“Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability”


9 June 2008
Transmittal Letter from the Chairperson of the Panel

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I have the honour, on behalf of my colleagues, members of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide, to submit to your attention our report “Towards a culture of security and accountability”.

We would like, first of all, to express our appreciation for your confidence in entrusting such an important and delicate mission to us.

May I also express my sincere gratitude to the Panel members - Colonel Paolo Coletta of the Italian Carabinieri, Brigadier General Elsayed Ibrahim Elsayed Mohamed ElHabbal of the Egyptian National Security Service, Mr. Anil Kumar Gupta of the Indian Police Service (retired), Ambassador Ümit Pamir of the Turkish Diplomatic Service (retired), Major Thomas Boy Sibande of the South African National Defence Force (retired), and Ms. Margareta Wahlström of Sweden, former Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs (also Secretary of the Panel) – who shared their expertise generously, worked hard and travelled widely to collect and analyse information, and finalize this report. They were assisted by a very small and dedicated Secretariat whose contribution was vital to our work.

The Panel visited over 20 headquarters and field duty stations. In New York, as everywhere else, Permanent Representatives of Member States, Heads of Departments in the Secretariat, Executive Heads of Agency, Funds and Programmes, and staff members, national and international, were generous with their time and shared with us their thoughts, their concerns and their documents. We are immensely grateful to all of them.

We have approached our work guided by your advice and recommendations, including your statement of 5 February, and have focused our attention on the “strategic issues vital to delivery and enhancement of the security of United Nations personnel and premises and the changing threats and risks faced by it.”

Total security has not been achieved anywhere by anyone in the past and will not be achieved in the future. But security conditions can and must be constantly improved. Thus, we see our modest contribution as being one stage in the long route that your predecessors have travelled in the past, and you and your successors will continue to travel to progressively improve security conditions for all members of the UN family as they discharge their noble mission, often under very difficult conditions, in all corners of the world.

Following the terrible tragedy of Baghdad, the UN system, starting with Member States and the Secretary-General, but also including all Agencies, Funds and Programmes, worked together and separately to address shortcomings and gaps that were revealed by what happened on 19 August 2003. We believe that much was done and note in particular that Member States have been receptive and generous in their response to this tragedy.
The establishment of the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) in January 2005 was a significant step forward. Though the UN security management system, led by DSS, has been addressing very challenging global and local threats, the 11 December 2007 attack in Algiers put the new security arrangements to the test. Most unfortunately, the system as a whole and individuals who, both in the duty station itself and at Headquarters, held direct responsibility for the UN presence in Algiers and the security of its personnel and premises, have been found wanting.

The Panel, mandated to look at strategic issues and to “identify the fundamental lessons drawn from preceding reports on the subject up to and including the preliminary report of the Department of Safety and Security of 11 January 2008” on the Algiers attack, did not consider it could or should identify individual accountabilities. The Panel’s report, however, finds ample evidence that several staff members up and down the hierarchy may have failed to respond adequately to the Algiers attack, both before and after the tragedy.

It is for this reason that the Panel considers that the attack on UN premises in Algiers of 11 December 2007 warrants a separate and independent audit and accountability procedure. Such a procedure would review the responsibilities of the key individuals and offices concerned and provide you with a basis for whatever actions you might consider taking with respect to those individuals and offices. The Panel believes that such an independent procedure would go a long way towards restoring the confidence and the morale of the staff.

When you addressed the General Assembly upon taking the oath of office in December 2006, you identified a crucial issue for the Organization: “the good name of the United Nations is one of its most valuable assets, but also one of its most vulnerable.” You added that you would “work to enhance morale, professionalism and accountability among staff members, which in turn will help us serve Member States, and restore trust in the Organization.”

The Panel’s findings are consistent with your own vision. We identified in particular an urgent need to “restore trust in the Organization” and its fundamental values of impartiality and neutrality.

We very much hope that the Panel’s findings and recommendations will provide you with additional elements to continue to galvanize support among Member States, Executive Heads of Agencies, Funds and Programmes, staff associations and UN personnel in general to address the issues you highlighted then and to reshape the Organization’s institutional culture into one that embraces security as a common and shared responsibility.

Yours sincerely,

(signed)
Lakhdar Brahimi
Chairman

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Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>ACABQ</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions</td>
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<td>CEB</td>
<td>Chief Executives Board for Coordination</td>
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<td>Chief Security Adviser</td>
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<td>Designated Official</td>
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<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>Division of Security and Safety (DSS)</td>
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<td>Field Security Coordination Officer</td>
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<td>United Nations Field Security Handbook</td>
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<td>Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat</td>
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<td>GoA</td>
<td>Government of Algeria</td>
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<td>Malicious Acts Insurance Policy</td>
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<td>Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<td>Peacekeeping Operations Support Service (DSS)</td>
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<td>Security Risk Assessment</td>
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<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<td>United Nations Information Center</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
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<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency</td>
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<td>UNSECOORD</td>
<td>United Nations Security Coordinator</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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Executive Summary

A. Context of the Work of the Panel (paras. 1 - 30)

1. The Independent Panel on Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel and Premises Worldwide was established by the Secretary-General on 5 February 2008. Although prompted by the attack on UN offices in Algiers on 11 December 2007, the Panel had a broad mandate, with a focus on “strategic issues vital to delivery and enhancement of the security of United Nations personnel and premises and the changing threats and risks faced by it.”¹

2. The Panel visited some 20 duty stations – from New York and other headquarters to some of the riskiest environments in which the Organization operates – and met with UN staff as well as government, NGO and UN officials in all these locations. Past United Nations reports concerning the safety and security of personnel and premises were reviewed, as was relevant literature and reports from outside the UN system.

3. Today, the UN has a greater presence worldwide than ever before. With greater UN presence has come greater exposure to risk of all kinds. In the past, violence against the UN was isolated incidents or was the result of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. But, it is becoming more and more the result of deliberate targeting, including by extremist groups.

4. This report is, in part, an attempt by the United Nations to examine why the Organization is now a target – the perceptions and possible reasons behind such violence – and what it can do about it.

B. The 11 December 2007 attacks in Algiers (paras. 31 - 86)

5. The attack on the UN offices in Algiers on 11 December was a reminder that there is no total security and that incidents will happen as long as there are groups and individuals determined to commit acts of violence against the UN. The Algerian authorities provided effective protection to the UN throughout the almost 20 years of violence in the country. On 11 December 2007, the measures taken to protect the UN proved inadequate. The lack of a close working relationship between the two sides prevented better cooperation on security. This weakness could and should have been at least partially offset by pro-active support from DSS Headquarters.

6. The response of the Government of Algeria after the attack was remarkably swift and efficient. Measures taken since 11 December 2007 have the potential to substantially facilitate and enhance cooperation between Algerian authorities and the UN on all matters related to security and safety of UN premises and personnel.

7. The Panel does not believe that it was mandated to identify individual accountabilities. Nor had it the time and resources to do so. For this reason, the Panel believes that the attack on UN premises in Algiers warrants a separate and independent audit and accountability procedure. It is the view of the Panel that such an independent procedure would go a long way towards restoring the confidence and the morale of the staff.

¹ SG/SM/11403 on the establishment of the Panel and its mandate.
C. The UN Security Management System (paras. 87 - 207)

8. The Department of Safety and Security, established on 17 January 2005, brought together in one organizational entity the preexisting security management functions of the Office of the UN Security Coordinator, the Safety and Security Services, and the civilian field staff security component of DPKO. In the three years since the creation of DSS, the UN security management system has improved significantly, including in areas that were considered deficient in the 2003 report by the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq. UN security management is increasingly based on threat and risk assessments; the concept of compliance with security rules is also a key component of the new system, security decisions are now better documented and cooperation among different components of the system has improved. However, all of these areas need strengthening.

9. Nonetheless, DSS must address as a matter of priority key areas that are in need of improvement: accountability, leadership, and internal management and oversight. It is also inadequate in its response to warnings and security-related information, and it has insufficient technical and financial resources to design and set up preventive and protective measures. These concerns are similar to those identified by the Ahtisaari Report after the 19 August 2003 attack on the UN offices in Baghdad.

10. The urgency to establish DSS following the 2003 attack against the UN in Baghdad did not permit a more in-depth study of the organizational and operational consequences of unification. The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security should conduct a review of the present organization of the Department with the purpose of better defining roles and responsibilities, with clear lines of accountability, and identify work methods and organizational structure that privilege the field. DSS will require additional human and financial resources, but their level and allocation should be determined following the management review.

11. Within the UN security management system, decentralization of day-to-day decision-making to the country level is a guiding principle. The Designated Official is the central point in the country-level security management system. Accountability, responsibility, and resource allocation do not converge in support of the Designated Official. For Designated Officials to function as intended, they must be supported by the Host Government and at all levels of the UN system.

12. Among the challenges faced by UN security managers in the field, at least three require urgent attention from senior management: replacement of the current security phase system with one based on the Security Risk Assessment; implementation of MOSS for UN offices in vulnerable locations; and striking a more proactive balance between programme delivery and security measures in some high risk areas. The size of the UN staff presence, and the manner in which the system does business, must be reviewed in light of security considerations and opportunities offered by modern information and communication technology for staff to work remotely. Only with a strategic approach and long-term vision can these challenges be addressed effectively.

2 The Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq was chaired by former Finnish President Maarti Ahtisaari and its report, issued on 20 October 2003, became known as the “Ahtisaari Report”.
D. Responsibility for the well-being of UN Personnel and their Dependents ( paras. 208 - 214) 

13. The United Nations, as an employer, recognizes that risk is an inescapable part of the work of its personnel. However, the Panel found that UN personnel in general have limited confidence in the security management system. The well-being of staff and their dependents, and the care made available by the UN as an employer, deserve attention as a security-related area. UN personnel, in general, are not adequately informed about their rights and obligations. The lack of easily available factual information can, at times, contribute to a perceived lack of equity in working conditions between different categories of staff, particularly between nationals and internationals. 

14. Today, nearly seventy-five per cent of the United Nations’ personnel in the field are “national staff.” A number of UN security procedures, practices, and policies were conceptualized for a small population of international staff. The UN needs to be seen as proactively addressing the problems related to the perception that national and international employees are not treated in an equal manner. The UN must also find ways of addressing the moral dilemma it faces when transferring risk to contractors in environments where it cannot operate. 

E. Ensuring Adequate and Sustainable Funding for Security ( paras. 215 - 225) 

15. The activities of DSS are financed from both the regular UN budget and on a cost-sharing basis with other organizations participating in the UN security management system. The Panel strongly believes that the UN security system would benefit immensely if it were to be funded entirely from the regular budget. This must be a gradual, step-by-step process. The USG/DSS should engage Member States to review and propose the best option available for the conversion of the DSS budget to the UN regular budget. The USG/DSS should also engage with donor countries to establish the principle of “no programme without security.” 

F. The Framework for Accountability: Creating a Culture of Security ( paras. 226 - 249) 

16. Striking the appropriate balance between the security imperative and the programme imperative is the fundamental challenge facing the UN security management system. Addressing this challenge is not merely a matter of refining the structure of DSS, nor of more money or more posts. A change in culture is needed and it will not come about until senior managers see security as a strategic instrument for achieving substantive goals. The Secretary-General, as the Chair of CEB, and the CEB must review the security system, its strategy, performance, and resources regularly. 

17. The Framework for Accountability is a potentially powerful tool. If it is to become effective, it needs to be fully operationalized and checked against day-to-day practices. The wide dissemination of the Framework for Accountability would make a significant contribution to the creation of an organizational culture that embraces security, based on trust in the security management system and among the key security actors. The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security should convene a working group.

comprising key actors and stakeholders in the UN security management system to review the Framework for Accountability in order to identify where further clarity may be needed.

G. The Responsibility of Host Governments and Member States (paras. 250 - 267)

18. The primary responsibility of Member States for the security and safety of UN officials and premises is a guiding principle of the United Nations. However, Member States are not equally well-equipped to provide that security. Indeed, it is quite often in those countries where capacity is modest or lacking all together that the most serious risks exist. All the UN can and should expect from the host government is that it provides security to the best of its ability. The central element of the cooperation and trust between the two sides is information sharing about security conditions. The Secretary-General should consider making it a regular element of all his conversations with senior officials of Member States to promote an understanding of the need for closer cooperation on security matters.

19. As an employer, the UN continues to be legally and morally responsible for the security and safety of its staff and their dependents and for its property. The first duty of the UN is to understand fully what it can – and cannot – expect from the host government in terms of support sought by the Organization for security. USG/DSS and DPKO should be required to provide the Security Council with a security risk assessment for all peacekeeping and special missions that the Security Council decides to establish.

H. The Public Image of the United Nations and its Implications for Security (paras. 268 - 292)

20. One of the most important issues the Panel examined is why a significant and growing part of the public no longer perceives the UN as impartial and neutral. At the core of this issue is the perception that the United Nations has become an instrument of powerful Member States to advance agendas that serve their own interests, rather than those of the global community of nations.

21. This perception has a negative impact on the security of UN personnel, its activities, and its premises. Member States and United Nations officials need to earn back the public’s trust in the Organization. Restoring the credibility of the UN requires commitment from all parts of the system, from Member States and the Secretary-General to individual staff members. The guiding spirit for all should be the principles of the Charter itself.

22. How the UN conducts its business has a significant influence on public understanding of the Organization’s impartiality. What the decision-making bodies mandate UN entities to do, and how the UN organizes itself to deliver its services in so many different countries and areas of activity, are two strategic matters that impact on the perception people around the world have of the United Nations and thus on staff security.
I. Context of the Work of the Independent Panel

1. The decision to establish the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel and Premises Worldwide followed the devastating attack of 11 December 2007 which destroyed the UN offices in Algiers and killed 17 UN staff and injured 40, many seriously. Many individuals living close to the UN offices or passing by at the time of the attack were also killed or injured. Another attack, on the same day, less than half an hour earlier, targeted the Algerian Constitutional Court, with an even higher death toll and number of injuries.

2. On 5 February 2008, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced that he had decided to establish an Independent Panel and appointed Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi as chairperson. In the Secretary-General's announcement, he stated:

“The independent review will evaluate the strategic issues vital to the delivery and enhancement of the security of United Nations personnel and premises and the changing threats and risks faced by it. The panel will examine the inherent vulnerabilities of United Nations operations around the world in order to build confidence among the staff within the system and enhance credibility among the Member States, civil society and other relevant stakeholders. It will study the responses of host countries, as well as identify the fundamental lessons drawn from preceding reports on the subject up to and including the preliminary report of the Department of Safety and Security of 11 January 2008, covering the most recent attack. It will make recommendations on improvements needed in the systems and practices of the United Nations, as well as additional resources needed to face security challenges, where possible, to prevent the occurrence of such incidents and where they have occurred, to lessen their impact.”

3. The attack in Algiers has prompted this report. Though it has a chapter dedicated to the Algiers 11 December attack, the report has a global focus in its review of the United Nations security management system, the role and relationship with host governments, as well as the public perception of the UN and its impact on the security of the Organization's personnel and premises.

4. Over the past two decades, there has been a steady change in the environments in which UN personnel is requested to operate by Member States. The world has witnessed a number of attacks on institutions and officials – ambassadors and other diplomatic personnel, journalists, and humanitarian staff, convoys, and facilities, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – that had traditionally been "protected" from such acts of violence, whether by norms of diplomacy or by the benevolent nature of humanitarian work.

5. Indeed, concern for the safety and security of UN staff and associated personnel is not a new issue. Member States, Secretaries-General, Heads of Agency, and UN personnel themselves have long been aware of the risks faced by the men and women, both national and international, who work for the UN. References to the safety and security of personnel are found in the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and in the policy documents of the Secretariat, agencies, funds, and programmes for many years now.
6. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali, in his 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, observed,

> “When United Nations personnel are deployed in conditions of strife, whether for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping, peace-building or humanitarian purposes, the need arises to ensure their safety. There has been an unconscionable increase in the number of fatalities…Depending on the nature of the situation, different configurations and compositions of security deployments will need to be considered. As the variety and scale of threat widens, innovative measures will be required to deal with the dangers facing United Nations personnel.”

7. In the years immediately following this observation, attacks against UN staff and associated personnel continued to grow, prompting the General Assembly to adopt the Convention on the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel on 9 December 1994 in response to the increase in UN fatalities and injuries in line of duty. In its Preamble, the Convention acknowledges that:

> “existing measures of protection for United Nations and associated personnel are inadequate,” and that

> “there is an urgent need to adopt appropriate and effective measures for the prevention of attacks committed against United Nations and associated personnel…”

8. Recognizing that the 1994 Convention afforded insufficient legal protection to staff and associated personnel whose engagement in the delivery of humanitarian, political, or development assistance exposed them to particular risks, the General Assembly further adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel on 8 December 2005.

9. Beginning in the early 1990s, both the demand for, and scale of, United Nations operations increased relative to the previous five decades of the Organization’s existence. The revitalization of peace operations and the growth of humanitarian activities put more staff and associated personnel in the field. This reflected a thawing

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4 A/47/277-S/24111, para 66.
7 A/Res/60/42
8 Article 1 of the 1994 Convention defines “Associated Personnel” as follows: “(i) Persons assigned by a Government or an intergovernmental organization with the agreement of the competent organ of the United Nations; (ii) Persons engaged by the Secretary-General of the United Nations or by a specialized agency or by the International Atomic Energy Agency; (iii) Persons deployed by a humanitarian non-governmental organization or agency under an agreement with the Secretary-General of the United Nations or with a specialized agency or with the International Atomic Energy Agency, to carry out activities in support of the fulfilment of the mandate of a United Nations operation.”
of the global political environment which enabled the UN to take on a role in more locations around the world. Not by coincidence, those locations most in need of the assistance of the United Nations were emerging from conflict – if not lapsing back into it – or were in the midst of humanitarian and political crisis. Thus, the UN found itself with more staff in more dangerous places.

10. This trend has continued. Today, there are more than 140,000 civilian UN staff and associated personnel covering over 180 countries. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations oversees over 19,000 of these civilians in mission environments, as well as nearly 89,000 troops, military observers, and police deployed on twenty peacekeeping and special political missions. United Nations humanitarian operations have likewise dramatically increased, accounting for some 37,000 of these civilian personnel. The responsibility of the United Nations does not stop with its staff and associated personnel. Many international staff are accompanied by dependents – more than 300,000 worldwide. These numbers represent a greater UN presence than ever before. And this trend is likely to persist as the Organization is called upon by Member States to deploy personnel in response to urgent humanitarian, political, and security needs, as well as longer term development goals.

11. With greater UN presence has come greater exposure to risk of all kinds. As An Agenda for Peace and, more recently, the Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq observed, there is general acceptance that deployment of UN operations to conflict zones involves intrinsic risk.

12. According to an empirical study of violence against humanitarian workers from 1997 to 2005 by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), it is national staff who face a disproportionately higher danger of being targeted by violence owing to the practice of risk transference through remote management of programmes. To that, many would add that national staff are seen as a softer target than international personnel. In some cases, their mere association with the UN is a source of personal danger.

13. The HPG study also found that, relative to the greater numbers of staff in the field, violent attacks appear to have increased some 22 per cent over the nine years.

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9 “Field” is used throughout this report to mean all UN offices that are not located at any Headquarters locations. This includes offices in capital cities and provinces as well as in farther away locations, also called “deep field”.
10 There is currently no single-source aggregated figure for UN personnel; the figure given is based on A/62/294, Table 1 and Table 2 (as of 31 March 2007) and CEB/2007/HLCM/30 (as of 31 December 2006). As a result, the total does not include headquarters-based personnel of specialized agencies.
11 DPKO civilian figures as of 29 February 2008. The 89,000 uniformed personnel includes 88,200 uniformed personnel in 17 peacekeeping operations (as of 30 April 2008) and 455 in three special political missions (as of 30 April) “directed and supported by DPKO”.
12 Figure includes field staff of FAO, OCHA, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO, based on CEB headcount as of 31 December 2006 (CEB/2007/HLCM/30). According to Stoddard et al., the number of UN humanitarian personnel in the field increased 54 percent from 1997-2005, albeit using a different data set that includes UNDP. Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, and Katherine Haver, “Providing aid in insecure environments: trends in policy and operations,” ODI HPG Report 23, September 2006, p. 16.
13 A/59/365/Add.1, para. 48. This figure does not include dependents of personnel from specialized agencies, for which no aggregate total is available.
examined. The proportion of victims from UN humanitarian organizations and the ICRC has decreased relative to non-governmental organizations and national Red Cross and Red Crescent society workers as these latter two institutions have increased their field presence.14

14. Since 1992, a total of 270 UN civilian staff members15 and 2468 uniformed personnel16 have been killed as a result of malicious acts, including murder, bombings, landmines, and hijacking. Of the 270 civilians killed, locally-recruited staff comprise the majority – 215, or eighty per cent. This is largely consistent with the overall proportion of national to international UN staff. In the past, this violence represented isolated incidents or was the result of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. But, as noted, it appears that this is more and more the result of deliberate targeting.

15. The deliberate targeting of the UN by extremist groups is a dimension of this phenomenon which is of particular concern. The United Nations is targeted by extremist groups not only for what it does, but also for what it is perceived to represent. Most apparent, decisions of the Security Council often have political ramifications for how the UN as a whole is seen by affected populations, especially in the Middle East. This is true elsewhere as well, where UN activities can be seen as supporting and stabilizing governments or undertaking programme activities which are perceived as counter to traditional values or group interests.

16. The United Nations has been identified by al Qaeda as a hostile organization for over a decade. Beginning in 2006, the group’s anti-UN rhetoric began referring to the Organization as instrument of influential Member States for sanctioning hostilities against Muslims. In this context, even moderate Muslim countries are regarded as enemies by nature of their membership in the UN. Al Qaeda further widened its anti-UN rhetoric in 2007 to include UN programmes as hostile to Islam, thereby making all UN entities a “legitimate” target for its followers.

17. The deadly attack on the Canal Hotel in Baghdad on 19 August 2003 underscored the step change in the nature of the threat now facing the United Nations. Although the United Nations had been targeted before, Baghdad introduced new tactics and a new scale of violence for which the UN was unprepared. As a consequence, twenty-two UN staff and visitors were killed, and a further 150 individuals injured. On 22 September, a second bomb attack killed a UN security guard and two Iraqi police officers, injuring 19 others.

15 As of 28 May 2008; figures from the Department of Safety and Security. Between July 2006 and June 2007 alone, 16 civilian staff were killed, and there were 507 recorded cases of violent attacks against UN personnel, including: “442 incidents of harassment and intimidation, 543 cases of robberies, 232 cases of physical assaults, 126 cases of hijacking, and about 273 reported cases of arrest and detention by State and non-State actors. In addition, there were 68 cases of forced entry and/or occupations of UN offices and 592 residential break-ins involving UN and associated personnel.” (A/62/324, para. 6)
18. The multiple investigations that followed the attack concluded that the UN security management system had failed in its mission to provide adequate security to the organization’s personnel and office. In response, the UN undertook a major restructuring of its security management system, leading to the establishment in January 2005 of the Department of Safety and Security (DSS).

19. Four years after Baghdad, the attack on the United Nations in Algiers underscores not only that there continue to be serious threats against the Organization, but equally important that, in spite of all reasonable measures taken – and to be taken in the future – there will always be risks for UN personnel and property everywhere.

20. At the same time, it is equally important not to be hypnotized by the type of violence in Algiers, i.e., the kind of terrorism practiced by al Qaeda and its associates.\textsuperscript{17} Statistics tell us that the number of UN personnel killed by groups hostile to the UN is relatively small compared with those killed by armed robbery, banditry, carjacking, and other malicious acts.\textsuperscript{18}

21. This report is, in part, an attempt by the United Nations to examine why the Organization is now a target – the perceptions and possible reasons behind such violence – and what it can do about it.

The Independent Panel and its Methodology

22. In addition to the Chairperson, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, the other members of the Independent Panel are: Colonel Paolo Coletta of the Italian Carabinieri, Brigadier General Elsayed Ibrahim Elsayed Mohamed ElHabbal of the Egyptian National Security Service, Mr. Anil Kumar Gupta of the Indian Police Service (retired), Ambassador Ümit Pamir of the Turkish Diplomatic Service (retired), Major Thomas Boy Sibande of the South African National Defence Force (retired), and Ms. Margareta Wahlström of Sweden, former Assistant Secretary-General of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), who also served as Secretary of the Panel. All Panel members served in their personal capacity, not as representatives of their respective Governments nor of any organization. The Panel was supported by a small secretariat.

23. The Panel worked independently of the United Nations, but benefited from cooperation and support by all UN entities, as well as representatives of Member States.

24. Past United Nations reports concerning the safety and security of personnel and premises were reviewed, as was relevant literature and reports from outside the UN system. Panel members had meetings with Permanent Missions and Regional Groups in New York as well as with officials of the United Nations Secretariat and the Agencies, Funds and Programmes headquartered in Geneva, New York, and Rome.

\textsuperscript{17} In fact, according to the “Human Security Brief 2007” (Human Security Report Project, May 2008) there has been a “remarkable but largely unnoticed decline in the incidence of terrorism around the world, including a sharp decrease in deadly assaults” by al-Qaeda, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{18} Sean Greenaway and Andrew J. Harris identify four types of threat: accident, criminality, banditry and targeting. According to their 1998 paper, “Humanitarian Security: Challenges and Responses,” accidents are responsible for the most lives lost; criminality and banditry are next, then targeting, which is the least common but deadliest threat when it does occur.
25. Panel members also visited a number of UN duty stations in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East that, together, offered first-hand exposure to different types of UN operations – from peacekeeping and complex humanitarian operations to representational or “traditional” national offices – and how they organize and manage security in different environments. Locations visited include: Addis Ababa, where the Panel also collected data on UN activities in Eritrea; Algiers, Amman, Bangkok, Beirut, Beit-El (West Bank), Cairo, Colombo, El Fasher, Geneva, Islamabad, Jerusalem, Kabul, Khartoum, Nablus, Nairobi, where it also examined UN activities for Somalia; Naqoura, Ramallah, Rome, and Vavuniya (northern Sri Lanka).

26. During these field missions, Panel members met with a wide range of individuals within the UN System, including executive and senior managers, security professionals, civilian staff, both national and international, from the Secretariat, the Agencies, Funds, and Programmes, the Regional Commissions, and peacekeeping missions. It met with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Geneva and in country locations. Panel members also met with host country authorities. Most importantly, the visits provided the Panel with the opportunity to talk with both national and international staff about their perceptions of – and confidence in – the UN security management system.

27. In Algeria, the Panel was particularly concerned with meeting the Algerian authorities, as well as with UN staff and personnel who survived the deadly attack on the UN offices, and the families of those who were killed or seriously injured.

28. The Panel held both group and individual meetings. To encourage individuals to share their thoughts and opinions on the United Nations security management system freely, many of the interviews and meetings conducted by the Panel were confidential.

29. To ensure that all staff and personnel in the UN System, regardless of their location, had a confidential and direct means of addressing their thoughts or concerns on security and safety, the Panel created an email address, which was announced through iSeek and by the Panel in its country visits.

30. Finally, while the Panel originally set a time frame of six to eight weeks to produce its report, it became evident that the work required at least three months. With the multitude of issues that have emerged, even more time could have been invested in this exercise. The Panel has decided to focus its full attention on those areas, which if addressed, could have an immediate positive impact on the UN security management system.

II. The 11 December 2007 attack against the United Nations in Algiers

31. As stated at the outset of this report, the attack against the UN offices in Algiers was not the only reason for the establishment of the Independent Panel, but it was the most immediate. The Panel has viewed its work as an effort to ensure that the profoundly shocking and regrettable loss of life in Algiers will result in reforms and changes in attitudes that will hopefully contribute to a reduction in future loss of life and damage to property.
32. The Panel has examined the attack on UN personnel and premises in Algiers and its aftermath taking into consideration, in particular, the Framework for Accountability for the United Nations security management system, adopted by the General Assembly on 4 April 2007.  

33. Many compare the December 2007 attack in Algiers to the August 2003 bombing of the UN office in Baghdad. The attack in Algiers, however, differed from that in Baghdad in at least one important respect: Iraq was a war zone; a country recently invaded and occupied, in which the presence of the United Nations was heavily politicized. The UN presence in Iraq was perceived in some quarters, both within and outside the country, as complicit by association with the occupation. UN presence and work in Algiers, by contrast, is low-profile, small-scale and not the object of any controversy in Algeria itself or elsewhere.

A. Summary of Facts

34. Facts are essential for understanding the circumstances in which the attack of 11 December 2007 took place. While some considerable security measures were taken during 2007 in response to security incidents and heightened security risks, an examination of the facts helps to understand what happened and how it happened.

a) The combined programmes of all UN agencies, funds, and programmes in Algeria for the period 2007-2011 total US$ 62.3 million, excluding the Sahrawi refugee assistance programme in the Tindouf area. By October 2007, UN staff in Algeria included 116 nationals and 18 internationals. There is no UN presence outside the capital city, Algiers, with the exception of the Sahrawi refugee assistance programme. Despite the relatively small dimension of UN programmes in the country, the Government of Algeria (GoA) told the Independent Panel that it attaches great importance to the UN’s presence in the country.

b) The following UN entities are present in Algeria: FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNIC, UNICEF, UNIDO, WFP, WHO. The World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) are also represented. UNICEF and FAO, as well as the Bank and IFC, had their own offices. All other agencies shared common premises in what was known as UN House, provided by the Government of Algeria. (UNHCR had an office across the street from the UN House). These two offices – UN House and UNHCR – were hit by the 11 December attack.

c) The Government of Algeria faced an increasingly volatile security environment beginning in the mid-1980s. In 1994, the UN designated Algeria as a Phase IV security environment. In 1996, the security phase was lowered to Phase III. Measures by the Algerian security forces and a 1999 Government amnesty gradually improved the overall security environment. By 2000, the Government

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19 A/RES/61/263.
21 Throughout this report, the term “agencies” is used as shorthand for “agencies, funds, and programmes.”
22 The UNICEF offices moved out of the UN House in late 2004 due to UNICEF’s need of more space.
regarded the terrorist groups as largely defeated, save for a few pockets of resistance. Algerian authorities consider that the situation further improved with a national reconciliation programme put in place following a referendum in 2005. But the GoA was aware, all along, that continued vigilance was required.

d) Throughout, the Government of Algeria provided security to the United Nations as well as Diplomatic Missions in Algiers. In August 2006, Algiers and all but the rural areas of twelve other departments (wilayas) were lowered to Phase I. The UN declared Phase III in Algiers immediately after the 11 December 2007 attack.

e) As noted in the preliminary DSS report on the 11 December 2007 attack, all contact by the UN Designated Official for Security (DO) and the Security Adviser (SA) with the national security authorities occurred through the Director General for Protocol (DGP) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). This restricted contact with security agencies was not limited to the UN; diplomatic missions in Algiers also conduct their security relations through the DGP/MFA. This is the practice in a number of other countries. 23

f) Beginning in September 2006, terrorist groups again carried out a number of high-profile attacks on government assets.

g) On 21 December 2006, [redacted] the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) issued an assessment of the 10 December 2006 attack in Algiers by the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC). It stated: “It is likely that GSPC and their proxies will continue this line of targeting, of which the UN figures prominently; UN staff, operations, and facilities should be considered probable targets.” 24 The [redacted] analysis also underlined that “GSPC was able to conduct hostile reconnaissance and surveillance on the target and overcome the security forces mitigating measures. This would suggest that an urban cell is in place and may have been tasked with attacking foreign targets…the specificity is of particular importance to the UN, as the organization is now a well established target of Al Qaeda’s senior leadership.” 25

h) According to the DO, in anticipation of the upcoming regional meeting of the Ministers of Interior of Arab countries in January 2007, where the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security (USG/DSS) was to participate, the SA on behalf of the DO requested the USG to meet with the Minister of Algeria at the margins of the plenary, and to raise the issues of communications with the government on security, the vulnerability of the UN offices, and the security arrangements for the UN.

i) A 17 March 2007 [redacted] evaluation by the [redacted] in Algiers noted that security incidents and attacks during February and March 2007 in Algiers, Boumerdes, Tizi Ouzou and Bouira demonstrated “an evolution in the mode of operations by terrorist activists,” including consecutive or simultaneous attacks in urban areas, and the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. 26

j) On 11 April 2007, a vehicle-borne bomb targeted the main government building – the Palais du Gouvernement, where the Office of the Prime Minister and several

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23 According to Article 41 (2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), “All official business with the receiving State entrusted to the mission by the sending State shall be conducted with or through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State or such other ministry as may be agreed.”

24 [redacted]

25 [redacted]

26 [redacted]
other ministries are located. The same day, a similar attack was conducted against a police station in Bab-Ezzouar, just outside the city, and a third attempt failed in the vicinity of the World Bank and Danish Embassy in the Hydra section of Algiers, where the UN House was also located. As a result of these incidents, 33 people were killed and over 200 wounded. The attacks, as with nearly all significant attacks after January 2007, were claimed by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

k) On the same day, 11 April, at an emergency meeting, the United Nations Security Management Team in Algeria (SMT), decided to maintain security phase I with enhanced security measures. As noted by the preliminary report of DSS, although Phase I was officially maintained, the mitigation measures taken corresponded more to those of Phase II.

l) The Designated Official sent a Note Verbale, dated 11 April 2007, to the DGP/MFA requesting reinforcement of existing security measures in place at UN premises in Algiers.

m) Following up on the transmission of the Note Verbale, the DO met with the DGP/MFA to convey the security concerns of the UN Country Team. He also informed the DGP/MFA of his intention to meet with the President of the Assemblée Populaire Communale of Hydra – effectively the mayor of Hydra. The DO was reportedly told by the DGP/MFA that, for barriers, making a one-way street, and speed bumps, he should see the Mayor of Hydra.

n) On 23 April 2007, the DO met with the mayor of Hydra and requested: (i) installation of speed bumps on Emile Payen Street, which runs in front of the UN House; (ii) making the street one-way; and (iii) installation of bollards in front of the UN building. A letter, confirming these requests, was sent by the DO to the President of the Assemblée Populaire Communale on 24 April. Though police presence was increased, with police checkpoints established in front of the UN House and on the street, the bollards and measures to restrict traffic were not implemented by the Government.

o) The SMT meeting of 29 April 2007 reviewed measures taken following the 11 April attack and endorsed the proposal by UNDP to examine options for relocating the UN House owing to lack of stand-off distance. As none of the premises considered was found to be suitable, the UN House remained in Hydra up until the 11 December attack. The intensity of UNDP’s search diminished by September 2007. One of the reported explanations for this is that the search continued, but much more selectively following the rejection by

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27 [redacted].
28 In his 11 September 2006 video-taped interview, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri announced that GSPC had joined the al Qaeda organization. The GSPC confirmed its allegiance to al Qaeda in a statement posted on its website two days later (TRU/DSS email dated 21 December 2006). By January 2007, GSPC changed its name to al Qaeda in the Maghreb (memorandum by the DSS Security Adviser in Algiers dated 17 April 2007).
29 [redacted] The SA was out of the country on 11 April and called the DO from Dakar upon hearing of the attack to offer to return immediately to Algiers and to discuss the situation. In the 17 April memorandum, the SA made an analysis of the situation and recommended additional security measures, which were the ones presented to the mayor of Hydra by the DO in the 23 April meeting.
30 The exact date of this meeting cannot be verified. The Office of the Resident Coordinator informed the Panel that his calendar was not found after the 11 December blast.
31 Interview with the Office of the Resident Coordinator for Algeria, 26 May 2008.
32 [redacted].
p) On 15 May 2007, [redacted] [the DSS] issued another threat assessment, distributed to senior DSS and UN agencies security focal points, managers, as well as to the UN Security Adviser in Algiers, in which it observed for the first time that “the former GSPC directly addresses the UN with hostile rhetoric that may potentially inflame their followers against the Organization creating conducive conditions in areas where it has or may have operational capacities.” [redacted]

q) On 29 May, the UN Resident Coordinator/DO in Algeria informed the GoA of the wish of the UN Country Team to move into common premises “to respond in a more appropriate manner to needs of space, parking and access.” In the same Note Verbale, the UN in Algiers asked for the Government’s assistance to identify suitable premises. On 2 July, the office of the DGP/MFA confirmed its agreement with the desired move, but did not offer alternative premises.

r) On 7 August 2007, [redacted] [DSS] sent an alert to all Agencies’ security focal points and DSS senior staff, [redacted] – suggesting that it be shared with Agencies’ field security officers and DSS Security Advisers – citing a general risk of al Qaeda targeting humanitarian or developmental arms of the United Nations, though the message did not mention any geographic region specifically, nor specific operational intent.

s) In response to significant terrorist attacks in Batna, Dellys, and Tebessa on 6 and 7 September 2007, the Designated Official reaffirmed at the SMT meeting of 9 September the security measures already in place since April 11[redacted].

t) The SMT minutes from 9 September 2007 do not mention discussion of a recommendation to change the security phase. The same day, however, the Security Adviser recommended to [redacted] [DSS] that the security phase in Algiers and “all areas where there were major incidents or large scale military operations,” be upgraded to Phase II, considering the forthcoming month of Ramadan, and regional elections scheduled for 29 November 2007. [redacted] The Security Adviser reports in this email that the proposed phase change led to a lively one hour discussion in the SMT, but SMT members decided not to put it on record.

u) The October 2007 Security Risk Assessment [redacted] sent to the DO, who shared it with the SMT and the West Africa Desk – rated the risk of terrorist attacks, including vehicle-borne suicide bombs as “critical” and “very likely,” with an anticipated “critical” impact.

v) In preparation for the visit of the [redacted] [DSS] to Algeria, the DO said he sent a Note Verbale to the DGP/MFA requesting a meeting on behalf of the OIC. Subsequently, a reminder was sent regarding the request. Both Note Verbales were left without answer.

w) The [redacted] [DSS] visited Algiers from 16 - 18 November 2007. According to a member of the SMT, the [redacted] [official] was unable to provide advice

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33 According to interviews with members of the Country Team and Office of the Resident Coordinator, the reference to “access” was a means to overcome the sensitivity of the GoA to matters of security.
34 Memorandum from the DO to all Heads of Agency, dated 12 September 2007.
35 [redacted].
36 Preliminary DSS Report para 23
37 [redacted]
during his visit, nor sent any report to Algiers following his return. 38 The [redacted] [official] did not file a mission report with DSS/HQ; nor did his supervisor request a report or briefing from him.

x) Following a visit to Algiers in late November, [redacted] [an SRSG] sent an email to the [redacted] [concerned department of DSS] in which he expressed his concern that “Algiers is an accident waiting to happen.” 39 According to the [redacted] [head of this office], this message was passed on to the [redacted] [desk]. The SRSG did not speak to the DO of Algeria.

y) According to the DO, as a consequence of relative quiet during the month of Ramadan, the peaceful atmosphere of the 29 November local elections, and the high-profile state visit in early December of French President Nicholas Sarkozy to Algeria, the Algerian security services relaxed their state of alert. The Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale informed the Panel that police had been on continuous duty since the beginning of Ramadan and that normal leave schedules were reintroduced after the departure of President Sarkozy. But the Algerian authorities insist their vigilance remained high at all times.

B. The Attack of 11 December and the Immediate Aftermath

35. On 11 December 2007, a vehicle-borne bomb (VBB) struck the Algerian Constitutional Court at approximately 09.30 am. At 09h52, a second VBB detonated at the UN offices, destroying the building and severely damaging surrounding structures, including the UNHCR office across the street. Seventeen UN personnel were killed and 40 injured. A policeman on duty at the UN House and a DHL agent inside the UN were also killed in the blast, as were five individuals residing adjacent to the office. Nine severely wounded staff were evacuated to France and one to Geneva for medical treatment within 48 hours of the attack. Blast film, installed on all windows in the UN offices, undoubtedly reduced the injuries of many inside the buildings – a valuable lesson learned from both the Baghdad bombing and the targeting of the UNAMA offices in Kandahar in 2003. UN vehicles, equipment, and files were also destroyed. The UN lost part of its operational capacity in the attack. Important physical damage was inflicted on many of the houses neighbouring the UN offices in this residential district of Algiers.

36. With the death of the DSS Security Adviser as a result of the blast, the UNICEF Regional Security Adviser for the Middle East and North Africa, who happened to be on mission in Algiers, arrived at the UN House within some 15 minutes of the attack and assumed the role of managing the scene of the incident on behalf of the UN. The Algerian Civil Defence provided search and rescue response, which was considered by different UN witnesses as “phenomenal” and most efficient. The GoA also provided cars to transport staff and telephones for them to call family members. Senior government officials visited the scene. Many of the surviving UN personnel worked around the clock to assist with clearing rubble in order to locate victims and identify the dead. Several stood out for their dedication and courage during the rescue effort, including the ILO Officer-in-Charge, and an office cleaner who was several months pregnant.

37. On the same day, the DO, who was lightly injured, convened an emergency SMT meeting at the UNICEF office, located in another area of Algiers, and where a UN crisis

38 Interview with member of the SMT, 26 May 2008.
39 [redacted]
emergency centre was also established. UN Headquarters declared Algiers a phase III security environment and set up a crisis operations centre at DSS Headquarters.

38. As noted in the preliminary DSS report, additional security officers from DSS, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, and WFP all arrived in Algiers within 24 to 48 hours, as did a WFP emergency communications team. Two DSS and one UNHCR stress counsellors arrived within 32 hours of the attack to provide support to survivors and the families of victims, conduct needs assessments, recruit local counsellors, and to follow up the cases of those evacuated. The team’s work has been widely appreciated. The UNDP Administrator, the USG/DSS, and the Regional Operations Director of DSS arrived in Algiers within 48 hours.

39. The Secretary-General visited Algiers on 18 December. Following the visit, he approved a one-time ex gratia payment to injured UN staff and the families of those killed, paid in addition to indemnities, including the UN Malicious Acts Insurance and the GoA’s national insurance for victims of terrorism. Under the ex gratia payment, the families of the 17 UN personnel killed and 13 seriously injured each received €5000; 25 other injured personnel each received €3000. These payments were made in December 2007. Additionally, all UN personnel were provided salary advances and those with contracts due to expire by end-December 2007 were given a three month extension in order to provide additional financial security; these contracts were subsequently extended a further three months until the end of June 2008.

40. Approximately US$ 36,700 collected by the joint UNDP, UNFPA, UNOPS staff association in New York was donated to the families of seven non-UN staff killed or seriously injured who were at the UN House or its immediate vicinity and who, not having a contractual relationship with the UN, would not be able to benefit from the Organization’s insurance or other entitlements. Algerian nationals received a payment under the Algerian government’s benefit scheme for victims of terrorism, which was also extended to the families of internationals killed.

41. GSPS released a communiqué quoted in the Algerian daily Al Watan on 13 December in which it claimed responsibility for the attacks. A second statement, this time issued under the name of al Qaeda in the Maghreb on 29 December 2007, again claimed responsibility for the attacks against the Constitutional Court and the United Nations. The group boasted that their attacks were successful even though the Ministry of Interior had been aware – through pictures of the two buildings found on the mobile phone of a terrorist captured earlier by the Security Services – that the two sites were targeted. The Algerian authorities deny that there were any pictures of the UN building on any phone found with a captured terrorist. The Algerian official press agency, Algerie Press Service, said on 11 December that the Interior Minister emphasized that, according to statements made by members of GSPS arrested following the 11 April attacks, sites like the Constitutional Court were designated targets of the terrorist group.

42. All UN agencies with offices hit on 11 December set up their offices in Algiers. In mid-February, they moved to a suite of offices in the ABC building, provided gratis by the GoA until the end of 2008. According to information provided by the DGP/MFA to the Panel, additional and significant security measures were put in place

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40 The RR/RC approved an ex gratia payment of €5000 to the family of the seventeenth UN staff member killed, a UNDP-administered consultant.
after 11 December, including deploying uniformed and plainclothes police to UN offices in Algiers and appointing a security focal point in the office of the DGP/MFA. The GoA also offered the UN an 8000m² plot of land in the future Algiers diplomatic enclave on which to build a new UN House.

43. On 11 January 2008, DSS provided its preliminary report to the Secretary-General.

44. It was only on 22 April 2008, after a three month gap, that a Resident Coordinator/Designated Official ad interim arrived in Algiers. During this period, Heads of Agency based in Algiers rotated as DO.

C. The Panel’s Observations and Recommendations

45. There are lessons to be learned from the tragic events in Algiers. In addition to the observations in this section, other conclusions and lessons will be reflected in various chapters of this report and in the Panel’s overall recommendations to the Secretary-General.

46. The Panel has carefully tried to avoid giving in into the temptation of passing judgment with hindsight.

47. Any Designated Official and Security Adviser needs to be able to rely on the support and guidance of Headquarters as well as on the cooperation and support of the host government.

48. In the case of Algeria, a distant relationship with the authorities in the field of security and the strong views of the Government regarding UN Security Phases in the country tainted what could and should have been a close working relationship: there were no exchanges at the strategic level and there was no cooperation at the technical level. This weakness could and should have been at least partially offset by pro-active support from DSS Headquarters.

Role of the Host Government

49. The Government of Algeria has been battling terrorism since the mid-1980s, well before the interruption of the electoral process of December 1991. Over 100,000 Algerians lost their lives in what the Algerians call the “black decade” of the 1990s. In addition to this staggering loss of life, the cost in terms of destruction of infrastructure and economic assets was equally high. Throughout this period, the United Nations never left the country and the security measures taken by the GoA to protect the UN enabled the Organization to continue working even during the worst periods of this violence.

50. Today, the Government believes that it has largely defeated terrorism in Algeria. Yet, it is also aware that what remains of it continues to constitute a threat both to the Algerian people themselves and to their foreign partners. In the analysis that the GoA shared with the Panel, the attacks since the end of 2006, which increased in frequency in 2007, represented a new type of threat linked to international terrorism and utilizing a new method – suicide attacks. The GoA is also aware that the United Nations does face a heightened threat from terrorist groups in Algeria and elsewhere. Following
the 11 April attack, the GoA took extra measures to protect all diplomatic missions in Algiers, including the UN, although the nature and scope of these measures were unfortunately not communicated to the Designated Official or Security Adviser.

51. The GoA organized its relations with the UN on security through the sole channel of the Director General of Protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGP/MFA), as it does with most embassies in Algiers. As previously noted, Algeria is not the only country using this system. Unfortunately, under this system, the Designated Official and Security Adviser had practically no access to – and thus no possibility to discuss security with – their counterparts in the Government’s security services.

52. No matter how helpful the Director of Protocol and his staff may have been, they could not possibly replace the benefit of direct contact with the Algerian security services with their extensive knowledge and experience of anti-terrorist actions. Such contacts would have been immensely valuable to the Designated Official and the Security Adviser as they tried to assess the security situation.

53. The GoA strongly believes that it did enough to protect the UN prior to 11 December. The Panel knows today, as do the Algerian authorities, that these security measures were not enough. They were not enough for the UN House, nor were they enough for the Constitutional Court. To be sure, total security does not exist anywhere. Incidents like this have happened in the past, not only in Algiers, but also in Bali, Istanbul, London, Madrid, Mumbai, and elsewhere. And, unfortunately, they will happen again in the future.

54. In the case of the attack on UN House in Algiers, it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty that the attack would not have taken place if only there had been a freer exchange of information between the UN and the Algerian security services, or even if greater protective measures had been taken, such as the more robust police deployment and restriction of vehicular traffic in front of UN offices that were requested but not implemented. But at least, everyone would have felt that all reasonable measures had been taken or at least thoroughly discussed.

55. The Panel is now aware that although they did not exchange information, the Algerian security services as well as the United Nations Country Team were equally worried about the possibility of security incidents during Ramadan in September, the local elections in November, and the visit of the French President early in December. These three events passed without incident. After months of mobilization, the Algerian security services resumed near normal duty routine and that is when the terrorists struck.

56. After the attack, as noted, the reaction of the “protection civile” (fire department and emergency services) was swift and efficient. Ambulances were waiting to transfer those pulled from the wreckage to hospital without delay. The hospitals’ medical personnel provided a high level of care to the many injured.

57. During the Panel’s visit to Algiers, the Government explained the impressive measures that had been taken subsequent to 11 December to protect the city in general and the diplomatic corps – including the UN – in particular. Additional, robust protective measures have been installed, especially for UN offices. The Government also held a
meeting, at the UN temporary premises, bringing together senior staff of the office of the DGP/MFA, led by the Director General, and the UN Country Team.

58. The Panel noted as a positive step that a security focal point within the DGP/MFA had been created. Such a measure has the potential to substantially facilitate and enhance cooperation between Algerian authorities and the UN Country Team on all matters related to security and safety of UN premises and personnel.

59. Welcome as these measures taken post-11 December are, it is still a matter of deep regret that cooperation between the GoA and the UN Country Team was not as close as it could and should have been and there will always be a lingering doubt in everyone’s mind that had the two partners been working together, perhaps, the 11 December tragedy might not have taken place – and, if it did, its consequences might have been less catastrophic.

60. Beyond these steps specific to Algeria, there are also two lessons for all Member States of the United Nations:

- First, the explicit targeting of the UN by terrorist groups represents a sea-change among the threats the Organization faces at present and will continue to face in the foreseeable future. The UN is being targeted by terrorists for what it is and what it represents, not because its people happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time or for what any part of the organization happens to have done at a particular place, at a particular time. As such, this threat is not confined to any one country or region; indeed, for this specific type of threat – that of al-Qaeda and similar organizations – the UN is a potential target everywhere it has a presence.

- Second, United Nations officials entrusted with security responsibilities should have direct access to the security services of every host government in order to ensure timely exchange of information and common analysis of available facts concerning the safety and security of UN personnel, activities and premises. The UN has no intelligence gathering and analysis capacity of its own; it relies entirely on that which Member States are willing to provide.

Role of the Designated Official

61. The Designated Official was neither forceful nor persistent with the Algerian authorities to insist on the security measures requested of the Government. There is no record of any further effort by him beyond the 11 April Note Verbale and meetings which immediately followed with the DGP/MFA and Mayor of Hydra. He does not seem to have tried to meet Algerian officials to insist on the need for enhanced security measures or seek explanation why the requested measures could not be put in place. In late 2007, in anticipation of the visit to Algeria by [redacted] [concerned official] the DO sent a Note Verbale to the DGP/MFA requesting a meeting for the [redacted] [official] regarding security. The Note Verbale was followed by a reminder. There was no response by the DGP/MFA. The [redacted] [official] did not meet with him during his visit. The DO told the Panel that although he met with the DGP/MFA on other matters,
he did not raise security concerns because the attitude of the Algerian officials was always that “the Government would take care of it if there were to be a problem.”

62. The DO did not seek assistance from DSS/Headquarters and/or from UN senior management at Headquarters to intervene directly with the Algerian Government in support of his own demarche. Nevertheless, as stated above, the DO also said that at the end of 2006 he requested the USG/DSS see the Algerian Minister of Interior at the meeting of Ministers of Interior of Arab countries held in early 2007 in Tunisia and to raise the DO’s concerns about security in Algiers, UN communications with the GoA, and in particular the vulnerability of office spaces. He received no reply and only in January 2008 he was informed that USG/DSS did not see the Minister because the latter did not attend the meeting. The USG did meet the Minister in Tunis in January 2008.

63. According to the DO, his reticence to ask for help from his superiors was a reflection of an institutional culture that sees a request for assistance from Headquarters as a sign of managerial weakness. The DO said he had no basis on which he could expect any help, based on past experience.

64. The DO did not change the Security Phase from I to II after 11 April or in September, as recommended by the SA. Though the Phase was not changed, the DO did take on board the measures recommended by the Security Adviser to mitigate the identified heightened risk. The DO reported to the Panel that, bearing in mind the constant pressure of the Government to lower the Security Phase, he opted – with the support of the SMT – for formal maintenance of the Security Phase at the same level, yet with a heightened level of security measures, which would be commensurate with Phase II.

65. The DO informed UNDP staff over three meetings between April and October 2007 of his contacts with the GoA on the issue of security, status of implementation of security measures, as well as of the search for a new office space. The DO does not recall having ever been approached by staff with specific concerns about security at UN House. The concern was about the return of terrorism to Algiers.

Role of the Security Adviser

66. The relationship between the DO and the SA reportedly was not close. This seems indeed to have been the case, and, as far as the Panel can ascertain on the basis of interviews, it caused personal frustrations for both of them, in particular for the SA who felt he was not listened to or supported. The DO told the Panel that they “were not friends” and indicated during his interview with the Panel that perhaps he could have worked more on that relationship. The SA’s formal performance evaluation by the DO is positive in all areas of competency, with the SA being rated as either meeting expectations or exceeding them.

67. Among the main responsibilities of a Security Adviser identified in the Framework for Accountability are: (i) to provide professional security advice to the Designated Official and the SMT on threats, risks, and mitigating measures, and (ii) to establish contacts within the national security authorities necessary to do this.

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41 Interview by telephone by DO, 14 May 2008.
68. The Panel gauged that the Security Adviser was professional and dedicated. Despite the complex local environment, the difficult relationship with his supervisor, and the fact that Algiers was his first posting, the SA fulfilled his professional duties by providing regular advice to the DO and SMT. The Panel also notes that there was no practice of the SA copying the DO on his correspondence with Headquarters. According to security colleagues, he felt that his warnings regarding the vulnerability of the UN were not taken seriously enough by his colleagues in the SMT, including the DO. He also produced threat and risk assessments. Sadly, the attack of 11 December confirmed his worst fears in the most dramatic way. He proposed risk mitigation measures which regrettably were not all implemented by the GoA. He had regular contacts with DSS Headquarters to discuss developments in the region, including threats and risks to the UN. Regrettably, DSS Headquarters was not able to transform these exchanges into effective pro-active support to the security team in Algiers.

69. There was no working relationship between Algerian security officials and the Security Adviser and therefore there was no room for him to share with the GoA his own security assessment. The absence of a professional security focal point at the DGP/MFA’s office also meant that the SA could not make determinations about the nature and severity of the threats and risks to the UN, with the benefit of information that was known to the Algerian security services. The Security Adviser had contacts with a number of security officials in embassies in Algiers.

Role of the Department of Safety and Security

70. Concerning the Department of Safety and Security in New York, the [redacted] [concerned desk] regularly communicated with the Security Adviser by telephone and email. [redacted]. As such, the [redacted] [officer] and other members of the [redacted] Desk were aware of the view of the Security Adviser in Algiers that the threats and risks for the UN in Algeria were serious and increasing. New York was also privy to all security measures taken – and not taken – by the Designated Official in Algeria.

71. In addition to that, the [redacted] [official concerned] had recent first-hand contact with the situation during his visit from 16 - 18 November 2007. He stated that he did draft a mission report upon his return but did not finalize it or make recommendations concerning the situation in Algiers. The [redacted] [official concerned] informed the Panel that the Desk was unable to take a proactive position on Algeria – and, for that matter, other countries in its area of responsibility– due to the [redacted] [short staffing] The Panel asked why, following the OIC’s visit, no report was filed to record the results of that visit. The [redacted] [official concerned] informed the Panel that no official report was expected, as the original purpose of the trip – SMT training – was cancelled. Nor was an official report apparently asked for by the Director/DRO either.

72. Based on the records of communications made available to the Panel, the [redacted] [concerned desk] did not provide any further comments, revisions, or advice to the Security Adviser or Designated Official on the mitigating measures taken during the course of 2007, in particular after the 11 April and September 2007 terrorist attacks, or the October 2007 Security Risk Assessment. DSS senior and middle management in New York did not initiate any measures to support the efforts of the Designated Official, Security Management Team and Security Adviser. In particular, no one seems to have

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42 [redacted]
thought of approaching the Algerian Mission to the United Nations to seek their support with the request for more enhanced security measures for the UN in Algiers.

73. [redacted] [Concerned DSS officials] commented that there was no reason to consider the risk to the UN in Algeria any higher than in neighboring Tunisia and Morocco. This was based on the belief that the Algerian Government’s security strategy had been successful for many years, and that no information or incident had come to their attention that warranted any other judgment. According to [redacted] [the head], when the [redacted] [concerned official] visited Algiers in November, he was specifically requested by the Director/DRO to assess the security environment. [redacted] [He] stated he was unaware of the warnings sent by the Security Adviser to the Desk until the [redacted] [concerned official] reported them in December after the attack took place. According to the [redacted] [concerned official], among the diplomatic community as well as UN personnel in Algiers, there was greater fear of kidnapping than of bomb attacks on premises.

74. The email from the [redacted] [SRSG] concerning the situation in Algiers also appears not to have elicited a reaction. The Panel does recognize that the Desk, comparing information from Tunisia and Morocco, may have attributed the warnings of the SA to inexperience, and likewise may not have given much importance to the email from the SRSG. The views of the SA and the SRSG were not seen in light of the assessments made by the Threat and Assessment Unit, which on at least two occasions drew attention to dangers that the UN may face in Algiers. Consequently, the Panel is of the view that the Desk and the Director of Regional Operations should have given more weight to the views expressed by the Security Adviser, as well as to the email from the SRSG. No indication has been given to the Panel that any of these issues have been the subject of any discussion, at any level.

75. The Panel notes the failure of DSS Headquarters, in particular in the senior management and Division of Regional Operations, to put in place a system such that when there is a convergence of warnings of potentially high risk, it will trigger action from the Desk to the SA and DO and to bring to the attention of senior DSS officials UN security needs at the concerned duty station.

Role of the Security Management Team

76. Out of 12 UN entities represented in Algeria, only six of nine Heads of Agency participated in the 2 December 2007 SMT. Of these, two were Officers in Charge and two were about to retire or to be transferred to another duty station. Nor was this a unique situation; for example, the SMT minutes from 28 October show four Heads of Agency present, one of whom was OiC; those of 4 August show six Heads of Agency present, two of whom were OiC. These circumstances significantly weakened the effectiveness of the SMT as a forum for discussion on security matters. The DO opened the SMT to national staff OiCs, though not all Agencies wanted to be represented in the SMT by national staff.

Role of the UN security system focal points

77. The assessments and analyses produced [redacted] at DSS Headquarters were made available to all UN agencies security focal points and senior security officers. The analysis of the threats and risks for the UN system in Algeria was therefore available to
all agencies that had offices and staff in Algeria. The recipients [redacted] had the security expertise and authority to advise their Executive Heads and Representatives in Algiers as well as to question DSS Headquarters, if they felt further or different actions were needed. The Panel has not seen indications that any initiative was taken by the Headquarters of any UN organization with an office in Algiers.

78. No members of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) with whom the Panel spoke recalled Algeria having been raised during the [redacted] security conference calls during 2007.

Support to the UN Country Team after 11 December

79. Headquarters crisis management and the support to the UN Country Team after 11 December 2007 was fragmented and uneven. Too quickly, Headquarters systems – the Secretariat and agencies – seem to have stopped treating the aftermath of the attack as a top priority. This has caused delays in administrative action, left a serious leadership gap that has resulted in a negative image of the UN among its own personnel and lack of appropriate interlocutor with the GoA authorities.

80. The visit of the Secretary-General on 18 December 2007 was welcomed by UN staff and families in Algiers. The UNDP Administrator visited on 13 December 2007. UNDP sent in three administration managers who worked on issues related to contracts, compensation claims documentation, medical evacuation, and care. UNHCR sent in a management team to also fill in for the vacant post of the Chief of Mission. The Department of Public Information sent two spokespersons to facilitate media relations.

81. Nonetheless, agency headquarters continued to require routine reporting from its country office, acknowledging neither that the office was operating with essential staff only, nor that the country office’s files were destroyed or incomplete as a result of the blast. Senior managers of some of the larger agencies visited and made changes to their senior staff assignments. The ongoing effort to develop a practice and culture of business continuity planning should better protect the UN in the future against similar difficulties restarting activities.

82. The RC/DO was separated from duty in Algiers and transferred while he was in Geneva for the memorial organized for the UN staff killed in the bombing. The RC post was temporarily filled only after three months of minimal action on the recuperation and coordination of the UN System in Algiers. The delay in filling the central post for the representation of the Organization left, among staff and the Algerian authorities, a question about the UN’s intentions. The press statement made by the UNDP Administrator on 15 December 2007 that United Nations offices in Algiers would “begin work again in the forthcoming days,”[43] which was presumably intended to reassure both UN staff and the GoA, also appears to have raised expectations and thus created frustration. UNDP informed the Panel that they had applied for a visa for a replacement for the DRR in January without any positive reply. This was followed up in March and subsequently in April, resulting in a visa being granted for the UNDP staff member appointed as RC/RR/DO ai. The appointment was long overdue; both the UN and the GoA share responsibility for this inexcusable delay.

43 Algérie Presse Service, 15 December 2007
83. The vacuum in leadership and the reduced administrative capacity of the UN in Algeria at a time when the Country Team was traumatized and weakened caused frustration, as noted above, but also a sense of abandonment among staff and the families of UN personnel who were injured or lost their lives in the 11 December 2007 attack. The Panel met separately with the staff and with the victims’ families. Both meetings were emotional and revealed bitterness and indignation. Despite the irreparable sense of loss, much of the anger directed at the Organization would not be there if the RC/DO post had been filled more rapidly and if the most needed administrative support deployed right after the tragedy had remained in Algiers. Many of the questions and issues raised by the victims’ families, for example, would have been handled much earlier, significantly reducing frustration and, most importantly, providing the support the families needed during a most difficult period in their lives. They did, however, express their appreciation for the work of the UN stress counsellor team.

84. The situation concerning the replacement of the SA is similar to that of the RC. Seventeen security officers came and left Algiers from January 2008 until April 2008 – one every week on average – when a temporary, three-month replacement was deployed. The Panel was informed during its visit to Algiers that several of those initially deployed were unable to speak either Arabic or French, severely limiting their capacity to be effective and fully operational during their short stay in-country. The current SA has started to put systems in place and rebuild confidence. He should be extended until the arrival of the new, permanent SA.

85. While all the individuals who have been deployed to Algiers after the bombing have worked with great commitment and diligence, the support of the UN Development Group to the UN management in-country did not maintain momentum. Nor did it use previous lessons learned in terms of ensuring senior leadership, restoring operational capacity, and communications. Overall, the leadership of managers on the ground should have been better supported, and enabled to look after their staff as a first priority.

86. Key recommendation on the 11 December 2007 attack on the UN in Algiers: The Secretary-General should consider establishing an independent audit and accountability procedure to review the responsibilities of the key individuals and offices concerned with the 11 December 2007 attack on the UN offices in Algiers. Such independent procedure should provide the basis for whatever actions the Secretary-General might decide to take with respect to those individuals and offices. The Panel believes that such an independent procedure would go a long way towards restoring the confidence and the morale of the staff.

III. The UN Security Management System

87. For many years now, the Organization has periodically reviewed its security management system in order to keep pace with the deteriorating security environments in which it operates. As the Secretary-General observed in his report, “Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations,” these steps have included, beginning in 1999, an increase in the staff in the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, the appointment of a full-time UN Security Coordinator in 2001, more than doubling the size of its headquarters staff and more than quadrupling the number of staff in the field in 2002. 44

44 A/59/365, para, 4.
88. After 2001, and in 2003, prior to and immediately after the attack in Baghdad, several independent evaluation teams were commissioned to identify long-term improvements.

89. In fact, the Panel found a wealth of excellent recommendations in earlier reports and has benefited from the letter and the spirit of many of them during its work (a list of these reports is included in Annex VI). The Panel was also impressed by the amount of attention given to security by all parts of the United Nations: Member States, in particular through the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and several Departments in the Secretariat, Agencies, Funds, and Programmes, and Staff Unions. Much of this work has been very thorough and creative.

90. But it was surprising that many of those recommendations – even some that have been repeated again and again – have not been fully implemented over the years. The Panel believes that the USG/DSS should assign a senior staff member in DSS to review, and thus help DSS to make full use of these recommendations.

91. The Ahtisaari Report recommended an “in-depth review and reform of the UN security system by independent professionals in security management.” This Panel is pleased to note that such a review took place and among the recommendations in some of these reports was the need for an integrated security management system. These became the basis for proposals by the Secretary-General for a new UN security management system. Thanks to Member States, who followed up on these recommendations, a new security management system was established, with significantly increased resources that enabled the creation of the Department of Safety and Security, reviewed in detail below.

92. The necessary starting point for a review of the UN security management system is the Framework for Accountability, which “specifies the roles and responsibilities of all actors in the United Nations security management system, from the Secretary-General and other senior officials, through to every individual staff member and employee within the United Nations System.” It is intended to integrate all staff into one common security management structure, in which all staff members – from the Secretary-General through individual personnel – are linked by clear lines of accountability. The Framework for Accountability is potentially a powerful tool – but it has yet to be fully operationalized (see Chapter VII).

93. The goal of the United Nations security management system is “to enable the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the security, safety, and well-being of staff as a high priority.”

94. The UN security management system is founded on two principles: that the primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and security for UN staff and premises rests with

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46 Letter from the USG/DSS, dated 4 April 2007.
47 Framework for Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System, para. 2; also (A/57/300) and (A/57/365).
the host country and, second, that the UN security management system should be unified, but decentralized to the country level.\footnote{Ibid.}

\section*{A. The IASMN, HLCM, and CEB}

95. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) is a forum for the elaboration of security policy and guidelines within the United Nations. Chaired by the USG/DSS and comprised of the security focal points from the agencies, funds, and programmes, and relevant departments of the Secretariat, the IASMN is intended to provide “coherence, direction, and client ownership in the UN security management system (A/62/324).” The IASMN is not a governance body. \[redacted\] The full IASMN meets twice a year to discuss and endorse recommendations on safety and security that are submitted to the High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM) and, in turn, the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB). The CEB has thus far not considered security a central part of its work as a collective body.

96. The IASMN has done commendable work in building a body of policy and guidance for the UN common security system. Its members also see the IASMN as having the responsibility for ensuring these policies and guidelines are translated into action within their own organizations.

97. Many stakeholders within the UN security management system observed that the number (46) and diversity of entities represented in the IASMN makes it an unwieldy body in which it is difficult to reach agreement. Because of this size and diversity of the IASMN, its members all comment that their needs are not sufficiently reflected in the outcome of its work. It is evident that the IASMN, if it is going to service the UN security management system, must be led and supported in a manner which can produce policy guidance appropriate for the variety of its members needs.

98. DSS is financed by the regular UN budget and a cost-sharing arrangement with contributions from agencies according to a cost-sharing formula established by the HLCM following a request from the General Assembly in A/RES/55/238. As a result of the latter, IASMN has also become a forum to discuss the cost-plan for the biennial plans of the cost shared part of DSS.

99. As the strategic forum of the UN system that brings together the Secretary-General and the Executive Heads of Agencies, Funds, and Programmes, the CEB should be providing regular guidance and leadership on security-related matters, including, for example, on the concept of security as an enabler of safe programme delivery or on how to obtain donor support for the expanding costs of operating in high-risk areas, as mandated by Member States. The HLCM is the appropriate forum for reviewing the costs of IASMN-proposed measures and how to finance them, prior to submission to the CEB. However, there is a call, even within the context of the current system, to rationalize its administration.

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Key recommendations on the IASMN, HLCM, and CEB:}
\item \textbf{(i) The Secretary-General, as Chair of the CEB, and the CEB must review regularly the security system, its strategy, performance, and resources.} Consideration
should be given to have the CEB/HLCM serviced by a small working group that brings in IASMN representatives and DSS to provide the substance for the decisions by CEB.

(ii) Given the pressing and strategic nature of security-related issues and the fact that the CEB only meets twice a year, the Secretary-General should convene a smaller senior management group, serviced by the USG/DSS, that will meet every two months, or as required by events, in order to review and decide on strategic security issues, provide policy guidance, and review country-specific situations. Overall, the group would ensure that senior managers of the Organization are – and are seen as – leading the change to a managerial culture of responsibility and proactivity on security that enables delivery of programmes.

B. The Department of Safety and Security

101. The Panel devoted significant attention to reviewing the formation, structure, and functionality of the Department of Safety and Security, as the entity within the United Nations mandated to oversee, coordinate, and support the UN security management system. This section of the report examines the major components of DSS, their competencies, and effectiveness.

102. DSS was established by the General Assembly on 17 January 2005, based on the proposals of the Secretary-General and the recommendations of the ACABQ. In approving DSS, the General Assembly allocated a significant increase in financial and human resources for UN security. From these increased resources, incoming DSS recruits receive more thorough training – including briefings with agencies – than their UNSECOORD predecessors, and DSS is present in more countries around the world. Among the Department’s other achievements, the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security has made a concerted effort to meet Designated Officials in their RC/HC trainings and has intensified contacts with Member States, both in New York and in their capitals. It is especially commendable that DSS has improved the UN capacity for risk and threat assessment and analysis. The DSS stress counseling unit has added significant capacity to the ability of the UN to respond to emergencies.

103. The 11 December 2007 attack in Algiers was a serious test for DSS and quite a few flaws came to the surface. The Panel, in its interviews and country visits, has identified a number of gaps and weaknesses in the functionality and design of DSS that must be addressed as an urgent priority if the goal of the UN security management system is to be achieved. The gaps and weaknesses include: leadership and accountability, and internal management and oversight.

104. These weaknesses are the result, in part, of compromises within the Fifth Committee to reduce costs and set priorities for DSS, and of early reluctance among entities of the UN system to have a strong department. But the greater share is due to two factors – insufficient implementation by DSS senior management of the security management system approved by the General Assembly, and inadequate management of the rapid growth of the Department following its creation.

105. The creation of DSS was met with high hopes and expectations across the United Nations. The Panel feels there still is much good will towards the Department. Much support and respect has been voiced among field security staff for the USG/DSS
and his efforts to modernize the UN’s security management approach. Achievement of the objectives set for DSS depends entirely on the ability of those who are responsible for its development to negotiate and perform to the level of those hopes and expectations.

a. Leadership and Accountability

106. The Framework for Accountability assigns the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security responsibility for “the executive direction and control of the UN security management system.” Nevertheless, a number of senior officials in DSS and elsewhere in the Organization believe the USG/DSS needs to be given additional authority over security issues within the UN system. The Panel considers that such authority is clear in the mandate from the General Assembly, the highest UN deliberative body. It needs to be exercised comprehensively and timely at Headquarters and in the field. For this, the USG/DSS needs a departmental capacity – and more importantly, senior managers – that supports and executes a sound vision of internal management and oversight.

107. As the Framework for Accountability has not yet been operationalized within the Department of Safety and Security, there is a lack of clarity among staff regarding their responsibilities and reporting lines. The USG/DSS needs to delineate the role and responsibilities of the departmental divisions and their units. The language in the Framework for Accountability regarding DSS security personnel other than the CSA/SA is especially ambiguous: “Security personnel of [DSS] are responsible for assisting the Chief Security Adviser and the Designated Official, and are accountable to their respective heads of office.” While the Panel is of the view that this category is meant to include the Headquarters work units of DSS – e.g., the Director of Regional Operations, the Regional Desks, the Compliance, Evaluation, and Monitoring Unit – the Framework’s Annex refers only to the Chief of Security and Safety Services/Sections and the Chief Security Officer for Peacekeeping Missions, both outside of DSS/HQ. The Framework for Accountability needs to be operationalized within the Department of Safety and Security in order to eliminate lack of clarity among staff regarding their responsibilities and reporting lines.

108. At the current stage of the development of the security management system, it is necessary to solidify the role of the Department and to ensure that security, as a strategic matter, is part of the UN agenda. Now that the DSS country presence is widely deployed, the Panel notes that more of the USG’s time is needed at Headquarters, for strategic discussions and negotiations with Member States as well as the Executive Heads of the UN system. An Assistant Secretary-General could help meet this need. Although the original proposal for a new department on safety and security included provisions for a USG and an ASG, the latter post was deferred when DSS was established. As the USG/DSS is appointed for a non-renewable term, his eventual successor must similarly be a security professional with an international stature who will continue to develop and modernize DSS.

109. The ability of the USG/DSS to provide leadership and direction for the Department is jeopardized by the open conflict between DSS executive managers over a

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49 Framework for Accountability, para. 4,
50 Ibid, para. 13.
number of significant issues. This situation has clearly hindered the implementation of policy directives from the USG/DSS and is detrimental to staff morale within DSS Headquarters and elsewhere, thus undermining the effective functioning of the Department as a whole.

110. **Key recommendations on DSS executive management:**

(i) The USG/DSS must clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the different work units in his own Department, in line with the Framework for Accountability.

(ii) The post of Assistant-Secretary-General for Safety and Security should be established to enable the USG/DSS to focus on strategic issues, with the guarantee that a senior official will be available for both day-to-day overall management and strengthening of internal management of DSS, as well as to represent the Department in the absence of the USG.

b. **Status of Unification: Division of Security and Safety Services and Peacekeeping Operations Support Service**

111. When the new Department of Safety and Security Service was designed, it was modelled on the concepts of a common system and unification of the capacity for setting policy and standards, coordination, communications, compliance and threat and risk assessment. DSS is mandated to provide leadership and direction in all these areas. Only in this way could the UN have a coherent, robust, and competent security management system; the overall principle of a unified system was proposed to the General Assembly bringing together within one organizational entity – and under one USG’s direction – the pre-existing security management functions of the Office of the UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), the Safety and Security Service (SSS) at Headquarters and Offices Away from Headquarters, and the civilian field staff security component of DPKO.

112. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) immediately foresaw challenges, observing in its response to the 2004 Report of the Secretary-General on a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations that although the structure of DSS “represents progress, it appears to be far from unified despite its title.” It continued:

“As it stands now, separate security structures will continue to exist, with a continuing potential for duplication and potentially dangerous confusion.”

113. In the three years since it was created, DSS has made only partial progress towards reorganizing the constituent security management structures into a single unified system. It is understandable that, post-Baghdad, the urgency to improve the security management system did not permit a more in-depth study of what the organizational and operational consequences of unification would be. It is now important for the USG/DSS to review the functionality of DSS and make the required adjustments.

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51 A/59/276
52 A/59/365 and Corr.1
53 A/59/539, para 24.
Division of Security and Safety Services

114. The DSS Division of Security and Safety Services (DSSS) brings together the separate Security and Safety Sections (SSS) of Headquarters and offices away from headquarters, including Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Beirut, Geneva, Nairobi, Santiago, and Vienna, as well as the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. Its main responsibility is perimeter and access control. DSSS also includes the Protection Coordination Unit, responsible for close protection policies, procedures, and practices.

115. Prior to DSS, the Security and Safety Sections – the “uniformed security elements” – used to report to the individual managerial structures of their respective locations. It is clear to the Panel that unification has created new reporting lines that have exacerbated tension that preceded the unified system. In at least some headquarters locations, there has been an attempt to clarify these reporting lines. Further effort is required to delineate them, and in a consistent and standardized manner across the Offices Away from Headquarters so that DSS standards and practices, though acknowledging the different needs and responsibilities of each of the department component units, are applied everywhere.

116. There has been a visible increase in the number of senior officials that are allocated personal protection. [redacted] [Personal protection details cannot be divulged]

117. The Panel has not dedicated much attention to this aspect of the security system, but it has noted that there is a need for a UN system-wide minimum standard. [redacted] [Above comment applies].

Peacekeeping Operations Support Service

118. The Peacekeeping Operations Support Service (POSS) within the Division of Regional Operations is the main day-to-day operational security linkage at Headquarters between DSS and both DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS). POSS is funded from the Peacekeeping Support Account. Its Desk Officers all have DPKO field and/or headquarters experience, enabling them to better understand and support the security needs of field missions.

119. Where DPKO-led operations are deployed, DSS depends on the services of DPKO and DFS. Cooperation between the three departments “is defined by a unique relationship of mutual support in working towards the implementation of the unified security management system.” This mutually supportive relationship in the field, at times, does not sufficiently and effectively incorporate agencies that work alongside

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54 [redacted].
55 The USG/DPKO is responsible and accountable for the safety and security of all civilian and uniformed personnel – currently more than 100,000 in 20 missions – deployed in the field under his authority. DPKO fields more than 1,400 professional field security coordinators and 2,500 locally-recruited field security assistants.
56 “Policy on Cooperation and Coordination between the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),” October 2006, p. 2
peace operations. There are concerns from agencies that co-location of POSS with DPKO, as originally intended, will result in decreased support from POSS. DSS needs to be able to provide appropriate support and guidance to all participants in the UN common security system, whether in the context of integrated missions or peacekeeping and special political missions generally. The source of financing for different work units of DSS – whether the Peacekeeping Support Account or agency cost-sharing – should not bias the delivery of service towards DPKO or UN Country Teams; the mandate of DSS is to ensure the security of all UN personnel.

120. Although POSS reports to [redacted] [internal reporting details], the structure that is in place does not facilitate close horizontal cooperation [redacted]. This means that although the security situation in adjacent countries may be inter-dependent, within DSS, they are bureaucratically stove-piped.

121. Key recommendations on further unification of the Security and Safety Sections and DPKO civilian field staff security into DSS:

(i) The USG for Safety and Security should clearly delineate – and clarify any remaining contradictions in – the reporting line of the Chief/SSS to the CSA in Headquarters and Offices Away from Headquarters.

(ii) The USG/DSS should consider integrating POSS officers into the Regional Desks as an alternative to the current stand-alone desk. POSS officers would maintain their dedicated function for peacekeeping mission environments, but report to the Chiefs of the Regional Desks. A dual reporting line through a POSS senior coordination officer would remain the main link to DPKO and DFS.

c. The Division of Regional Operations

122. The Division of Regional Operations of DSS consists of [redacted] [internal details]. DRO also includes Field Security Operations – the international and locally-recruited DSS security professionals [redacted] [personnel numbers not divulgable] who provide security advice to the designated official and the security management team. According to the IASMN, of the more than 180 countries where the UN has a presence, there are still 58 with no professional security adviser.

The present structure and management culture within DRO does not yet fully enable the delivery of operational support, backstopping, monitoring, and oversight to the country-level. The Algiers bombing is a case in point. In fact the "alert system" functioned neither from the field up to the top, nor from the top down: the Designated Official in Algiers did not solicit support from Headquarters; the Security Adviser did, but neither the Desk Officers, nor the Director of Regional Operations, nor the USG/DSS reacted to any of the alarm signals from the Treat and Risk Assessment Unit or from the field.

57 According to its terms of reference, POSS is supposed to be co-located with DPKO. It has until recently been co-located with the DRO geographic desks due to a lack of available space within the UN Secretariat building.

58 CEB/2008/HLCM/3, para. 26(i)
123. The establishment within DSS of dedicated units [redacted] was intended to relieve Regional Desk Officers, enabling them to focus greater attention on supporting security management in their countries of responsibility. According to Desk Officers, their ability to adequately support country security managers is overwhelmed by having individual responsibility for too many countries. Desk Officers state that they are overstretched, regularly working 12+ hour days. [redacted] As a result, Desk Officers say that they cannot closely follow country developments, nor spend enough time in-country to get to understand the situation better.

124. During its country visits, the Panel learned that the Regional Desks are perceived as either “hands-off,” or “micromanaging.” Considerable time is spent by the Desks on mechanically generating or transferring to the field demands that the Desks receive – such as reporting obligations – rather than on supporting the Designated Official, Chief Security Adviser, and wider Security Management Team to execute their security functions, overcome difficulties, and provide advice. Consequently, qualified staff are often under-utilized with routine tasks. In the view of the Panel, a review of the work processes at the Desk level would be beneficial for the Department’s capacity and greatly help make better use of skill and experiences of desk officers themselves.

125. Despite the goal of a decentralized security management system, DRO – and, indeed, DSS overall – remains highly centralized both in structural hierarchy and in working methods. As such, the fundamental role of the Regional Desks is to provide the point of service for the field – to represent their interests to Headquarters and senior management, to coordinate support both internally from DSS and externally from the wider security management system, and to provide technical expertise. Moreover, Desk Officers must themselves have prior field experience as Security Advisers in order to credibly backstop the field and to troubleshoot, including when there are differences between the CSA/SA and DO, or with the host government.

126. DRO overall has introduced a more open and sharing working style among its units. But Desks are seen as reactive instead of being proactive. The Panel sees the need for Desk Officers to be out in front of emerging trends for DSS to be able to provide guidance to the UN system in a form relevant to the full scope of clients for which the Department is responsible. There are recent positive examples [redacted] where DRO has improved cooperation with host governments. But making this the rule, rather than the exception requires strategic guidance from the top, as outlined above. It also requires improved capacity and procedures at the Regional Desk level to bring them into line. There is insufficient guidance on how they should work and on what kind of product is expected. After three years, DRO is only now standardizing procedures across its Regional Desks and formats used in duty stations [redacted] for core documents of the UN security management system.

127. Related to this, internal and external DSS communication needs to improve. Though very supportive of the security management system established in 2005, Designated Officials consistently reported that they have minimal, if any, contact with senior DSS management, nor do DOs seek them out. It is evident from information distribution lists and presentations on systems and functions that DSS does not seem to recognize and support the role of DOs as intended by the security management system.

128. Many field and headquarters staff believe that proximity of DSS to the field is essential if the Department is to more effectively provide day-to-day support to the
country-level, including collecting information at or close to the field, making more focused threat assessments, conducting regular training and simulation exercises, monitoring compliance, providing guidance, ensuring continuity of coverage when the CSA is absent, and, in the unfortunate event of a crisis, enabling both urgent response necessary to save lives and provision of psychosocial support to victims and their families. The overwhelming majority of UN duty stations conduct activities in Africa and Asia and are far removed both geographically and in time zone from DSS/HQ. The ability of DSS to respond to the security and safety needs of the field in a timely manner has perhaps been the most consistent issue raised to the Panel by interlocutors, including many within DSS itself. [redacted]

129. There are different views on the best way of redressing this problem. One recurrent proposal is to move the technical expertise provided by the Desks [redacted] to the field.] In its initial commentary on the design of DSS, the ACABQ observed that the Division of Regional Operations was “heavily concentrated at Headquarters” and that the extensive field travel this required of desk officers was unlikely to be “an adequate substitute for an actual presence in the field.” It therefore requested exploration of a “regional field presence while maintaining a lean central capacity at Headquarters.”59

130. At the initiative of the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, a regional security cell was piloted by DSS [redacted] in 2006, with the objective of replicating the concept in other regions. Staff consisted of a Regional Chief Security Adviser and one staff assistant; they were joined six months later by an FSCO acting as an analyst. According to the project evaluation,

“[T]he [redacted] regional project has augmented and increased the capacity of the country and agency security management systems within the region; acting as a force multiplier for the provision of safety and security of UN Staff... The project has increased security communication and interoperability between countries, DPKO missions and agencies in the field.”60

The initiative nonetheless was cancelled six months later, reportedly due to the withdrawal of support by key members of the IASMN. The IASMN membership has now started to again consider regional resource hubs for DSS.

131. It is critical for the Division of Regional Operations to have an effective surge capacity. Currently, to generate additional capacity in the event of a crisis, DSS shifts security advisers from one country to another, possibly from outside the region. In effect, this fills a void by creating one elsewhere. DSS is currently unable to immediately reinforce crisis preparedness or respond to multiple, simultaneous or mass casualty crises. The Algeria case illustrates this weakness. Immediately after the bomb attack, DSS fielded several security advisers, but was not able to keep any for a longer period to provide continuity and stability. In addition, some of those initially deployed were not able to speak either Arabic or French, which severely limited their capacity to be effective and fully operational.

59 A/59/539.
60 [redacted].
132. In light of the nature of current threats and MOSS requirements, the professional security community in the field are especially concerned with the absence of DSS expertise in specialized technical areas – including blast engineers, building and aviation safety specialists, information technology, and quality control for protective equipment, such as armoured vehicles. These are skills that no security officer in the field can be expected to have. They must be able to invoke standards set by the Organization and get advice from DSS/HQ. Without these skills, DSS cannot advise Chiefs of Administration, procurement units, and other relevant actors on the best use of security budgets. These areas are central to the UN’s ability to protect premises and personnel. DSS should review its priorities in this area and determine the best means of acquiring them.

133. Key recommendations to improve the capacity and functionality of the Division of Regional Operations:

(i) To augment the ability of the Department of Safety and Security to carry out its advisory role to the Designated Official, the USG/DSS should consider deploying the Regional Desks and key technical and analytic staff to [redacted] [the field] making optimum use of available resources.

(ii) DSS should maintain a roster of experienced security professionals within the UN System who are willing to rapidly deploy when surge capacity is needed.

(iii) The USG/DSS should consider, in cooperation with agencies and the Secretariat departments, expanding the pre-deployment of security equipment to facilitate rapid distribution to duty stations in the event of a sudden, negative change in the security environment. The strategic deployment stocks of DPKO provides a useful model. 61

d. [redacted] 62

134. [redacted].

135. [redacted]

136. Key recommendations to strengthen the threat and risk assessment capabilities of the UN security management system:

(i) The USG/DSS should consider deployment of additional operational/tactical assessment capabilities [redacted]. Consideration should likewise be given to establishment of analyst posts for high-risk duty stations. Additional analyst posts should be established [redacted].

(ii) The USG/DSS should provide the UNDP Administrator, as the head of the UN Development Group, as well as the Executive Heads, with a security risk assessment for high-risk, non-mission environments where the UN has a presence. The UNDG, thus, will be able to recognize risk, and commit to

61 OIOS report (A/59/702), para. 121
62 [redacted].
measures for mitigation. (See also para. 267, *mutatis mutandis*, on Security Council-mandated missions.)

e. Staff Counseling, Trauma Care, and Well-being

137. Within the UN System, the DSS Critical Incident Stress Management Unit (CISMU) has the mandate for critical incident stress management prevention and policy. DSS sees its role as being responsible in the immediate aftermath of a crisis (three months) after which the respective agency support services are expected to take over and provide longer-term care according to the rules, regulations and culture of their respective organizations.

138. The DSS capacity of four professional counsellors is supplemented by that of agencies that maintain stress counsellors on their staff. In total, there are 72 professional counsellors across the UN System responsible for support to more than 140,000 personnel, and their dependents.

139. Though accompanied by words of caution on the cultural sensitivities inherent to counseling, everywhere the Panel went, it heard only positive comments about stress counseling. It is a highly appreciated service, the demand for which is present and growing, and those who manage this service at DSS and in agencies will need to carefully review the need for expanding this service.

140. DSS staff at Headquarters and in the field work in a high stress environment, work long hours, often in crisis situations. DSS management must ensure that their health, well-being, and welfare are effectively cared for.

f. Training and Standardization

141. Training of security professionals, managers responsible for security decisions, and staff and associated personnel is a central component of developing the skills and confidence needed for individuals to safely carry out their operational duties and responsibilities, thereby creating the foundation of a robust security management system.

142. The new DSS was provided with extensive capacity for training – sixteen Professional category trainers, who travel constantly to meet the demand for training. Increasing the demands on trainers, they are often temporarily reallocated from Training and Development Section, DSS (TDS) to augment DRO desk officers to cover incidents or during leave (four of the 20 staff in the training section are now covering country

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63 UNHCR and WFP provided the greatest level of coverage with permanent counsellors in Headquarters and in the field. [redacted]. Both work closely with UNICEF. UNDP, UNFPA, and other agencies have no counselling services and rely on DSS and/or UNHCR and WFP to provide field support and the UN counsellors for New York staff. [redacted] UNDP does have a staff member in the Office of Human Resources who advises on stress related incidents, but has no stress or trauma counselling training or experience. UNDP also currently has ad hoc arrangements for staff members who may be affected by a critical incident such as the Baghdad or Algiers bombing.
desks full time). When conducting training for senior staff, trainers are reportedly at a
disadvantage owing to their lack of more in-depth experience in security management
(the bulk of the trainers are at the P3 level).

143. The TDS, part of the DSS Field Support Service, currently runs the Security
Certification Programme (SCP) for newly recruited UN security advisers and field
security coordination officers, refresher courses for existing security professionals,
training-of-trainers for the Division of Security and Safety Services, Hostage Incident
Management, and the “Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments” (SSAFE).
Risk management and crisis response training is run for Security Management Teams,
as is induction briefings for Designated Officials. Other initiatives include interagency
development of security guidelines for women, as well as desktop exercises on field
security for staff and on natural disasters prevention and preparedness. DSS training of
new security officers, for example, has increased from three days under UNSECOORD,
to three weeks. In 2007, DSS trained 30 SMTs around the world. In 2008, they have a
budget to train another 30. At this pace, it would take six years to train all SMTs once,
not withstanding staff rotations.

144. As the UN endeavours to develop an institutional culture that embraces
security, further attention to and resources for educating all actors within the UN security
management system on the principles, policies, rationale and purpose of security is a
vital need. Yet, the present security training programmes are inadequate for an
Organization responsible for the safety and security of so many people.

145. Security training for non-security professionals – particularly for incoming
Designated Officials – has often been an “add-on” to other predeployment training
programmes. UNDP and DSS are now examining multiple approaches in this regard
and are trying to take advantage of different venues and opportunities to provide training
to DOs. To meet the Secretary-General’s requirement that all newly appointed DOs
receive training before assuming their duties, DSS has implemented a programme to
provide two-day "one-on-one" training sessions to incoming DOs.64 DSS, however, is
due to convene several former DOs at the Staff College in November 2008 to identify the
next generation of training needs for DOs.

146. Key recommendations on development and delivery of security training:

(i) TDS should prioritize planning, development of training packages and
standards as well as monitoring of the impact of training. Implementation should
be carried out by the [redacted] [various] stakeholders.

(ii) TDS should hire a former Designated Official as part of its training team to
support the design of SMT training packages, as well as provide real-life
experience and insight to incoming DOs on their role, challenges and guidelines.

(iii) A dedicated Safety and Security Training Centre should be established as part
of the UN Staff College as the focal point for all safety and security training within
the UN.

64 A review of the training agenda suggests that the nature of this “training” is more in line with
“briefings” – i.e., short informational sessions on the UN security management system, the
Framework for Accountability, and security risk management.
g. Crisis Management and Response

147. An initial 2008-2009 DSS budget proposal including appropriations for five strategic emergency reserve teams for crisis response, to be funded through the cost-sharing budget, was not endorsed by IASMN at its May 2006 meeting owing to financial limitations of IASMN members. A subsequent request in June 2006 for three strategic emergency reserve teams was also not supported.

148. Seven posts for a dedicated crisis management capability at DSS headquarters were approved by the General Assembly effective 1 January 2008 as part of the programme budget for the 2008-2009 biennium. The Panel considers that these posts should gradually enable DSS to take a lead role in crisis response and crisis management for the United Nations system. The Panel notes that the addition of a properly staffed and resourced 24/7 Crisis Management/Operations Centre capable of serving the entire UN security community as originally envisioned would greatly increase the crisis response capacity of DSS/HQ.

149. Summary of key recommendation on crisis management: the UN system must establish standing crisis management support teams that can be activated when needed. Only staff with experience and proven competence in this area should be selected. They should be trained as teams and be immediately released from their regular jobs when called for deployment.

h. Information and Communications Technology

150. In the original proposal to establish DSS, resources for the information technology support function were requested but, regrettably, the General Assembly decided that DSS should be supported by the existing UN system capacity. As with other field-oriented entities, it is important for a department like DSS to have a reliable, appropriate, and robust information technology (IT) support system that helps develop and support the central product of DSS: information and knowledge. Information technology is not a luxury; it is a central instrument for delivery of security services. The Panel strongly underlines the urgent need to develop the IT support function of DSS for the field and Headquarters. Without a serious level of investment within the overall framework of the UN’s information technology and knowledge development, DSS will not have the capacity to exercise its leadership in UN security.

151. In the field, WFP provides the backbone of the UN emergency telecommunications system. It is highly sophisticated, but is also prohibitively expensive for other agencies to utilize. A single, interoperable, and reliable system is needed for field operations.

152. Even though the DSS information technology team is doing tremendous work, the needs are far beyond their capacities: statistics, geographic information systems (GIS), security incidents tracking, staff tracking, security staff deployment, are major components of security analysis and threat assessment. The Panel observes that the current Integrated Security Clearance and Tracking (ISECT) system, which has greatly improved the process for security clearance, has potential beyond its current limited use.

i. Safety of Personnel and Premises
153. Safety is half the mandate of DSS, but in practice, the available resources have been used to prioritize the security of personnel and premises. This focus reflects both the high level of demand from the UN system for security, rather than the safety-related services from DSS, as well as the lack of resources provided to the Department for safety. However, the General Assembly has stressed that “safety is a vital aspect of the mandate of the Department of Safety and Security.” 65 DSS has indicated that safety, particularly air safety, fire safety, and road safety, is a priority for 2008-2009 biennium. It is not clear to the Panel how DSS will manage to resource this priority with the pressures it is under to deliver on numerous other priorities. Nevertheless, DSS is in the process of developing fire safety guidelines. Other areas of concern include: seismic risk, stress management, post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP), first-aid, and emergency medical preparedness.

154. Safety and security are mutually-reinforcing halves of the goal of enabling the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities. Attention not only to one’s own safety, but that of colleagues in daily work, will reinforce and strengthen overall security. For fire safety, for example, this includes participating in fire drills, reporting obstructed fire exits to fire wardens, and checking that fire extinguishers are charged. This is the duty of all staff. The common thinking of senior staff, who often dismiss preparedness activities as less important than their other functions, sends the wrong message to all staff.

155. At a number of locations visited by the Panel, air safety was raised as a concern by UN personnel. The Panel has also learned that air safety recommendations have been considered and adopted by the HLCM, but they remain unimplemented. Regrettably, the IASMN air safety working group was suspended owing to lack of specialized expertise. The Panel notes that both DPKO and WFP, which manages the UN Humanitarian Air Service, have considerable experience in procuring and managing air transport services and that the rest of the UN system should benefit from such expertise.

156. Key recommendation on safety: to enhance the safety of UN personnel, a dedicated Safety Unit should be established within DSS with competent staff and resources to fulfill the safety-related aspects of its mandate. As a matter of immediate priority, the Unit should facilitate development of system-wide guidance on air safety.

j. Recruitment, Administration and Management

157. The DSS Executive Office currently provides full administrative support to the Department’s staff at Headquarters, and collaborates with Chiefs of Administration at Offices Away from Headquarters and Regional Commissions to ensure appropriate and consistent administrative arrangements for the Safety and Security Services. The Executive Office is also responsible for supporting managers in the selection and career management of security advisers and DPKO security coordination officers in the field. UNDP, through a bilateral agreement with the UN Secretariat, continues to administer and support those field security officers on behalf of DSS, including daily administration of resources.

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65 A/RES/61/263
158. Given the length of time required to fill vacancies under the Secretariat’s Galaxy recruitment system, UNDP agreed to handle recruitment of the field posts created with the establishment of DSS. What was intended as a temporary solution has now led to two recruitment systems that are not compatible. All DSS field personnel remain on UNDP contracts and apply to posts via the UNDP human resources system. Headquarters DDS personnel and DPKO mission field security officers are hired through the Secretariat’s Galaxy system. For security officers to transfer from the field to Headquarters or vice versa, they must apply as external candidates. These contractual arrangements limit career mobility and undermine the morale and effectiveness of UN security professionals. Among country-level staff, there is a lack of harmonization between the contracts of DSS security professionals employed on a UNDP contract and field security coordination officers of DPKO.

159. Overall, DSS experiences a high rate of turnover among its security professionals at Headquarters to country-level security positions within DSS, as well as to agencies and peacekeeping missions. The Panel was informed that DSS is planning to institutionalize such movement through a managed rotation exercise and, through its promotion criteria, is creating incentives for personnel with country-level experience to work at Headquarters. This should be encouraged.

160. Key recommendations on strengthening the administration and recruitment practices of DSS:

(i) The Executive Office of DSS is responsible for staff worldwide; its administrative capacity should reflect this responsibility. The DSS Executive Office should be provided with the necessary resources and delegation of authority to assume full administrative responsibility for all DSS staff, including recruitment.

(ii) Pending UN human resources management reforms, DSS security professionals on UNDP contract should gradually be transferred over to the DSS contracts and all new recruitments should be through DSS.

C. The UN Security Management System at the Country Level

1. The Designated Official for Security and the Security Management Team

161. Within the UN security management system, decentralization of day-to-day decision-making to the country level is a guiding principle. The Designated Official for Security is the person responsible for the security management system of the United Nations family in each country or designated area where the United Nations is present. As per the Framework for Accountability, the DO maintains overall responsibility and accountability for ensuring that the goals of the UN security management system are met at the duty station. He or she is accountable to the Secretary-General, through the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, for the security of personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependents throughout the country. The DO is supported in his/her role by a Chief Security Adviser/Security Adviser, as well as by the Security Management Team, comprised of the Heads of Agency in the country.
162. The Security Management Team, while an advisory body to the DO, is comprised of senior UN officials who, in their individual capacity as Country Directors/Representatives of UN organizations, all hold a high degree of accountability for the safety and security of their own staff. Where the DO-SMT teams work well, they are an effective mechanism for security management. SMTs do require specific attention, however. DSS has developed, and is continuously implementing, SMT trainings. These provide opportunities for developing the security awareness and understanding of the security management. The SMTs, in general, have several weak points. Heads of Agency often delegate representation on the SMT to their deputies (or even more junior staff). This may be a sign of the Head of Agency misunderstanding his/her accountability and responsibility. Attendance at SMTs can also be inconsistent, as in the case of Algeria. Lack of engagement in the security risk assessment and in security planning were also reported. While it is the impression of this Panel that field managers do have a strong concern for security, it is important that the various UN managers are fully aware of their individual responsibility to make the SMT and the country-level arrangements work. It is suggested that all UN organizations include the security responsibilities of their country office representatives in their job descriptions and post profiles. This is already the practice of a number of UN agencies. This includes the responsibility to contribute to an effective SMT in support of the DO.

163. When considering the merits of the Designated Official role, the Panel looked at comparable security management structures in other organizations from which the UN might be able to draw lessons. These included, on the one hand, the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) security structure and, on the other, the International Committee of the Red Cross. They are quite different institutions and have security systems designed to respond to their specific needs. However, there is one characteristic that is common to them and to the United Nations: all three security management systems, in varying degrees, are decentralized and final decisions are made by the most senior substantive officer or his/her deputy. The FCO and ICRC have two points in common that distinguish them from the UN: (i) they have smaller personnel deployment and operations, and (ii) they both have focused mandates, contrary to the UN, which has multiple areas of programme delivery. This makes a significant difference for security planning.

164. Within the specific context of the United Nations, having a senior manager as DO is a clear indication that security is guided by the substantive goals of the UN System. This reflects the imperative of security not as an end, but as a means to achieve a substantive goal. However, for the DO system to function as intended, it must be more effectively supported by senior managers, by staff, and by the UN system. The authority, responsibility, and resources required to carry out this central task must converge in the DO, which does not happen now.

a. “Multiple Hats” and Accreditation of the Designated Official

165. The most senior UN official in a country is appointed as the Designated Official. The role of DO is one among multiple roles or “hats” on behalf of the UN System for which the individual is responsible.

166. As Designated Official, the Resident Coordinator or SRSG is vested with the responsibility for the safety and security of the UN at the country level; many DOs regard this as their most important, and often the most demanding, function. The perception
among DOs about how well they are equipped and supported to exercise this function
varies from operation to operation and from country to country. It is recognized that
there is a tension between the twin goals of ensuring, first, that the UN delivers on
programmes and, second, that delivery is carried out with a risk management
perspective. As one experienced DO put it, “We do not need security training in a
technical sense, we need training in how to manage this balance between the two
requirements of the UN”. The same DO also insisted that the two roles are inextricably
linked and can only be separated with diminishing return on both delivery and security:
“We need support by excellent security professionals who understand how our
programmes work.”

167. The Designated Official is the central point in the country-level security
management system. Yet, in a review of reports, resolutions, and work programmes put
forward in the UN since 1987, the DO is noticeably absent as a function to resource,
develop, and support.\(^{66}\) This absence signals that a central part of the security
management system has not been regarded by the UN System itself as central. It may
further signal the poor integration of security management and the overall management
elements in the UN, which is a prerequisite for the functioning of the Accountability
Framework – and the system as whole.

168. Many Resident Coordinators say that their security responsibilities as
Designated Official are the most demanding of all their roles. Occasionally, the idea of
having a separate DO, distinct from the RC/SRSG role, has been raised. This is not a
very widely voiced opinion, however. More significant is the fact that DOs, as a
category, have not had the level of support that Resident Coordinators have had from
UNDG and Humanitarian Coordinators from OCHA. This should be an obvious role for
DSS. The Panel also notes that though the DO is supported by the CSA/SA, country-
and area-level security offices are themselves under-supported, for example, lacking
competence in technical areas.

169. The ability of RC/SRSGs to carry out their DO responsibilities requires that they
are appropriately trained and supported with dedicated resources, and that they have a
clear line of communication with the senior managers of the DSS. The Panel has
identified a number of shortcomings in the current DO arrangements and relationship
with DSS. Most important, DOs have the responsibility for ensuring that MOSS and
other security measures are taken, but control neither the authority nor resources to
ensure their decisions are implemented.

170. Some CSA/SAs have stated that they have difficult working relations with their
DO. The Panel is of the view that senior managers in DSS need to focus on the
relations that CSAs/SAs establish with DOs, as well as with SMTs. It is essential for
efficient security management that these key actors are able to work as a team. RCs
have also pointed out that the host government should be officially informed about their
functions as DOs. This is a reasonable expectation, though it is worth noting that
Member States approved the UN security system, and thus are fully aware of its
elements, including the DO role.

\(^{66}\) In 2006, DSS commissioned two studies as part of its “Designated Officials Project,” which was
intended to “improve the assistance that the United Nations system provides to Designated
Officials”.
b. Security Management Experience and Training

171. Security is increasingly a factor in the selection of candidates for the position of Resident Coordinator in higher risk countries. The Department of Safety and Security is part of the Inter-Agency Appointment Panel for the selection of Resident Coordinators. In some cases, RCs, in their capacity as Designated Official, have been sent to other high-risk countries to shadow an incumbent DO for a few weeks. However, such pre-deployment exposure remains *ad hoc* and exceptional. On the whole, the overriding criteria for the appointment of RCs and SRSGs are based on their political, development-related, and/or humanitarian qualifications, not on their skill as security managers. Consequently, many DOs arrive in post without a full awareness of what their responsibilities are on a day-to-day basis. This is similarly true of Heads of Agency vis-à-vis their security responsibilities, both as members of the security management team and towards their own staff.

172. The SMT, through its collective analysis of the security situation and programming priorities, is intended to support the decision-making role of the DO. Focusing only on enhancing the skills of the Designated Official is not sufficient. Heads of Agency, as members of the Security Management Team, require the same level of understanding of risk assessment and management as the DO. The Framework for Accountability clearly states that the Head of Agency has responsibility for the security of his/her staff. The security risk management approach being adopted by the United Nations is still relatively new; the competency of all members of the SMT in the risk management model needs to be improved through training and practice. This will better enable SMT members to apply their often extensive country and situation knowledge to analyze the security dimensions of their programmes.

173. In this context, training for Designated Officials and Heads of Agency is one of the greatest imperatives for strengthening the security management system. A new programme needs to be designed to their specific needs, including threat and risk assessment, guidelines for implementation of security measures, and roles and responsibilities with a focus on staff-management interaction on security issues. The Panel supports the initiative by DSS, noted above, to identify the next generation of training needs for DOs.

174. **Key recommendation on supporting the role of the Designated Official and Security Management Team:**

(i) Designated Officials must be supported at all levels of the UN system. They should be encouraged to call on senior management at DSS/HQ for guidance and support if faced with difficult situations that warrant engagement from Headquarters.

(ii) The Department of Safety and Security and UNDP, as the administering support agency for Resident Coordinators, should design a comprehensive training programme for DOs and Heads of Agency. They should consult a number of experienced DOs to ensure that the programme does meet all the needs of new DOs.

2. Security Professionals in the Field
175. The Panel heard a number of comments, expressions of concern, and suggestions about DSS field personnel – Chief Security Advisers and Security Advisers. Among the points raised with the Panel were that: DSS field posts in a number of situations are graded too low to have incumbents with the experience that can command respect from DOs and SMTs. Following its establishment in January 2005 and under pressure to deliver, DSS may have needed to recruit too many officers – most coming from military or police institutions – too quickly, and thus did not have the time to expand the pool of candidates to form a work force with more diversified security experience, including more women security professionals; security officers need to understand and be sensitive to programme delivery needs, in particular humanitarian ones; furthermore, CSA/SA could better appreciate the experience and contributions of their national Security Assistants; and, more generally, much more could be learned from national staff in general for the benefit of security plans and considerations.

176. Agencies have also invested considerable human resources to develop their own security components, including field security expertise and training modules for security and non-security professionals alike, tailored to the specific needs of their mandates.

177. Security cells, led by the CSA/SA and comprising all UN security advisers, including DSS, Agencies, and DPKO, exist at country level and sub-national level. Within the security cell, security professionals work together as a team to identify security issues, and to make recommendations to SMT on priority issues for discussion, to determine how to implement SMT decisions, and to refer problems in implementation back to the SMT for further discussion. These cells have proven to be a highly valuable mechanism for the integration of security structures at the field level. By and large, they work together in a professional and collegial manner to ensure the support for SMT and DO decision-making, to advise and to ensure systems-wide implementation and monitoring. Ideally, the security cell works together to produce Security Risk Assessments that reflect the threat and risk environment facing all members of the UN Country Team. The cell will also ensure that mitigation measures are appropriate to each Agency’s operational needs.

178. Agencies, funds and programmes acknowledge the important security role of DSS Security Advisers at the country-level. At the same time, DSS does not have sufficient presence and resources to fully meet the mandate-specific security needs of Agencies – for example, providing security in refugee camps, to food convoys, or to vaccination drives. Nor, with its present level of capacity, is DSS able to provide the agencies with full-time and one-on-one service, especially for those whose operational presence is predominantly outside of country capitals. Agencies therefore continue to require their own security personnel, which should coordinate with DSS through the security cell, and at the programme level through the Security Management Team. Single-Agency Security Officers are complementary to DSS, not their competition.

179. Cross-agency training of security staff is occurring through joint training and security cells. Rotation by DSS officers through agencies and vice versa would attune

67 [redacted]
68 In fact, national staff – and, indeed, implementing partners – generally are an important source of information for assessing the local security environment. Agencies are more aware of, and make better use of this resource.
DSS Security Advisers to the specific mandates, operational ethos, and related security implications of agencies, funds, and programmes. In the short-term, such an exchange would help build confidence among staff in the UN security management system, and in the long-run contribute to a system that is both more unified and more flexible.

180. Key recommendations on DSS and agency security professionals in the field:

(i) The recruitment pool from which DSS draws security professionals should be expanded to include qualified staff from Agencies, peacekeeping missions, as well as from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

(ii) Selection panels for Chief Security Advisers/Security Advisers must include representation from agencies and DPKO, which are the primary clients of security at the country-level where CSAs/SAs are deployed.

(iii) The professional level and experience of security advisers should be commensurate with both the security environment at the duty station and the grading of his/her peers on the Security Management Team. DSS, in conjunction with the Department of Management, should review the post grading structure of country and area-level for Security Advisers based on their roles and responsibilities as members of the SMT.

(iv) To facilitate the exchange of security advisers, a system-wide policy or guideline (e.g., on secondment and surge capacity support) should be developed by DSS and agencies.

3. Security Management at Headquarters and Offices Away from Headquarters

181. UN Headquarters locations and Offices Away from Headquarters feature a large and diverse presence of UN departments and agencies, often accounting for thousands of personnel and their dependants. Operationally, these duty stations include country-based, regional, and international programmes. Indeed, they share more in common with each other than with the country-level and mission duty-stations in “the field.” Having met with both DOs and security professionals and staff in these environments, in the view of the Panel, they require special attention.

182. Being a Designated Official in these locations is a particular challenge. In keeping with the principle that the senior-most official is DO, an Executive Head of Agency fills the post, but he/she is frequently unable to devote sufficient attention to this important added responsibility. In these locations, the DO is supported by a small DSS office, which is also responsible for supporting the entire UN presence with security management services, including perimeter security. For a DO in Headquarters locations to lead the security management system to the standards expected, the profile and resources of these DSS offices must be strengthened. It requires considerable senior experience to be able to service Headquarters and at the same time service operational agencies in-country with programmes in distant rural areas. Security professionals must likewise be senior managers able to work with an executive-level DO and SMT, and at the same time provide leadership for the security system.
183. Headquarters locations are highly visible and many are quite vulnerable. Setting a common agenda for such a diverse group of UN entities requires a clear body of policies and guidelines from the UN specifically designed for such settings. The Panel was informed that the use of the field-oriented policies and guidance in the UN Field Security Handbook (FSH) is not appropriate. Instead, the USG/DSS should consider further developing the concept of “Headquarters MOSS”. Although the General Assembly has supported some recent investments in better Headquarters security, including access control, it is clear that all UN locations suffer from many years of lack of attention to and investment in security. In addition to technological measures, a change in managerial and organizational culture is needed to respond to vulnerabilities. The still-incomplete integration of the SSS into DSS both in managerial acceptance and career prospects also leads to a lack of flexibility and thus under-utilization of resources for the common system.


184. The security risk assessment, security phase, and Minimum Operating Standards (MOSS) are the three critical instruments for analysis, assessment, and standard-setting in the UN security management system. As such, these merit broader use and integration with other elements of preparedness, contingency planning, and business continuity planning tools that the UN is rapidly developing and putting in place. A better convergence between these crisis management tools will make the UN more aware and more comfortable with its crisis response capacity.

1. Security Risk Assessment

185. The United Nations has adopted a risk management approach to security. The elements of this approach are to identify the nature of threats faced by the Organization where it operates, to determine associated risks, and to develop, implement, and review mitigating strategies so that it is able to conduct its operations while ensuring the security and safety of its staff. In this approach, decisions regarding the appropriate security posture need to begin with individual, programme objectives and work backwards to identify the measures needed to mitigate security risks that could have an impact on the safety and security of UN personnel and premises: criminality, natural disasters, and accidents, in addition to terrorism.

186. Security risk assessment is a critical component of the security risk management process at the local, regional, and headquarters level that aims to determine existing threats to United Nations activities and to assess associated risks in order to identify required mitigating measures. It has been adopted as a common mechanism across the entire UN System and is the principle basis for defining the security phase, MOSS, [redacted], and the country-wide security plan. The Designated Official and the SMT, with assistance from the CSA/SA, are required to conduct security risk assessments.

187. The efficacy of the SRA as a tool for managing risk is dependent upon the quality of information upon which it is based, on the analysis of this information, and on a clear understanding by programme and security professionals of how to use it. DSS and DPKO acknowledge that there are continuing gaps in information gathering and analytic capacity within the UN, which affects the ability of the Organization to undertake timely, quality risk assessment. Though DSS is a champion of this mechanism, the Department
is also aware that the SRA model is complex and that its implementation needs to be strengthened and improved. In consultation with agencies, DSS is developing expanded SRA training for different categories of security managers. All CSA/SAs and DOs/SMTs need to be fully familiar with it. DSS needs to exercise active and creative leadership, using innovative training, briefing and discussion methods to achieve this goal.

2. Security Phase System

188. Although the UN security phase system has evolved over the past twenty-eight years to accommodate new operational realities, the overall approach has not been altered since its creation in 1980. Today, one of the most sensitive aspects of the application of the security phase is the real or perceived pressure exercised on DOs and Executive Heads of Agency by host governments not to present their country in what they see as a negative light by elevating the UN security phase. Governments want to ensure that their country is seen as investment-friendly, and, in many cases, a tourist-friendly environment. The DO is often without shield from such sensitivities when seeking to increase – or maintain – a phase, the level of which often ends up being the product of negotiation, rather than an accurate reflection of the security environment.

189. The phase system is oriented in one clear direction: from presence to evacuation, clearly shaped around the concept of internationals present in a country/environment evacuating the area of operations when it becomes too dangerous or risky.

190. Currently, about 75 per cent of all UN personnel in the field are “national staff,” often forming the core of the UN administrative and programme implementation staff. DSS statistics show that most UN personnel killed and injured are nationals. Further, many international personnel will insist that their security depends on the knowledge and insights of national colleagues and national security officers. The *UN Field Security Handbook*, in its Annex C, contains guidance on measures the UN security management system should take for the safety of locally recruited staff members and their dependents. As originally designed, national employees will not be evacuated. If the assumption was that nationals would not want to leave, or would be at no risk, or would be a small group of no relevance to operations, these assumptions are mostly no longer valid (if they ever were).

191. A weakness of the phase system is that it is linked with administrative measures regarding staff entitlement. This is a well-known and often referred to difficulty in phase III environments, because if there is relocation of staff, education grants for dependents and daily stipends to cover hotel costs, for example, come into play. Adding these types of financial considerations to the security phase discussion blurs what should be a strictly technical security consideration.

192. There are also valid questions raised about the usefulness of a five-phase system, in which the purpose of the phase has become distorted. Phase I is often seen by the security system as a useful administrative device “to know where everyone is;” in other words, it is used for administrative purposes rather than for security. Phase II is meant to be “transitional” and not to be used for more than three to six months, yet is
applied for much longer periods. Phase IV was introduced in 1994 to allow “humanitarian” operations to continue when other UN personnel were moving towards evacuation; that phase IV activities today expand far beyond the humanitarian is taken for granted within the system. And, in fact, in several locations, development workers are at higher risk than humanitarians, as in [redacted] [one African country]. Of most concern from a security management point of view is the recent practice of what are informally called “half phases” – e.g., “Phase II½” and “Phase IV½.” In practice, this means that risk mitigation measures that are usually identified with a higher phase are applied, but the phase itself is kept at a lower level. In such instances, the use of the more accurate phase would impact on programme delivery – restricting pressing (normally political) needs or, in the case of phase V, resulting in evacuation.

193. All of this, as far as the Panel can determine, has an underlying positive motivation: to continue to deliver and to avoid host government pressures. But this tendency seriously undermines not only the security of personnel, but by blurring some of its central concepts, the integrity and credibility of the security management system as a whole.

194. For a few years now, the UN has explicitly adopted a stance of “no departure” – the security management approach of “enabling” activities. This is aimed at ensuring that the UN can continue to operate, even if at much reduced levels, through adjustment of operational modes and mitigating measures, while the situation on the ground may deteriorate or change in terms of security. In the most extreme environments where the UN has a presence, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, stringent security measures are being taken, but the phases are not changed. Indeed, the Security Council and senior UN management are today taking decisions with major implications for security, but are perceived to transfer the risks to staff in the field that are equipped with neither the political responsibility nor financial resources to assume those responsibilities.

195. The security phase system is no longer in line with the United Nations’ approach to security. Most senior security officials state without hesitation that the system is due for overhaul, but there seems to be both resistance by and fear among many security personnel to the idea of opening what they fear may be a “Pandora’s Box.” The Panel received suggestions from experienced security professionals in the UN ranging from abolishing the classification of phases and identifying security measures on the basis of SRAs, to a three phased security system, to alternative models (e.g., color-coding corresponding to level of risk) which follow the same current logic, but would aim to change the mindset about the current system.

196. In the view of the Panel, the concept behind phases – i.e., requiring implementation of predetermined “packages” of security measures – is not consistent with the security risk management approach now in practice. The Organization’s security posture in a given duty station should be defined on the basis of the SRA – i.e., tailored to the specific threats faced. For this reason, it is important that host government authorities, where possible, are part of the security risk assessment and are engaged in identifying appropriate protective measures that they can take. Replacing the phase system would also empower DOs by giving them more responsibility for measures to be taken and relieve them of pressure from host governments. Meanwhile, senior management must provide guidance so that the system is applied in a coherent manner and with full understanding of its consequences. Staff respect for a system is built on understanding security measures and their intended protection impact.
197. Key recommendation on the UN security phase system: the existing UN security phase system should be replaced with a system in which country- and area-based security measures are determined on the basis of the Security Risk Assessment. DSS and the IASMN should determine the implications of such an approach on the application of MOSS, travel clearance, and other security policies and procedures.

3. Minimum Operational Security Standards (MOSS)

198. The purpose of MOSS is “to establish a standard field based criteria for minimum security arrangements to enhance field security, mitigate risks and enable field operations.” The guidance for MOSS, provided in the UN Field Security Handbook, outlines measures that can be applied in whole or in part, depending on the security needs of a given duty station. It is a defined responsibility for senior managers at agency headquarters and in the field and as such it is subject to accountability.

199. The DO and the SMT are responsible for the development of their country-specific MOSS, which is based on a Security Risk Assessment. Its implementation costs are covered by the UN Country Team as a group (e.g., the costs of a common communications centre, its operators and equipment) and by individual agencies (e.g., the VHF radios for the agency’s staff). MOSS is well accepted and understood. It has been refined over the years and with the increase in security standards, in particular in response to terrorist threat, the cost of MOSS implementation has soared, posing a challenge for agencies and country teams alike.

200. During field visits it was brought to the Panel’s attention that MOSS includes plans for medical evacuations and provision for medical trauma kits. It was noted, however, that medical preparedness, such as medical emergency teams, health facilities in vulnerable areas, including for mass casualties need to be developed. This would include minimum standards for paramedics, first aid and emergency drug stock specification. Depending on the health infrastructure of the location, medical preparedness would be more or less comprehensive.

201. UN security arrangements are not limited to the protection of office premises. Personnel of many agencies – unlike most embassies and consulates – will most of the time be engaged in activities out of the office and often deep into the country; MOSS identifies the measures required for safe and secure programme delivery in all foreseeable situations. [redacted] .

202. A current critical concern of nearly all DOs and UN Country Teams is the status of MOSS-compliance of their offices. After the Algiers bombing, DSS sent out UN System-wide instructions requesting renewed SRAs for UN premises. In its field visits, the Panel saw that there is general understanding that offices need a stand off distance [redacted], revealing what seems to be an across the board approach for individual situations. Even considering the global nature of the terrorist threat, this is contrary to the principle of the SRA, by which local mitigation measures should be determined on the basis of local threats.

70 [redacted]
203. If any single issue is now foremost in the minds of DOs, it is the issue of safe office space. DOs interviewed by the Panel reported spending a good deal of staff time on visits to possible alternative locations, chasing prime locations in expensive cities with a thriving real estate market, and trying, in the meantime, to negotiate improvement of perimeter security with the host government. Often, this effort is unsuccessful because UN offices are usually located in dense urban environments or semi-residential areas where local authorities have little inclination to limit access.

204. Office premises are one of the most complex issues nowadays for UN Country Teams. In addition to the problems noted above, agencies are increasingly co-located within UN Houses (and when they are not, this is a goal of many country teams). As a consequence of their mandates, they have special needs – access by asylum seekers, for example – that sometimes create tensions within the Country Team and, most importantly, with neighbors. Solutions are possible and have indeed been found. But they often require specialized technical advice as well as financial resources – not always available – if they are to accommodate a number of agencies under the same roof, are to be MOSS-compliant, sensitive to the needs of neighbors, and also to be accessible to staff without their own means of transport in cities where public transportation is not always readily available.

205. In certain places, the wide range of UN operations and actors results in a significant presence in terms of offices, staff, and dependents. Among the duty stations that the Panel visited, [redacted] [one country] stands out as a case in point. There, the UN has offices in [redacted] [several tens of] buildings occupying [redacted] [several] separate locations for [redacted] [over a thousand] staff. Here, and in similar situations elsewhere, the security of the Organization should not be seen solely as a matter of real estate or roadblocks in front of UN offices. In the view of the Panel, the Secretary-General and other members of the CEB must provide strategic direction for such country presences. The size of the UN staff presence, and the manner in which the system does business, must be reviewed in light of security considerations and opportunities offered by modern information and communication technology, for example. Senior UN and Government officials often discuss the challenges of the 21st century. For the UN, how to adapt to these challenges is a major consideration, and only with a strategic approach and long term vision can it be addressed effectively.

206. In the meantime, a number of DOs and CSA/SA in the more vulnerable locations require immediate support from UN Headquarters (primarily DSS, UNDG, and UNDP, which support Resident Coordinators and manage UN Houses, when they exist) in three areas: (i) to obtain host country support for the urgent identification of acceptable alternative space if at all possible, (ii) to get support for common premises solutions since many agencies have similar vulnerabilities, and (iii) to obtain technical advice and support to determine how to accept an imperfect location and improve it to an acceptable level of perimeter integrity. This last point is important since in several

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71 The Panel focused on the security implications of UN common premises; it does not take a position on common premises as a principle. It notes that though it is easier and less expensive to protect fewer premises, this does not necessarily imply a single, common premise.

72 Among the several measures recommended by the Ahtisaari Report to strengthen the security mechanism was the “provision of necessary technical and logistical resources to all duty stations to comply with the MOSS.”
locations, for lack of blast engineering expertise within DSS (and lack of resources to contract such expertise commercially), it appears that “perfection” is the only standard applied. In search for perfection, a UN office may be left in a vulnerable location for years until a new office is identified. (This was the case in Algiers, where the Country Team had been looking for new premises since 2004 and visited and rejected scores of buildings in the city including the ABC building they are using today.) The Panel further notes that there may be an issue of Organizational liability in determining that an office is not compliant with the enhanced MOSS, but requiring personnel to continue working in the premises.

207. Key recommendations on MOSS and protection of premises:

(i) The CEB, at the earliest possible occasion, should review the exposure of UN programmes and deployment of UN staff and offices around the world, and jointly consider measures to reconfigure or reduce the Organization’s presence in the most vulnerable locations. Where the issue cannot be resolved, the USG/DSS must inform the Secretary-General so that the issue is addressed at a highest level.

(ii) Preparedness for medical emergency needs must be incorporated into MOSS. Each duty station should have an emergency response plan that includes medical preparedness, including for mass casualties.

IV. Responsibility for the well-being of UN Personnel and their Dependents

208. The United Nations, as an employer, recognizes that risk is an inescapable part of the work of its personnel. Over the years, it has developed a range of different instruments for the individuals it employs as part of their conditions of service – contractual arrangements, insurance and other indemnities, MORSS, hazard pay, and occupational recuperative break. (These are described in greater detail in Annex IV).

209. The Panel has noted that UN personnel, in general, are not adequately informed about their rights and obligations. Their perception of the UN as an employer is formed more by the ability of the Organization to display a caring and compassionate attitude in the follow up to crisis and incidents such as Algiers and Baghdad. The other element of their perception is the administrative ability of the UN to process compensations and claims after an incident.

210. Human resources professionals are aware of the need to be more proactive in briefing and updating staff on their entitlements. The lack of easily available factual information is most serious when it contributes to a perceived lack of equity in working conditions between different categories of staff. This is most often seen as a difference between national and international categories of staff. The Human Resources Network of CEB informed the Panel that this issue is on its work programme. While not directly a security concern, the matter itself affects working relations and the perception of the UN as an employer. The Panel notes that private corporations, as well as nonprofit organizations, face similar dilemmas.

211. The UN should aspire to be clear and transparent about the risks faced by UN personnel and the policies in place for their well-being. In particular, it needs to be seen as proactively addressing the problems related to the perception that national and
international employees are not treated in an equal manner. The Organization needs to build trust among managers and staff working in vulnerable environments. It also needs to ensure that the consequences for death or injury are taken care of in a consistent manner. UN employees, for their part, need this information in order to take well-informed decisions about their assignments to risky environments.

**Contractors and sub-contractors**

212. The UN and its agencies use significant numbers of contractors in field operations. This is a sensible option to add extra capacity, reduce direct management burden and costs. This in itself is not a subject on which the Panel has focused. The Panel has, however, given attention to the use of contractors in high-risk environments where the Organization cannot operate freely. This may also appear to be a reasonable solution on the surface. However, there are many dilemmas for the Organization and its staff hidden in this practice of “risk-transfer.” A private contractor is paid to provide its own security arrangements and it works under its own brand name. Yet, when there is a security incident involving a contractor implementing a UN-funded project, the project is still perceived as a UN project and the Organization almost inevitably gets involved. Likewise, UN staff tend to take the view that the Organization has a moral responsibility to address the consequences of such an incident, even though the contractor knows that it carries its own risks (and is financially compensated for assuming these risks). It has been reported that during the first quarter of 2008 alone, 26 truck drivers working for WFP have disappeared in Darfur. These drivers are not UN staff. They were contracted or subcontracted to drive these trucks which are not the property of WFP either. Yet, WFP and the UN in general cannot simply look the other way; they have to worry about the fate of these drivers and their families.

213. The United Nations and its agencies will most probably continue to employ contractors, but they must find ways of addressing the moral dilemma they face when contracted personnel sustain injury or death.

214. **Key recommendations on the responsibility of the United Nations as an employer:**

(i) The senior management of the UN and its agencies, funds, and programmes should aim to articulate a statement of “Employer Responsibility.” The statement should outline the Organization’s measures to manage risk, the duties of staff for risk mitigation, and the measures in place to ensure that staff and their dependants are cared for when, despite all reasonable measures to protect staff, incidents do occur.

(ii) Headquarters should deploy rapid-response administration personnel as part of the immediate post-crisis response to help victims and/or their families understand entitlements and process claims.

(iii) Staff should be regularly updated and informed through a compensation and benefits guide in a clear, easy-to-follow manner.

(iv) The Hazard Pay System should be harmonized among the Secretariat and the agencies, funds, and programmes.
(v) Options for extending the locally-decided MORSS to national staff should be reviewed based on the safety concerns of staff themselves, as well as the country-specific threat and risk assessment.

V. Ensuring Adequate and Sustainable Funding for Security

215. There is a growing recognition throughout the United Nations system that security must be an integral part of “doing business” – whether this is humanitarian assistance, development, or political activities. But this understanding weakens over the question of how to finance security. There remain fundamental differences of opinion within the UN over how best to internalize the cost of security.

216. The cost of responding to criminality, banditry, terrorism, and other threats is potentially very high for the UN. The understanding that security must be funded in a sustainable manner rather than solely by a resource-driven financial process is firm, but the means to achieve this objective needs continued development and must be driven by a strong sense of common purpose.

217. DSS has a dual responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of UN personnel, delegates, and visitors, as well as premises, at United Nations Headquarters locations, and for UN Systems operations at the country- and area-level. The activities of DSS are financed from both the regular UN budget and on a cost-sharing basis with other organizations covered by the UN security management system. The cost of core security and safety functions on behalf of the UN System as a whole – including executive direction and management, policy and contingency planning, investigation, oversight of security operations, and administrative support – are financed under the regular UN budget.73 Costs that “are incurred in the field or are directly related to providing operational support by Headquarters to the field offices” – the DSS Division of Regional Operations74 and the Field Support Services – are financed through the cost-sharing arrangement.75

218. The financial responsibility of each participating organization in the cost-sharing system is based on its proportional share of the number of UN personnel in non-OECD countries where the Organization has a responsibility for security and safety. Under the current formula, adopted by the HLCM in April 2005, costs are proportionally allocated to each UN entity on the basis of its percentage of the total number of personnel – regardless of their contractual status or their funding modality. The HLCM set as the minimum level of contribution USD 75,000. The main contributors to the cost-sharing budget are the Secretariat, UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR, and the World Bank.

219. Agencies, funds, and programmes have expressed frustration with the current arrangements, as they pay into the DSS budget in addition to local-level shared budget for common services in support of MOSS (globally, approximately USD 5,000,000 per year). And this comes on top of the financing of their own agency security components. Agencies argue that higher security expenditures mean less money for programme activities. The agencies are largely dependent on voluntary funds for their budgets. Moreover, since security costs for programme delivery are relatively fixed, if donated

73 A/56/469, para 33(a).
74 As previously noted, POSS is covered separately from the Peacekeeping Support Account
75 A/56/469 para32(c), cited in A/61/223, para 3
funds are lower than programming needs, then budget shortfalls are charged against programme activities. The current system of budgeting in most agencies does not include contingency for security, and thus provides little scope or flexibility for unforeseen expenses.

220. While the cost-sharing system is administratively heavy in its implementation, it also generates concerns regarding the services that agencies expect from DSS in response to their needs in the field. The HLCM has recently established a task group to work on improving the implementation of the system. The aim of this effort is to rationalize the process, while achieving greater transparency. There are also, for DSS, issues of non-uniform reporting requirements and accounting structures that increase the demand on DSS administrative services.

221. In October 2005, the HLCM agreed that all contributing organizations should participate in determining the strategic direction of the security management system and scope of operational requirements. However, in discussions with executive and senior managers from numerous Agencies, Funds and Programmes, the continued absence of such involvement was cited. In this context, there were agencies that questioned the value of what they get from DSS for the financial resources they contribute to the security system.

222. The General Assembly has requested a report that provides an overview of the costs of security investment. This report is still pending, partly because the various budgeting and reporting practices used by the system makes it complicated to achieve an overview of the situation. Most organizations within the UN system, when asked, estimate that they spend approximately two per cent of their overall budget to cover security costs, including Headquarters and the field. For field operations this may increase to about three per cent.\(^\text{76}\) This is not excessively high, especially if we keep in mind the under-investment over many years.

223. It is important to recall that the Secretary-General, in his proposal for a new UN security management regime, proposed to fund the system from one source – the regular UN budget. However, in its resolution A/59/276 establishing the Department of Safety and Security, the General Assembly maintained the pre-DSS cost-sharing arrangements for safety and security, rather than funding these costs entirely from the UN regular budget. The General Assembly’s Fifth Committee has consistently reiterated its preference to maintain cost-sharing, citing the importance of sharing common ownership, along the right to participate in decision-making. In the view of the Panel, this argument conflates two important but separate functions; the right to participate and contribute to the policy and guidance development of the common system, and the financing and oversight of the system. The way this system currently works, it is difficult to hold the USG/DSS accountable for the total direction of the system, given how IASMN can overturn his proposed priorities by not agreeing to fund them. The Panel strongly believes that the UN security system would benefit immensely if it were to be funded entirely from the regular budget.

224. However, this must be a gradual, step-by-step process, engaging Member States in their capacity as donors. Since the 2005 Paris Declaration, which called for the harmonization of donor budget processes, Member States’ views of funding may have

\(^{76}\) This is not based on a survey, but on interviews and thus represents a rough impression.
evolved. Informal consultations with some experienced donors have provided ample constructive ideas and interest to envision that there are opportunities to develop instruments applied on similar cross-cutting issues.

225. Key recommendations on adequate and sustainable funding for security:

(i) The USG/DSS should engage Member States to review and propose the best option available for the conversion of the DSS budget to the UN regular budget, for recommendation to the General Assembly.

(ii) The USG/DSS should engage with donor countries to establish the principle of “no programme without security,” in which security is streamlined as an integral part of programming. The same standards and methods for financing security should be adopted across agencies, in line with the 2005 Paris Declaration, which called for harmonization of donor budget processes.

VI. The Framework for Accountability: Creating a Culture of Security

A. The United Nation’s approach to Security

226. As previously noted, the goal of the United Nations security management system is “to enable the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the security, safety, and well-being of staff as a high priority.” There is widespread support within the UN System for the principle as stated, but it is the view of many participants at the country level and at Headquarters that security, in practice, is not oriented by this vision. DSS should be the primary driver of this mind set in day-to-day operations. Meeting the goal of the UN security management system is not merely a matter of refining the structure of DSS, nor of more money or more posts, but of Organizational leadership.

227. The United Nations Secretariat and the agencies, funds, and programmes have a diverse range of mandates, governing boards, budgets, organizational cultures, and programme activities. While this diversity and complexity is part of what makes the United Nations unique, it also poses tremendous challenges for ensuring the security and safety of staff and associated personnel in a manner that enables continued delivery of operations. There is universal agreement within the UN on the need for “better” security, but differences exist over what this means in practice. To be effective, the UN security management system must recognize and remain responsive to these and other differences – to those between Headquarters environments with large numbers of civilian staff and dependants, to development-oriented settings with relatively small UN country teams, to integrated mission environments with large numbers of civilian and military personnel, to humanitarian emergencies with personnel providing assistance deep in the field.

228. Striking the appropriate balance between the security imperative and the programme imperative is the fundamental challenge facing the UN security management system. No single approach to security will be appropriate for all these contexts, nor for all participating UN entities. Having a common security management system should not

77 Framework for Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System, para. 2; also (A/57/300) and (A/57/365).
preclude diversified approaches, but it does necessitate sensitizing security to the programme arena. Different types of threats, programme priorities, and operating environments require different risk mitigation efforts if the dual goal of effective programme delivery and staff safety is to be achieved. Flexibility is essential. A common language of security is emerging across the UN – but risk management is not yet consistently understood or applied by all actors.

229. The behaviour of managers is of fundamental importance. Inherent in the goal of the UN security management system is the principle that responsibility for security rests not with security professionals, but with managers. Managers “are the single most important element in both augmenting the culture of security and in ensuring effective and appropriate security management.” It is ultimately Executive Heads of Agency and, indeed, the Secretary-General, who not only must advocate internally for integration of security into programming, but who also are accountable for implementation and compliance. And it is they who must advocate externally with Member States to guarantee sufficient resources so that the Organization does not have to compromise on safety measures.

230. The Report of the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel, issued on 3 March 2004, noted in its conclusion that “the Organization and its staff will continue to have to accept risks” and that “the challenge will be to ensure that the Organization has in place, for any given operation, a range of security measures commensurate with the degree of risk of that operation. This will require…not only sufficient security resources, staff and training, it will also require a culture of security within the Organization….”

231. To date, this message has not been consistently affirmed or supported at the strategic level of the Organization. There is no champion of security within the Organization who will, on a regular basis, ensure that the issue is part and parcel of considerations by the Secretary-General and the Executive Heads of Agency. The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security should have direct and frequent access to the Secretary-General and the Executive Heads of Agency to discharge this responsibility. The Secretary-General and Heads of Agency need likewise to incorporate security as a strategic consideration in their policy planning. Enhancing the culture of security requires significant, sustained commitment from managers at the highest levels throughout the Organization.

232. To achieve a comprehensive approach, security must be proactively supported throughout the Organization and at each and every level. Duty of care obliges the Organization to ensure that everyone employed under the United Nations flag, regardless of their contractual status or whether they are international or locally-recruited, are given the information and tools they need to make responsible decisions affecting their own security. All staff should understand and be given the opportunity to consciously accept the risks inherent in their work for the Organization. Executive Heads of Agency, through line managers, should ensure that staff are aware of the risks they face in a given duty station and of the measures the UN will take to mitigate those risks. In this regard, the Panel notes the “TEAM” model used by UNHCR as an example of good practice – training on skills, education to enable all UN personnel to understand the principles, policies, rationale and purpose of security requirements; awareness of

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security and security requirements, and motivation – creating a shift in attitude and belief in the value of making positive choices for security.

233. One of the greatest challenges facing the UN security management system is the pervasive lack of confidence on the part of staff throughout the Organization in the notion that their well-being is a top priority. The less trust there is that the system works to keep staff and personnel safe, the more likely they are to shortcut the system, and thus the less likely the system is to function properly. There have been significant improvements in the security management system since Baghdad, but, clearly, there is more still to be done – both in strengthening the system and in educating staff about the measures that are in place to protect them. In order for lines of accountability to be protected, staff and managers alike must respect the system. The Secretary-General has observed that disciplinary action should be the last in a series of steps to inculcate accountability.\textsuperscript{79} To maintain the integrity of – and respect for – the system, disciplinary measures are a necessary response to personal and professional conduct of staff and managers that is unsatisfactory or which deliberately flouts polices, rules, and regulations.\textsuperscript{80} Staff have a responsibility under the Code of Conduct to adhere to instructions and procedures designed to protect their safety and those for whom they are responsible.\textsuperscript{81}

234. Building back staff trust in the security system will require the Organization’s senior management to act – and be perceived as acting – in the best interest of UN personnel. This behaviour will go a long way towards communicating the message that their safety and security is a matter of the highest priority. Rather than leaving rumour to spread and distort information, management should be clear and transparent about exactly where UN personnel stand regarding the occupational risks they face and their corresponding entitlements. As called for by the General Assembly,\textsuperscript{82} personnel should understand, prior to their deployment, what risks they will face at a post, what the UN will do both to mitigate this risk in keeping with the goal of the UN security management system, and what compensation will be provided to the individual or his beneficiaries in the event of serious injury or death in the line of duty. It is the duty of managers to ensure this information is clearly provided, and regularly updated. Staff members and associated personnel must then decide on the basis of this information whether to accept deployment.

235. Although it is a reality that high-profile emergencies and conflicts attract young, enthusiastic staff, the Organization should either limit the practice of sending newly recruited staff without prior experience to high risk environments or provide rigorous predeployment training on high risk environments. Even less preparedness training is given to locally-recruited staff, despite evidence that they face higher, rather than lower, risk than internationals in these environments.

\textsuperscript{79} “Report of the Secretary-General on Accountability and Responsibility,” A/55/270, para. 23.
\textsuperscript{80} In approving the establishment of DSS, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General and Executive Heads of Agency to strengthen security compliance, including disciplinary measures. A/RES/59/276, para. 15-16.
\textsuperscript{82} A/Res/61/133, para. 19.
236. Strengthening the UN security management system will require the support from Member States in their roles as voting members of the General Assembly and Security Council, as donors, governing boards, troop contributors, and host governments. Where Member States require the UN to take on responsibilities in difficult environments, they must also commit the necessary resources to safely carry out these mandates. As the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations cautioned, the Secretary-General should resist Security Council resolutions where conditions for implementation do not exist.

237. Key recommendation on creating a organizational culture of security: the United Nations should develop the means to provide all staff and associated personnel with all relevant information regarding possible deployment, including risks, mitigating measures, and entitlements, enabling them to make informed decisions on accepting assignment to a specific duty station.

B. The Framework for Accountability

238. The Framework for Accountability for the United Nations security management system is one of the most significant and positive developments in the evolution of how security is conceptualized and managed by the United Nations. The identification of security actors and their roles and responsibilities is an important step away from a time in the past when there was room for confusion as to who was responsible for what, in ensuring security functions.

239. The Framework was initiated in 2002. Two years later, the General Assembly, in its resolution 59/276 (XI), requested the Secretary-General to submit a revised accountability framework for the UN security management system as a whole, in particular, making clear the role of each responsible official and elaborating on how security personnel of other UN entities would be integrated in the common security management structure at the country level under the authority of the DO.

240. After a long process led by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, with the support of the Office of Legal Affairs, the 2002 Framework was extensively reviewed and updated. In his report A/61/531 of 19 October 2006, the Secretary-General submitted it to the General Assembly, which took note of the report of the Secretary-General (resolution 61/263 of 4 April 2007), formally adopting the Framework. It is therefore considered to be binding on all participants in the UN unified security management system.

241. The Framework represents an extraordinary and commendable effort to identify lines of accountability within the complex UN system. Although the Framework is now a primary basis of the UN security management system, the Panel has not seen strong evidence that managers use it and have widely disseminated it, as requested by the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security in his 4 April 2007 memorandum to the most senior UN officials at Headquarters and in the field, including all Executive Heads of Agency, as well as all Designated Officials.

The Framework, in existence for just over a year, is still a new instrument. If it is to become an effective working tool, it needs to be checked against day-to-day practices.

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242. According to the Framework, the DO is accountable “for the security of personnel employed by the organization and their recognized dependents throughout the country or designated area.” However, as there is no reporting line between Heads of Agency and the DO, the Panel questions how the DO can exercise his/her responsibility. Such a line of accountability should exist between the Designated Official and the Heads of Agency, mirroring that at the global level between the Secretary-General and the Executive Heads of Agency.

243. Expressing a related concern, the Ahtisaari Report noted that “the UN System should clarify the role of group structures such as SMT” and that “consultative mechanisms should not blur the chain of command and accountability on security issues of UN managers responsible for the security of UN staff, from the Secretary-General to the UN Security Coordinator84 and the Designated officials in the field.” The issue of chain of command, though perhaps strengthened since the Ahtisaari Report, continues to merit attention as a means of enhancing the authority of the DOs.

244. In some cases, the Framework is quite detailed about the roles and responsibilities of different actors; in others, it seems to miss important actors. The document outlines in detail, for example, the responsibilities of Chief Security Advisers/Security Advisers, which are DSS field actors, but it does not explicitly identify those of DSS Headquarters actors with the exception of the Head of the Department.

245. As the Framework is more widely disseminated, it is likely to become a truly common reference and effective tool for managers and staff to play a role “in contributing to the highest standards of safety and security, regardless of their seniority, function or duty station.”85 The wide dissemination of the Framework for Accountability would make a significant contribution to the creation of an organizational culture that embraces security, based on trust in the security management system and among the key security actors. Dissemination of the Framework and an understanding of who is accountable will hopefully help eliminate the fear of lack of organizational support and of being blamed for taking “wrong” decisions that currently exists among programme managers and security professionals.

246. The Framework has not yet been translated into a tool for systems development and management training. In its absence, rather than empowering managers and staff, there is a risk that “accountability” is instead generating a culture of fear, as the Panel witnessed in its interviews in a number of locations, including at Headquarters. Currently, there is the perception that, in the event of a serious security incident, “accountability” always falls on a scapegoat and sanctions do not reach those higher up.86 Recording of actions and decisions, above all the decisions which may impact on people’s lives is critical. However, such a sound practice cannot, because of fear, be motivated solely by a “cover-my-back” attitude. In 2000, the Secretary-General provided a mechanism entitled “Four steps to ensuring accountability” for

84 With the reform of the UN security management system and the creation of DSS, the UN Security Coordinator was replaced by the USG/DSS.
85 [redacted].
86 The trauma of the Baghdad August 2003 attack on the UN has not yet been overcome owing to the perception among some staff that those held accountable were scapegoats and that internal sanctions did not go far enough up the accountability chain.
implementation of accountability throughout the Organization; this document should be widely disseminated to all staff at Headquarters and in every duty station (see Annex III).87

247. In a dysfunctional system, people do not share the same understanding of mechanisms that enable them to do their work. Since 2005, however, a new security management system has been established and, while improvements are still needed, it does provide the basis for sound and robust security. Such a new system is necessary to protect UN personnel, programmes, and premises in the dangerous environments that Member States mandate UN personnel to work in. There are no zero-risk operations. If the UN is to fulfill its mandates in today’s world, its managers and staff need to be prepared to accept a certain level of risk and have the instruments to manage these risks.

248. It is essential, for the institutional well-being of the Organization and the implementation of viable programmes, that staff and managers alike recognize in the Framework an instrument that allows them to work, to be creative and effectively manage risks, and that they will be fairly treated, if anything goes wrong.

249. Key recommendations on the strengthening accountability within the Organization:

(i) The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security should convene a working group comprising key actors and stakeholders in the UN security management system – particularly Designated Officials and agency security managers – to review the Framework for Accountability in order to identify where further clarity may be needed.

(ii) Executive managers should ensure that the Framework for Accountability is widely distributed throughout their respective Organizations. Furthermore, they should see to it that the Framework is operationalized within each organization by identifying internal lines of responsibility and accountability for security and safety. As a necessary corollary, all actors must be given the necessary training, tools, and resources to fulfill their responsibilities for security.

VII. The Responsibility of Host Governments and Member States

250. The primary responsibility of Member States for the security and safety of UN officials and premises is a guiding principle of the United Nations security management system. This responsibility derives from the inherent function of government to maintain law and order on their national territory. The provision in Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations has been consistently upheld by the General Assembly in its resolutions and legal instruments, including the Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel (1994) and its Optional Protocol (2006). The principle was again reiterated in the Framework for Accountability, which states,

“The primary responsibility for the security and protection of personnel employed by the United Nations system organizations, their spouse and

251. The protection of the 1994 Convention extends only to United Nations operations that are conducted “for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security; or...[w]here the Security Council or the General Assembly has declared that there exists an exceptional risk to the safety and security of the personnel participating in the operation.” In 2003, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1502, which requests the Secretary General to seek the inclusion of – and host countries to include – key provisions of the 1994 Convention in future and, if necessary, existing Status of Forces Agreements, Status of Mission Agreements, and host country agreements with the UN. The Security Council also expressed a determination to issue the declaration of exceptional risk envisaged in the 1994 Convention and invited the Secretary-General to advise the Council where, in his opinion, circumstances would support such a declaration. The 2007 Optional Protocol extends this protection to include all other UN operations, whether related to the delivery of humanitarian, political, or development assistance.

252. Under the 1994 Convention and its Optional Protocol, Member States who are parties are expected to prevent attacks against UN staff and personnel, to establish such attacks as crimes punishable by law, and to prosecute or extradite those responsible. To date, of the 192 Members States of the United Nations, only 84 are party to the Convention; 13 are parties to the Optional Protocol. A further nine State parties are required before the Option Protocol enters into force. DSS and the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) bring individual cases in which the rights, privileges, and immunities of UN personnel have been infringed upon to the attention of the host government concerned.

253. In practice, however, the Convention and Optional Protocol are weak instruments for the protection of United Nations personnel. Even in circumstances when UN staff members have been deliberately killed, there is often a high degree of State incapacity to investigate and prosecute those responsible. Very few of the perpetrators of malicious acts against UN staff and personnel are ever brought to justice. Yet, each year the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Member States in the General Assembly the numbers of UN personnel injured and killed in the course of the previous year. In a separate annual report, the Secretary-General also reports on UN staff detained or held in arrest in various countries. The Panel has noted at least 80 resolutions and reports adopted by Member States since 1980 on the topic. While this is an impressive expression of concern, the Panel also notes that UN staff and officials still consider developing a relationship of mutual trust with host countries to be the most complex aspect of, but also most positive opportunity for, strengthening the safety and security of UN and associated personnel.

254. The 1994 Convention requests countries to inform the Secretary-General of actions taken in pursuit of a crime and to bring perpetrators to justice. In his report A/58/187, the Secretary-General observed that out of 198 civilian personnel who lost

88 Para. 1
89 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel, Article 1(c),i-ii.
90 Multilateral agreements deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York (SG/LEG/CER/E).
their lives as a result of a malicious act, the Secretariat has been advised in only 21 cases of legal action taken by host governments. The same report also stresses the fact that national staff are those most vulnerable. There is concern among UN staff about the perceived impunity and lack of pursuit by both the United Nations and the host country for crimes committed against personnel in the service of the United Nations.

255. The strength of the protection framework provided lies only in the readiness on the part of Member States to ensure its implementation. The obligation to pursue such crimes already existed before the 1994 Convention through the opinion issued by the International Court of Justice in 1949 on “Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations” when the first UN civil servant, Count Bernadotte, was killed in the line of duty.91

256. There is, in particular, an opportunity for the Security Council to ensure that in its deliberations and decisions, it requests the Secretary-General to provide the Council with a full security risk assessment for new operations and regularly (on the occasion of each mission extension) for on-going operations. This would enable the Council to assess the risks involved for the United Nations, and to recommend the allocation of appropriate resources for the safety of the staff in the operation. This would uphold the same standard as the Security Council has established for the protection of children in armed conflict, for women in armed conflict, and for the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

257. Another opportunity for the Security Council to provide firm and clear direction on the issue of staff security would be for the Council to hold a special thematic session. Member States would have the opportunity to reflect on their own role in this and to recognize that their decisions (or omissions) do have direct security implications. Moreover, active leadership from the Council on this issue could bring about better compliance by governments with their obligations under the various legal instruments such as the Convention on Privileges and Immunities, the Convention on Safety and the Protocol as well as status of force agreements.

258. As an example, the Panel would like to highlight the current Security Council determination for the UN to “re-establish” itself in Somalia. Naturally, there is no disagreement on the need to give attention to Somalia. UN agencies and NGOs that have worked in Somalia have, at times expressed very serious doubts about pressures and interventions from the international community that have complicated rather than helped the security situation in the country. Hostage-taking of foreigners has become a rapidly growing trend in Somalia.92 Similarly, during recent months, regions in Somalia that have hitherto been considered “the safest” in the country have had serious incidents directed against UN staff.93 No doubt, the Security Council, as it reflects on how to reengage the UN in Somalia, shall carefully consider the existing context and, in particular, make sure that the security and safety of UN personnel will be fully taken into consideration and provided for.

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92 [redacted]
93 [redacted]
259. That the host government holds “primary responsibility for the security of United Nations personnel” in no way means that the responsibility of the Organization itself diminishes or disappears. As an employer, the UN continues to be morally and legally responsible for what happens to its personnel. The first duty of the UN is to understand fully what it can – and cannot – expect from the host government in terms of information exchange, regular consultations, possible secondment of senior security personnel to the UN offices, and of what other financial, material, or physical support sought by the Organization that particular Government is willing to provide.

260. The assessment of the risk faced by the United Nations in any country at any given time may differ significantly between the host government and the members of the Security Management Team. Exchange of information and regular consultations between the two sides will, in most cases, eliminate or significantly narrow the gap. Security is a sensitive subject and in many countries, it is assumed rather than stated that the host government takes all reasonable measures to protect the UN. Where an appropriate working mechanism between the UN and the host government is absent, UN staff may not be made aware of protection measures that exist. Similarly, when meeting with government authorities, the Panel was informed of their perception that the UN did not want to share information that would be essential for the efficient protection of UN staff. In other situations, the perception of the UN role in a country does not provide the basis for mutual trust between the host government and the UN. The Panel noted an absence of mutual understanding and exchange of information about what is the overall security situation of the UN and what the UN senior leadership wants to achieve in cooperation with host governments for the safety of staff and premises.

261. It bears repeating that close cooperation and mutual trust are vitally important between the host government and the members of the SMT. All the UN can and should expect from the host government is that it provides security to the best of its ability. The central element of the cooperation and trust between the two sides is information sharing about security conditions.

Improving security cooperation between Members States and the UN

262. Member states, in an ACABQ report of 2004, made the point that the UN approach to security should take note of host countries’ “uneven capacity”, and that, where host countries have the means and capacities, the UN should concentrate on enhancing cooperation with host countries’ national and local law enforcement organs, particularly in developing security structures and in assessing security threats and risks.94

263. DSS, in close cooperation with the Office of Legal Affairs, recently conducted an inventory of all existing host country agreements relating to United Nations Headquarters and offices away from Headquarters. A detailed examination of these agreements is being conducted to determine whether they adequately reflect the respective responsibility of the host government and the UN and whether, in practice, the agreements that are in force are being fully complied with.95

94 A/59/539
95 A/62/6 (Sect. 33), Table 33.23
264. Information-sharing is essential for strengthening the ability of the UN to analyze threats to its safety and security and, by facilitating informed decisions, to manage security risks. Recent experiences have demonstrated mutual benefits for host governments and UN security officials alike when they share information and analysis of the local risk and threat environment. As information collected by national intelligence services is often not UN-specific, greater openness by host governments to sharing such information with UN security personnel facilitates the Organization’s ability to identify information that might be relevant to specific threats against it. Equally, the UN must share with host governments its analysis of its own vulnerabilities in a specific context.

265. When the matter of information-sharing with – and information analysis by – the United Nations has arisen in the past, it has been met with concern by some Member States. With the clear evidence of the UN being a high-value target for certain groups, it must be more and more recognized by Member States that the protection of UN staff and property in their own territory requires such an exchange of information. It is hardly necessary to remind that UN staff are all nationals of Member States.

266. After reviewing the circumstances of the 19 August 2003 attack on the office in Baghdad, the Ahtisaari Report, which also aimed at strengthening the UN security management system, recommended that the “General Assembly and Security Council should provide clear, continuous guidance on the type of measures they see as appropriate to prevent the recurrence of attacks against UN staff and premises… Member States should be asked to conduct consultations among their security, humanitarian and development communities to gather diverse views on the long-term strategies for the UN.” This Panel has not been able to confirm the implementation of this important 2003 recommendation.

267. Key recommendations on the responsibility of host governments for the security of the United Nations:

(i) The Secretary-General should consider making it a regular element of all his conversations with senior officials of Member States to promote an understanding of the need for closer cooperation on security matters, including the signing and ratification of the 1994 Convention and the 2006 Optional Protocol as a manifestation of the determination of both parties to work closely together in this crucial area of the Organization’s work.

(ii) To help insure “buy in” by all Member States into the requirements of protecting UN staff and premises worldwide, a working group of senior UN officials, led by the USG/DSS, and interested Member States, should urgently propose practical guidance for a best practice mechanism.

(iii) USG/DSS and DPKO should be required to provide the Security Council with a security risk assessment for all peacekeeping and special missions that the Security Council decides to establish. On the basis of that analysis of the security implications for UN personnel, the Council will ensure that resources are made available for the required mitigating measures.

(iv) The members of the Security Council should hold a special thematic session on staff security.
(v) The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security should further intensify his efforts on building mutual trust and cooperation with Member States on security matters. These contacts and joint efforts of Members States with the UN should be reflected in the annual report to the General Assembly on UN Security.

VIII. The Public Image of the United Nations and its Implications for Security

268. In all locations the Panel visited, UN personnel – from the most senior to the most junior – expressed concern over the Organization’s public image. Their concern is that a negative public image means security risks for them and for the programmes they are there to implement.

269. At the core of this issue is the perception that the United Nations has become an instrument of powerful Member States to advance agendas that serve their own interests, rather than those of the global community of nations. This is often broadly referred to as a pro-western agenda; others have called it an anti-Muslim agenda. Whatever it is called, and whatever possible manipulation of these perceptions there may be the fact is that in many places the UN is no longer seen as impartial and neutral. For many people, this is reality, not a matter of perception.

270. The concern in the field – and at different UN Headquarters – is substantiated by public opinion surveys conducted by reputable international polling organizations.66 Most recently, this “anti-UN” reality hit the UN community in a most shocking way when, in the aftermath of the 11 December attack on the UN offices in Algiers, al Jazeera TV conducted a poll among its viewers which showed that 54 per cent of respondents felt the attack was justified. There is every reason to believe that the result of this poll does not reflect public opinion in the Arab or Muslim world. The feeling of horror and condemnation of the attack in the Arab world was felt as strongly as everywhere else. But it is significant that a popular television station dared to ask such a shocking question.

271. While security measures can better protect personnel and premises, they cannot remove the threat itself. There is no zero-risk situation, but security measures can have more of an impact if the environment in which programmes and services are delivered and staff operate is one of support and not of hostility. For such an environment to be nurtured, Member States and UN officials need to earn back the public’s trust in the Organization. In their actions, they need to be guided by the principles and spirit of the Charter and they need to act, and be seen to be acting, in a manner that is consistent with those principles and in that spirit.

272. Communication efforts can play a role in helping to address public perceptions of the United Nations. The problem, however, needs to be addressed in a more substantive and comprehensive manner as it is intimately related to public understanding of what the UN represents as a result of action (or lack of action) in the political sphere, and programmes it undertakes or fails to undertake.

273. It helps to understand the complexity of the issue if one sees the United Nations not as many different entities – Member States, General Assembly, Security Council,

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Secretary-General, agencies, funds, and programmes – but as one single Organization that happens to have a dual identity. On one hand, it is a “stage” used by Member States for deliberations, negotiations, and decision-making. On the other hand, it is an “actor” that implements programmes, delivers services, and maintains peace.

274. UN programmes that promote social and economic development are agents of social change and as such are sometimes seen as a threat to local leadership or as offensive to values based on fundamentalist ideologies. As a result, these types of programmes have suffered attacks which range from the curtailment of funds to actual physical violence against programmes themselves.

275. [redacted]

276. UN programmes, it must be stressed, are approved by host governments and community-based projects are often designed with the active participation of communities and their leaders. The problem is that despite the acceptance of these projects by the community as a whole, the protection of UN activities and personnel cannot always be guaranteed.97 Also, the UN cannot rely on the communities to provide protection, as they themselves are often threatened by radical elements in their midst and an association with the UN or what is perceived as “foreign” may put the community at risk.

277. However, where the community is able to protect the UN – and sees the UN as worth protecting in the first place – it has done so, often by sharing information about local threats. Here again, information is essential for humanitarian and other staff with the greatest exposure to danger.

278. On the “political” side, the impact of the position, decisions, and statements of the Organization are much greater and wider, not least because they provide the context for those whose intention it is to shed a negative light on UN humanitarian or development activities.

279. There are key decisions or statements, in particular about the Middle East, which are seen as ignoring the very principles on which the Organization was founded, and that leads to a perception of “double standards.” The UN is then seen by those directly concerned, and by the many millions around the world sympathetic to their causes, as being on the wrong side of justice.98

280. The image of the UN in peoples’ mind is not only a question of public information and public relations. It is absolutely true that, in general, what the UN is and what it does needs to be better known. In areas of conflict, however, the UN tends to be very well known for its actions (or lack of action) on the ground, and increasingly, its incapacity to be impartial and neutral. An internal agency report, following the 2006

97 The attacks by the Taliban on schools in Afghanistan, even setting on fire schools for girls, illustrates this situation.
98 The most notable case is the Middle East and the Question of Palestine. The general perception in the region and in other world regions is that Security Council resolutions on the Question of Palestine are ignored and that there is no firm action or intention to enforce them. This contrasts with forceful measures taken by the Council to implement resolutions on other subjects. This is seen as double-standard.
The lack of decisive action or even statements from the UN Security Council on the Lebanon crisis, made for an initially hostile working environment as well as negative reporting in the Arab media. This reinforced an already negative image of the UN, accused especially in the Arab world of double standards and lack of impartiality.  

281. On this same subject, it is important to note the Secretary-General's remarks to the Security Council on 30 July 2006: “... the authority and standing of this Council are at stake. People have noticed its failure to act firmly and quickly during this crisis. Today's events at ESCWA were in part an expression of that frustration...” On that day a large number of protesters broke into UN headquarters in Beirut (ESCWA) and set fire to it. The fire was quickly put out and, fortunately, only three staff members were injured.

282. How the UN conducts its business has a significant influence on public understanding of the Organization's impartiality. In the discharge of its programmes – be they humanitarian, development, human rights or political in nature – the UN needs to engage all relevant parties, from local authorities to non-state actors. If UN officials in the field are not able to do so, their analysis of a given situation is likely to be incomplete and as a result the Organization's actions may well be ineffective. Programmes that do not respond to well-documented local needs will often be a waste of the resources of the international community. Equally important, they erode the credibility of the United Nations and its image. And this may well have a direct impact on the security of UN personnel and premises.

283. At the 2005 World Summit, the Secretary-General brought this concern to the attention of Member States: “We must restore confidence in the Organization’s integrity, impartiality, and ability to deliver – for the sake of our dedicated staff, and those vulnerable and needy people throughout the world who look to the United Nations for support.”

284. This is of particular relevance to UN humanitarian activities. Neutrality, impartiality and monitoring of programme delivery are key pillars of humanitarian operations. There is sensitivity within the UN system to the principles that need to guide humanitarian programmes. Yet, UN humanitarian actors feel that at times their activities have been limited or curtailed for political or other considerations.

285. At a number of locations visited by the Panel, including in places where there is no peacekeeping mission, this matter arose. The concern is expressed with greater emphasis in the context of “integrated missions.” It is felt that activities based on humanitarian principles have been, or run the risk of being, negatively affected by the need to conform to requirements of a non-humanitarian nature. This includes, among other things, too close association with international or national military forces, security arrangements that do not seek acceptance from local communities, and, last but not least, what may be perceived as subordination of humanitarian activities to partisan political considerations.

286. Additionally, at a number of locations, the question of physical protection of UN premises or of field staff movements and its impact on UN image was often brought to

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99 Internal report from a UN agency, 12 September 2006.
100 Address by the Secretary-General to the 2005 World Summit, 14 September 2005.
the attention of Panel members. What some call the “UN fortress” approach – a model of protection perceived as being based on over-reliance on physical security tools like “T” walls and heavily armed military escorts – associates the Organization with military powers, and potentially distances it from the public it was founded to serve. This physical profile, in the eyes of many, has a direct negative impact on UN image.

287. Almost every entity within the UN system tends to argue that it should be looked at differently because of what it perceives as the uniqueness of its objectives, mandate, and needs. But, following the recommendations of the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence, there is now a decisive drive within the Organization as a whole “to deliver as one”. However, in the case of security, irrespective of broader institutional arrangements, the proper use of Security Risk Assessments should provide the opportunity to identify specific needs of programmes, projects and activities which should inform the design of security measures.

288. It is the view of many with whom the Panel spoke that the “average person on the street” does not distinguish between UN entities. For most people in the world, the United Nations is one; they make no difference between and among the various institutions: General Assembly, Security Council, Human Rights Council, Secretary-General, and agencies.

289. This includes detractors who also do not make this distinction – and arguably have no interest in making this difference. For them, the target is just one: the United Nations.

290. This realization adds a heavy responsibility on all parts of the system, in particular on those, like the Security Council, that make decisions that have an impact on how the UN as a whole is perceived and even, sometimes, on how programmes can be delivered in certain areas.

291. What the decision-making bodies mandate UN entities to do and how the UN organizes itself to deliver its services in so many different countries and areas of activity, are two strategic matters that impact on the perception people around the world have of the United Nations and thus on staff security.

292. Key recommendations on the public image of the United Nations and its implication for security:

(i) Restoring the credibility of the United Nations needs to be a commitment of all parts of the system, beginning with Member States, at their deliberations in the General Assembly, Security Council and other organs, but also in other fora and in their own countries. The guiding spirit for all should be the principles of the Charter itself. UN staff, from the highest to the lowest in the hierarchy, no matter where they serve and in what capacity, need to do their part by taking decisions and behaving in a manner that is always consistent with the Charter and the Oath of Office.

(ii) The people of the world, which the United Nations serves, expect to hear statements from the United Nations that are consistent with the Organization’s principles. Statements, mainly by the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as by the Secretary-General, are the ones most scrutinized and therefore
best placed to meet those expectations and demonstrate an impartial, fair, and principled United Nations.

(iii) When adopting resolutions that restrict contact by UN officials with local political actors, Member States need to be aware of the impact such decisions may have on the image of impartiality and neutrality of the United Nations and on the security of UN staff and property around the world.

IX. Conclusion

293. Members of this Panel are very much aware that their report “Towards a culture of security and accountability” is neither exhaustive nor comprehensive. They know they have not addressed all the issues that need to be addressed, and they readily accept that they have not come with the perfect, or final solution to each of the problems they raised and discussed.

294. There is no single, perfect, final solution to security problems. There is only patient, consistent vigilance and constant, hopefully creative, improvement. Those wishing to do harm to the UN, are watching all the time and they too try to be creative.

295. This Panel did, nevertheless, identify some of the weaknesses that presently exist in the security system of the United Nations and suggested a few possible solutions.

296. The attack on the UN offices in Algiers on 11 December 2007 was a brutal aggression on the Organization. Since the Panel began its work three months ago, there have been other attacks, but fortunately none of them as devastating as the one in Algiers. This is a reminder of the simple truth that there is no total security and that incidents will happen again and again as long as there are groups and individuals determined to commit these shocking acts of violence.

297. Few countries in the world have suffered from blind, cruel terrorism as have the Algerian people and Government. Algerian officials as well as ordinary citizens, speak all the time of the fact that throughout the 1990s, they mostly fought alone against what was later called international terrorism. Indeed, they are quick to point out that during the best part of those years, there was much distortion and gross misunderstanding of what was going on in their country. But in the process Algeria also acquired much knowledge and experience on how to fight terrorism.

298. For over fifteen years, the Algerian authorities protected the United Nations effectively and helped it carry out its work without interruption. Alas, that remarkable success was interrupted on 11 December 2007. The Panel hopes that this report helps to bring to light at least some of the lessons coming out of the Algiers tragedy.

299. A key observation by the Panel is a kind of passivity of the System that the Panel finds difficult to understand, let alone explain. For example, absolutely everyone agrees that in some duty stations the UN has too many offices and too many staff. Many agree that quite a few of these staff are probably not needed at all. And with the benefit of today’s communication tools, quite a few who are necessary could very well work out of other, safer locations. And yet, no one moves, no one suggests solutions, no one brings
these issues to the higher echelons of the hierarchy, up to the Secretary-General himself, if necessary.

300. However, the UN security management system has been significantly improved these last few years, especially after the tragedy in Baghdad. The creation of DSS and the allocation of significant additional resources by Member States to support UN security are very positive steps. The agencies have equally stepped up their allocation of resources for security. The Panel believes that the UN has the basis for a robust security system. Adjustments are necessary – earlier recommendations need to be implemented more quickly - as the system goes through the pains of growth and its different components work together to make good on the vision of security stated in the Framework for Accountability – security as an enabler of safe programme delivery.

301. Now that the basic elements for a more robust security management system are present, there is the more difficult task of ensuring that the system works effectively, that it is perceived as doing so and that it enjoys the trust of UN personnel and their dependents.

302. Only with an institutional culture that embraces security can that goal be achieved. It is the Panel’s view that personal accountability of those entrusted with the safety and security of personnel lies at the very core of the development of such a culture. Despite the recommendations of previous reports and other efforts, the Organization has yet to develop that culture of accountability in security management.

303. The Panel hopes that this report will prove to be a modest contribution to help Member States, senior management and staff to identify the role each needs to play to build such a culture.

304. Finally, as Member States, managers or staff do their part to reshape the UN security culture, no-one should forget those who have fallen in the line of duty and those who have suffered serious injury, not only in Baghdad and Algiers, but also everywhere the UN is present.

305. Numbers – 22 dead in Baghdad and 17 in Algiers, with dozens injured – do not tell the whole story. Let us take the example of the cleaning lady in Algiers who lost one foot and sight in one eye. She is the only bread earner for her family. All credit goes to UNHCR who are providing her with very good medical care as if she were staff. But what is going to happen to her and her family next month, next year and all the years thereafter?

306. These people must not be forgotten. And they must not be abandoned.

* * * * *
X. Summary of Recommendations

A. The 11 December 2007 attack against the United Nations in Algiers

(1) The Secretary-General should consider establishing an independent audit and accountability procedure to review the responsibilities of the key individuals and offices concerned with the 11 December 2007 attack on the UN offices in Algiers. Such independent procedure should provide the basis for whatever actions the Secretary-General might decide to take with respect to those individuals and offices. The Panel believes that such an independent procedure would go a long way towards restoring the confidence and the morale of the staff.

B. The public image of the United Nations:

(2) Restoring the credibility of the United Nations needs to be a commitment of all parts of the system, beginning with Member States, at their deliberations in the General Assembly, Security Council and other organs, but also in other fora and in their own countries. The guiding spirit for all should be the principles of the Charter itself. UN staff, from the highest to the lowest in the hierarchy, no matter where they serve and in what capacity, need to do their part by taking decisions and behaving in a manner that is always consistent with the Charter and the Oath of Office.

(3) The people of the world, which the United Nations serves, expect to hear statements from the United Nations that are consistent with the Organization’s principles. Statements, mainly by the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as by the Secretary-General, are the ones most scrutinized and therefore best placed to meet those expectations and demonstrate an impartial, fair, and principled United Nations.

(4) When adopting resolutions that restrict contact by UN officials with local political actors, Member States need to be aware of the impact such decisions may have on the image of impartiality and neutrality of the United Nations and on the security of UN staff and property around the world.

C. The role of Member States

(5) The UN Secretary-General should consider making it a regular element of all his conversations with senior officials of Member States to promote an understanding of the need for closer cooperation on security matters, including the signing and ratification of the 1994 Convention and the 2006 Optional Protocol as a symbolic manifestation of the determination of both parties to work closely together in this crucial area of the Organization’s work.

(6) To help insure “buy in” by all Member States into the requirements of protecting of UN staff and premises worldwide, a working group of senior UN officials, led by the USG/DSS, and interested Member States, should urgently propose practical guidance for a best practice mechanism. This group should report on the conclusion of its work within six months.

(7) At the country level, the host country and the UN senior official as Designated Official should make sure that practical mechanisms for the exchange of information, analysis, decisions on actions, and follow up on the security situation exist and are fully used.
Good practices should be shared with the Secretary-General’s working group in the preceding recommendation.

(8) USG/DSS and DPKO should be required to provide the Security Council with a security risk assessment for all peacekeeping and special missions that the Security Council decides to establish. On the basis of that analysis of the security implications for UN personnel, the Council will ensure that resources are planned for the required mitigating measures.

(9) The members of the Security Council should hold a special session on staff security in relation to peacekeeping and special political missions as soon as possible. This is particularly important in view of the possible considerations of a new UN mission to Somalia, which is presently on the Council’s agenda.

(10) The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security should further intensify his focus on building mutual trust and cooperation with Member States on security matters. These contacts and joint efforts of Members States with the UN should be reflected in the annual report to the General Assembly on UN Security.

D. The IASMN, HLCM, and CEB:

(11) The Secretary-General, as the Chair of CEB, and the CEB must review the security system, its strategy, performance, and resources regularly. Consideration should be given to have the CEB/HLCM serviced by a small working group that brings in IASMN representatives and DSS to provide the substance for the decisions by CEB.

(12) Given the pressing and strategic nature of security-related issues and the fact that the CEB only meets twice a year, the Secretary-General should convene a smaller senior management group, serviced by the USG/DSS, that will meet every two months, or as required by events, in order to review and decide on strategic security issues, provide policy guidance, and review country specific-situations. Overall, the group would ensure that senior managers of the Organization are – and are seen as – leading the change to a managerial culture of responsibility and proactivity on security that enables delivery of programmes.

E. Accountability:

(13) The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security should convene a working group comprising key actors and stakeholders in the UN security management system – particularly Designated Officials and agency security managers – to review the Framework for Accountability in order to identify where further clarity may be needed.

(14) The United Nations should develop the means to provide all staff and associated personnel with all relevant information regarding possible deployment, including risks, mitigating measures, and entitlements, enabling them to make informed decisions on accepting assignment to a specific duty station.

F. The Department of Safety and Security:

(15) The USG/DSS must clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the different work units in his own Department, in line with the Framework for Accountability.
(16) The post of Assistant-Secretary-General for Safety and Security should be established to enable the USG/DSS to focus on strategic issues, with the guarantee that a senior official will be available for both day-to-day overall management and strengthening of internal management of DSS, as well as to represent the Department in the absence of the USG.

(17) To augment the ability of the Department of Safety and Security to carry out its advisory role to the Designated Official, the USG/DSS should deploy the Regional Desks and key technical and analytic staff to [redacted], [the field] making optimum use of available resources.

(18) The USG/DSS should consider integrating POSS officers into the Regional Desks as an alternative to the current stand-alone desk. POSS officers would maintain their dedicated function for peacekeeping mission environments, but report to the Chiefs of the Regional Desks. A dual reporting line through a POSS senior coordination officer would remain the main link to DPKO and DFS.

(19) The USG/DSS should consider deployment of additional operational/tactical assessment capabilities at the [redacted] [field]. Consideration should likewise be given to establishment of analyst posts for high-risk duty stations.

(20) The USG/DSS should provide the UNDP Administrator, as the head of the UN Development Group, with a security risk assessment for high-risk, non-mission environments where the UN has a presence. The Chair of the UNDG, together with the Executive Directors, must be provided with a full analysis of the security implications for staff and explicitly recognize that the nature of the situations is known, and resource the required mitigating measures. The UNDG thus will be able to recognize risk, and commit to measures for mitigation.

(21) The UN system must establish standing crisis management support teams that can be activated when needed. Only staff with experience and proven competency in this area should be selected. They should be trained as teams and be immediately released from their regular jobs when called for deployment. The decision of the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, made in consultation with a crisis task team of interagency senior managers, should provide the triggering mechanism for activating these teams and should provide the necessary support from Headquarters.

(22) DSS should maintain a roster of experienced security professionals within the UN System who are willing to rapidly deploy when surge capacity is needed.

(23) The USG/DSS should consider, in cooperation with agencies and the Secretariat departments, expanding the pre-deployment of security equipment to facilitate rapid distribution to duty stations in the event of a sudden, negative change in the security environment.

(24) TDS should prioritize planning, development of training packages and standards as well as monitoring of the impact of training. Implementation should be carried out by the [redacted] [various] stakeholders.
(25) TDS should hire a former Designated Official as part of its training team to support the design of SMT training packages, as well as provide real-life experience and insight to incoming DOs on their role, challenges and guidelines.

(26) A dedicated Safety and Security Training Centre should be established as part of the UN Staff College as the focal point for all safety and security training within the UN.

(27) The Executive Office of DSS is responsible for staff worldwide; its administrative capacity should reflect this responsibility. The DSS Executive Office should be provided with the necessary resources and delegation of authority to assume full administrative responsibility for all DSS staff, including recruitment.

(28) Pending UN human resources management reforms, DSS security professionals on UNDP contract should gradually be transferred over to the DSS contracts and all new recruitments should be through DSS.

(29) To enhance the safety of UN personnel, a dedicated Safety Unit should be established within DSS with competent staff and resources to fulfill the safety-related aspects of its mandate. As a matter of immediate priority, the Unit should facilitate development of system-wide guidance on air safety.

(30) The USG for Safety and Security should clearly delineate –and clarify any remaining contradictions in – the reporting line of the Chief/SSS to the CSA in Headquarters and Offices Away from Headquarters.

G. Adequate and sustainable financing:

(31) The USG DSS should engage Member States to review and propose the best option available for the conversion of the DSS budget to the UN regular budget, for recommendation to the General Assembly.

(32) The USG/DSS should engage with donor countries to establish a good practice principle of “no programme without security,” in which security is streamlined as an integral part of programming. The same standards and methods for financing security should be adopted across agencies, in line with the 2005 Paris Declaration, which called for harmonization of donor budget processes.

H. Supporting the Designated Official and Security Management Team:

(33) Designated Officials must be supported at all levels of the UN system in effectively performing. They should be encouraged to call on senior management at DSS/HQ for guidance and support if faced with difficult situations that warrant engagement from Headquarters.

(34) The Department of Safety and Security and UNDP, as the administering support agency for Resident Coordinators, should design a comprehensive training programme for DOs and Heads of Agency. They should consult a number of experienced DOs to ensure that the programme does meet all the needs of new DOs.

I. The responsibility of the United Nations as an employer:
(35) The senior management of the UN and its agencies, funds, and programmes should aim to articulate a statement of “Employer Responsibility.” The statement should outline the Organization’s measures to manage risk, the duties of staff for risk mitigation, and the measures in place to ensure that staff and their dependants are cared for when, despite all reasonable measures to protect staff, incidents do occur.

(36) Headquarters should deploy rapid-response administration personnel as part of the immediate post-crisis response to help victims and/or their families understand entitlements and process claims.

(37) Staff should be regularly updated and informed through a compensation and benefits guide in a clear, easy-to-follow manner.

(38) The Hazard Pay System should be harmonized among the Secretariat and the agencies, funds, and programmes.

(39) Options for extending the locally-decided MORSS should be reviewed based on the safety concerns of staff themselves, as well as the country-specific threat and risk assessment.

J. Security system instruments:

(40) The CEB, at the earliest possible occasion, should review the exposure of UN programmes and deployment of UN staff and offices around the world, and jointly consider measures to reconfigure or reduce the Organization's presence in the most vulnerable locations. Where the issue cannot be resolved, the USG/DSS must inform the Secretary-General so that the issue is addressed at a highest level.

(41) Preparedness for medical emergency needs must be incorporated into MOSS. Each duty station should have an emergency response plan that includes medical preparedness, including for mass casualties.

(42) The existing UN security phase system should be replaced with a system in which country- and area-based security measures are determined on the basis of the Security Risk Assessment. DSS and the IASMN should determine the implications of such an approach on the application of MOSS, travel clearance, and other security policies and procedures.

K. DSS and agency security professionals in the field:

(43) The recruitment pool from which DSS draws security professionals should be expanded to include qualified staff from Agencies, peacekeeping missions, as well as from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

(44) Selection panels for Chief Security Advisers/Security Advisers must include representation from agencies and DPKO, which are the primary clients of security at the country-level where CSAs/SAs are deployed.

(45) The professional level and experience of security advisers should be commensurate with both the security environment at the duty station and the grading of his/her peers on the Security Management Team. DSS, in conjunction with the Department of
Management, should review the post grading structure of country and area-level for Security Advisers based on their roles and responsibilities as members of the SMT.

(46) To facilitate the exchange of security advisers, a system-wide policy or guideline (e.g., on secondment and surge capacity support) should be developed by DSS and agencies.
Secretary-General to appoint independent panel on Algiers bombing

The following statement was issued today by the Spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon:

On Friday, 11 January 2008, the Secretary-General received from the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security a preliminary report on circumstances leading up to the terrorist attack that took place a month earlier against United Nations premises in Algiers.

The Secretary-General has now decided to appoint an independent panel to establish all the facts concerning the Algiers attack and also to address strategic issues vital to the delivery and enhancement of staff security for the United Nations in its operations around the world. The panel will seek the full cooperation of the Algerian governmental authorities.

The Secretary-General fully recognizes the global reality of the environments in which the United Nations operates and the need to work actively with Member State support to improve the security of the staff.

The composition of this independent panel, which will draw on international experts from outside the United Nations system, and its more detailed terms of references are expected to be announced shortly.

The Secretary-General reiterates his commitment to continue to work with Member States to improve the security of United Nations staff.

* * * *

For information media • not an official record

Guidance to the International Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide

- Establish, on the basis of a questionnaire which will be submitted to the Algerian authorities, the facts concerning the 11 December 2007 Algiers bombing which targeted the United Nations Headquarters, in order to complete the initial evaluation of the Safety Director of the United Nations on the incident;

- Evaluate and report on the threats/risks applicable to the United Nations, with a focus on the change of level of the threat (throughout the investigation);

- Examine the adequacy of the security arrangements compared to the responsibilities of the United Nations system and examine the responsibility of the Host Country and the measures it will need to take to address such situations;

- Examine the inherent vulnerabilities of the United Nations operations and personnel and the reality of the risks facing United Nations personnel;

- Identify the fundamental lessons on the global security policy, its management and arrangements, including lessons drawn from preceding reports on the matter, and make recommendations on the improvements to bring to the systems and practice, as well as on additional resources which should be provided to face security challenges and prevent such incidents or lessen their impact.

[Signature]

Vijay Nambiar
Chef de Cabinet

New York, February 2008
Annex II: Members of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide

Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria) has held a number of senior UN positions at UN Headquarters and in the field, including South Africa, Haiti, Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2000, he chaired the Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations. He served as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria (1991-93) and Algeria’s Ambassador to Egypt and the United Kingdom.

Colonel Paolo Coletta (Italy) is Head of the Logistics Department of Carabinieri Headquarters in Rome, Italy. He has also served as Civilian Police with international organizations, including the United Nations. Colonel Coletta graduated from the Modena Army Academy and also has a degree in National and International Security Sciences.

Brigadier General Elsayed Ibrahim Elsayed Mohamed Elhabbal (Egypt) has served in the Cairo Security Directorate and the National Security Sector since 1982. He is a graduate of the Egyptian Police Academy with a post-graduate diploma in Administrative Science and a Master’s Degree in Police Science.

Mr. Anil Kumar Gupta (India) retired earlier this year from the Indian Police Service while on deputation with the Ministry of Home Affairs as Spl. Secretary to the Government of India. Between 1974 and 1986, Mr. Gupta served in various capacities in the State of West Bengal before his 22 year career with the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Ambassador (ret.) M. Umit Pamir (Turkey), Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO (2004-06), to the United Nations (2000-04) and to ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) in 1990-1991. He also served as Ambassador to Greece and to Algeria between 1995 and 1997.

Major (ret.) Thomas Boy Sibande (South Africa) has been a consultant to the Government of South Africa on security matters since his retirement from the South African National Defence Force in 2004. Originally a teacher, Mr. Sibande joined the African National Congress (ANC) in 1981. He obtained his B.A. Degree in Nigeria.

Ms. Margareta Wahlström (Sweden), former United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan. Ms. Wahlström also had an extensive career in the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, starting with the Swedish Red Cross.
Secretariat of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide

Mr. Manoel de Almeida e Silva, United Nations Secretariat

Ms. Melanie Redondo, United Nations Secretariat

Ms. Naomi Scott-Dunne, United Nations Secretariat

Mr. Jake Sherman, Center on International Cooperation

The Panel also wishes to acknowledge the following individuals:

Mr. James Coates, United Nations Secretariat

Ms. Jane Pearce, World Food Programme

Mr. Charles Petrie, United Nations Development Programme

Mr. Ugo Solinas, United Nations Secretariat

Ms. Annabel Taylor, Department for International Development
Annex III: Four Steps to Ensuring Accountability

Four steps to ensuring accountability

1. Specifying responsibility, authority and results to be achieved

   The persons who are to be held accountable must be informed of the following:

   (a) What they are to be held accountable for, that is, the programme results they must deliver, and the resources — financial and human — that they will be allocated;

   (b) How their results, and their exercise of responsibility and authority will be monitored and assessed;

   (c) The limits of their authority, that is, the types of decision they may make without reference to a central or higher authority;

   (d) The overall parameters within which their decisions must be made, that is, the Organizational values, policies, rules and regulations they must abide by, and the behavioural standards to which they will be expected to conform.

2. Providing guidance and support

   The persons who are to be held accountable must be provided with guidance and support to enable them to exercise their responsibility and authority responsibly and effectively. This should include the following:

   (a) Regular, timely and relevant management information;

   (b) Training and development in the required skills and competencies;

   (c) Ready access to a more senior manager for advice and guidance;

   (d) Professional advice from central finance and human resource experts.

3. Monitoring and assessing the exercise of responsibility and authority

   Monitoring must result in information that permits objective comparison of results against targets and standards, covering, among other things, the following:

   (a) Delivery of programmes, in terms of time, cost and quality;

   (b) Management of human and financial resources;

   (c) Evidence that authority has been fully exercised but not exceeded, that is, that managers have not sought to avoid decisions

101 A/55/270, Annex I
they are empowered to make; and have referred decisions elsewhere if they are not empowered to make them;

(d) Compliance with policies, values, regulations, rules and behavioural standards.

4. **Taking appropriate action**

Follow-up must be capable of distinguishing between and dealing appropriately with the following:

(a) Excellent or satisfactory execution of responsibility and authority;

(b) Unsatisfactory execution of responsibility and authority as a result of carelessness or ignorance;

(c) Unacceptable exercise of responsibility and authority due to deliberate flouting of policies, rules and regulations, or exceeding the limits of authority;

(d) Misconduct or fraud.
Annex IV: Summary of Compensation and Benefits

A. Contractual Arrangements

307. It is estimated that across the different agencies, funds and programmes there are at least 24 different contract types covering the professional and general services categories with different benefits, entitlements, and coverage. For safety and security purposes, however, all individuals irrespective of their contract type or duration will fall within the wider UN security plan.

308. The Human Resources Network of the CEB is working to strengthen the concept of a common approach to contracts across the agencies, funds, and programmes, including reviewing contractual arrangements for consultants and Special Service Agreement-type contract holders. Recently, the Secretary-General’s proposal to introduce a single UN staff contract under one set of rules was again deferred by the General Assembly.102

309. The great diversity of contractual arrangements affects the security and safety of personnel by creating groups of UN personnel with different insurance coverage arrangements and other entitlements.

B. The Malicious Acts Insurance Policy

310. The malicious acts insurance policy (MAIP) provides worldwide coverage in respect of death or permanent disability caused directly or indirectly by war or a malicious act.103 The policy covers all national and international designated UN contract holders, consultants, and official visitors across 21 (out of 24) agencies, funds, and programmes at a cost of US$4.8 million per year. The cost-sharing allocation to be paid by the participating Agency is determined by the level of risk in the countries that the agency operates in, the number of personnel they have in a country, and the grades of those personnel. Each year, the participating UN entities are required to inform the Insurance and Disbursements Service (OPPBA/Department of Management) what staff categories are covered by the MAIP.

311. The MAIP was renegotiated after the Baghdad bomb in order to also include terrorism actions among the malicious acts covered by the policy. It also now has better coverage for post-traumatic stress disorder treatment and for Headquarters locations.


312. Appendix D to the UN Staff Rules (ST/SGB/Staff Rules/Appendix D/Rev.1 Consolidated text) governs the provision of compensation in the event of death, injury, or illness of UN staff attributable to the performance of official duties on behalf of the United Nations.

102 A/62/772
103 A malicious act includes hostilities, revolution, rebellion, insurrection, riots or civil commotion, sabotage, explosion of war weapons, terrorism, murder or assault or an attempted threat.
Nations. It applies equally to national and international staff members, based on their contracts, length of service, and pension fund scheme.\textsuperscript{104}

313. Appendix D is long due for revision. It came into effect in January 1966 and has been revised twice – in January 1976 and, most recently, in January 1993. Both the procedure for evaluating disability and the amount of compensation need to be reviewed to ensure that it adequately reflects present-day realities. At its March 2008 meeting, the Human Resource Network called for volunteers to draft the terms of reference to review Appendix D. While on the work plan for 2008, it is not expected to be completed during the course of the year.

D. Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards

314. The current policy of minimum operating residential security standards (MORSS) applies only to international staff. The MORSS has financial implications that increase with the increased vulnerability of many environments. The MORSS measures are quite basic; such as a robust entrance door and light, window bars, a generator for emergency light. There is no MORSS for national employees, or for unarmed, uniformed personnel, such as Military Liaison Officers. Among national personnel in particular, this generates a sense of inequity in the system. The Panel notes that these personnel have raised a number of options upon which such a system could be based, subject to their own safety concerns and the security risk assessment.

E. Hazard Pay

315. Hazard pay is a special allowance authorized by the International Civil Service Commission and granted to all staff members who are required to work in what is deemed hazardous locations. According to UN Rules and Regulations, hazard pay is an entitlement for internationally recruited staff members and those national staff who continue to report to work.\textsuperscript{105} Implementation has been left to agencies to apply according to their own standards, which has resulted in a diversity of standards linked to financial viability. Consequently, as the Panel found in Algiers among UN staff sharing office space after the bombing, personnel working side by side but from different agencies are entitled to different hazard pay; indeed, depending on their organization, some are not entitled to hazard pay at all.

F. Occasional Recuperation Break

316. UN rules and regulations (ST/AI/2000/21) foresee that in duty stations that are perceived to be hazardous, stressful and/or have difficult living conditions, all staff members that have international status are granted occasional recuperation break (ORB), also referred to as “rest and recuperation.” The duty stations that are eligible for ORB are designated each year and circulated through an Information Circular. UN funds, programmes and agencies that are members of the UN common system, have, on the recommendation of the Inter-agency Hardship Working Group, adjusted their ORB cycles to comprise various cycles dependent on perceived hardship. These range from six weeks for “all extreme Non-Family duty stations with considerable insecurity

\textsuperscript{104} United Nations Volunteers are not covered by Appendix D, but are covered by the same Group Insurance Contract as the malicious acts insurance policy.

\textsuperscript{105} ST/AI/2006/6, Section 12
and active conflict” to six months for “duty stations with seasonal lack of basic goods for which regular importation is not feasible."
Annex V: List of interviews conducted by the Panel

Meetings (individual and by group)\(^{106}\) and telephone interviews held by Panel in New York

Permanent Missions to the UN

[ redacted]

UN Officials

[redacted]

Non-UN/Permanent Mission officials

[redacted]

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\(^{106}\) Some were participants at the IASMN Meeting in Washington DC on 26 February 2008
Meetings (individual and by group) held by Panel in Geneva

UN Officials

[redacted]
[Various representatives from UNOG, UNHCR, WIPO, WHO, ITU, OHCHR, WTO, UNFPA and ILO]

Other Organizations

[redacted]

[Officials from IFRC, ICRC, Care International, Medecins Sans Frontieres, World Vision and Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Centre]
Meetings (individual and by group) held by Panel in Bangkok, Thailand

Government Officials

[redacted]

[Officials from National Police Bureau, Metropolitan Police Bureau, National Intelligence Office, Ministry of Interior, Foreign Affairs]

UN Officials

[redacted]

[ESCAP, UNRC, UNDP, ESCWA]

Staff Associations/Staff Representatives from FAO, ICAO, ILO, UNAIDS, UNDP, ESCAP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNIFEM, UNODC, OCHA, UNOPS, WB and WFP

The Security Management Team

Representatives from ESCAP, UNDP, DSS, ICAO, ILO/ROAP, UNAIDS, UNHCR, UNICEF and UNIDO

Other Organizations

[redacted]

[ICRC, CARE, World Vision]

Meetings (individual and by group) held by Panel in Islamabad, Pakistan

Government Officials

[redacted]

[Officials from MFA, Inspectorate General of Police, National Crisis Management Centre]

UN Officials

[redacted]

Staff Associations/Staff Representatives from FAO, ILO, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP and UN Staff Association

The Security Management Team

Representatives from WHO, UNHCR, UNDP, OHCHR, FAO, ILO and UNICEF
Other Organizations
[redacted]
ICRC, CARE International

Meetings (individual and by group) held by Panel in Kabul, Afghanistan

Government Officials
[redacted]
[Afghan National Directorate of Security]

UN Officials
[redacted]
[Officials of UNAMA UNDP, UNODC, UNMACA, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF]

Staff Associations/Staff Representatives from UNICEF, ANBP, WHO, UNAMA, UNV and UNDP

The Security Management Team

Representatives from UNAMA, DSS, UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, IOM, UNMACA, UNESCO, World Bank, UNODC, UNFPA, UNOPS, FAO, UNEP, IRIN, ADB and UNIFEM

Other Organizations
[redacted]
[Officials of ISAF, ANSO and ICRC]

Meetings (individual and by group) held by Panel in Colombo, Sri Lanka

Government Officials
[redacted]
[Officials of Foreign Office and Police]

UN Officials
[redacted]
Staff Associations/Staff Representatives, Colombo, from UNHCR, UNOPS, IOM, ILO, UNICEF, WFP, OCHA and UNMAP

Staff Associations/Staff Representatives, Vavuniya from UNHCR, IOM, ILO, UNICEF, UNOPS, WFP, OCHA and UNMAP

The Security Management Team

Representatives from UNDP, UNHCR, ADB, OCHA, WFP, UNAIDS, UNOPS, ILO, UNICEF, FAO, IOM, World Bank, WHO, UNHABITAT and DSS

Other Organizations

[redacted]

[Officials of IFRC and ICRC]

Meetings (individual and by group) held by Panel in Nairobi, Kenya

Government Officials

[redacted]

[Officials of Foreign Ministry, Police, including Diplomatic Police Unit ]

UN Officials

[redacted]

[Officials of UNON, UNEP, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR , UNPOS,FAO]

Staff Union Representatives

The Security Management Team

Representatives from HABITAT, UNON, UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO, UNEP and DSS

Other Organizations

[redacted]

[Officials of Kenya Red Cross Society, ICRC, Somali Red Crescent Society]

Meetings (individual and by group) held by Panel in Khartoum/Darfur, Sudan

Government officials

[ redacted ]
UN Officials, Khartoum

[redacted]

Visits to FAO, WHO and WFP in Khartoum
Meeting with NGOs organized by OCHA in Khartoum

The Security Management Team, Darfur

Representatives from UNAMID, UNDP, DSS, UNICEF, OCHA, UNHCR, WFP, IOM
UNJLC, FAO, UNAIDS, UNOPS, UNMAO, WHO, UNFPA and UNMIS

The Security Management Team, Khartoum

Representatives from UNMIS, UNHCR, WFP, FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, OCHA, UNOPS,
UNFPA, WHO, IOM, UNJLC, UNESCO and DSS

Meetings (individual and by group) held by Panel in Rome, Italy

UN Officials

[redacted] [WFP, IFAD and FAO]

Meetings (individual and by group) held by Panel in Algiers, Algeria

Government Officials

[redacted]

UN Officials

[redacted]

Non-UN officials

Families of the victims

The Security Management Team

Representatives from UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP, ILO, FAO, UNHCR and DSS

Meetings (individual and by group) held by Panel in Amman, Jordan

Government Officials

[redacted]
[Officials of Preventative Department, Operation Unit, Civilian Affairs, and Security Affairs Department]
UN Officials

[redacted]
[Officials of UNESCO, UNAMI, WHO/CEHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA, UNDP, UNIFEM and UNRWA]

Staff Associations/Staff Representatives from UNESCO, UNAMI, WHO/CEHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA, UNDP, UNIFEM and DSS

Wardens from UNAMI, UNDP, DSS, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNRWA

The Security Management Team

Representatives from UNDP, DSS, UNAMI, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNHCR, UNESCO, WHO, UNRWA, OCHA and UNIFEM

Meetings (individual and by group) held by Panel in Jerusalem and oPT

Government Officials

[redacted]
[Officials from Ministry of Interior, and of IDF Civil Administration West Bank Military Police]

UN Officials

[redacted]
[Officials of UNRWA, UNTSO, UNDP, UNICEF, OCHA, WFP, OHCHR from Nablus, Gaza, Ramallah and others]

The Security Management Team

Representatives from UNRWA, UNTSO, WBFO, FAO, UNICEF, UNDP/PAPP, UNESCO WFP, WHO, UNFPA, OHCHR, UNHCR and DSS

Meetings (individual and by group) held by Panel in Beirut, Lebanon

Government Officials

[redacted]
[Officials from Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Interior, Internal Security Forces, Military Intelligence]

UN Officials
Meetings (individual and by group) held by Panel in Cairo, Egypt

Government Officials

[redacted]
[Officials from MFA, including Operations and Protection Department ]

UN Officials

[redacted]

[Officials from UNDP, UNHCR, FAO, ICAO, ILO, IOM, UNAIDS, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNFEM, UNODC, World Bank, WFP, WHO, UN Staff Association]

The Security Management Team

Annex VI: List of security and safety-related reports

A. General Assembly Reports


A/54/154 & Add.1 Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations Report of the Secretary-General

A/55/494 Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel; Report of the Secretary-General


A/56/384 Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel; Report of the Secretary-General

A/57/300 Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel; Report of the Secretary-General

A/57/365 Report of the Secretary-General

A/58/6/Add.1 General Assembly, Official Records, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 6


A/58/344 Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel; Report of the Secretary-General

A/58/756 Report of the Secretary-General
A/59/226  Respect for the privileges and immunities of officials of the United Nations and the specialized agencies and related organizations: safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel; Report of the Secretary-General

A/59/332  Report of the Secretary-General

A/59/365  Report of the Secretary-General

A/59/365/Corr.1  Report of the Secretary-General, Corrigendum

A/59/365/Add.1  Report of the Secretary-General, Addendum

A/59/396  Note by the Secretary-General

A/59/448/Add.2  Report of the Fifth Committee

A/59/539  Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

A/60/223  Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel; Report of the Secretary-General

A/61/223  Measures taken to improve the operational administration of existing cost-sharing arrangements for safety and security; Report of the Secretary-General

A/61/642  Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations: Measures taken to improve the operational administration of existing cost-sharing arrangements for safety and security; Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations: standardized access control; Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

A/61/463  Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel; Report of the Secretary-General

A/62/91  Section 33, Safety and security, of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009; Note by the Secretary-General

A/62/257  Improving global road safety; Note by the Secretary-General

A/62/324 & Corr.1  Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and
protection of United Nations personnel;
Report of the Secretary-General

A/62/641 Measures taken to ensure the effective implementation of
the arrangements in place for the sharing of costs for
safety
and security across the United Nations system
Report of the Secretary-General

ACC/1994/19 Report of the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security
Matters

ACC/1996/21 Report of the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security
Matters

ACC/1997/10 Report of the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security
Matters

Matters

ACC/1999/10 Report of the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security
Matters

ACC/2000/10 Report of the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security
Matters

A/AC.96.923 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner:
Strengthening partnership to ensure protection, also in
relation to security

A/C.5/36/31 )
A/C.5/37/34 )
A/C.5/38/17 & Add.1 )
A/C.5/39/17 )
A/C.5/40/25 )
A/C.5/41/12 )
A/C.5/42/14 )
A/C.5/43/18 )
A/C.5/44/11 )
A/C.5/45/10 )
A/C.5/47/14 )
A/C.5/49/6 & Add.1 )
A/C.5/50/3 )
A/C.5/51/3 )
A/C.5/52/2 )

B. General Assembly Resolutions

A/RES/35/212
A/RES/36/232
A/RES/37/236
A/RES/38/230
A/RES/39/244
A/RES/40/258 C
A/RES/41/205
A/RES/42/219
A/RES/43/225
A/RES/44/186
A/RES/45/240
A/RES/46/220, Annex I.C and II.A
A/RES/47/28
A/RES/49/238
decision 50/484
A/RES/51/227
decision 52/476
A/RES/52/216
A/RES/53/87
A/RES/54/192
A/RES/55/175
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A/RES/60/42
A/RES/60/123
A/RES/61/133
A/RES/62/95

C. Security Council Resolutions

D. ST/SGBs
ST/SGB/2000/4 SG’s bulletin: Organization of the UN Office at Geneva
ST/SGB/2000/5 SG’s bulletin: Organization of the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
| ST/SGB/2002/16 | SG’s bulletin: Organization of the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Western Asia |
| ST/SGB/2004/5 | SG’s bulletin: Organization of the UN Office at Vienna |
| ST/SGB/2005/11 | SG’s bulletin: Organization of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific |
| ST/SGB/2005/12 | SG’s bulletin: Organization of the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Africa |
| ST/SGB/2008/7 | SG’s bulletin: Organization of the UN Office at Nairobi |

### E. Information circulars (Geneva)

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