Summary of press briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Liberia, Jacques Klein - New York

17 July

Quick and concerted international action was needed to address the human suffering of the people of Liberia, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Liberia, Jacques Klein, told correspondents at a Headquarters press briefing today.

The humanitarian situation in Liberia was undoubtedly among the worst in the world and had deteriorated dramatically since the fighting in Monrovia earlier last month, Mr. Klein said. There were some 250,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Monrovia, many of whom had fled violence two or three times in the past few months. They suffered from cholera and malaria -- diseases that spread due to a lack of clean water, sanitation and shelter. Hospitals were totally overwhelmed and unable to cope with the sheer number of incoming patients. They lacked the basic medications, sanitation and water.

Commenting on his recent appointment, Mr. Klein said he was delighted to serve as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Liberia. This would be the third United Nations assignment for the former head of the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) and the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).

Describing the situation in Liberia, Mr. Klein said looting and robbery were widespread in and around Monrovia, and there were also persistent reports of human rights violations. Residents of camps complained of harassment by armed groups. Fearing for their lives, people were unable to forage even for food. “It is simply not safe enough for humanitarian agencies to operate, to save the lives that need to be saved”, he said.

He said United States President George W. Bush had assured the Secretary-General, when he met with him on Monday, of his commitment to help. The first step in helping Liberia was the re-establishment of secure conditions in which humanitarian agencies could operate. The early deployment of the advance guard of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) troops was essential for the restoration of humanitarian aid.

It was a sequential process, he continued. The United States was looking to ECOWAS to go in first. When sufficient ECOWAS troops were on the ground, there could conceivably then be a United States presence. At that point, President Taylor would leave, hopefully for Nigeria.

“Then, over the next two months or so, we hope that a safe and secure environment could be established so that we could stand up a peacekeeping mission sometime later this fall”, he said. He was organizing a team to carry out a basic assessment of what size peacekeeping mission would be needed. The mission would have several components, including military, civilian and police restructuring.

Asked if the United States would stay for two months, Mr. Klein said he did not know how long the United States would stay because it had not made a commitment yet to actually go. The ECOWAS needed to move quickly. That was key. ECOWAS units had been trained and should be ready. The Americans would not make their decision before ECOWAS troops were deployed. The United States was ready to engage, and he had been very taken by President Bush’s commitment. But the United States was looking to see what the region would do first.

The sooner ECOWAS deployed, the sooner the United States Government would make a decision and the sooner a secure environment could be created, and he could send his small staff of 20 to make an assessment, he added. Liberia’s whole infrastructure had disappeared. The first element was security. After that, the non-governmental organizations and international relief agencies could be harnessed.

Asked how soon Charles Taylor would leave once ECOWAS troops were deployed, he said it was his understanding that Mr. Taylor would leave the day the Americans arrived. The United States would arrive and he would leave, and hopefully go to Nigeria, where he would play a “less visible” role. The danger was, however, someone with a cell phone in Nigeria still manipulating things abroad. That would not help stabilize the situation in Liberia. The longer the delay in ECOWAS deployment, the more the various parties saw a vacuum.

ECOWAS forces had requested logistical assistance, Mr. Klein said in response to another question. An American team, which was in discussion with ECOWAS, had been sent to carry out a survey of what was needed. Many of those units should have already been trained, prepared and equipped. Other equipment, however, would also be needed, such as airlift capability.

Asked what would happen if Mr. Taylor did not leave the country, Mr. Klein said he had been told that the accepted scenario was that Mr. Taylor would leave the day the Americans arrived.

Responding to a question of constraints, he said when people went into exile in countries, those countries had a certain element of control, including on the visibility, freedom of movement and access to the media of those in exile. Hopefully, the constraints would be there. Liberia’s Vice-President would then take charge and there would be an interim government for a period of time. There were many “technocrats”, people in the diaspora who would like nothing more than to return and aid in the process of reconstruction. It would take some two years to rebuild Liberia’s infrastructure in terms of political parties and eventual elections, which would allow the Liberian people, for the first time in many years, to determine their own future.

The Bush Administration would wait to see that ECOWAS troops were on the ground before making a decision, Mr. Klein said in response to another question. The United States wanted to know if there was a serious commitment by ECOWAS. A sufficient number of troops were needed and not just some show of force. Requirements in other parts of the world were drawing down troop levels. He thought there was a great deal of sympathy and willingness to make a commitment when the region itself had made a serious commitment. The United States could do a fairly quick assessment in terms of what was needed.

Asked if the timing of a religious delegation from the United States that was planning to visit Liberia was appropriate, Mr. Klein said that it was not within his purview to comment on such matters.

The religious community, he said, could play a role in the huge amount of work that needed to be done by non-governmental organizations. There were strong roots in Liberia to religious sectors in the United States and elsewhere. Such groups could generate money for the establishment of a trust fund to rebuild Liberia. The fact that one third of the people were in the capital out of sheer fear of being in the countryside was a reflection of the security situation in Liberia.

Asked what was currently being done to help Liberians, Mr. Klein said United Nations organizations were desperately coping with the people in the stadium to give them a modicum of food, water and sanitation. One had to admire unarmed humanitarian aid workers for working amid armed thugs and killers to bring humanitarian aid to people. They were doing that, but they needed security. No one had even a vague idea of what was going on in the rest of the country. The country’s whole infrastructure had broken down.

Would Mr. Klein be looking to the Security Council to authorize a “Chapter VII” mandate? a correspondent asked. The key to success in any United Nations operation, he responded, was a clear, robust mandate with a clear chain of command. “If you can get that, then you can actually do the job”, he said.

Responding to a question on the indictment by the Special Court in Sierra Leone against President Taylor, Mr. Klein said it was important that anyone for whom a warrant had been issued faced justice. Until that was done, there would never be true reconciliation. It was important not to send the message that a person could violate the law, brutalize his own people, wait long enough and find a safe haven.

In response to a question on the possible strength of the United Nations presence, Mr. Klein said it was hard to postulate on what it should be since no one had been there. Troop structure depended on the mission’s role. Without an assessment, it would be speculation.