Peacekeeping has occupied a central place in United Nations activities in the last decade or so and was given added prominence following the adoption in 2000 of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, known as the Brahimi Report.

Scores of peacekeeping missions have been mounted in trouble spots worldwide; in Africa, the majority of operations were conducted in situations of internal conflict. While such intervention has led to cessation of hostilities, it has not necessarily resulted to a permanent peace nor has it fully addressed the factors that led to the conflict in the first place. The reasons for this shortcoming have to do with the causes of the conflict, the peacekeeping mandates, the structure and composition of the missions, and the perceived role of the United Nations in mediation. Many conflicts remain only superficially resolved, with all the elements for a relapse remaining intact. In fact, in some countries hostilities flared as soon as the United Nations left, as was the case in the Central African Republic and Haiti.

UN Photo

The United Nations must find a formula that will allow a successful transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and consolidation. But it is not presently structured to easily identify where to place this mandate within the Organization. The Security Council's mandate is clearly defined and limited to issues of global security, and peacebuilding goes beyond the need to secure the peace. It encompasses interventions that derive from a development mandate, which is the purview of the Economic and Social Council. This gap has been recognized over the years, leading to serious reflection on what is needed to invest the United Nations with the capability and capacity not only to make the peace but also to maintain and sustain it.

UN peacekeeping missions in internal conflicts are mounted when there has been a near-total breakdown of law and order: Governments have lost control; civilians are at the mercy of the warring parties; women, children and other vulnerable groups face extreme hardships; and there appears to be no end in sight. In many cases, government security capabilities would have been completely lost, and peacekeeping missions would be expected to provide security, secure public institutions and perform civilian police functions. The UN mission would have to monitor and enforce ceasefire and, if necessary, organize discussions or meetings, even if the mediators might be external actors. The mission is the eyes and ears of the international community in the conflict area and as such must constantly monitor the situation and present regular reports to the UN Security Council.

Peacekeeping missions typically have immediate or at best short-term objectives, such as: stop the hostilities; protect the civilian population; demobilize combatants; restore State authority; relaunch democratic governance processes; and organize multiparty elections. Even after the situation has been brought well under control, these objectives circumscribe the mission's capacity to effectively build and consolidate the peace. Once a country is at war, the assumption is for the United Nations to come in, cool down the fires, reinstate established authority, organize and supervise the elections, and then leave after two or three years. The United Nations would have kept the peace, but it might not necessarily have built it. Many have argued that peacebuilding is not within the purview of UN peacekeepers, especially under their present mandates. Yet, unless there are firm guarantees that hostilities have been halted permanently, and the underlying causes of the conflict have been identified and removed, peacekeeping gains could very easily become reversed and ultimately lost.

Experts have identified three clusters of factors that give rise to conflict: root or structural, proximate and triggers. Structural factors relate to issues of governance and the functioning of State with regard to its relationship with the citizenry, legitimacy, ability to provide basic services and mode of governance. They manifest themselves in weak or overly strong autocratic governments, rampant inequities among the population, corruption, discrimination, extreme poverty and deprivation, human rights deficiencies and a weakened system of adjudication. These cause disaffection among the population, which could eventually lead to uprisings, insurgencies and violent confrontation with established authority.

Proximate factors differ only by degree from structural causes. When discrimination becomes legitimized in the promulgation of laws that target a particular ethnic group, religion or clan, or if there is a precipitous decline in the standard of living, the conditions of conflict become heightened. These factors are one step removed from the triggers of conflict. There are sudden social traumas that spark off hostilities. In Rwanda, for example, there were many elements in the relationship between the Hutus and Tutsis that constituted structural and proximate causes of violence, but it took the shooting down of the presidential aircraft to trigger off the genocide. These factors are further compounded by State weakness, or the status of a shadow or soft State, whose governance capacities are so weak that it can easily be destabilized by internal or external aggressors. It is just one step away from a State failure, invariably resulting from prolonged internal strife, as was the case in Somalia and Liberia.

Understanding the causes of conflict is important for post-conflict reconstruction and the maintenance of peace. A typical African country in conflict is poor, with weak government and public institutions, a small private sector, high illiteracy, a narrow skills base and limited capabilities for guaranteeing security. This state of affairs is rendered even more dire by civil strife, whose effects on the economy and the society at large are debilitating. The situation after the conflict is one of destruction: infrastructure destroyed; basic services, water and fuel supplies, and electricity disrupted or lost; and transportation system barely functioning. Many professional and skilled personnel would very likely have left the country, thus severely circumscribing the ability of institutions to function.

In such a post-conflict situation, economic management capacities are seriously weakened, and security cannot be adequately provided. Even where the structures and institutions of democracy do exist, they are usually weak and unable to sustain the workings of a democratic system. Children are out of school, unemployment is very high and a large proportion of the population displaced. The non-physical fallout of war is even more devastating. A large number of people suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, many women are raped and children traumatized, and abuse among young people would be a serious social problem. The feeling of despondency, bitterness and anger is pervasive, creating the very conditions for a flare up of violence and hostilities.

Stopping the conflict is good, but it is even better to have measures in place to ensure that the situation is not only contained but also improved. It is important to institute programmes and mechanisms that would inevitably address the outcome of the conflict and its antecedents to ensure that there is no sliding back into conflict. In this, the UN peace missions in Africa have suffered their greatest weakness. By giving too much prominence to security responsibilities that need a military predominance in UN peace operations, the requirements for reconstruction, rehabilitation and relaunching of democratic and economic development processes are downplayed and become unresponsive to the need for recovery and the functioning of basic infrastructure and government services. The UN missions in Namibia and Mozambique came closest to full-blown peacebuilding missions, but the requirements for building the peace in general do not feature prominently in the mandates, composition and structure of UN peace missions in Africa. Because of this shortcoming, successful peacekeeping operations have had their gains wiped out by a hasty withdrawal from the post-conflict country before these issues were addressed, as was the case in Somalia, Central African Republic and Liberia, where hostilities resumed shortly after the closure of the peacekeeping operations.

What are the requirements for the reconstruction and the building of lasting peace? First is the restoration of established authority throughout the territory. After the cessation of hostilities in Sierra Leone, State authority did not extend to more than 10 per cent of the entire territory; the rest was in the hands of the rebels. The UN mission, as its topmost priority, set to help the Government regain control of the country. Second is to sequester and demobilize the insurgents. In a situation where thousands of heavily armed men roam the countryside and wreak havoc among the civilian population with virtually no central authority to control them, it is urgent to have these elements disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into civilian life. In 1997, Liberia's disarmament and demobilization programme was deeply flawed and half-heartedly undertaken, which led to the holding of a hasty presidential election at which the warlord Charles Taylor intimidated the electorate. It also led the country into another conflict and resulted in complete State failure. By contrast, Sierra Leone's post-conflict activities were very well handled. Combatants were first sequestered, then demobilized and disarmed, and were paid to turn in and destroy their weapons, and camped for eventual reintegration into their respective communities.

Election ballot boxes are loaded onto a UN helicopter for transport to Cancuzo, Burundi, as part of the United Nations electoral assistance. UN photo/Martine Perret

Then there is the necessity to relaunch economic activity. The immediate need would be for essential services, such as water, electricity, telecommunications and transportation, to be reinstated. The Government invariably would not have the wherewithal to undertake these activities, having become virtually bankrupt due to State collapse; therefore, the United Nations and the donor community would have to step in and provide the assistance required. Both public and private institutions, which are vital for the resuscitation of the economy, would have to be revived. The fourth requirement is to revive the civil service, which in most cases would have been decimated. The judiciary, in particular, should be reinvigorated early on to bolster the observance of the rule of law, protect human rights and help support security within the country. Programmes should be put in place to bring back and re-instate civil servants who were displaced or in exile.

There is also the need for security reform. In situations of prolonged conflict, security services take on a new culture and entrenched behaviours conditioned by the conflict. It is important to change those behaviours very early on and restructure the army, police and other security and law-enforcement institutions to meet the peacetime needs of the country. Failure to do so could lead to problems, such as those faced by Guinea-Bissau, where security services are still locked in a wartime mentality and have become a liability and an impediment in the democratic process. Not least important is the need for full engagement of the international community to provide assistance for reconstruction and keep the peacebuilding process firmly on course.

Three conditions always prevail in post-conflict situations. First, there would be a severe paucity of funds to allow the Government to meet its external obligations and its responsibilities to its people. Second, donors are unwilling to entrust their monies to a government that has lost its capacity for economic and financial management. To compound matters, government corruption is usually very high in post-conflict countries, making it more difficult to attract official development assistance. This has been the experience in Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, as well as in Sierra Leone, where the Government had to set up an anti-corruption commission to address the problem and reassure donors. The third condition concerns the country's relations with the Bretton Woods institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A country that has defaulted on its loan repayments would be placed under prescribed sanctions and therefore would not be eligible for further loans. Because the IMF programme would have been suspended, donors would be reluctant to engage directly with this country. This situation makes it more difficult for countries emerging from conflict to keep their reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts on an even keel.

To ensure that peacekeeping dovetails into peacebuilding and consolidation, the United Nations should go beyond the immediacy of the political requirements for consolidating peace and address the broader dimensions of governance. It would do well to include a robust capacity-building element into its peacebuilding operations in order to help countries emerging from conflict to be invested with good governance and effective public sector management capabilities. This calls for an extensive UN-supported technical assistance programme to plug the skills gaps in key government sectors, as well as a well-focused training programme for public officials. Timor Leste's experience could serve as an ideal model here.

An inter-agency programme needs to be mounted to support the peacebuilding process, with clearly defined roles and responsibilities for each participating agency. Job creation is a priority because economies of post-conflict countries are typically depressed and unemployment is extremely high. Public works employment generation projects are greatly recommended as they provide livelihood to poor households, rehabilitate infrastructure and contribute to reviving domestic demand, which help to stimulate the growth of the local economy. There is also a need to strengthen government structures and institutions to increase synergies between the executive, the judiciary and the legislature. A special programme to bring back skilled workers who left the country is required to fill the gaps and provide services, as was successfully done in Timor Leste.

The United Nations should assist countries in organizing donor conferences and prepare Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which are the programme contexts for assistance from the Bretton Woods institutions. Countries emerging from conflict would have a set of developmental priorities and be assisted in articulating these needs.The Bretton Woods institutions could be encouraged to create a special facility for these countries. The World Bank has such a facility, but the terms for accessing it are so stringent that most countries that qualify would unlikely benefit much from it. The facility must be designed to ensure that the lack of funds does not impede the implementation of basic stabilization programmes, such as starting off the school system, and will operate, if necessary, on a highly concessional or a full-grant basis. IMF regulations are more stringent and do not leave much room for countries to manoeuvre-a situation that has to be reviewed further, because good relations with the Fund are always an important pre-condition for good relations with donors. In all cases, there is a need for a bridging arrangement upon the cessation of hostilities, through which an emergency programme of assistance will be launched to allow the Government to discharge its most basic responsibilities. This programme would target issues, such as emergency food needs, resettlement of the displaced, reintegration of ex-combatants and rehabilitation of child soldiers, for which the United Nations would have to secure the resources needed.

The United Nations is in the process of reappraising its role in the prevention of conflict and the maintenance of peace. It has decided to position itself to better respond to the increasing urgency to be more proactive in its peacebuilding activities. In 2000, the General Assembly adopted resolution 55/217 on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. In 2001, the Economic and Social Council issued a Ministerial Declaration, addressing the United Nations role in support of the efforts of African countries to achieve sustainable development.

In 2002, the Council decided to set up ad hoc advisory groups, whose terms of reference were to assess the humanitarian and economic needs of countries emerging from conflict and elaborate a long-term support strategy that would ensure an easy crossover from relief to development. The first such group was set up for Guinea-Bissau in 2002, followed for Burundi in 2003. So far, these groups have proven to be effective mechanisms, have been flexible and efficient, and have brought some synergy among the partners in support of their respective countries. They have played an important advocacy role on behalf of their client countries and have guided Governments, encouraging them to embark on courses of action that would get the backing of and assistance from donors.

But perhaps a more formal response to the need is yet to come. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2004 created the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, whose report has a number of recommendations for the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, which was considered by Heads of State and Government at the 2005 World Summit. With this decision, peacebuilding is formally granted a place within the structure, functions and mandates of the United Nations. A peacebuilding support office would be established to serve as the secretariat to the Commission and enable the Secretary-General to easily integrate system-wide peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and provide cohesive support and leadership in field operations. On 20 December 2005, the General Assembly, acting concurrently with the Security Council, decided to establish the Peacebuilding Commission. In our bid to render the United Nations more relevant to present-day needs and realities, strengthening its capabilities to build and consolidate the peace is one measure that would close the door on one threat to peace and security in a cost-effective and positive way.