7 October 1994








1. The present report is the sixth submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991) which requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council every six months on the implementation of the Special Commission's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). 1/

2. The present report marks a very important stage in the evolution of the Commission's mandate. It is particularly detailed in order to support the conclusion contained in chapter VI below that the Commission's ongoing monitoring and verification system is provisionally operational. While certain elements are not yet in place, so much of the preparatory work is complete, with gaps being filled for the time being by use of alternative measures, that the Commission can with confidence commence the testing of the thoroughness and efficacy of its system. The remaining elements should be in place shortly.


3. The attachment to document S/1994/341 outlined the Commission's operational concept for implementing its plan for ongoing monitoring and verification as contained in document S/22871/Rev.1. In brief, the concept is based on regular inspection of facilities of concern, on an inventory of all dual-purpose items (i.e. those which have permitted uses but which could be used for the acquisition of banned weapons) and on following the fate of all inventoried items. Underpinning the inspections and the establishment and maintenance of accurate inventories will be a full array of interlocking activities: aerial surveillance with a variety of sensors, remote sensors, tags and seals, a variety of detection technologies, information obtained from other sources, and, when sanctions on the dual-purpose items are lifted, notifications under the export/import control mechanism. No one of those elements on its own would

94-38383 (E) 101094 /...

suffice to provide confidence in the system but together they should constitute the most comprehensive international monitoring system ever established in the sphere of arms control. Confidence in its effectiveness will rely, inter alia, on the following:

(a) Possession by the Commission of a full picture of Iraq's past programmes and full accounting of the facilities, equipment, items and materials associated with those past programmes, in conjunction with full knowledge of the disposition of dual-purpose items currently available to Iraq. That information provides the baseline data from which ongoing monitoring and verification proceeds. Uncertainties relating to the accuracy or completeness of those data will feed through into uncertainties as to whether the ongoing monitoring and verification system is indeed monitoring all the items that should be monitored. This, in turn, would entail more inspections to obtain the data required to provide confidence in the system. This information is primarily obtained from Iraq's declarations, required under resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), and through the Commission's inspection and analysis activities. Iraq is required to update its declarations on its dual-purpose activities and capabilities every six months;

(b) Completion of comprehensive monitoring and verification protocols for each site at which monitoring will be conducted as a consequence of the dual-purpose items present or activities undertaken there. These protocols are the product of the baseline inspection process, that is, inspections for the purposes of familiarization, tagging and inventorying, sensor installation and protocol-building as necessary. They provide the basis for future ongoing monitoring and verification activities at the specified site;

(c) Successful testing of the system of ongoing monitoring and verification in order to:

(i) Establish a clear understanding and practice of how the elements of the system, including the actions required of Iraq, should operate;

(ii) Evaluate the effectiveness of its elements both individually and as a whole.

While the system is premised on the provision by Iraq of accurate and complete declarations of its dual-purpose activities and capabilities and cannot be operated at its most effective and least intrusive without such full declarations, it has also been designed to be robust. Experience has shown that, even when initially presented with inadequate declarations, the Commission has been able, through the deployment of its various resources and the exercise of its inspection rights, to elicit the information required for the system to be established. However, should Iraq seek systematically to block the work of the Commission by, for example, preventing access to sites, the Commission would not be able to provide the Security Council with the assurances it seeks concerning Iraq's compliance with the terms of paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991). If such a case were to arise, the Commission would immediately inform the Council.

4. Once the sanctions imposed on Iraq under resolution 661 (1990) are eased or lifted in accordance with paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991) to the extent that the export to Iraq of dual-purpose items is again permitted, a further essential element of the overall monitoring of Iraq's dual-purpose capabilities will be the export/import mechanism envisaged under paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991).


5. Implementation of the plan is predicated on the Commission's obtaining full accounting for Iraq's past capabilities and full information on current dual-purpose activities and capabilities in Iraq. However, until 26 November 1993, Iraq failed to acknowledge its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved thereunder and, until that time, made no declarations in accordance with the requirements of the plans. It also impeded or blocked certain activities it deemed to be of a monitoring nature. Thus, in the circumstances that prevailed until Iraq's acknowledgement, while the Commission undertook much preparatory work, it was in no position to initiate its plan.

6. Once Iraq's formal acceptance of the resolution, adopted on 11 October 1991, was obtained on 26 November 1993, the Commission, while continuing efforts to elucidate all aspects of Iraq's past programmes, immediately reallocated the bulk of its resources to the establishment, as soon as feasible, of the system of ongoing monitoring and verification. In addition, the Commission added substantially to its staff in New York in order to ensure that personnel restrictions did not become a significant delaying factor in this process. This reallocation and increase of resources is amply demonstrated by the fact that, in the 30 months to November 1993, the Commission conducted 44 inspections, whereas, in the 10 months since then, the Commission conducted or initiated 29 inspections, of which all but 5 were directly related to the establishment of ongoing monitoring and verification.

7. The concept of operations and the numbers of inspections conducted show that establishment of the ongoing monitoring and verification system is a complex and large undertaking. It has entailed inspection of entire categories of sites and industries not previously visited by Commission personnel. This has required the Commission to adapt as follows:

(a) The new inspections called for expertise not previously used by the Commission and not available to it from amongst its own staff. Consequently, the Commission drew upon the resources of a large number of Member States to ensure that it was able to conduct its operations to the highest standards. Even so, in several areas the expertise could not be found from amongst the employees of supporting Governments and so had to be obtained through the recruitment of specialists from private industry;

(b) New methods needed to be developed for the conduct of baseline inspections and to assess the feasibility of monitoring methods;

(c) New applications of technologies had to be developed to serve the monitoring needs identified in the baseline inspection process.

8. The specific steps undertaken to establish and operate the system of ongoing monitoring and verification since 26 November 1993 are described in detail in annex I to document S/1994/489 and in annex I to the present report. The following paragraphs summarize the current status of those activities.

A. Knowledge about past programmes

9. The Commission's understanding of Iraq's past programmes has grown considerably during the past six months as a result of improvements in Iraq's declarations and to the inspection and analytical efforts of the Commission. As a result, the Commission is approaching a full understanding of those past programmes.

10. A full picture of Iraq's past programmes in relation to proscribed weapons is important as it provides a crucial part of the baseline information from which ongoing monitoring and verification proceeds. It is essential to verify Iraq's declarations if one is to have confidence in those baseline data and hence in the system built on them. Efforts to verify the information provided by Iraq, particularly that concerning foreign supplies, are ongoing. Given that Iraq has provided only limited documentation (claiming all documentation relating to its past programmes has been destroyed), those efforts have had to rely on the Commission's inspection activities, on interrogation of Iraqi personnel involved in the programmes and on contacts with the Governments of the declared or presumed suppliers. Through that process, the Commission has obtained additional information, which itself needed further investigation, including data concerning the disposition of production equipment and the acquisition and use of items and materials for the programmes, some of which revealed inconsistencies in Iraq's declarations. While those efforts helped to close gaps in Iraq's declarations of its past programmes and to verify other aspects declared but not previously supported by corroborating evidence, further actions are required by Iraq to provide all the necessary data. In that regard, follow-through on Iraq's commitment, expressed on numerous occasions, to cooperate in providing further complementary information and clarifications concerning its past programmes is essential in arriving at the full picture of those programmes referred to above and thus in building full confidence in the monitoring system.

B. Iraq's declarations on current capabilities

11. The situation is much improved from that which prevailed in November 1993 when Iraq, upon accepting the terms of resolution 715 (1991), announced that its previous reports entitled "Information and data related to the ongoing monitoring and verification plan" should be "considered to have been made and submitted in conformity with the provisions of resolution 715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder". The Commission at that time responded that those previous reports were deficient in many regards and could not be considered as initial declarations under the plans, nor did they constitute a sufficient basis for the proper planning and implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification.

12. The Commission has since obtained a great deal of information about Iraq's dual-purpose activities and capabilities, enough to commence ongoing monitoring and verification. However, some of Iraq's declarations in this regard are still incomplete. Iraq needs to improve these declarations. There are gaps and discrepancies in each area, which the Commission has endeavoured to resolve. Great difficulties were faced in obtaining the necessary data, particularly in the biological area. The process being pursued by the Commission to overcome them is illustrative of the process pursued in the other areas. Chapter III of annex I describes this in detail.

13. During the discussions in New York in September 1994 between the Commission and a high-level Iraqi delegation led by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, the Commission indicated areas where further information was required in this regard. Subsequent follow-up action is continuing in Iraq at the expert level in the course of inspection and ongoing monitoring and verification activities. Methods have been suggested by the Commission whereby information required for monitoring could be obtained. The Commission has received assurances that the missing information will be provided.

14. The complexity and size of the task of establishing the system of ongoing monitoring and verification is reflected in the difficulties encountered by the Commission in obtaining and by Iraq in gathering the required information. In large part, these difficulties can be ascribed to the fact that the Commission's ongoing monitoring and verification activities are taking it to sites it has not visited before and hence into contact with Iraqi personnel who have not previously had to deal with the Commission. Further efforts, primarily by Iraq, whose obligation it is to provide complete declarations, but also by the Commission in clarifying the requirements of the plan, are required to educate the Iraqi officials concerned. This should rectify the situation in the coming months.

C. Baseline inspections

15. The purpose of baseline inspections is to assess whether a site requires monitoring and, if so, to make recommendations on how monitoring should be conducted at the sites in question, on the items to be tagged and on the installation of monitoring devices. The end product of the baseline process, after decisions have been made on these recommendations, are site monitoring and verification protocols for each site to be monitored. Such protocols contain all information about the site and its contacts with other organizations of relevance to the Commission's monitoring activities.

16. A total of 27 inspection teams, in addition to numerous visits by smaller groups of specialists in sensor technologies, have conducted activities related to the acquisition of the baseline information. While that process will never be complete, in that the system will evolve continually in response to changes in Iraq's industrial base and developments in relevant technologies (e.g. development of new processes for the production of banned items or materials or of new monitoring technologies), the Commission now has the information necessary to prepare usable monitoring and verification protocols for all the sites to be subjected to regular monitoring.

17. In the missile area, that process is most advanced. All the protocols currently envisaged have been prepared, that is, for some 30 sites. In the chemical area, the baseline inspections have been completed and the Commission's staff in New York are currently using the data from those inspections to prepare some 50 protocols. Those for the most important sites have already been completed. In the biological area, while gaps remain in the information provided about dual-purpose capabilities and further inspections are planned to address the matter, the Commission has completed its protocol-building inspections and hopes soon to have sufficient information to prepare the protocols currently envisaged, that is, some 75 protocols.

D. Installation of sensors and tags

18. The conduct of baseline inspections has given the Commission the information it requires to make decisions on the types of tags and monitoring sensors to be used in the ongoing monitoring and verification system in general and on how many and where they should be deployed. Tagging of all identified dual-purpose items and permitted short-range missiles and installation of sensors has been completed in the missile area. In the chemical area, four chemical air-sampling devices have been installed at one site. There are plans to install a further 20 such samplers in addition to monitoring cameras and flow meters. All identified relevant dual-purpose items in the chemical area have been tagged. In the biological area, tagging of all identified items is still proceeding - a team is currently in Iraq to pursue this. A comprehensive plan for the installation and operation of remote-controlled monitoring cameras at key biological sites has been prepared by a team sent to Iraq to study the feasibility of remote-controlled sensors in biological facilities. The Commission has identified funds and equipment to proceed with the plan, which it intends to do shortly. In its efforts to install sensors and tags, the Commission has received considerable assistance and support from Iraq.

E. Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre

19. Upon initiating the process of establishing the ongoing monitoring and verification system, it became apparent that the Commission would need to create a centre in Baghdad to operate the system. The intention to do so was reported to the Security Council in March and April 1994 (S/1994/341 and S/1994/489). Since that time, the Commission has undertaken a feasibility study for such a centre; identified a site; obtained the agreement of the Government of Iraq to the use of that site as the Centre; drawn up architectural and engineering plans for the reconstruction of the building concerned to conform with the requirements of the Centre; accepted the Iraqi Government's offer to perform the reconstruction; supervised the construction work; conducted a security review upon the completion of the construction work undertaken by the Government of Iraq and produced a security programme for the Centre; identified major components of the security system (doors, locks, railings and surveillance cameras); acquired much of the furniture and equipment required for the Centre; and started the process of installing the communications and other equipment required for the Centre. The Commission notes Iraq's contribution to and cooperation in the construction works required to establish the monitoring system. These efforts, particularly those to construct a communications mast and to renovate the building to be used for the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre, have significantly expedited the process of establishing the system. Full details are contained in annex II.

20. When the Centre is fully operational, it will comprise the following: offices of the Director and Deputy Director; monitoring experts in each of the areas to be monitored (missile, chemical, biological and - from IAEA - nuclear); export/import control experts; biological and chemical laboratories; the aerial inspection team with their photographic laboratory and imagery library; communications with New York, Vienna and all the remote-controlled sensors installed by inspection teams; equipment for reviewing the product of the remote-controlled monitoring cameras; medical and logistics support, including helicopter and ground transport; and interpretation and translation services. It is expected that, once fully operational, the Centre will have a total complement of approximately 80 persons.

21. Recruitment of personnel for this Centre is proceeding. For the monitoring, aerial inspection and export/import control experts, the Commission is setting up a pool of experts whom supporting Governments would make available to serve for a minimum of 90 days at the Centre. The aim is to rotate staff on a three- or six-month basis, with experts returning for several tours at the Centre, so as to benefit both from fresh perspectives and from continuity of experience.

22. In the missile area, the first monitoring group of experts arrived and commenced work on 17 August 1994. The first rotation is due on 14 October 1994. The first chemical team arrived in Iraq on 2 October 1994 to commence operations immediately. The first biological team is to arrive in the near future. The aerial inspection team has been operating in Iraq since June 1992. Export/ import control experts will be recruited as and when it becomes evident that sanctions imposed by Security Council resolution 661 (1990) are due to be eased or lifted in accordance with paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991).

F. National implementation measures

23. Paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Commission's monitoring plan require Iraq to adopt the measures necessary to implement its obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991), resolution 707 (1991) and the plan itself. Those measures are to include a prohibition and penal legislation forbidding all national and legal persons under Iraq's jurisdiction or control from undertaking anywhere any activity prohibited for Iraq by resolution 687 (1991) and all other related resolutions.

24. Iraq has forwarded to the Special Commission and IAEA the draft of a decision by the Revolutionary Command Council intended to give effect to those requirements. The Commission has discussed the draft decision informally with the competent Iraqi officials and has made certain suggestions. The Commission has drawn attention to the need to provide for prompt action in respect of any changes in the items prohibited or controlled under the annexes to the Commission's plan, as these annexes may be updated and revised from time to time. It would seem preferable to embody the lists of such materials and equipment in administrative regulations rather than the law itself. The Iraqi side has undertaken to review this aspect of the draft decree, which had annexed the lists of items to the decree itself, before being presented to the Revolutionary Command Council for adoption.

25. The Commission has also indicated the desirability that the legislation should make it clear that cooperation by natural or legal persons in Iraq with the Commission in carrying out its tasks is required and that such cooperation would not per se be the subject of any legal or other punitive measures.


26. As mentioned in the last report (S/1994/489), the Special Commission and IAEA prepared, pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991), a concept paper outlining their proposal for an export/import mechanism for monitoring any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions. The concept paper sets out procedures for notifications to the Commission and IAEA of exports of dual-purpose items to Iraq. Such notifications would be made both by the exporting country and by Iraq for the items referred to in the relevant annexes to the plans of the Commission and IAEA for ongoing monitoring and verification already approved by resolution 715 (1991).

27. On 13 May 1994, the Executive Chairman of the Commission addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) (i.e. the "Sanctions Committee"), transmitting to him the concept paper for consideration and approval by that Committee. It will be recalled that paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991) had requested that the Sanctions Committee, the Commission and the Director-General of IAEA develop "in cooperation" the export/import mechanism for approval by the Council.

28. In his letter of transmission, the Executive Chairman pointed out that paragraph 7 envisioned a system of monitoring that was to be of indefinite duration. It was thus understood that paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991) was intended to make provision for the monitoring of sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of relevant dual-purpose items after the general sanctions imposed by resolution 661 (1990) on those items had been lifted, pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991).

29. In order to avoid confusion between the sanctions regime and the monitoring mechanism, the Executive Chairman proposed that the two regimes should be kept entirely separate. The role of the Sanctions Committee would have priority for as long as items covered by the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification remained subject to the general sanctions under resolution 661 (1990). Any requests for their sale to Iraq, as essential for civilian needs, would continue to be addressed in accordance with existing procedures to the Sanctions Committee. Once the sanctions under resolution 661 (1990) on any dual-purpose items or categories of items were lifted, those items would become subject to the proposed export/import mechanism.

30. The joint Commission/IAEA concept paper, together with the Executive Chairman's letter of transmittal, were submitted by the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee to that Committee. Informal discussions in the Sanctions Committee appeared to reveal that a consensus could be arrived at on the proposal contained in the concept paper. However, before going to the Security Council with the required tripartite proposal for the export/import mechanism, the members of the Committee preferred to see a more detailed list of items to be reported than already appeared in the relevant annexes to the Commission's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification.

31. In the light of this, the Commission decided to prepare revisions to the annexes in its plan to provide therein more detailed information and lists on the items to be covered by the reporting procedures. These revised lists have now been completed, and informal expert discussions will shortly be held to determine the adequacy of the revisions for purposes of implementing an export reporting procedure. Those discussions should be completed in the near future, after which the proposed revisions to the annexes will be made available to the Sanctions Committee and will be reported to the Security Council. It will be recalled that the plans of the Commission and IAEA for ongoing monitoring and verification permit the Commission and IAEA to update and revise the annexes to their plans based on information and experience gained in the implementation of resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991) and of the plans, after informing the Council of such revisions. This is, therefore, the procedure that will be followed. The Commission and IAEA hope that it will be possible then to submit to the Security Council an agreed proposal by the Sanctions Committee, the Commission and IAEA, for the export/import mechanism.


A. Finance

32. The monitoring and other activities of the Special Commission and of IAEA, undertaken pursuant to the relevant Council resolutions, are to be of indefinite duration and have to be planned on the assumption that there will be a sufficient, guaranteed, long-term source of funds to finance those activities. At the present time, as described in detail in annex III to the present report, financial restraints under the legal and other arrangements now pertaining have come very close to delaying the acquisition of all items and supplies required to have the monitoring system "up and running". Quite apart from this consideration, the constant need to seek contributions in cash and in-kind from various Governments is proving to be a time-consuming and onerous responsibility for the executive management of the Commission, diverting resources that could otherwise be devoted to operations. At the end of 1994, the funds for financing the operations of the Commission and IAEA will be exhausted and, at the time of writing, there is no firm undertaking that those funds will be replenished. The Council needs to address the issue of both short- and long-term financing at an early date if it is to have an assured and effective monitoring system.

B. Operations and organization

33. Funds permitting and unforeseen obstacles not intervening, the Commission expects to have installed all the tags and sensors currently envisaged and to have the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre fully equipped and staffed by the end of 1994. Work there will then focus on the conduct of ongoing monitoring and verification activities, which have already been initiated. In New York, while there will be further efforts to resolve outstanding issues in relation to Iraq's past programmes and to complete the installation of the currently envisaged elements of the ongoing monitoring and verification system, there will be a further redeployment of resources from efforts to establish ongoing monitoring and verification towards the organization and analysis of data being obtained from the monitoring process and preparations for the operation of the export/import control mechanism.

34. It is envisaged that, until the implementation of the export/import control mechanism, ongoing monitoring and verification activities will comprise primarily the following types of activities:

(a) Inspections to verify the completeness of the list of sites monitored and of the inventories, to verify declarations as to the activities conducted at sites, or to pursue any information obtained that might question Iraq's compliance with its obligations under paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991);

(b) Aerial surveillance, from both the Commission's high-altitude surveillance aircraft (the U-2) and its helicopters;

(c) Maintenance of the site-monitoring and verification protocols by the monitoring experts at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre;

(d) Monitoring activities conducted by experts dispatched to Iraq for that specific purpose because either the expertise required for the activity is not available among the staff of the Centre or because the scope of the activity is too great for the staff of the Centre to undertake without additional assistance;

(e) Review and analysis of the product of the sensors installed at the various sites.

C. Revisions to the annexes

35. In the course of operations in Iraq, it has become evident that some revisions to the annexes to the Commission's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification are in order. This is in response to a number of factors:

(a) As indicated in chapter IV above, discussions with the Sanctions Committee on the export/import control mechanism concept paper have shown that exporting States will require greater specification in technical terms of what constitutes a dual-purpose item and hence the export of which to Iraq would be subject to notification to the joint Commission/IAEA unit provided for in the concept paper;

(b) Experience gained by the Commission during its inspection activities and in the course of establishing the system of ongoing monitoring and verification;

(c) Iraqi requests that provisions of the annexes to the Commission's plan be specified in greater technical detail to assist Iraq in understanding what is covered by the plans.

36. As noted above, revisions to the annexes have been prepared by the Commission. These should facilitate the performance by all concerned of their obligations under the Commission's plan and the export/import monitoring mechanism, thereby contributing to the increased effectiveness of the overall regime to monitor Iraq's compliance with paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991).


37. The establishment of the system for ongoing monitoring and verification was a highly complex and sizeable undertaking, achieved not without difficulty. The Commission believes that the basic elements for a thorough system are now in place. There are plans to introduce in the immediate future technical additions to the system to improve its efficiency and convenience. In the light of the progress reported above, the Commission's system of ongoing monitoring and verification is now provisionally operational. The testing of the thoroughness and efficacy of the system has begun.

38. Enough operating experience will have be gained to demonstrate that the integrated system will provide the Council with the assurance that Iraq's obligations not to re-acquire proscribed weapons can indeed be verified. After the lifting of the sanctions, the system, if it is to be effective and to endure, will have to be a dynamic one, refined and augmented in the light of experience, of technological developments and of the growth of Iraq's economy.

39. An essential condition for the effective operation of the system will be Iraq's actions in compliance with its obligations in accordance with the plans approved under resolution 715 (1991). If Iraq extends to the operation of ongoing monitoring and verification the same level of cooperation that it has to date in its establishment, there can be cause for optimism. The Executive Chairman will keep the Security Council informed each month in his oral reports on the working of the system so that the Council can draw the necessary conclusions at the appropriate time.


1/ The present report updates the information contained in the first five reports, circulated as documents S/23801, S/24661, S/25620, S/26684 and S/1994/489. Further information concerning developments relating to the implementation of the plan is contained in the reports to the Security Council contained in documents S/1994/520, S/1994/750 and S/1994/860. The first is a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the high-level talks, held at Baghdad from 24 to 26 April 1994, between the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the one hand and Iraq on the other. The second is the sixth report provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 699 (1991), appendix II of which covers in detail the array of ongoing monitoring and verification activities undertaken by the Commission in the period from December 1993 to June 1994. The third is the text of a letter sent to the President of the Security Council and subsequently circulated on the instructions of the President. It contains, in the appendix, the joint statement issued at the end of the July 1994 high-level talks and an assessment of how the process of establishing ongoing monitoring and verification was proceeding at that time.


Ongoing monitoring and verification activities


1. Since the last report, intensive efforts have been made to put into operation ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's missile-related activities and dual-purpose capabilities. Those efforts resulted in putting in place the essential elements of the system, including the creation of a group of resident expert monitors in the Commission's Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. Protocols for missile-related facilities have been completed and serve as guidelines for ongoing monitoring and verification activities at the specified facilities. They also form an information source on Iraq's past and present activities. Iraq's declarations submitted under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, including the required biannual declarations received in July 1994, were assessed on a continuous basis. In parallel, the Commission continued its investigations into Iraq's past prohibited missile programmes and its compliance with resolution 687 (1991).

A. Activities to establish monitoring

1. UNSCOM 71/BM22

2. After Iraq's initial declaration under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification had been received in January 1994 and analysed by the Commission, the Commission was able to proceed to the preparation of monitoring and verification protocols for identified missile-related facilities. UNSCOM 71/BM22 was tasked with that mission. The team carried out its activities in Iraq from 30 March to 20 May 1994. It visited more than 30 facilities to verify on site Iraq's declarations concerning those facilities and to identify focal points for future monitoring activities.

3. UNSCOM 71/BM22 prepared monitoring and verification protocols for each facility with specific recommendations for monitoring arrangements and inspection modalities. Depending on the nature of facilities and activities, different regimes of monitoring were envisaged. These included, inter alia, modalities for the collection of information, installation of cameras and other sensors, tagging and on-site checks of missile-related and dual-purpose equipment. The protocols also contain outlines for on-site inspection programmes for each facility. Successful completion of UNSCOM 71/BM22 marked a critical step towards the creation, in the missile area, of an ongoing monitoring and verification system covering research, development, modification, production, testing and other facilities, and missile-specific and dual-purpose items.

2. UNSCOM 79/BM23 and UNSCOM 80/BM24

4. Ongoing monitoring and verification provides for monitoring of missiles designed for use, or capable of being modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a range greater than 50 kilometres. UNSCOM 80/BM24 was given the task of tagging a number of operational missile systems to be monitored. The purpose of the tagging is to assist the Commission in effective monitoring of non-modification of missile systems and in keeping a reliable missile inventory control.

5. UNSCOM 80/BM24 conducted its mission in Iraq from 10 to 24 June 1994. In total, the team tagged more than 1,300 missiles of different types in a manner that would preclude undetected modifications of missiles to achieve proscribed ranges. All missiles were tagged by Commission inspectors, with Iraq's authorities providing preparations and support necessary for safe and efficient operations. UNSCOM 80/BM24 also visited a number of missile sites to ascertain that they were not suitable for prohibited modification activities.

6. After completion of the baseline activities related to operational missiles, the Commission will request Iraq, up to three times per year, to assemble a limited number of tagged missiles for purposes of inspecting them and making sure that they have not been modified to enable those missiles to reach a range greater than 150 kilometres. The Commission will select for each inspection up to 10 per cent of the quantity of tagged missiles. The first inspection of that kind will take place shortly.

7. Tagging operations with live missiles required extensive preparations, personnel training and elaboration of appropriate inspection modalities and safety procedures. UNSCOM 79/BM23 was in Iraq from 23 to 28 May 1994 to conduct preparations for UNSCOM 80/BM24 activities. UNSCOM 79/BM23 checked on-site work areas for tagging operations and other preparatory work done by the Iraqi authorities. Prime attention was paid to the safety aspects of working with live missiles. Special operational procedures, commensurate with the unique character of tagging activities, were established by the Commission.

8. UNSCOM 79/BM23 also compiled a technical reference baseline for Iraq's missile systems of interest to the Commission. Reference data for each missile system were obtained to include measurements and photography of major parts and components. The data collected will be used to establish "official" missile configurations for each missile system for use in future inspections and to support automated processing of data collected from the monitoring cameras.

3. UNSCOM 81/BM25

9. UNSCOM 81/BM25 was in Iraq from 14 to 22 June 1994. The objectives of the team were twofold: to present to Iraq's experts definitions under elaboration by the Commission of the dual-purpose items and technologies contained in annex IV of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification and to discuss certain aspects of past prohibited activities in Iraq, including missile production, modification projects and foreign supplies. As a special task related to verification of Iraq's compliance with resolution 687 (1991), the team was requested to investigate the alleged use of a tracking radar to support launches of prohibited missiles in December 1990. Iraq's officials strongly denied that the radar had been used during those tests or even had been intended to be used in any activities related to prohibited missiles. Those denials are contrary to information obtained by the Commission, which is currently pursuing its investigations in order to arrive at a final determination of the disposition of this radar.

4. UNSCOM 82/BM26

10. The Commission decided to use cameras and other sensors to increase the effectiveness of monitoring activities at a number of missile-related facilities selected by it for monitoring. Through efforts of several inspection teams, including UNSCOM 66, 69 and 71, specific areas were identified where hardware or technology essential for acquiring crucial elements of proscribed capabilities were present. Furthermore, the suitability of camera surveillance for monitoring activities at those areas was assessed. Over all, some 30 areas at 13 facilities were selected for camera monitoring.

11. UNSCOM 82/BM26 was mandated to carry out actual installation of monitoring camera systems. A typical system with constant data-collection capability consisted of the following: camera(s) with trigger sensors (if necessary), a controller, a recorder, a power unit and a transmitter at the monitored site; and a receiver, a controller computer and a recorder at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. Each system is self-sufficient, with built-in redundancy and security controls. Interlinking communications are accomplished through a specifically designed system.

12. The team operated in Iraq from 3 to 28 July 1994 and installed more than 50 cameras with associated equipment. The team also placed tags and inventory labels on equipment identified for monitoring. The team used tamper-proof tags, specially designed to provide for high security, durability and effective inventory control.

13. After a period of initial operation of camera systems, a special sensor- testing team was dispatched to Iraq from 8 to 16 August 1994. The team's mission was to validate operational capabilities of the camera-monitoring systems (through tests of sensor and communication technologies), operation and maintenance procedures and processing modalities. The team provided recommendations for improved use of sensor-monitoring systems in the missile area.

14. As of now, a system for data collection from the camera systems and data analysis is provisionally operational.

5. UNSCOM 85/BM27

15. The team was in Iraq from 15 to 24 July 1994 with the primary mission of updating Iraq's information and the Commission's assessments of missile research and development activities in Iraq. Such research and development updates, based on the declarations and special reports by Iraq and data collected by inspection teams, are carried out by the Commission on a biannual basis. UNSCOM 85/BM27 was the second team to perform such a task.

16. Extensive discussions were held with Iraq's officials and missile experts to obtain information relevant to the team's mission. Iraq submitted a detailed report of its current missile programmes relevant to surface-to-surface missiles with a range greater than 50 kilometres. The team reaffirmed limitations established by the Commission on some missile design features so as to preclude the production of missiles that might achieve the proscribed range.

17. UNSCOM 85/BM27 was also mandated to investigate a number of issues related to research and development activities carried out by Iraq for the past proscribed missile programmes.

6. MG1

18. Upon completion of the baseline process in the missile area, the Commission decided to dispatch the first missile group of resident inspectors to the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. Such groups will operate continuously from the Centre and will be a core element in the ongoing monitoring and verification system. They are to perform a variety of important ongoing monitoring and verification missions, including:

(a) Execution of monitoring inspections on a regular basis at all missile-related sites under monitoring;

(b) Checks of the tagged operational missiles;

(c) Initial assessment and verification of Iraq's declarations and reports;

(d) Upkeep of a current inventory of items under monitoring;

(e) Supervision of the operation of the sensor-monitoring system and initial screening of the system output.

19. The first monitoring group arrived in Iraq on 17 August. The group is composed of four experts. The group's personnel will be rotated every three months, with the first rotation to take place on 14 October 1994. So far, MG1 has conducted more than 40 visits to facilities being monitored and has presented a number of monitoring reports to the Commission.

B. Past prohibited missile-related activities

20. To establish a solid and verified baseline for ongoing monitoring and verification, the Commission needs to have a full and comprehensive picture of Iraq's missile-related capabilities, both present and past. As stipulated in Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), Iraq is required to provide full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its proscribed programmes and to respond fully, completely and promptly to questions and requests from the Commission. Through its inspection activities, lengthy technical discussions with Iraq's authorities and in-depth analyses, the Commission now possesses a much fuller and more accurate picture of Iraq's past prohibited programmes, as compared with that presented by Iraq in its official "Full, final and comprehensive report" submitted in May 1992.

21. The Commission has continued its investigations into issues related to the past proscribed missile programmes. Special emphasis has been placed on verification of information provided by Iraq on foreign acquisition of proscribed missiles, their components and related production capabilities. Verification of this and other information provided by Iraq has been pursued by the Commission energetically.

22. Issues related to past programmes were also discussed with Iraq during the rounds of high-level talks in April and September 1994. During the reporting period, several inspection teams also addressed the relevant issues with Iraq's officials. While Iraq has not volunteered information, neither has it declined to provide answers to the Commission's specific requests. In general, information thus provided by Iraq agreed with that obtained by the Commission from other sources. Some explanations and clarifications from Iraq are still pending.

C. Current monitoring programme

23. The current monitoring programme in the missile area constitutes a multilayered system to accomplish the tasks of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification in an efficient and practical manner. It covers, inter alia:

(a) A variety of sites and facilities, both currently engaged in missile activities and having relevant capabilities. At the present moment, the number of such facilities under monitoring exceeds 30;

(b) Activities crucial to re-acquiring prohibited missiles. Special modes of monitoring, that is, camera systems, were established. Such focal points for monitoring include missile-propellant mixers/extruders, equipment for liquid engine production and gyro balancing, missile/warhead assembly lines, wind tunnel and static test stands;

(c) Specialized and dual-purpose equipment. Appropriate inventory control was established. For example, nearly 200 items have been tagged by the Commission. Many more are covered by facility protocols;

(d) Operational missiles designed for use, or capable of being modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a range greater than 50 kilometres. More than 1,300 missiles have been tagged by the Commission and will be regularly checked for non-modification.

24. Under its current monitoring programme, the Commission will use a variety of inspection modalities, including:

(a) Resident monitors (missile groups) in the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre to perform a number of monitoring and verification tasks. It is envisaged that missile groups would carry out more than 150 inspection visits per year to facilities under monitoring;

(b) Camera and sensor monitoring of specific areas to collect on a continuous basis data on activities under observation;

(c) Special inspection teams to address specific issues, for example, research and development activities and static and flight missile tests;

(d) Compliance inspection teams to investigate Iraq's compliance with the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991);

(e) Missile monitoring activities to be supported by aerial inspections and surveillance carried out by the Commission.

25. It should be noted that the key to implementation of missile-related provisions of ongoing monitoring and verification will be transparency on Iraq's part concerning its activities to be monitored under the plan.

26. In summary, elements of monitoring and verification have been put in place and are operational.


27. Since the last report, the Commission has worked in four areas to implement the chemical-monitoring aspects of the plan. Firstly, the Commission continues to investigate past Iraqi chemical weapons activities using seminars and question-and-answer sessions with competent Iraqi officials. A thorough understanding of Iraq's technical capabilities, manufacturing equipment and precursor suppliers, and past chemical weapons production activities are necessary prerequisites for the successful design and implementation of the ongoing monitoring and verification system. Secondly, the Commission conducted a site sweep and hand-over of the Muthanna State Establishment. That facility was the hub of Iraq's past chemical weapons programmes. As such, it contained the bulk of the declared and discovered chemical agents, filled munitions and munitions production and filling equipment. The site survey and hand-over teams established that the site was free of prohibited materials and that all dual-use equipment at the site was properly tagged and inventoried. Thirdly, three chemical protocol-building missions have been conducted at a variety of sites. Finally, the chemical group has arrived in Iraq as part of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre and started its monitoring activities.

A. Activities to establish monitoring

1. UNSCOM 67/CW13 and UNSCOM 70/CW14

28. The inventory and protocol testing activities of UNSCOM 67/CW13 and the chemical air sampler installation by UNSCOM 70/CW14 have been described fully in chapter II.2.B, annex I of S/1994/489.

2. UNSCOM 75/CW16

29. The first series of chemical baseline inspections was carried out by UNSCOM 75/CW16 from 25 May to 5 June 1994. The team's task was to conduct baseline inspections and build protocols for the chemical sites known to have been associated with Iraq's past chemical weapons programmes or to have dual-purpose capabilities of specific concern for the future ongoing monitoring and verification system.

30. The team generated protocols for 14 sites. The protocols include data on the layout of the site, the chemical processes used, precursors utilized and waste materials produced. The team was able to make recommendations on the frequency of monitoring inspections for the 14 sites. They were also able to refine the baseline data requirements established by UNSCOM 67/CW13.

3. UNSCOM 76/CW17

31. The destruction of declared and discovered chemical weapons and related equipment and materials took place at the Muthanna State Establishment beginning in the summer of 1992. The work of the chemical destruction group was completed in the spring of 1994. Because the Muthanna site had been used as both Iraq's main chemical weapons production facility and as a collection point for prohibited items awaiting destruction, a team was dispatched to the site to certify the successful completion of destruction operations.

32. From 31 May to 12 June 1994, UNSCOM 76/CW17 surveyed the Muthanna site. The team conducted extensive chemical sampling and analysis operations in order to be able to declare the site free of chemical weapons hazards. During their survey operations, the team noted the existence of several pieces of equipment and other materials on which the Commission needed to take a decision as to their disposition. A complete description of those items was passed to the hand-over team.

4. UNSCOM 77/CW18

33. In addition to the work of the site survey team, a second mission (UNSCOM 77/CW18) reviewed the environmental analysis report of the survey team. The team, inter alia, tagged several pieces of relevant chemical-manufacturing equipment and dual-use metal working tools.

34. On 13 June 1994, a formal meeting was held at Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate at Baghdad. A protocol describing Commission actions at Muthanna and future Iraqi obligations with respect to the site was signed by representatives of Iraq and the Commission. This inspection ended the Commission's two-year control of the facility.

5. UNSCOM 89/CW19

35. This team operated in Iraq from 10 to 23 August 1994. Its task was to build protocols for 22 chemical facilities associated with the oil and petrochemical industry. Those sites were of interest because of the potential presence of either equipment or raw chemicals that could be used in the production of chemical warfare agents or equipment that could be used to store such chemicals.

36. The team verified declared equipment and activities, for example, the hydrofluoric acid catalysed alkylation of olefin to produce detergents, at the sites, which indicated that they should be subjected to monitoring. It collected the information required for the building of protocols for each of the sites and undertook much of the work to create the protocols.

6. UNSCOM 91/CW20

37. This team conducted its activities in Iraq from 13 to 24 September 1994. Its principal task was to conduct protocol-building inspections for 12 sites associated primarily with Iraq's chemical fertilizer industry in order to identify possible dual-purpose equipment, equipment or facility redundancies, plant capacity and normal utilization, unusual chemical processes and waste disposal methods, and to resolve anomalies in Iraq's declarations about those sites. The team obtained the information required to build protocols for these sites.

7. CG1

38. The first chemical monitoring group (CG1), arrived in Iraq on 2 October 1994 and comprised four experts. The team immediately initiated chemical monitoring. The experience of the team will be used to refine chemical monitoring and to refine further the information requirements for monitoring and verification protocols and baseline.

39. Under the guidance of the Commission's staff in New York, the chemical group at Baghdad will:

(a) Draft and revise site monitoring and verification protocols;

(b) Conduct inspections of research, development and university facilities;

(c) Tag and monitor dual-use chemical-processing equipment;

(d) Conduct inspections of sites of potential relevance to the chemical- monitoring regime;

(e) Collect, assess and record monitoring sensor data;

(f) Provide technical expertise to the export/import monitoring group.

B. Iraq's past chemical weapons programme

40. As indicated throughout the present report, full knowledge and accounting for Iraq's past programmes is essential for confidence in the baseline information from which ongoing monitoring and verification will be conducted. The Commission has continued its efforts to fill in gaps in Iraq's declarations of its past chemical weapons programmes, particularly those relating to suppliers and quantities of items and materials supplied, as well as to find ways to verify independently Iraq's accounting of the past programme.

41. At the high-level political talks held in New York in November 1993 between the Commission and representatives of Iraq, it was suggested that seminar-style meetings between former officials involved in Iraq's chemical weapons programmes and Commission experts be held. The goal of those seminars would be to develop a more complete, accurate and detailed view of the past chemical weapons programmes.

42. A major breakthrough in that regard was made in April 1994, when a team (UNSCOM 74/CW15), sent to Iraq specifically to address that set of issues, obtained a hand-written list of the letters of credit authorized for the import of items in support of the chemical weapons programmes. Iraq claims that the list covers its entire procurement activities, which used letters of credit for its past chemical weapons programmes. Verification of the newly revealed Iraqi procurement data is complicated by the sometimes overly generalized descriptions of procured items associated with each letter of credit. Also complicating the assessment of this new data is the difficulty of obtaining corroborating information from the alleged supplier Governments. The Commission continues to pursue vigorously its efforts to refine and verify this new, and potentially valuable, information. With this information verified, it should prove possible to have a firm understanding of the capabilities acquired by Iraq and hence to account for the materials and equipment supplied. This, in turn, will allow the Commission to be certain that it is indeed monitoring all the dual-purpose items in the chemical area that should be subjected to monitoring. Another inspection is planned for the second half of October 1994 to pursue the matter further.

C. Current chemical-monitoring activities

43. In addition to conducting ongoing monitoring and verification activities at sites for which monitoring and verification protocols have been prepared, the chemical monitoring teams (CG1) will also conduct visits to various institutions at which chemical research is undertaken but which might not need to be subject to regular monitoring. The aim of such visits would be to have an understanding of the direction and level of Iraq's basic research into chemistry and chemical processes that might also be useful for the production of chemical warfare agents or their precursor chemicals.

44. The team will also seek to clarify outstanding anomalies in Iraq's declarations concerning its dual-purpose capabilities. Minor adjustments have been made by the Commission to the formats under which Iraq reports such capabilities in order to facilitate both the collection of data by Iraq and its analysis by the Commission. The team will explain those changes to its Iraqi counterparts and provide such further clarifications as are required for Iraq to provide full and consistent declarations.

45. In support of ongoing monitoring and verification in the chemical area, the Commission intends to install further sensors. An additional 20 air-sampling devices are envisaged for installation at various chemical production facilities of special interest. At least one site will have flow meters installed at key points in the production equipment and several sites will be monitored by remote-controlled cameras.

46. Analysis of the samples taken by the air samplers will initially be conducted in laboratories outside Iraq. However, with the completion of the equipping of the Baghdad Centre, it is intended that analysis of those samples should be conducted at the chemical laboratory in the Centre. Only the samples that deviate from the normal background levels will be sent to approved international laboratories in order to obtain a cross-check from an independent laboratory. From time to time, calibrating exercises will be undertaken to ensure the accuracy of analysis at the various laboratories.


47. In preparation for the monitoring of Iraq's biological activities, UNSCOM has proceeded with the evaluation of the sites or facilities concerned, by assessing the various elements that constitute Iraq's capability. Iraq's declarations form the basis for that work and are verified by the Commission for completeness and accuracy, after which the Commission is able to conduct a full analysis of Iraq's biological capabilities of concern to ongoing monitoring and verification.

A. Baseline data on Iraq's capabilities

48. Following discussions held in Baghdad and New York during the autumn of 1993, formats for reporting under the plan were established and presented to Iraq in December 1993. These were designed to facilitate the task of providing information concerning dual-purpose sites or facilities, activities, equipment, import or export and technical expertise. Iraq returned to the Commission formats for 35 biological sites in January 1994, but these did not contain complete responses to all the questions in the formats and hence did not furnish a full picture of the sites' capabilities.

49. Following discussions in February 1994 regarding the scope of Iraq's reporting on biological issues, the Commission presented Iraq, in March 1994, with a revised format for reporting to facilitate the task of gathering the information required and to incorporate questions to cover the information missing from the previous Iraqi response. In two subsequent inspections (UNSCOM 72/BW4 and UNSCOM 78/BW5, in April and May 1994, respectively), Commission teams visited sites declared by Iraq to familiarize themselves with the sites in preparation for later protocol-building and in order to tag and inventory declared dual-purpose items. During the course of those inspections, further discussions were held with Iraq on the information required. Further information was obtained, but also undeclared dual-purpose items, which should have been declared, were found and inconsistencies between the various sets of Iraqi declarations were noted. In short, the information contained in the total set of declarations remained incomplete.

50. Consequently, a team (UNSCOM 86/BW7) was dispatched to Iraq in June 1994 specifically to address the question of the gaps, inconsistencies and anomalies in the Iraqi declarations. As a result of those talks, Iraq was requested to provide supplementary information on 24 sites with biological activities and capabilities. Discussions focused on university laboratories, production facilities, breweries, import facilities and factories for the manufacture in Iraq of equipment that could be used in the production of biological agents.

51. Even so, the next inspection team (UNSCOM 84/BW6) in June 1994, with the task of inspecting a combination of declared and undeclared sites to assess how and whether they should be monitored, concluded that eight of the undeclared sites visited required monitoring because of the presence at the sites of items or activities subject to declaration. Iraq was again asked to provide missing information and clarifications to its earlier declarations. The issue was pursued further during technical talks held in New York in July 1994.

52. The next stage was to write the monitoring and verification protocols during a two-month long protocol-building inspection (UNSCOM 87/BW8) in July-September 1994. During the course of the inspection, more undeclared sites were inspected and found to require declarations and further inconsistencies were noted between previous declarations and the situation observed at the sites by the team, to include the discovery of undeclared equipment and activities that should have been declared. A follow-up inspection (UNSCOM 92/BW10) in September 1994 was organized to address issues not satisfactorily resolved during the protocol-building inspection. The results of the mission were pursued further during discussions in New York in September 1994. At that time, the Commission informed the high-level Iraqi delegation of the various steps taken in order to obtain the data required for monitoring and the difficulties encountered in doing so, while acknowledging Iraqi cooperation in facilitating access to sites. It was agreed that a further team (UNSCOM 96/BW12) should be dispatched to Iraq to present a list of additional information required. This team held discussions with Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate from 23 to 26 September 1994, stressing the link between full knowledge of Iraq's past programmes and in monitoring as well as the need for a full inventory of dual-purpose items. It suggested ways in which Iraq might assist the Commission in indirectly substantiating its account of its past programmes and accurately reporting its dual-purpose activities and capabilities in order to expedite the Commission's fulfilment of its mandate. Iraq reiterated its willingness to cooperate and, upon receipt of the list of additional information required, promised to respond promptly to all the questions.

B. Activities to establish monitoring

53. From April to October 1994, a total of nine inspections have been conducted in the biological field. They focused on the analytical work required to establish effective and efficient monitoring.

1. Initial inspection of undeclared sites (UNSCOM 72/BW4)

54. The team conducted its activities in Iraq from 8 to 26 April 1994. Its objective was to assess the information supplied by Iraq concerning the 35 sites declared by Iraq in January 1994 and 2 sites designated by the Commission. The inspection sites included university laboratories, laboratories for routine control in medical diagnosis, veterinary diagnosis and food control, breweries and alcohol production facilities, and production facilities for vaccines, single-cell protein, fertilizers, pesticides and castor oil.

55. As noted in paragraph 49 above, the team also held discussions with Iraq on the content of its declarations. Just before the team left Baghdad and at the team's request, Iraq submitted copies of the declarations, information and data sent to the United Nations pursuant to the agreements on confidence-building measures for the year 1994 in accordance with document BWC/Conf.III/23/II and its annex on confidence-building measures.

2. UNSCOM 78/BW5

56. The purpose of the inspection was to identify and inventory equipment subject to declaration under the plan. This included equipment declared by Iraq or observed sites during UNSCOM 72/BW4. The inventory data is subsequently processed in a computer database, where it can be readily analysed and accessed by future inspectors.

57. UNSCOM 78/BW5 carried out its duties in Iraq from 28 May to 7 June 1994. It visited some 31 sites, at which 330 pieces of equipment were identified, described in detail, tagged and photographed.

58. In addition to the preparation of inventories, the team discussed with Iraq the issue of changes to the configuration of dual-purpose equipment. During discussions held with Iraq, it was stressed that the monitoring of dual-purpose equipment was a crucial element in the monitoring regime for a site and that the Commission needed to be aware of any changes of the location of and modification to such equipment. The team prepared a procedure for 30-day prior notification of transfer or modification of inventoried equipment. Iraq was informed that notification would be processed by the Commission on a no-objection basis. No such notification has yet been received.

3. UNSCOM 86/BW7

59. Biological technical talks (UNSCOM 86/BW7) were held at Baghdad from 5 to 8 June 1994. The purpose was to try to clarify inconsistencies and anomalies in declarations of the biological area submitted by Iraq in January and April 1994. The results of the mission were noted in paragraph 50 above.

4. UNSCOM 84/BW6

60. UNSCOM 84/BW6 had the task of conducting initial inspections at an additional 35 biological sites, either for initial inspection or in preparation for protocol-building. The objective of the inspection was to assess activities conducted and to identify the equipment present at the sites in order to assess whether those sites, activities and equipment should be subject to declaration and hence to monitoring. UNSCOM 84/BW6 carried out its tasks from 24 June to 9 July 1994. In addition, and with a view to facilitating subsequent protocol-building at the biological sites to be monitored, protocols were built for four sites in order to test the viability of the draft protocol for such sites. The sites chosen for the testing had been visited previously. They represented four different activity areas: vaccine production, supplier company, research and development laboratory and single-cell protein production.

5. UNSCOM 87/BW8

61. The team's objective was to establish protocols for sites identified as requiring ongoing monitoring and verification. The main focus of this inspection was to establish guidelines, questionnaires and detailed instructions to be followed by the monitoring inspectors to be based at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre.

62. The team conducted its activities in Iraq from 25 July to 8 September 1994. It was planned that the inspection would prepare protocols for 55 sites. The team made three trips to Iraq (for a period of 10 days each) and visited facilities designated by the Commission. Each of the trips to Iraq was followed by a six-day protocol-drafting session at the Field Office in Bahrain.

63. Prior to the inspection, the team was provided by the Commission with a great deal of background information prepared from previous declarations and special reports, inspection findings and assessment work by the Commission's experts. However, the team had to gather much additional information in order to be in a position to prepare the protocols, given the inconsistencies between the situation it found on the ground and the information declared (see para. 52 above). Site plans and organizational charts requested during previous inspections but not received were provided by Iraq during the inspection.

6. UNSCOM 88/BW9

64. The team's objectives were to perform a feasibility study of remote monitoring in the biological area and, for the sites where this was deemed feasible, to establish the scope, foundations and requirements for the installation of remote monitors at biological sites.

65. It carried out its tasks in Iraq from 20 to 25 August 1994 and visited five biological facilities. It concluded that, at those sites, remote monitoring equipment could constitute an effective means of supplementary on-site inspections.

7. UNSCOM 92/BW10

66. The team's objectives were to visit sites falling under two main categories:

(a) Initial inspection of additional sites in order to assess activities at those sites and to identify dual-purpose equipment present there, with a view to subsequent protocol-building;

(b) Follow-up inspections of declared sites in order to complete the protocols for the sites.

67. The team carried out its tasks in Iraq from 29 August to 3 September 1994. During that time, the team visited a total of seven sites, acquiring further or new knowledge of them. The information is currently being analysed by the Commission's staff in New York.

8. UNSCOM 96/BW12

68. Further biological technical talks (UNSCOM 96/BW12) were held at Baghdad from 23 to 26 September 1994. The results of those talks are recorded in paragraph 52 above.

C. Past military biological programmes

69. The verification of Iraq's account of its past military biological programme has been rendered difficult by the claimed lack of supporting documentation. The areas where full verification remains pending include various aspects of the programme, such as storage of equipment, storage of organisms, personnel, relationships between the declared biological warfare research site and other organizations and facilities, and the acquisition of biotechnology. Additional information has been obtained on many of those areas in the course of the baseline inspection process, but more is required. The Commission continues to pursue the matter vigorously in all its contacts with Iraq.

D. Current biological monitoring activities

70. UNSCOM 94/BW11 was dispatched to Iraq on 29 September 1994. Its main objective is to continue the inventory and tagging of dual-purpose biological equipment started in May 1994 with UNSCOM 78/BW5. Owing to the receipt of additional information, including the new findings of declarable equipment during inspections since the first inventory, it has been necessary to perform a further inventory at approximately 50 sites. The team will also try to establish the circumstances that gave rise to the damage to or loss of tags noted during recent inspections, with a view to remedying the problem. The team is expected to operate in Iraq for approximately two weeks, covering a variety of sites falling in the categories of research and development facilities (such as universities and research institutes) and industrial facilities (such as vaccine production and pharmaceutical plants).

71. Once the process of preparing the protocols for each of the sites to be monitored in the biological area is complete, which should be in the near future, monitoring in the biological area will be conducted along the same lines as missile and chemical monitoring, with a resident team of experts based in the Baghdad Centre. Currently, it is envisaged that the team will comprise four experts.


72. The Director-General of IAEA is reporting separately on the activities of the action team set up to implement paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991) and the IAEA plan for ongoing monitoring and verification approved under resolution 715 (1991).

73. The Special Commission continues, in accordance with paragraph 9 (b) (iii) of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 715 (1991), to provide its assistance and cooperation to the IAEA action team through the provision of special expertise and logistical, informational and other operational support for the carrying out of the IAEA plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. In accordance with paragraph 9 (b) (i) of the same resolution and paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 715 (1991), it continues to designate sites for inspection. In accordance with paragraph 3 (iii) of resolution 707 (1991), it continues to receive and decide on requests from Iraq to move or destroy any material or equipment relating to its nuclear weapons programme or other nuclear activities. Furthermore, it continues, in accordance with paragraph 4 (c) of resolution 715 (1991), to perform such other functions, in cooperation in the nuclear field with the Director-General of IAEA, as may be necessary to coordinate activities under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, including making use of commonly available services and information to the fullest possible extent, in order to achieve maximum efficiency and optimum use of resources.

74. In conformity with its obligations to designate sites for inspection, the Commission, in late 1993, conducted a second aerial survey of gamma radiation over certain locations in Iraq. The results of the analysis of the survey were discussed at a meeting in September 1994 in New York. The assessment of the system for detecting gamma emissions and surveying gamma radiation levels concluded that the equipment could be of great potential use to the Commission in the performance of its mandate to support the work of the IAEA action team.


75. The aerial inspection team continues to undertake aerial inspections at sites being monitored and at new facilities considered to be of possible relevance to the Commission's mandate. Where required, the team also provides support to ground inspections. All aerial inspections continue to be conducted on a no-notice basis. To date, some 500 aerial inspections have been undertaken by the team.

76. In response to the evolving requirements of ongoing monitoring and verification, the aerial inspection team is in the process of making a number of changes to its method of operations. As the expert monitoring groups become established at the Baghdad Centre, members of the groups are accompanying the aerial inspection team on relevant aerial missions. This allows the experts to advise the aerial inspectors to focus on particular areas or activities of importance at the facilities.

77. The aerial inspection team's photographic library will shortly be moved from its present location in the Commission's Bahrain Field Office to the Baghdad Centre. The library contains copies of all imagery and reports prepared by the team since the commencement of aerial inspections in June 1992. Immediate access to this historical imagery will enhance the aerial and ground teams' operations by allowing them to study sites in advance of inspections and thus readily to detect any external changes that have taken place at a facility since the previous inspection. In addition to the library, the aerial inspection team's photographic processing laboratory will also be moved into the Centre, thus permitting rapid access to the product from the aerial missions. During the course of the next three months, additional equipment will be procured for the team to assist in refining and improving the product from the aerial inspections.

78. The Commission's high-altitude surveillance aircraft, the U-2, continues to undertake an average of one or two flights a week. To date, 224 missions have been flown. The imagery obtained through those missions is crucial to the Commission's analysis of Iraq's capabilities and the Commission's operational planning. The Commission's photographic interpretation abilities have further improved during the period under review.


Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre


1. The concept of a Centre to support the ongoing monitoring and verification programme became an operational goal in early 1994. At the request of the Executive Chairman, the Chief of the Commission's Field Office at Baghdad undertook a study of alternative means to achieve a secure area for the collection of data from the ballistic-missile-monitoring camera system. On 7 February 1994, the Chief submitted a report in which the United Nations offices at the Canal Hotel at Baghdad were the recommended site. On 7 March 1994, the Executive Chairman formally approved the site selection and a detailed plan of action to acquire 15 rooms on the second floor of the hotel.

2. The Canal Hotel was donated for exclusive use of the United Nations in the mid-1980s. It had been operated as a training hotel since 1978 in conjunction with a hotel management school that continues to operate in an adjacent compound. The facility is managed by the United Nations Administrative Unit, Baghdad, for a variety of United Nations agencies, including the Special Commission. The compound is guarded by a small contingent of the Iraqi Army. The main gate and immediate perimeter are guarded by Administrative Unit guards, all of whom are local nationals approved for United Nations employment by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq. The Commission's efforts focused upon providing for facilities for a continuous presence in Iraq (beyond the presence of the small logistics support, medical and communications contingent within the Commission's Field Office), and within those offices to provide a secure area for sensitive information acquired from monitoring and from inspections.

3. By mid-April 1994, the Executive Chairman received a final report from a technical team addressing the design and installation of missile-monitoring cameras at (then) 14 sites in Iraq, connecting the cameras to the Centre and transmitting data to and from New York, Vienna and supporting analytical facilities. The technical team also conducted further assessment of the communications and security requirements for the Centre. Plans were completed for the transition of the Commission's Field Office facilities in the Ishtar Sheraton Hotel to the Centre.

4. In May 1994, via an exchange of letters, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq accepted a proposal by the Executive Chairman to designate the Canal Hotel as the Baghdad Centre. The Chairman also selected Rear Admiral (retired) Göran Wallén of Sweden to be the first Director of the Centre. On 20 May 1994, the Commission presented its requirements for personnel and equipment to the representatives of 20 permanent missions to the United Nations, and requested that interested Member States respond with an expression of support no later than 1 July 1994.

5. Including the small cadre of United Nations international staff members assigned to the Commission's Field Office, the Centre would support monitoring groups and technical support staff, totalling approximately 50 personnel. The staff would be recruited from contributing Governments for a minimum period of 90 days. Ideally, the Commission looked for national commitments to staff certain positions during specific cycles or on a constant basis. Some Governments quickly affirmed their support, such as that of New Zealand, which is providing medical and some communications personnel. Including the Commission's helicopter unit, provided by the German army at Al-Rasheed Air Base, within the Centre's resources, the total complement for the Centre would be approximately 80 staff. While Governments evaluated the Commission requirements of 20 May 1994, the Commission's New York staff commenced active recruitment from contributing Governments of persons known for their expertise and, in many instances, their experience during previous inspections. In the course of that process, several Governments commenced personnel contributions to the Commission by offering experts in a variety of disciplines for service in the Centre and on inspection teams.

6. As the Commission prepared its equipment requirements for ongoing monitoring and verification, several contributing Governments made available computer and communications systems, chemical air-sampling stations, cameras and associated detection equipment, along with technical experts to install and initially operate the equipment at remote sites and within the Centre. One Government, for example, provided intrusion detection and surveillance cameras for interior Centre areas. Another Government donated over 50 cameras for remote site monitoring. Yet another Government paid for the purchase of computer equipment for use within the Centre.

7. In June 1994, the Administrative Unit staff assisted the Commission with preliminary assessments of the types of renovations required to provide for the varied operations within the Centre. To achieve greater efficiencies with the available floor space, for example, the Unit experimented with the removal of bathroom walls within several rooms. Every room included a bathroom. It was determined that removing the bathrooms increased the available space by 27 per cent in each room. Based on this and other considerations, initial allocations of space within the Centre indicated that more rooms would be required than the original conception of 15. Requirements for IAEA monitors were incorporated into the Centre. Studies also indicated the need for the Commission to secure the services of civil engineers to evaluate facility electrical, heating and air-conditioning systems, and to oversee renovation construction work.

8. The Administrative Unit, the Commission's Field Office, and other United Nations agencies resident in the Canal Hotel developed a plan for the reallocation of floor space to accommodate the expanding needs of the Commission. By mid-July, the Commission was granted an area encompassing most of the second floor, with the potential for future expansion if needed.

9. The Government of Iraq offered to construct a 92-metre antenna mast near the Centre to support the Commission's communications requirements and to eliminate the need for remote transmission via an antenna on the Ishtar Sheraton Hotel roof. The mast was erected within two weeks, from 13 to 25 June 1994, and was quickly put into service by the Commission. The height of the antenna fully supported Commission requirements for transmissions from remote locations. Further, the size of the mast platforms (approximately every two metres) affords great capacity for the addition of system equipment for the Commission and other United Nations agencies.

10. The pace of building the Centre accelerated with the joint announcement by the Commission, IAEA and the Government of Iraq on 5 July 1994 that the Centre should be provisionally operational during September 1994. In mid-July 1994, the Executive Chairman accepted the Iraqi Government's offer to perform the larger renovation tasks within the Centre area as a further step to meet the September date. The Government designated the Al-Fao Construction Bureau to design and implement the renovations to meet Centre requirements. The demolition and construction was performed beginning 8 August 1994 and terminated on 17 September 1994. The extensive renovation was accomplished under the supervision of construction engineers from a supporting Government.


11. As the construction efforts were being arranged, the Centre staff was moving into the Canal Hotel building. On 31 July 1994, the staff of the operations room in the Ishtar Sheraton Hotel ceased functioning and relocated to the Canal Hotel building. On 1 August 1994, the Director assumed responsibility for the Commission's operations in Baghdad. The Chief of the former Field Office was designated Chief of Logistics within the Centre.

12. The first resident monitoring group for the Centre arrived at Baghdad on 17 August. This four-person team, the missile monitoring experts (designated MG1), was soon followed by the nuclear monitoring group (NMG 94-01), a two-person team, on 22 August 1994. (NMG 94-01 expanded to three persons on 29 September.) On 2 October, the first chemical group members arrived at Baghdad. The first biological group members are expected to arrive in the near future.

13. Missile group and nuclear monitoring group personnel commenced monitoring activities at various sites throughout Iraq. Remote camera monitoring systems were tested and the Commission's and the IAEA's tags were checked for tampering or damage from movement of equipment. Several inspection teams used the temporary facilities within the Centre.

14. As the staff assembled, preparatory activities continued to move the Centre offices and functions to their permanent areas. The Centre security doors controlled access to 49 rooms on the Canal Hotel second floor. Furniture was being donated for the Centre from the Australian and American Embassy compounds. Office furniture was also acquired from the former Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) at Baghdad.

15. In the final days of the present reporting period, a special team of security experts conducted an extensive survey of the facility to recommend measures for the Centre. Commitments from several contributing Governments were made to donate equipment, materials and technicians to ensure that the security programme was an integral function of Centre operations. Those commitments include ongoing maintenance, repair and renovation resources to sustain the Centre for as long as its operations are required.


Administrative and financial issues


1. The financing of the operations of the Commission and IAEA under section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions continues to be a matter of the most serious concern. Council resolution 699 (1991) explicitly provides that Iraq "shall be liable for the full costs of carrying out the tasks authorized by section C". However, the only Iraqi funds made available for financing the operations concerned are Iraqi frozen assets provided by Member States, under paragraph 1 of resolution 778 (1992), to the United Nations escrow account established pursuant to Council resolution 706 (1991). To the extent that those assets have not been sufficient to meet all the requirements of the Compensation Commission, the Special Commission and IAEA, and other United Nations operations in Iraq under the Council's resolutions, the financing of all those activities has had to be on the basis of voluntary contributions from States. In that regard, it will be recalled that resolution 699 (1991), in addition to laying down Iraq's obligations, encouraged "the maximum assistance, in cash and in kind, from all Member States to ensure that activities under section C of resolution 687 (1991) are undertaken effectively and expeditiously". The Council augmented that request in its resolution 715 (1991), approving the plans of the Commission and IAEA for ongoing monitoring and verification, by calling for such assistance "in carrying out [their] activities under the plans approved by the present resolution, without prejudice to Iraq's liability for the full costs of such activities".

2. The Council's calls for such assistance have been generously responded to by a number of Governments, which have provided cash, equipment, services and personnel. However, it cannot be expected that the generosity of Governments will continue indefinitely or that funds in the escrow account will be sufficient, for even the immediate future, to meet the requirements of the various activities that are financed from that account, the Compensation Commission's Fund having the priority in that respect.

3. By the end of 1994, the Special Commission and IAEA will have spent a total of $81.5 million for their operations, including the costs of the contracts for the removal of fresh and irradiated nuclear fuel. A total of $71.4 million was provided through the escrow account and $9.4 million from direct contributions and loans. The operational budget of the Commission under long-term monitoring will in essence be for travel and mission subsistence allowance of experts and for the salary of the administrative and support staff provided by the United Nations. The Commission and IAEA will require an estimated $25 million in 1995 in support of their operations. This forecast assumes that Governments will pay for the salary of the experts and technical staff and that the monitoring equipment, that is, cameras, sensors, data-processing and analysis equipment will be provided by donor countries. However, the present funds earmarked for the Commission in the escrow account will be depleted at the end of 1994 if further funds earmarked for the Commission are not provided to the escrow account by Member States.

4. Contributions in cash and in kind from Governments may be either donations or subject to reimbursement of the costs involved when adequate Iraqi funds are available. Accordingly, the Special Commission, acting under the Security Council resolutions, has sought contributions directly from Governments for services, equipment and personnel needed to carry out its mandate. It has also given the necessary undertakings to Governments regarding reimbursement of their costs, if they indicate their intention to seek such reimbursement under the terms of the Council's resolutions, when Iraqi oil funds are available. That direct procedure, under the Council's authorization, is essential to a timely performance of the Commission's mandate, and the Commission will continue to act on it.


5. The establishment of ongoing monitoring and verification required a new infrastructure within the Commission to reflect its expanded activities. The operations of the Commission will now focus on monitoring activities while maintaining the ability to respond to any new information that might be obtained on Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes. The new organizational structure will eventually also have the additional mandate of implementing the export/import control mechanism required under paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991).

6. The following paragraphs contain a review of how the structure of the Commission has evolved or will evolve in order to respond to the changed circumstances in which it is now operating.

A. Headquarters of the Special Commission

7. At the headquarters of the Commission, the focus of effort shifted to the building of protocols, the development of relevant databases and the analysis of information - written and visual. Additional technical expertise was requested from Governments in order to boost the Commission's ability to cope with the additional workload. The total number of technical experts was increased from 12 at the end of 1993 to 23 by early September 1994. The most dramatic change occurred in the biological area. The Commission had only one biological expert in October 1993: it now has five.

8. The development of a custom-designed computer database in support of data gathering and analysis has been made possible thanks to the generosity of various Governments who contributed equipment, specifically designed software and training. Funds were allocated from the operational budget to improve the satellite link between New York and Baghdad and to increase the number of lines to allow the smooth and secure transmission of data.

B. Office of the Special Commission at Baghdad

9. The functions of the Office of the Special Commission at Baghdad, which previously had comprised essentially logistic support for inspections, were revised to respond to the additional requirements of ongoing monitoring and verification. The Executive Chairman decided that the Office would be replaced by a Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre, headed by a Director who would act as his personal representative in Iraq. Details of developments in that regard are contained in annex II.


Inspection schedule

(in-country dates)


15-21 May 1991 IAEA1/UNSCOM 1

22 June-3 July 1991 IAEA2/UNSCOM 4

7-18 July 1991 IAEA3/UNSCOM 5

27 July-10 August 1991 IAEA4/UNSCOM 6

14-20 September 1991 IAEA5/UNSCOM 14

22-30 September 1991 IAEA6/UNSCOM 16

11-22 October 1991 IAEA7/UNSCOM 19

11-18 November 1991 IAEA8/UNSCOM 22

11-14 January 1992 IAEA9/UNSCOM 25

5-13 February 1992 IAEA10/UNSCOM 27

7-15 April 1992 IAEA11/UNSCOM 33

26 May-4 June 1992 IAEA12/UNSCOM 37

14-21 July 1992 IAEA13/UNSCOM 41

31 August-7 September 1992 IAEA14/UNSCOM 43

8-18 November 1992 IAEA15/UNSCOM 46

5-8 December 1992 IAEA16/UNSCOM 47

25-31 January 1993 IAEA17/UNSCOM 49

3-11 March 1993 IAEA18/UNSCOM 52

30 April-7 May 1993 IAEA19/UNSCOM 56

25-30 June 1993 IAEA20/UNSCOM 58

23-28 July 1993 IAEA21/UNSCOM 61

1-15 November 1993 IAEA22/UNSCOM 64

4-11 February 1994 IAEA23/UNSCOM 68

11-22 April 1994 IAEA24/UNSCOM 73

21 June-1 July 1994 IAEA25/UNSCOM 83

22 August-2 September 1994 IAEA26/UNSCOM 90

3-29 September 1994 NMG 94-01

29 September-21 October 1994 NMG 94-02

14-21 October 1994 IAEA27/UNSCOM 93


9-15 June 1991 CW1/UNSCOM 2

15-22 August 1991 CW2/UNSCOM 9

31 August-8 September 1991 CW3/UNSCOM 11

31 August-5 September 1991 CW4/UNSCOM 12

6 October-9 November 1991 CW5/UNSCOM 17

22 October-2 November 1991 CW6/UNSCOM 20

18 November-1 December 1991 CBW1/UNSCOM 21

27 January-5 February 1992 CW7/UNSCOM 26

21 February-24 March 1992 CD1/UNSCOM 29

5-13 April 1992 CD2/UNSCOM 32

15-29 April 1992 CW8/UNSCOM 35

18 June 1992-14 June 1994 CDG/UNSCOM 38

26 June-10 July 1992 CBW2/UNSCOM 39

21-29 September 1992 CW9/UNSCOM 44

6-14 December 1992 CBW3/UNSCOM 47

6-18 April 1993 CW10/UNSCOM 55

27-30 June 1993 CW11/UNSCOM 59

19-22 November 1993 CW12/UNSCOM 65

1-14 February 1994 CW13/UNSCOM 67

20-26 March 1994 CW14/UNSCOM 70

18-22 April 1994 CW15/UNSCOM 74

25 May-5 June 1994 CW16/UNSCOM 75

31 May-12 June 1994 CW17/UNSCOM 76

8-14 June 1994 CW18/UNSCOM 77

10-23 August 1994 CW19/UNSCOM 89

13-24 September 1994 CW20/UNSCOM 91

2 October- 1994 (ongoing) CG1


2-8 August 1991 BW1/UNSCOM 7

20 September-3 October 1991 BW2/UNSCOM 15

11-18 March 1993 BW3/UNSCOM 53

8-26 April 1994 BW4/UNSCOM 72

28 May-7 June 1994 BW5/UNSCOM 78

24 June-8 July 1994 BW6/UNSCOM 84

5-8 June 1994 BW7/UNSCOM 86

25 July-8 September 1994 BW8/UNSCOM 87

20-25 August 1994 BW9/UNSCOM 88

29 August-3 September 1994 BW10/UNSCOM 92

29 September-14 October 1994 BW11/UNSCOM 94

23-26 September 1994 BW12/UNSCOM 96

Ballistic missiles

30 June-7 July 1991 BM1/UNSCOM 3

18-20 July 1991 BM2/UNSCOM 10

8-15 August 1991 BM3/UNSCOM 8

6-13 September 1991 BM4/UNSCOM 13

1-9 October 1991 BM5/UNSCOM 18

1-9 December 1991 BM6/UNSCOM 23

9-17 December 1991 BM7/UNSCOM 24

21-29 February 1992 BM8/UNSCOM 28

21-29 March 1992 BM9/UNSCOM 31

13-21 April 1992 BM10/UNSCOM 34

14-22 May 1992 BM11/UNSCOM 36

11-29 July 1992 BM12/UNSCOM 40 A+B

7-18 August 1992 BM13/UNSCOM 42

16-30 October 1992 BM14/UNSCOM 45

25 January-23 March 1993 IMT1a/UNSCOM 48

12-21 February 1993 BM15/UNSCOM 50

22-23 February 1993 BM16/UNSCOM 51

27 March-17 May 1993 IMT1b/UNSCOM 54

5-28 June 1993 IMT1c/UNSCOM 57

10-11 July 1993 BM17/UNSCOM 60

24 August-15 September 1993 BM18/UNSCOM 62

28 September-1 November 1993 BM19/UNSCOM 63

21-29 January 1994 BM20/UNSCOM 66

17-25 February 1994 BM21/UNSCOM 69

30 March-20 May 1994 BM22/UNSCOM 71

23-28 May 1994 BM23/UNSCOM 79

10-24 June 1994 BM24/UNSCOM 80

14-19 June 1994 BM25/UNSCOM 81

3-28 July 1994 BM26/UNSCOM 82

15-24 July 1994 BM27/UNSCOM 85

17 August-9 October 1994 MG1

3-6 October 1994 BM28/UNSCOM 98A

21-31 October 1994 BM28/UNSCOM 98B

14 October- 1994 (ongoing) MG2

14-19 October 1994 MG2A

Computer search

12 February 1992 UNSCOM 30

Special missions

30 June-3 July 1991

11-14 August 1991

4-6 October 1991

11-15 November 1991

27-30 January 1992

21-24 February 1992

17-19 July 1992

28-29 July 1992

6-12 September 1992

4-9 November 1992

4-8 November 1992

12-18 March 1993

14-20 March 1993

19-24 April 1993

4 June-5 July 1993

15-19 July 1993

25 July-5 August 1993

9-12 August 1993

10-24 September 1993

27 September-1 October 1993

1-8 October 1993

5 October-16 February 1994

2-10 December 1993

2-16 December 1993

21-27 January 1994

2-6 February 1994

10-14 April 1994

24-26 April 1994

28-29 May 1994

4-6 July 1994

8-16 August 1994

15-19 September 1994

21-25 September 1994

23-26 September 1994

3-6 October 1994