During the period under review the Special Mission established in accordance with General Assembly resolution 48/208 continued its work under the leadership of Mr. Mahmoud Mestiri. Also in January 1995, the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan (OSGA) was established in Jalalabad, until conditions could permit it to return to Kabul.
I visited Pakistan from 6 to 8 September 1994 and was briefed by Mr. Mestiri on his intensive consultations in previous weeks about transitional arrangements which would lead to a cease-fire and the convening of a Loya Jirga (Grand National Assembly). I also met separately with various representatives of the party leaders and with independent Afghans. Mindful of the strong desire of the Afghan people for peace, I instructed Mr. Mestiri to continue his endeavours.
On Mr. Mestiri's initiative, an advisory group of recognized and respected independent Afghan personalities from within and outside the country met at Quetta for 19 days starting on 29 September 1994 to advise the United Nations in its efforts to achieve progress. Their recommendations for an early transfer of power to a fully representative Authoritative Council, a country-wide cease-fire, a security force for Kabul and the subsequent establishment of a transitional government or the convening of a Loya Jirga were endorsed by the Security Council in November and subsequently by the General Assembly in December. In October, President Burhanuddin Rabbani had made a conditional offer to transfer power and Afghanistan gave its support to the United Nations peace proposals in a statement issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (S/1994/1227, annex).
Mr. Mestiri returned to the region on 29 December 1994 and focused his efforts on the early transfer of power to the Authoritative Council. During January 1995, negotiations on its membership were held with all the major leaders, including President Rabbani, who reiterated his readiness to step down on 20 February when the Council was to be set up.
The military successes of the Taliban, a newly established armed force, delayed the setting up of the Council in Kabul. Efforts were made to include this group in the Council but it declined to participate in the process directly. The convening of the Authoritative Council was postponed to 21 March while a committee of four personalities worked to reconcile the areas of divergence. Its proposal that the Council be composed of two representatives from each of Afghanistan's 32 provinces, plus 15 or 20 representatives nominated by the United Nations to achieve the necessary ethnic and political balance, was accepted by some, but not all, of the parties.
As the date for the transfer of power drew closer, changes in the political and military situation began to accelerate. On 6 March, intensive fighting erupted in Kabul and adjacent areas between the forces of General Massoud and those of Mr. Mazari (Hezb-i-Wahdat), and then between those of General Massoud and the Taliban. The renewed fighting resulted in a virtual stalemate in the peace process. No nomination for the Authoritative Council had been received by mid-April, when Mr. Mestiri departed from the area.
In June, I called Mr. Mestiri to New York and, after discussing the new situation with him, decided that the United Nations should immediately resume its efforts towards peace in Afghanistan. On my instructions, Mr. Mestiri visited the region between 18 July and 1 August in order to reassess the prevailing situation. During his visit, he exchanged views with key Afghan leaders and senior officials of the neighbouring countries on ways in which the United Nations could assist the peace process. His interlocutors included President Rabbani, General Dostum, Mr. Ismael Khan and leaders of the Taliban.
I received Mr. Mestiri's report on the latest round of his activities in early August and agreed with him that he should assume residence inside Afghanistan and pursue his efforts to obtain the agreement of all concerned to the modalities for the transition to a broad-based and widely accepted Government. I also decided to enhance the Special Mission and OSGA by stationing additional political affairs officers in the country.
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) continued to coordinate the humanitarian programme throughout the country. A consolidated appeal, seeking $106 million to cover humanitarian needs for a 12-month period, was issued in October 1994. The main targets of the appeal were the emergency in Kabul, the needs of the internally displaced and support for voluntary repatriation of refugees from neighbouring countries. The total cash and in-kind contributions received during 1994 by United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations for activities outlined in the approach are estimated at $85 million. As a result of a mid-term review that was carried out early in 1995, a general consensus has emerged among all humanitarian partners concerned over the need for a new consolidated appeal covering the period from October 1995 to September 1996. The appeal will include projects covering the provision of emergency relief to vulnerable groups in urban and rural areas, including internally displaced persons and returnees. Emergency rehabilitation projects targeting communities made vulnerable by loss of livelihood, basic services or shelter will also be incorporated.
When I met the leaders of all the main Afghan factions in Islamabad in September 1994, I urged them to lift the blockade of Kabul, which had prevented the delivery of humanitarian aid to the city since late June. As a result, convoys carrying over 1,500 tons of urgently needed supplies reached Kabul in December. After fighting ended in the city, regular United Nations convoys carrying relief supplies reached the city as of mid-March. Refugees and displaced people also began to return. However, much of the southern part of the city is completely devastated. Mines and unexploded ordnance present a constant danger, and little clean water is available. United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations are working together to address these most urgent humanitarian needs, providing food, shelter, sanitation and health care.
Throughout 1994, internally displaced persons from Kabul continued to arrive in Jalalabad. By January 1995, almost 300,000 persons were living in camps assisted by the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations. As a result of coordinated efforts, the health and nutritional status of camp residents improved dramatically.
Joint United Nations interventions in the humanitarian field include a mass immunization campaign, organized by the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund, in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Health and non-governmental organizations. The first round took place in November 1994. Following an appeal by the United Nations, a complete cease-fire prevailed for the week of the campaign. The second and third rounds took place in April and May 1995.
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