Since my previous report on the work of the Organization it has become increasingly evident that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the availability of their basic components constitute a growing threat to international peace and security. The hypothesis that terrorists, with no territory to defend and unafraid of sacrificing themselves, could develop and use weapons of mass destruction is a frightening prospect, which is already affecting the security perceptions of many people throughout the world. Therefore, a coordinated response of the international community to those threats, and to the destabilizing effects caused by the unrestrained flow of conventional weapons, remains a high priority. Within the context of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime achieved in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an appropriate answer and should be accompanied as soon as possible by the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons, as well as by the establishment of a regime for the verification of compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.
While the Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a major focus of disarmament efforts in 1995, the international community has undertaken other disarmament initiatives to deal with the destabilizing effects and unconscionable waste of resources caused by the unrestrained flow of conventional weapons. The progress achieved, as far as the review process of the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects is concerned, in assuring the full protection of civilians from the indiscriminate effects of anti-personnel land-mines and working towards their eventual elimination constitutes a step in the right direction. Furthermore, transparency measures, such as the Register of Conventional Arms, must be strengthened, and confidence-building and disarmament initiatives at the regional level should be developed further, in particular with reference to illicit traffic in light conventional weapons.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty now has 178 States parties, commanding virtually universal adherence. The indefinite extension of the Treaty, decided upon at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as well as the other commitments made by the States parties reflected in the documents of the Conference, have strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime and will make a substantial contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. I expressed gratification at the success of the Conference and recommended that the States parties continue to work in a spirit of cooperation and pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons as the ultimate goal of the non-proliferation process.
There have been advances in other areas of nuclear disarmament. The negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty have made progress at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva and strengthened determination to resolve technical issues could bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion no later than 1996. The negotiating mandate was agreed upon at the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material and this should enable the Conference to begin the negotiations expeditiously and bring them to an early and successful conclusion. Other encouraging steps are Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances. Proposals aimed at transforming these unilateral declarations into a legally binding treaty obligation would contribute considerably to further progress in this area.
The general strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is matched and reinforced by the remarkable results achieved so far by the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the other European countries in post-cold-war security arrangements. The elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe under the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the reduction of nuclear strategic warheads in operational deployment resulting from the START process, the continuing successful implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the ongoing security dialogue within the OSCE framework form the basis of a cooperative security system that in some measure could transcend the narrow limits of the European region. In Europe, the newly emerging cooperative security system is the product of negotiations based on consensus and cooperation. Significant initiatives for security dialogues are also being promoted in Asia, in Africa and in Latin America. Further enhancement of those initiatives would be an important step towards the strengthening of international peace and security at the regional level.
While progress in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons is encouraged, concerns about the safety and security of fissile material have increased. The smuggling of nuclear material is no longer only a fear but a frightening reality. Stronger global and national measures are needed to deal with illicit trafficking and to guarantee the secure disposal and storage of such material. Particularly important is universal recognition that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are an integral part of the international non-proliferation regime and that the Agency plays an indispensable role in ensuring the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) are essential building blocks to progress towards nuclear-free regions elsewhere in the world, in particular in the Middle East and Asia, which would include in their scope all weapons of mass destruction. There has also been progress on the treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.
There has been a steady increase in the number of ratifications of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons, which has now reached 27 States parties. In discharging my responsibility as depositary to the Convention, I have written to all Member States urging ratification and entry into force of the Convention at the earliest possible date. In connection with the Convention on Biological Weapons, efforts of States parties are under way to strengthen the Convention by developing a legally binding verification protocol. The frightful consequences for humankind of biological warfare, or terrorism, must be avoided at all costs.
Measures to prevent proliferation of weapons should be fashioned to avoid any obstruction to the development process of countries. Developing countries need unimpeded access to technology and agreement is needed on appropriate controls concerning technology transfers, including transparency measures, that would be universal and non-discriminatory in nature.
The urgent problem of the proliferation of conventional weapons also demands the continuing attention of the international community. Unrestrained and illegal arms transfers have resulted in suffering and misery for hundreds of thousands of people particularly in the developing world. At the global level continued support by Member States for the Register of Conventional Arms is essential. Reports to the Register indicate a degree of openness and transparency with regard to legitimate arms transfers for defensive purposes. Such openness will promote confidence and encourage responsible conduct in the transfer of major conventional weapon systems. Initiatives and ideas from regions and subregions, in particular Africa, Asia and Latin America, can enhance the global Register with complementary confidence- and security-building measures.
At the regional and subregional level, in particular in the developing world, direct action is needed to deal with the flourishing illicit traffic in light weapons, which is destabilizing the security of a number of countries. With the support of seven Member States in the Sahara-Sahel region, I dispatched an advisory mission with a view to assisting those States in their efforts to combat and stem the illicit flow of light weapons within and across their borders. More resources must be invested if there is to be any prospect of success.
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