The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq
By James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik and Anga Timilsina; and

America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq
By James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger and Anga Timilsina Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation (2005)

In ideal circumstances, the State provides peace, human rights and human needs, and forms the foundation of a stable international system. Many of the most challenging problems that afflict humankind are related to State weakness or failure, where Governments are unable or unwilling to fulfil basic standards of human security, or where violent conflict or chronic underdevelopment undermines public goods and the institutions of statehood.

It is generally agreed that the effects of State failure and violent conflict can spill over territorial borders and cause a range of wider security threats, which include refugee flows, illegal trafficking in narcotics and humans, environmental problems, and disruption of financial markets and trade, as well as terrorism, as in the case of Afghanistan. Before the fall of the Taliban, experience showed how corrupt, unstable, ineffective and repressive governance was in that country: human rights, development and education, among others, ranked worst in the world. At the same time, such a state of affairs was a breeding ground and haven for violent grievances and terrorism, the effects of which have had a greater impact on international peace and security.

The negative implications of failed statehood go far and wide. Various mechanisms have evolved to resolve conflict, promote democracy and assist in economic development within countries. When international actors are involved in peacekeeping, democracy assistance, reconstruction and economic development, many commentators talk in terms of "national building". The concept has fallen in and out of political vogue since the end of the Second World War, after the great successes led by the United States in Germany and Japan. In the post-cold-war world, in particular, "nation-building" has been an amorphous and controversial topic. There was optimism at first that the international community, through the United Nations, would be willing and able to effectively support nation-building activities in the midst of New World Order values of multilateralism, democracy and human rights.

Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping", wrote of "the start of a new phase in the history" of the United Nations. In this context, the Organization became involved in a number of peace operations worldwide; but as a result of experimentation, overreach and even crisis, the concept of nation-building began to turn in 1993. Earlier pledges of support by many UN Member States were forgotten, as the cost in human and material terms of the New World Order was realized. Ideas of nation-building were abandoned and an environment of cautious realism and multilateral fatigue subsequently pervaded the United Nations. "Nation-building" became a political term of abuse. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, interest in the concept has returned, especially with the success of democracy promotion in many areas. This forms the background for these excellent companion books that comprise RAND Corporation's "history of nation-building", providing a history and analysis of peace operations led by the United Nations and the United States. They also attempt an ambitious comparison between the two approaches to nation-building and draw out best practices and lessons learned for future policy.

In terms of the volume on United States nation-building, the focus is on the use of military force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin rapid and fundamental societal transformation. It asserts that nation-building "is the inescapable responsibility of the world's only superpower" and looks at seven very different case studies-Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan-where the United States took a leading role in supporting peace, economic development and democracy. It draws out overarching conclusions and lessons learned. In comparing these different cases, the book focuses upon quantitative "inputs", such as police presence, total and per capita external assistance in financial terms, and external assistance as a percentage of the gross domestic product. The evaluation of "outputs" is based on the success in promoting peace, economic development and democracy.

Considering all seven cases, some lessons learned are striking and highly topical: democracy can be transferred and exported to non-Western counries; military force can underpin democratic transformation; unilateral nation-building can be simpler but more expensive than multilateral efforts; nation-building objectives need to be scaled to available resources; exit deadlines can be counterproductive; building competent administrations and democratic institutions takes time; the nexus between organized crime and political extremism can be a serious challenge to enduring democratic reforms; broad participation and extensive burden-sharing can be compatible with unity of command and United States leadership; and a low initial input of money and troops leads to correspondingly lower results in terms of security, democratization and economic growth.

The primary question is why some cases are successful, such as Germany and Japan, while others like Somalia and Haiti are failures, or mixed, as in Bosnia. The volume suggests that success is more likely in societies that have a history of being developed and economically advanced, and those that are homogenous rather than divided ethnically, socially or tribally. The willing cooperation of the existing power structures, clear and independent United States command, and a conclusive end to a conflict are more conducive to successful external intervention for reconstruction. And when the United States is working in cooperation with international actors, a shared common vision and a clear division of labour are essential-what the book calls "a viable amalgam of burden-sharing and unity of command". However, the book also argues that ultimately it is the level of manpower and resources that the United States and the international community put into nation-building that determines the level of success. Recall that there were 1.6 million United States troops in Germany during the reconstruction there and 350,000 in Japan at the peak. Moreover, "while staying long does not guarantee success, leaving early ensures failure". Indeed, the authors suggest that democratization may take five years of engagement.

The companion volume, "The UN's Role in Nation-Building", was written shortly after and thus has a greater emphasis on comparisons between the United States and UN-led operations. It analyses lessons learned from experiences in the Congo and Cambodia (both partially successful), Namibia, El Salvador, eastern Slovenia and Timor Leste (all successful), Mozambique (mostly successful) and Sierra Leone (initially unsuccessful, then much improved). The book draws a number of lessons from UN efforts: money and manpower demands almost always exceed supply; controversial missions leave legacies of "risk aversion"; compliant neighbours, a competent Government and a clear-end State can contribute to a successful outcome; UN participation in settlement negotiations can facilitate smooth transition; democratization requires long-term engagement; incorporation of insurgent groups into the political process is essential for democratic transition; and while the United Nations can successfully conduct peace enforcement missions with support from major powers, lack of such support can undermine any UN operations.

This volume notes that there are differences between the United Nations and the United States approaches to nation-building. In terms of UN weaknesses, it argues that UN missions are undermanned and underfunded; they are often sized and deployed on the basis of unrealistic best-case assumptions; troop quality, as well as police and civil personnel, are uneven; and all components of the mission arrive late. Yet, the two volumes are rather positive in their conclusions of the significant achievements of the United Nations, observing that it has done a good job of learning from its mistakes and able to apply the "soft power" that derives from its legitimacy and impartiality. Overall, both endorse the theory and practice of "nation-building" and indeed argue that the decline in deaths from armed conflict in recent years points to the effectiveness of this activity.

There is much to learn from these books. Their methodical structure, rigorous analysis, presentation of data and rational conclusions are compelling and highly readable. However, there are a number of points with which one can take issue. The conceptual assumption of "nation-building" and the manner in which these volumes bring together many very different cases for comparison within the label of "nation-building" will be challenged by many scholars in this field. A caveat is certainly offered: the United States volume observes that "occupation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, stabilization and reconstruction do not fully capture the scope of such operations. Neither does the term nation-building, but we believe it comes closest to suggesting the full range of activities and objectives involved". This is a reasonable point, but then to take as the core issue circumstances "in which United States military power has been used to underpin democratization" would seem to stretch the concept of nation-building somewhat. A further gripe is the basis upon which comparisons are made, such as post-war Germany with Kosovo, and proposing general conclusions may also be something of a stretch. Similarly, making quantitative analysis on any single or multiple cases has its limitations: qualitative issues, norms, cultures and values are also fundamentally important.

Moreover, it is possible that some readers would prefer if these studies could have been a little more "critical" of the concept of democracy promotion, especially democracy enforcement. Indeed, these volumes appear to be premised on the concept of "liberal peace": (liberal) democracy, human rights, market values and the integration of societies into globalization, self-determination and the idea of the State and citizenship. This reflects the trend of some States to place foreign policy emphasis on the promotion of democracy as a means for spreading peace within societies and internationally. While the "democratic peace thesis" has attained empirical validity in terms of peaceful relations between States, "liberal peace" is promoted conceptually and in policy circles as a panacea for peace and development within States.

However, according to many contemporary observers, liberal peace is problematic. It is not necessarily appropriate for post-conflict or divided societies. Democracy in terms of liberal democracy, human rights, mainly civil and political rights, market values, the integration of societies into globalization, and the idea of State and national citizenship are not necessarily universal values. Democracy and the market are arguably adversarial or even conflictual forces, at home in liberal Western societies but not universal. Ill-timed or poorly designed elections in delicate political situations can be hazardous, as in Angola and Burundi. They can exacerbate existing tensions, result in support for extremists or encourage patterns of voting that reflect wartime allegiances, as in Bosnia. Therefore, so-called peacebuilding is not normatively neutral concepts. In certain circumstances, some values of liberal peace may be at odds with the attainment of sustainable peace, for example, when they promote an economic agenda that may exacerbate social/economic tensions. Moreover, observers have suggested that liberal peace is being promoted in favour of the market and not social justice, and of stability rather than human rights and accountability.

Some aspects of the liberal peace model are in tension with each other. Democracy might result in situations that could be at odds with the wishes of international donors, such as in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq. Some aspects of contemporary conflict management associated with liberal peace, including the role of international financial institutions, NGO work and other aspects of humanitarianism, may be contributing to certain types of conflict, especially those driven by a "war economy". Perhaps it is expecting a little too much for these two RAND volumes to engage in normative debates such as this, since they attempt an empirical approach to the topic of post-conflict reconstruction. In so doing, they are a very valuable resource; nevertheless, it is always healthy to keep in mind the more critical perspectives on "nation-building".