During the 12 months since my last report, it has become evident that the humanitarian tragedy in Somalia has been overcome, thanks to the international humanitarian assistance supported by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). This achievement contrasts sharply with the lack of tangible progress in national political reconciliation, for which the responsibility must be borne by the Somali leaders and people. Because of the deteriorating security situation in the country, including attacks and harassment directed against UNOSOM II and other international personnel, and because of the lack of cooperation from the Somali leaders concerned, the continued presence of UNOSOM II became increasingly questioned.
On 14 October 1994, I reported to the Security Council (S/1994/1166) that the Somali leaders still had not carried out commitments entered into under the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Nairobi Declaration. The UNOSOM goal of assisting the process of political reconciliation was becoming ever more elusive, while the burden and cost of maintaining a high level of troops were proving increasingly difficult for Member States to justify. The presence of UNOSOM II troops was having a limited impact on the peace process and on security in the face of continuing inter-clan fighting and banditry.
I therefore recommended that if the Security Council maintained its previous decision to end the mission in March 1995 and to withdraw all UNOSOM II forces and assets, it should extend the mission's mandate until 31 March 1995 to allow the time required to ensure a secure and orderly withdrawal. At the same time, I stressed that the withdrawal of UNOSOM II would not mean United Nations abandonment of Somalia. However, although humanitarian organizations were committed to continuing their work in Somalia, they could continue doing so only in a secure environment for which Somali leaders would bear the ultimate responsibility. The United Nations would also remain ready to assist the Somali parties in the process of national reconciliation.
On 26 and 27 October 1994, before taking a decision on the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, the Council sent a mission to Somalia to convey its views directly to the Somali leaders. The mission concluded that 31 March 1995 was the appropriate date for the end of the mandate of UNOSOM II. None of the Somali factions, humanitarian agencies or non-governmental organizations had requested a longer extension.
On 1 November, the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA), led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid, and other factions convened a unilateral national reconciliation conference in south Mogadishu. This was against the advice and warning of the Security Council mission and my Special Representative, Mr. Victor Gbeho, who had warned that the convening of such a conference before the question of participation in it was resolved would be a recipe for continued strife.
On 4 November, by its resolution 954 (1994), the Council extended the mandate of UNOSOM II for a final period until 31 March 1995. On 10 November, I transmitted to the Council a statement by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee reaffirming the commitment of the humanitarian agencies to continue their emergency and rehabilitation work in Somalia after the expiration of the UNOSOM mandate. The President of the Security Council, on behalf of the Council's members, wrote to me on 7 December welcoming the commitment of the agencies. The Council also encouraged me to play a facilitating or moderating role in Somalia after March 1995 if the Somali parties were willing to cooperate.
Prior to the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi signed a peace agreement on behalf of the SNA and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), respectively. In February they also signed three other agreements to manage the operations of the Mogadishu airport and seaport by a joint committee. The Mogadishu seaport was reopened to civilian traffic on 9 March. I was encouraged by the signing of these agreements, which helped to avert fighting over the facilities.
The withdrawal of the 15,000 United Nations troops, as well as civilian personnel, facilities and property from Somalia, began in November 1994. In response to my request, seven Member States joined forces in providing support and security for the withdrawal. To that end they established a combined task force, "United Shield", composed of France, India, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, under U.S. command. I announced on 2 March that the withdrawal had been completed in a safe and orderly manner, ahead of schedule and virtually without a problem. I again emphasized that the United Nations effort could continue and that the United Nations would not abandon Somalia.
On 28 March, I submitted to the Security Council a general assessment of the United Nations achievements in political, humanitarian, military and security matters and the police and justice programme. I recalled that, in late 1992, some 3,000 Somalis had been dying daily of starvation; that tragedy had been ended by the international relief effort. However, the endeavour to achieve political reconciliation had not succeeded because of the lack of political will among the Somali leaders. The international community could only facilitate, encourage and assist the process; it could neither impose peace nor coerce unwilling parties into accepting it.
In a presidential statement of 6 April (S/PRST/1995/15), the Council supported my view that Somalia should not be abandoned by the United Nations and welcomed my intention to maintain a small political mission, should the Somali parties so wish, to assist them in achieving national reconciliation. However, the SNA, then headed by General Aidid, expressed objection to a United Nations political presence and role in Somalia, although a wide range of Somali leaders representing the main factions, including a wing of the USC/SNA, had called for such a presence. In view of these divisions among the Somali parties, I have concluded that, for the time being, a political office, headed by Mr. Abdul Hamid Kabia, should monitor the situation from Nairobi. It is my intention to relocate the political office to Mogadishu when the necessary conditions exist, including adequate security. The President of the Security Council conveyed to me in his letter of 2 June (S/1995/452) the agreement of the members of the Council with my decision.
On 15 June, General Aidid was named "interim president" by his supporters. Following his announcement of a unilateral "government", General Aidid made an attempt to claim Somalia's seat at the OAU summit meeting, but OAU refused to recognize his "government" and decided to keep Somalia's seat open until a generally accepted government was formed. OAU urged the Somali leaders urgently to promote dialogue to ensure the formation of a broad-based national authority.
I remain convinced that a durable political settlement through national reconciliation is an indispensable prerequisite for the re-establishment of government, restoration of law and order, and rehabilitation and reconstruction in Somalia, and that the attainment of national reconciliation for the sake of the common good is well within the power of the Somali leaders. It is my hope that they will find the strength and the courage to pursue a more productive peace process in the coming weeks.
Coordination of the United Nations humanitarian assistance programme was, until December 1994, the sole responsibility of the Division for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of UNOSOM, which was headed by a Humanitarian Coordinator. The Division's tasks included fielding humanitarian affairs officers throughout the country, coordinating inter-agency assessment missions, providing funding for small-scale projects, assisting with emergencies, building essential structures such as schools and clinics, digging wells, facilitating the protection of humanitarian relief convoys, providing logistical support to humanitarian partners, holding security briefings and information-sharing meetings with United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, and providing support to local bodies such as district and regional councils.
In October 1994, when it became apparent that the UNOSOM mandate would not be extended and the Division would be dismantled, the agencies established a United Nations Coordination Team, chaired by the Resident Representative of UNDP (who was later appointed United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator) and composed of representatives of United Nations agencies and IOM, to manage the transition to a post-UNOSOM period and to ensure the continued coordination of the United Nations humanitarian assistance programme. The Coordination Team works in close cooperation with both international and Somalia non-governmental organization consortia. It also works to support the coordination efforts of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body, a consortium of donor Governments, United Nations agencies and organizations, and international non-governmental organizations.
In 1994, no consolidated inter-agency appeal for Somalia was issued. Instead, United Nations agencies presented their requirements and plans for that year through a document prepared for the Fourth Humanitarian Coordination Meeting, held at Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993. Consequently, in 1994 there was no systematic tracking of contributions received by various agencies for Somalia as is ordinarily done by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs under the procedures adopted for consolidated inter-agency appeals. The agencies nevertheless reported that their programmes were relatively well funded, although implementation was hindered by security conditions in the country.
Despite the absence of political progress in Somalia, significant gains have been made on the humanitarian front over the past year. Agencies and organizations have focused their efforts on community-based community initiatives, providing support to capacity-building programmes while assisting local non-governmental and community-based organizations in the areas of relief and initial rehabilitation. Direct support was provided in the form of supplies, training and management services. Food-for-work schemes replaced free food distributions as the preferred mode of delivering food assistance, while agricultural assistance took the form of targeted initiatives rather than the large-scale distributions of seeds and tools undertaken in previous years.
It was possible in 1994 to undertake modest rehabilitation activities in areas where relative security existed. In other areas, however, incidences of kidnapping of humanitarian aid workers occurred, while operations continued to be vulnerable to frequent labour disputes and subjected to unrealistic demands for the payment of security services. The humanitarian agencies expect that for the foreseeable future they will continue to operate against a background of uncertainty. The United Nations agencies nevertheless believe that they can, with the direct support of the Somali people and their leaders, collectively assist Somalia to progress into a new era of rehabilitation, recovery and development.
In view of this, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs launched a consolidated inter-agency appeal for Somalia, covering a period of six months beginning in January 1995. The organizations participating in the appeal requested a total of $70.3 million for their activities during the first half of 1995.
To date the consolidated inter-agency appeal for Somalia has received under 20 per cent of the resources requested. It is essential that funding for the humanitarian relief and rehabilitation programmes be provided to ensure that progress made by the United Nations agencies, international organizations and national and international non-governmental organizations over the past three years is not reversed.
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