Conclusions of UN Freedom of Information Conference 1948:
Efforts to Reconcile Opposing Concepts
Just after he had signed the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information, the Conference President, General Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines declared that this document might come to be regarded in the future as the "Magna Carta" of freedom in the field of thought and expression.
Earlier in the Conference, at the end of a day during which a spirit of goodwill spread among the members, Professor Fernand Dehousse of Belgium remarked that it "might well mark a turning point for the United Nations". Even the sober "realists" must recognize that any conference which aroused such a degree of enthusiasm and confidence among members taking part in it must have contributed something of real value on the problems it sets out to tackle.
The Final Act itself, with its annexes embodying the decisions taken, tells part of the story of this achievement, but can no more tell the whole story than the tally of a man's estate can tell the full story of his contribution to life. At this Conference, more than at most others, a great part of the achievement was intangible. That, perhaps, is why, among both those who endorsed these final decisions and those who found them unacceptable, there is a feeling that the Conference has paved the way for a greater degree of understanding in the future than these decisions represent.
These practical decisions, however, are in themselves important—more so when it is remembered that there were many who believed, before the Conference started, that it would be useless to hold an intergovernmental meeting at all on a subject as elusive as freedom of information.
Broadly speaking, the practical achievements can be classified under three main heads. Firstly, the overall rights, obligations and practices to be included in the concept of freedom of information were given expression, both in resolutions and conventions, in a form which was acceptable to a great majority of delegations.
Secondly, in two conventions and several resolutions, practical steps were taken to draw attention to the main problems of a technical nature and to prescribe remedies for some of the obvious obstacles in the way of a free flow of information.
Lastly, it was decided to extend the life of the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and to expand its terms of reference, in order that continuing machinery, under United Nations auspices, would be provided to give constant attention to the subject and to carry out some of the tasks which the Conference recommended should be carried out on the international plane.
All these decisions were not unanimous. Right up to the end, it proved impossible to reconcile two fundamentally opposed conceptions of how the subject should be approached.
The Two Concepts
The approach which gained majority acceptance, and on which basis the decisions in the Final Act are founded, was that the freedoms attaching to the overall concept of freedom of information were the birthright of every human being and should be clearly defined and proclaimed. But the responsibility for exercising those freedoms in a way that would be beneficial to human society should be left primarily in the hands of those professionally engaged in the information field, rather than be enforced by law or governmental action. The argument for this was that to enforce "responsibility" would necessitate restricting "freedom", and that any agency given power to enforce the one would inevitably be given power to destroy the very freedom itself.
Those holding the extreme view in this respect, in particular the United States, felt so strongly on this last point that they were chary of writing any restrictions whatsoever into the conventions governing the principles of freedom of information. The majority, however, felt that a minimum of restrictions was necessary to ensure that the background against which freedom of information would operate would be that of an ordered, civilized society. They believed further that the very limited fields within which restrictions were permissible should be clearly stated to prevent the abuse, arising out of deliberate misinterpretation, which would be possible if no reference, or too loose a reference, were made to restrictions.
All the representatives who argued for this approach to the subject recognized that responsibility must go hand in hand with freedom, but felt that it was something which could best be fostered by professional organizations and similar bodies. They insisted that no attempt should be made to define the "functions" of the press—to lay down, for instance, that the press must be democratic, or that it must fight fascism. To do this, they argued, meant that in effect Governments were being given the right to dictate what was good and what was bad, and this, they held, was a matter which could not be decided by any one government or group. It was for the people, they said, to choose for themselves from the greatest possible variety of views presented to them.
The opposite approach, expressed in particular by the Soviet Union, was that freedom without attendant responsibility was no more than anarchy and license, and that experience proved that unless responsibility is enforced, it is seldom practiced. Furthermore, they argued that absolute freedom did not exist and that therefore uncontrolled freedom itself led to the destruction of freedom because it enabled a few to become powerful and to abuse that freedom to the detriment of the many.
The programme they urged was first to lay down precisely those activities of the press which should be encouraged—that it should fight fascism, racial discrimination and warmongering, and should be prevented by law from spreading false and distorted reports. Furthermore, it should labour directly to promote democracy and economic and social progress, and should foster friendly relations between States. Once such functions had been agreed on and defined, they said, then every step should be taken to make information which fulfilled these requirements freely available to the people.
The nearest attempt at resolving these two different approaches was made in connection with the resolution against warmongering and false and distorted reports, which the Conference passed unanimously. The final text expressed the view that these objectives were sound guidance for information media.
Another split developed, however, when the Soviet Union and others asked that such provisions be written into the conventions. The majority objected that while it might be good to proclaim in general terms the desirable activities of the press, it would be quite wrong to attempt to lay down in precise terms that only these activities were good, that only these activities were to be permitted, and that all other activities were to be denied. They objected further that many concepts—such as democracy, fascism and social progress—were capable of very different interpretation and that to attempt to include in a legal document such as a convention, terms on which no agreement existed as to the precise definition, was a very dangerous practice.
Though this fundamental division among the members continued to the end, the prevailing impression was that the full discussions in the Conference had opened the way to greater understanding in the future.
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This article was previously published in United Nations Bulletin Vol. iv No. 9, 1 May 1948. (precursor to UN Chronicle)
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