The security relationship between the United Nations and Europe has become more entwined than ever before in the decade since the end of the cold war. What is new in Europe is the emergence of a variety of actual and potential conflict situations that require limited response, as opposed to defense against a massive military threat.

Today's international force in Kosovo and the NATO-led (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) force in Bosnia and Herzegovina operate under UN mandate. The civilian United Nations Mission in Kosovo is led by a French official, appointed by and responsible to the Secretary-General. Earlier, the United Nations conducted, in a veritable combat zone, a humanitarian relief operation in Bosnia, under the protection of a UN-mandated force of 15,000 troops. In addition, a sizeable UN force was deployed as a preventive measure in Macedonia. Such UN operations were unheard of in the days of the cold war when European security was governed by the NATO-Warsaw Pact stand-off.

On-the-ground involvement of the United Nations in a continent which boasts the most sophisticated security alliance in history might seem redundant. Yet, this decade has taught us that security can be jeopardized in many ways short of military attack, and preserving it requires more than military capabilities. The United Nations offers tools and experience in conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building that can be adapted to European needs today. At the same time, many of Europe's well-developed security institutions may provide lessons or "best practices" for the United Nations itself and for other regions. To make possible such mutual benefit however, it is urgent to develop effective communication and information exchange among the several European security institutions and between them and the United Nations.

Despite the frictions and unseemly polemics which have sometimes characterized early cooperative efforts with the United Nations, considerable progress has been made in Bosnia. Post-conflict operations in Kosovo may also benefit from a clear commitment to work together among the several institutions involved. Among European security institutions, NATO is clearly the foundation, the chief forum for discussions about developing crises and for military planning and operations to deal with them. However, a number of other organizations also have important roles to play, especially in preventing or defusing crises and in the repair or renewal of civil society after a conflict has ended. Across a spectrum, from military through political to economic focus, they include the Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Each has its own founding history, purpose and membership, although there is overlap among them. Many countries in and outside Europe belong to or are affiliated with two or more of these institutions. All have undergone considerable change in facing the challenges that have pressed Europe since the end of the cold war.

NATO has admitted three new members from central and eastern Europe and has developed partnership relations with a number of countries of the former Soviet bloc. It has also adapted from a defensive mode to one capable of mounting limited peacemaking operations. Earlier in the decade, NATO could hardly conceive of such engagement to the point where a NATO spokesman admitted privately that involvement in Bosnia would be "the end of NATO".

The EU has now begun to think of itself as an instrument to promote security in a broad sense. It has already admitted three new members from northern and central Europe, is negotiating with six more aspirants and will likely expand that list soon. The mere possibility of EU membership has inspired several States in Europe to resolve potential disputes.

The WEU has become a link between NATO and the EU, which aspires to a common security vocation of its own. As the EU augments its role of promoting stability through economic development, the WEU will probably merge with it to become a vehicle for bringing about a "European Security and Defense Identity", or common defense policy. Less heralded but no less important has been the institutionalization of the OSCE through the establishment of a secretariat in Vienna and auxiliary offices elsewhere. The OSCE focuses on human rights and minority questions, parliamentary cooperation and so forth. It has special missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and a number of other less well-known trouble spots in Europe.

The end of the cold war, and the Kosovo crisis, have led to renewed and more intensive talk in Europe of an independent European security capability "separable from but not separate" from NATO. The idea is for Europe to have the ability to respond to a crisis affecting it, which the United States might not want to get directly involved in. This aim is also fuelled by a recurring wish that Europe could have a stronger voice when differences arise with the United States on how to respond in a given crisis. In any event, the drive for such an independent capability on the part of Europeans springs not only from such differences, but a desire to be able to do more on their own behalf. This will define the security agenda within Europe for the foreseeable future. Strengthened capabilities in high-tech warfare, intelligence, communications, airlift and so on, many feel, can enable Europeans to do more on their own, reducing dependence on American forces and views on tactics and diplomacy.

The conduct of the war in Kosovo, and the diplomacy that finally helped bring about a ceasefire there, brought numerous instances of European countries' disagreement with United States actions, although the NATO alliance hung together, just. The Kosovo experience has made Europeans face up to the fact of their military dependence on the United States. Of course, the United States itself, which has continually called upon Europeans to put more into defense, would welcome the development of a strengthened European security and defense capability-and even a more independent European security voice-if it produced a stronger, more effective European role in the NATO alliance.

The United States supplied 80 per cent of warplanes for the Kosovo operation and would be more than happy to see Europe take up a more effective effort on its own behalf. However, Americans also remain wary of anything that would undermine the United States influence, through NATO, in dealing with important security problems in Europe. Moreover, Washington might not be so happy when more confident Europeans took positions on particular issues at variance to those Washington-favoured. Yet, this may be the trade-off for Washington to gain a Europe that can "get its act together" and contribute more effectively in taking care of its own affairs and acting as a stronger supporting partner of the United States.

Please use this version of the article for printing.

Next Page of this article