The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
93-36314 (E) 240693 /...
Fifth report of the Executive Chairman of the Special
Commission, established by the Secretary-General
pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991), on the activities of the
1. The present report is the fifth on the activities of the Special Commission, established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), submitted to the Security Council by the Executive Chairman of the Commission. It is the fourth such report provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 699 (1991). It covers the period from 14 December 1992 to 14 June 1993. It is further to the reports contained in documents S/23165, S/23268, S/24108 and Corr.1 and S/24984.
2. Since the last report, there have been further changes in the composition of the Special Commission. Mr. Nicola Circelli has replaced Col. Armando Caputo; Mr. Peter Dunn has replaced Mr. John Gee, who left to take up the position of Director of Verification in the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; and Mr. Ron Manley has replaced Professor Bryan Barrass upon the latter's retirement. Mr. Manley has since also submitted his resignation to take up the position of Head of the Chemical Weapons Branch of the Verification Division with Mr. Gee. The Commission hopes to be in a position to submit a nomination for his replacement to the Secretary-General shortly.
3. The organizational structure remains essentially as reported previously. Currently there are 32 staff in the Office of the Executive Chairman in New York, 25 in the Bahrain Field Office and 83 in the Baghdad Field Office.
4. There is still no agreement on the sale of Iraqi oil to finance United Nations operations resulting from the cease-fire resolution. Current expenses have been met from voluntary contributions and advances from Member States and funds made available from frozen Iraqi assets in accordance with Security Council resolution 778 (1992). However, in the absence both of Iraqi agreement to sell oil and of Iraq's acknowledgement of its obligations under resolution 699 (1991) to meet the full costs of the tasks authorized by section C of resolution 687 (1991), the problem of the financing of the Commission's operations remains a matter of great concern and further cash contributions by Governments are urgently required. This is particularly important now as a contract has been concluded to remove from Iraq the irradiated uranium fuel currently stored at Tuwaitha and at Location B, reprocess it and permanently store the wastes. This will involve for the Commission the largest expenditures it has incurred to date. The net contact price amounts to $24,565,000. However, there will be certain ancillary costs for special risk insurance and for radiation protection and other equipment currently estimated to cost in the neighbourhood of $800,000. These items are available at much lower rates to the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) than to the contractor. While the United Nations Controller has given a guarantee that the United Nations has a legal responsibility to meet the costs of this contract, thereby allowing it to go ahead, it has been agreed that meeting the costs of the contract will have first call on all future incoming funds. Consequently, in order to continue operations, the Special Commission must receive funds adequate not only for operations, but also first to meet the outstanding funds for the contract. The funds currently available to finance the contract will have been expended by late August.
5. Governments have continued to support the operation of the Special Commission through the contribution of personnel, services and equipment. Resolution 687 (1991) foresaw government support in the form of both voluntary contributions and advances, pending a long-term solution to the financing issue. Supporting Governments were asked, in accordance with paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 778 (1992), to inform the Commission of the cost of those contributions that they consider advances. Some responses have been received, most of which indicate that the support provided to date should be viewed as voluntary contributions. A statement of the Commission's operating costs, together with further information on organizational and administrative issues, can be found in appendix I.
6. The status, privileges and immunities of the Special Commission, IAEA and the United Nations specialized agencies involved in the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) continue to be regulated by the relevant agreements and Council resolutions and decisions.
7. The Special Commission and IAEA, on the one hand, and the Government of Bahrain, on the other, have extended for a further six months, until 30 September 1993, the agreement provided for in the exchange of letters relating to the facilities, privileges and immunities of the Special Commission and IAEA in Bahrain. The formal response from the Government of Bahrain was received by the Secretary-General on 29 April 1993.
8. In Iraq, there have been continuing problems in the implementation of the Special Commission's status, privileges and immunities. The security of Commission personnel and property in Iraq had improved somewhat, but the situation recently deteriorated with attacks on Commission personnel and property (see appendix III). It thus continues to remain a serious concern.
9. Inspections of sites declared by Iraq or designated by the Commission have continued. However, Iraq still refuses to cooperate with the Commission and has exhibited a most unwelcome trend in relation to field operations, namely to seek to restrict the manner in which the Commission's rights are implemented. The main problems are as follows:
(a) (i) Iraq continues to maintain its position on the plans approved under Security Council resolution 715 (1991) for ongoing monitoring and verification, stated in the letter of 19 November 1991 from the then Foreign Minister of Iraq addressed to the President of the Council;
(ii) On 31 January 1993, the Iraqi Government officially informed the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission in writing that Iraq considered the new arrangement of interim monitoring at the Ibn Al-Haytham facility to be conducted under resolution 687 (1991). The Commission understood this to mean that Iraq would prevent this team, or any other team, from operating under the terms of the plan approved under resolution 715 (1991);
(iii) On 1 April 1993, General Amer, Chairman of the Iraqi Military Industrialization Corporation, reading from prepared notes and stressing that this was the official Iraqi position on the issue of monitoring, is reported by the Chief Inspector of an inspection team to have said:
"Iraq accepted the first monitoring team to the Ibn Al-Haytham Centre in accordance with resolution 687 (1991). However, it appears from the modalities of the monitoring team that the Special Commission is trying to overlap in a discreet fashion Iraqi obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and resolution 715 (1991). This is very clever. Iraq knows that, using Iraqi cooperation under resolution 687 (1991), the Special Commission wants to assert Iraqi obligations under resolution 715 (1991). Iraq is fully aware of this effort. If the objective of the Special Commission is to make sure that no prohibited activities are going on, prohibited items are destroyed and Iraq has no capability to reactivate proscribed programmes, Iraq has no objections as this is part of resolution 687 (1991). However, if the objective is to start a de facto implementation of resolution 715 (1991) without Special Commission testament to the Security Council that Iraq is in full compliance with resolution 687 (1991) and without implementing paragraph 22 of that resolution, Iraq will not welcome this mission. The monitoring missions would not be welcome. But, even in this case, Iraq will still cooperate with the Special Commission to see the true objectives of these missions and to explore the intentions of the Special Commission. Iraq told the Special Commission that resolution 715 (1991) could be discussed only in connection with the implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991). You should never think or believe that it could be done otherwise.";
(iv) On 6 June 1993, the Special Commission informed Iraq of its intention to install cameras to monitor rocket test stands at two sites. On 7 June 1993, a senior Iraqi representative informed the chief of the UNSCOM expert team dispatched to Iraq for the installation of the cameras that Iraq would not accept any monitoring activities and would insist that the Special Commission limit itself to inspection activities under resolution 687 (1991). This position was confirmed in a letter of 8 June 1993 from Mr. Riyadh Al-Qaysi, Iraqi Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Deputy Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, which stated that the installation of the cameras did not fall within the purview of resolution 687 (1991) "but rather comes within the framework of matters and questions that are still the subject of dialogue between the Iraqi authorities on the one hand and the Special Commission on the other". In a further letter dated 11 June 1993, Mr. Al-Qaysi added that "what we requested ... was a 'postponement of the decision' on the subject" until the proposed dialogue;
(v) Iraq's position is maintained despite assurances by the Commission that, if Iraq cooperated, its legitimate concerns would be met and the Commission's activities would be carried out in a manner which is not unduly intrusive;
(b) Iraq's full, final and complete disclosures of its proscribed weapons programmes, due under Security Council resolution 707 (1991), and its initial declarations, due under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, contain major shortcomings that will need to be rectified if they are to form the basis for a definite material balance of Iraq's past weapons of mass destruction programmes and for effective monitoring and verification of compliance. The information so far provided is tailored to what the Iraqi authorities consider the Special Commission to know already, rather than constituting a frank and open disclosure of all the true facts. One set of declarations, concerning the legal and administrative actions taken by Iraq to give effect to its obligations relating to ongoing monitoring and verification, has never been submitted;
(c) Iraq continues to refuse to divulge information indicating the names of foreign companies from which it has purchased equipment and materials. This is clearly unacceptable. Accurate information is essential if the Special Commission is to establish a material balance for proscribed items and, with IAEA and the Sanctions Committee, to devise a workable and realistic mechanism for import control required by paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991);
(d) In the period under review, there have been a number of serious incidents of breaches by Iraq of the Commission's rights, privileges and immunities. In January 1993, as reported in document S/25172, Iraq sought to deny the Commission the use of its own aircraft to transport personnel and equipment into and out of Iraq to and from Bahrain. In February 1993, Iraq threatened to shoot down a helicopter providing supporting overhead surveillance for an inspection team if the aircraft did not leave the vicinity of the site. In June, Iraq has blocked the installation of monitoring cameras (see subpara. (a) (iv) above), missed two deadlines for the removal and delivery to the Special Commission of equipment for the production of chemical weapons precursors and delayed an inspection of a site by a full day;
(e) The events referred to in subpara. (d) above also fit into a general pattern of Iraqi conduct. Iraq has, through its conduct since the last report, consistently demonstrated its desire to limit the Commission's inspection rights and operational capabilities through seeking to place restrictions on inspectors in the course of their work. While many of these Iraqi actions have taken place during the course of inspections under resolution 687 (1991), the Commission has no doubt that they form part of a long-term campaign to establish a practice for the conduct of inspections that would severely restrict the rights provided in the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification and relevant Security Council resolutions. Iraq is thus clearly seeking to assert for itself the right to interpret how the resolutions should be implemented. Included in this campaign have been attempts by Iraq to dispute the Commission's instructions on the destruction of equipment intended for the production of banned weapons; to restrict the scope of inspections and information gathering; to restrict access and impose delays on inspections; to restrict the exercise of the Commission's aerial rights; to impose limits on the duration, size and composition of inspections; to require advance notice of inspection activities; and to limit the right to take photography. Further details on these incidents can be found in appendix III. Each incident has varied in seriousness. Some might not be significant were they not part of a general trend. However, when taken together, these incidents add up to a major impediment that would effectively impede credible long-term monitoring and verification. This again underlines the need to obtain from Iraq as soon as possible its formal acknowledgement of its obligations under resolution 715 (1991), so that the Council's requirements laid down in that resolution can be met.
10. Thus the situation remains essentially unchanged from the time of the last report: the intention to proceed from inspection and survey through destruction to ongoing monitoring and verification has, in large part, continued to be thwarted by the actions of the Iraqi Government. While preparations for the implementation of the plans are being made, the basic conditions for their full-scale implementation have not yet been met.
11. In the chemical weapons area, further inspection and destruction activities have been conducted, with the emphasis remaining on destruction. Attempts to elicit further information on Iraq's chemical weapons programme through a "seminar" held during an inspection proved unproductive because of the uncooperative attitude of the Iraqi counterparts. No further weapons or associated equipment have been found by inspection teams or declared by Iraq. However, further progress has been made in identifying what equipment and plant need to be destroyed. In this regard, a serious instance of Iraqi obstruction has arisen. Iraq was instructed to move certain items of equipment acquired for chemical weapon precursor production to Muthanna for destruction under Commission supervision there. It replied that it wished to reuse the equipment for the production of pesticides. Iraq, despite the Commission's insistence that its decision is final on the grounds that the equipment was acquired expressly for chemical weapons production and that, even if converted for pesticide production, it could easily and rapidly be reconverted for weapons production, has still not moved all the equipment as instructed. Full accounts of inspection and destruction activities can be found in appendices IV and V respectively.
12. Further biological inspections were also conducted, as was a "seminar" with Iraqi counterparts on biological weapons issues. The same non-cooperative attitude was met in this area as with chemical weapons. However, inspection activities did assist in identifying additional facilities to be included in the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification.
13. On ballistic missiles, efforts have concentrated on three main aspects: trying to establish a definitive material balance for the SCUDs supplied by the former Soviet Union; trying to account for Iraq's production capacity in the ballistic missiles area; and establishing an interim monitoring regime for Iraq's dual-capable missile research and development facilities. This last has proved necessary because of Iraq's refusal to acknowledge its obligations under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification (see appendix II).
14. Aerial surveillance activities have continued apace, using both U-2 (a total of 141 missions now flown) and helicopter platforms (236 targets now flown). Helicopter missions continue to be flown in support of ground inspections and to provide a time-series photographic record of sites which will need monitoring under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. Plans are also in place to mount additional sensors to the helicopters to give them greater monitoring and deterrence capability. Details of both these operations are contained in appendix V.
15. Iraq's failure to provide full and honest declarations was touched upon in paragraph 9 (b) above. On 14 February 1993, Iraq provided a second set of declarations entitled "Updated monitoring information. Report No. 2". These add little to the first declarations. Attempts to elicit fuller information on chemical and biological issues were met with a totally unacceptable and uncooperative response, as noted above. Despite internationally verified evidence to the contrary, Iraq denies ever using chemical weapons. It refuses to hand over the missile-firing records essential if the Commission is to verify Iraqi claims to have accounted for all the Soviet-supplied SCUD missiles.
16. From the above, it can be seen that, despite further progress, no major breakthrough has been achieved that could make it possible to change the conclusion of the previous report. The most important developments have taken place in the area of destruction of proscribed items, but still much remains to be done. The main areas that require action before the Commission will be in a position to report to the Security Council that Iraq is in substantial compliance with its obligations remain as follows:
(a) Acknowledgement by Iraq of its obligations under Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991);
(b) Supplementation and revision of Iraq's "reports" to the point where, in the view of the Commission, they conform with the full, final and complete disclosures required under resolution 707 (1991), particularly as concerns former suppliers, and with initial declarations required under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification adopted by resolution 715 (1991);
(c) Destruction of all items of equipment identified by the Special Commission as requiring destruction;
(d) The initiation and smooth functioning of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq does not reacquire the weapons proscribed to it;
(e) Acceptance and implementation by Iraq of all the Commission's privileges and immunities, including ensuring the safety and security of the personnel and property, landing rights for aircraft and non-obstruction of the inspections and logistics.
17. Further inspection activities are planned in each of the weapons categories. Destruction activities now focus on chemical weapons and equipment for their production. Preparations for the implementation of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification are under way and ideas on the potential form of an import control regime for after the lifting of sanctions have been discussed. New staff recruitment reflects the shift of emphasis towards attempting to establish whether Iraq still has items which should be declared; tracking down Iraq's supplier networks; interim monitoring; preparations for ongoing monitoring and verification activities; and further elaboration of the ideas for import monitoring.
18. The priorities remain to obtain Iraq's acknowledgement of its obligations under resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) and to obtain satisfactory amendments to the various declarations, especially in relation to suppliers.
1. The Commission currently has a total of 140 positions distributed amongst its three offices. Fifty positions are supported by the Commission. The balance of the staff are on loan from their Governments for assignments ranging from 3 to 12 months. Personnel, equipment and services have been provided for the Commission's activities by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Venezuela. The responsibilities of the Director-General of IAEA are carried out by the Action Team set up within IAEA, the staff of which charged to the Commission's budget are indicated in paragraph 3 below. The Action Team draws upon the part-time services of numerous staff of various IAEA departments, funded under the regular IAEA budget.
2. The staff of the Commission are distributed as follows:
(a) Headquarters of the Commission in New York. The headquarters of the Commission in New York has a total of 32 staff assigned to it: 18 positions (8 in the Professional category and 10 in the support staff category) are currently charged to the operating budget of the Commission; and 14 positions are filled by staff assigned to the Commission by various Member States.
Office of the Chairman 1 Executive Chairman
1 Deputy Chairman
1 Legal Adviser
1 Political Adviser and Spokesman
3 Support staff
Administrative Office 3 Professionals
2 Support staff
Division of Operations 7 chemical, biological, ballistic and nuclear experts
1 Support staff
Information Assessment Unit 5 Chemical, biological, ballistic and
2 Advisers in aerial photography
5 Support staff
(b) Office of the Commission in Bahrain. The Bahrain Field Office has a total of 25 staff assigned to it on a regular basis to provide financial, administrative, logistic and training support to the inspection activities of the Commission and IAEA pursuant to section C of resolution 687 (1991). Eleven positions (three Professionals and eight local support staff) are charged to the operating budget of the Commission. Functions break down as follows:
Administration and logistic support 3 Professionals
8 Local staff
Aerial and photographic support 1 Adviser
Air transport 13 Transall C-160 crew members
(c) Office of the Commission in Baghdad. A total of 83 persons are currently assigned on a long-term basis to the Commission's Baghdad office to provide logistic, communication and medical support to the inspection teams of the Commission and IAEA and in support of the chemical destruction programme and interim monitoring activities. Fourteen positions (nine Professionals, one international support staff and four local support staff) are under the Commission operating budget. The other 69 staff are provided by Governments.
Administration and logistic 8 Professionals and Field Service staff
support 4 Local staff
1 International support staff
Aerial and photographic support 4 Advisers
Medical support 5 Medical staff
Chemical destruction 23 Advisers (including 3 medical staff dedicated to the chemical
Monitoring team 8 Advisers
Air transport 30 Helicopter crew members
3. The Action Team has a total of seven staff charged to the operating budget of the Commission (see also above):
Operational and technical support 5 Professionals
Administrative support 1 Professional
1 Support staff
4. Under Security Council resolution 699 (1991), Iraq is responsible for meeting the costs of all United Nations operations resulting from section C of resolution 687 (1991). To date, Iraq has made no contribution to the Special Commission's expenses. Indeed, it has rejected two Security Council resolutions, 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), which sought an interim solution to the financing issue.
5. Consequently, the Commission has had to rely on voluntary contributions, in cash and in kind, and on cash advances. Since the inception of its operations in April 1991, a total of $42.4 million has been contributed by a limited number of countries to support the operations of the Special Commission. This amount includes a total of $33 million transferred from the escrow account established under Security Council resolution 778 (1992) and loans to be repaid from Japan, of $2.5 million, and the United States, of $2 million.
6. Resolution 778 (1992) requested the Secretary-General to ascertain the costs of United Nations activities concerning the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. On 3 November 1992, the Special Commission wrote to Governments that have supported the Commission's operations through the provision of equipment, services, personnel and transportation to ascertain whether they considered their support to be voluntary contributions or an advance, for which reimbursement will eventually be required. Germany has indicated that it considers a part of its contributions - $10 million - to be an advance requiring reimbursement. Saudi Arabia made a contribution of $30 million to the escrow account for the Special Commission activities. An additional $3 million has been made available from the escrow account to the Special Commission for a grand total of $33 million.
7. Expenditures crossed the $40 million mark at the end of May 1993. This amount includes the cost of major projects like the successful removal in 1992 of unirradiated nuclear fuel out of Iraq under a contract between IAEA and the Russian Federation for $2 million. The $40 million also includes the first instalment of $6 million for the cost of the contract for the removal of irradiated nuclear fuel which will have to be paid in the coming months. The remaining $32 million have been used to cover the cost of all other activities and operations of the Commission and IAEA.
8. An additional $35 to $40 million will be required between now and the end of 1993 to maintain the current level of activities:
(a) Removal of nuclear fuel contract: the balance of $18.565 million will be required to cover the $24.565 million contract. An estimated additional $0.8 million will be needed to cover the cost of spare parts, logistic support, insurance, etc;
(b) Ongoing operations: $10 to $15 million will be needed to maintain the pace of ongoing programmes and to cover the cost of planned operations;
(c) Loans: $4.5 million will be needed to cover repayments should the United States and Japanese loans be called. The above amount does not include the $10 million that Germany has disbursed until the end of 1992 for the air support provided to the Special Commission and which it has indicated that it considers an advance to be repaid.
9. The Commission's expenditures have always been kept to the bare minimum and it has essentially been operated on a shoestring budget for lack of an appropriate funding mechanism. The uncertainty of the Commission's financial future currently has an impact on the ability to plan operations effectively. The implementation of Security Council resolution 715 (1991) will require a reassessment of staffing and logistic support requirements both at headquarters and in the field. A full-scale plan of operations could result in at least a doubling of current operational expenditures.
List of contributions US$
United States 2 000 000
2 000 000 ( loan)
Japan 2 500 000 ( loan)
Kuwait 1 000 000
United Kingdom 175 400
Saudi Arabia 1 730 000
(Escrow account) 30 000 000
(Escrow account) 3 000 000
Total contributions, including loans 42 405 400
Expenditures, up to 31 May 1993 39 815 000
for 1 June-31 December 1993 37 810 000
Total 77 625 000
Projected shortfall for 1993 operations 35 219 600
Note: The total shortfall is $50 million when the loans of $4.5 million from Japan and the United States and the contribution of $10 million from Germany are taken into account.
1. UNSCOM47, consisting of two sub-teams, one designated CBW3 and the other IAEA 16, conducted inspection activities during the period from 5 to 14 December 1992, mainly in the chemical and bacteriological weapons field. The last report to the Council under resolution 699 (1991) was prepared before the results of this inspection had been assessed. Seven potential chemical weapons-related sites were visited, including a pharmaceutical plant. Nothing related to Security Council resolution 687 (1991) was found at any of these sites.
2. The two sub-teams jointly conducted a search of the "PetroChemical-3" headquarters. On arrival at the site, an incident occurred: documents were observed being removed from the premises. Some documents were subsequently returned and verified to be unrelated to Security Council resolution 687 (1991). However, the team was unable to establish whether these were the same as those removed.
3. Three question-and-answer "seminars" were held with Iraqi counterparts, specifically on Iraq's "full, final and comprehensive report" on chemical weapons. Little information was obtained. Indeed, the Iraqi side made it clear that it would not answer any question it considered "trivial, unethical or outside the scope of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)".
4. UNSCOM55 conducted chemical inspection activities from 6 to 18 April 1993. A number of potentially chemical weapons-related sites were visited, including the Fallujah sites, formerly part of the Muthanna State Establishment.
5. On 15 April 1993, during the UNSCOM55 inspection, the Chief Inspector handed over to the Iraqi side a letter requiring the removal by 31 May 1993 of certain items of equipment used in the PCl3/POCl3 production plant at Fallujah to Muthanna for destruction there under Special Commission supervision. These items had been acquired by Iraq specifically for the production of these chemical weapons precursors and as part of Iraq's chemical weapons programme. Consequently, the Commission decided that they needed to be destroyed. Irreversible conversion was not an option and, in any case, Iraq continues not to accept monitoring of dual-purpose equipment under the terms of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved by the Council in its resolution 715 (1991) adopted unanimously under Chapter VII of the Charter. In such conditions, the Commission cannot guarantee the fate of any equipment redeployed by Iraq.
6. Iraq replied to this demand on 29 April 1993 saying that it wished to redeploy this equipment for use in insecticide production. On 14 May 1993, the Commission responded that it had taken into account Iraq's request for reuse of the equipment but that it stood by the earlier decision that, because the items were specifically acquired for the purpose of chemical weapons production, the equipment be removed and destroyed. Iraq responded to this letter on 27 May 1993, saying that the Commission had gone to extremes, adverse to Iraq, in interpreting its mandate, criticizing it, the Sanctions Committee and the Security Council respectively for their decisions relating to the destruction of equipment associated with weapons programmes, to Iraq's requests for imports and to the decisions to maintain sanctions. It accused the Commission and the Committee of following a policy of revenge against the Iraqi people and requested that the Commission change its decision. The Commission again responded on 4 June 1993, reminding Iraq of its obligations under the relevant resolutions and the Commission's rights and duties. It explained that the equipment in question could not be rendered harmless as it was intrinsically capable of being used for prohibited purposes and could quickly be reconverted for such. It gave Iraq until 10 June 1993 to complete the removal of the equipment and warned Iraq that failure to do so would result in the Commission reporting the matter to the Council. On 11 June 1993, Iraq responded that it "remained prepared to give the Special Commission, through bilateral technical consultations, practical guarantees to ensure peaceful use of this equipment in the long term". The Commission has informed Iraq that its decision on destruction is final. As of 14 June, some of the equipment had been removed to Muthanna, but much remained at Fallujah. No formal communication had been received from the Iraqi authorities as to their intentions regarding the remaining equipment. The matter was thus brought to the attention of the President of the Security Council and a formal report made to the Council on 16 June 1993 (S/25960).
7. UNSCOM47 also inspected three biological sites, including a visit to the Al Hakim Single Cell Production Facility. Nothing related to Security Council resolution 687 (1991) was found. However, some of the sites will have to be subjected to compliance monitoring.
8. Two question-and-answer "seminars" were held on biological weapons issues. As with the chemical issues, no useful information was obtained.
9. UNSCOM53/BW3 conducted inspection activities from 11 to 18 March 1993. Seven sites were inspected, including one that was undeclared and never previously visited by the Commission. The items inspected included research equipment, munitions and munition-filling equipment (which transpired to be conventional items). No evidence was found of activities related to Security Council resolution 687 (1991) but, as with most bacteriological weapons-related activities, many sites were found to have a dual-purpose capability. Consequently, the team made recommendations for compliance-monitoring activities.
10. UNSCOM50 was conducted from 12 to 21 February 1993. This inspection recorded serial numbers of specific machinery and details of raw materials (to assist in the determination of the Iraqi supplier network) and assessed the capabilities of certain establishments and facilities in Iraq, including the Nasser State Establishment, the Yawm Al Azim Facility and the TECO test stand at Zaafaraniyah. The team also supervised the destruction of the dies and molds at Taji used or intended for use in proscribed missile activities.
11. The mission of UNSCOM51 was to check specific information that items proscribed by Security Council resolution 687 (1991) were present in an area west of Baghdad. The items were reported to be related to ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and their associated vehicles. Three undeclared sites, suspected of concealing them, were thoroughly inspected: a large military ammunition production plant and two military units. The Commission designated each site for a short-notice inspection by UNSCOM51. The team conducted its activities on 22 February and mixed proven operational practices with a number of new operational modalities. The inspection team was established and dispatched to Iraq in very short order; it was augmented by the inspection personnel from UNSCOM50, already in Iraq. The designated sites were inspected immediately upon the arrival of the team in Iraq. Helicopter and high-altitude surveillance aircraft were fully integrated into the overall inspection programme. No proscribed items or activities were observed by any of the inspection elements.
12. However, during the inspection, a serious breach of the Commission's aerial surveillance rights occurred. A helicopter was initially prevented from establishing aerial surveillance over one site. Iraqi officials employed repeated and open threats of force to impede the helicopter's mission. On one occasion, this threat was aggravated by Iraqi personnel aiming and training their anti-aircraft guns on the helicopter. These actions on the part of Iraq put Commission personnel in real danger and constituted a gross violation of the Commission's rights and immunities. This serious incident was reported by the Executive Chairman to the Security Council on 24 February 1993. A full account, in the form of the note handed over to the President of the Council on that occasion, follows.
"1. On 22 February 1993, one of the Special Commission's helicopters was flown in support of an inspection of three sites by Special Commission ground inspection teams. This flight had been notified to and acknowledged by the Iraqi authorities under established modalities.
"2. The Special Commission had information that missiles and launchers proscribed by resolution 687 (1991) might be concealed at the sites concerned and the helicopter air surveillance was undertaken so as to ensure that nothing was removed from the sites during the course of the short-notice ground inspection.
"3. At 1320 hours, the crew of the Special Commission's helicopter, on approaching one of the sites, was informed by radio from the accompanying Iraqi helicopter escort that the Commission's helicopter would not be permitted to fly over the site and it was forced to circle 1 to 2 kilometres north-west of the site. The crew contacted the Commission's Chief Inspector on the ground and informed him of the refusal received from the Iraqi authorities. The crew were ordered by the Chief Inspector to proceed again in the direction of the site. As the crew carried out these instructions, they were informed by the Iraqi helicopter escort that, if the Commission's helicopter did not turn away from the site, it would be shot down. Visual observation from the helicopter confirmed that the anti-aircraft guns on the ground were being trained on and were tracking the helicopter. On receipt of this information, the Chief Inspector ordered the helicopter to withdraw to the other inspection sites.
"4. While circling the other inspection sites, the Iraqi authorities ordered the helicopter to return to its base at Rasheed and again threatened to shoot down the helicopter if it did not return to Rasheed. In the circumstances, the captain had no alternative but to proceed in the direction of Rasheed. While en route there a new communication was received from the Iraqi authorities that aerial inspection of the site could now take place. The helicopter proceeded to the site where the Iraqi authorities imposed new restrictions, permitting it to fly only over the western side of the area. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter had to return to Rasheed because of lack of fuel, landing there at 1512 hours.
"5. At Rasheed airbase, the Special Commission's Chief Aerial Inspector strongly protested to the local Iraqi officials the above events and indicated that one result had been that the aerial inspection had not been able to complete the tasks assigned to it. He indicated his intention to refuel and to return to the area to complete the assignment. The local Iraqi officials, after checking with higher authorities by telephone, interposed no objection, and the flight thus took place.
"6. In a subsequent interview between the Special Commission's Chief Inspector and General Amer Rashid, in response to the former's strong protest at the Iraqi threats to shoot down a Special Commission helicopter undertaking assigned aerial surveillance in support of a ground inspection under Security Council resolution 687 (1991), General Amer responded that the statements that the helicopter would be shot down were standard military practice."
13. Iraq's continued failure to acknowledge its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) is a major factor preventing the initiation of long-term monitoring by the Commission of Iraq's activities. Meanwhile, as has been ascertained in the course of recent Commission ballistic missile inspections, Iraq is actively pursuing missile-related activities that are covered by the long-term monitoring plan, to include the establishment of a dedicated missile research and design centre north-west of Baghdad.
14. This facility, known as the Ibn Al Haytham Missile Research and Design Centre, was established by Iraq on 4 April 1992 as the main centre for research and design activity in Iraq involving ballistic missiles not prohibited by resolution 687 (1991). This Centre is involved not only in the maintenance of existing permitted missile systems, but also in the design of new missile systems, including the Ababil 100 with a range close to 150 kilometres. The Centre employs many of the scientists and technicians who were involved in the proscribed ballistic missile programmes prior to the Gulf War and adoption of resolution 687 (1991).
15. In the absence of Iraq's acknowledgement of resolution 715 (1991), which delays long-term monitoring efforts across the whole spectrum of Iraqi missile-related activities, interim monitoring of the Ibn Al Haytham Centre was initiated by the Commission to track Iraqi ballistic missile programmes to ensure that no proscribed activity is taking place. The first interim monitoring team, IMT1a, was sent into Iraq on 25 January 1993, where it spent eight weeks investigating the work of the Ibn Al Haytham Centre. The focus of the IMT1a mission was in the area of liquid propulsion systems and related technologies.
16. Based upon the results of IMT1a, the Commission dispatched to Iraq a new team of interim monitors, IMT1b, to relieve IMT1a on 27 March 1993. The purpose of the team was mainly to investigate and assess Iraq's capabilities to produce solid propellant missile systems and to establish the relationships between the various facilities involved in such activities within the Military Industrialization Corporation. It conducted its activities over a 52-day period 27 March to 17 May 1993, centred around 2 facilities: the Al Rasheed Factory, comprising the 3 plants, and the Al Qa'qaa' Establishment. In addition, the team visited the Ibn Al Haytham Research Centre, the focus of the previous monitoring team's activities, and other sites related to missile research and development in and around Baghdad.
17. The main issues discussed with the Iraqi counterparts included details of Iraq's missile designs; Iraq's knowledge of solid propellant technology; Iraq's general capabilities in missile production, both of complete systems and of components; Iraq's ability to increase the range of existing systems; the current status of Iraq's production facilities; and its plans for missile research, development, testing and production.
18. The information obtained by the team has improved the Commission's understanding of Iraq's past weapons programmes and of its technology baseline. It should, furthermore, be of use as and when the Commission is able to commence ongoing monitoring and verification activities in accordance with the plan approved by the Security Council in its resolution 715 (1991).
19. A third interim monitoring team entered Iraq on 5 June 1993. The main focus of this team is Iraq's production capacity in the ballistic missiles area. A full assessment and inventory will be made of Iraq's high-precision machine tools. Accompanying the team was a smaller sub-team whose task was to install cameras to monitor rocket test stands at two sites. Iraq was informed of the Commission's intention to install these cameras on 6 June 1993 but, as noted in the main body of the report, Iraq has to date blocked their installation on the grounds that they comprise sensors for monitoring under resolution 715 (1991), a resolution which Iraq says it will not accept, despite its being adopted unanimously by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.
20. Each interim monitoring team has been initially accompanied by a specialist team from the Commission, to oversee the establishment of the modalities of inspection and conduct preparatory discussions with Iraqi officials concerning the implementation of the interim monitoring regime. Interim monitoring of Iraqi missile-related facilities will continue as long as the Commission deems necessary.
21. Under paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Iraq is required to place all its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of IAEA, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission. It has already proved possible to remove from Iraq all the fresh uranium fuel assemblies intended for use in the reactors at Tuwaitha.
22. However, the complex legal and practical problems involved in removing, reprocessing and permanently storing the resultant wastes from the irradiated fuel assemblies used in the reactors and now stored at Tuwaitha and Location B, have so far delayed the removal of this nuclear fuel.
23. In late 1992, IAEA again approached the nuclear-weapons-States with a request for proposals for removal of the irradiated fuel assemblies, reprocessing and permanent storage of the resultant wastes. On the basis of replies received, negotiations have been entered into with CIR Minatom of the Russian Federation for a contract that would cover all aspects of removal, reprocessing and permanent storage of the resultant wastes. The Special Commission, which will be required to finance the contract, has been actively participating in these negotiations.
24. From 19 to 24 April 1993, an IAEA survey mission, with the participation of representatives of the United Nations, the Special Commission, CIR Minatom and its principal subcontractor for operations in Iraq - the Nuclear Assurance Corporation of the United States - visited Iraq to survey the sites where the removal of the fuel will be undertaken and to arrive at understandings with the Government of Iraq on its provision of services, equipment and manpower for the preparation and removal from Iraq of the 208 irradiated fuel assemblies.
25. A contract was concluded in Vienna on 14 June 1993. IAEA, the United Nations and the Special Commission insisted that the fuel assemblies are to be dealt with in accordance with all requisite international and national safety requirements and that the contract be for a fixed price without the possibility of major cost overruns.
1. During the course of the first interim monitoring team's mission, several other discussions occurred that indicated a misconception, deliberate or otherwise, on the part of Iraq. The Iraqi counterparts questioned the right of the team to make an inventory of or to tag certain items of equipment at the sites monitored, requesting that specific criteria be established and used to decide which items might be so treated. The team did not accept this position. Iraq indicated that certain items were of no concern to the Special Commission, when clearly the decision as to what is of concern to it lies with the Commission. Furthermore, some of the items involved have the potential to be used for proscribed purposes. The counterparts also complained about the purpose of this team, stating that it was to control, not monitor, Iraq's activities.
B. Denial of, or restrictions on, access and delays
2. On four occasions, Iraq has sought to deny the Commission's basic aerial rights - once in relation to entry of transport aircraft into and out of Iraq (see S/25172) and thrice in relation to overflight of sites for aerial surveillance by helicopter. Except for the flight over the two sites on the outskirts of Baghdad (see S/24985), the Commission was eventually able to conduct the flights. However, as already reported to the Council, one of these flights had to be conducted with a restricted flight pattern, and not before Iraq had threatened to shoot the helicopter down if it did not leave the vicinity of the site.
3. Iraq has also hindered access for inspection teams, sometimes seeking, on spurious grounds, completely to deny access. One team was initially denied access because inspection would "breach the sanctity of universities and would upset the students". In each instance, the inspection eventually took place. In the period under review, a total of eight Commission inspection activities were seriously delayed, in one case by over four hours. One, the aerial surveillance on the outskirts of Baghdad, has been blocked.
4. Paragraphs 11 (f) and (h) of the six-monthly report of 17 December 1992 (S/24984) described at length the problems faced until that date by the Special Commission. Problems have continued since. In addition to the incidents referred to in paragraph 2 above, Iraq has created further difficulties in relation to the Commission's aerial rights.
5. In his letter of 5 August 1992, Mr. Al-Zahawi, Adviser in the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs, informed the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission that his request to use the Al-Rasheed airfield as the point of entry and departure for inspection teams was unworkable as the airfield was unserviceable. The Deputy Executive Chairman replied the next day, expressing the desire to use Al-Rasheed airfield as soon as it became operational. Recently, Sudanese Airways Boeing 707 aircraft have been observed using this airfield. However, inquiries by Commission personnel about the possibility of using it as the point of entry and exit have met with the response that such a decision would be political. No progress has been made on this issue.
6. Iraq has created problems in the operation of the aerial inspection team. It has sought: to establish "no-go" areas over which the team may not fly and which may not be included in the boxes designated the night before aerial inspections; to prevent the team taking photography and using binoculars while flying between designated sites and even over the designated site; to regulate the altitude at which the helicopters may fly over certain areas; and to demand 10 minutes' notice before an aerial inspection starts.
7. Each time the Commission's high-altitude U-2 surveillance aircraft flies, Iraq lodges a formal complaint about its activities. Iraq persists in calling the aircraft a United States spy plane and has recently described it as being used for "despicable criminal purposes", despite its United Nations registration and mandate. On 10 March 1993, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, Mr. Al-Sahaf, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General (S/25387), which alleged that the aircraft had been used to assist in the planning of an Israeli operation to assassinate President Saddam Hussein.
D. Limits on the duration, size and composition of
8. Iraq has sought to limit the duration of both monitoring and aerial surveillance activities, indicating, in relation to the former, that it should be of finite duration and, in relation to the latter, that aerial inspections should not last longer than 15 minutes.
9. Iraq has also sought to limit the size of inspection teams at certain sites it deems sensitive, such as universities, and to interfere in the composition of the team by, for example, seeking to exclude the Commission's own interpreters from a team. It has also sought to establish that those involved in the chemical destruction group at Al Muthanna are not permitted to take part in other inspection activities and to limit the turnover of Commission personnel in the helicopter support staff.
10. It is clear from the Status Agreement of May 1991 that the Commission has the right to decide the expertise it needs to conduct inspections and hence the right to choose the number and the types of experts it needs on each team and to inspect each site. Iraq is obliged to allow personnel named by the Commission access to conduct their tasks.
11. For aerial surveillance activities, Iraq has sought to establish that it should receive advance notice of the site to be surveyed. No-notice inspections are essential to the effectiveness of the Commission.
12. As noted in paragraphs 9 (b) and 15 of the main body of the report, Iraq has failed to provide adequate declarations either of its past proscribed programmes or of its dual-capability facilities, which would need to be incorporated into the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. The Commission has sought to supplement those declarations during each of its inspections. However, Iraq refuses to offer information willingly, or at all, in certain key areas, e.g. on its supplier networks or its previous use of chemical weapons. Consternation has also been expressed by Iraqi counterparts that the Commission continues to ask questions about Iraq's past programmes, despite the fact that these questions are asked because of Iraq's failure to fulfil its obligation to make full, final and complete disclosures on all aspects of its past programmes.
13. Furthermore, Iraq has been unable or unwilling to produce specific items of equipment that the Commission has evidence were supplied to Iraq. Teams continue to find equipment and documents containing information pertinent to their mandate under the resolutions and ongoing monitoring and verification plans.
14. Iraq has sought to limit the Commission's unrestricted right to photograph any item or activity it deems of relevance to its task. Iraq has delayed photography until "permission" has been obtained from more senior officials; it has sought to prevent photography over a designated site; and it has sought to limit aerial photography to items within a set perimeter and inspection team photography to items Iraq deems to be related to resolution 687 (1991). If this last rule were applied, it would open the possibility of Iraq deciding what was "687-related" and could be used by Iraq to exclude all dual-purpose facilities, items and activities covered by the plans approved under resolution 715 (1991).
15. The issue of security was dealt with at length in appendix II to document S/24984. Since that report and in addition to the threats to the Commission's aircraft referred to above, there have been continued incidents of vandalism of Commission vehicles, including the smashing of windscreens, windows and mirrors and the breaking of aerials. Four of these incidents occurred while the vehicles were being driven by Commission personnel. In one such incident, the drivers were medics and the vehicle bore Red Crescent markings. These ambulances have also come under attack whilst parked in hotel car parks.
16. Items continue to be taken from the offices and personal quarters of the Commission. Staff continue sporadically to receive threatening and harassing telephone calls in their hotel rooms in the middle of the night. On 8 June 1993, members of an inspection team had light bulbs thrown at them while they were walking to a restaurant in Baghdad.
1. The present report focuses on developments since the last report.
2. On 21 February 1993, activities started at Muhammadiyat, a chemical weapons storage site west of Baghdad. Most of the stable, filled munitions have been transported to Muthanna (99 250-gauge bombs, 21 500-gauge bombs and 9 DB0 bombs). Destruction on site of unfilled (52 DB0 bombs and 1,105 DB2 bombs) and unstable filled (81 250-gauge bombs and 6 500-gauge bombs) munitions has started. Remaining at Muhammadiyat are 5,127 250-gauge and 1,094 500-gauge bombs (unfilled) and 20 mustard-agent-filled 250-gauge bombs.
3. The incinerator operates at temperatures in excess of 1,100o C and so meets the specifications set by the Destruction Advisory Panel for the destruction of mustard agent and precursors. During the third week of March 1993, a combustion efficiency monitoring system was installed to monitor performance by continuously measuring concentrations of the combustion gases.
4. Mustard agent is destroyed either by direct injection into the furnace or in a toluene/benzene/diesel mix. Some of the mustard agent has polymerized, complicating the process of extraction and destruction.
5. The neutralization of nerve agents by hydrolysis continued. In early February 1993, hydrolysis of the bulk stocks of the nerve agent sarin was completed, followed shortly after by the completion of the explosive incineration of 122mm sarin-filled rockets on 14 February 1993. On 23 April the destruction of the remaining sarin from the Al Hussein warheads was completed. On 15 February 1993, operation of the hydrolysis plant turned to destruction of the tabun precursor D4.
6. During the period covered by the present report, destruction of the following munitions was completed: 122mm rocket motors and components, R400 aerial bombs and tail fin assemblies, unfilled 250-gauge bombs (by cutting) and unfilled DB2 bombs (by crushing). Drainage of 250- and 500-gauge aerial bombs continued and a technique of venting the 155mm mustard-filled projectiles was developed and adopted as the key initial step in the method for their destruction.
265 122mm rockets and warheads
6,152 122mm rocket warheads
873 122mm rocket motors
16,885 122mm rocket propellant grains
1,977 122mm rocket motor tubes
1,492 155mm mustard projectiles
21 empty 155mm projectiles
29 Al Hussein warheads for GB/GF
347 R400 bombs
333 R400 tail fin assemblies
1,473 partially filled and polymerized 250- and 500-gauge aerial mustard
120 litres of GB nerve agent
61,273 litres of GB/GF nerve agent
69,328 kg mustard agent
73,005 litres of D4
14,600 litres of DF
1,120 litres dichlorethane
107,148 litres isopropyl alcohol
28,730 litres thio-diethyleneglycol
1,200 litres cyclohexanol/isopropyl alcohol
297,400 litres phosphorous oxychloride
134,200 litres thionyl chloride
415,000 litres phosphorous trichloride
32 2-ton bulk storage containers
1. During the period under review, the Information Assessment Unit has been strengthened and the Commission has been able to make good use of its improved capabilities.
2. The Unit is mandated to carry out the collection and management of information and to assess available data, in order to create a strong foundation for the Special Commission's implementation of the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council.
3. With regard to information collection, the Unit is, inter alia, identifying information gaps and preparing proposals for how they might be filled using the Commission's collection capabilities. These capabilities include the high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft (U-2), which is currently carrying out up to three surveillance missions per week over Iraq. U-2 imagery is the property of the Commission. It is processed for the use of the Commission (and IAEA) with the help of the United States Government. The Unit is responsible for the tasking of the U-2, coordinating its operations and, with the support of United States specialists, the assessment and interpretation of the imagery.
4. The Unit is furthermore responsible for the aerial inspection activities using the Commission's helicopters in Baghdad as a platform. Thus the Unit identifies targets for aerial inspections carried out by the aerial inspection team permanently based in Baghdad. The aerial inspections utilize first and foremost photography, but other means are also in planning. The imagery resulting from these surveys is analysed by the Unit's photographic interpreters. The imagery, as well as other data acquired through the aerial surveillance activities, are made available for operational planning purposes.
5. The Unit also maintains contacts with relevant agencies within the supporting Governments and requests and obtains from them information of relevance for the work of the Commission.
6. The management of the large amount of data made available to the Commission is a growing responsibility for the Unit. The sources for the data to be dealt with by the Unit are, in addition to Iraq's own declarations, the inspection reports, the aerial surveillance products and the information from Governments.
7. The Unit has spent considerable time in developing ways and means for effective and dynamic management of the wealth of data collected by it. An information management evaluator has been assisting the Commission in developing a data management system corresponding to the needs of the Information Assessment Unit. Inside the Unit, a fully functional data management system is now in place. Some more equipment has to be purchased and recruitment of further operating personnel is under way.
8. The assessment or analytical work on available data carried out in the Unit constitutes, in many respects, the heart of the Commission's activities. This work sets the agenda for the operations side and provides the Executive Chairman with the substance and the technical foundation for reports to the Security Council, for the political evaluation of the extent of Iraq's implementation of its obligations under the cease-fire arrangements and for assessments of the magnitude of the remaining tasks. The significance and importance of the analytical work will only grow with the gradual introduction of monitoring and verification in the activities of the Commission.
9. It is the ambition to keep the Unit, on a continuous basis, staffed with analysts knowledgeable in all the relevant weapons and production categories. However, as there are both practical reasons and reasons of principle for expanding their experience in the field, analysts will regularly participate in inspection teams.
10. As of 15 June 1993, 236 targets had been subjected to helicopter surveillance, and 141 U-2 missions had been flown.
11. As additional staff has become available to the Unit, particularly additional photographic interpreters, the Unit has been increasingly able to provide specific taskings for U-2 missions. Prior to this, the U-2 operated primarily on the basis of a general priority list, rather than specific taskings to photograph specific sites.
12. Over the past several months, the focus of the helicopter photographic surveillance programme has been on sites which, at least potentially, are to be subjected to long-term monitoring. Some 60 monitoring missions have been completed. The first such mission at a given site is intended to produce comprehensive photographic coverage of it; subsequent missions would normally involve photography only of changes at the site evident from visual observation.
13. Helicopter surveillance missions continue to be executed in conjunction with ground inspections; typically, the aerial inspection team on board the helicopter is used to "secure" a site subjected to a surprise inspection. In this context, to "secure" a site is to maintain surveillance so as to spot any attempt by Iraqi authorities to remove proscribed items prior to the site being sealed off by the ground inspection team. Subsequently, the aerial inspection team can conduct a normal photographic mission of the site.
14. During UNSCOM51, for example, both the heliborne aerial inspection team and the U-2 were used for surveillance of the sites being inspected by the ground teams.
15 May-21 May 1991 IAEA1/UNSCOM 1
22 Jun-3 Jul 1991 IAEA2/UNSCOM 4
7 Jul-18 Jul 1991 IAEA3/UNSCOM 5
27 Jul-10 Aug 1991 IAEA4/UNSCOM 6
14 Sep-20 Sep 1991 IAEA5/UNSCOM 14
21 Sep-30 Sep 1991 IAEA6/UNSCOM 16
11 Oct-22 Oct 1991 IAEA7/UNSCOM 19
11 Nov-18 Nov 1991 IAEA8/UNSCOM 22
11 Jan-14 Jan 1992 IAEA9/UNSCOM 25
5 Feb-13 Feb 1992 IAEA10/UNSCOM 27
5 Feb-13 Feb 1992 IAEA10/UNSCOM 30
7 Apr-15 Apr 1992 IAEA11/UNSCOM 33
26 May-4 Jun 1992 IAEA12/UNSCOM 37
14 Jul-21 Jul 1992 IAEA13/UNSCOM 41
31 Aug-7 Sep 1992 IAEA14/UNSCOM 43
8 Nov-19 Nov 1992 IAEA15/UNSCOM 46
5 Dec-14 Dec 1992 IAEA16/UNSCOM 47
22 Jan-27 Jan 1993 IAEA17/UNSCOM 49
3 Mar-11 Mar 1993 IAEA18/UNSCOM 52
30 Apr-7 May 1993 IAEA19/UNSCOM 56
9 Jun-15 Jun 1991 CW1/UNSCOM 2
15 Aug-22 Aug 1991 CW2/UNSCOM 9
31 Aug-8 Sep 1991 CW3/UNSCOM 11
31 Aug-5 Sep 1991 CW4/UNSCOM 12
6 Oct-9 Nov 1991 CW5/UNSCOM 17
22 Oct-2 Nov 1991 CW6/UNSCOM 20
27 Jan-5 Feb 1992 CW7/UNSCOM 26
15 Apr-29 Apr 1992 CW8/UNSCOM 35
21 Sep-29 Sep 1992 CW9/UNSCOM 44
6 Apr-18 Apr 1993 CW10/UNSCOM 55
18 Nov-1 Dec 1991 CBW1/UNSCOM 21
26 Jun-10 Jul 1992 CBW2/UNSCOM 39
6 Dec-14 Dec 1992 CBW3/UNSCOM 47
21 Feb-24 Mar 1992 CD1/UNSCOM 29
5 Apr-13 Apr 1992 CD2/UNSCOM 32
18 Jun 1992- CDG/UNSCOM 38
2 Aug-8 Aug 1991 BW1/UNSCOM 7
20 Sep-3 Oct 1991 BW2/UNSCOM 15
11 Mar-18 Mar 1993 BW3/UNSCOM 53
30 Jun-7 Jul 1991 BM1/UNSCOM 3
18 Jul-20 Jul 1991 BM2/UNSCOM 10
8 Aug-15 Aug 1991 BM3/UNSCOM 8
6 Sep-13 Sep 1991 BM4/UNSCOM 13
1 Oct-9 Oct 1991 BM5/UNSCOM 18
1 Dec-9 Dec 1991 BM6/UNSCOM 23
9 Dec-17 Dec 1991 BM7/UNSCOM 24
21 Feb-29 Feb 1992 BM8/UNSCOM 28
21 Mar-29 Mar 1992 BM9/UNSCOM 31
13 Apr-21 Apr 1992 BM10/UNSCOM 34
14 May-22 May 1992 BM11/UNSCOM 36
11 Jul-29 Jul 1992 BM12/UNSCOM 40 A+B
7 Aug-18 Aug 1992 BM13/UNSCOM 42
16 Oct-30 Oct 1992 BM14/UNSCOM 45
25 Jan-23 Mar 1993 IMT1a/UNSCOM 48
12 Feb-21 Feb 1993 BM15/UNSCOM 50
22 Feb-23 Feb 1993 BM16/UNSCOM 51
27 Mar-17 May 1993 IMT1b/UNSCOM 54
5 Jun 1993- IMT1c/UNSCOM 57
30 Jun-3 Jul 1991
11 Aug-14 Aug 1991
4 Oct-6 Oct 1991
11 Nov-15 Nov 1991
27 Jan-30 Jan 1992
21 Feb-24 Feb 1992
17 Jul-19 Jul 1992
28 Jul-29 Jul 1992
6 Sep-12 Sep 1992
4 Nov-9 Nov 1992
13 Mar-22 Mar 1993
19 Apr-24 Apr 1993