At the same time, he said, the African Union seemed to be reconsidering its decision, made on 12 January, to hand over to the United Nations.  The regional body had made it clear that the decision had been made “in principle” at an ambassadorial-level meeting, and was to be confirmed at a political-level meeting scheduled for next Friday.  That meeting had now been postponed at the Sudan's request.

He said the Sudan had sent delegations to many countries around the world to plead its case that there should be no transition, and that the African Union should remain in charge.  It was no longer certain that the continental body would make a formal reconfirmation of its decision, and if it reversed itself, the Security Council would be unable to authorize the transition to a United Nations mission.

Referring to the difficult situation in Darfur, he said that areas in which there was a sizeable African Union military presence, were quiet.  However, in places with few troops, militia were assembling in the thousands to prepare attacks, which they launched against villages.  In one area of South Darfur, 300 people had been killed, since December, by attackers on horseback and camelback.  They were backed by military vehicles, and in other places there was fighting between Government troops and rebel forces of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA).

Stressing the need for a robust United Nations mission to prevent attacks, he said that, at the same time, it was essential that an agreement emerge from the peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria.  Without one, there was little chance of consensus being achieved, among the five permanent members of the Security Council, on a robust Chapter VII mandate for a United Nations force.  “I think it's a non-starter,” he added.

However, the most important question was not whether agreement could be reached, but what its contents would be, he said.  If such an agreement turned out to be like the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement of March 2004 –- the frequent violations of which were merely noted, rather than addressed –- it would work neither for the African Union, nor for a United Nations mission.  Such a mechanism would be worthless, because no meetings would ever be held to address the many violations.

Describing the political situation as a stalemate, he said that, at the same time, the anti-United Nations climate in Khartoum was heating up very strongly.  There were threats and warnings, as well as talk, that the transition would be less a United Nations transition, than a conspiracy to reduce the Sudan to a situation similar to that of Iraq two years ago.  While such feelings were being manipulated by political leaders, they were true for many people in the streets of Khartoum.

Turning to the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement, he warned that growing anti-United Nations sentiment would also have consequences for the ability of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to carry out its mandate.

Asked whether involvement by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) could help stabilize the situation in Darfur, he said that NATO member countries had the technological and other capacities to prevent attacks, while no member State of the African Union had that capacity.  However, it was not at all necessary to replace either the African Union or the United Nations with a force that was not the result of a global consensus.

Another journalist asked whether there could be a “replay” of the Yugoslavian situation, whereby NATO could be called upon if transitional arrangements failed.

Mr. Pronk said that would be a recipe for disaster.  What was needed was either an effective African Union force – the present one was too small –- or the United Nations.  There was no alternative; otherwise the Sudanese people would start a jihad against it.  At the moment it was difficult enough to reassure them that the United Nations was not the same as the United States, NATO or the West.

He said he had been able to make Darfur 's assertive traditional leaders understand that the United Nations was different.  But any decisions to intervene without consultation would spark talk about recolonization , invasion, imperialism, Afghanistan and Iraq.  People would start talking about the “conspiracy” against the Arab and Islamic world.  Such terminology could easily be used to stir up heated opposition throughout the country, even among those who disliked the Government.

Asked whether sanctions would be counterproductive, he said the Security Council should use all the instruments at its disposal, including sanctions.  There were many arms-delivery sources, as well as many instances of the rebels frustrating the peace process.  It would, therefore, be possible to draw up a balanced list of people responsible for ongoing arms deliveries and for ongoing frustrations of the peace process.

Another correspondent asked about the possibility of the Sudan situation deteriorating into a crisis similar to that seen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the past 50 years.

The Special Representative said he had frequently warned against the internationalization of the Darfur conflict.  While many countries within and outside the region had interests in the Darfur situation, there was a world of difference between the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in terms of presence on the ground.

Asked whether Darfur could undo the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the North and South, Mr. Pronk said he had always warned against excessive expectations for the involvement of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in resolving the Darfur conflict.  However, it would be in the SPLM's interest to help, because if the conflict was not resolved, and if peace in the Sudan was not sustainable, the South would be affected in different ways, including by incursions from Darfur, by rebels and militia alike.

In addition, the international community was unwilling to assist the Sudan as a whole, for instance through debt reduction, he said.  There could also be consequences for the elections in South Sudan, which was why it would be wise for the SPLM to be more involved in seeking a solution to the Darfur conflict.  The question was whether the National Congress Party, its peace partner, would allow it to do so.