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Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan
Briefing to the Security Council

Friday, 19 July 2002

Mr. President

It has been over five months since I last addressed the Security Council. I am heartened by your continued interest throughout this period, and the support you have provided for the work that the United Nations is trying to do in Afghanistan.

I am most grateful to my colleague Sir Kieran Prendergast, who has briefed you regularly on developments in Afghanistan. You have also seen the 11 July report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan. I am pleased, however, to have this opportunity to share with you a few impressions about where things currently stand and where we go from here.

So far, the peace process is on track. To be sure, it is a fragile peace, which must be handled with great care so that it does not unravel. But there are a few critical factors that give cause for cautious optimism.

First, the people of Afghanistan are truly tired of fighting. After 23 years in which they experienced every form of bloodshed and repression, and witnessed every kind of loss and destruction, Afghans are finally tasting peace, and most are determined to do everything in their power to avoid a relapse into war.

Second, while there are still many individuals and factions who seek power, and are perhaps ready to go to great lengths to achieve or hold on to it, no one has, so far, opted out of the peace process.

Third, the international community's interest in Afghanistan has not waned, despite the fact that there are many other crises and deserving causes elsewhere in the world.

We owe a particular debt of gratitude to the donor community for its invaluable assistance to the Interim Administration and its UN and NGO partners in the following areas:

· the successful campaign which has allowed over three million children to return to primary school;
· the return of over one million refugees and hundreds of thousands of IDPs;
· a modest but determined poppy eradication campaign;
· a successful locust control program in the north of the country; and
· a series of nationwide vaccination campaigns which reached millions of children. As a result of the patient and persistent work of the United Nations, we hope that polio will be eradicated completely in Afghanistan within two or three years.

And finally, all the deadlines set out in the Bonn Agreement have been met on time. Perhaps the most significant was the timely convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga - an event that many people doubted would ever take place. Indeed, the fact that it did take place, on schedule and without a single security incident, is a great achievement.

The Loya Jirga is a traditional institution which, historically, has not been very representative. This Loya Jirga, which took place only six months after the end of a long and bitter conflict, was not designed to be, nor could it realistically have been, a perfectly democratic or representative process.

It did, nevertheless, incorporate significant and innovative democratic elements. As a result, 2/3 of the 1,600 delegates who took part were actually selected by the people themselves, the members spanned every ethnic and political group, and 200 of them were women. There was no precedent for any of this in Afghanistan.

For more than a week, these delegates gathered together, in the absence of guns and bullets, to begin debating some of the most difficult and controversial issues facing the country, providing great hope for national reconciliation. In all of these senses, the Loya Jirga, even if it was not perfect, represents a significant step forward in the peace process.

Despite these achievements, countless challenges and problems remain. Foremost among these is security, which is one of the most critical requirements for a sustainable peace, but has remained elusive in many parts of the country.

The questions we had six months ago about how many members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are left in the country, and what kind of a threat they really pose to the stability of Afghanistan, remain unanswered. Until and unless we have evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these groups can still pose a threat.

In many regions of the country, security remains precarious. In the North, for example, the situation has seriously deteriorated in recent weeks, culminating in the tragic gang rape of a female aid worker last month. Since January, the United Nations has documented over 70 serious security incidents involving aid agencies or vulnerable groups. This list does not begin to capture the insecurity with which Afghans in certain regions of the country, who feel that they are permanently at the mercy of armed groups, have to live on a daily basis.

In the North, I have taken up this issue with the Commanders and made it clear to them that they bear the ultimate responsibility for bringing criminals and human rights violators to justice. I have also repeatedly conveyed the warning of the Secretary-General that continued insecurity is likely to discourage donors from investing in the region.

But the real key to the restoration of security lies in the creation of a national army and a national police force, along with a strong demobilisation programme. Equally important will be the proposed reform of the National Directorate for Security (NDS).

It is reported that a young man died last month in circumstances that were suspicious, to say the least, while he was in detention in the NDS. This is not acceptable in today's world and, more important, it is not acceptable to the people of Afghanistan, who need to feel protected, not threatened, by the intelligence and other security services in their country.

President Karzai has highlighted the establishment of the national army and police, and reform of the NDS, as being among his top priorities for the transitional period, but he will need a clear commitment from factional leaders, as well as much more determined and sustained support from the international community, in order to realize these objectives.

Our American and German partners have been doing very good work in training the army and police, respectively. But before rushing ahead with training, it is essential to ensure that a comprehensive strategy has been worked out for these institutions, of which training would be only one part - a strategy that needs to have the support both of the Transitional Administration and of donors. And it must be ensured that potential spoilers have been brought on board or otherwise neutralized. Failing that, a national system of security will not have any chance of success.

It is indispensable, for example, that plans are in place for the phasing out of those who currently call themselves soldiers and police, so that we do not simply create yet another police force and yet another army, in a country where too many such forces already exist.
It must be established that the relevant ministries are committed to pursuing sustainable methods of recruitment, and ensuring that the new forces are adequately armed and equipped. And it must be ensured that barracks are in place to house new trainees and that the resources are available to pay them over the long run.

For this, we will need to translate international commitments into concrete contributions, both to the Army Trust Fund, which UNAMA will manage, and to the Law and Order Trust Fund for police activities, which UNDP is managing.

All of this will take time, but it is time well spent, if it leads to the establishment of truly sustainable institutions. In the meantime, however, a real security void exists in the country, leaving many Afghans feeling vulnerable and uncertain about their own and their country's future.

We have recognized, time and time again, the dramatic improvement in security in Kabul in less than six months, thanks to the presence of ISAF. Every foreign delegation that has visited Kabul over the past few months has praised this progress, and acknowledged that the precarious security situation elsewhere in the country could hamper progress both on the political and recovery fronts.

And yet, there does not seem to be much support for the one measure that is certain to improve the security situation - namely, the expansion of ISAF to other parts of the country.

We continue to believe that the expansion of ISAF would have an enormous impact on security, and could be achieved with relatively few troops, at relatively little cost, and with little danger.
It had been suggested that alternative solutions for security might be proposed and considered pending the establishment of the national army and police. But no such ideas have been put forth and even the very modest arrangements which the Secretary-General had proposed in order to provide security during the Loya Jirga were not supported.

Mr. President --
The peace process has now entered a new phase and we must all turn to the important tasks ahead. During this transitional period, the Afghan leadership must translate the priorities that have been outlined by President Karzai into a set of achievable objectives, including good governance, development of key institutions and implementation of recovery and reconstruction projects. The international community must do what it can to help the Government function as a cohesive national unit that speaks with one voice.

The Transitional Authority must also proceed quickly to establish a Constitutional Commission to undertake the sensitive task of drafting the country's new Constitution.

With regard to the census, which was one of the requests made of the international community in the Bonn Agreement, experts have advised us that it could take anywhere from 3 to 5 years, and perhaps even longer, in the circumstances that exist in Afghanistan, to complete a census. Nevertheless, we are looking into whether this timeframe could be reduced if maximum resources were made available.

At the same time, the Electoral Division of DPA will soon undertake an assessment of what will be needed in order to start preparations for the national elections, also provided for in Bonn.

With regard to human rights and the justice sector, the Commissions prescribed in Bonn have been set up and we hope that they will soon be operational. Our objective is to assist in creating the conditions that will allow Afghans to take full charge of these issues.

Clearly, the international community will have to provide significant assistance - financial, technical and political - to help the Commissions carry out their difficult and sensitive tasks, which will be critical in restoring accountability and the rule of law in Afghanistan. However, the process must be led and implemented by Afghans.

Mr. President --
We must not forget that there is still a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, and that this crisis is likely to persist for some time.

We are facing funding shortfalls, but refugees are returning in record numbers, and the services that would allow them to resettle and reintegrate in their own towns and villages, instead of flocking to already overcrowded and overburdened urban centres, are mostly absent. Meanwhile, the drought continues and household food security is at risk. And a few months from now, millions of vulnerable Afghans will face another hard winter.

In addition to helping the Government of Afghanistan meet the humanitarian needs of its people, we must support sustainable recovery and reconstruction efforts. But recovery and reconstruction have been slow to materialize, and the pledges made in Tokyo have not yet translated into concrete improvements in the lives of ordinary people.

Meanwhile, the Transitional Administration anticipates a serious crisis with respect to its ability to cover recurrent expenditures beyond the next four to six months.

Thus, while recognizing that the donor community has been extremely generous to date, and while acknowledging that the impact of most recovery and reconstruction projects cannot be immediately visible, continued engagement and the urgent translation of pledges into commitments are essential. I know that our concerns on this issue are shared shared by ACBAR, the coordinating body for the most important Afghan and international NGOs working in Afghanistan.

The recent meetings in Europe of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering Group, the Afghanistan Support Group and the G-8 indicated that the donor community intends to stay the course and ensure that Afghanistan does not experience paralyzing delays in providing the bare necessities to its neediest regions and people.

Mr. President -
As far as the structure of UNAMA is concerned, the underlying philosophy of the mission remains the same: on the one hand, integration, so that political activities are linked to and informed by those in the relief, recovery and reconstruction sectors, as well as to the four cross-cutting areas: gender, human rights, rule of law and demobilisation.

On the other hand, the mission is to have a light expatriate footprint and strive to build Afghan capacities, so that Afghans can take over as many of the functions that we are now performing, as soon as possible.

 

Integration is already taking place, but we need to accelerate the pace. The different and sometimes contradictory rules, regulations and
cultures of the peacekeeping, political and assistance arms of the UN have made the already difficult integration process an even more challenging one.

This has been a learning process for us all, but I believe that the entire UN family is committed to our goal of ensuring that the UN's activities strengthen Afghan capacities -- not only our own institutional capabilities; and, second, that we are responsive to the priorities articulated in the Transitional Administration's National Development Framework - and not to our own agendas or priorities.

A great deal of hard work has been done to develop a clear strategic direction for all of our recovery, relief and reconstruction activities. The appointment, in May, of Programme Secretariats, was an essential element in the effort to bring together agencies and donors into Programme Groups, and help the Administration know what resources are coming into the country, and who is doing what, where.

But better management and circulation of information remains a major challenge on which UNAMA has to work with its partners in the weeks and months ahead.

As far as the light footprint is concerned, progress has been made, but I believe that we must continue to make the delivery of services to the people of Afghanistan even more cost-effective. Each part of the UN system must, therefore, continuously ask itself whether its involvement in a particular sector is based on the fact that it has a comparative advantage to offer.

The Transitional Authority is concerned that donors remain reluctant to contribute significant financial resources directly to the national budget, while they continue to channel much of their assistance through the UN and NGOs.

A core element of UNAMA's role during the next eighteen months will be to assist in building national capacity and confidence in governance systems so that international assistance will flow more directly to the Afghan Administration and civil society organizations, making the UN presence lighter and more effective. This has already been accomplished in the field of de-mining, and sets a very strong and encouraging example for the rest of the UN family.

In order to achieve this across the board, we plan to give maximum emphasis to supporting capacity development within central and provincial administrations, thereby increasing the number of Afghan professionals in the UN system. This should go a long way toward achieving the objectives upon which the structure of UNAMA was based.

Mr. President --
The late Haji Abdul Qadir played an extremely positive role during the Loya Jirga, and the support he provided in his native Jalalabad was decisive in making the preparatory phase highly successful.

We had been looking forward to his contribution in the next stage of the peace process, as Vice-President of the Transitional Administration. He will be sorely missed.

His tragic assassination serves as a reminder that, whatever successes we may have witnessed so far in Afghanistan, a single act or event can send fear down the spines of the most powerful people in Afghanistan, and has the potential to seriously destabilize the situation.

So far, we have been lucky, for there have been few such events. But as the peace process moves forward, we must be prepared for further setbacks, and perhaps even crises, for a situation as complex as Afghanistan defies quick and easy resolution. And the response to tragedies such as the assassination of Haji Qadir should be more determined cooperation with the Afghan people and those leaders who are dedicated to the peace process.

Mr. Ashraf Ghani, the new Minister of Finance of Afghanistan, reminded us at the ASG meeting in Geneva last week that, following the establishment of the Transitional Administration, Afghanistan is at a crossroads. We have encountered many other crossroads in the months since Bonn, and I hope that we have taken the right turn most of the time.

The challenge before us now is to prove to the people of Afghanistan that we will not disengage until we have made good on our promises to them, and that we will not allow setbacks to reverse our course. We owe this to the Afghan people, and to regional and global security, for we know all too well that instability in that remote part of the world can have grave repercussions far beyond the borders of Afghanistan.

Thank you, Mr. President