandate of a United Nations operation that would be established in support of the implementation of the agreement.
The parties are to be congratulated for the wisdom and statesmanship they displayed in reaching this agreement, and succeeding in bringing the talks to a close by the end of the year in accordance with the commitments they gave at the historic meeting of the United Nations Security Council in Nairobi , Kenya in November 2004. The signing of the agreement marks the start of the six month pre-interim period. This will be followed by a six year interim period, in the middle of which, national elections will be held. At the end of the interim period almost six and a half years from now, the population of South Sudan will settle the question of the status of South Sudan in a referendum to decide between unity and secession. The Secretary General recommends that United Nations Mission in Sudan will work for a further six month period after the referendum to help the government ensure the results are implemented. The successful implementation of this result will mark the exit point for the peace support operation. It goes without saying that the work of the United Nations Funds, Programs and Agencies will continue after that.
While the agreements signed in Nairobi detail the implementation of the peace agreement, some areas still remain to be agreed. This process will be completed by the new Presidency of Sudan, which is to be formed following the acceptance of the new constitution, (which is being drafted at this moment). The Presidency will be composed of President Bashir and vice presidents Taha and Garang. When they signed the agreement in January 2005, the Parties put a few remaining issues such as the size of the armies, into the hands of the presidency. This means a considerable amount of work remains in the months ahead.
With the initialing of the agreements on 31 December 2004 and the signature of the peace agreement on 9 January, the parties started the clock running on a demanding timetable that lays out a road map for implementation of the agreement according to a number of fixed milestones. By sticking to their commitment to sign on time, the Parties have created a valuable political momentum which must be harnessed to keep implementation moving forward on schedule through the pre-interim period up to June 9, and into the interim period of the following six years.
All this means that both the parties and the international community which has helped them in the period up to the peace agreement have to work very hard in order to sustain the momentum. Presently we are almost one month into the six month pre-interim period, and cannot afford to lose any time in taking important decisions on implementation. Moreover the environment for implementation both in the pre-interim and interim periods, contains risks and challenges. Some of them have been mentioned by the Secretary General in his report. The need to provide political solutions for the problems in Darfur is one clear example, but there are many more. They are bound to increase if there is delay or disappointment in slow implementation. This is why we have already taken steps to avoid delay. We have prepared measures to support the parties in their implementation of the agreement through planning and preparations carried out under the UNAMIS mandate. We have had for some months a functional mission headquarters on the ground, we have developed detailed plans for the establishment of an institutional framework for the United Nations in South Sudan . There have been consultations and briefings with both the Government of Sudan and the SPLM on the above issues since July 2004. The logistical and operational plan to deploy just over 10,000 troops for monitoring and verification has been developed in detail. The core of this consists of 750 military observers. They will have to carry out a difficult task in a wide area of 1000 by 1250 km, with very poor communications. Professional planning requires that they will have to be assisted by an enabling force of round 5000 and a protection force of about 4000, all included in the total number of 10,000. In the light of the circumstances this is a relatively lean deployment. We are ready to send them to begin their work on the ground as soon as we have the necessary Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
I would like to express my thanks to the countries who have already committed troops for the intended peace support operation. This makes it possible for us to initiate the first phase of deployment as soon as we have the mandate and the SOFA. None of the member states who responded positively to the Secretary General's appeal with adequate capacities have been excluded.
If solutions are not found to the conflicts in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan , any peace support operation limited to South Sudan would be affected by the consequences of such conflicts. As has been said many times, peace in Sudan is indivisible. Both President Bashir and Chairman Garang have, time and again, in particular since the signing of the peace agreement, made clear that they understand that finding solutions for Darfur and similar conflicts in other parts of Sudan is now a clear objective for 2005. This underlines the importance of the national conference which is provided for in the peace agreement. The indivisibility of peace in Sudan also has consequences for the United Nations' peace support operation. Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1564 (2004) requested the Secretary General to incorporate into the mission contingency planning for Darfur . This has been carried out in accordance with the Council welcoming the lead role of the African Union in the search for political and security solutions for the conflict in Darfur . It is essential that the mandate for the future United Nations Mission in Sudan take account of all these efforts towards reaching peace in Darfur so that we see progress towards a sustainable solution through a well fused and widely supported strategy.
One of the risks mentioned earlier is that violence could return if the causes of the conflict are not addressed. To support the peace process and to render peace sustainable it will not be enough to monitor the cease fire and help avoiding breaches of the agreement. It will also be necessary to help take away possible reasons for the parties to the agreement to return to violence. And it will be necessary to remove the incentive for others in Sudan to seek a solution of their problems through force. Those others could be people in other parts of Sudan , who feel oppressed, marginalized or neglected. That would apply to, for instance, groups in eastern Sudan , but also the very poor, and some tribes or other sections of the population that consider themselves discriminated against. They might feel that their expectations following the peace agreement are not being met. They may become frustrated, protest, mobilize constituencies and resort to violent action. For all these reasons it is important that the peace process is as comprehensive as possible. The report presented to you by the Secretary General therefore refers to, for instance, de-mining, so that farmers can till their land and children can play in peace. It also refers to the disarmament and demobilization of combatants and the reform of the security sector, which so far consists of both regular troops and para-military and militia. The report also refers to the return and reintegration of displaced persons and refugees, which has to go hand in hand with the reintegration of the demobilized soldiers and with a form of support to the local population that has stayed in the region and that has to share its resources, such as land and water, with the returnees. Reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, recovery of production capacity, rehabilitation of social structures, reconciliation between former opponents, reduction of poverty, re-assurance that the basic needs of the population from now on will be met, all that is part of a comprehensive approach, aiming to replace ad hoc relief from outside by sustainable development from within. That requires good economic and political governance, predominance of the rule of law, reform of state institutions and a new constitution, the guaranteeing of human rights, further democratization, an all inclusive national development policy and the meeting of the Millennium Development Goals, also for the poorest parts of the country. Not only peace, but also development is indivisible. In a country where one in four children dies before the age of five, there is not much chance for survival, let alone for the realization of peoples expectations beyond a cease fire and a peace agreement.
This is an enormous challenge for a nation that is rebuilding itself, fifty years after having become independent, following a long period of colonial rule. The people of Sudan have to do all this basically themselves. It is their nation, their peace, their future. But they will have to be helped from outside, and this is what they expect. We will have to meet that expectation.
So, in order to render peace sustainable, the Government and the people of Sudan will have to choose a comprehensive approach. That means: address all causes of conflict, none excluded, in a holistic way and balanced, avoiding new distortions. The peace support operation will have to follow the same pattern; comprehensive and balanced. It is not the task of the United Nations to carry out functions that can better be fulfilled by the Sudanese themselves. The support operation will have to be catalytic, not turn-key. That is why we are aiming at a relatively light footprint. We intend to regularly reassess and review tasks and priorities in the light of changing circumstances. We will have to show a clear awareness of the impact of all foreign activities on Sudanese society, boosting those with a positive impact such as the use of local resources, including manpower and womanpower in combination with capacity building and training, avoiding negative consequences such the distortion of the local economy or the spread of HIV/Aids.
A comprehensive approach does not require a completely new structure for the United Nations mission. On the contrary: many United Nations institutions, agencies, funds and programs present in Sudan have developed a lot of expertise and built an impressive capacity that should be used to its fullest extent, in a unified manner: common objectives, mutual consultation and coordination, no overlap of the mission with activities of the United Nations Country Team, but complementarity and cooperation. That is what the Secretary General has emphasized in his report: a comprehensive and unified approach: peace and development, both from the inside, as autochtonous as possible, only facilitated - not managed - from outside.
Let me conclude by quoting the central recommendation of the Secretary General in this report: that the Security Council, acting under chapter VI of the Charter, authorize the deployment of a multidimensional United Nations peace support operation with a mandate to assist the parties in achieving a sustainable peace in Sudan through its good offices, and in aspects of security, governance, humanitarian assistance and development.