The First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention met in The Hague, the Netherlands from 28 April to 9 May 2003, to undertake a review of the Convention's operation. Its mandate included, in particular, a review of scientific and technological developments, and the verification regime for the chemical industry.

The Conference ended with the adoption of a political declaration of States Parties reaffirming their commitment to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the global ban on chemical weapons (CW). This declaration highlighted the States Parties' conviction that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) contributes to enhancing international peace and security, and that its full, effective and universal implementation will exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons. The Conference also adopted a report containing assessments of the Convention's operation and recommendations for its future implementation.

The success of the Review Conference was particularly significant if seen against the current stagnation of other multilateral disarmament efforts. With changing security conditions, evolving non-proliferation policies for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the possible association between these weapons and terrorism, and the significant advancements in science, technology, chemical production and trade, the success of the Conference could not be taken for granted. It signalled the strong political support of the States Parties for their Convention and the OPCW.

The CWC was the result of protracted negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, concluded in 1992, and was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly. The Convention was "designed" to deal with the huge CW stockpiles of the Soviet Union and the United States. Many of its provisions reflect the political, economic and military circumstances at the end of the cold war, which opened a window of opportunity for the global chemical weapons ban. The negotiations were also influenced by Iraq's use of chemical weapons during the 1980s. The aspiration of the developing countries to improve international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemistry was another important factor.

Eleven years later, the security landscape of the world has changed. The CW stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the United States, as well as the smaller stockpiles of the three other declared possessor States Parties, are being destroyed under international safeguards, and measures to prevent proliferation are being implemented under the Convention. But concerns about CW proliferation remain, as do concerns about the absence of important States from the CWC regime. In addition, there is today the real threat of terrorists acquiring WMD capabilities. There is thus a growing question: what role can and should global disarmament regimes play in the increasingly complex array of political, economic, military and diplomatic means to counter the threats of WMD proliferation and use.

Furthermore, developments in science and technology affect the CWC regime. New research techniques allow the synthesis and screening of potentially millions of new chemicals. Industrial production has become increasingly versatile, and worldwide trade in chemicals has much increased as a result of globalization. The chemical industry fully supports the CWC, but the scientific and technological potential that is at the disposal of States has increased enormously.

The confirmation by the 153 States Parties of their conviction that the CWC remains an essential instrument for international peace and security was very important indeed. They characterized the CWC as non-discriminatory, setting new standards for global disarmament under strict and effective international control, non-proliferation, assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and international cooperation. They emphasized the comprehensive nature of CWC prohibitions and concluded that the CWC adequately covers scientific and technological developments.

The Review Conference in particular stressed the importance of universal adherence to the CWC. It urged States that had not yet ratified or acceded to it to do so without delay, and requested the OPCW Executive Council to develop and implement an action plan to further encourage adherence. Universality is not only seen as an increase in numbers; there are important qualitative factors. States Parties must be fully capable of implementing the CWC, and universality measures must address States whose absence from the Convention has given rise to particular concerns.

The Review Conference noted the progress made in the destruction of CW stockpiles and in the elimination of CW production capabilities, recognizing that the possessor States are fully committed to meet their obligations. There has been progress in chemical weapons disarmament. However, there have been difficulties in the destruction of CW stockpiles, and the Conference has taken action on delays in some States Parties and granted extensions of destruction time-limits, as provided for by the Convention. Other issues included: a pledge for assistance for possessor States that request it for the implementation of their CW destruction programmes; the need for these States Parties to provide adequate security for their stockpiles; a recognition of the progress made in the destruction and conversion of CW production facilities; the need to monitor the effectiveness of the mechanism for reimbursing verification costs under Articles IV and V to the OPCW; and a recognition that the verification system for chemical weapons and their production facilities should be further optimized.

The Review Conference recognized the important contribution that the Convention makes to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons. It requires States Parties to criminalize acts of proliferation, enforce legislative and administrative measures to prevent such proliferation, including export controls, and open their chemical industries to international verification.

The review of the verification regime for the chemical industry was a specific requirement for the Conference. This regime was only completed during the last months of the negotiations, which included such key decisions as the composition of the schedules of chemicals, the precise declaration and inspection requirements, the inclusion of chemical plant sites other than those involved with the production of scheduled chemicals, and the nature of on-site inspections at these "other chemical production facilities" (OCPFs). Practical experience was limited at the time. The regime needed to be evolutionary, adaptable to changes in industry and capable of learning from experience.

After six years of operation, the Review Conference confirmed the overall balance within the verification regime for the chemical industry and called for adequate inspection intensity in all categories of declared facilities. The OCPF inspections were found useful for increasing confidence among States Parties. Their selection mechanism needed to be improved and their number should increase as appropriate.

The Review Conference also made an overall assessment of the OPCW verification system and was satisfied that it meets the requirements of the CWC. The OPCW has accumulated considerable expertise in routine inspections, conducted in more than 50 countries worldwide; no challenge inspections have been requested. The Conference did, however, take cognizance of the positive experience that many States Parties have acquired with bilateral clarifications of compliance concerns. The Technical Secretariat is also actively involved in clarifying issues related to declarations and inspections. A process of optimizing verification resource utilization has begun, and the Conference encouraged its intensification so that recommendations could be implemented as from 2004.

How to improve national implementation was one of the most prominent themes at the Conference. National implementation was characterized as one of the essential conditions for the functioning of the CWC. There were concerns about the large number of States Parties that have yet to establish or designate a national authority, and an even larger number have yet to notify the OPCW about their legislative and administrative measures to implement the CWC. Despite the fact that the OPCW offers implementation support to States Parties, and despite bilateral assistance being provided by a good number of them, progress has been slow. The Review Conference, consequently, tasked the Executive Council to prepare an action plan for adoption by the Conference of the States Parties in October 2003, in order to fully implement these CWC requirements.

In the area of assistance and protection against chemical weapons, the Review Conference recognized that progress has been made, but that additional work was needed to develop the response capacity expected of the OPCW should chemical weapons be used. The OPCW role in an international emergency response needed further clarification, and there was a need to coordinate activities with other national and international agencies.

Fostering international cooperation in the peaceful application of chemistry was another issue that was high on the agenda. The Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of CWC provisions in this area and the commitment of all States Parties to fully implement them. It reviewed the current OPCW international cooperation programmes and provided guidance on the further development of this programme portfolio. Some specific examples include the facilitation of expert advice on peaceful uses of chemistry, national capacity-building, including support for national authorities, and the need for partnerships with other international organizations, as well as with the private sector.

The Review Conference also examined the functioning of the OPCW, including in such key areas as the protection of confidentiality, and assessed the work of the policy-making organs, OPCW subsidiary bodies and the Secretariat, with the Director-General at the helm. It confirmed the strong support of the membership for the OPCW and its leadership. The Review Conference was not only a vote of confidence for the Organisation, it identified concrete goalposts for further progress in the implementation of the Convention. The OPCW has set itself a clear and realistic "roadmap" towards a chemical weapons-free world.