Report of
The Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq

20 October 2003
**Acknowledgement**

The Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of the United Nations Personnel in Iraq wishes to express its appreciation for the support and availability of UN staff in New York, Amman, Geneva and Baghdad. The Panel was given access to individuals with whom it requested to meet. It was also given access to all essential documents related to the security of staff.

The Panel acknowledges and commends the dedication of the United Nations national and international staff working for a more peaceful, just and democratic world, often in difficult and high-risk environments. It sees UN staff as the Organization’s most precious resource, a human interface amid conflicts and tensions, promoting human rights and dignity. The Panel remembers those who have given their lives or were injured in United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, particularly in the bomb attacks in Baghdad on 19 August and 22 September 2003.
Executive summary

On 19 August 2003, the United Nations headquarters in the Canal Hotel in Baghdad suffered a devastating bomb attack. The detonation resulted in the death of 22 United Nations staff and visitors, and over 150 persons were injured. The United Nations carried out an internal investigation in the field. On 22 September 2003, Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan appointed an Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq. The Panel was asked to examine all relevant facts about the situation before the 19 August attack, the circumstances of the attack itself and the actions taken by different parties in the immediate aftermath. The Panel was also asked to identify key lessons on security arrangements and to make recommendations on measures that would assist in preventing or mitigating future incidents in Iraq or other high-risk missions. (See annex I of this report, “Terms of Reference of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel in Iraq”)

The Panel interviewed a large number of UN staff, in particular security staff, in New York, Amman, Baghdad and Geneva, as well as representatives of the Coalition Forces, the Coalition Provisional Authority and non-governmental organizations operating in Iraq. It visited the site of the attack and collected information on ongoing investigations by the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi police.

The report of the Panel assesses the adequacy of arrangements for and fulfilment of responsibility within the United Nations both at Headquarters and in the field and by the Coalition forces for the safety and security of United Nations personnel in Iraq. The report explores some of the policy issues and dilemmas associated with the security of UN personnel and provides practical recommendations for improving UN security management and arrangements, with a view to preventing as much as possible such tragedies and limiting their impact on UN staff.

In the view of the Panel, the UN security management system failed in its mission to provide adequate security to UN staff in Iraq. The failure of UN management and staff to comply with standard security regulations and directives left the UN open and vulnerable to the type of attack that was perpetrated on 19 August 2003. In particular, the UN security system failed adequately to analyse and utilize information made available to the system on threats against UN staff and premises. The security awareness within the country team did not match the hostile environment. The observance and implementation of security regulations and procedures were sloppy and non-compliance with security rules commonplace. Adequate security arrangements may not have been able to prevent the attack against the Canal Hotel perimeter, but would certainly have minimized the vulnerability of the staff and premises and reduced the number of casualties caused by the attack.

The main conclusion of the Panel is that the current security management system is dysfunctional. It provides little guarantee of security to UN staff in Iraq or other high-risk environments and needs to be reformed. The challenge of security of UN staff in crisis zones in the current world requires the highest level of professionalism and expertise from the security management. The current system is not able to provide this expertise. The new system should have a clear chain of command, an audit trail, extensive information management

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capabilities and clear division of labour and coordination. Adequate financial resources for the UN security management to act in a timely and effective manner should be available.

**A major deficiency identified by the Panel is the lack of accountability for the decisions and positions taken by UN managers with regard to the security of UN staff.** The United Nations needs a new culture of accountability in security management. Personal accountability of those entrusted with the safety of personnel as well as all staff in the field for their compliance with security rules should be paramount. In the case of Iraq, the Panel is of the view that the seriousness of the breaches in the UN security rules and procedures in the field and at Headquarters warrants a separate and independent audit process.

**There is no place without risk in Iraq. A new security approach is needed in order to ensure staff security in such a high-risk environment.** The key objective for the UN system in these circumstances is to reach and maintain an acceptable balance between UN operational objectives in Iraq and the security and protection of its staff and assets, both national and international. Before the decision to resume the activities in Iraq is made, a thorough and professional security assessment should be undertaken in order to determine whether the return of international staff is possible and, if so, under what kind of security arrangements. These arrangements should be set in place prior to the return of UN staff.

The Panel feels strongly that these principles should be applied to all UN missions.
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1 Background of the work of the Independent Panel

On 19 August 2003, the United Nations headquarters in the Canal Hotel in Baghdad suffered a devastating bomb attack. The detonation resulted in the death of 22 United Nations staff and visitors, and over 150 persons were injured. The Canal Hotel suffered significant structural damage, and vehicles and other United Nations property were damaged as well. A second bomb attack against the UN headquarters on 22 September killed a UN security guard and two local police officers.

Following the attack on 19 August, the United Nations carried out an internal investigation. In the view of the gravity of the attack and, the potential conflict of interest within the UN security management, the Secretary-General decided to call for an Independent Panel to examine the incident further and to complement the findings of the internal investigation.

On 22 September 2003, Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan appointed Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland, to chair an Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq. Mr. Ahtisaari selected Mr. Peter Fitzgerald, Deputy Commissioner of the Irish National Police, Brigadier-General Jaakko Oksanen of the Finnish Army, and Mr. Claude Bruderlein, Director of the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, to join him on the Panel. They were assisted by Mr. Kevin Carty, Assistant Commissioner of the Irish National Police, Lieutenant-Colonel Raimo Koskela of the Finnish Army and Ms. Kristiina Rinkineva, Director of Crisis Management Capabilities Programme at the Crisis Management Initiative.

The Panel was asked to examine all relevant facts about the security situation in Iraq before the attack, the UN security mechanisms, procedure and measures in place, the circumstances of the attack itself and the actions taken by different parties in the immediate aftermath. The Panel’s report was expected to give a detailed account of a range of issues including, but not limited to, security relations between the United Nations and the Coalition Provisional Authority as well as responsibilities within the United Nations relating to staff security, both at Headquarters and in the field (see annex I, “Terms of Reference of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel in Iraq”).

The Panel was also asked to look forward and identify key lessons for future security management and arrangements, with a view to preventing further such tragedies in high-risk missions, or at least limiting their effects.

1.1 Methodology

The Panel started working on 24 September 2003. The Chair of the Panel and the police and military experts conducted a field trip to Amman, Baghdad and Geneva from 4 to 14 October 2003. The panellists were able to call on the assistance of other experts as and when they found it necessary. The panellists were independent of the Secretariat and from all the other UN bodies and were able to interview any staff member in full confidentiality, and they had access to all necessary documents, including the internal investigation report on the 19 August attack and other reports, minutes of meetings and so on.
The Panel interviewed a large number of people both at Headquarters and in the field in Amman, Baghdad and Geneva. This group consisted of those involved in the security management and decision-making at different levels of the command chain; members of senior management in the United Nations headquarters, particularly members of the Steering Group for Iraq, the representatives from the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) both in New York and Baghdad, national and international staff members present in Baghdad during the attack, Staff Union representatives, representatives of CPA, Coalition Forces, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation and local Iraqi police, as well as members of NGOs operating in Iraq and diplomats.

The Panel examined the report of the initial investigation of the 19 August attack that was carried out as part of the responsibilities of UNSECOORD to conduct investigations into deaths of staff members of the UN system under malicious circumstances. The Panel recognizes the quality and professionalism of the initial investigation and shares many of its findings.

1.2 Mandate for UN presence and activities in Iraq

The current UN presence in Iraq is based on the mandate granted to the United Nations by Security Council resolution (SCR) 1483 adopted on 22 May 2003 and on SCR 986 of 14 April 1995 establishing the "oil-for-food" Programme. These resolutions have been complemented by SCR 1500 of 14 August 2003 establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and SCR 1511 of 16 October 2003, which authorizes the deployment of a multinational force to contribute to the security of UN personnel in Iraq, among other duties.

SCR 1483 confirms that the United States and the United Kingdom are occupying Powers in Iraq. It specifically calls upon them to comply fully with the obligations imposed by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague regulations of 1907 on occupying forces and calls on them to work towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability in Iraq. It further calls for the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future.

The resolution also provides for the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq (SRSG), with responsibilities relating, among others, to coordinating humanitarian and reconstruction activities, promoting the return of refugees, economic reconstruction and the protection of human rights, encouraging other restorative efforts and working intensively with the occupying Powers to establish the necessary institutions for representative governance in Iraq.1

The United Nations has been present in Iraq for over 40 years with various development programmes. Its humanitarian activities accelerated in the mid-1990s when it undertook the monitoring and implementation of the oil-for-food programme established under SCR 986 of 14 April 1995. During that period, the United Nations provided Iraq with an opportunity to sell oil to finance the purchase of humanitarian goods, and mandated various activities concerning Iraq. The Programme, which is still in place but should be terminated by 21 November 2003 upon the request of the

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1 See paragraph 8 of SCR 1483 of 22 May 2003.


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Security Council,\textsuperscript{2} was intended to be a temporary measure to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. This operation counts among the largest endeavours in the history of the United Nations in terms of financial means, logistics, and staff involved. During that period, the United Nations also undertook several weapons inspection programmes requested by the Security Council, as well as implementing various development and humanitarian activities.

\textbf{2 \hspace{1mm} Mechanisms within the United Nations on the safety and security of staff}

The primary responsibility for the security and protection of UN national and international staff members rests with the host Government. This responsibility flows from the inherent function of government of maintaining law and order, as well as from the special responsibility enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{3} Under occupation, occupying forces carry definite responsibilities for the security of UN staff and premises located in the territories under their control, as derived from article 43 of the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 and SCR 1483, 1502 and 1511.\textsuperscript{4}

In spite of these responsibilities, there may be instances where the security and protection factors will be uncertain. To deal with these situations, the bodies of the United Nations have put in place a system for planning and managing security issues which is aimed at ensuring that there is a coordinated approach for the protection of staff.

In the United Nations, security systems are managed by four separate structures:

1) the Office of United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), which operates on behalf of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMIN) composed of representatives of security management of all UN agencies, funds and programmes;

2) The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which manages the security of peacekeeping operations;

3) The Safety and Security Service (S&SS), which manages the security of UN major headquarters around the world, and the close protection of senior UN staff members;

4) UN agencies, funds and programmes, which operate parallel security management structures within their operations.

\textsuperscript{2} See paragraph 16 of SCR 1483 of 22 May 2003.
\textsuperscript{3} See Article 105 of the UN Charter. Additional diplomatic privileges are accorded to UN staff members and premises in times of international crisis by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies and, more explicitly, by the Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel.
\textsuperscript{4} Article 43 of the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 reads: \textit{The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.}

SCR 1483, paragraphs 4 and 5, and SCR 1502, paragraph 4, recall the international obligations of the Coalition Forces to restore the necessary conditions of security and stability in Iraq and to promote the safety, security and movement of UN personnel and their assets.

\textsuperscript{3} Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of the UN Personnel in Iraq
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These four systems are intended to be linked by formal and informal networks to work in a coordinated way.

The Chief Executives Board (CEB), chaired by the Secretary-General, has established a system of governance of security management for the United Nations system as a whole, through the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM). Under this system, an Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMIN) has been established, which reports to HLCM. The IASMIN is mandated to monitor the implementation of UN security management policies, practices and procedures by all actors of the UN system, and to report to HLCM.

Security standards and procedures are described in the *UN Field Security Handbook* as well as a number of UN internal publications (see annex II, “The United Nations Security Management System”, for a summary of the current security procedures and standards, as well as location of responsibilities).

In addition to the Handbook, the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, "A framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system", which was approved by the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh, identifies a single chain of command which delineates responsibilities for security by every individual in the security management system.

According to the *Field Security Handbook*, the United Nations Security Coordinator acts on behalf of the Secretary-General to ensure a coherent response by the United Nations to any emergency situation and is responsible for all policy and procedural matters related to security matters. In each mission, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the executive heads of agencies, appoints one senior official as the Designated Official (DO) for Security. The DO is provided with security advice by the Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO) named and supervised by UNSECOORD.

Security standards are established at the field level on the basis of criteria set up at UN Headquarters in New York. These standards constitute the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) and are specific to each location.

2.1 Personal responsibility and accountability

UN staff bear an individual responsibility to follow and implement security instructions, including the MOSS and other security procedures.

According to the Charter of the United Nations, the staff is appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly. Staff members are accountable to the Secretary-General for the proper discharge of their functions. Staff members are required to uphold the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity in carrying out their functions.

Their performance is appraised periodically to ensure that the required standards of performance are met. Staff regulations include special provisions for disciplinary

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5 See UN document A/57/365
6 See paragraph 5 of the *UN Field Security Handbook*. 

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measures in cases of misconduct. Only the Secretary-General can initiate an accountability investigation. For the purposes of strengthening accountability in the Secretariat, a Panel has been established in the latest reform to advise him. The Panel is chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General. It should ensure that the findings of its oversight bodies, such as systemic management weaknesses and irregularities, are addressed in a systematic manner.

2.2 Insurance for malicious acts

Those staff members required to work at hazardous duty stations identified by the United Nations Security Coordinator are covered by Malicious Acts Insurance. This policy was put in place in response to a ruling by the ILO Administrative Tribunal that adjudged that organizations bear responsibility for the assignment or travel of staff members to potentially dangerous areas and ruled that an employee is not obliged to run abnormal risks for the benefit of his/her employer, at any rate, unless he/she is given adequate insurance coverage. (See annex III, "What is Malicious Acts Insurance)

UNSECOORD at Headquarters and the field has frequently used the insurance coverage as a point of leverage on staff and agencies for system-wide compliance to UN security procedures. The threat of withdrawal of insurance coverage is particularly common to ensure compliance with security clearance procedures by UN agencies. In this context, non-compliance with UN security rules would result in the withdrawal of insurance coverage for the concerned staff. In reality, the threat has had only a poor deterrent effect on UN staff as, in the very few exceptions where non-compliance resulted in the withdrawal of coverage by the insurance underwriters, the UN agencies offered equivalent benefits to the beneficiaries of the insurance.

3 Relationship between the United Nations and the Coalition in the field

In each country, the primary responsibility for the security and protection of staff members of the United Nations and their spouses and dependants rests with the host Government. In the case of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority, as the occupying power, bears this responsibility until the restoration of an internationally recognized Iraqi Government.

It is a custom that a Memorandum of Understanding is signed between the host country and the United Nations further describing the obligations and privileges of each party in terms of presence and security of UN staff.

In Iraq, there was no formal agreement on the security arrangements between the UN and CPA or Coalition Forces, but a number of exchanges on this issue took place between the United Nations and both the United States and United Kingdom missions in New York, and representatives of the occupying forces in Iraq.

A central element of the relationship between the United Nations and the host Government is the sharing of information about the security conditions in the operating environment of the United Nations, in particular about potential threats towards the UN staff and premises. In the case of Iraq, these exchanges took place
at the field level and consisted mostly of open source information. The SRSG had on his staff a Military Adviser who ensured the liaison with the Coalition Forces. Although he was not allowed to participate in the Coalition Forces security briefings, the Military Adviser received in an ad hoc manner security-related information, which he passed on to UN security officers. After the attack on 19 August, the Coalition Forces revised his security clearance and he was allowed to participate in Coalition Forces security briefings on a daily basis. The advisory function of the Military Adviser focuses on the general operating and policy environment of the United Nations. It does not include responsibilities regarding the security of staff. The UN Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO) in charge of advising the Designated Official on the security of UN staff and premises did not have formal liaison arrangements with the Coalition Forces.

In this context, the relationship between the United Nations and the Coalition Forces regarding the security of UN staff and premises remained ambiguous. Although there were clear needs for security arrangements and Coalition Forces/CPA was formally responsible for the security UN staff in Iraq, members of UN senior management in Baghdad felt uncomfortable because of the visible presence of Coalition Forces elements in and around the UN Canal Hotel compound. On several occasions, they asked the Coalition Forces to remove protective positions and equipment around the perimeter of the Canal Hotel without requesting alternative security arrangements.

4 Analysis of the security of United Nations personnel in Iraq

The objective of this section is to review and analyse the implementation of security measures to ensure the safety of UN personnel in Iraq since April 2003. The section has been divided in four segments, the first three covering the period from the return of the UN country team to Baghdad until early October 2003, the fourth one focusing on lessons learned.

4.1 Review of the situation prior to the evacuation in March 2003

From the outset, it should be noted that the United Nations has been in Iraq for over 40 years. Over the past decade, the United Nations has developed one of its largest operations ever under the sanctions regime to monitor compliance with the requests of the UN Security Council regarding disarmament of Iraq, the oil-for food programme, which manages over US$ 250 million per month of assistance, and other humanitarian and development programmes. Throughout these years, the United Nations maintained a large group of international staff and employed over 4,000 national staff. Due to the impending conflict between the United States-led coalition and Iraq, the Secretary-General decided on 17 March 2003 to order the evacuation of all UN international staff from Iraq. At that time there were a total of 387 international staff in the country, including agencies’ staff and the weapons inspectors and related support staff. The evacuation was completed on 18 March 2003.

Prior to the evacuation, the Canal Hotel in Baghdad served as headquarters for United Nations activities in Iraq. It was protected by a considerable presence of Iraqi military personnel, who maintained security around the perimeter of the compound. The Iraqi military operated outside of the compound but close to the perimeter.
Locally recruited unarmed guards provided additional security as well as screening capabilities at points of entry and within the compound.

It is generally accepted that the Iraqi regime of the time provided acceptable protection to the United Nations. There was no security threat against UN staff. The United Nations had in place an evacuation plan and security procedures appear to have been well applied. At the time of evacuation the situation in relation to the United Nations was stable, with a low threat assessment.

At a meeting of the senior management Steering Group on Iraq on 14 March, it was agreed to await recommendations from UNSECOORD and the Humanitarian Coordinator before the redeployment of international staff to Baghdad. It was also agreed that possible options should be explored, including a proposal from the Humanitarian Coordinator to deploy a team in Ramadi, in the vicinity of Baghdad, which could be used as a base for initial security assessment and humanitarian operations in Baghdad. Once the airport was secured by the Coalition Forces and after a first ICRC flight to Baghdad, the United Nations requested from United States Central Military Command (CENTCOM) flight clearance for a UN team to return to Baghdad by air.

On 24 March, the Humanitarian Coordinator reported to the SGI that 28 international staff had crossed into northern Iraq earlier that day, bringing the total number of international staff in the Northern Governorates to 34, but no firm indications from CENTCOM had been received yet in response to the earlier request for flight clearance to Baghdad.

At the meeting of the SGI on 28 March, in the absence of a formal response from CENTCOM granting security clearance and taking into account that the United States could take another two weeks to declare Baghdad as “permissive”, the Humanitarian Coordinator recommended that a team of 18 UN international staff travel to Baghdad on 1 May. The team would be headed by the Humanitarian Coordinator and would include members of the core management of the UN country team and support staff, including a total of seven security staff, four from UNSECOORD and three from UN agencies. The Canal Hotel would be used both as office and as living quarters. The Steering Group endorsed the Humanitarian Coordinator’s recommendations.

It should be noted that the SGI which is composed of heads of agencies and departments, does not have official responsibilities in terms of UN security management or clearances. Chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General (DSG), its purpose is to provide a sharing mechanism and forum for discussion on UN operations in Iraq. However, as the operations evolved, the SGI came to play a decision-making role, as most of the heads of the departments and agencies attended the SGI meetings regularly. The DSG, according to her own understanding, often represented the Secretary-General in providing authority to the SGI decisions. Notwithstanding the growing role of the SGI, the key decision regarding the return of the UN country team to Baghdad was approved by the Secretary-General. The Humanitarian Coordinator was notified by UNSECOORD the same day that he could proceed. There is no record of a security assessment prior to the return of the UN staff to Baghdad nor of discussions at the SGI of the security implications and requirements of this decision.
On 1 May, the Humanitarian Coordinator and the UN team of 21 staff returned to Baghdad from Amman. They travelled in a convoy of eight vehicles, having advised the Coalition Forces of their intended route.

4.2 Security of personnel between 1 May and 19 August

4.2.1 Operational environment of the United Nations in Iraq

At the time of the return of the country team, military operations were being conducted in Baghdad and other areas of the country. Although the former regime was clearly defeated, there were pockets of resistance as well as a very high level of insecurity due to the collapse of the former police and security system, generating chaos and violence, looting and other criminal activities.

In these circumstances, the Coalition established a system of clearances regarding the deployment of humanitarian organizations. Under this system, there were three types of operational environments identified in Iraq which are intended for use between the Coalition Forces and humanitarian assistance organizations. For each, precautionary measures were specified.7

These environments were identified as:

1) **Hostile**: Humanitarian assistance organizations should not enter these areas.
2) **Uncertain**: Humanitarian assistance organizations can only have access to these areas with military escort.
3) **Permissive**: Humanitarian assistance organizations can have access to these areas but should use all precautionary measures and notify the Coalition Forces.

At the time of the return of the UN team, the operational environment in Baghdad was clearly defined as “Hostile”, due to the prevailing military activities and the chaotic situation. It had changed dramatically from the time of evacuation on 18 March, as Baghdad was now effectively a combat zone. Despite the hostile environment, the risk factor of direct targeting of the United Nations at the time of re-entry was deemed to be low by the UN. The risk of being in the wrong place at the wrong time was deemed to be high.

As time progressed, the security environment deteriorated further and attacks against the Coalition Forces increased in number and sophistication. However, with regard to UN security, the period between 1 May and early June was relatively calm, with no serious incidents reported.

This situation contrasts drastically with the period between 1 June and 19 July, with the increase of UN staff presence and operations in the country and the arrival of the...
SRSG and his team. In the course of that period, there were 15 incidents which affected the operations of the UN. These ranged from rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks on the World Food Programme and International Organization for Migration offices in Mosul to gunfire directed into the United Nations Development Programme compound in Baghdad. There are no records of discussions of the deterioration of the security situation at the senior management level or the SGI until 1 July, when the SGI noted the need to reduce the number of staff because of the security situation.

4.2.2 Security of staff

The speed of the UN return to Iraq did not allow for any professional security assessment, despite the considerable alteration in the operational environment and the possible consequences of engaging in a non-permissive area. It also militated against other security considerations in relation to route planning and convoy size for the return journey.

On arrival in Baghdad, the Humanitarian Coordinator convened a Security Management Team (SMT) meeting with the heads of agencies that returned to Baghdad with him. The SMT decided to recommend to the Secretary-General an immediate update to security phase IV for the city, under which the UN international staff should be limited strictly to the involvement in emergency or humanitarian relief operations or security matters. The recommendation was accompanied by caveats that related to travel, staff ceilings, accommodation, and MOSS compliance.

UNSECOORD personnel in Baghdad set up a Security Information Centre, which was tasked with the collection of open information from a variety of sources. Some of the UN agencies’ security officers contributed actively to this office and assisted in the preparation of the daily security updates, which were used to inform the SMT and were distributed to UN staff throughout the country. It should be noted that there are no clear guidelines as to the chain of command or reporting procedures between UNSECOORD personnel and the security staff from the different agencies.

The concerns over the overstretching of the capacity of the security team grew considerably in June with the arrival of new staff almost on a daily basis, many of whom clearly did not fit the criteria of phase IV. In the course of this period, particularly with the arrival of the SRSG and his team, the existing security team was overwhelmed with administrative and bureaucratic functions and unable to discharge its security-related responsibilities properly, particularly in terms of threat assessments.

At the SMT meeting of 30 June 2003, it was agreed to establish a staff ceiling of 200 international staff in Baghdad. This figure was considered by the SMT to be manageable with the existing security capacities and a willingness of staff to accept a high level of risk. Agencies were requested to provide staff numbers immediately so that a determination of staff cuts could be properly made. The DO took sole responsibility for security clearance requests. Because the DO directly managed security clearance, the FSCO did not have direct access to staff numbers and was unable to provide accurate figures. The DO was reportedly under constant pressure from agencies and UNSECOORD at UN Headquarters in New York to provide security clearances to non-essential staff, particularly after the arrival of the SRSG’s political
team, whose operational objectives are barely justified under the criteria of security phase IV. Once exceptions were made for the SRSG team, it became hard to reject demands from other UN entities for security clearances.

At the time of the attack on the Canal Hotel, staff numbers had in fact risen to approximately 350, which is considered to be a conservative estimate. Independent estimates put UN staff numbers in Baghdad as high as 550, with possibly 900 in the country. At the same time, there was only one core UNSECOORD post supported by five extrabudgetary posts in Baghdad. In addition, there were approximately 15 agency security staff, giving a total number of approximately 20 professional security staff for the whole country.

The fact that some agencies were in blatant non-compliance in relation to staff lists led to a difficult situation on 19 August when no one could give accurate numbers of the staff in the Canal Hotel or account for other staff in the country who could be in danger and might need to be evacuated.

Apart from the number of staff in Iraq, the UN security team was concerned by the significant number of agencies that were not MOSS-compliant. The SMT decided that all agencies must attain full MOSS compliance by 12 July 2003 or they would be required to leave the country. Few, if any, of the agencies appeared to take the appropriate action, and MOSS compliance was not achieved. The announced consequences were not initiated and those organizations continued to operate in Iraq.

On 2 June, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello with his staff and close security detail arrived in Baghdad. The SRSG moved into a second-floor office that overlooked the access road to the catering college on the south west corner of the building. Prior to his arrival, a team from the S&SS in New York had carried out a security assessment, including a risk analysis. Their terms of reference were strictly limited to assessing the potential threats to the SRSG and not to the United Nations in general. The report concluded that the risk of the SRSG being a direct target of attack was low. However, the team judged the risk to the SRSG to be high if he would be in the wrong place at the wrong time, as assessment similar to that for UN staff generally.

The assessment recommended a Close Protection Team (CPT) of one supervisor and 10 members. The S&SS approved the proposal and the team was deployed. It should be noted that the S&SS and CPT team were concerned about the location of the SRSG office and suggested moving it to a different part of the building. The SRSG declined and stated that he would leave the matter to his successor.

As the number of staff increased, the staff began to take up residence in hotels in Baghdad. Staff interviewed by the Panel stated that they felt extremely vulnerable in the hotels in Baghdad, as frequent shootings occurred in front of the hotels and they were not provided with adequate protection.

It is apparent that many staff members who were present in Baghdad at the time of the attack were not adequately trained or prepared for deployment in a combat zone. It is also apparent that before the attack some staff ignored basic security instructions in relation to communications, travel and attending security briefings. Several agencies paid scant regard to basic security issues like the completion of the
CD-ROM on basic security and MOSS compliance. This made it extremely difficult for the UNSECOORD staff to carry out their functions.

4.2.3 Security of premises

When the United Nations returned to Baghdad, the Canal Hotel was occupied by the 2nd US Armored Cavalry Regiment of the Coalition Forces. UNSECOORD contacted the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations in New York regarding the occupation of the UN compound and requested that the troops be moved to the outside perimeter of the Canal Hotel. At the request of the DO, a platoon from the Regiment’s anti-aircraft unit remained to provide perimeter security. Based on the tasking, one Air Defense Avenger platoon\(^8\) plus additional maintenance personnel were assigned the security mission. The platoon’s mission was to augment UN security personnel and to provide a Coalition presence. It had no authority to search vehicles or personnel entering the compound. It was the UN-employed unarmed local security guards who performed those functions.

The platoon carried out its mission in the following manner:

- One Anti-Aircraft Avenger with crew was posted at the front gate from 0700 to 1900. From 1900 to 0700 hours the front gates of the compound were secured and the Avenger system stayed in place.
- A second Anti-Aircraft Avenger with crew was posted at the back gate of the compound 24 hours a day to control access and security for the rear entrance.
- A third Anti-Aircraft Avenger manned a third position north-west of the Civil Military Operations Centre, directly behind the UN compound, with a crew, from 0200 to 0500 hours.
- In addition, the platoon also maintained a roving guard from 0200 to 0500 that conducted patrols in the vicinity of the compound and manned observation posts on top of the UN building and troop billets in order to keep watch and to provide early warning for the entire compound.

To enhance the protection of the Canal Hotel compound, United States military personnel established an observation outpost on the roof of the hotel and placed a five-ton truck to block access to a service road that runs parallel to the western perimeter wall of the Canal Hotel compound. The road gives access to a catering college at the Institute of Tourism that is directly to the rear of the compound. (See annex IV, map of the Canal Hotel area.)

UN senior management in Baghdad was uneasy with this highly visible military presence. According to the United States officer in charge of the security arrangements around the Canal Hotel, UN senior management asked the Coalition Forces to withdraw their heavy equipment from the front of the compound, dismantle the observation post on the roof top of the building and remove the obstacle on the access road because the United Nations did not own the property. No alternative security measures were requested. Later, the United States military laid concertina wire across the access road, but again the United Nations requested that the

\(^{8}\) An Air Defense Avenger platoon consists of up to 30 soldiers equipped with several armoured vehicles and anti-aircraft missile launchers mounted on heavy military vehicles.

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obstructions be removed. The access road was open to traffic on 19 August and was used by the attackers to approach and target the UN building.

The inner perimeter of the Canal Hotel complex was guarded by locally recruited unarmed UN security guards. Their main task was to check incoming traffic and maintain a night watch on the premises.

The reluctance of the United Nations to request additional protection from Coalition Forces does not imply that UN staff were unaware of the vulnerability of the Canal Hotel to attacks. On the contrary, from early on, UN security staff in Baghdad and the SMT recognized the vulnerability of the Canal Hotel to attacks, particularly bomb and RPG attacks. The SMT discussed in June and July plans for the fitting of glass fragmentation retention film for the windows of the Canal Hotel and the extension of the perimeter wall around the complex.

The purchasing and fittings of anti-blast film were discussed repeatedly at SMT meetings. However, administrative obstacles appear to have delayed the purchase of the material. As the name suggests, the film is designed to prevent the fragmentation and dispersion of glass that may cause severe injuries in the event of a bomb blast. It is marketed under various brand names. In an attempt to expedite this urgent requirement, WFP offered to provide the funding and material for fitting the windows of the Canal Hotel. The offer was rejected by the UN administration because it had commenced a tendering process to purchase the material. On 19 August, the windows of the Canal Hotel were still not fitted with the necessary material, and the fragmentation and dispersion of glass resulting from the explosion contributed greatly to the number of casualties. An ultraviolet-type film was fitted to the windows of the cafeteria, but this did not offer protection against a bomb blast.

Regarding the perimeter wall, following the discussions at the SMT, a wall was built on the western side of the Canal Hotel complex adjacent to the catering school service road in June 2003. It was built to a height of 4 metres from the Canal Road entrance to a passageway that led to the front of the Canal Hotel. This entrance was approximately 15 metres wide and was sealed with steel fencing to prevent access from the service road. Immediately after the fencing, the wall recommenced at a height of 2.20 metres at the south-west corner of the building. It continued at a height of 2.20 metres for a distance of approximately 10 metres at which point it was again built to a height of 4 metres and continued at that height to the rear of the building. (See annex 4, map of the Canal Hotel area.)

The 2.20 metres portion of the wall corresponded with a portion of the front of the building that protruded towards the service road and was not in alignment with the main structure. It is significant and coincidental that this area was immediately below and to the front of the office occupied by the SRSG. It was at this point that the bomb was detonated. It was intended to build the wall to a uniform height of 4 metres but this work had not commenced by 19 August. The wall was built of hollow concrete blocks within a metre of the building and was designed to deter intruders to the complex rather than to provide any fortified protection against explosive devices.

4.3 The deteriorating security conditions and the attack on 19 August
As mentioned earlier, the security situation in Iraq deteriorated drastically in the period from June to August 2003. The number of attacks perpetrated against the Coalition Forces in Iraq rose from 117 in May to 307 in June, 451 in July and 318 in August. This deterioration is well reflected in the daily security updates that were prepared by UNSECOORD staff. These reports reflect:

- Extensive use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs);
- The bombing of the Jordanian Embassy on 7 August;
- Several attacks on NGO and ICRC personnel.

On 10 and 11 August, information became available to the UN security team in Baghdad of an imminent bomb attack in the Canal Road area of Baghdad. The target or method of delivery of the attack was not indicated. It was also reported that other information was available around mid-July that the UN headquarters in Baghdad was under threat from a group loyal to the former regime.

An analysis of the escalation, increasing sophistication and target selection for the period indicates a rapid deterioration in the UN security environment. UN daily security updates for July and August reflected the increasing frequency and sophistication of attacks on the Coalition Forces. In early August, the CPA reported intelligence that fighters from Ansar al-Islam were now in Iraq, where they were planning large-scale terrorist attacks. On 7 August, a car bomb was detonated outside the Jordanian Embassy in central Baghdad, killing 18 people. The attack on the Jordanian Embassy was a defining moment in the deteriorating environment in Baghdad. It gave a message that armed elements were prepared to mount and were capable of mounting suicide attacks on targets which were not part of the Coalition but were perceived as supporting or facilitating it.

The UN daily security updates for 18 and 19 August indicate a growing concern for the security of UN staff. The update for 19 August refers specifically to dangers of attacks with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by means of car or truck bombs. However, UN management did not interpret the information in this way and did not take adequate increased measures to protect its staff and premises.

At approximately 1630 hours local time on Tuesday, 19 August, a flatbed truck carrying an estimated 1,000 Kilograms of high explosives was detonated on the service road to the catering college adjacent to the south-west corner of the Canal Hotel. The blast spread of shrapnel, falling masonry and flying glass took a devastating toll on the occupants of the Canal Hotel and resulted in the death of 22 persons, with over 150 sustaining injuries, some extremely serious. SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello was among those killed as a result of the explosion. The bomb had exploded immediately below his office, which was almost totally demolished in the blast.

The Canal Hotel building sustained severe structural damage, as did the Spinal Injury Hospital, which is situated on the other side of the service road directly opposite the Canal Hotel. The blast waves also severely damaged other UN structures and a fleet of vehicles in the compound.
It is believed that the truck approached the Canal Hotel from the west-bound carriageway of the Canal Road dual carriageway, which runs along the perimeter of the Canal Hotel. To get to its target, the truck had to turn into the service road to the catering college. This service road runs adjacent to the western side of the Canal Hotel and Mr. de Mello’s office. The truck drove approximately 100 metres on the service road to the point of detonation. A witness who was in a ground-floor office on the south-west corner of the building describes seeing the lorry approach from the direction of Canal Road at high speed. The witness was able to see the vehicle because the external wall was only 2.20 metres high at that point. The witness described how the speeding truck was causing a spray of gravel to hit the windows of the office. The witness then heard the screeching and tearing of metal and the explosion came almost immediately. The witness was able to describe the truck but did not see the driver or whether there were other occupants in the vehicle.

The immediate response to the attack and the effort to rescue people from the rubble and tend to the injured were good. All those present on the site at the time of the attack suffered shock and trauma. Despite being shocked, these people tended to the more severely injured and contributed to the overall rescue mission. Indeed, there were many reports of individual courage and commitment by staff who worked to exhaustion in order to save their colleagues. Members of the Swedish Rescue Service Agency received special praise from UN staff members at the scene.

The efforts of the Military Adviser to the SRSG, Colonel Jeff Davie, merit special mention. He was just returning to the Canal Hotel at the time of the blast. He immediately called for United States medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) support from the Coalition Forces from his cellphone and maintained liaison throughout the rescue operation. He and other colleagues made heroic efforts to rescue the SRSG from the debris, sadly to no avail. The response provided by the Coalition Forces was fast and professional and is worthy of the highest commendation. The manner of the response saved many lives and provided expert treatment and comfort to the injured. It is also recognized that the Iraq emergency services made a significant contribution to the rescue mission.

The lack of contingency planning by the United Nations for an attack with a large number of casualties manifested itself in the rescue mission. There was no systematic or organized response from staff members in relation to command posts, points of assembly or the tracking of casualties as they left the site either by their own means or by medical evacuation. There was also a shortage of medical supplies and first aid kits.

The discrepancy in the staff lists supplied by the agencies made it difficult to account for the number of persons killed, injured or missing. Many injured people left the scene by their own devices and for several days were unaccounted for. There was also the unfortunate incident of a female staff member listed as killed when in fact she was alive and left without UN contact or support for several days in an Iraqi hospital. This caused considerable trauma for her family and relatives.

Some of the injured national staff who met the Panel felt they had not been treated the same way as international staff, particularly those who suffered from eye injuries or whose medical conditions required sophisticated surgical or rehabilitation procedures.

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4.4 Investigation

The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation arrived at the scene within 40 minutes and commenced a criminal investigation. After the scene was cleared of casualties, it was preserved for technical examination. Coalition Forces engineers assisted in clearing debris and making the site safe.

Examinations at the scene revealed an impact crater three and a half metres in diameter and one and a half metres deep. The bomb was delivered in a flatbed truck believed to have an orange-coloured body and brown cab. It is believed that it was owned by the former regime in Iraq and used by the Government in the oil-for-food programme. The truck bore false registration plates at the time of the attack.

The investigation of the bombing is continuing under the direction of the FBI. The Bureau is assisted in its endeavours by the Iraqi police. Responsibility for the attack was claimed, among others, by Abu-Hafs al-Masri Brigades, a group affiliated with the Al-Qaeda organization. The message was published on the Internet and in Arabic newspapers.

4.5 Security arrangements since 19 August

The security rating for Baghdad remained at phase IV after the attack on 19 August. The staff made the point that if an attack of the magnitude of 19 August did not merit phase V, then what would?

Nevertheless, the attitude of UN staff towards security did not alter to any significant degree after the attack. Although the Coalition Forces upgraded in a significant manner their presence around the compound, there was little if any enhancement of security at the hotels occupied by UN staff. There was no significant staff reduction until the issue was pursued by UNSECOORD in New York. UN Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) flights continued to bring more personnel, and staff lists were still not in order over a week after the attack. Some staff members continued to adopt a careless attitude towards their personal security, and only a small number were wearing protective vests.

On 2 September, the UN Security Coordinator advised the implementation of phase V - Evacuation for Iraq that would have entailed the immediate cessation of UN activities and the withdrawal of all international staff from Baghdad. The Secretary-General, who is the only UN officer entitled to declare a phase V, declined to follow his recommendation, primarily to maintain a core institutional presence in the country for life-saving activities, provided there was adequate security.

At the SMT meeting on 13 September the criteria for the declaration of phase V were again discussed. The SMT members acknowledged that the situation met the criteria for an evacuation under phase V as commonly understood (see annex II). It was agreed, however, at the meeting, that a declaration of phase V would not necessarily mean the evacuation of all international staff or the cessation of all activities, as the United Nations continued to operate in other phase V environments, including Somalia and Afghanistan. The meeting also discussed the difficulty of declaring phase V at that time when it was not declared on 19 or 20 August.
During the evening of 13 September, gunfire erupted outside the perimeter of the Canal Hotel complex which lasted for about 90 minutes. On that date, there were 61 international staff in Baghdad. On the morning of 22 September, a car bomb exploded in a parking lot approximately 50 metres from the gate of the UN compound at the Canal Hotel. The explosion took place in a parking area used by international and national staff at a time when national staff were arriving for work. The explosion killed several Iraqi police officers who used the area to assemble in the morning. This was a suicide-type attack, as the driver detonated the bomb when challenged by the police officers. It is probable that the bomb was intended for UN personnel who were arriving for work at that time.

At the SMT meeting in Baghdad on 22 September, the unanimous decision was made to recommend to the Secretary-General the evacuation of all international staff under phase V. The UN senior management at an SGI meeting in New York endorsed this position. The Secretary-General declined to follow these recommendations, primarily to maintain a core institutional presence in the country.

On early October 2003, there were between 20 and 30 international staff in Baghdad and about 5 to 10 more in the rest of the country. If, technically, phase V has not been declared by the Secretary-General, it is the opinion of all UN security staff interviewed by the Panel that current conditions in Iraq have far surpassed the capacity of the United Nations to provide adequate security to its staff in the country.

4.6 Review of the findings

The principal security lapses that characterized the re-entry and the UN presence in Baghdad up to the attack can be summarized as follows.

- The UN conducted no prior risk or threat assessment of the area before the return of the UN team, in breach of basic UN security standards. In particular, the UN security team failed to conduct a professional security survey of the Canal Hotel complex and to take appropriate action in relation to perimeter security as well as measures to minimize blast damage.

- The UN team Baghdad and operational management in New York failed to appreciate the change in the operational environment since its evacuation in March 2003.

- The UN security team failed to prepare a proper security plan, as requested by UN security procedures, in particular to prepare an evacuation plan and contingency plans to respond to an attack on the building.

- The UN country team in general failed to abide by the security regulations and directives of the Organization, with the small exception of some agencies that maintained MOSS.

- SMT meeting minutes were not always recorded as required by UN security procedures. SMT decisions and recommendations in relation to security were not pursued at a speed that reflected the urgency of the situation.
• The DO continued to issue security clearances for new staff in a deteriorating environment beyond the agreed staff ceiling, and UNSECOORD at Headquarters failed to enforce the ceiling among UN agencies as a policy decision of the UN system.

• The DO requested in letter dated 14 July formal security liaison with the Coalition Forces. Besides ad hoc contacts by individual security staff, the UN security team failed to establish organized security liaison functions with the CPA.

• UNSECOORD and UN senior management at UN Headquarters in New York have failed to ensure compliance with basic UN security rules and procedures, and no accountability or audit trails have been implemented in spite of evident and serious breaches of security rules.

4.7 Specific comments

Many of the lapses identified above arose from the haste in which the United Nations returned to Baghdad. The time factor did not allow for the necessary security planning or risk assessment. Once back in Iraq, security issues became entrenched in bureaucracy in relation to budgets and methods of acquisition of materials. The number of professional security officers was not sufficient to respond to the heavy and administrative workload, and there was an attitude, at least within some agencies, that security was an inconvenience best avoided.

The re-entry of the UN team to Iraq on 1 May 2003 was characterized by a series of breaches of the Organization’s own security regulations and directives. The breaches at the time of re-entry were exacerbated by a continuing ambivalent attitude to security issues up to the time of the attack on 19 August and a failure to recognize that the deteriorating security situation presented a very real threat to the United Nations. The security deterioration was not matched by any significant up-scaling of security precautions at the UN headquarters in Baghdad. In fact, some UN agencies were disregarding instructions in relation to staff ceilings, and incorrect figures were provided to conceal the total number of UN personnel in Baghdad.

To afford protection and minimize risk to the building and staff, it was necessary that suitable blast-resistant barriers should have been placed at strategic locations and at a safe distance from the building. The service road to the catering college should have been closed and the catering college and the spinal injury hospital that was on the opposite side of the service road adjacent to the Canal Hotel evacuated.

The deteriorating environment also called for an increase in the military protection on the perimeter of the Canal Hotel to guard all possible entrances to the complex. It defeats logic to guard one entrance while the entrance to the service road that leads to such an obviously vulnerable area was left unguarded. The security lapse was exacerbated by the fact that the SRSG had his office immediately above and overlooking the roadway.

It was necessary to prohibit public parking within 300 metres of the building, and sensitive office space should have been relocated away from vulnerable areas.
It was essential to protect the windows with a suitable-quality protective film. Despite the fact that the issue was identified and discussed at SMT meetings, the film was not fitted by 19 August. Many serious injuries inflicted by flying glass might have been prevented. It is unfortunate that offers to supply and fit the film were rejected for bureaucratic reasons.

There was no contingency planning in place to respond to a major emergency like an attack on the building. Drills in relation to evacuation were not practised, and no thought was given to the management of a large number of casualties. The management of the Iraq operations “by committee” blurred the chain of command and accountability on security issues as established by the CEB and endorsed by the General Assembly. At UN Headquarters in New York, the SGI also blurred the chain of command in terms of security management. Rather than reporting directly to the Secretary-General on security matters, the UN Security Coordinator frequently presented his assessment and positions to the SGI where other members of the UN senior management with competitive interests had an opportunity to influence the security management process. In few instances and only when the situation badly deteriorated, the attention of the Secretary-General was drawn to security matters in Iraq.

The failure of the UN system to comply with its own security regulations and directives left the Organization and its staff and premises open and vulnerable to the type of attack that was perpetrated on 19 August 2003. Adequate security arrangements may not have been able to eliminate the risk of an attack against the Canal Hotel perimeter, but they would certainly have minimized the vulnerability of the staff and premises and reduced the number of casualties caused by the attack.

5 Broader strategic and policy considerations

As instructed in its terms of reference, the Panel reviewed and discussed broader policy considerations based on the facts gathered during the inquiry. This section presents a summary of these debates and identifies some of the questions and dilemmas related to the security of UN personnel in conflict areas.

5.1 The security of UN staff in the changing global security environment

Widespread agreement exists with the notion that the deployment of UN operations in conflict areas involves an intrinsic level of risk for its national and international staff. UN security procedures, as described in the UN Field Security Handbook, have been developed to manage and mitigate these risks in an effective and systematic manner. Over recent years, however, UN personnel have been increasingly exposed to security threats as the Organization has been more frequently called on to deploy its staff in hazardous areas in order to undertake humanitarian, political or development programmes and activities (see the table).

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9 See UN documents A/57/365 and A/58/188.

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Table: Number of UN staff deployed in hazardous missions
(Source: UNSECOORD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) The UN Security Coordinator declares a mission hazardous when prevailing security conditions require the application of security measures under UN security phases.

Staff exposure to risks in conflict areas is compounded with several factors, including:

- The growing number of field operations in fragmented or failed states;
- The blurring of the distinction between civilians and combatants in conflict areas;
- The privatization and fragmentation of armed forces and the increased availability of weapons;
- The globalization of terror movements;
- The spreading of religious and fundamentalist ideologies, some of whose adherents openly oppose key UN tenets.

These factors have contributed substantively to the deterioration of security conditions for UN staff worldwide. The case of Iraq exemplifies almost all these new risk factors. It carries, however, an important additional aspect: the history of UN engagement in Iraq in the eyes of the Iraqi population. The UN system is viewed by many to be at the origins of the imposition of the longest and most stringent sanctions regime ever, the deployment of the most invasive weapons inspection programmes and the conduct of the oil-for-food programme, where for over a decade the UN system controlled much of the income of the oil production of Iraq.
This cumulative experience is now coming up as a liability as the Organization is redefining its role in the country.

The exposure of UN staff to high-risk environments is likely to persist for years to come. As a result, it is a fair assessment to consider that UN agencies, staff and premises will be subject to increasing security threats in Iraq and elsewhere. In this context, the organizations of the UN system need to take a proactive stand to face and deal with these threats by reviewing their operational and security strategies in a radical manner. These strategies must be based on much clearer objectives and mandates for UN operations in conflict areas, on more adequate security strategies for each distinct function of the UN Organization and agencies, and on the ability to explore enhanced security measures to improve the safety of UN staff and premises when required by circumstances. The key objective for the UN system in such circumstances should be to reach and maintain an acceptable balance between UN operational objectives in conflict areas and the security and protection of its staff and assets. Clear and achievable operational objectives and access to solid analysis regarding security risks are central components of this balancing exercise.

From the outset, the Panel is of the opinion that UN security standards represent a good set of practical rules and procedures to ensure the security of UN staff and premises in most circumstances. These standards could constitute the basis of a robust security system for any large organization active in conflict areas. However, the distinctive political character of the UN system and of its various missions appears to complicate considerably the implementation of these security standards. Three issues in particular drew the attention of the Panel:

- What are the actual role and responsibilities of the UN system in ensuring the protection of its staff in view of the responsibility of the host State or, as in the case of Iraq, of the Coalition Forces?
- What are the actual options for improving the security conditions of the UN operating environment in Iraq?
- What might be the consequences of the targeting of the United Nations on its operations in general and on its security policies in particular?

5.2 The role and responsibilities of the UN system in ensuring the security of its staff

As mentioned earlier in this report, the primary responsibility for the security and protection of staff members and of the Organization’s property rests with the host Government. One could ask, therefore, in what circumstances and under what terms the United Nations should take responsibility for the security of its staff, independently from the obligations of the host State. According to the UN Field Security Handbook, there are instances in which the organizations of the UN system are expected to take action necessary for the protection and security of their staff members. These emergency situations include a forced change of the host

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10 See UN Field Security Handbook, p. 10
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Government and, particularly, cases of civil disorder that affect the ability of the host State to ensure the protection of UN staff and premises.\textsuperscript{11}

While the United Nations is mandated to respond to international crises in the most difficult environments, its ability to establish proper security mechanisms appears contingent on the perception of Member States that the host Government should be seen as primarily responsible for the security of UN staff \textit{in all circumstances}. Whereas such perception is entirely legitimate in normal situations regarding common security threats, UN operational environments are increasingly exposing UN staff to exceptional threats that are often politically motivated. The protection provided by host Governments can be insufficient or become a source of increased risk for UN staff, in addition to representing a major political liability for its mission. In these circumstances, the United Nations should be able to develop and implement separate security procedures in close coordination with the police and military authorities of the host country.

There are currently no clear directives from the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council specifying in which circumstances the security of UN staff falls primarily under the UN’s auspices and what preventive or protective measures the United Nations is expected to implement. Although UN Security Council and General Assembly instructions have repeatedly urged the Secretary-General to take all measures necessary to ensure the security of his staff, there are no specifications outlining the type of measures or protection to be implemented.

On the contrary, efforts over the recent decade to develop the security and information-gathering capability of the UN system have been met by reservations and suspicion by the Member States. As a result, the UN security apparatus has traditionally been given limited scope to develop and implement serious security strategies. The UN security apparatus in the field and at Headquarters is often resource-deficient and ill-equipped to ensure the physical protection of staff and premises. It is usually unable to collect and analyse information on potential threats or to implement preventive strategies. More importantly, UN security policies and decisions (for example, the determination of UN security phases) bear a definite political dimension that often supersedes the security interest involved in protecting its staff.\textsuperscript{12}

In the view of the Panel, this absence of specific guidelines from the UN governing bodies has contributed significantly to the blurring of the obligations of the UN system to ensure the security of its staff in an efficient and strategic manner. Despite recently increased resources, UN security measures remain limited to passive protection and mitigating strategies. One of the unfortunate consequences of this systematic lack of security capabilities is the prevalent belief among many UN staff that staff security remains a secondary priority for the Organization and that in dire situations, the United Nations will not be able to offer substantive protection to

\textsuperscript{11} See \textit{UN Field Security Handbook}, p. 10

\textsuperscript{12} It should be noted that the UN General Assembly has, nevertheless, provided support for the UN Secretariat to strengthen its security coordination capability and in recent years has increased the level of resources allocated to the security of UN staff. It also supported the efforts of the Secretariat in promoting compliance with and accountability to UN security standards defined in the UN Field Security Handbook. See UN General Assembly resolution 54/192 of 17 December 1999, the UN Secretary General’s report A/55/494 of 18 October 2000 and the Secretary-General’s report A/58/188 of 23 July 2003.


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its staff. In these circumstances, many staff members in the field become careless about their own security and negligent in applying basic rules and procedures.

In the case of UN operations in Iraq, this lack of guidance is aggravated by mounting pressure from Member States for the return of UN staff to Iraq. This pressure should have been combined with support for more robust security arrangements to allow the expansion of the UN presence in a conflict zone. The latest resolution of the Security Council (SCR 1511 of 16 October 2003) offers, however, new perspectives as it recognizes a level of discretion for the Secretary-General to decide on building up the capacity of the United Nations in Iraq as “circumstances permit”. A multinational force is also authorized to “contribute to the security of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq”.

5.3 The options for improving the security conditions of the UN operating environment

In the case of Iraq, options for obtaining adequate security support were (and remain) rather limited. Following the United States-led invasion of Iraq, an occupation regime was established calling for the application of the rules of international law in occupied Iraq. SCR 1483 recognized the applicability of these rules and called for the full compliance of all concerned. The resolution further requested that the UN system, through its SRSG, “work intensively” with the occupying forces to restore local and national institutions for representative governance and encourage international efforts for legal and judicial reform. Apart from a lack of clear and achievable goals, the duties imposed on the United Nations also raised a number of ambiguities regarding the legality and legitimacy of such efforts in occupied territories.

These difficulties were acknowledged in the report of the Secretary General introduced to the Security Council on 17 July 2003 and by the late SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello himself in his presentation to the Council on 22 July. The pressing demands for the restoration of Iraq’s sovereignty, the opposition to foreign-led democratization, the process of de-Ba’athification and the dissolution of the Iraqi army were all identified as major issues of concern warranting attention from both the political and security sectors of the UN. Unfortunately, UN management failed to recognize the security risks involved for the UN system in these circumstances.

The level and the military nature of the threats against the United Nations, as observed during the two bomb attacks and several incidents against UN staff, vehicles and premises throughout the country over the summer, demonstrate the urgent need for a more forceful approach to UN security. Regardless of the type of activities the United Nations plans to undertake in Iraq, whether political, developmental or humanitarian, it can do so only with security and deterrence capabilities appropriate to protect its staff and premises. New operational strategies must also be elaborated to minimize staff exposure to threats. Staff numbers and movements will need to be kept to a strict minimum, as allowed by the new security arrangements.

13 See the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 24 of SCR 1483 (2003), S/2003/715.

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Currently, the only potential source of adequate security arrangements is the Coalition Forces. The fact is that the UN senior management in Baghdad asked on several occasions for the removal of positions and equipment of the Coalition Forces from the vicinity of the Canal Hotel. This created a critical security vacuum that armed elements could easily take advantage of. The argument of distancing the United Nations from the occupying forces in order to enhance its neutral image is relevant only to the extent that the UN benefits from such an image in the first place and also has a security alternative. In the midst of a conflict where armed groups openly declare their intent of targeting the UN system and in view of the predominantly political character of the UN presence and history in Iraq, security threats should have been expected from the outset and proper security arrangements, in this case from the Coalition Forces, should have been requested and implemented.

With the adoption of SCR 1511, a possible alternative can now be explored along with other security parameters for the return of the United Nations to Iraq. This resolution authorizes the deployment of a multinational force that could contribute to the security of UN staff and premises in Iraq. Such forces will need to offer adequate security coverage for UN operations in the field, including control of UN perimeters, security of UN movements, and the close protection of UN staff as required. In all cases, the United Nations will need to define in an independent and a professional manner the terms of its security needs and conditions for the expansion of its presence in Iraq.

5.4 The consequences of the targeting of UN staff and premises

The targeting of UN headquarters on 19 August and 22 September came as a tragic blow to the UN staff in Iraq and their colleagues throughout the world. Many in the UN system have been profoundly disconcerted not only by the destructive power of the attacks directed towards the United Nations but also by the mere fact that the UN could be the target of such devastating violence.

In the Panel's view, the attacks on 19 August and 22 September 2003 are signals of the emergence of a new and more difficult era for the UN system. It is of the utmost importance for UN management and staff to recognize the extent to which the security environment of the United Nations is changing. Already, parties to hostilities in numerous conflicts are targeting civilians in order to draw military advantages, in violation of the most basic principles of international humanitarian law. In several instances, staff members of the UN and other humanitarian agencies have been victims of targeted attacks for their role in assisting these civilians. The bombings in Baghdad differ from these previous attacks not so much for having targeted the United Nations, but for having done so by using abhorrent tactical means and military-scale weapons. These characteristics, added to the potential links to global terror groups, are significant developments that the United Nations needs to factor into its security strategy.

Current security procedures have been essentially designed to prevent or mitigate the impact of opportunistic or criminal assaults against UN staff and premises. Accordingly, these strategies do not entail the notion of protection against targeted attacks of any scale, as the United Nations sees itself as a benevolent agency, supported and respected by all parties. As a result, UN premises, staff and convoys
are for most missions in the world unarmed and the UN security apparatus is concerned almost exclusively by the probability of opportunistic assaults or misfortune, that is, "being in the wrong place at the wrong time". Very few, if any, UN field headquarters have been subject to Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) that would inevitably envisage the UN premises as a potential target. As of early October, even UN headquarters in Baghdad has had no MOSS after two bomb attacks. In fact, most UN headquarters are extremely vulnerable to targeted attacks because of their proximity to communication roads, the permissive access to offices, and the lack of an information-gathering system to analyse potential threats.

As the Organization becomes a profitable target to attack, the United Nations must take active measures to protect its staff and premises. UN staff can no longer count on avoiding threats by simply staying away from the wrong places. Based on information posted on web sites related to global terror groups, the United Nations could in theory be the target of similar attacks anywhere at any time, from Baghdad to Kabul, Nairobi, Jakarta, Geneva or New York. There are no indications that the perpetrators of the two attacks in Baghdad would refrain from attacking other UN targets worldwide if it provided further advantages. The UN approach to security must be drastically revised in order to address this new dimension.

6 Findings and recommendations

The purpose of this section is to summarize the main observations of the Panel and to outline the necessary recommendations for improving the safety and security of UN personnel in Iraq and other similar operational environments.

6.1 Main findings

In the course of its inquiry, the Panel came to the conclusion that the UN security system in Iraq has failed to provide the necessary security to its staff in Iraq. The Panel has identified a number of significant deficiencies that, besides exposing staff to great risks, contributed to the high level of casualties in the attack on 19 August. Among these deficiencies, the Panel noted:

- The general lack of compliance with basic security procedures at all levels;
- The lack of proper threat assessments both at the strategic level at Headquarters and in the field;
- The lack of responsiveness to warnings and security-related information;
- The lack of qualified professional expertise in the setting up of protective measures, such as the perimeter wall;
- The lack of attention of UN management and leadership to security issues;
- The lack of proper supervision of UN security staff, inspections of UN security procedures and investigations of UN security breaches;
- The lack of documentation of security decisions and positions at field and Headquarters levels;
- The absence of proper disciplinary measures to ensure the implementation of essential security procedures by management and staff;
- The lack of internal cooperation and coordination in matters related to security.
The implementation of basic security procedures, such as the protection of the perimeter of the Canal Hotel in Baghdad, especially after receiving credible information on imminent bomb attacks in the area, might have saved the lives of a number of UN staff. The application of mitigating measures, such as shatter resistant film on the window, could have saved many UN staff and visitors from serious injuries.

The UN system failed to provide adequate security to its staff prior to the attack. Despite attempts to address this situation, UN staff continue to be at risk in Iraq. In particular, there are serious concerns that UN staff and premises remain targets for armed elements. In the view of the Panel, this situation needs to be corrected urgently. A number of recommendations arise from these observations.

6.2 Recommendations

In order to address the deficiencies identified by the Panel, it believes that a new security strategy for the UN system as a whole needs to be developed. The core elements of this strategy are:

- An in-depth review and reform of the UN security system by independent professionals in security management;
- Clear guidance by and clear responsibilities of the United Nations to ensure the security of its staff;
- The availability of professional assessment tools for the collection of information on potential threats and for the analysis of risks for UN operations worldwide;
- A robust security management system with adequate disciplinary measures to counter non-compliance;
- Accountability at all managerial levels for the implementation of security regulations;
- Adequate and sustained insurance coverage for staff in high-risk missions;
- Significant increases in resources to develop and maintain the necessary security infrastructure

- An in-depth review and reform of the UN security system by independent professionals in security management

In the Panel’s view, the current security management system is dysfunctional and needs to be reformed. The challenge of the security of UN staff in crisis zones in the current world requires the highest level of professionalism and expertise from security management. The current system is not able to provide this expertise. Accordingly, professional expertise on security management will need to be brought into the reform process to address the current deficiencies in a systemic manner.

- Clear guidance by and clear responsibilities of the United Nations to ensure the security of its staff
The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council should provide clear, continuous guidance on the types of measures they see as appropriate in order to prevent the reoccurrence of attacks against UN staff and premises such as the ones on 19 August and 22 September 2003. Member States should be asked to conduct consultations among their security, humanitarian and development communities in order to gather diverse views on long-term strategies for the United Nations.

- **The availability of professional assessment tools for the collection of information on potential threats and the analysis of risks for UN operations worldwide**

As mentioned earlier in this report, access to information and security analysis is a vital part of an effective security system. The UN Security Coordinator must be provided with the tools to carry out these assessments in the most professional manner. Such tools include:

- A dedicated risk and threat assessment unit at Headquarters with dedicated links at the field level;
- A dedicated 24-hour operations centre;
- A dedicated training and testing centre for Field Security Coordination Officers.

These analyses should be made available to all relevant security management structures within the system through specialized information management tools that can guarantee both the efficacy of information sharing and the necessary security of communications.

- **A robust security management system with adequate disciplinary measures to counter non-compliance**

One of the main causes of security lapses in the UN system is the non-compliance of UN managers and staff with clearly established rules and the resulting lack of trust in the overall security mechanism. In addition to the measures being implemented as part of the framework for accountability, several measures should be implemented immediately to strengthen the security mechanism, including:

- The strict compliance with MOSS and staff ceiling rules at all duty stations;
- The strict implementation of security clearances for all UN staff travelling to hazardous missions;
- The implementation of disciplinary measures for non-compliance with these basic rules;
- The provision of necessary technical and logistical resources to all duty stations in order to comply with MOSS. Failure to comply should, after an appropriate delay, automatically entail the closing of a duty station and disciplinary measures should ensue for the persons in charge of security;
- All staff travelling to any duty station should be properly trained regarding UN security standards. Disciplinary measures should ensue for those responsible
for negligence in the event that UN staff reach their duty station without having received proper training and instructions.

A dedicated inspection and compliance unit should be created within UNSECOORD to ensure the implementation of these measures and the accountability of management. Disciplinary procedures need to be defined and agreed between the Secretary-General, the executive heads of agencies and the UN Security Coordinator. The decision to implement these measures should rest with the UN Security Coordinator and his representative at the field level. Persistent or serious instances of non-compliance of particular staff should be brought to the attention of the heads of agencies and the Secretary-General by the UN Security Coordinator. Individual staff concerned should be barred from travelling to any UN duty station.

- **Accountability at all managerial levels for the implementation of security regulations**

Security decisions are among the most critical responsibilities of UN managers. They should be properly motivated and documented (for example, minutes of SMT and other security meetings). The obligation to document these decisions should be specifically acknowledged as a security requirement by UNSECOORD. This requirement should apply at all levels of UN administration. This and all other documentation should be archived with the UNSECOORD dedicated inspection and compliance unit and should be made available to any UN staff member who can demonstrate a legitimate interest in examining the motive of a specific security decision. Disciplinary action should ensue for the lack of documentation of a security decision in phase III and higher phases.

In general, the UN system should clarify the role of group structures such as SMT and the SGI. These consultative mechanisms should not blur the chain of command and accountability on security issues of UN managers responsible for the security of UN staff, from the Secretary-General to the UN Security Coordinator and the Designated Officials in the field.

In the case of Iraq, the Panel believes that the seriousness of the breaches in the security system by the UN managers in charge at Headquarters and in the field warrants the setting up of a separate and independent audit and accountability procedure to review the responsibilities of key individuals in the lack of preventive and mitigating actions prior to the attack on 19 August.

- **Adequate and sustained insurance coverage for staff in high-risk missions**

UNSECOORD and relevant security staff should avoid using the threat of withdrawal of insurance coverage as a tool for compliance with security prescriptions. As a matter of policy, insurance coverage should be guaranteed (by the Malicious Acts Insurance policy, or, subsidiarily, by the United Nations) to all UN staff operating in hazardous missions, regardless of their professional behaviour. Violations of security prescriptions should trigger disciplinary actions, not the withdrawal of insurance coverage.
- **Significant increases in resources to develop and maintain the necessary security infrastructure**

The implementation of these new strategies will require appropriate budgetary allocations. Based on the new cost-sharing mechanisms, necessary allocations should be made to cover not only the cost of current security measures at the level of the duty stations, but also the new budgetary requirements of UNSECOORD at the Headquarters level. Already, major efforts have been made by the UN General Assembly to increase the biennial budget of UNSECOORD from US$ 1.3 million in 2000-2001 to US$ 75 million in 2002-2003. With more than 150 duty stations, 91 being deemed hazardous, and in the light of the need to strengthen information-gathering capabilities, staff training, inspection and accountability, much more will need to be done to bring the UN security system in line with the ambitions of UN Member States in terms of its operations in conflict areas. Member States with specific expertise should also consider providing professionally recognized assistance to the emerging structure.
ANNEX I


- Examine adequacy of UN security policy, management and practices in Iraq prior to the attack;

- Establish facts, circumstances of the attack and actions taken in the immediate aftermath, through a review and examination of the report of the initial investigation team and any other appropriate measures deemed necessary.

- Assess and report on adequacy of arrangements for and fulfillment of responsibilities within the United Nations and by the Coalition for the safety and security of United Nations personnel in Iraq, prior to attack and subsequently.

- Examine measures taken by the CPA to identify, apprehend and punish perpetrators of the attack.

- Identify key lessons learned on security policy, management and arrangements - as well as emergency preparedness – and make recommendations on measures that would assist in preventing or mitigating future incidents.

- The Panel will be provided with full access to documents and will be able to interview staff in a confidential manner.
ANNEX II

**The United Nations security management system**

**Introduction**

In each country the primary responsibility for the security and protection of staff members of the United Nations, their spouse and dependants rests with the host government. This responsibility flows from every government's function of maintaining order and protecting persons and property within its jurisdiction. In the case of international organizations, their officials and property, the government is considered to have a special responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations or the governments agreements with individual organizations.

In spite of these responsibilities, there may be instances where the security and protection factors will be uncertain. To deal with these situations, the organizations of the United Nations have put in place a system for planning and managing security issues which is aimed at ensuring that there is a coordinated approach for the protection of staff.

The security planning and management system of the United Nations comprises several actors at different levels. Some are based at the country level, while others are based at different headquarters levels.

**The United Nations Security Coordinator**

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has appointed a senior official as the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD). This official reports directly to the Secretary-General and serves as his coordinator at United Nations Headquarters. The UNSECOORD is responsible for:

- All policy and procedural matters related to security;
- Ensuring a coherent response by the United Nations to any emergency situation;
- Formulating detailed recommendations aimed at ensuring the security and safety of staff and eligible dependants of the United Nations system;
- Coordinating, planning and implementing inter-agency security and safety programmes and for acting as the focal point for inter-agency cooperation concerning all security matters;
- Assessing on a continuing basis the extent to which staff of the United Nations system and operations worldwide are exposed or vulnerable to security problems;
- Reviewing security plans formulated for United Nations staff in each country and ensuring that each duty station has an adequate state of preparedness regarding contingency planning;
- On behalf of the Secretary-General, taking all decisions relating to the relocation/evacuation of staff members and their eligible dependants from very insecure areas.

**Headquarters of United Nations Agencies, Programmes and Funds**

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14 This annex is an extract from the Security in the Field booklet, which is based on the UN Field Security Handbook
The Executive Head of each United Nations organization appoints a Field Security Coordinator at its headquarters to ensure the necessary liaison between the United Nations Security Coordinator, the respective organization headquarters and its offices in the field. These individual organization Field Security Coordinators:

Act as the security focal points for the management of security with respect to their organizations;
Keep UNSECOORD informed of any security information which comes to their attention;
Support their field offices through periodic contact;
Participate in joint inter-agency security assessment missions;
Ensure that the staff of their organizations comply with system-wide security instructions.

**Responsibility for security at the country level**

**Designated Official**

At each duty station, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the executive heads of the other organizations, appoints one senior official, normally the Resident Coordinator, who is called the Designated Official for Security. This individual has special responsibility for the security and protection of all staff members of the organizations and their eligible dependants at the duty station. The Designated Official shall:

Ensure the security and safety of United Nations personnel in the country;
In this regard, be accountable and responsible to the Secretary-General through UNSECOORD;
Constitute a Security Management Team (SMT) to advise him/her on all security-related matters;
Prepare, in consultation with the Security Management Team, a security plan for the country;
Report all security matters to UNSECOORD;
If there is a security phase in effect, grant security clearance for United Nations staff and their dependants, if applicable, to enter the country whether on mission or on assignment;
Ensure that all staff members and their dependants are briefed on security measures in place at the duty station;
Ensure that appropriate arrangements are in place for the security of locally recruited staff members;
Give appropriate security directives to staff members in the expectation that they will be followed.

**Alternate Designated Official**

In the absence of the Designated Official, his/her functions will be assumed by an Alternate Designated Official, nominated by the Designated Official and Security Management Team and appointed by UNSECOORD.

**Representatives of organizations**

At the country level representatives of organizations shall:
Consult with and assist the Designated Official on all matters concerning security and the implementation of the country-specific security plan;
Ensure that the Designated Official is provided at all times with updated lists of all staff members and their eligible family members;
Ensure that the Designated Official is at all times informed of the whereabouts and movements of the organizations staff members and their dependants especially in countries where insecurity is high;
Report all incidents which have security implications to the Designated Official;
Comply with all decisions of the Security Management Team.

Field Security Officer

At duty stations where a full-time security officer is not warranted, one international staff member will serve as the Field Security Coordination Officer. For those duty stations where security is tenuous, a full-time Field Security Coordination Officer will be appointed to assist the Designated Official. The Field Security Coordination Officer plays a key role in organizing and implementing relocations/evacuations of United Nations staff and their eligible dependants in times of crisis. The Field Security Coordination Officer shall:

Assist the Designated Official in carrying out his/her responsibilities with regard to the security of staff members and their dependants;
Ensure that all staff members and their dependants are kept fully informed on matters affecting their security;
Conduct security surveys of residential areas and premises;
Coordinate United Nations responses to crisis situations on behalf of the Designated Official;
Report all cases in which staff members and their dependants have been victims of conventional crime and submit a quarterly incident report recording these cases.

Area Coordinators

Some of the larger countries have specific areas which are separate from the capital city in terms of both distance and exposure to emergencies. For such areas, the Designated Official and Security Management Team will appoint Area Coordinators who, on behalf of the Designated Official, will coordinate and control the security arrangements for the area. Area Coordinators will have responsibilities similar to those of the Designated Official in their respective area. In addition, he/she will keep the Designated Official informed of all incidents or developments which have a bearing on the security and protection of staff members and their dependants.

Wardens

In order to facilitate coordination of the security arrangements, information and instructions, the Designated Official and Security Management Team will appoint Wardens and Deputy Wardens to ensure the proper implementation of security in particular, predetermined zones of the city. The zones covered by a Warden will not be larger than that which would enable him/her to reach staff members on foot in case of an emergency. Wardens shall:

Ensure the proper implementation of the security plan in their zone of responsibility;
Visit periodically all domiciles/families of staff members for whom the warden is responsible;
Function as a channel of communication between the Designated Official and staff members in their zones;
Ensure that staff members and their dependants in their zones are informed with regard to security arrangements and security phases in effect; 
Ensure that security instructions are being followed; 
Ensure that United Nations visitors residing temporarily at hotels within their respective zone are included in security arrangements.

**The Security Management Team**

The Security Management Team shall be constituted by the Designated Official to advise him/her on all security-related matters. The composition and size of the team may vary; however, most representatives of United Nations agencies, programmes and funds at the duty station are expected to participate. For duty stations where there are a large number of organizations represented, the Designated Official may select a limited number of representatives to assist him/her in planning and managing security matters.

**Applicability of security arrangements**

Security arrangements apply, in varying degrees, to a wide number of categories of individuals connected with the work of United Nations organizations. Security arrangements detailed in the Field Security Handbook are primarily focused on internationally recruited staff members of the United Nations, their spouse and their dependants, as well as taking into account the situation of locally recruited staff members, whether nationals or non-nationals of the host country. Most of the security arrangements are intended to apply to:

- All persons in the employ of the organizations, except those who are both locally recruited and paid by the hour, their spouse and dependants who are authorized to be at the duty station;
- Consultants, officials or experts, including transient personnel, on mission for the organizations of the United Nations system;
- United Nations volunteers, their spouse and dependants who are authorized to be at the duty station;
- United Nations fellows, either non-resident fellows studying in the country, or nationals who are on leave from the country of study.

**Peacekeeping forces**

With respect to United Nations peacekeeping and special missions, military and civilian personnel are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Representative of the Secretary General and/or the Force Commander or Chief of Staff, as applicable. Under the terms of their contracts. Staff members who are included in the civilian component of the mission are obliged to serve wherever the Organization considers necessary.

**The Security Plan**

The primary management tool for security preparedness at the duty station is the Security Plan, which must be established by each designated Official and Security Management Team. It describes the various security measures to be taken and arrangements to be
followed in the event of serious criminality or emergency situations such as hostilities, internal disorder or natural disasters. The aim of a Security Plan is to detail the responsibilities of specific individuals, the actions to be carried out and the sequence to be followed to ensure the security of staff members and their eligible family members.

Security phases

The United Nations employs five specific security phases to describe those security measures to be implemented based on the prevailing security conditions in a given country or in parts of a country. These five phases are standard for all duty stations and must be included in all Security Plans.

The five phases of the Security Plan are:

**Phase One, Precautionary**

This phase is designed to warn staff members that the security situation in the country or a portion of the country is such that caution should be exercised. All travel into the duty station requires advance clearance from the Designated Official.

**Phase Two, Restricted movement**

This phase signifies a much higher level of alert and imposes major restrictions on the movement of all staff members and their families. During Phase Two all staff members and their families will be required to remain at home unless otherwise instructed. No travel, either incoming or within the country, will occur unless specifically authorized by the Designated Official as essential travel. Phase Two is generally of short duration, after which the phase will return to less restrictive terms or will be increased because of the threat.

**Phase Three, Relocation**

Phase Three indicates a substantial deterioration in the security situation, which may result in the relocation of staff members or their eligible dependants. When recommending Phase Three to UNSECOORD, the Designated Official and Security Management Team may recommend any of the following mandatory actions:

- Temporary concentration of all internationally recruited staff members and/or their eligible dependants in one or more sites within a particular area;  
- Relocation of all internationally recruited staff members and/or their eligible dependants to alternative locations within the country; and/or  
- Relocation outside the country of all eligible dependants of internationally recruited staff members and/or non-essential internationally recruited staff members. The determination of essential staff members for security purposes will be made jointly by the Designated Official and the individual representative of the agencies, programmes or funds at the duty station.

Special Note: As a result of a recent amendment to the Field Security Handbook, spouses of internationally recruited staff members may remain, on a voluntary basis and subject to the approval of the Designated Official, at a duty station where Phase Three has been declared. Should this option be exercised, no evacuation allowances would be payable for the
individual concerned. This option applies only to Phase Three and only to spouses of internationally recruited staff members, never to other dependants.

**Phase Four, Programme suspension**

Phase Four is to enable the Designated Official to recommend to the Secretary-General, through the UNSECOORD, the relocation outside the country of all remaining internationally recruited staff members except those directly concerned with emergency or humanitarian relief operations or security matters. All other internationally recruited staff members who heretofore were considered essential to maintain programme activities will be evacuated at this time.

**Phase Five, Evacuation**

The decision to initiate Phase Five (which can only be declared following approval by the Secretary-General) signifies that the situation has deteriorated to such a point that all remaining internationally recruited staff members are required to leave.

The relocation/evacuation of internationally recruited staff members and/or their eligible family members will, in the first instance, normally be to a designated safe haven, either inside the country or in another country approved by UNSECOORD. Staff members and/or dependants who are relocated/evacuated from a duty station may be entitled to evacuation allowances. (For more information regarding this matter, please contact your administrative officer.)

Following the relocation/evacuation, a decision will be taken within 30 days to:

Authorize their return to the duty station;
Reassign staff members, temporarily or otherwise;
Authorize their return to their respective home country.
WHAT IS MALICIOUS ACTS INSURANCE?

1. Effective 1 January 1990, insurance coverage was obtained on a system-wide basis for those staff members required to work at duty stations, which the United Nations Security Coordinator had identified as potentially hazardous. This policy was put in place in response to a ruling by the ILO Administrative Tribunal that adjudged that organizations bear responsibility for the assignment or travel of staff members to potentially dangerous areas and ruled that an employee is not obliged to run abnormal risks for the benefit of his/her employer, at any rate, unless he/she is given adequate insurance coverage.

2. The following organizations have chosen to participate in this scheme: The United Nations including its programmes and regional commissions), CTBTO, FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ICTR, ICTY, IMO, IOM, ITC, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNOPS, UNRWA (excluding nationally-recruited staff), WFP, WHO/PAHO. In addition, organizations decide which categories of individuals they wish to have covered. For example, most organizations do not provide coverage for Special Services Agreement contract holders.

3. Coverage under this policy is related ONLY to malicious acts, i.e. for death or disability caused directly or indirectly by war, invasion, hostilities, acts of foreign enemies, whether war be declared or not, civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection, military or usurped power, riots or civil commotion, sabotage, explosion of war weapons, terrorist activities (whether terrorists are the country’s own nationals or not), murder or assault by foreign enemies or any attempt thereat. Coverage only applies to those duty stations declared “hazardous” by the United Nations Security Coordinator. At present there are 90 countries included on the list where this policy is in effect. (See annex 1).

4. This policy does not cover death or disability directly or indirectly resulting from or consequent upon:

(a) The insured person engaging in or taking part in naval, military or air force service or operations;

(b) The insured person engaging in air travel, except as a passenger on official travel;

(c) Suicide, attempted suicide, intentional self-injury or the insured person being in a state of insanity;

(d) Deliberate exposure to exceptional danger (except in an attempt to save human life) or the insured person’s own criminal act; and

(e) The insured person being under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
(f) Any claim that, regardless of any contributory cause(s), is in any way caused or contributed to by an act of terrorism involving the use or release or the threat thereof of any nuclear weapon or device or chemical or biological agent. For purposes of this policy terrorist activities are defined as but not limited to, the use of force or violence and/or the threat thereof, by any person or group(s) of persons, whether acting alone or on behalf of or in connection with any organisation(s) or government(s), committed for political, religious, ideological or similar purposes or reasons including the intention to influence any government and/or to put the public, or any section of the public, in fear.

5. As conditions of the policy, claims will be accepted under the policy only if the Organization and/or the Insured Person concerned has demonstrated to UNSECOORD that it has complied with all UNSECOORD security guidelines, and claims will be submitted to the Underwriters by UNSECOORD only when UNSECOORD is satisfied that the UN security guidelines have been complied with.

6. The policy provides benefits for three main categories of staff. For purposes of Malicious Acts Insurance Policy, an Insured Person is defined as any employee of the organizations who participate in this policy:

(a) In the Professional category whose duty station is one of the designated countries. The statistics for this category of staff are obtained from the annual census conducted by the ACC based on those staff members assigned by the organization to a particular country.

(b) Professional staff members, experts and consultants on mission/travel/DSA status and other official visitors in the designated countries; The statistics for this category of staff are obtained from the quarterly head count conducted at the duty stations.

(c) Internationally and nationally-recruited general service staff members/field service staff members and those paid according to the field service salary scale. The statistics for this category of staff are obtained from the annual census conducted by the ACC based on those staff members assigned by the organization to a particular country.

7. Benefits under this policy are as follows:

(a) For staff in the Professional category whose duty station is one of the designated countries as well as for Professional internationally-recruited staff members, experts and consultants on mission/travel/DSA status and other official visitors in the designated countries, the benefits are $500,000 per person for death or permanent total disability and payment according to the “continental scale” for permanent partial disability (the continental scale is a percentage rate that is payable for each type of disability);

(b) For Internationally and nationally-recruited general service staff members/field service staff members and those paid according to the field service salary scale, the benefits are 10 times annual salary up to a maximum of $500,000 for death or permanent total disability and payment according to the “continental scale” for permanent partial disability. Annual salary is defined as the net salary shown for the insured person’s level and step in the published salary scale applicable
at the time of the incident at the duty station. All additional allowances, i.e. spouse and child benefits, are to be excluded in the calculations.

8. The annual premium under this policy is $300 per person per year in respect of Professional staff assigned to the duty station; $81.73 per person per year in respect of internationally and nationally-recruited General Service staff; and $25 per person per month in respect of Professional staff members, experts and consultants on mission/travel/DSA status.

9. Claims under this policy will be submitted to UNSECOORD by the employing organization for submission to the Underwriters. The following documentary evidence must accompany each claim:

   (a) Original death certificate;
   (b) Police report or report by UN security official;
   (c) Post mortem and/or Autopsy report;
   (d) Copy of the individual’s contract with the organization;
   (e) In the case of staff members assigned to a duty station, a copy of staff member’s letter of appointment;
   (f) In the case of staff members on mission/travel/DSA status, a copy of the Travel authorization.
   (g) A copy of the security clearance authorizing the staff member to be at a particular location.
   (h) A copy of the local salary scale in effect at the time of death (if applicable);

Banking instructions including name and address of the bank, routing number and account number into which the settlement may be deposited.

10. It is the responsibility of the employing organization to administer the death benefits in accordance with the applicable staff regulations and rules.
LIST OF DUTY STATIONS/AREAS COVERED
BY MALICIOUS ACTS INSURANCE POLICY
As at 1 April 2003

AFGHANISTAN
ALBANIA
ALGERIA
ANGOLA
ARMENIA
azerbaijan
BANGLADESH
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
BRAZIL
BURUNDI
CAMBODIA
CAMEROON
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
CHAD
COLOMBIA
COMOROS
CONGO
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
COTE D’IVOIRE
CUBA
DJIBOUTI
EAST TIMOR
ECUADOR
EGYPT
EL SALVADOR
ERITREA
ETHIOPIA
FIJI
GAMBIA
GEORGIA
GUATEMALA
GUINEA
GUINEA-BISSAU
GUIDAYA
HAITI
INDIA
INDONESIA
IRAN
IRAQ
ISRAEL, WEST BANK AND GAZA
JAMAICA
JORDAN
KAZAKHSTAN
KENYA
KUWAIT
KYRGYZSTAN
LEBANON
LESEOHO
LIBERIA
A Service Rd to
B Catering College
C Point of bomb Detonation
D Canal Road
E Office of SRSO