How might all this affect the United Nations?

First, several well-established, non-military institutions in Europe in combination strengthen Europe's security in many, often little appreciated ways. They promote economic well-being, foster democratic institutions and methods, build habits of cooperation, foster mutual confidence, improve conditions for minorities and monitor human rights issues. Organizations like the Council of Europe and the OSCE have been very busy since the opening of the East. In the past few years, the number of OSCE special missions, for example, has quadrupled, while its financial and human resources remain severely limited. Continued expansion and improvement of this kind of work by European institutions, combined with an improved European defense capability, ought to reduce the need for the United Nations to expend its assets to Europe, thus allowing them to be used elsewhere.

A stronger, more independent European capability would also presumably be available to the United Nations. Europe's leaders and several of its major national political parties favour close cooperation with the United Nations. Though reluctant to act outside of the "NATO area", they might be more willing to do so under UN mandate. A related though indirect benefit to the United Nations might be the ability of a Europe with its own defense capability to encourage closer United States cooperation with the United Nations. The Europeans give high priority to such cooperation. Many of their Governments and political parties are extremely concerned that the air campaign in Kosovo, undertaken without specific UN authorization, does not constitute a precedent. Their views in what looks likely to become a continuing discussion over rights of intervention and requirements for a UN mandate will be important as the world community strives to define the ground rules for undertaking peacekeeping operations.

Finally, there is the improved synergy that should develop between the United Nations and several European security institutions. As they work to find better ways to avert crises, deal with conflict and support failed or newly emerging States, the United Nations and these European organizations will have much to share in "best practices", lessons learned and mutual reinforcement. Policing, monitoring elections and introducing lines of separation between hostile neighbours are areas where the United Nations has decades of experience. Europeans, on the other hand, have worked hard and with success at building stable institutions over the long term, promoting democracy and respect for human rights in new States, instituting military confidence-building measures, and furthering political and economic integration. The United Nations as a global organization and Europe as a regional one have much to gain from working closely together in crisis prevention. For best results, however, they both need to improve in a number of areas, and the United States could play a positive, catalytic role in this. Europe will not attain a common independent defense or a single foreign-policy voice early or easily -- if at all. This goal will require a long-term commitment of will and public resources and no little ingenuity. Cooperation among Europeans must be developed further in defense production, for example, and clever ways of applying comparative advantage must be worked out among countries that want to cooperate but fear to yield any further measure of sovereignty. The United States could help by ending its own ambivalence toward a self-sufficient European defense role. Washington should reinforce its many declarations of support by actions to help further the goal in practical ways.

One step would be to relax American regulations that inhibit United States-European defense cooperation. The United States could also continue efforts to promote the Allied's interoperability in defense equipment, technology and tactics. Further, the United States could encourage the Europeans to create more innovative crisis-prevention instruments under their so-called "Petersberg Tasks", from a WEU declaration of June 1992, outlining a commitment to develop capabilities ranging from humanitarian and rescue operations to more traditional peacekeeping and military peacemaking functions. The Petersberg Tasks were adopted by the EU through the Amsterdam Treaty, which also gives the European Council a directive authority over the WEU. Practical capabilities to carry out the tasks are still being developed.

Along those lines, the United States is working with other OSCE participating States to improve national means of providing to the OSCE Secretariat civilian personnel in various skill areas. This is to ensure a standing capability for rapid deployment of special teams to crisis spots. Such an improved rapid deployment capability could also help European States respond more effectively to urgent appeals from the United Nations for civilian resources.

The United States should also adopt an attitude of more forthright cooperation toward the United Nations. An obvious first step is for Washington to pay its arrears. Another would be for the Administration and Congress to refrain from carping at the United Nations as an institution. Its failures are often owed to circumstances beyond its control -- political obstruction or financial limitations. As a creature of the international community, it can only be as strong or as effective as its members will allow.

Personalizing disagreements, moreover, can undermine respect for the institution as a whole. To illustrate, the then United Nations Secretary-General was much vilified in certain quarters in the United States as he tried to cope during the difficult UN Protection Force operation (pre-Dayton period) in Bosnia. He had called upon United Nations members to increase the troop level in Bosnia from about 15,000 to 40,000. He never got those numbers from Member States though -- and he and the United Nations were roundly criticized for not "measuring up" to the task. Yet, when the NATO-led Implementation Force, agreed at Dayton, relieved the smaller UN contingent in Bosnia, it went in with no less than 60,000 troops!

Of course, improvements had been necessary at the United Nations to respond more effectively to fast-moving developments in the Bosnian war and, certainly, additional improvements can be made to make UN crisis-management efforts effective. But success can only come in an atmosphere of cooperation and shared effort. The results will benefit Europe, the United Nations, the United States -- and the world community.

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