It is easier to rally support for particular biological assets, tigers or wetlands, than for a relatively abstract biodiversity, consistently ranked last in public awareness among all environmental issues, ranging from wildlife to climate change. Indeed, its constituency has to be considered soft even among many who consider themselves environmentalists. Yet, governance of a global issue like biodiversity needs the direct involvement of the United Nations. More than 150 Governments signed the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. Today with 175 States parties to it, the CBD must be one of the biggest treaties ever ratified to in the UN system.

The CBD presents an opportunity to realize important goals, but it has been hard to sustain enthusiasm, much less secure funding and institutional commitments. Of all the commitments to come out of UNCED, the CBD has proven the hardest to market to politicians and the public. Parties to the CBD cannot ignore that they are launching an uphill campaign at an unpropitious time, just when the environmental movement's momentum appears to be reaching a plateau. Merely educating the public and world leaders about the stakes, much less agreeing among themselves, will itself consume considerable effort. In this context, the process needs to be realistic about its goals.

From its inception, the CBD has been burdened with a lack of clarity and potential conflict in its institutional mission. There are those whose primary motive is to conserve nature for future generations, and there are those for whom conservation must be subordinate to development. Of course, there is an important range of policy options in which the two aims are congruent. But when the path of conservation departs from that of economic benefits, with proposals that would preserve valued assets but at a cost to development, which course will the parties take? Even within the ambit of conservation, institutional tensions persist that need to be resolved. Is this new framework convention an opportunity to attack all biology-related problems on all fronts? But there is already a host of treaties, agreements and institutions that address biodiversity.

Some believe that is part of the problem, that the present fragmentation of effort is too "piecemeal", and that all these diverse efforts require coordination or consolidation. Desertification, rivers, toxic waste and ocean management all impact biodiversity, as do weapons testing, trade, agriculture, mining and auto emissions. And there is little evidence that great umbrella agencies are in any way more effective or efficient than moderately-sized institutions with more sharply focused mandates.

It is clear that biodiversity cannot be safeguarded without advancing into areas already addressed by other regimes, and that the CBD should avoid duplicating any ongoing efforts that are moderately well-working, restrict its role to identifying problems that have been overlooked and recommend improvements.

Even this limited role will, however, inevitably create tensions. For example, to what extent should the Convention pursue its own agenda concurrently and independently? How far can the CBD withdraw from forest management and still maintain credibility? Where trade-related matters are concerned, should the parties to the CBD try to influence the World Trade Organization (WTO), or do their best to withdraw trade-related matters, for example in genetic resources, from the WTO, or place them under a competing regime? The underlying question must be, in which areas is a commanding role worth developing? In light of alternative institutional competencies of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Commission for Social Development and of so many other agencies, what can the CBD contribute uniquely or preeminently? To what extent can it even fill the role of institutional steward?

Even if the parties steer a clear path away from other institutions and take up only the tasks most clearly within the Convention's purview, they will have to give some aims priority over others, if only because of budgetary and institutional constraints. A core agenda for its aims has already been laid out in a series of first-rate studies going back to the 1980 World Conservation Strategy. At this point, the question is not what should be done? There is more to do than can be handled. The question is one of focus: which of many worthwhile objectives take precedence?

Perhaps it is possible to identify and prioritize projects that are win-win: those that can enjoy the support of conservationists and developmentalists alike. Consider the amount of total effort that has gone into bio-safety. Supporters justify the attention by labelling the issue "crucial". But it is possible to suppose that bio-safety has been labelled "crucial" because it is something the parties have been able to agree to spend time on, putting off discussion of problems that are far more consequential.

Institutional links and cooperative relationships with other international bodies are fundamental to the implementation of the Convention, particularly in the financial mechanisms, which in institutional terms is largely housed in the Global Environment Facility, and its implementing agencies: the United Nations Development Programme, UNEP and the World Bank. Institutional links have been established with a wide range of other bodies. The Secretariat of the CBD has participated in the Inter-Agency Task Force of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests and the Inter-Agency Committee on Sustainable Development of the United Nations.

Agreements to provide a framework for developing institutional links and cooperation with other bodies have been concluded between the Secretariat of the CBD and the secretariats of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora, the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the Convention on Migratory Species, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, the World Bank, the World Conservation Union, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, amongst others.

The Convention of Parties (COP) has regularly adopted decisions directed towards other processes and invited them to take an active role in the implementation of aspects of the Convention. For example, the third meeting of the COP invited the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance to cooperate as a lead partner in the implementation of activities under the Convention on Biological Diversity related to wetlands. Consequently, the Ramsar Bureau has played an important role in the preparations for the consideration of the biological diversity of inland waters for the forthcoming COP. As a result, it is expected that the programme of work which the COP may establish to address the issue will invite the full and active participation of the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance process.