The Organization's continuing efforts in the former Yugoslavia remain focused on a multiplicity of mandated responsibilities that span humanitarian, military and political tasks in an environment characterized by vicious cycles of cease-fire violations, human rights infringements, physical destruction and death.
Unceasing conflicts, entrenched hostilities, violation of agreements and a genuine lack of commitment and good faith have become the hallmarks of this crisis. Taken together, these factors give the impression either that not enough is being done to find a peaceful resolution or that fundamental questions and issues that divide the parties are insurmountable. For too long, from the start of military confrontation in 1991 until the time of writing, all efforts aimed at reaching a negotiated and peaceful solution to the conflicts and outstanding issues have been in vain. The Organization and agencies within its common system that have programmes in the area are, however, continuing to devote the highest priority to bringing peace to the region and alleviating the suffering brought about by the conflict.
The presence of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) continues to make an important contribution to stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. However, as stated in my report last year, internal differences that could lead to political instability remain a cause for concern. Regarding the dispute between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, my Special Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, has continued his efforts pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993).
On 7 November 1994, Mr. Vance and I met with President Kiro Gligorov at Geneva following the elections in his country. I urged him to give favourable consideration to a number of proposals for resolving the dispute. On 6 February 1995, Mr. Vance began a series of parallel meetings with the parties with a view to convening direct negotiations. During the meetings both parties took a serious and constructive approach that could in time lead to direct talks. In a subsequent meeting with President Gligorov at Copenhagen on 10 March, I urged him to facilitate a face-to-face meeting with the other side. Between March and June, Mr. Vance continued his meetings with the two sides. When I visited Greece in July, I urged the Greek leaders to respond favourably to his proposals.
The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia continues to provide a permanent forum for the negotiation of a comprehensive political solution to the problems in the former Yugoslavia. Its Steering Committee is co-chaired by Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, representing the United Nations, and the former Swedish premier Mr. Carl Bildt, who was appointed by EU on 9 June following the resignation of Lord David Owen in May. My Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, as well as the States members of the Contact Group, have continued their efforts to advance the peace process. At an EU summit meeting at Cannes, France, in June, European leaders determined that diplomacy should be the main tool for achieving several primary objectives, including the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo; resumption of a dialogue between the parties on the basis of the Contact Group Plan; establishment of a new four-month cease-fire; re-establishment of a dialogue between the Government of Croatia and the Krajina Serbs; and mutual recognition by the former Yugoslav republics.
Under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the Ambassadors of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to Croatia, the Government of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in Croatia concluded, on 2 December 1994, an Economic Agreement. That Agreement was seen as a major confidence-building measure towards the restoration of normal economic activities in Croatia. With continued adherence to the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994, it seemed that both sides had embarked on a course of normalizing their relationship by pursuing a number of tangible and mutually beneficial economic improvements, such as the opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway through Sector West, opening the Adriatic oil pipeline, rehabilitating and reconnecting the electricity grid and exploring the reopening of railway connections.
On 12 January 1995, I received a letter from the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, informing me of his Government's decision not to agree to a further extension of the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) beyond 31 March. While the Government of Croatia's frustration was understandable, its decision to insist on the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia renewed mistrust and created new tensions, as a result of which cooperation on further elements of the Economic Agreement petered out.
Diplomatic efforts by the international community, Mr. Stoltenberg and my Special Representative eventually won acceptance of the continuation of the United Nations peace-keeping presence in Croatia, albeit with revised tasks and a reduced troop strength of 8,750. At the end of March, the Security Council in its resolution 981 (1995) established the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation, to be known as UNCRO, which was to implement a number of core tasks that were defined in consultations between Mr. Stoltenberg and the parties. The elements of UNPROFOR stationed in Croatia were to be converted into UNCRO by the end of June 1995. At the same time separate forces were created for Bosnia and Herzegovina (retaining the name UNPROFOR) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP). Overall command and control of all these forces was to be exercised by my Special Representative and the Force Commander from United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters (UNPF-HQ) at Zagreb.
On 1 May, the Croatian army and police undertook an offensive against Sector West from both directions on the Zagreb-Belgrade highway with some 2,500 troops, heavy equipment and air support. UNPROFOR, whose mandate was to monitor the cease-fire arrangements agreed in March 1994, was powerless to prevent an offensive on that scale. However, UNPROFOR and other international agencies were able to keep the international community at least partially informed and to discourage violence against the Serb population, though abuses undoubtedly occurred during the early stages of the conflict. More than 10,000 Serb civilians crossed into Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Subsequently, UNPROFOR and UNHCR helped those remaining Serb civilians who so wished to leave Sector West in a protected and orderly manner. Although the Government of Croatia declared its intention to respect fully the human rights of the remaining Serb population, it was not able to create confidence among the Serbs that it was in their interests to remain in Croatia. The mistrust created by the Croatian operation against Sector West further undermined efforts to resume negotiations towards a peaceful settlement in Croatia.
Following the take-over of Sector West by the Croatian army, tensions in the UNCRO area of operations remained high, preventing the deployment of the Operation as originally envisaged in Security Council resolutions 981 (1995), 982 (1995) and 990 (1995). On 19 July, the Krajina Serb army and the forces loyal to Mr. Fikaret Abdic launched offensives against the Bosnian Army V Corps in the Bihac pocket. Croatia almost immediately warned that the displacement of the population of Bihac would be considered a serious threat to its security and stability. The Presidents of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Split Declaration on 22 July, which committed the Government of Croatia to assist Bosnian forces militarily in the Bihac pocket. Within Croatia, the Croatian army continued a major build-up of troops around Sectors North and South in apparent preparation for a major military offensive aimed at re-establishing Croatian control in those areas.
Intensive efforts to defuse the crisis and restart political negotiations were undertaken by the United Nations as well as by Member States. My Special Representative met with President Tudjman to forestall a looming military confrontation. He also met with local Serb leaders at Knin. On 3 August, at Geneva, Mr. Stoltenberg chaired a meeting of the representatives of the Government of Croatia and the Croatian Serbs and presented the two sides with a paper covering seven points of contention. The Croatian Serb side was inclined to accept the paper as a useful basis for progress, subject to clearance by its political leadership, but the Government indicated that the paper did not address its fundamental concern that the Krajina Serbs should be reintegrated under the Croatian Constitution and laws. On the evening of 3 August, I telephoned President Tudjman and urged the utmost restraint.
On 4 August, the Croatian army launched a major offensive, which was largely completed a few days later. I immediately issued a statement expressing my regret at the outbreak of hostilities in Croatia, and urged the parties to respect international humanitarian law and the human rights of the affected population. At the start of the action, a significant number of United Nations observation posts were overrun by the Croatian army and some were deliberately fired upon. Some United Nations troops were used as human shields by Croatian army units as they conducted their attacks. Vigorous protests have been launched against these incidents by the United Nations and the troop-contributing Governments concerned. In the period following the Croatian military actions, the United Nations has concentrated on dealing with the humanitarian crisis brought about by the massive displacement of people and on maintaining contacts that would permit political negotiations to be resumed. Thus my Special Representative on 6 August concluded a nine-point agreement with the Croatian authorities allowing the United Nations, and other international organizations, to cope with the major humanitarian difficulties and to monitor the human rights situation on the ground. Mr. Stoltenberg was also in active contact with the authorities at Zagreb and Belgrade. These events had obvious implications for the future role of UNCRO in that, with the collapse of the armed forces of the Krajina Serbs, there was no longer a requirement, except in Sector East, to monitor or control the confrontation line, zone of separation, weapons storage sites and areas of limitations established by the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994. On 23 August, I recommended to the Security Council an immediate start to the repatriation of all UNCRO troops, except the two battalions in Sector East, with the aim of reducing troop strength to below 2,500 by mid-November 1995.
For the most part, developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the past year have been equally discouraging. In the autumn of 1994, military activity assumed unacceptably high levels, in particular in the Bihac area and around Sarajevo. The overall situation reached a crisis point when Bosnian Serb infantry entered the designated safe area of Bihac to repulse an offensive launched from the Bihac pocket in October by the Bosnian army. Following air attacks by Krajina Serbs into the Bihac pocket on 18 and 19 November 1994 and NATO air strikes against the Udbina airfield in Sector South in Croatia and on Bosnian Serb missile sites on 21 and 23 November, respectively, the situation sharply worsened. Some 250 UNPROFOR personnel were confined to the weapon collection points around Sarajevo and 26 United Nations military observers were detained in their quarters. The situation improved when, following former United States President Jimmy Carter's visit in late December, my Special Representative was able to secure a cessation-of-hostilities agreement, which came into effect on 1 January 1995.
Although the cessation of hostilities had been agreed for four months, fighting in the Bihac area never ceased, and those elements of the agreement which could have secured a more stable cease-fire, such as the creation of buffer zones and the interpositioning of UNPROFOR troops along the confrontation line, could not be implemented for lack of cooperation by the parties. In March 1995, the Government, in the first large-scale violation of the cease-fire agreement outside the Bihac area, launched offensive operations at Mount Vlaic, near Travnik, and the Majevica Hills near Tuzla. When efforts to extend the cessation-of-hostilities agreement beyond 1 May failed, the situation in and around Sarajevo began to deteriorate rapidly. The humanitarian airlift into Sarajevo airport has been blocked by the Bosnian Serbs from 8 April to the time of writing; sniping and exchanges of artillery fire have increased to levels not experienced since the establishment of the heavy weapons exclusion zone in February 1994.
On 25 May, as a result of the failure of the Bosnian Serbs to respect the deadline for the return of heavy weapons, an air strike was launched against an ammunition dump near Pale, with another against the same target the following day as a result of continuing non-compliance. The Bosnian Serbs shelled all safe areas except Zepa, and 70 civilians were killed and over 130 injured as a result of a rocket attack on Tuzla. The Bosnian Serbs surrounded UNPROFOR personnel in weapon collection points and detained 199, many of them under humiliating circumstances.
As the crisis heightened, NATO, on 29 June, approved a plan to send up to 60,000 troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina to cover the withdrawal of United Nations peace-keepers, should the need arise. United Nations-designated safe areas came under sustained attack from Bosnian Serb forces and Srebrenica was overrun on 11 July. The Security Council on 12 July demanded the withdrawal of the Bosnian Serb forces from Srebrenica but this demand was ignored. The Bosnian Serb army detained UNPROFOR troops from the Netherlands and by 14 July had evicted thousands of Muslim refugees from Srebrenica, while detaining Muslim men, whose fate is still unknown. The violations of international humanitarian law that appear to have been committed in the wake of the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa are a matter of utmost concern, and it is imperative that access be given to permit full international investigation of these allegations. The degrading and cruel treatment of the civilian population has been strongly, and justifiably, condemned. Zepa then came under attack and also fell to Bosnian Serb forces. In the Zepa enclave, both sides threatened to kill UNPROFOR troops from Ukraine -- the Bosnian Serbs if NATO air strikes were used against them, and the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina if NATO air assets were not used. On 20 July, the Security Council adopted a presidential statement condemning humanitarian abuses in Zepa by the Bosnian Serb army. During this period the United Nations devoted all energies to dealing with the monumental humanitarian consequences of the fall of the two enclaves. Efforts to account for the missing and gain access to the detainees are continuing.
These dramatic developments and threats against the remaining safe areas were discussed at a conference in London on 21 July, which I attended along with leaders of the Contact Group and representatives of troop-contributing countries. The London conference considered measures, including air power, to deter further attacks on the safe areas. On 26 July, NATO approved plans for employing air power should Bosnian Serbs threaten or attack Gorazde. Following intensive discussions between NATO and the United Nations, appropriate procedures were agreed for this purpose, and I have delegated authority for launching air strikes in the region to the UNPF Force Commander.
The crisis situation that began to develop in May once again highlighted the vulnerability of UNPROFOR as a lightly armed, widely dispersed peace-keeping force. I therefore appreciated the offer made by France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to make available to UNPROFOR some 12,500 additional troops as a rapid reaction capability in order to improve the Force's security and thus its ability to implement the mandate given to it by the Security Council. Difficulties raised by the Governments of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have delayed the entry into operation of the rapid reaction capability.
The five-member Contact Group continued its efforts to arrive at a political solution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but little progress was made in convincing the Bosnian Serb party to accept the territorial map for an overall settlement, despite the support of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The latter has continued to minimize its relations with the Bosnian Serb leaders, and the monitor mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, established in September 1994, has maintained its monitoring of the closure of the 300-mile border with Bosnian Serb-controlled territory.
The dramatic developments that are taking place as this report is being finalized at the end of August provide, at long last, reason to hope that there may be worthwhile progress towards a political settlement. It is regrettable that in order to achieve peace the international community has had to resort to using force, but the warning that was given following the London Conference of 21 July was clear and unmistakable. After so many disappointments in past years of tragedy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this new opportunity for political negotiation must not be wasted.
I am well aware that the patience, resources and will of Member States to resolve the crises in the former Yugoslavia have been sorely tested. Nevertheless, I remain convinced that only a negotiated comprehensive settlement will lead to an enduring peace. Part of that settlement must include arrangements for arms limitations and confidence-building measures that will prevent further outbreaks of conflict in the Balkans. There must also be an extensive plan for reconstruction and rehabilitation in the region as a whole. There will therefore be a continuing need for the international community to remain committed and involved.
In August 1992, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights convened, for the first time ever in its history, in a special session to consider the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia. The Commission requested its chairman to appoint a special rapporteur to investigate the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia, in particular within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Special Rapporteur, Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki (who resigned on 27 July 1995), submitted regular reports during this past year to the Commission on Human Rights and to the General Assembly. The Commission requested the Secretary-General to make those reports available to the Security Council and to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. In 17 reports, the Special Rapporteur assessed the human rights situation in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In each of the reports, he presented a number of recommendations for action by the international community and various parties in the region.
With regard to the areas under the control of the de facto Bosnian Serb authorities, the Special Rapporteur drew attention to the ongoing practice of ethnic cleansing and the widespread violation of the human rights of peoples living in those areas, including Bosnian Serbs who were perceived as disloyal by the de facto authorities. There has also been a continuation of military attacks on civilians and interference with the delivery of humanitarian aid by Bosnian Serb forces in areas throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Special Rapporteur vigorously condemned all such violations of human rights and called for the prosecution of the perpetrators by the International Tribunal.
In addition, the Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 1994/75 in which it requested me to report to the Commission on the situation of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In my report, I addressed the issue of the actions taken by the Special Rapporteur, the situation concerning the voluntary return of displaced persons, the problem of disappearances and actions taken by the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992), the International Tribunal, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
In November 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia confirmed the first indictment against a Bosnian Serb, Mr. Dragan Nikolic, on charges of gross violations of the Geneva Conventions, the laws and customs of war and crimes against humanity. Soon thereafter, a formal request was issued to the Government of Germany for the deferral of the Tadic case, involving charges of genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape and murder of civilians and prisoners of war. Proceedings for the transfer of the case from the German courts were completed a few months later and the first hearing of the Tadicé case was held on 26 April 1995.
The Tribunal confirmed two more indictments in February 1995, bringing the total number accused to 22. Requests for their arrest and surrender to the Tribunal have been sent to the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb administration at Pale. Except for Mr. Tadic, however, who was transferred to the Tribunal by Germany, the remaining 21 accused are still at large.
In May, the Tribunal issued a formal request to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the deferral of its investigation and criminal proceedings in respect of crimes committed against the civilian population in the Lava river valley, where Bosnian Croat forces have allegedly committed mass killings of Bosnian civilians. The Tribunal issued another request for deferral of investigation proceedings to the Government with respect to the Bosnian Serb leadership at Pale. The latter investigation focuses on the question of possible responsibility of the Serb leaders for genocide, murder, rape, torture and forced transfer of population from large parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 21 to 25 July the Tribunal handed down five indictments covering 24 people.
The March 1994 Washington Agreement that led to the establishment of the Federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the introduction of the Contact Group Plan in May 1994 and the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities signed at the end of the year brought a period of stability to Sarajevo and improved freedom of movement. These developments, while not fundamentally changing the situation, made it possible gradually to reduce the number of beneficiaries needing international assistance to some 2.1 million persons, of whom 1.4 million were in Bosnia and Herzegovina. United Nations humanitarian agencies could then concentrate more on displaced persons and the most vulnerable groups.
With the exception of Bihac, overall access for humanitarian assistance was successful, at least during the period from June 1994 to March 1995, with UNHCR being able to exceed its monthly target in Sarajevo and elsewhere in central Bosnia. It was possible to bring winterization items and fuel to Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves. Arrangements were also made with FAO for the distribution of much-needed seeds and fertilizers throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Overall security rapidly deteriorated in March 1995, making movements of humanitarian assistance increasingly difficult. The airlift to Sarajevo came to a halt on 8 April and with the escalation of the conflict from late May, land convoys became unpredictable and vulnerable. For the first time, signs of malnutrition and exhaustion were visible in Bihac and in the eastern enclaves.
The dramatic escalation of the conflict in June, July and August led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people throughout the former Yugoslavia. With the Croat authorities regaining control of western Slavonia in June, thousands of Serbs were displaced to north-west Bosnia. Following the fall of Srebrenica in mid-July, some 30,000 people were compelled to flee. At the beginning of August, thousands of men from Srebrenica still remained unaccounted for. Some 4,350 people were evacuated from Zepa in late July. A Bosnian Croat offensive on Glamoc and Grahovo led to the displacement of some 13,000 Serbs in the Banja Luka area.
The retaking of the Krajina by the Croat authorities in early August led to an exodus of some 150,000 people to north-west Bosnia and to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UNHCR, in cooperation with other humanitarian partners, mounted a major assistance effort to meet the needs generated by this emergency. The departing Krajina Serbs suffered widespread maltreatment, injuries and some deaths at the hands of Croatian troops and civilians, and UNCRO personnel reported much looting and burning of houses. UNHCR made efforts to monitor the situation of those Krajina Serbs remaining and to ensure the right to return of those who fled. UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies have continued to given assistance in Croatia and in western Bosnia, despite pressures for their departure, all too often through acts of violence. The practice of forced labour, often on front lines, is of great concern, and this situation has been exacerbated by renewed tensions and the recent influx of Serb refugees from western Slavonia and the Krajina, which has resulted in the Banja Luka region in worsening treatment and evictions of Muslims and Croats in retaliation.
In general, forced population movements, either associated with ethnic cleansing or leading to the same result, have been of great concern to UNHCR during the period. UNHCR has actively intervened against forced mobilization of refugees. The United Nations revised consolidated inter-agency appeal for the former Yugoslavia covering January-December 1995 was issued on 2 June by nine United Nations agencies, for a total of $470 million for humanitarian operations. The UNHCR component is $172 million to cover the cost of humanitarian aid for an estimated total of 2,109,500 beneficiaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Contributions as at 1 August 1995 were $1.36 million.
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