

**PEACE CONSOLIDATION IN  
AFRICA**

**CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES**

**UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA)  
December 2005**

# Table of Contents

<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b> .....	3
<b>I. INTRODUCTION</b> .....	6
<b>II. THE CONCEPT OF PEACE CONSOLIDATION</b> .....	6
<b>III. AN OVERVIEW OF PEACE CONSOLIDATION CHALLENGES</b> .....	7
A. Political .....	7
B. Policy .....	8
C. Institutional .....	9
D. Financial .....	9
E. Peace Consolidation Challenges Specific to Africa .....	10
<b>IV. ENHANCING PEACE CONSOLIDATION APPROACHES</b> .....	11
A. What Kind of Peace? .....	11
B. Peace Consolidation: The Bridge from Security to Development .....	12
C. The Primacy of Peace Consolidation .....	13
D. Addressing the Politics of Peace Consolidation .....	14
E. The Case for a Country-Specific Approach .....	15
<b>V. ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE PEACE CONSOLIDATION</b> .....	16
A. Preventing the Recurrence of War .....	16
B. Creating the Conditions for Sustained Peace .....	21
C. Strengthening Ownership and Capacity-Building .....	24
<b>VI. CONCLUSION</b> .....	27
<b>ENDNOTES</b> .....	28
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b> .....	30

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 1998, fourteen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were engaged in armed conflict. Today, only three African countries are experiencing major armed conflict. While this reduction is encouraging, it creates an even bigger challenge: to consolidate the hard-won peace and prevent the recurrence of war. While the international community has a better understanding of the elements of successful peacekeeping, it lacks sufficient knowledge of *what peace consolidation is* and *how best to achieve it*.

Therefore, this paper addresses three important and interrelated questions:

- a. What are some of the main challenges to peace consolidation?
- b. How can the international community improve its peace consolidation efforts?
- c. What are the major elements of peace consolidation?

Peace consolidation refers to post-conflict civilian and military efforts, by both external and internal actors, intended to prevent the recurrence of conflict and establish the conditions for durable peace and sustainable development. It is therefore similar, though not completely synonymous, with post-conflict peacebuilding. The phrase ‘peace consolidation’ is a relatively new, more precise term, carrying less ‘conceptual baggage’.

Peace consolidation faces important political, policy, institutional and financial challenges as well as challenges specific to Africa. One major political challenge is the post-9/11 emphasis on the stabilization of ‘failed states’, which may undermine peace consolidation because it is externally-driven and does not address the root causes of conflict. The lack of coherent peace consolidation policies and strategies also remains a key obstacle to success. Moreover, peace consolidation efforts are considerably hampered by institutional fragmentation as well as insufficient resources. The pervasiveness of sources of conflicts combined with high rates of unemployed youth with easy access to arms, are key impediments to peace consolidation in Africa. Finally, incoherence and lack of coordination of multilateral efforts often leads to individual actors pursuing self-interested policies which lessens the possibility of overall success.

In addition to overcoming these challenges, the international community must determine precisely which activities are actually capable of consolidating peace and how it can enhance its approach to consolidating peace. There are two kinds of peace consolidation activities: those that have a direct impact on the recurrence of war; and those that have general and longer-term peace-supportive effects. Activities that prevent the recurrence of war should be given priority because they specifically seek to address the fundamental sources of conflict as well as critical ‘conflict opportunities’. In contrast, peace-supportive activities have wider objectives which may include the building or rebuilding of physical and social structures and economic and political governance systems.

Common sources of conflicts in Africa are numerous and include poverty, inequality, various forms of exclusion and marginalization and structural insecurity. Employment-generating economic growth, wealth-sharing, transformation of

exclusionary structures, and security guarantees are some key strategies and instruments to address these sources of conflict.

Reducing the opportunities, attractiveness and profitability of conflict is equally important. While sources of conflict abound in Africa, and effectively addressing them all will take time, reducing conflict opportunities may be an effective measure to prevent the recurrence of conflict in the short and medium-term. Therefore, efforts to prevent powerful groups from being able to acquire weapons, generate funds, receive know-how, recruit troops and find the political support necessary to wage war must be stepped up.

Enhancing the way the international community undertakes peace consolidation efforts is a key determinant of success. The international community should pursue a 'positive peace' that is legitimate and lasting, which can then serve as a solid foundation for sustainable development, rather than a 'negative peace' that merely aims to achieve an absence of violent conflict. Another important way to improve current peace consolidation efforts is to recognize that peace consolidation is a medium-term activity, with its own agenda and set of instruments, distinct from, yet linked to, short-term peacekeeping and long-term development. As peace is the prerequisite for development, all international policies affecting post-conflict countries, including trade and debt policies, should be integrated into an overall peace consolidation strategy, as their macroeconomic impact often determines the winners and losers of tomorrow and thereby affects the prospects for durable peace. To improve its approach, the international community must further recognize that peace consolidation is strikingly political because it encompasses wide-ranging political, social and economic reforms. In that respect, it needs to address the nature of its own power and understand local power dynamics. Consolidating peace in post-conflict contexts requires an in-depth understanding of the society and its transformation as a result of the conflict. As the international community lacks sufficient capacity and knowledge generation structures for that purpose, it should reach out to African owners such as the African Union (AU) to set up networks of African experts that can provide in-depth analyses and policy design in a regular and systematic fashion. More generally, widening the concept of ownership to include regional organisations and the African diaspora more fully is critical to further improving peace consolidation and, above all, for overcoming constraints faced by external and governmental actors.

The challenges of consolidating peace in Africa are immense, yet the benefits are truly overwhelming. Overall, success will depend on the provision of sufficient resources and the longevity and strength of political commitment. It also depends on applying the most appropriate of peace consolidation elements. Finally, success depends on designing a more effective strategy in the application of the appropriate elements of peace consolidation.

Unfortunately, the resources available are only a fraction of the resources necessary for peace consolidation, and political commitment tends to be insufficient and short-term. Mobilizing additional resources and political commitment must therefore be a priority for all stakeholders. However, closing the gap will require time, as it largely

depends on a shift in thinking about global peace and security. In the meantime, existing resources have to be optimally allocated and their impact maximized while current instruments have to become more appropriate and more adequately applied. More energy must therefore be invested in infusing current efforts with a field-driven realism that strengthens owners so as to overcome existing political, financial and technical constraints and that is based on specific local realities and needs, rather than external perspectives and mandates.

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

In 1998, fourteen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were engaged in armed conflict. This gloomy picture has brightened dramatically since then. Today, only three African countries are experiencing major armed conflict, although some are experiencing other forms of civil strife.<sup>1</sup> Many factors have contributed to this positive development. One is the growing willingness of the international community and other regional actors to expand and improve conflict prevention and peacekeeping efforts.<sup>2</sup> While this trend is encouraging, it creates an even bigger challenge: to consolidate the hard-won peace and prevent the recurrence of war. A recent study concluded that almost half of the countries that experienced a violent conflict see a recurrence of conflict within five years.<sup>3</sup> For example, in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) violence re-erupted after several interventions by the international community. There should be no illusion that peace consolidation and the transition to sustainable development is an easy task. While the international community has gained a better understanding of the elements of successful peacekeeping, it lacks adequate knowledge of *what peace consolidation is* and *how best to achieve it*.

Accordingly, this paper addresses three important and interrelated questions:

- a. What are some of the main challenges to peace consolidation?
- b. How can the international community improve its peace consolidation efforts?
- c. What are the major elements of peace consolidation?

## **II. THE CONCEPT OF PEACE CONSOLIDATION**

For the purposes of this paper, peace consolidation refers to post-conflict civilian and military efforts by both external and internal actors that seek to prevent the recurrence of conflict and establish the conditions for durable peace and sustainable development.

The term ‘peace consolidation’ is not in widespread usage. Post-conflict peacebuilding, the meaning of which largely overlaps that of peace consolidation, is more commonly used in academic and policy communities. The concept of peacebuilding was first used in an international policy context in the United Nations Agenda for Peace (1992) prepared under Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, wherein peacebuilding was described as post-conflict “action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict.”<sup>4</sup> It was seen as part of a set of efforts which form a continuum stretching from preventive diplomacy to peacemaking to peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Later, the meaning of the term ‘peacebuilding’ expanded to encompass not only post-conflict activities but also pre-crisis preventive development and diplomacy, thus becoming “a catchall concept, encompassing multiple (and at times contradictory) perspectives and agendas.”<sup>5</sup> The term ‘peace consolidation’ has a number of advantages over post-conflict peacebuilding; specifically, it is a relatively new term carrying less ‘conceptual baggage’ and is more precise and goal-oriented.

Many other terms exist which have meanings that overlap with peace consolidation and that refer to similar activities and instruments. These include post-conflict reconstruction, transition issues, conflict recovery, civilian crisis management, civilian post-conflict issues, conflict transformation, stabilization, state-building and nation-building. Varying institutional mandates and interests, as well as a lack of overall conceptual discipline, have generated this plethora of terms.<sup>6</sup>

Despite these commonalities, some tasks differ with regard to their objectives as they reflect diverging interests. In some cases, their objectives might even conflict.<sup>7</sup> Stabilization activities may favour order over legitimacy thereby preventing genuine peace consolidation. This conceptual anarchy has, at times, led to significant policy incoherence and institutional chaos.

### **III. AN OVERVIEW OF PEACE CONSOLIDATION CHALLENGES**

#### **A. POLITICAL CHALLENGES**

Peace consolidation is a process of rebuilding a society that has experienced violent conflict in such a way that it leads to durable peace and sustainable development, not the resumption of conflict. This usually requires fundamental reforms of political and social structures that may be invasive. Governments of affected states are therefore likely to put limits on the scope and depth of activities of external actors. Likewise, external actors, concerned about appearing to violate the sovereignty of the post-conflict country, often exert caution and shy away from any action which could be construed as political interference, and in doing so sometimes miss unique opportunities to address key structural causes of conflict. As a result, many peace consolidation efforts fall short of their potential.

Another major political challenge to peace consolidation is the shift from peacebuilding to stabilization, structural stability and reconstruction in recent years.<sup>8</sup> This new and externally-driven emphasis on security and stability seeks to prevent instability and threats emanating from weak states. While security is a prerequisite for peace and development, durable peace can only be achieved by moving beyond security to addressing the root causes of the conflict. Furthermore, peace is inextricably linked to development and cannot be imposed externally. The desire for stability as a bulwark against terrorism and transnational crime ought not defeat or stifle the pursuit of lasting peace in Africa.

Unfortunately, some states continue to support armed groups and hamper efforts of the international community to resolve conflicts. Armed groups remain largely dependent on state sponsors to receive the necessary financial, political and technical support. National interests of major global or regional powers - while a force for good in many cases - can also further complicate and perpetuate conflicts. During the Cold War many African countries were subject to direct or indirect international intervention. External interference, both international and regional, has since diminished but not vanished. For example, Central Africa is home to a regional conflict complex that links multiple conflict and post-conflict countries and is produced by the interaction of

numerous states and non-state armed groups.<sup>9</sup> The international community needs to find more innovative ways to curtail the ability and legality of state sponsoring of armed groups while strengthening regional and international fora through which states can settle differences peacefully.<sup>10</sup>

## **B. POLICY CHALLENGES**

The lack of clear, coherent and jointly pursued objectives remains a significant obstacle to effective peace consolidation efforts. A wide range of actors, both internal and external, is typically involved in peace and development efforts in post-conflict contexts. Most of these actors have different, sometimes conflicting objectives. Disagreements about the short-term and long-term goals of post-conflict efforts frequently exist even among major external actors. In some cases, official objectives tend to remain vague, reflecting the incongruity of positions within the group of external actors or the fact that some actors pursue hidden agendas. Without clear, coherent and broadly agreed objectives, however, peace consolidation policy, strategy and implementation will likely be ineffective, inadequate and fragmented. Indeed, “governments that are actively engaged in peacebuilding still do not have clear, consistent, and well-articulated policies on post-conflict peacebuilding.”<sup>11</sup> Rather, what exists are a number of activities and instruments, something of a toolbox, which are associated with peace consolidation.<sup>12</sup> However, reaching agreement on a peace consolidation policy is vital for success. As a leading coordinating body, the newly established UN Peacebuilding Commission is well-positioned to contribute to the development of such a policy.

Current peace consolidation instruments and activities typically further political and economic liberalisation, which are seen as a means to achieving long-lasting peace and development. However, the mixed peace consolidation record of the international community is sometimes viewed as a result of the unsuitability of liberalisation in immediate post-conflict contexts.<sup>13</sup> By nature, liberalisation leads to political and economic competition and by definition, losers. Competition and inequality can rekindle existing conflicts, particularly in the face of a fragile institutional economic and social fabric. Furthermore, post-conflict countries may lack the capacity to cope with liberalisation. The success of both political and economic liberalisation is predicated upon heavy regulation as well as legal structures and enforcement mechanisms that can uphold the realm within which liberalisation can flourish. Most post-conflict countries, however, have weak institutions which are easily overwhelmed by popular expectations and often see their capacity to regulate outstripped by the dynamism of liberalisation. An alternative approach would be to sequence peace consolidation efforts so as to create the necessary conditions for liberalisation.<sup>14</sup> In other words, institutionalization, capacity-building and the reduction of conflict opportunities would precede gradual political and economic liberalisation.

Most conflicts in Africa have regional implications or are part of wider regional conflict complexes. Peace consolidation in one country is unlikely to succeed if neighbouring countries remain at war or if peace efforts are not harmonized. Minor exceptions notwithstanding, peace consolidation approaches, instruments and funding

arrangements are rarely tailored to address the regional nature of conflicts nor are separate peace efforts harmonized or sequenced.

### **C. INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES**

Peace consolidation efforts are considerably hampered by institutional fragmentation.<sup>15</sup> Responsibility for policy formulation rests with different actors within the international community as well as with different organs, departments and ministries within the UN System, regional organizations and donor states. Policy planning and strategy capacities are similarly fragmented. Within the UN system, peace consolidation capacity and expertise is mainly dispersed among Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Bureau for the Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), a bureau of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). While donor states and international organisations have responded to peace consolidation with the establishment of specialized units, this has not significantly resolved fragmentation, as the variation in functions, approaches and institutional location of these units reflect different interpretations of peace consolidation. Within the UN and its member states, peace consolidation has therefore remained “an institutional orphan without a home.”<sup>16</sup>

In recognition of these challenges, the international community decided to establish a Peacebuilding Commission<sup>17</sup> to fill the UN’s institutional void regarding peace consolidation. As an organ that will include the main actors involved in peace consolidation, the Commission is likely to play an important coordination role and will contribute to more coherent peace consolidation policies and strategies. Along with the Peacebuilding Commission, a Peacebuilding Support Office will be established within the Secretariat to provide expert technical support to the Commission. Its main task will be to consolidate existing expertise and knowledge and serve as an institutional memory. More effective funding for peace consolidation is likely to be achieved through the use of the anticipated Peacebuilding Fund. While important questions regarding location, functions and members have yet to be resolved, the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission, support office and fund represent significant steps which will lead to better financed, more effective and more coherent peace consolidation.

### **D. FINANCIAL CHALLENGES**

Peace consolidation is an expensive undertaking requiring extensive financial resources and investments. While only part of these resources can realistically be provided by the international community, insufficient funding remains the most significant obstacle to peace and development efforts.

Funding for peace consolidation is largely voluntary, and actual disbursement of funds regularly falls short of donor pledges and promises. As a result, funding is often unreliable, leading to delays and misallocation and negatively affecting programme planning and implementation.

Most donor funding is still supply rather than demand-driven. As a result, critical local needs are overlooked or under-funded in favour of projects that fall within a

predetermined donor agenda. Furthermore, much funding continues to contain high overheads and to be tied to the use of personnel, services or products from the donor country.

Effective disbursement and use of resources for peace consolidation is further hampered by the existence of multiple donors with different disbursement systems, funding objectives, timeframes and sources that are insufficiently coordinated. While recently established trust funds have partly alleviated some of these difficulties, they remain too few and too limited in scope.

#### **E. PEACE CONSOLIDATION CHALLENGES SPECIFIC TO AFRICA**

Peace consolidation efforts in African post-conflict countries must confront an additional set of challenges. Sources of conflict such as inequality and poverty are particularly prevalent in Africa. Africa also suffers disproportionately from structural factors facilitating conflict. For example, few African countries can offer their population reliable paths to affluence beyond state employment. This often leads to increased competition for state power leading to conflict among elites. Moreover, many African states lack the capacity to exert physical control over their territory due to a combination of weak capacity, low population density and artificially created borders.<sup>18</sup> Such structural insecurity makes states chronically vulnerable to armed groups.

Countries in conflict are frequently part of larger interlinked regional conflict complexes; ex-combatants operating in these regional conflict complexes are known to cross state borders frequently. Such a situation complicates consolidating peace in any single country as efforts have to be made to harmonize regional peace efforts and bring peace to the whole region. Many regional conflict complexes in Africa are also awash in small arms and light weapons. Curbing their proliferation and reducing their numbers is extremely difficult due to porous borders and limited national and regional capacity. Building a peaceful region under these circumstances is difficult.

Almost one in two Africans are under the age of 14;<sup>19</sup> in West Africa 65% of the population is less than 30 years of age.<sup>20</sup> In post-conflict countries, these frequently marginalized and unemployed youth can be easily recruited for wars. Solving the problem of mass youth unemployment is a long-term challenge which will continue to hamper peace consolidation efforts.

African post-conflict countries typically lack one of the most effective engines of growth, i.e. strong light and heavy industry. The prospects of rapid reconstruction and sustained economic growth with its positive side effects on peace are therefore dim in Africa.<sup>21</sup>

Africa lacks an attractive regional 'security and economic community' that can serve as a strong structural peace and stability incentive. For example, the European Union has considerably contributed to peace, stability, democracy and development in Europe by offering significant economic incentives and different types of attractive partnerships on the road to full membership. African regional and sub-regional

organisations have made considerable advancements with regard to peace and security as well as regional economic integration. Transforming them into stable and attractive security communities that become real incentives for peace will require additional internal and external assistance.

Furthermore, the commitment of the international community to bring about peace in Africa seems to be significantly less than in other regions. In general, peace consolidation efforts in Africa tend to receive fewer resources while political will tends to be weaker and less sustained. The limited desire of the international community to provide security guarantees in Africa, in the form of long-term peacekeeping commitments, constitutes an additional obstacle to effective peace consolidation.

On the positive side, Africa has a very active civil society involved in peace and development issues that has been growing exponentially over the last decade. At a continental level, the African Union, with its new focus, improved mandate, and greater capacity, has proven its genuine commitment and dedication to bringing peace to the region.

#### **IV. ENHANCING PEACE CONSOLIDATION APPROACHES**

##### **A. WHAT KIND OF PEACE?**

Peace is not only an end in itself but is also the foundation for prosperity and development. Achieving peace in Africa therefore requires the full attention and the persistent efforts of Africa and the international community. However, peace is defined differently by various organisations, groups and individuals. Indeed, different conceptions of peace underlie current peace consolidation activities. Minimalist conceptions of peace i.e. ‘negative peace’, interpret peace as the absence of violent conflict or of a recurrence of conflict within a few years. Policies aimed at achieving a ‘negative peace’ emphasize security-related activities such as the disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants. Moreover, the focus of ‘negative peace’ is on the short-term as a non-recurrence of war within few years counts as a peace consolidation success.

However, peace which is lasting, legitimate and provides the foundation for sustainable development is only attainable if peace consolidation pursues a ‘positive peace’. A ‘positive peace’ includes yet goes beyond the absence of violence. It embraces a) undertaking recovery from war such as re-building infrastructure as well as the social fabric through reconciliation among other things; b) addressing the root causes of the conflict such as inequalities, discrimination, poverty and structural insecurity; c) reducing conflict opportunities; and d) creating peace-supportive and sustaining structures and firmly establishing the foundation for economic growth and development.

While ‘negative peace’ denotes a temporary state of the absence of war, ‘positive peace’ is a transformative endeavour. Efforts to achieve a ‘positive peace’ therefore have a long-term perspective, are comprehensive in scope and depth, and link security and development.

As a long-term project, achieving and consolidating a ‘positive peace’ is significantly more complex and frequently fails to receive the necessary strong and long-term political and financial commitments. In response, some have called to forego a ‘positive peace’ and support a more realistically attainable ‘negative peace’. Yet efforts solely seeking to achieve a ‘negative peace’ tend to be externally driven, inappropriate to successfully address root causes, and privilege stability over legitimacy; they will therefore fail to produce a durable, legitimate and self-sustaining peace.

## **B. PEACE CONSOLIDATION: THE BRIDGE FROM SECURITY TO DEVELOPMENT**

The emphasis of peacekeeping is short-term. It seeks to stabilize an immediate post-conflict situation, provide security and monitor ceasefires and peace agreements. Development policies, in contrast, have a more comprehensive and longer-term perspective. Peace consolidation falls in between peacekeeping and development as it addresses the challenges of the medium-term, namely to consolidate the existing peace and build the foundations for development.

While the fields of peacekeeping and development have grown significantly in importance, and have seen conceptual and institutional innovations, the international community’s sustained interest and involvement in peace consolidation is still relatively new. For a variety of reasons, the international community is largely preoccupied with short-term crisis management and long-term development. Consequently, the medium-term challenge of peace consolidation has remained conceptually and institutionally ‘underdeveloped.’<sup>22</sup> As a result, the international community has not yet developed sound expertise regarding medium-term peace consolidation. There is little systematically accumulated, analysed and readily applicable knowledge and expertise in peace consolidation in the form of concrete policies, strategies and principles on how to consolidate peace successfully and effectively in diverse situations. Additionally, there are still too few funds and instruments dedicated to the medium-term.

Hence, the international community has increasingly looked to the more established fields of peacekeeping and development to fill the medium-term gap. Many multidimensional peacekeeping operations of the third and fourth generation now have peace consolidation elements. Similarly, development agencies have integrated peace consolidation activities into their development programmes. Despite practical benefits, this situation has sometimes led to problems such as the application of inappropriate instruments and resources. For example, funding for the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants was typically provided by the UN peacekeeping budget as it was considered a security issue. The most critical part of DDR, namely reintegration, however, was usually funded by donors through voluntary extra-budgetary contributions as it was considered a development issue. The unreliability associated with voluntary funding for reintegration has sometimes left ex-combatants disarmed and demobilized but not reintegrated. Unemployed and in limbo about their future, many ex-combatants have become angry and readily recruitable for war. This volatile situation undermines peace consolidation efforts.

While multilateral peace efforts cannot hope to duplicate the smooth integration and sequencing of humanitarian, political, security and economic activities that is associated with unilateral efforts, they can attempt to link short, medium and long-term activities through increased coordination of actors by a lead organisation, and through designing a coherent overall political strategy. However, this requires the international community to understand peace consolidation as a separate and independent field - as a bridge between short-term security and long-term development - with its own strategies, instruments, actors and resources. In this regard, the establishment of an institutional 'home' for peace consolidation within the UN in the form of the Peacebuilding Commission is a positive development, and reflects the growing commitment of the international community to addressing peace consolidation as a key component of peace efforts.

### **C. THE PRIMACY OF PEACE CONSOLIDATION**

The effects of wars on societies are horrific and carry intolerable human, economic and social costs. Rebuilding a country emerging from conflict, securing and consolidating its peace, and establishing the foundation for development, are tasks of colossal proportions. In principle, vast resources of the international community as well as of the affected country will be necessary, and should be available for this undertaking. In reality, resources for peace consolidation are extremely scarce. The resources available are scattered among a wide range of actors with different objectives, investing in various projects and activities. None of these projects or activities can be sustained or reap benefits without durable peace.

Hence, all international policies affecting post-conflict countries should complement the country's overall peace consolidation strategy. Unfortunately, this is not yet the case. Many international policies, particularly of an economic nature, are not integrated into an overall peace consolidation strategy. This is particularly true for trade policies and debt arrangements. Through their macroeconomic impact these policies determine to a large extent the winners and losers of today and tomorrow and thereby affect the prospects for lasting peace.

To enhance the effectiveness of peace consolidation efforts and to make maximum use of available resources:

- a. International policies affecting post-conflict countries should be fundamentally conflict-sensitive and peace-supportive
- b. Furthermore, domestic economic policy should be aimed at ameliorating economic inequalities through wealth-sharing, generating employment-producing growth and abolishing structural obstacles to fighting poverty and underdevelopment such as through carrying out growth-producing land reform
- c. Post-conflict countries should enjoy preferential treatment. In practice that means that these countries should be freed from strict conditionalities and heavy regulations that might otherwise be applicable to countries not emerging from conflict. For example, where there is a legitimate post-conflict government, most if not all debt should be forgiven, and tariffs for vital export goods cut or cancelled for the recovery and consolidation period.

Institutionally, these policies require early and close cooperation between leading peace consolidation organisations, such as the UN and its Agencies, relevant UN Member States, key development and economic actors such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Paris Club, the London Club and the G8 among others. With its mandate to bring together all relevant actors involved in peace consolidation, the recently established Peacebuilding Commission can be expected to significantly enhance international cooperation and coordination.

#### **D. ADDRESSING THE POLITICS OF PEACE CONSOLIDATION**

*“[T]he measures of peace-building are necessarily intrusive and relate to the core issues of the functioning of society and the state [ ... ][peace building] is essentially political in nature”*<sup>23</sup> Annotated Agenda of the 4<sup>th</sup> UN-Regional Organizations High Level Meeting

*“One of the characteristics of the failed state is that state institutions are weak [ ... ] because it is not in the interests of the people in power to have a modern functioning state.”*<sup>24</sup> Former Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Kieran Prendergast

The international community approaches peace consolidation as a technical matter. Yet peace consolidation is strikingly political because it involves wide-ranging political, social and economic reforms. The unwillingness on the part of the international community to acknowledge the political nature of its efforts has often had negative consequences:

- Critical windows of opportunity for peace have been overlooked
- Genuine conflict transformation and improvement for the majority of the population have often not been achieved despite considerable investments of resources, energy and time from internal and external actors
- The hopes of war-affected populations have been raised while exclusionary social, economic and political structures have been left untouched, perpetuated or inadvertently strengthened
- International actors have been unable to foresee or manage resistance and hostility on the part of local actors

To improve its peace consolidation activities, the international community must recognize that it is a political actor entering a political environment. It needs to address the nature of its own power in relation to local actors. At the same time, it also needs to understand local power dynamics and be able to assess the political motives and strategies of local actors.

This knowledge can only be generated by an in-depth country-specific analysis of structures, dynamics and context before, during and after the conflict as well as of the political, economic and financial constraints and capacity and legitimacy of the various actors. On the basis of this analysis and its overall objectives, a political strategy to

determine how to best achieve these objectives needs to be designed. Such a strategy is likely to be contested, and includes tough and politically delicate decisions. Yet without a political strategy, peace consolidation efforts are likely to be ineffective or cause harm.

### **E. THE CASE FOR A COUNTRY-SPECIFIC APPROACH**

Every conflict is unique and complex. Every country has its own specific conflict history, power dynamics, social structures, conflict causes and actors. Consolidating peace in post-conflict contexts requires an in-depth understanding of the society and its transformation as a result of the conflict.

The international community does not yet have this in-depth country-specific expertise as it has insufficient capacity and structures to generate adequate and timely knowledge. As a result, international peace consolidation efforts tend to be insufficiently informed by local realities. This situation is one of the greatest challenges to successful peace consolidation in Africa.

Within the UN for example, there is a lack of capacity to generate country-specific knowledge. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA), established to provide the UN with political analyses, currently has 52 desk officers for 191 countries, with almost half of all desk officers covering more than 5 countries.<sup>25</sup> While more expertise exists in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP, country-specific expertise within the UN system remains limited and fragmented. This situation may not change as the UN is unlikely to receive significant budget increases from Member States. The lack of country-specific expertise is also characteristic of many donors.

The international community sometimes uses inadequate methods of knowledge generation. Policy is designed using political and technical input. Technical input is often based on past practical experiences with policy instruments in certain fields of activity. This practice is based on the assumption that what worked in one country can, should or will also work in another. The profound differences of situations and countries and the limited validity of transferring lessons from one context to another are often ignored. For peace consolidation to be successful, generic lessons need to be contextualised and guided by in-depth country-specific conflict analyses.

However, developing more country-specific analyses will require changes to the existing structures of the UN Secretariat and donor ministries. A re-structuring of that kind is unlikely in the short-term. An alternative is to reach out to owners. The international community could support some lead African actors to set up networks or institutions of African experts that could provide in-depth analysis and policy formulation in a regular and systematic fashion. In designing policy for a specific African post-conflict country, experts can reach out to others in the network to develop country-specific instruments. In a recent brainstorming retreat, the African Union considered the idea of establishing a database of African peacebuilding experts.<sup>26</sup> This database could later be expanded to form a permanent think tank or research network for African peace consolidation experts. Such a think tank or networks should bring experienced African security, peace building and development experts together with academic professors,

former politicians, civil servants and above all grass-roots civil society activists. Such a structure would be relatively inexpensive while supporting African ownership and possibly making a significant contribution to successful peace consolidation. Capacity-building for these organisations to undertake such tasks should be a priority for the international community.

## **V. ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE PEACE CONSOLIDATION**

To consolidate peace is to address the factors that may lead to a recurrence of war and build the conditions for durable peace. It is useful to make a distinction between activities that have a direct impact on the recurrence or non-recurrence of war and activities that have general and longer-term peace-supportive effects. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and curbing illicit arms trafficking are common examples of the former, while rebuilding infrastructure, human rights training and employment-creation for marginalized youth are common examples of the latter. Both categories of activities are inherently interlinked and critical for peace consolidation.

In the face of scarce resources, however, activities that prevent the recurrence of war should be given priority because they provide the space and time needed for the country to recover and build a more peaceful society. These activities specifically seek to address the key causes and sources of conflict as well as critical conflict opportunities. In contrast, peace-supportive activities have wider objectives and may include the building or rebuilding of physical and social structures and economic and political governance systems in order to place the country on the path of peace and development. Despite the importance of prioritization, some activities will need to be carried out simultaneously rather than sequentially. Finding the right balance between the two is the recipe for success.

### **A. PREVENTING THE RECURRENCE OF WAR**

#### **1. Addressing Sources of Conflict**

Causes, sources and enabling conditions, as well as their scope and mix, are unique to each conflict. Nevertheless, some common sources of conflicts exist. The Secretary-General's Report on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development detailed internal and external sources as well as sources of conflict related to historical legacies and economic motives.<sup>27</sup> Important sources include a) poverty, b) inequality, c) various forms of exclusion and marginalization and d) structural insecurity.

##### **a. Poverty**

Poverty by itself does not necessarily lead to conflict but it remains a key underlying factor. While not all poor countries have experienced conflict, most conflicts occur in poor countries.<sup>28</sup> One in two Africans is living on less than \$1 a day; and per capita incomes in Africa today are lower than in 1990.<sup>29</sup> African countries consistently take up the bottom 20 to 25 places of UNDP's Human Development Index, reflecting the dire conditions in which most Africans lead their daily lives.<sup>30</sup>

More than half of all Africans are children or youth. Often the hardest hit by poverty and widespread unemployment, they face a grim future. The absence of viable opportunities to earn a living is exacerbated by their social and political marginalization. This situation creates many incentives for poor and excluded youth to join armed groups.

To redress this situation, poverty reduction and microcredit programmes should be expanded and strengthened. However, the only long-term way to lift generations of young Africans out of poverty will be through dramatic growth of the productive capacity of national economies. Previous peace consolidation efforts have shown that sustained economic growth may be the best peace consolidation instrument as it re-focuses energies away from the conflictual realm of politics, provides increased avenues for individual and collective upward mobility and reduces economic grievances. Without economic growth, countries are in danger of becoming even more dependent on external assistance. If coupled with poor governance, dependence on external assistance may exacerbate 'rent-seeking' i.e. the unproductive or consumptive use and abuse of public resources by elites.

Bringing about an expansion of the economy and generating lasting economic growth must therefore be a priority. Yet growth must be both conflict-sensitive and peace-supportive if it is not to undermine the fragile peace. Inequalities created by economic restructuring and growth must be mitigated and counter-balanced, and growth must be employment-creating. In order to achieve high rates of growth, countries should focus on strategic sectors in which they have comparative advantages and which can reasonably be expected to produce sustained economic growth in the future.

***Recommendations:***

- **Promote balanced and sustained growth of the agricultural sector.** Agriculture can serve as a vehicle for development, growth and peace by (a) providing employment for a large number of people, (b) improving food self-sufficiency and (c) generating foreign exchange through exports. It is critical to establish a diversified economy and diversified agriculture sector so as to minimize possible negative effects on peace from external shocks such as sharp drops in world market prices.
  
- **In the long-term, encourage labour-intensive industrialisation.** Industrialisation is one of the most effective engines of growth. African countries possess an abundance of unskilled labour that can benefit from large-scale employment-creating industrialisation. The development and expansion of agricultural products and processing industries should receive particular attention. A beneficial corollary of industrialisation is that it re-shuffles social structures many of which have been exclusionary and discriminatory in post-conflict countries.

**b. Inequality**

Inequality between groups, so-called horizontal inequality, is a factor underlying conflict, while inequality between individuals is closely associated with violent crime.<sup>31</sup> Peace consolidation must address these severe inequalities to prevent a recurrence of

conflict and ensure that violent conflict does not transform into violent crime after the re-establishment of the state's monopoly of force. Addressing economic inequality between groups is particularly important in countries that are poverty-stricken. Unequal access to a country's resources is one of the main grievances of insurgents and gaining access to these resources is often a key reason for enlisting. The post-conflict situation provides a unique opportunity to address this condition with the support of the international community.

### ***Recommendation***

- **Remove structural obstacles to economic empowerment and design safety nets and social protection schemes for the poor to combat excessive inequality.** These schemes are key to building durable peace. This is so because they can address past economic injustices and ensure a fairer distribution of wealth and resources to prevent the re-emergence of widespread grievances. Relevant instruments should be designed in consultation with civil society and with the support of regional organisations and the international community. Commissions set up to monitor and oversee developments in this area should consist of diverse stakeholders. Addressing inequalities is imperative to building durable peace and should receive strong political and technical support.

#### **c. Exclusion and Marginalization**

One of the most important sources of conflict is severe discrimination of groups or individuals of which the most common forms are economic, political, social and ethnic exclusion and marginalization. People are excluded on the basis of their identity or affiliation to a certain group or belief and are persecuted or denied access to vital resources. But discrimination also has a psycho-social dimension in that perceived or felt discrimination may be as important as visible discrimination. In any case, the exclusion is usually detrimental to the well-being of the individual or the group of people. Common lines of discrimination in Africa tend to be urban-rural, coastal region-hinterland (particularly in West Africa), elite-masses, ethnic group-ethnic group, region-region and Christian-Muslim. Addressing severe forms of discrimination is critical to achieving durable peace.

### ***Recommendation***

- **Expand the sphere of solidarity beyond narrow groups and promote overall inclusion.** Discrimination will always exist in societies. It is therefore important to 'de-securitize' differences that have severely negative political and social effects i.e. 'shift' discrimination to differences that are less existential and thereby weaken politically significant discrimination. This can be done on a socio-psychological level through reconciliation, sensitisation, dialogue and similar instruments and, on a material level, by de-linking access to vital resources from allegiance or membership to a specific group.

#### **d. Structural Insecurity**

Many African states lack the monopoly of force and have therefore lost their ability to control their entire territory. They face violent insurgencies in parts of the

country, sometimes for more than a decade. Often the government and opposing groups engage in protracted armed conflict without either side achieving an ultimate victory. This reflects a situation of structural insecurity in which control over parts of the country is regularly contested and where peace remains temporary and fragile. This condition of insecurity has structural reasons some of which are related to colonial borders, weak state capacity, economic development and demographic factors. Addressing the lack of a monopoly of force is vital as security is the key prerequisite for all other peace consolidation elements.

### ***Recommendations***

- **Provide a security guarantee.** Certain structural factors such as a regionalization of conflict can undermine the durability of peace in a post-conflict country despite strong peace consolidation efforts. In these cases, an international security guarantee, in the form of a multi-year mandated peacekeeping force, a multinational defence pact or similar instruments may provide sufficient deterrence to allow the country to build an indigenous capacity to deal with structural insecurity.
- **Regionalise security.** In some cases, a security guarantee can also be provided by a regional security community. Over the last few years, both the AU and African regional organizations have developed regional security, conflict management and early warning mechanisms which, if developed further, could lead to the formation of genuine security communities.<sup>32</sup> Current efforts to establish an AU Standby Force should lead to enhanced regional security.
- **Nationalise the armed forces.** In many African countries, militaries have a strong ethnic or regional bias and are therefore not truly national in composition. This may lead to a loss of legitimacy and cause regionally and ethnically-based grievances, particularly if large segments of the army and the senior cadre are from the same region or ethnic group as the political leadership. Recruitment strategies including elements of a conscript force could be used to ensure a broad national representation.
- **Create and strengthen community security strategies.** Many armed groups started as small, ill-equipped, undisciplined and untrained, with some relying on forced recruitment. An effective community security strategy is one of the most effective ways to prevent armed groups from emerging. At the same time, community security may strengthen trust in and legitimacy of security forces.

## **2. Reducing ‘Conflict Opportunities’**

The importance of addressing the causes of conflicts is widely acknowledged. However, reducing the opportunities, attractiveness and profitability of conflict constitutes an equally important task. While sources of conflict abound in Africa, and addressing them may take time, reducing conflict opportunities may be an effectual measure to prevent the recurrence of conflict in the short and medium-term. Therefore efforts to prevent powerful groups from being able to acquire weapons, generate funds,

receive know-how, recruit troops and find the political support necessary to wage war must be stepped up. This can be achieved through measures directed at war entrepreneurs and through establishing structures that reduce the attractiveness yet at the same time increase the opportunity cost of mobilizing for war. Areas of intervention may include a) the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and other military equipment; b) illicit trading of natural resources; c) state complicity and political support for illegitimate armed actors; d) recruitment and training of soldiers, particularly on foreign soil; and e) fundraising and financial support for armed groups, particularly in the Diaspora.

A challenge to reducing conflict opportunities is the fact that most opportunities arise from and rely on international, political, economic and financial structures and transactions. Therefore ways must be found to end the impunity of engaging the international political and economic marketplace to create and support armed groups and parties in conflict. The complex legal structures, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms necessary for such endeavours require a paradigm shift in thinking among major political and economic actors.

Preventive tools may range from national or international monitoring or fact-finding mechanisms in the areas of governance, natural resource management and military expenditure to the establishment of smart sanction regimes. Many significant steps in that direction have already been made or are currently underway. The creation of the International Criminal Court, the Kimberly Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds, Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) in Liberia, the UN Panel of Experts, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Publish What You Pay Campaign are some good examples of the various instruments available. But more needs to be done. The key to success is to design similar instruments for areas insufficiently covered (such as international economic crimes), expand the scope and depth of existing ones, and replace temporary with more permanent arrangements wherever viable. In the end, nets of voluntary and binding agreements, monitoring and fact-finding mechanisms on local, national, regional and international levels should be established.

To bolster the legitimacy of these activities, actions should ideally involve diverse stakeholders and have ample input from owners, particularly civil society and regional organisations. Some should include a sanctions component which can be imposed in response to violations. It is critical, both for reasons of legitimacy and effectiveness, to expand the target group from armed groups and government to other national and international political and economic entrepreneurs with a stake in the country. Institutions overseeing activities should also consist of diverse stakeholders, including civil society as well as regional or international observers. In addition, countries emerging from conflict should be encouraged to join NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)<sup>33</sup> process early on so as to promote good governance structures and policies from the beginning as well as attract the foreign investment that is vital for reconstruction and development. Much more can be done in this respect and the international community should consider ways to further undermine, discourage and penalize activities that actively support armed groups or facilitate their operations.

## **B. CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR SUSTAINED PEACE**

Building the conditions of peace entails the general recovery and reconstruction of a society from war and the building of governance structures and institutions that will consolidate peace and establish the foundation for economic growth and development. It consists of a wide range of areas and activities. While the importance of each activity, instrument and sector of engagement, as well as their mix of application, varies in accordance with the specific post-conflict situation, the following may be common elements of peace consolidation strategies:

### **1. Political and Public Sector Governance**

Improving political governance is critical to providing the foundation for good governance. Important activities in this sector include: (a) the support of electoral processes; (b) the promotion of participatory processes; (c) the establishment of a political system that has effective checks and balances such as watchdog organisations and independent electoral and natural resource management commissions; (d) public sector reform; (e) constitution-making; (f) decentralization of governance; and (g) capacity-building for government and civil society.

### **2. Economic Governance, Growth and Development**

This sector is one of the most neglected yet critically important sectors for peace consolidation. Important activities in this sector include: (a) Transparent and accountable management of natural resources; (b) combating youth unemployment; (c) jumpstarting the economy; (d) wealth-sharing and the fair distribution of resources; (e) long-term economic growth and investment; (f) provision of health, social and educational services; (g) reform of the banking and financial sectors.

### **3. Security**

Important activities in this sector include: (a) disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); (b) security sector reform (SSR); (c) small arms and light weapons control and monitoring; (d) community security; (e) regional security.

### **4. Information, Media, Public Opinion, Sensitization**

Important activities in this sector include: (a) establishment of an independent media, particularly print media and radio; (b) peace education and sensitisation; (c) capacity-building for civil society.

### **5. Justice, Rule of Law, Human Rights and Reconciliation**

Important activities in this sector include: (a) transitional justice (e.g. Special Criminal Courts); (b) justice sector reform; (c) reconciliation activities including Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, restorative justice, restitution and healing; (d) human rights training and watchdogs.

## **6. Humanitarian Assistance, Relief, Recovery, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction**

Important activities in this sector include: (a) de-mining; (b) rebuilding of physical infrastructure; (c) return, repatriation and reintegration of IDPs, refugees and other war-affected persons; (d) food security and shelter.

### **Prioritization**

While the challenge of consolidating peace is tremendous, external assistance for peace consolidation tends to be short-lived and local capacity weak. Rather than strictly prioritising between these competing elements, current peace consolidation efforts tend to pursue a wide range of activities thus reflecting a “laundry list” approach.<sup>34</sup> While some activities need to be carried out simultaneously, a laundry list approach often leads to the needless overstretch and dilution of already scarce resources. To avoid this situation, peace consolidation efforts should be guided by a coherent strategy that clearly prioritises elements based on an in-depth analysis and that aims at leaving behind legacies.

### **Recommendations**

#### ➤ **Prioritize peace consolidation efforts**

Priorities may vary from country to country and at different stages of the peace consolidation process. They should be based on local realities and established in close consultation with owners. Nevertheless, creating and maintaining a secure environment is likely to be the most important priority as security is a pre-requisite for all other peace consolidation efforts.

#### ➤ **Leave lasting legacies**

There should be a strong focus on leaving behind lasting legacies. This includes creating institutions, norms and rules that are strong enough to reinforce themselves over time, can weather external shocks and are not dependent on continued outside attention.

### **Reform of Political Governance**

Oftentimes, existing political structures are at the heart of conflicts in Africa. Lack of service provision, barriers to political participation, abuse of political power, plunder of public resources and absence of the rule of law have tended to cause or facilitate conflicts in Africa.

In general, political structures have often not been responsive to the needs and demands of the people. For example, in many African countries the justice sector lacks public support beyond a small urban elite and upper-class, is not familiar to the majority of the people, is characterised by high barriers to access, and carries such high participation costs that it remains beyond the reach of most people.

In general, the political system should be easy to understand, participate in and influence. As state structures tend to be a product of and reaction to specific histories of rule and power, post-conflict environments offer an exceptional opportunity to redevelop

and reform these structures in a way that rectifies the structural faults of the pre-conflict state.

***Recommendation:***

- **Design governance structures that match post-conflict needs and increase the accessibility, accountability and transparency of existing political structures.** African post-conflict countries should design political systems and electoral laws to address the history of poor governance, abuses of power, corruption and injustices that have often been sources of conflict. For example, Ethiopia which emerged from over thirty years of conflict linked to Eritrean secession, promulgated a federal constitution that de jure recognises the right of any constituent ethnic or regional group to secede. To build lasting institutions, more innovation in the design of important political and economic structures is critical. A national debate on, and a thorough review of, the existing structures - as well as innovative ideas for new or improved political processes and institutions - must be therefore be sought.

### **Psychological Peacebuilding**

Reconciliation between warring parties and between perpetrators and victims of the conflict is important for rebuilding a peaceful society. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and sensitization programmes aimed at reintegrating ex-combatants have proven to be valuable instruments in this regard. But reconciliation is not enough; equally important for creating conditions for peace is changing political culture and people's mindsets. This is a long-term process that requires a major shift from violent to peaceful conflict resolution.

***Recommendation***

- **Demilitarize political culture and people's minds.** Demilitarizing political culture and people's minds can be achieved through 'psychological peacebuilding' - sensitization and peace education programmes - and strengthening peaceful and participatory conflict resolution and decision-making institutions and processes. Sensitization and peace education programmes have often been neglected.<sup>35</sup> Given the difficulties and time involved in addressing root causes and the scarcity of funds, systematic and broad-scale sensitization programmes are some of the most valuable and cost-effective peace consolidation tools available. Programmes aimed at demilitarizing political culture and changing people's mindsets should be expanded and should receive greater and more secure financial support.

### **Political Processes**

Another underfunded element of peace consolidation are political processes and process skills. Peaceful societies typically rely on formalised processes to maintain peace, justice and order. For example, due process is critical to peaceful conflict-resolution mechanisms, the rule of law and political participation. Unfortunately, funding projects with short time frames and concrete outputs is more favoured by donors than funding processes which tend to be much less concrete, time-bound and output-oriented.<sup>36</sup>

### ***Recommendation***

- **Increase financial support for political processes.** Political processes both on the community and the national level are vital to establishing non-violent conflict-resolution mechanisms, promoting a culture of peace and understanding and participating in political processes. Supporting these political processes is important, as is supporting the necessary process skills through capacity-building.

### **C. STRENGTHENING OWNERSHIP AND CAPACITY-BUILDING**

Ownership has become a broadly accepted concept which commands widespread support among Africans, the United Nations, donors, international and regional organisations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society. It has also been integrated into almost all international peace efforts. The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process was one of the first international fora to embrace and support African ownership and New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has embraced African ownership as one of its main principles.

Ownership is critical as it can lend greater legitimacy to peace efforts. Moreover, local actors typically possess superior knowledge about the dynamics of the conflict and the parties involved. They are also better equipped to find solutions to resolve conflict that are not only effective but in line with local traditions and moral values. Finally, as international involvements tend to be short-lived, the continuity and sustainability of peacebuilding efforts relies on the existence of legitimate owners with sufficient capacity.

### **From Rhetoric to Action:**

Despite its popularity, African ownership often remains rhetoric. To some extent, this is because achieving genuine ownership is hampered by practical challenges encountered by external actors, including a) finding appropriate and legitimate owners; and b) working with owners that lack capacity and the ability to engage in partnerships. Internal actors face the challenge of a) formal barriers to partnerships; and b) unequal partnerships. Another key challenge to translating rhetoric into action is addressing the lack of consensus about the nature, scope and depth of ownership.

Generally, peace agreements can only be established among leaders of armed groups, many of whom have been responsible (but often not be held responsible) for gross human rights violations or crimes against humanity. Moreover, few armed actors enjoy popular support or have democratic credentials. The owners of the peace process might not be the most suitable owners of the future of the country if they are not equipped to lead the society from war to peace and development. In this case, efforts must be taken to strengthen legitimate and constructive actors, ensure their inclusion, first as observers and later as participants in decision-making processes, and assist them in gaining popular support. As the situation in Liberia and Sudan shows, this is a very delicate process, and the pace and timing should be carefully calibrated to the power dynamics on the ground. Establishing national dialogues, inclusionary constitution-

making processes and quotas to ensure participation of women, civil society and opposition parties in government and parliament are some of the practical measures worth pursuing.

After years of war, many credible and experienced civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) simply do not exist. If they do exist, they might not be appropriately skilled to formulate, plan and undertake post-conflict tasks. This often leads to external actors foregoing genuine local ownership. Rather, increased energies should be focused on capacity-building.

Formal barriers related to donor language, procedures and administrative regulations tend to exclude those local organisations that are well-embedded in the local society but have little expertise with international partnerships. Other local non-governmental organizations fail to receive donor funding because their activities do not neatly fit pre-designed funding priorities. While local NGOs are often more aware of community needs and innovative in addressing the causes of conflicts, donors are often not flexible enough to support these important organisations. This is a major obstacle to genuine ownership. In post-conflict contexts, local NGOs cannot be expected to adhere to the same strict project management requirements as in non-post conflict countries. It is therefore critical to reduce the overregulation and formality of donor-NGO relations.

Genuine ownership is frequently hampered by stark financial, political, economic and military imbalances between internal and external actors. External actors are not only more powerful, they also tend to be accountable to external constituencies. As a result, some external actors conduct consultations with local actors as “legitimising exercises”. Local actors are sometimes used to lend their consent to pre-conceived perspectives and programmes and are not given a genuine opportunity to provide effective input and analyses at the early stages of programme design. However, ownership is meaningless if it is not accompanied by a significant amount of influence. Genuine support for ownership should seek to increase the ability of owners to help set the agenda and formulate peace consolidation policies and put more emphasis on capacity-building to ameliorate existing imbalances.

Another reason why ownership often remains rhetoric is that there is little agreement about what ownership really means, which groups can be legitimate owners, and in which situations, and areas of concern, ownership is a means or an end - or both. First, there might be periods of time when achieving ownership is nearly impossible or undesirable, as in the aftermath of an intervention to prevent genocide, while at other times, the success of peace consolidation efforts will strongly depend on the exercise of ownership. Second, in countries that are marked by illegitimate and weak institutions, ownership as a means might not be desirable. In these situations, support for ownership might mean support for ownership as an end, not a means. Third, some areas of intervention, such as security, lend themselves less to ownership than others.

## **A Way Forward: Different Layers of Ownership**

Ownership is often defined in narrow terms. It is commonly used to either refer to the national government, or alternatively to civil society or local actors. However, there is a wide array of actors that can legitimately claim some form of ownership and that fulfil one or more of the requirements of ownership. In addition to government and civil society, women's organisations, opposition parties, national and regional diaspora, academia and the private sector as well as regional economic communities (RECs) and the African Union should be seen as legitimate owners. Peace consolidation and recovery from war are monumental and complex tasks that require the efforts and goodwill of diverse national and regional stakeholders. Different owners and stakeholders have different comparative advantages and can provide various types of legitimacy and critical checks and balances.

African regional organisations and the African diaspora are two key owners that should receive increased attention and support. The African Union has become a prime stakeholder in Africa's peace efforts and is undertaking important steps to strengthen African expertise and increase African resources for peace and development. The African diaspora can play a critical role through peace-supportive political involvement and by providing technical expertise and investment. To achieve sustainable and meaningful ownership it is critical to build capacity.

### ***Recommendations***

- **As much ownership as possible should be sought.** Where it does not yet exist, considerable efforts should be made to build capacity in order to achieve ownership in the longer term. The end goal should be to increase ownership and decrease external involvement over time.
- **A “net of ownership” should be constructed** that consists of many layers and actors, each with their own comparative advantages, and supported by a variety of external actors that provide their support collectively and in a unified way. No one actor can claim to be the exclusive owner of peace efforts; multiple layers of ownership are valuable and should be strengthened.
- **The role of African regional organisations and the African diaspora should be strengthened**
- **Owners should be included at an early stage** in analysis, agenda-setting, program design and decision-making
- **The mix, strength and timing of ownership should be decided depending on the country, its conflict dynamics, the actors involved, the international environment and its peace prospects** among other things.

## VI. CONCLUSION

The challenges of consolidating peace in Africa are immense, yet the benefits are truly overwhelming. Overall, success will depend on the provision of sufficient resources and the longevity and strength of political commitment. It also depends on the application of the most appropriate peace consolidation elements. Finally, success depends on designing a more effective strategy for peace consolidation. Unfortunately, the resources provided are only a fraction of those necessary for peace consolidation, and political commitment tends to be insufficient and short-term. Acute crises tend to receive greater resources than prevention and peacebuilding activities; and peacekeeping budgets usually dwarf peace consolidation budgets. While these facts are widely acknowledged, and the reasons well-known, the situation has not improved significantly in recent years. Drawing attention to this significant gap, and mobilizing additional resources and political commitment, will therefore have to remain the priority of all stakeholders. By any measure, closing the gap will require time as it largely depends on a shift in thinking about global peace and security.

In light of this longer-term challenge, existing resources have to be optimally allocated and their impact maximized while current instruments have to become more appropriate and more adequately applied. Current peace consolidation efforts remain off-target in this regard. Therefore, significantly more energy must be invested in infusing current efforts with a field-driven realism that is predominantly guided by local needs, and makes innovative use of owners so as to overcome existing political, financial and technical constraints.

The 2005 Human Security Report singles out international peace activism as the most important factor in reducing conflict and achieving peace over the last decade.<sup>37</sup> If the international community significantly increases its political commitment and resources while enhancing its peace consolidation efforts it will have a far-reaching and positive impact on peace consolidation in Africa.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa (Progress Report of the Secretary-General)*, UN Doc A/60/182 (1 August 2005), paragraph 3

<sup>2</sup> Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005 – War and Peace in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, <http://www.humansecurityreport.info/HSR2005/Part5.pdf>, p. 155

<sup>3</sup> Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, (World Bank: Washington D.C., 2003), p. 7

<sup>4</sup> United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992)*, UN Doc A/47/277 - S/24111 (17 June 1992)

<sup>5</sup> Neclâ Tschirgi, *Post-conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges*, (International Peace Academy: New York, October 2004), p. 2

<sup>6</sup> Charles Call, *Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding – Concepts and Issues for DPA*, (UN Department of Political Affairs: New York, 31. January 2005. pp. 4-5

<sup>7</sup> Ibrahim Gambari, *The Transition from Peace Support Missions to Sustainable Development - Complementary and/or Diverging Objectives in the Context of Peace-building?*, International Policy Dialogue: Development Policy and the Armed Forces, (InWent: Berlin, 14–15 September 2004), <http://mandela.inwent.org/ef/military/gambari.htm>

<sup>8</sup> Neclâ Tschirgi, *Post-conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges*, (International Peace Academy: New York, October 2004), pp. 17-18

<sup>9</sup> Several rebel groups and militias as well as Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Rwanda had all been party to the conflict in the DRC. Other countries in the region affected by or linked to the regional conflict complex include Sudan, Central African Republic and Burundi.

<sup>10</sup> The African Union has made membership more conditional and successfully refused to recognize governments that have assumed state power through unconstitutional means. Similar policies could be applied to governments that have been found guilty of supporting armed groups.

<sup>11</sup> Neclâ Tschirgi, *Post-conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges*, (International Peace Academy: New York, October 2004), p.7

<sup>12</sup> Neclâ Tschirgi, *Post-conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges*, (International Peace Academy: New York, October 2004)

<sup>13</sup> Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004)

<sup>14</sup> Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004)

<sup>15</sup> Jane Boulden, S. Neil MacFarlane, Jochen Prantl and David Williams, *The Consolidation of Peace in Africa*, Final Project Report, (University of Oxford, Oxford, 2004), [http://cis.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/Consolidation/Consolidation\\_of\\_Peace\\_Building\\_Report\\_FINAL\\_doc.pdf](http://cis.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/Consolidation/Consolidation_of_Peace_Building_Report_FINAL_doc.pdf), pp.52-53

<sup>16</sup> Neclâ Tschirgi, *Post-conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges*, (International Peace Academy: New York, October 2004), p. i

<sup>17</sup> United Nations, *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 2005 World Summit Outcome*, UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005), paragraphs 97-105

<sup>18</sup> Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa – Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2000), pp. 11-13

<sup>19</sup> The exact figure is 43.7 % (2003). See World Bank, *2005 World Development Indicators*, [http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi/pdfs/table2\\_1.pdf](http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi/pdfs/table2_1.pdf), p.50

<sup>20</sup> IRIN News. *West Africa: Youth unemployment threatens regional stability*, (2 December 2005), [http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=50475&SelectRegion=West\\_Africa&SelectCountry=WEST\\_AFRICA](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=50475&SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=WEST_AFRICA)

<sup>21</sup> James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger and Anga Timilsina, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, (RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, 2003) <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1753/>, p.160

- <sup>22</sup> Charles Call, *Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding – Concepts and Issues for DPA*, (United Nations Department of Political Affairs: New York, 31. January 2005), pp. 15-17
- <sup>23</sup> United Nations, *Annotated Agenda of the 4th UN-Regional Organizations High Level Meeting*, 6 February 2001, p. 3
- <sup>24</sup> Comment by Former Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Kieran Prendergast at an International Peace Academy High-level Workshop on *State Building and Strengthening of Civilian Administration in Post-Conflict Societies and Failed States*, 21 June 2004. See Workshop Report, pp. 25-26
- <sup>25</sup> Charles Call, *Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding – Concepts and Issues for DPA*, (United Nations Department of Political Affairs: New York, 31. January 2005), p. 22
- <sup>26</sup> African Union. *Draft Report of Proceedings, 4th Brainstorming Retreat of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and other Permanent Representatives to the African Union (AU) on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) in Africa*, Durban, 4-5 September 2005, p.23
- <sup>27</sup> United Nations, *Report on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa (Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council)*, (April 1998), <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/>, paragraphs 7-15
- <sup>28</sup> Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005 – War and Peace in the 21st Century*, <http://www.humansecurityreport.info/HSR2005/Part5.pdf>, p. 152
- <sup>29</sup> United Nations Development Programme, *Facts on poverty in Africa*, <http://www.africa2015.org/factspoverty.pdf>; United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2005 – The World at a Crossroads*, <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/>
- <sup>30</sup> See UNDP Human Development Reports 2003, 2004 and 2005. <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/>; <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/>; <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/>
- <sup>31</sup> P. Fajnzylber, D. Lederman and N. Loayza, *What causes violent crime?* (The World Bank, Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region: Washington D.C., 1998); C. Hsieh and M.D. Pugh, , "Poverty, income inequality, and violent crime: a meta-analysis of recent aggregate data studies", *Criminal Justice Review*, 18(2)(1993), pp.182-202; Frances Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development*; Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity Working Paper No. 1, (Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford: Oxford, February 2002), [http://www2.geh.ox.ac.uk/research/wpaction.html?jor\\_id=239](http://www2.geh.ox.ac.uk/research/wpaction.html?jor_id=239); Gudrun Østby, *Horizontal Inequalities and Civil War - Do Ethnic Group Inequalities Influence the Risk of Domestic Armed Conflict?*, (NTNU: Trondheim, 2003), [http://www.prio.no/page/Publication\\_details/CSCW\\_Staff\\_alpha\\_ALL/9429/40747.html](http://www.prio.no/page/Publication_details/CSCW_Staff_alpha_ALL/9429/40747.html).
- <sup>32</sup> See Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002), ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (1999), Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States (2002), SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (1996), ECCAS Protocol Relating to the Establishment of a Mutual Security Pact in Central Africa (2000), among others. Available at [http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity\\_to\\_union/main.html](http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/main.html)
- <sup>33</sup> Available at: <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/49.pdf>
- <sup>34</sup> Charles Call, *Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding – Concepts and Issues for DPA*, (United Nations Department of Political Affairs: New York, 31. January 2005), pp. 5-6
- <sup>35</sup> Committee for Conflict Transformation Support, *The interplay of domestic, regional and international forces in post-conflict peacebuilding*, Seminar Report, Newsletter 13, (Committee for Conflict Transformation Support: London, 10 May 2005), <http://www.c-r.org/ccts/ccts13/seminar.htm>
- <sup>36</sup> Committee for Conflict Transformation Support, *The interplay of domestic, regional and international forces in post-conflict peacebuilding*, Seminar Report, Newsletter 13, (Committee for Conflict Transformation Support: London, 10 May 2005), <http://www.c-r.org/ccts/ccts13/seminar.htm>
- <sup>37</sup> Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005 – War and Peace in the 21st Century*, <http://www.humansecurityreport.info/HSR2005/Part5.pdf>, p. 155

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

African Union. Draft Report of Proceedings, 4th Brainstorming Retreat of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and other Permanent Representatives to the African Union (AU) on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) in Africa, Durban, 4-5 September 2005.

Bendana, Alejandro (2003). What Kind of Peace is Being Built?, Centro de Estudios Internacionales, Managua, Nicaragua.

Boulden, Jane (2004). The Role of the Security Council and Regional Organizations in Peace Consolidation, Centre for International Studies, Oxford.

Boulden, Jane; McFarlane, S. Neil; Prantl, Jochen and Williams, David (2004). The Consolidation of Peace in Africa, Centre for International Studies, Oxford.

Call, Charles (2005). Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Concepts and Issues for DPA, United Nations Department of Political Affairs, New York.

Chesterman, Simon; Ignatieff, Michael and Thakur, Ramesh (2005). *Making States Work - State Failure and the Crisis of Governance*. Tokyo, United Nations University.

Collier, Paul (2003). *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. Washington, D.C., World Bank.

Committee for Conflict Transformation Support. The interplay of domestic, regional and international forces in post-conflict peacebuilding, Seminar Report, Newsletter 13, London, 10 May 2005, <http://www.c-r.org/ccts/ccts13/seminar.htm>.

Department for International Development. Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states, London, January 2005.

Dobbins, James; McGinn, John G.; Crane, Keith; Jones, Seth G.; Lal, Rollie; Rathmell, Andrew; Swanger, Rachel and Timilsina, Anga (2003). America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1753/>.

Duffield, Mark (2001). *Global Governance and the New Wars*. London, Zed Books.

Evensmo, Ivar (2000). Assessment of Lessons Learned from Sida Support to Conflict Management and Peace Building, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Stockholm.

Fajnzylber, P.; Lederman, D. and Loayza, N. (1998). What causes violent crime?, The World Bank, Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Washington D.C.

Gambari, Ibrahim (October 2003). Conflict Prevention and the Consolidation of Peace in Africa, Chairman's Issue Paper.

Gambari, Ibrahim. The Transition from Peace Support Missions to Sustainable Development - Complementary and/or Diverging Objectives in the Context of Peace-building? International Policy Dialogue: Development Policy and the Armed Forces, Berlin, 14-15 September 2004, InWent, <http://mandela.inwent.org/ef/military/gambari.htm>

Herbst, Jeffrey (2000). *States and Power in Africa - Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Hsieh, C. and Pugh, M.D. (1993). "Poverty, income inequality, and violent crime: a meta-analysis of recent aggregate data studies." Criminal Justice Review 18(2).

Human Rights Watch. Youth, Poverty and Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa's Regional Warriors, New York, 2005.

Human Security Centre. Human Security Report 2005, British Columbia.

International Crisis Group. Liberia's Elections: Necessary But Not Sufficient, Brussels, 2005.

International Development Research Centre. What Kind Of Peace is Being Built? Reflections on the State of Peacebuilding Ten Years after The Agenda for Peace, Ottawa, 2003.

International Peace Academy and Crisis Management Initiative. State-Building and Strengthening of Civilian Administration in Post-Conflict Societies and Failed States, New York, 2004.

International Peace Academy. State-Building and Strengthening of Civilian Administration in Post-Conflict Failed States, New York, 2004.

International Peace Academy. The Future of UN State-Building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq, New York, 2003.

IRIN News. West Africa: Youth unemployment threatens regional stability, 2 December 2005, [http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=50475&SelectRegion=West\\_Africa&SelectCountry=WEST\\_AFRICA](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=50475&SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=WEST_AFRICA).

Large, Judith (2005). The Interplay of Domestic, Regional and International Forces in Peacebuilding, Committee for Conflict Transformation Support, New York.

Lund, Michael (2003). What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Taking Stock of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Charting Future Directions, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., Washington, D.C.

NEPAD Secretariat. African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework, 2005.

Olonisakin, Funmi (2004). African Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: An Assessment of the Continent's Evolving Peace and Security Architecture, External Study, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York.

Østby, Gudrun (2003). Horizontal Inequalities and Civil War - Do Ethnic Group Inequalities Influence the Risk of Domestic Armed Conflict?, NTNU, Trondheim, [http://www.prio.no/page/Publication\\_details/CSCW\\_Staff\\_alpha\\_ALL/9429/40747.html](http://www.prio.no/page/Publication_details/CSCW_Staff_alpha_ALL/9429/40747.html).

Ottoway, Marina and Mair, Stefan (2004). States at Risk and Failed States, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York.

Paris, Roland (2004). *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Prantl, Jochen (2004). Enhancing the Effectiveness of Multilateral Cooperation and Coordination, Centre for International Studies, Oxford.

Prime Minister's Strategy Unit. Investing in Prevention: An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response, London, 2005.

Rupiya, Martin (2005). UN Panel of Experts: A Peace-Building Tool?, ISS Paper 112, Institute For Security Studies, Pretoria.

Samuels, Kirsti (2005). Sustainability and Peace-Building: A Key Challenge, International Peace Academy, New York.

Smith, Dan (2004). Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo.

Stewart, Frances (February 2002). Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity Working Paper No. 1, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, Oxford, [http://www2.qeh.ox.ac.uk/research/wpaction.html?jor\\_id=239](http://www2.qeh.ox.ac.uk/research/wpaction.html?jor_id=239).

Tschirgi, Neclâ (2000). Root Causes of Peace and Challenges to Peacebuilding, New York.

Tschirgi, Neclâ (2003). Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development: Is the Window of Opportunity Closing?, International Peace Academy, New York.

Tschirgi, Neclâ (2004). Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges, International Peace Academy, New York.

Tschirgi, Neclâ (2004). Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges, International Peace Academy, New York.

UN Millennium Project. A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, 2005, <http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/fullreport.htm>.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Background Note for Expert Group Meeting on Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Development, New York, 15 November 2004.

United Nations Development Programme and Chr. Michelsen Institute. Governance in Post-Conflict Situations, Bergen, Norway, 2004.

United Nations Development Programme. Facts on poverty in Africa, <http://www.africa2015.org/factspoverty.pdf>.

United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 2005 - The World at a Crossroads, <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/>.

United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 2003, <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/>.

United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 2004, <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/>.

United Nations Office for West Africa. Youth Employment and Regional Insecurity in West Africa, New York, 2005.

United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa. TICAD III - Summary Proceedings, New York, May 2004.

United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator for Africa and the Least Developed Countries. The Tokyo Agenda for Action - African Development Towards the 21st Century - TICAD II, New York, 1999.

United Nations. 2005 World Summit Outcome, General Assembly Resolution, New York, A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005.

United Nations. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, New York, 2004.

United Nations. An Agenda For Peace - Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General, New York, A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992.

United Nations. Annotated Agenda of the 4th UN-Regional Organizations High Level Meeting, 6 February 2001.

United Nations. Implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, Progress Report of the Secretary-General, New York, A/60/182, 1 August 2005.

United Nations. Plan of Action on Peace-Building, New York, 2001.

United Nations. Report on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, New York, April 1998, <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/>.

United Nations. Supplement to An Agenda For Peace, Report of the Secretary-General, New York, 1995.

Williams, David (2004). The Bretton Woods Institutions and Post-Conflict Cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa, Centre for International Studies, Oxford.

World Bank. Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1998.

World Bank. The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda, Washington, D.C., 2004.

World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2005, [http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdipdfs/table2\\_1.pdf](http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdipdfs/table2_1.pdf).