

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

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REPORT

HUMAN SECURITY AND PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA: THE NEED FOR AN INCLUSIVE APPROACH

(UNEDITED VERSION)

December 2009

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1. LIST OF ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa
DDR	Demobilisation, Demilitarisation and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OSAA	United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa
PBC	Peace Building Commission
PCRD	Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN PBF	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
UN PBSO	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America

2. INTRODUCTION

The discourse and practice of post-Cold War conflict transformation has been dominated by two relatively new and interrelated concepts: Human Security and Peace-building. Human Security entered the lexicon of the peace and security community of scholars and practitioners first through the United Nations Development Report of 1994¹ and later through the work of The Commission on Human Security, which was established at the 2000 United Nations Millennium Summit. The Commission's 2003 report, *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People*,² like that of the UNDP, sought to broaden our conceptions of security to include those non-traditional threats that affected states, individuals and communities.

The early 1990s was also a period in which the concept of peace building resonated with the international community. It was introduced by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992³ and gained institutional expression through the establishment of the Peace-Building Commission (PBC) in 2005. Central to both concepts was the need for a more comprehensive and sustainable view of peace and security that emphasised "root causes" of conflicts, structural shifts beyond that of the "absence of war", human protection and development. Our referents for peace and security shifted from an exclusive focus on the state to incorporate that of its citizens, particularly those most vulnerable during and after conflict: refugees, internally displaced person (IDPs) and women and children. In posing the questions such as "What kind of peace?" and "Security for whom?" especially in post-conflict settings, our attention was immediately redirected to the need of a societal engagement on the nature and provision of peace and security.

Peace building, largely viewed as a set of actions, processes and institution building that should take place in the post-conflict reconstruction phase in order to prevent a country from sliding back into conflict, emphasizes local ownership, civil society engagement and community buy-in. Both Human Security and Peacebuilding, therefore, require varied stakeholder participation and a combination of policies and practices at multiple levels of the societies concerned in order to be effective.

¹ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1994. *New Dimensions of Human Security. Human Development Report*, New York, Oxford.

² Commission on Human Security, 2003. *Human Security Now: protecting and Empowering People*. Available at <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/>

³ Boutros Boutros Ghali, 1992. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, 17 June. Report of the Secretary-General. This report also makes reference to the need to address the root causes of conflict through "an integrated approach to human security".

pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277 - S/24111. Available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>.

The United Nations (UN), through its peace keeping and peace building programmes (most notably that of the PBC) has been deeply involved in peace building efforts in Africa. The Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA) is mandated to prepare a report on the linkages between Human Security and Peacebuilding in Africa, focusing in particular on measures to be taken in order that human security would be fully ensured at the community and household levels. This report represents an initial investigation of this task.

2.1 Scope and Methodology

This report is an analysis of the peace building initiatives in Africa from a human security perspective. It is particularly concerned with teasing out the level of engagement of civil society in peacebuilding initiatives, and the impact of these initiatives on communities. The peace building initiatives of the UN PBC form a key component upon which the analysis is built.

Because of time and funding constraints, the data is derived primarily from a desktop survey of secondary literature and reports obtained from the UN website.

The PBC is active in Burundi, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau and Sierra Leone. Much of the focus of this study will be on Burundi and Sierra Leone where the PBC has been active for the longest period of time.

The report provides an entry point for re-examining peace building initiatives in Africa from the vantage point of the citizens for whom they are intended. However, because it is not based on primary interviews with those directly involved, or local communities, it has inherent limitations. It can only be viewed as a snapshot of peacebuilding efforts in Africa interpreted by the authors.

3. HUMAN SECURITY AND PEACE BUILDING

The end of the Cold War reconfigured the global environment in a number of ways that challenged traditional security paradigms. Of note was the shift from inter-state war to intra-state conflicts, as the withdrawal of superpower competition exposed a number of state structures to unexpected stresses, with which they were ill-equipped to cope. "Weak" and "fragile" states experienced new challenges to their legitimacy from within their borders, or were incapable of restraining violent entrepreneurs who sought to create "shadow states" within the national territory. The impact of globalization and the rapid implementation of neo-liberal economic policies also played their part in weakening state sovereignty in several parts of the world, most notably in Africa.

It also became apparent that the old realist state-centred analysis was of relatively little use either in explaining intra-state violence or in providing a basis for policy prescriptions to curb it. State autonomy in the global system

having been so deeply thrown into question, brought about a rethink among security analysts for another referent for their studies.

This search for new security paradigms opened up the debate on the subjective nature of security: whose view of security should count? Were we still to talk about the view of security from the vantage point of the international statesmen concerned with the balance of power and the defence of national interest, or should we take the vantage point of women, landless peasants or marginalized citizens in general whose views of security might be altogether different, though no less valid? This was particularly germane in an environment in which the bulk of war casualties were those of civilians.

The end of the bipolar superpower rivalry thus opened the way for a welcome resumption of a more open debate on security issues, one in which a far broader view of security gained expression. Thus, the early 1990s saw the re-emergence and deepening of a human rights debate and a discourse on security that had characterized the years immediately following the end of World War II, and the foundation of the United Nations.

For example, the USA's Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, at the launch of the UN in 1945 stated:

The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace.⁴

The re-emergence of this conceptualization in the 1990s took place in a post colonial environment and with an insistence by many that people and communities rather than states should be considered the essential reference point in any discussion of security. The "human security" paradigm drew largely on human development theory, though the two were not synonymous. Galtung's earlier work on structural violence and the arguments of the global systems theorists were major influences, as was the basic needs approach to poverty alleviation. In Africa, too, this people-centered approach to security was gaining ground. The Kampala Document: Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) noted that

The concept of security goes beyond military considerations. [It] must be construed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights.⁵

⁴ Cited in Stephen Schlesinger, *Act of Creation – the Founding of the United Nations*, 11 October 2006, a speech <http://www.un.org/aboutun/sanfrancisco/>

⁵ Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), Kampala, 1991. Adopted by the OAU in 1999.

Human security found its earliest comprehensive expression in the UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report. The report's authors argued that the best way to address the problems of insecurity were to focus on tackling "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear". The report thus explicitly recognized the "interdependence between security and development as the two main components of human life and human dignity."⁶ It also listed seven dimensions of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. Indeed, the UNDP's characterization of security was more comprehensive than anything assayed by the traditional theorists. Human security was defined as "safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities".⁷

Addressing threats to individual survival rather than threats to individual sovereign states were seen as likely to yield more direct benefits to the bulk of humanity, not least because states themselves now featured clearly among some of the greatest violators of human rights. Human security was about the quality of people lives and many actors were therefore to be involved in the provision of security: states, international organizations, NGOs and civil society.

The stewardship of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan saw the explicit incorporation of human security goals in the organization's programme for the new millennium, and in 1999 the Japanese government collaborated with the UN to establish the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, which has sought to operationalize the concept in areas such as post-conflict peace building, poverty relief, and disaster mitigation.

That same year, twelve other governments came together under Canada's leadership to establish the Human Security Network, and in 2000 in response to Annan's call at the Millennium Summit, an independent Commission on Human Security (CHS) was established, led by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen. The CHS report *Human Security Now*, issued in 2003, provided a clearer, though still broad, definition of human security and came to a number of policy conclusions in pursuit of its realization.

In 2004, the Human Security Unit (HSU) was set up in the Secretariat of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and that same year the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change broadened the interconnected threats to human security still further, urging greater international cooperation to counter risks and threats that were now well beyond the capability of individual states, or even regions, to counter.

Since then the human security discourse has pervaded the UN organization as a whole, though many of the member states may pay little more than lip

⁶ Katja Svensson, 2007. 'Human Security as inclusive security – gender, epistemology and equality' in *African Security Review* Vol 16. No.2 p6.

⁷ UNDP, *Human Development Report*, 1995 p23.

service to the concept and adhere to a more traditional defense of the essential inviolability of state sovereignty.⁸

Beyond the confines of the UN the human security debate continued in parallel in academic circles. Frances Stewart⁹ argued that poverty and inequality were root causes of human vulnerability, and that the absence of pervasive and chronic insecurity was fundamental to people's sense of well-being. This was a more accurate measure of development than simple indices of per capita income. Indeed, she also argued that lack of security impeded economic growth both through the physical and infrastructural damage wrought by violent conflict and by the adoption of short-term survival strategies. Imbalanced development and inequality in turn led to entrapment in a low equilibrium cycle of impoverishment and conflict that denied the possibility of realising human potential and thus development in any meaningful sense. For the developmentalists, then, the promotion of human security required that the state encourage sustainable economic growth targeted at the very poor, involving the provision of education, health services, wider access to market opportunities, security of safe and decent employment, and reasonable protection against social and economic hazards.

Given so broad an array of threats, it was hardly surprising that there soon emerged differences of opinion about the prioritisation of the threats and, given the impossibility of absolute security, the levels of threat to be addressed. There were also differences about the relative importance of "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want", which received varying emphasis from political scientists and developmentalists. This led to a degree of tension between the proponents of "human security" and "traditional security".

Those who sought to narrow the security debate to areas of traditional concerns retorted that the human security paradigm was short of conceptual rigour, lacking in hard recommendations for policymakers and/or difficult to operationalize.

Within the human security school, differences began to emerge with a more limited approach gaining ground. This approach was evident in the Canadian based Human Security Report of 2005: *War and Peace in the 21st Century*.¹⁰ The report noted that "a concept that lumps together threats as diverse as genocide and affronts to personal dignity may be useful for advocacy, but has

⁸ For a recent and comprehensively worked attempt to operationalize the principles of human security see, Human Security Unit, OCHA, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, 2009.

⁹ Frances Stewart, December 2004. "Development and security", *Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol4. No.3.

¹⁰ Human Security Centre, 2005. *Human Security Report: War and Peace in the 21st Century*, New York. www.humansecurityreport.info/

limited utility for policy analysis”.¹¹ It was thus limiting human security to “freedom from fear” -- concentrating on violent threats to individuals.

Attempts have been made to achieve a measure of reconciliation between the human security and traditional security schools, arguing that neither paradigm is sufficient in itself to address the security dilemma, though both are necessary to this end. The debate about means to achieve human security continues, however, and the degree to which it is prudent, or indeed possible, to interfere in the sovereign affairs of states remains moot.

But the human security debate has provided a more holistic view of security than has ever been attempted previously. It has clearly established the linkages between development (as distinct from economic growth) and security, even though differences persist about the causal nature of this relationship.

Operationalizing human security will still require that several diverse political issues are recognized and tackled, and only the UN, with its transnational focus, is currently in a position to begin the attempt.

3.1 The Evolution of Peace building

“Peace building” was another broad concept that gained traction in policy circles after the end of the Cold War. At its root lay the idea that peace was more than merely an “absence of war” or violent conflict, but that it constituted a positive state of being that needed to be built and reinforced. Peace building aimed to discover and address the proximate and root causes of conflict – the intention being to address these before they led to a return to conflict after the tentative or formal conclusion of a peace agreement.

Necla Tschirgi identified 5 important developments that supported the peacebuilding agenda at international level:

1. Normative developments: the security agenda broadened to include human security;
2. Policy developments: Conflict prevention, the uses of development assistance to address violent conflicts, more effective peace operations for peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction became officially declared goals and objectives at the international level;
3. Operational responses: the UN launched a growing number of multi-dimensional humanitarian, peacemaking and peace keeping operations;
4. Institutional reform: many governments and donor agencies established conflict prevention and peacebuilding units. Several multi-governmental and non-governmental peace building networks were created; and
5. New Institutional Arrangements – e.g., “coalitions of the willing” and the “UN plus model”¹²

¹¹ Human Security Report, Ibid p viii

As in the case of human security, peacebuilding was a concept that went beyond traditional security thinking to look at the social, economic, political and natural environments in which conflict might flourish. Similarly, too, there were some who sought to broaden the concept to its logical limits and others who saw this as damaging its utility in practice.

The term came into widespread UN use after Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali used it in his *Agenda for Peace*, released in 1992. Initially the concept was used to address the immediate activities required after the reduction or conclusion of conflict, and referred to capacity building, reconciliation and socio-economic transformation. Others seek to broaden it to reflect a longer-term approach to maintaining peace and security, embracing other fields generally associated with early warning, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, reconciliation, reconstruction and even political and economic development. Issues of governance and institutional capacity thus also fall within the remit of peace building as do concerns with broader structural issues in the international arena that may facilitate the achievement and maintenance of an equitable peace.

There has also been considerable debate about the relationship of peace building to the general field of development. Some argue that confusion between the two should be avoided and that peace building refers to strategies of finite duration, as opposed to the endless process of development. This school of thought would see peace building as a strategy for two to three years. A more inclusive interpretation argues that peace building cannot succeed unless it is integrated into a broader development strategy. This leads to differences about implementation, as the first school argues for a sequential progress from peace building to development initiatives, while the other argues that the synergies between peacekeeping and development have to be recognized and exploited if success is to be obtained. The following definitions extracted from the literature reflect these tensions.

The PBC views peace building as:

Peace building involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict in countries emerging from conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels, address key causes of conflict and lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. These measures include, for example, security sector reform, elections and human rights monitoring and institutional capacity development.¹³

For the PBC, then, it is a set of functional activities/measures in the post-conflict phase.

¹² Necla Tshirgi, 2003. *Peacebuilding as the link between Security and Development: Is the Window of Opportunity Closing?* International Peace Academy Studies in Security and Development, New York, pi.

¹³ Peacebuilding Commission webpage
<http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml>

The Peace building, Coordinating Committee notes:

Peace building is the effort to promote human security in societies marked by conflict. The overarching goal of peace building is to strengthen the capacity of societies to manage conflict without violence, as a means to achieve sustainable human security.¹⁴

This is a broad conceptualization, linking peace building to human security. In this conception peace building can start anywhere in the conflict cycle.

For the Kroc Institute:

Peacebuilding is the development of constructive personal, group, and political relationships across ethnic, religious, class, national, and racial boundaries. It aims to resolve injustice in nonviolent ways and to transform the structural conditions that generate deadly conflict. Conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and transformation, and post-conflict reconciliation are all part of peace building.¹⁵

Here peace building is conceived of as the reconstruction of a set of relationships, and having an end goal of structural transformation.

For Earl Conteh-Morgan the task of peace building is

to eliminate the mindset that compelled people to distrust and question their socio-political and psychological environment – emphasis should be on combating the structural and cultural sources of insecurity.¹⁶

Here peace building is viewed as a process of resocialization and, for Conteh-Morgan, it is imperative that this process takes into account indigenous knowledge and practices.

From this brief overview the linkages between human security and peace building become apparent and the reasons why the same types of tensions have emerged are also clear. Peacebuilding requires a human security orientation, in its broad sense, for it to be effective. Peacebuilding should not be reduced to state-building. But, when one focuses on the measures that will indicate when we have achieved peace building, and when it is primarily the work of the international community who want to know when to exit, the broad view becomes untenable.

For peace building to have a human security perspective, and thus to be sustainable, it requires that we give concrete expression to the ideas of “local

¹⁴Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee webpage:

<http://www.cpcc.ottawa.on.ca>

¹⁵ Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies Available at <http://kroc.nd.edu/aboutus/peacestudies/strategic-peacebuilding>

¹⁶ Earl Conteh-Morgan, 2005. ‘Peacebuilding and Human Security: A Constructivist Perspective’ in *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol.10 No1.

ownership” and community and civil society engagement in these processes. Their views and experiences must be drawn upon and peace building initiatives must incorporate programmes that are of direct benefit to these communities and are capable of being implemented once the country ceases to be on the donor agenda.

Renske Heemskerk captures this view noting that

Long term sustainable peace requires a “culture of prevention” and a “culture of peace”, generated from the bottom up as well as from the top down. It also demands a functioning state that is citizen focused, that can protect and provide for its population. Thus, in order to build sustainable peace, all peace building actors – the UN, regional organisations, governments and civil society – must be involved. Civil society is crucial; the engagement of large segments of society in peace building will make the changes needed to support sustainable peace both deeper and more durable.¹⁷

4. CURRENT OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT IN AFRICA

The human security and peace building paradigms were introduced at a juncture in which the African landscape was punctuated by civil wars characterized by violence against citizens, unspeakable acts of gender based violence, the emergence of child soldiers, large scale displacement of people with a severe impact on the structural, social and psychological fabric of the societies. The ushering in of many peace agreements over the past two decades have seen the formal conclusion of a number of these violent conflicts in Africa. However, it was the startling revelation that “between one-quarter and one-third of peace agreements ending civil wars collapse within five years”¹⁸ that directed the international focus towards peace building.

There have also been a number of efforts, using different methods, to consolidate the peace in the countries involved. Frequently, peace building efforts have taken on a regional dimension, in an attempt to address the complex issue of zones of conflict, in which the intricate local networks of political and economic activity have been reshaped by years of violence. Resolving the changes in power relations that occur as a result of conflict, and providing for the restoration of state authority and the rule of law, lie at the base of many peace building initiatives, and seem to be a pre-requisite if a lasting civil peace is to be achieved and a return to violence avoided. Unfortunately, those who have benefited from the “war economy” are more

¹⁷ Renske Heemskerk, 2007. The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Civil Society Engagement. *Disarmament Forum*, No. 2.

¹⁸ See Roy Licklider, 1995 “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars 1945-93” *American Political Science Review* Vol 89 No 3 and ed Charles T. Call, 2008. *Building States to Build Peace*, London, Lynne Rienner.

difficult to displace once formal peace agreements are concluded and, if anything, social distress continues to deepen following conflict.

In Angola and Mozambique, the emergence from civil war undoubtedly was assisted by the democratization of South Africa, which removed one of the external sponsors of the rebellions in those countries. Nevertheless, there is still a need to address the underlying regional, social and economic imbalances that also fuelled the conflicts in these two Lusophone states. In Angola, the dominance of a Luanda-based political and economic elite has delayed the distribution of the peace dividend across much of the country, where populations directly affected by the protracted civil war have been left largely to their own devices. The ruling party has consolidated its power and co-opted some of its erstwhile opponents, using state patronage to marginalize recalcitrants. Recent modifications to the constitution suggest a move to a more narrowly based presidential system in which parliamentary powers will be further eroded. The resultant narrowing of political space, however, though it may prevent any thought of a return to violent conflict, may be ill-suited to achieving a lasting positive peace.

In Mozambique, a similar process of political centralization has taken place following initial attempts to engage opposition forces in meaningful political participation. Attempts to address allegations of ruling party bias towards the capital and the south of the country have been countered by development efforts in north and centre, though these are also seen as attempts by the ruling party to extend its influence. In both Angola and Mozambique it is becoming almost impossible to distinguish the aims and operations of the ruling parties from those of the state.

The Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) demonstrates similar dynamics. Here the end of the Angolan civil war and the ousting of Mobutu's regime in neighbouring Kinshasa allowed the government of President Sassou-Nguesso to deal with his armed opponents using a mixture of military force and political concessions. The rebellion in the Pool region is now largely over, but serious efforts will be required to achieve a sense of national unity based on regional equity. The challenge ahead will be to diversify economic and social development away from the oil sector and the capital.

For the past twenty years at least, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has stood at the epicentre of what some regarded as Africa's first continental conflict. The accelerating disintegration of the Mobutu regime in the aftermath of the Cold War also inflamed a number of conflicts in surrounding countries and drew the national armies of many of these states into the civil wars that followed in the DRC. To some extent the tensions that gave rise to this situation remain unaddressed, except at a formal and superficial level. Though post-war elections have been held in DRC under the UN auspices there appears to have been only slow and partial progress towards the creation of an effective state machinery. The situation is particularly serious in the east of the country, though rapprochement with Rwanda and Uganda has defused cross-border tensions to a degree. Rebel movements continue to exercise a measure of control over territory and

resources in the Kivus and the national army is still in its infancy. Effective peace building in the DRC will be a matter of decades rather than years, and involves addressing the concerns of numerous different communities at a local level to avoid the aggregation of micro-level conflicts into a broader conflict zone. The tensions between Kinshasa and other provincial power centres will remain a threat to the reconstitution of an effective state apparatus and will be exacerbated by the very uneven geographical distribution of natural resources. The introduction of a depoliticized legal and judicial system would also strike most Congolese as a novelty, but without it the administration of the state will remain hostage politicians. The withdrawal of MONUC, envisaged for 2011, also raises serious questions about the likelihood of a deepening of the chronic instability in the East.

In Rwanda, the aftermath of the genocidal war of 1994 has seen the restoration of peace under a system of authoritarian democracy. The government of Rwanda has adopted a consciously developmentalist approach in an attempt to address the problems of resource scarcity that helped trigger communal violence over the years. Again, the difficulties that may emerge in the longer term are probably related to the pressures to open the democratic space, to achieve broad reconciliation at the same time as allowing for the reintegration of refugee communities.

In Burundi the formal peace process will be tested by the next electoral competition, which will pitch formal enemies against each other in a peaceful contest for political power. The stakes are perceived to be high, and the possible formation of party militias constitutes a real danger to the civil peace. As in Rwanda, though with a less well-focused government, Burundi faces long-term problems associated with resource scarcity and the return of large refugee populations that will need to be addressed. Burundi's population remains in the grip of pernicious poverty, which the advent of formal peace may do little to alleviate without more determined development policy measures.

Another post-conflict zone is to be found in the Horn of Africa. The border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea ended almost ten years ago, but there has been no successful demarcation of the disputed border, despite protracted international diplomatic effort and arbitration. Tensions remain high around the disputed area, and the expenses and other distractions of maintaining a high level of military preparedness prevents the two states from dealing more effectively with profound internal developmental problems. In addition, their mutual enmity has spilled over into the largely collapsed state of Somalia, whose intractable conflict has been fed by this proxy war. The globalization of the Somali conflict is one of the most worrying developments of recent times, and makes it difficult to anticipate the beginning of post-conflict peace building in this impoverished region. Across the Horn of Africa, impoverished communities, their lot exacerbated by the scourge of conflict, are also challenged on a recurring basis by a fickle climate. Drought and famine are common phenomena here, their deadliness aggravated by conflict and forces displacement. The cycle of poverty can be interrupted, but only if economic and social development are allowed to emerge as priorities.

Sudan's civil wars have also had major regional ramifications. At present the Comprehensive Political Agreement (CPA) between the National Congress Party and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement is slowly being implemented, and a best case scenario is that the elections in April 2010 and the Referendum on South Sudan's future in January 2011 will go ahead as planned. Whatever the decision of the South Sudanese about their future, functioning relations between North and South will remain essential. Given the underdeveloped nature of the South – economically, infrastructurally and administratively -- peace building here will be a long and expensive process. Should South Sudan choose independence in 2011, many of the problems it will confront will not be unlike those facing a “failed state”, and the exacerbation of local communal conflict cannot be ruled out.

Elsewhere in Sudan's national territory, the rebellion in the Red Sea region has been ended by a political compact, but much still needs to be done to consolidate the peace. The Nuba Mountains also remain an area of acute concern. The Darfur conflict has now transformed into a desultory military campaign, but huge population displacements and cross-border complications have drawn it into the domestic problems of both Chad and the Central African Republic. A regional solution to the conflict is urgently needed across the vast and undergoverned spaces of this war zone.

In West Africa most post-conflict peace building has centred on the states of the Mano River Union. Massive efforts continue to be made to restore some semblance of functioning and responsible government to the war-torn countries of Sierra Leone and Liberia. In both cases, instability in neighbouring states could easily spill over to undo the slow but steady progress being made. Developments in Guinea, where the death of President Lansana Conté precipitated a military coup followed by dangerous divisions within the security forces are especially threatening, though recent agreements brokered by other regional actors may avert disaster. Guinea Bissau has scarcely known stability since independence, and over the past twelve years relations between the military and the civilian political class have been fraught and occasionally murderous. Though the unrest of early 2009 has now abated, there are structural problems with state capacity and the penetration of wealthy and powerful foreign narcotic syndicates that use Guinea Bissau as a conduit to European markets. This development constitutes a novel danger to Guinea Bissau, its neighbors and beyond.

The situation in Côte d'Ivoire will also impact upon the general prospects for peace building in the West African region and even a popularly elected government will be hard pressed to undertake the business of national reconstruction so urgently needed after the violent political upheavals of the past decade. The recent electoral impasse in the country and the problems created by continued postponement of elections aptly demonstrates this fact.

The protracted political crisis in Madagascar has drawn more external attention to that country than it has been wont to receive since independence. The current issues can be traced to the giant island's structural and

developmental problems, which became evident during the contested succession of President Ravalomanana and the subsequent exile of his predecessor, Didier Ratsiraka. Issues of uneven development and unfulfilled expectations, combined with a degree of political ineptitude led to the ousting of Ravalomanana by the youthful and populist mayor of Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina, in 2009. This coup was widely condemned, and towards the end of 2009, diplomatic attempts to resolve the impasse appeared to have borne fruit, only for Rajoelina to renege on the agreements made. The failure of the power-sharing arrangements will make it that much harder to generate confidence in similar mechanisms in future. A broader peace building process, incorporating but not limited to political concerns, thus seems the most sensible way forwards.

This brief overview of the conflict and post-conflict environments in Africa reveals the continued fragility of a number of African states and tenuousness of peace processes and stability at large.. The return of unconstitutional changes in government, as recently witnessed in Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar and Niger, are indicative of this tenuousness. It is therefore imperative that our emphasis remains on creating human security and sustainable positive peace building architectures, principles and practices. Key to this has to be that peace building initiatives are inclusive and draws on local knowledge, resources and practices.

5. CIVIL SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT IN PEACEBUILDING

It was the seminal work of Lederach¹⁹ that placed the role of civil society, as opposed to external actors, as central to the peace building exercise. His work is best associated with what is known as the Conflict Transformation School and he argued that “third party intervention should concentrate on supporting internal actors and co-ordinating external peace efforts. Sensitivity to the local culture and a long term time frame are necessary.”²⁰

Lederach indicated that there were three types of actors engaged in peace building and three types of approaches to building peace. Track One approaches focused on high level negotiations where the top leadership (military/political groups, etc) were the main actors. In Track Two approaches middle range leaders (religious leaders/humanitarian NGOs/ intellectuals, etc) were the dominant actors and they engaged in problem solving workshops, training in conflict resolution, and so forth. Grassroots leadership (local leaders, indigenous NGOs, community developers, refugee camp leaders, etc) was represented in the Track Three approach and they were usually engaged in local peace commissions, prejudice reduction and psychosocial

¹⁹ Lederach, J.P. 1997. *Building Peace, Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace Process.

²⁰ Cited in Thania Paffenholz and Christopher Spurk, 2006, “Civil Society, Civic Engagement, and Peacebuilding” in *Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction No 36/ October*

work. To build a sustainable peace all the levels of society should be included in an integrated manner.

By now, the contribution of civil society to peace building is well established and there are many studies that highlight the different roles that they have played and can play. Much of this literature has focused on the role of women's organisations in peace building.

Paffenholz and Spurk²¹ have identified seven functions that civil society performs in relation to peace building. These are:

1. Protection – of citizens against human rights abuses
2. Monitoring and Accountability – including input into early warning systems
3. Advocacy and Public Communication – articulation of the interests of marginalized groups, creation of communication channels
4. Socialization of a culture of peace -reconciliation initiatives, training, joint visionary building etc
5. Conflict sensitive social cohesion -forming ethically integrated associations, strengthening links among citizens
6. Intermediation and facilitation – establishing links between warring parties at village level, between international and national aid agencies
7. Service provision

There is therefore a wide spectrum of activities in which civil society in fragile states has been engaged. This, however, does not speak to who this civil society is and how they have engaged. More particularly can these functions be equally attributed to the more recently emerged civil society in Africa?

In general civil society is noted to be those actors who occupy an intermediate sphere between the state, private sector and the family. They consist of diverse actors, both formal and informal organisations. The World Bank Report notes that "Civil Society is a political space, where governance and development (including peace building) goals are contested"²² The key actors they identify that are subsumed under the notion of civil society are:

- NGOs, especially those directly supporting peace processes or capacity building;
- Human Rights organisations, social justice advocacy groups and peace networks;
- Special or collective interest group organisations (faith based organisations, women, youth and professional associations);
- Community based organisations, institutions and initiatives (women and youth groups, self-help groups, traditional leaders etc);

²¹ Ibid, p27. Also see World Bank Report December 2006, *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Potential, limitations and Critical Factors. Report no. 36445-GLB*

²² World Bank Report Ibid.

- Informational and educational CSOs (independent media, journalists associations, research and academic institutions and think tanks).²³

The Peacebuilding Activities of Women's Organisations

Waging Conflict Non-Violently:

Monitoring and advocacy
 Direct Action
 Civilian based defence

Building Capacity;

Training and education
 Development
 Military Conversion
 Research and Evaluation

Reducing Direct Violence:

Legal and Justice Systems
 Humanitarian Assistance
 Peace zones
 Early warning programs

Transforming Relationships:

Trauma healing
 Conflict transformation such as dialogue, negotiations, mediation, restorative Justice
 Transitional Justice
 Governance and Policymaking

L. Schirch and M. Sewak, 2005. "The Role of Women in Peacebuilding" Issue Paper, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict.

There has been much debate around the nature of African civil society – much of this debate has been centred on whether or not traditional institutions form part of it and if there is a neat separation between civil society and the state in Africa. It is only relatively recently that the term "civil society" has been extended in the literature on Africa to include ethnic associations, which, with other associations of similar type, have important political functions beyond the surveillance of state agencies. Civil society, in the forms associated with western civil society mushroomed in the 1990s with the

²³ Ibid

democratisations project. They primarily emerged in the form of NGOs. These organisations remain relatively weak and are often accused of being somewhat disconnected from their purported support base. However, having said this, these organisations have often stepped in to fulfill the service delivery functions of failing states and they have often been ignored during peace-making efforts. In order to consolidate peace building, their experiences and their interventions remain pertinent.

Heemskerk links the role of civil society specifically to the PBC noting that civil society will be critical in the areas of local ownership and engagement of peace building processes – they are uniquely equipped to mobilize individuals in peace building activities. Linking the PBC with local populations, they are important sources of local knowledge and expertise in various sectors related to rebuilding societies after conflict such as DDR, justice and social reconciliation. They can liaise between the PBC and the local population and help to identify local priorities.²⁴

The question is whether the Peacebuilding Commission has sought to use them in this way.

The African Union (AU) also emphasizes the need for the participation of civil society, and especially women's engagement in post-conflict reconstruction. In 2006 it developed a Draft Policy Framework on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development which is conceived as a tool to: a) consolidate peace and prevent relapse of violence; b) to help address the root causes of conflict; c) to encourage fast-track planning and implementation of reconstruction activities; and d) to enhance complementarity and coordination between and among diverse actors engaged in PCRDR processes. The policy framework outlines six indicative elements to be concentrated on: security, humanitarian/emergency assistance, political governance and transition, socio-economic reconstruction and development, human rights, justice and reconciliation and women and gender.

Central to the framework principles is the collaboration between state and non-state actors in determining priority areas for engagement and the design and implementation of programmes and that special effort should be made to promote gender equality and women's participation. The implementation of this policy framework has however not yet transpired. The AU has been more pre-occupied with peace-making and peace-keeping efforts than with post-conflict reconstruction. Instead it has been seeking closer collaboration with the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Commission for the discharge of peace-building interventions.

²⁴ Heemskerk, op cit p.19

OVERVIEW OF THE PEAC EBUILDING COMMISSION'S ACTIVITIES

The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change²⁵ proposed the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission as part of the institutional peace and security architecture in the United Nations. They noted that the UN should play a key role in peace building, but expressed concern that:

1. Although the UN Security Council (UNSC) mandated operations had been expanded into peace building issues, the UNSC did not have adequate relationships with the international financial institutions, through which to effectively steer the relevant political-financial linkages necessary for effective post-conflict recovery;
2. There was inadequate coordination among UN agencies and departments, in part because of lack of coherence among donors whose separate strategies drive and enable separate agency action;
3. There was a lack of timely and adequate financing for the critical issue of the start-up or restoration of government institutions in post-conflict contexts, especially for the rule of law
4. There was a lack of medium-term political attention to countries emerging from conflict.²⁶

These findings found expression in Kofi Anan's, the then UN Secretary General, Report *In Larger Freedom*,²⁷ the World Summit Outcome and the UN Security Council Resolution 1645 of 2005, that ushered in the PBC. The Commission began working in June 2006. The main purposes of the PBC are:

1. To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peace-building and recovery;
2. To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;
3. To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of

²⁵ Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, New York, United Nations.

²⁶ NYU Center on International Cooperation and the International Peace Institute, April 2008, *Taking Stock, Looking Forward: A Strategic Review of the Peacebuilding Commission* p1.

²⁷ Report by the Secretary General, 2005. *In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All*. <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/>

attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery.²⁸

Its role is therefore largely of a co-ordination and advisory nature. The organizational committee of the PBC is made up of 31 members comprising: 7 from the Security Council; 7 from the Economic and Social Council, 5 top providers of financial contributions to the UN budgets; 5 top providers of military personnel and civilian police to UN missions and 7 additional members.²⁹

The UNPBC is further made up of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (UNPBSO) and a Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF). The UNPBF was established in 2006 by the Secretary General at the request of the General Assembly with an initial funding target of \$250 million. Since scarcity of resources was viewed as a major impediment to peace building, this fund was meant as a bridging that gap, especially in the early stages of peace building. It is not formally linked to the PBC but works closely with it.

The work programme for the PBC is determined by:

- requests for advice from the Security Council;
- requests for advice from ECOSOC or the General Assembly with the consent of a concerned member state in exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict and with which the Council is not seized in accordance with article 12 of the Charter;
- requests for advice from member states in exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict and which are not on the agenda of the Security Council; and
- requests for advice from the Secretary- General³⁰

To date the PBC has been operative in only four countries in Africa and a total of \$130 million has been dispensed by the Peace Building Fund for projects in 10 African countries. Burundi and Sierra Leone were the first countries in which the PBC worked and they received an allocation of US\$ 35 million each from the UNPBF. Later, Cote d'Ivoire, the Central African Republic and Guinea Bissau were also targeted for attention. There appeared to be a consensus that the first cases should be those that had some "real prospect of success".

Once on the PBC agenda, the PBSO "should consult with major stakeholders, donors, civil society and the government about a comprehensive strategy for assistance."³¹ Civil society lobbied strongly for language on their interaction to be included in the resolutions establishing the PBC. They held a conference

²⁸ UNSC Resolution 1645. Adopted by the Security Council at its 5335th meeting, on 20 December 2005.

²⁹ UNSC Resolution 1645

³⁰ Security Council Report 23 June 2006 – available at securitycouncilreport.org

³¹ Security Council Report 23 June 2006.

“From Reaction to Prevention: Civil Society Forging Partnerships to Prevent Violent Conflict and Build Peace” which was organized by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) in July 2005. Their inclusion would also then be in line with one of the key tenets of the PBC, namely, national ownership of the peace building process. UNSC Resolution 1645 “encourages the commission to consult with civil society, NGOs, including women’s organisations, and the private sector engaged in peace building activities, as appropriate.”

The PBC divides its work into “country specific sections managed by country-specific configurations and utilizes integrated peace building strategies as frameworks for progressing peace building...”³² The integrated strategies are formal agreements on the overarching challenges and priorities. The PBC also uses country assessments and monitoring and tracking mechanisms. Countries emerging from conflict face a mammoth task of rebuilding the economic, social and security aspects of their societies. The strategic frameworks then, logically, along with other frameworks such as the Poverty Reduction Strategies, attempt to address these aspects as well.

There are a number of ways civil society could interact with the PBC both at the level of UN headquarters and in the focus countries.

- Input into political deliberations between the PBC and government
- Input into procedural and political discussions in New York,
- Participation on the PBF in-country Steering Committees,
- Indirect funding to civil society organisations (CSOs) as implementing partners of PBF projects, through joint implementation of government or UN programmes under the PBF,
- Monitoring and accountability of the country-specific Strategic Peacebuilding Framework,
- Monitoring and accountability role regarding PBF-funded projects.³³

If we evaluate the peace building initiatives currently on the PBC’s agenda for its human security dimensions, we should be looking at how far it goes in achieving a balance between building institutions and structures and creating conditions for individual security through both social and economic empowerment activities; addressing social issues; addressing psychological issues in societies wrecked by the trauma of the violence; for the level of their engagement -- national vs local and for in how far it attempts to bring on board the different sectors/stakeholders. In short, in how far do the programmes and initiatives move away from an exclusive focus on rebuilding state institutions, to that of the improvement of the well being and security of ordinary households and communities? These activities are not the sole prerogative of the PBC, but it should play a key role in ensuring that they are on the transformation agenda of the country in question.

³² Security Council report 17 November 2009 available at securitycouncilreport.org

³³ Action Aid, CAFOD and Care International, *Consolidating the Peace?: Views from Sierra Leone and Burundi on the United Nations Peace Building Commission*

Burundi

The PBC has been active for the longest period in Burundi so this presents a good case study for this report. Burundi is one of the smallest and one of the poorest countries in Africa. Civil war broke out in 1993 after the assassination of the country's first democratically elected president, Hutu Melchior Ndadaye. The basis for this conflict was largely ethnic discrimination. The Arusha Peace agreement was signed in 2000 creating a power-sharing arrangement between the dominant groups. However, militia groups like the FNL did not sign the agreement until 2006. This is therefore a country with deep ethnically based cleavages between the Hutu and the Tutsi's and one that has been ravaged by the effects of a protracted war. Peacebuilding will therefore be a long multifaceted process.

At this point it will be interesting to note how ordinary Burundians define peace. In a study conducted by Peter Urvin,³⁴ in which he interviewed hundreds of Burundians on what peace meant to them, many had a multi-criteria definition of peace. That is, the absence of war was important, but it did not constitute the sum total of peace. Some of these conceptualisations are noted in the text box below.

- "Peace is getting up in the morning to go to work, and in the evening being able to enjoy the fruits of your work, whether it is little or much, but in calm" (Bugisa female farmer)
- "Peace is not hearing gun shots anymore, It is not fleeing one's house" (sexually abused victim from Musaga)
- "Amahoro starts with the belly, when it is empty there is no peace" (elderly female)
- "For me peace is foremost about bread. Afterwards it is security and work (university educated male)
- "Peace is about good cohabitation of between people, without suspicions...(young male from Musaga)

Cited in Peter Urvin, 2007. "Human Security in Burundi: The View from Below"

³⁴ Peter Urvin, 2007, "Human Security in Burundi: The view from below" in *African Security Review Vol16.No.2*.

For ordinary Burundians, the peace dividend should include an eradication of poverty, mobility that is often restricted during conflict, harmonious relationships between groups as well a ceasefire, i.e., economic, social and physical security related issues. These concerns will then have to be addressed within any peace building programme.

The process for developing Burundi's Strategic Framework commenced in February 2007. However, the Forum for Reinforcement of the Civil Society, in collaboration with GPPAC and Search for Common Ground had already organized a workshop in October 2006 to discuss strategic priorities for peace building. These priorities were presented to the PBC at the October country-specific meeting.³⁵ The process for developing this framework therefore appears to have been inclusive as "consultations were launched to solicit inputs both from the Commission and key stakeholders on the ground, namely, CSOs, the private sector, religious communities, political parties, UN agencies and bilateral and multi-lateral partners."³⁶ Indeed, Burundi's Strategic Framework acknowledges that civil society organizations play a key role in peace building and that a gender perspective should inform it. A joint committee of the government and UN was established to deal with the PBC work and civil society has observer status on it.

The objectives of this strategic framework are:

- (a) promoting good governance
- (b) completing the implementation of the ceasefire agreement
- (c) security sector reform
- (d) ensuring equitable access to justice, promoting human rights, building consensus in traditional justice mechanisms
- (e) finding suitable solutions to the land issue and the socio-economic recovery of populations affected by war
- (f) mainstreaming a gender perspective in the implementation of these priorities

Its priority areas reflect a mix between addressing state security concerns and human security concerns. However, in practice the implementation of this framework appears slow and still largely biased towards state security. This may not be that surprising for Burundi has not completely transcended into a post-conflict environment and thus security concerns remain high on the agenda. This will become more acute as we move towards the 2010 elections for political stakes will run high.

The 2009 Review of progress in implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi noted that there was "diminishing interest by stakeholders in the preparation of the report and indeed a questioning in some quarters of the utility of the UNPBC."³⁷ Furthermore, there still appears

³⁵ Renske Heemskerk, 2007, op cit, p.22.

³⁶ Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi.

³⁷ The 2009 Review of progress in implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi

to be a lack of trust among the major stakeholders of this society. The review, for example, notes concern among politicians and members of society that the national election committee will not be independent. Peacebuilding is about transforming relationships and trust, obtained through credible institutions and the necessary checks and balances, would be central to this process.

National security has largely improved in Burundi. The government announced the official end of the DDR programme on the 10 August 2009 and Security Sector Reform (SSR) is underway. One of the goals of SSR is to have a minimum of 10% female officers on the force which is important to 'combat gender-based violence that has continued at an unprecedented level even after the end of the civil war'.³⁸ DDR and SSR are critical steps in the transition from war to peace. Donors therefore tend to prioritise these traditional security related areas in their stabilization programs. The DDR program aimed to reintegrate 55 000 ex-combatants but had managed to demobilize only 26 000 official ex-combatants.

Ex-combatants, when not properly reintegrated, pose a huge threat to the communities and to the government, for they often resort to criminal activities to sustain themselves and/or are easily remobilized. In Burundi, these ex-combatants have to be reintegrated into an already impoverished society causing extra tensions within the communities. DDR programs tend to take an individualistic approach to reintegration, rather than a community centred one. The study by Specker, Briscoe and Gasana recommend that the short-term national DDR programs must be embedded into longer term reintegration programs that include the wider communities: "Jobs and income generation are a principal concern of local people and combatants alike and must be a central focus of an effective reintegration programme in Burundi."³⁹

Although the government has established security committees in all districts of the country in an attempt to have communities more involved in the provision of security, as noted by the Review, acts of armed banditry, killings to settle scores, robberies and rape and large numbers of crimes related to land disputes continue. There have been several projects to combat sexual violence and abuse of women and children but these acts still remain at unacceptably high levels. Moreover, the criminalization of homosexuality in the penal code does not bode well for gender sensitive legislation.

The 2009 review also notes with concern that human rights violations continue, especially around restricted space for freedom of expression, assembly and association and the imprisonment of some leaders. Burundi's pre-election climate is therefore being characterized by reports of intimidation of civil society actors and political opposition leaders. In September 2008 already, civil society raised these concerns in a joint statement signed by some 200 organizations. Between June 2008 and April 2009, Human Rights

³⁸ Maja Loevslett, 2009. "Building Peace in Burundi: A Multi-faceted approach" in *The Pathfinder: A Journal of peace and Conflict Studies Vol.1 No.1*.

³⁹ Leontine Specker and Ivan Briscoe with Jean Marie Gasana, 2010, "Early Economic Recovery in Fragile States. Case Study Burundi: operational challenges"

Watch reported the arrest of more than a hundred individuals associated with opposition parties.⁴⁰

'Freedom from fear' has therefore not as yet been accomplished in Burundi and requires much more concerted effort on the part of government, the PBC and the larger international community involved in post-conflict reconstruction in this country.

It is, however, in the area of economic recovery where more initiative is needed by those engaged in peace-building as this area is fundamental for a sustainable peace. Burundi has a predominantly rural economy and land is scarce, hence the placement of the land issue as a priority in the Strategic Framework. Land presents a conflict trigger for Burundi. There does not appear to be much progress in the implementation of land reforms. The preference for donors is usually quick impact projects but these do not address the structural issues that impede economic development in this country.

It is far easier to change political structures and political relationships and reconfigure security institutions than to create economic growth with equitable redistribution. This would be the litmus test for human security in Burundi. As yet, much of the focus, understandably, has been on the political and security situation as these are prerequisites for an environment in which development can occur. But a lack of development will in turn undermine efforts at political and security stabilization and therefore needs a concerted focus.

The area of transitional justice also requires attention. There is limited funding for this particular aspect of the larger justice priority area. Since engagement tends to follow funding, this aspect should be reviewed. Peace should not come at the expense of justice.

Civil society has and can continue to play a role in the development of long-term peace building initiatives. However, they need to be adequately funded for them to meaningfully assume their responsibilities. The Peacebuilding Fund and other donors must therefore continue to invest in capacitating civil society.

Sierra Leone

The signing of the Lome Peace Agreement in 1999 placed Sierra Leone on a path to rebuilding their society. The formal end to the conflict was announced in 2002. This country has made marked progress by, for example, hosting peaceful elections, setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that has completed its work, restructuring its national security institutions and the

⁴⁰ Jamila El Abdellaoui, 19 November 2009. "Another crossroad for Burundi: From the FNL to peaceful elections in 2010" *ISS Situation Report*

creation of various commissions aimed at consolidating democratic practices.⁴¹ The country, however, remains fragile and the root causes of the conflict largely unaddressed. These root causes were listed by the PBC as widespread corruption, marginalization and disempowerment of the rural communities, lack of economic opportunities and inadequate state capacity to deliver basic services.⁴²

The inclusion of Sierra Leone on the PBC's agenda, began when on the the 26th June, 2006 the UNSC formally requested the PBC to provide advice on Sierra Leone. In that same month, a conference was held in the country, by the international parties, to provide a preliminary analysis on the situation in the country that could lead to the identification of peace building priority areas. Civil society was quick to involve itself in this process. On the 19th and 20th of July 2006, The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), organized a national civil society consultation meeting on the PBC. Representatives of civil society were also part of the country-specific meetings organised in New York and in Sierra Leone. In addition, the Centre for Conflict Resolution held a meeting in Johannesburg with Sierra Leone civil society representatives to further discuss their perspectives on the PBC and in December 2006, they held a wider consultative meeting in Freetown.⁴³

There were a series of further meetings during 2007 giving rise to the PBC's Co-operation Framework for Sierra Leone, signed on the 12th December 2007. From the above it is clear that the process of determining the above priority areas involved extensive stakeholder consultation. These priority areas were identified as:

- Youth employment and empowerment
- Consolidation of democracy and good governance
- Justice and security sector reform
- Capacity building of public administration
- Energy development

Noteworthy, at this stage, is that the peace building process established by the PBC came five years after the end of the civil war. As in Burundi, the PBF set aside \$35 million for peace building projects. Given the extent of resource deprivation in these countries this hardly seemed adequate. Moreover, the concern remains of what happens when this money runs out given the long term structural challenges of these countries.

The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and the MANO River Women's Network for Peace (MARWOPNET) were the key organisations engaged by the government and the PBC. The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) is a regional initiative created in 1990 to promote

⁴¹ Peacebuilding Commission, Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework, 3 December, 2007. PBC/2/SLE/1

⁴² PBC *ibid.*

⁴³ ActionAid, CAFOD, CARE, *op cit*, pg 11.

cooperation between civil society organisations responding to and attempting to prevent conflict in West Africa. Its objectives are to:

- Strengthen the capability of peace building organizations and practitioners in West Africa to engage actively in the peaceful transformation of violent conflicts
- Increase awareness on the use of nonviolent strategies in responding to conflicts in West Africa
- Develop a conflict prevention network in West Africa to monitor, report and offer indigenous perspectives and understanding of conflicts in West Africa
- Harmonize peace building activities in West Africa through networking and coordination of WANEP members.
- Develop the justice lens of peace building to create understanding of the impact of truth, justice, and reconciliation on peace building in West Africa.
- Build the capacity of West African Women to participate in peace building processes at all levels.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ WAPNET website - http://www.wanep.org/op_principles.htm

WANEP Operating Principles

* Local ownership of peace building processes. Those who directly or indirectly are involved in a conflict situation are critical to peace building efforts. Third party must ensure that they are empowered to make decisions and not making decisions for them. WANEP's strategy is to locate, empower, support and accompany local actors as they respond to conflicts of their communities.

* Peacebuilding is a process not an event. It can be gradual or rapid depending on the nature of the conflict and the personalities of the parties. All this must be consider as we set goals and form expectations.

* Reconciliation is at the heart of peace building. Peacebuilding is about repairing broken human relationships. It includes empowering victims to work for the healing of their trauma, increasing the awareness of the perpetrators to take responsibility for their actions and facilitating communication amongst the two sectors that will restore both their humanity and relationships.

* Collaborative peace building. Peacebuilding is about complementarity and not duplication; about collaboration and not competition. WANEP's strategy focuses on mobilizing actors to clearly delineate their roles, responsibilities, strengths and limitations and evolve a coordinated and harmonized response to any conflict and process of change.

* People and their transformation are crucial to peace building. Transformation instead of ad hoc management or resolution of conflict is at the core of WANEP's philosophy. We believe people are the agents of their own change. Conversion instead of manipulation or coercion is central to WANEP's transformative philosophy. WANEP targets people's attitude, understanding, behavior, interest, culture, and context for transformation.

* Peacebuilding is a call to commitment and not to a career. Sacrifice and endurance are the intangible fortresses that guide WANEP.

* Peacebuilding is strategic and requires long-term commitment and flexibility. It cultivates imagination where immediate reactive tendencies are prevalent. It leads protagonists to look beyond their problems and see a future. Envisioning is the strategy that WANEP initiates as first entry in any conflict situation.

* Understanding the root causes of conflict is key to any intervention. Beginning with an in depth assessment of all conflict situations is the strategy.

* Inclusiveness in response by involving all actors and stakeholders. There are many different actors, instruments, and systems that affect the peace of a relationship, community and society. Bringing all actors on-board and planning with the whole picture in mind is critical.

* Keeping the process simple. Conflicts already lead to confusion and bewilderment. By helping the parties to respond gradually in a less complicated fashion removes the fear that conflicts especially intractable conflicts are insurmountable.

* Respect for the dignity of any and every person irrespective of sexual, religious, or cultural orientation is the bedrock of human relationships. Peacebuilding is about demonstrating reverence and appreciation for our common humanity and living with our differences.

* Accountability. Our first line of accountability is to those who are the beneficiaries of our intervention. The source of WANEP's legitimacy is the members and the communities we serve. We ensure that our reports are sensitive to the needs of this audience.

The second group is the partners who support us financially and the third includes all interested parties in the work of peace building.

* Solidarity. African traditions and values impel us to see beyond our territories and give a hand to any human being in need, especially a fellow African. Problems are never individual's they are communal.

* Cost effectiveness. We work in a cost effective way.

The major critique of the selection of these organisations, who have well established credentials in peace building in the region, was that civil society representation appeared to be skewed towards urban based organisations and 'not by grassroots communities most affected by the conflict.'⁴⁵ These organisations, however, as outlined above, attempted to solicit broader input from other civil society organisations. But, as with so many civil society organisations, they were constrained by time and financial resources.

The importance of civil society and larger community engagement in the PBC's identification of priority areas and implementation of programs is clearly evidenced by the above. Although there have been great strides in creating a more inclusive process for the development of the Strategic Frameworks, the hard part is often in implementation, sustainability and monitoring of the peace building programs. For this to be realized, much more thought needs to go into longer term strategies for civil society and community participation, beyond formulaic consultative processes.

CONCLUSION

Peacebuilding is fundamentally a political process that seeks to realign relationships and the distribution of power and resources. Peacebuilding is intimately linked to the creation of human security. A human security perspective is an inclusive one that seeks to determine the multitude and varied threats faced by different sectors of the society and to respond accordingly. It presupposes a holistic approach that will produce a positive peace, i.e., dealing with structural violence born of inequality. In this perspective, civil society has a central place in peace building both in terms of formulating the problems and finding viable solutions to them. Civil society can perform the function of articulating the broader communities concerns and interests, but they cannot be equated to the community. Sufficient broader community participation must be structured into peace building programs. This is an area that the PBC, government and other international partners must pay more attention to.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

For African Countries

1. African countries should open the political space to create an environment in which civil society, including those from the conflict-affected areas, can meaningfully and fearlessly contribute to the development of their societies
2. African countries must engage civil society on the analysis of the respective country's problems and threats and in the formulation to deal with these issues.
3. African countries must realise that the achievement and maintenance of a positive peace involves a mutually beneficial pact between rulers and ruled, government and civil society.

⁴⁵ ActionAid, CAFOD, CARE, op cit pg16.

4. African countries must involve civil society in all aspects of their peace building programmes.

For the International Community

1. The IC must adequately fund civil society capacity building initiatives
2. They must encourage governments to institutionalize civil society participation in peace building initiatives
3. They must ensure that the interests of local communities are adequately reflected in the peace building programmes
4. They must ensure a broad representation of civil society, and not limit the inclusion to NGOs
5. Local ownership must not be reduced to local elite participation

For the UN System

1. Entrench the understanding that no one community or nation's human security needs may be addressed at the expense of another. Human security is indivisible.
2. Both protection and empowerment of citizens are important aspects of a human security approach and must be foregrounded in peace building activities.
3. The PBC must ensure not only adequate representation of civil society in its in-country engagements, but that they are provided a safe space to articulate their concerns too.
4. Multi-stakeholder platforms must continuously be encouraged and supported.
5. The attraction of equating stability with security should be resisted.
6. Ensure that women's voices are heard and that their interests are addressed in peace building initiatives
7. Peacebuilding is a long term multi-faceted endeavour and planning should reflect this. In particular the relationship between democratization, development and security are important for analyzing the root causes of conflict and for developing appropriate responses to address the underlying causes of conflict in the peace building phase.