I. BACKGROUND1. By its resolution 733 of 23 January 1992, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia.
2. By paragraph 11 of resolution 751 of 24 April 1992, the Security Council decided to establish a Committee, consisting of all members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:
(a) to seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the embargo imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992);
(b) to consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the embargo, and in that context to make recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo;
(c) to recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo and to provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States.
3. In practice, the Committee has remained passive and the only action it has taken was to appeal to Somalia’s neighbouring States as well as other Member States for information on reported or suspected violations of the mandatory measures.
4. The Committee does not have any specific monitoring mechanism that would enable a more effective implementation of the arms embargo. It relies solely on the co-operation of States and organisations in a position to provide information on violations of the arms embargo. Regrettably, very little information on such violations has, so far, been brought to the attention of the Committee.
II. THE ANGOLAN AND RWANDAN PARADIGMS
5. There are no uniform sanctions “prescriptions” or “formulae”. Although sanctions monitoring and enforcement may be more difficult in Somalia than in other situations, IGAD may wish to consider the experience gained and the initiatives undertaken concerning Rwanda and Angola.
(a) Angola
6. In 1991, UNITA disputed the results of the UN supervised elections and soon thereafter commenced hostilities against the Angolan Government. Between 1991 and 1993, the Security Council initiated a range of actions intended to restore the peace process. It appointed a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, enlisted the support of the Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as well as the engagement of the “Troika” States (the United States, the Russian Federation and Portugal) in the peace process and supported the implementation of the Peace Accords.
7. By September 1993, having exhausted all available options, the Security Council “condemned” UNITA in its resolution 833 (1993) for its continued military actions resulting in the suffering and deaths of Angolan civilians and thus imposed an arms embargo against UNITA.
8. The Council’s imposition of sanctions against UNITA was significant because it was the first time in its history that it had applied an embargo against a non-state actor. The Council would later resort to the use of this measure against the Rwandan rebel forces in 1995. Although there are many more non-state actors on the Somali scene than in Angola, the experience and progress in applying, monitoring and enforcing the arms embargo against UNITA may prove useful in the case of the Somali factions.
(b) Rwanda
9. The original arms embargo on Rwanda was imposed on the Government itself in May 1994. As the situation dramatically deteriorated, however, the Council began to develop a more focused approach.
10. In June 1995, the Council affirmed that the arms embargo applied to neighbouring States. In August 1995, it specified that arms could not be “resold, transferred or made available to neighbouring States”. In September 1995, the Council reassessed the situation, suspended the arms embargo on the Rwandan Government and created the International Commission of Inquiry with broad investigative authority to pursue allegations of embargo violations.
11. Equally important was that the Council empowered UNICOI to consider information from sources other than Member States and to identify the parties “aiding and abetting the illegal acquisition of arms”. Notwithstanding the constraints faced by UN organs created on an ad hoc basis such as organisational support and resources, as well as the difficulties faced by any sanctions body in obtaining and verifying information, in this instance the Security Council gave UNICOI a free reign to investigate reported violations, even when made by non-governmental organisations or the media.
III. PROPOSALS FOR ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ARMS EMBARGO
(a) The role of the Security Council
12. The Security Council could authorise the establishment of a panel of experts to investigate violations of the arms embargo. The work of the panel could be funded by a trust fund established for the purpose. The panel could, in addition, offer detailed recommendations on steps that might be taken to enhance the effectiveness of the arms embargo on Somalia. Such an expert panel should be empowered to commission background studies by research institutes and other bodies possessing specific expertise and information useful to its work.
13. Such a panel would benefit from of the experience gained and the conclusions reached by a similar panel of experts established by the Security Council in the case of Angola concerning the work of the Angola Sanctions Committee .
14. The work of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda) (UNICOI) established by Security Council resolution 918 (1994) can also offer useful lessons that may apply in the case of Somalia. UNICOI investigated violations of the arms embargo on Rwandan rebels and provided "a useful means for strengthening the effectiveness" of a UN ban . UNICOI had broad investigative authority to pursue allegations of embargo violations. It was empowered to consider information from sources other than Member States.
15. The proposed panel in the case of Somalia could also recommend that the arms embargo include prohibitions on the export of military services and logistical assistance, as well as goods for dual-use (military/civilian) when there is a clear risk of diversion or proof that similar goods have been used and might be employed again to commit abuses. A register of such dual-use goods could be derived from the existing list approved by the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use goods, and adapted on an ad hoc and item per item basis .
16. The recommendations made by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms should be implemented. Member States should negotiate a convention for combating illicit trafficking in firearms, as envisaged by the UN Economic Council Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in its 28 April 1998 resolution (E/CN.15/1998/L.6/Rev.1), to combat the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, including, inter alia, effective methods of identifying and tracing firearms. Agreement is also necessary on the establishment or maintenance of an import and export and in-transit licensing or similar authorisation regime for the international commercial transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, to prevent their diversion for use in Somalia.
(b) The role of the Sanctions Committee
17. The Chairman of the Somalia Sanctions Committee could undertake a mission to that country to assess the situation and to demonstrate the determination of the Security Council to enhance the effectiveness of the sanctions regime. He could also visit neighbouring States to encourage efforts on their part to take steps against arms trafficking and other related violations.
18. In addition, the Chairman’s mission could contribute towards raising the awareness of national authorities, regional organisations, non-governmental organisations and opinion leaders of the need to identify measures to improve the effectiveness of the Council imposed embargo, to remind Governments of their obligation, under the Charter of the United Nations, to implement the resolutions of the Security Council and to enact the necessary legislation or regulations to this end, as stated in paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1196 (1998).
19. The Secretariat stands ready to provide, upon request, needed legal advice and assistance to this end. The Sanctions Committee should develop recommendations, as appropriate, to strengthen the effectiveness of the arms embargo. Cases of confirmed violations should be made public by the Committee or reported to the Security Council. Enquiries into arms trafficking routes, the follow-up of possible specific violations and the deployment of sanctions assistance monitors would be an essential requirement for any credible attempt to enhance the effectiveness of the measures. Neighbouring countries should be urged to establish sanctions assistance offices on their territory, possibly with the help of the Organisation for African Unity and sub-regional organisations. Other international and regional organisations should be ready to provide much needed logistical and other expert assistance. The mandate of these offices would be to assist the respective national authorities in monitoring and enforcing the arms embargo in their territories. They should submit reports on their activities to the Committee on a regular basis.
20. The Chairman might also emphasise during his mission the fact that without the co-operation of Member States in providing information on violations to the Committee, the latter would not be able to discharge its mandate. He would accordingly urge, during his mission, national authorities, non-governmental organisations and private entities to readily provide such information to the Committee.
21. In the absence of a monitoring mechanism to support the work of the Committee, the potential role of regional and sub-regional arrangements to facilitate the implementation of the measures could also be explored. Neighbouring States could monitor at least all major border crossings and airports in order to prevent illegal movements across the border. In addition, the States of the region could consider additional steps to monitor the ports and airstrips in their territories in order to prevent ships and aircraft engaged in violations of the measures from using them. Interpol and its two sub-regional bureaux in Abidjan and Harare should formally be invited to collaborate with the Committee.
22. While the responsibility for the implementation of these measures rests with Member States, the Security Council and the respective Sanctions Committee could review the implementation process periodically with a view to assessing the effectiveness of the adopted measures and identifying and possibly eliminating gaps. Such a review may be initiated on the basis of a report by the Chairman of the Committee following his mission to Somalia and the countries of the region.
(c) The role of regional and international organisations
23. In addition to assisting national efforts for enforcing the arms embargo, the OAU could contribute to a more effective monitoring of the implementation of the arms embargo. It could also encourage efforts to adopt a convention to combat illicit trafficking in arms and to harmonise licensing procedures among its members.
24. The importance of more effectively implementing the Council imposed sanctions against Somalia should be highlighted at summit meetings and major ministerial meetings and appropriate reference should be included in any communiqués issued.
25. The World Customs Organisation should support the work of the proposed Committee’s expert panel. Interpol should set up an informal working group to provide the Committee with views and proposals regarding its possible contributions towards the development and implementation of technical co-operation to strengthen the ability of Member States to combat illicit trafficking in arms.
26. Compliance with the arms embargo could be made a condition of aid from the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral bodies.
(d) The role of the Secretariat
27. Developing a more effective Security Council sanctions policy requires specialised expertise and analytical capacity within the Secretariat to support the Sanctions Committee. Greater technical expertise and enhanced analytical capacity would enable the Sanctions Secretariat to assist the Sanctions Committee in discharging its functions and to more effectively interact with Member States and regional organisations. Budgetary allocations should include provisions for securing technical expertise necessary for conducting investigations or assessment missions and supporting the monitoring and enforcement efforts of national authorities, augmented by the appropriate regional and sub-regional organisations.
28. Technical expertise is also needed urgently in such areas as military technology, arms trafficking and customs regulations and investigations. Also needed is greater availability of legal expertise, perhaps from the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA).
29. The Secretariat also requires the resources necessary to enable it to establish and maintain a reliable database of sanctions violations, including those relating to the arms embargo in the case of Somalia. It should also be given the resources that would enable it to undertake, at the request of the Security Council or of the respective Sanctions Committee, periodic analysis and assessment of the impact and effectiveness of the arms embargo.