22 April 1994








1. The present report is the fifth submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991), adopted on 11 October 1991, which requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council every six months on the implementation of the Special Commission's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It updates the information contained in the first four reports (S/23801, S/24661, S/25620 and S/26684).

2. Further information concerning developments relating to the implementation of the plan is contained in the reports to the Security Council of the high-level talks, held in November 1993 and March 1994, between the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the one hand and Iraq on the other (S/26825 and Corr.1 and S/1994/341). The attachment to document S/1994/341 contains an outline of the activities planned by the Special Commission to implement ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's obligation not to reacquire the weapons banned to it under section C of resolution 687 (1991). Document S/1994/151 contains the text of a joint statement made by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the Executive Chairman after the February 1994 round of high-level talks in Baghdad.


10 OCTOBER 1993-10 APRIL 1994

A. Acknowledgement of resolution 715 (1991)

3. The major development in the period under review was Iraq's acceptance of Security Council resolution 715 (1991), received in the form of a letter from the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, to the President of the Security Council (S/26811, annex). This came at the end of a round of

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high-level talks held in New York between the Special Commission and IAEA, on the one hand, and Iraq, on the other, reported in documents S/26825 and Corr.1.

B. Provision of information

4. At that time, Iraq declared that its previous declarations concerning its current dual-purpose capabilities should be "considered to have been made and submitted in conformity with the provisions of Security Council resolution 715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder". The Commission responded to Iraq that those previous declarations were deficient in many regards and could not be considered as initial declarations under the plans, nor did they constitute a sufficient basis for the proper planning and implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification.

5. To assist Iraq in the preparation of adequate declarations, the Commission prepared formats in which such declarations should be made. The first of these, covering ballistic missiles and chemical weapons, were provided to Iraq in late December 1993. The Commission received in Baghdad Iraq's first declarations on 16 January 1994. While these new declarations were a considerable improvement on Iraq's earlier reporting, they still were incomplete, particularly those relating to chemical facilities. In some instances, Iraq not only failed to answer some of the questions contained in the formats, but unilaterally rewrote the formats to delete those questions.

6. In parallel with its efforts to elicit full information on current dual-purpose capabilities, the Commission continued its efforts to obtain a complete account of Iraq's programmes banned under the terms of section C of resolution 687 (1991). Only with full information about these programmes and complete information on current dual-purpose capabilities would the Commission be in a position to plan and implement an effective ongoing monitoring and verification system.

7. Efforts here concentrated on information relating to the supply of precursor chemicals, chemical agent production capacity and its utilization, expenditure of SCUD-derivative missiles and suppliers of components for missile production. Discussions on chemical issues took place in the framework of the high-level talks held in Baghdad in February 1994 and in New York in November 1993 and March 1994. Ballistic missile issues were also addressed in the New York meetings. The outcome of these discussions was reported in documents S/26825 and Corr.1 and in the enclosure to document S/1994/341. In the absence of documentation that would assist in the verification of the latest data provided on chemical programmes, the Commission intends to send a team of experts to Iraq in May 1994 in order to interview former senior personnel associated with the programmes.

C. Operations

8. The concept of how the Commission intends to conduct ongoing monitoring and verification is contained in the plan approved by Security Council resolution 715 (1991) (S/22871/Rev.1). It was summarized in the attachment to document S/1994/341.

9. In parallel with the above efforts to elicit further information, the Commission has continued its assessment of Iraq's capabilities, in terms of sites, activities, equipment and materials, which will need to be monitored under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. Planning and identification of means for such monitoring is well advanced. These efforts have drawn upon international expertise through the holding of topic-specific seminars in the Commission's headquarters in New York. Trials have been conducted on certain of the tagging and sensor techniques to be deployed for ongoing monitoring and verification purposes. Several inspections focused primarily on ongoing monitoring and verification have already been launched or completed. Details of activities undertaken are contained in annex I to the present report.

10. Plans for further ongoing monitoring and verification activities remain as detailed in the attachment to document S/1994/341 with the following updates:

(a) The ballistic-missile protocol-building team planned to start its tasks on 30 March 1994, is now in Iraq and working smoothly, with good Iraqi cooperation;

(b) The chemical sensors referred to in paragraph 8 of the attachment have now, with the assistance of Iraq, been installed and their performance is being assessed;

(c) The biological protocol-building team started its mission in Baghdad on 8 April 1994;

(d) A team to assess plans for establishing a monitoring centre in Baghdad arrived there on 10 April 1994.

D. Export/import monitoring mechanism

11. Paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991) requires the Commission, in cooperation with the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) and the Director General of IAEA, "to develop a mechanism for monitoring any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, including the plans approved hereunder". The Commission and IAEA have prepared a concept paper outlining a mechanism which, in their view, would fulfil the requirements of resolution 715 (1991). It is the intention of the Commission and IAEA to present the paper formally to the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) before the end of April 1994. Thereafter, the three bodies will need to submit their joint recommendations to the Security Council for its consideration.

Prospects for the future

12. As indicated in the attachment to document S/1994/341, the Special Commission is mobilizing its resources and those of supporting Governments to ensure that an effective ongoing monitoring and verification system will be implemented as soon as feasible. However, in reaching that stage, the Commission is, in large part, dependent on the actions of others, foremost among which is Iraq itself. Without the cooperation of the Iraqi authorities, both in the provision of relevant information and in undertaking the many actions required of them to establish the system, effective implementation of the plan cannot be assured.

13. Iraq has, on several occasions and most notably in the joint statement (S/1994/151) issued at the end of the high-level talks held in Baghdad in February 1994, stated its intention to so cooperate in order to expedite the establishment of ongoing monitoring and verification, thereby enabling the Commission and IAEA to report Iraq's fulfilment of the terms of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991). The Commission hopes and expects this to be the case. However, during the latest round of high-level talks between the Commission and Iraq held in New York in March 1994 and reported in document S/1994/341, Iraq expressed a lack of confidence in the impartiality of the Commission and implied that, unless the Commission reported immediately under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991), cooperation might be withdrawn.

14. It was in the light of these statements that the Commission viewed with great concern an incident involving one of its helicopters, in which a crowd threw stones at the helicopter as it was taking on board two injured soldiers from the United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq for medical evacuation. A full account is contained in annex II to the present report.

15. This incident placed the aircraft and those on board in severe danger. Iraq is required, under its obligations in respect of United Nations operations in Iraq and, in particular, under the status arrangements through which the Special Commission operates in Iraq, resolution 707 (1991) and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved by resolution 715 (1991), to ensure the safety and security of Special Commission personnel and property. Iraq's failure in this instance to provide adequate security was strongly protested by the Commission to Iraqi authorities in both Baghdad and New York.

16. In response, the Iraqi Government has firmly denied any involvement in the attack, blaming the Commission for the alleged last minute change in landing site. However, the Commission has noted Iraq's assurances that this incident should not be seen as being in any way politically motivated and its undertaking to ensure that similar incidents do not recur.

Annex I

Ongoing monitoring and verification activities


1. Iraq's acceptance of its obligations under Security Council resolution 715 (1991) led to intensive work to establish a monitoring mechanism of missile-related activities and dual purpose capabilities in Iraq pursuant to the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification in the non-nuclear area (S/22871/Rev.1). These efforts included a number of inspections, assessment of Iraq's declarations submitted under the plan, identification of focal points for monitoring and appropriate monitoring techniques including their field trials, preparation of draft ongoing monitoring and verification protocols, and in-depth discussions with the Iraqi side of monitoring issues, including during the rounds of high-level talks both in New York and in Baghdad. In parallel, the Special Commission continued its investigation into the past prohibited missile programmes of Iraq and of Iraq's compliance with resolution 687 (1991).


2. UNSCOM 66 carried out an inspection in Iraq over the period from 21 to 29 January 1994. In view of Iraq's acceptance of resolution 715 (1991), UNSCOM 66 was tasked to accomplish the following missions:

(a) To update data collected by previous inspection teams on Iraq's missile research and development (R&D) programme;

(b) To examine issues related to Iraq's reporting on facilities to be monitored under the ongoing monitoring and verification plan in the missile area as approved by resolution 715 (1991);

(c) To conduct a preliminary survey for possible application of appropriate monitoring sensors and technologies.

3. UNSCOM 66 visited a number of R&D and industrial facilities to be monitored under the ongoing monitoring and verification plan. Iraq provided the team with a detailed update of its current missile programmes relevant to surface-to-surface missiles with a range greater than 50 kilometres.

4. UNSCOM 66 carried out extensive work related to Iraq's reporting obligations under the ongoing monitoring and verification plan. This included discussions of Iraq's reporting on facilities to be monitored, examination of declarations submitted by Iraq in January 1994 pursuant to the ongoing monitoring and verification plan and practical on-site investigation of relevant issues. This work resulted in a draft format for Iraq's reporting on those missile R&D and production facilities that would be under the most intensive monitoring regime. During inspection and soon after it, Iraq submitted to the Special Commission reports under this format for all relevant facilities. As a result of UNSCOM 66, Iraq also provided corrections to its January declarations under the ongoing monitoring and verification plan in the missile area.

5. UNSCOM 66 started a survey of sites where installation of sensors and use of other technologies might be appropriate for monitoring purposes. This survey addressed issues of inventory control of dual-purpose equipment, non-removal of equipment from declared facilities and monitoring of activities at facilities. Use of a variety of sensors and recording devices could be an important part of monitoring procedures under the ongoing monitoring and verification plan.


6. UNSCOM 69 was in Iraq from 17 to 25 February to accomplish the following missions:

(a) To assess Iraq's dual-purpose missile industrial capabilities that might be used in support of missile production;

(b) To continue compiling the database on Iraq's machine tools and equipment usable for missile production;

(c) To carry out an assessment of possibilities to install sensors and use other technologies to monitor missile-related activities.

7. UNSCOM 69 visited 15 facilities in Iraq, identified a number of focal points for monitoring activities at those sites and carried out a survey for the use of sensors. The machine tool database built by the previous inspection team (UNSCOM 57) was updated, new machines were recorded and some items were tagged.

8. The results of UNSCOM 69 provided the Commission with the necessary background data to refine a scope of facilities for ongoing monitoring and verification under the ongoing monitoring and verification plan.


9. Based on the results of UNSCOM 66 and 69, UNSCOM 71 was organized to prepare draft ongoing monitoring and verification protocols for facilities identified so far by the Commission as needing to be subject to ongoing monitoring and verification. A monitoring and verification protocol would incorporate detailed procedures for monitoring activities utilizing a variety of different means at sites in Iraq covered by the ongoing monitoring and verification plan. It would also contain systematized collection of information known about a specific site essential for effective monitoring and verification. Once created, the protocol for a given site would be updated as a result of monitoring and verification activities at that site.

10. UNSCOM 71 started its activities in Iraq on 30 March. The team will continue its work through a succession of rounds of visits to Iraq until the accomplishment of all its tasks. It is anticipated that this will take at least two months.

11. At the time of writing, UNSCOM 71 has completed its first round of activities in Iraq. During this round, the team visited nine facilities to be placed, depending on the nature of their activities, under different regimes of monitoring. UNSCOM 71 also verified on-site Iraq's declarations and reports for monitoring and verification protocols on facilities visited by the team. The team is currently working on the draft protocols for those facilities. UNSCOM 71 will return to Iraq on 18 April to start the second round of its inspection activities. In total, it will visit more than 30 sites.

D. Other activities

12. In support of its efforts to establish a mechanism for ongoing monitoring and verification, the Commission held a number of meetings with international experts. During these meetings, issues were discussed related to the assessment of Iraq's declarations, identification of focal points for monitoring missile-related activities and appropriate monitoring techniques, including sensors, to ensure effective monitoring. Lists of dual-purpose equipment, technologies and other items that could be used for the development, production, modification or acquisition of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres were also discussed.

E. Past prohibited activities

13. The Commission continued its investigation of the outstanding issues related to the past missile programme proscribed under resolution 687 (1991). This work is essential to establish a solid and verified baseline for ongoing monitoring in accordance with resolution 715 (1991). In particular, this will allow the Commission to have a full and comprehensive picture of the knowledge and know-how Iraq obtained in the missile area through its past activities.

14. Issues related to programmes proscribed under section C of resolution 687 (1991) were discussed with Iraq on a continuous basis, especially during the rounds of the high-level talks in November 1993 and March 1994 in New York. Iraq has furnished additional details on foreign acquisition of critical ballistic missile items as well as its expenditure of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres.

15. The Commission continued to reiterate its request that Iraq provide original documentation that would substantiate the declarations made by Iraq concerning its past prohibited missile programmes. During the February visit of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission to Baghdad, Iraq finally agreed to hand over to the Commission documentation on the expenditure of prohibited missiles. This documentation covers the period from 1977 to December 1990 and accounts for nearly three quarters of the missiles covered by resolution 687 (1991) and declared by Iraq. Currently, the Commission is conducting an in-depth investigation of these documents and information contained therein. The results of this investigation will be critical for the Commission's reporting to the Security Council under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991).


A. Data collection

16. In parallel with the various rounds of high-level political talks, UNSCOM experts have held three technical meetings with Iraq on chemical weapons issues.

1. Past programmes

17. In the course of the meeting held in New York in November 1993, Iraq stressed that it had tried to meet all the requirements put forward by the Commission on the provision of information. However, Iraq agreed to endeavour to address any questions that might arise during the Commission's verification activities. The Commission, for its part, informed Iraq that it had assessed as credible the information provided in the talks held in Baghdad in October 1993 regarding Iraq's past chemical weapons programme. However, in the absence of documentation, independent verification of the data remained problematic. The Commission suggested that Iraq, in order to address that problem in part, hold seminars of the officials involved in the chemical weapons programme aimed at stimulating their collective memory to remember details that might facilitate independent verification. The issue of equipment and chemicals left at the Muthanna State Establishment was also discussed. It was agreed that the Commission should send a mission to Baghdad in January 1994 to mark equipment in order to prepare an inventory as to the release or disposal of this equipment. Further discussion was reserved on the release or disposal of chemicals remaining at the site.

18. During the meeting held in Baghdad in February 1994, Iraq informed the Commission of the results of its seminar with senior Iraqi personnel formerly involved in the chemical weapons programme. Additional data on outstanding issues, e.g. the research and development programme and imports of precursor chemicals, were provided.

19. During the meeting held in New York in March 1994, the Commission asked Iraq for additional details to fill in gaps in previously provided information. In response, Iraq presented the results of another seminar it had convened, this time involving retired former officials. These included a breakdown of the quantities of imported precursor chemicals by year and contract. In addition, Iraq was able to present a correlation, on an annual basis, between produced quantities of agents, available precursor chemicals, stored and consumed agents, and available chemical production capacity. A complete overview of its chemical weapons research and development programme, including time-frames, was also provided.

20. The additional information obtained during the course of these meetings was essential to the Commission's efforts to obtain as full a picture of Iraq's chemical weapons programme as possible. For example, in October 1993 Iraq declared 13,221 tons of traceable imported precursor chemicals; in February 1994, 15,037 tons; and in March 1994, 17,657 tons. The declared quantities of produced agents, however, remained unchanged at 4,340.5 tons.

21. The picture created by this additional information is more internally consistent than previous accounts given by Iraq. The order of magnitude of the declared figures appears credible. However, in the absence of supporting documentary evidence, the issue of independent verification remains. In this context, the Commission plans, in April 1994, to interview the personnel involved in Iraq's data recollection seminars.

2. Declarations of dual-purpose facilities

22. In December 1993, the Commission provided Iraq with model formats for the latter's initial declarations, required under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, of dual-purpose chemical facilities. On 16 January 1994, Iraq delivered to the Commission's field office in Baghdad partially completed formats. At subsequent meetings of the two sides, Iraq was informed by the Commission of the inadequacies of these returns and of what was required to bring them into conformity with the Commission's requirements. Iraq was told that full initial declarations were one of the main prerequisites for the protocol-building procedure and hence for the initiation of ongoing monitoring and verification.

B. Inspections

23. In the period from 1 to 11 February 1994, UNSCOM 67/CW 13 inventoried and tagged approximately 240 pieces of dual-use chemical production equipment. This equipment had been procured under the auspices of Iraq's chemical warfare programme. On 14 March 1994 Iraq was informed that 44 pieces that had been used for the production of agents and precursor chemicals would have to be destroyed. Iraq was provided with precise descriptions of those items. In addition, Iraq was asked to provide, by 30 April 1994, a detailed description of the intended permitted future use of the remaining tagged equipment for a final decision on their disposal. Those items not destroyed would then be subjected to ongoing monitoring and verification.

24. In the course of UNSCOM 67/CW 13, the team also visited the Ibn al Baytar facility in order to create a monitoring and verification protocol for that site. The purpose of this was to assess whether the general model for monitoring and verification protocols developed in the Commission's headquarters in New York was indeed applicable in practice to dual-purpose chemical facilities.

25. During the period from 20 to 26 March 1994, UNSCOM 70/CW 14 installed four air samplers at the Muthanna site. These samplers are designed to determine the types and levels of chemicals in the air at that site. The team also employed portable samplers that took additional samples for gaining an even more comprehensive survey of the air at Muthanna. The samplers were installed in a pattern that would cover air quality on the site from all wind directions. An Iraqi maintenance and construction crew prepared the mounting poles for the samplers. The samplers were programmed to sample the air around the clock in a discontinuous mode for a 30-day period. The sample tubes are to be removed, replaced with fresh tubes every 30 days and sent to laboratories for analysis. The sampler mechanism is microprocessor-controlled and is powered by a storage battery charged by a solar panel. A microprocessor-driven meteorological station is mounted on one of the samplers to record hourly wind speed, wind direction, temperature and humidity. The meteorological data are to be down-loaded each time the sampler tubes are changed and will become a part of the permanent record of the sample set.


26. The first biological inspections in the baseline process started with the arrival in Iraq of the fourth biological inspection team on 8 April 1994. The team is scheduled to conduct its activities over a three-week period. The main purpose of this inspection is to verify the declarations submitted by Iraq in January 1994, pursuant to the plan, approved by Security Council resolution 715 (1991), for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance not to reacquire items prohibited under resolution 687 (1991). Other objectives of this inspection are to provide an assessment of the work being undertaken and of the equipment present at those biological facilities declared by Iraq, many of which have never been visited by the Special Commission; to establish an inventory of said equipment for future tagging; and to draft a format for Iraq's regular reports under the monitoring and verification plan.

A. Talks with Iraq to fill in data gaps

27. In November 1993, discussions that had started in October 1993 regarding formats for reporting under the plan continued. The purpose of these discussions was to provide the Government of Iraq with a frame that would facilitate reporting under the plan by the drafting of limited-text answers, yes/no answers or multiple-choice answers.

28. Following the presentation of Iraqi declarations in January 1994, high-level talks were conducted with Iraqi officials in February and March 1994. These discussions focused upon the information to be provided by Iraq for an efficient and effective monitoring of the biological area. The outcome of these discussions was the provision by Iraq of a new version of the declarations required under the plan in a form that would allow completeness and clarity of the information to be analysed.

B. Seminars of experts in New York

29. In March 1994, a seminar of international experts was held in New York to prepare for inspections connected with establishing the biological baseline. Further seminars to discuss past programmes, Iraq's declarations under the biological provisions of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, sensors and other monitoring technologies, monitoring modalities and requirements for training of monitoring inspectors are planned.

C. Protocol-building efforts

30. Efforts to build the protocols for each biological site are under way. The information relating to geographic location has been compiled or will be gathered during the first visit inspection to take place in April 1994. The remaining information will be assembled throughout the baseline process. A draft of the format for information to be provided by Iraq under the protocol will be developed during the inspection in April 1994.

D. Sensor/tagging trials

31. A feasibility study of monitoring by cameras will be conducted during the April inspection. Further efforts in this field will be effected by way of seminars in the coming month. Tagging technologies have already been identified and deemed appropriate with respect to biotechnological equipment.


32. Activities in the nuclear area since 10 October 1993 are reported in the IAEA report (S/1994/490, appendix). In support of its obligation to designate sites, including in the nuclear area, the Special Commission conducted one gamma survey in the period under review.

33. The second gamma aerial survey mission performed its mission from 2 to 15 December 1993. During this mission, the team surveyed six sites. It obtained detailed gamma spectra at radioactive disposal areas at Tuwaitha as well as two areas at Al Atheer. In addition, gamma surveys were conducted at Rashdiya, Al Hadre, a site near Tikrit and Salah al-Din State Establishment (SAAD-13). While the data are still being analysed, early indications show the power of this capability to survey a relatively large area rapidly and to pinpoint particular sites for more detailed investigation. This system is still being developed, and evident improvements are under way.


34. The Commission's aerial inspections, using both helicopters and high-altitude surveillance aircraft, continued over the period under review. The Commission's high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft (U-2) now flies once or twice a week, having flown a total of 201 missions since the inception of its use in support of the Commission's operations. The Commission's helicopters have now flown 273 missions, covering some 395 sites. The aerial inspection team currently conducts three to four flights a week.

Annex II

Helicopter-stoning incident

1. While it was undertaking a humanitarian mission to evacuate, at the request of the United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq, two United Nations soldiers shot in the north of Iraq during an ambush, a Special Commission helicopter was stoned by a crowd that had gathered at the landing site used to take on board the injured.

2. For this operation, the Commission had followed normal procedures, informing the Iraqi authorities first orally and, at 1100 hours on the morning of the mission, in writing of the flight plan and landing site to be used (a playing field adjacent to the Mosul Saddam Hospital). Iraq had officially expressed agreement to these plans. (1)

3. Upon landing at the hospital at 1600 hours, the helicopter was surrounded by a crowd. When the ambulance arrived with the two guards, the crowd sought to hinder its passage to the aircraft and started to throw stones. Only a few of the Iraqi military personnel on hand sought to intervene, ineffectively.

4. Once the injured had been loaded onto the helicopter, the Iraqi soldiers gave up their efforts to control the crowd, who pelted the helicopter with stones. Damage was sustained to all six rotor blades and stones that went into the air intakes damaged the motor bearings and turbine. Further damage was sustained to windows and the fuselage. This damage grounded the aircraft for a period of three weeks while repairs, costing around $1.5 million, were undertaken.

5. The pilot of the helicopter decided that, regardless of the damage sustained by the helicopter, immediate departure was the surest way to safeguard the lives of the crew and passengers and to escape a dangerous situation.


1. Contrary to an Iraqi press release dated 29 March 1994, there was no last minute change of flight plan or landing site. Indeed, Iraqi personnel in Mosul had assisted in the preparation of the landing site at 1130 hours and in Baghdad had received a written flight plan containing flight path and landing site details.